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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Health

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, April 7, 2003

1535

The Chair (Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.))

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. José Cadorette (Procedural Clerk)

The Chair

Mr. José Cadorette

The Chair

Mr. José Cadorette

The Chair

Mr. José Cadorette

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Ms. Yolande Thibeault (Saint-Lambert, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

1540

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Donald F. Warden (Fire Chief and Chairman, Government Relations Committee, Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs)

1545

The Chair

Mr. Donald McCarty (Vice-President, Law, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited)

1550

1555

The Chair

Mr. Douglas Lennox (Lawyer, Klein Lyons, Barristers & Solicitors)

1600

The Chair

1605

Mr. François Damphousse (Director, Quebec Office, and Representative, Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, Non-Smokers' Rights Association)

1610

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

1615

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Donald F. Warden

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Donald F. Warden

Mr. James Lunney

1620

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Donald McCarty

The Chair

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Douglas Lennox

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Donald McCarty

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

1625

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. François Damphousse

1630

The Chair

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East)

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. John McKay

1635

The Chair

Mr. Donald McCarty

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. François Damphousse

1640

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Douglas Lennox

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Donald McCarty

The Chair

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay (Madawaska—Restigouche, Lib.)

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis (Director, Product Development, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited)

1645

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. Gaetan Duplessis

1650

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

M. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis

Mr. Réal Ménard

1655

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

The Chair

Ms. Carolyn Bennett (St. Paul's, Lib.)

Mr. James Lunney

Ms. Carolyn Bennett

Mr. Donald McCarty

Ms. Carolyn Bennett

Mr. Donald McCarty

Ms. Carolyn Bennett

1700

Mr. Donald McCarty

Ms. Carolyn Bennett

Mr. Donald McCarty

The Chair

Dr. Stewart Massey (Director, Scientific Affairs, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited)

The Chair

Ms. Yolande Thibeault

Mr. Donald McCarty

1705

Ms. Yolande Thibeault

Mr. Donald McCarty

Ms. Yolande Thibeault

Mr. Donald McCarty

Ms. Yolande Thibeault

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Donald McCarty

Ms. Yolande Thibeault

The Chair

Dr. Stewart Massey

1710

The Chair

Dr. Stewart Massey

The Chair

Dr. Stewart Massey

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Donald McCarty

Dr. Stewart Massey

Mr. James Lunney

Dr. Stewart Massey

1715

Mr. James Lunney

Dr. Stewart Massey

Mr. James Lunney

Dr. Stewart Massey

Mr. James Lunney

Dr. Stewart Massey

Mr. James Lunney

Dr. Stewart Massey

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. John McKay

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. John McKay

Mr. François Damphousse

1720

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Douglas Lennox

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Douglas Lennox

Mr. John McKay

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Donald McCarty

Mr. François Damphousse

1725

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. François Damphousse

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Health

NUMBER 029

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Monday, April 7, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.)): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It's my pleasure to welcome you to this meeting of the Standing Committee on Health, during which we will examine Bill C-260, an act to amend the Hazardous Products Acts (fire-safe cigarettes).

It's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses and ask them to come forward to the table.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): On a point of order, Madam Chair.

[English]

The Chair: Before we have the meeting?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Ménard would like to raise a point of order.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I'll be brief, because I don't want to take up too much time.

Madam Chair, you were planning on calling a meeting of the committee tomorrow morning and I imagine it is to discuss the draft report on HIV. I was wondering wether we could do that on Wednesday, since it is a short report. Couldn't we just have one meeting, since tomorrow morning, some of us have to be at other committees? If we have a meeting tomorrow, it might be tricky, since there always seems to be someone missing. Since we have already more or less decided on future business and have a work plan, and since it is a short report and, as far as I understand, the witnesses on the insulin issue are not available, could we cancel tomorrow's meeting and have one on Wednesday only?

It's up to you. If you don't think that's possible, I'll abide by your decision.

[English]

The Chair: What's Wednesday?

Mr. José Cadorette (Procedural Clerk): It's the business meeting, the discussions on--

The Chair: I thought that was tomorrow morning.

Mr. José Cadorette: No, that would be Wednesday. Tomorrow morning would only be the--

The Chair: The draft report?

Mr. José Cadorette: Yes.

The Chair: We couldn't do it all in one meeting?

Mr. José Cadorette: It could be done.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard, do you have another meeting at 9 tomorrow morning?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Basically, yes, but I don't understand why we don't have just one meeting for all of that on Wednesday, especially since we were here last Monday. Why don't we just have one meeting on future business and study the four-page report? We won't need three hours to study the report. Why add an extra meeting for something which could be done within a single meeting?

[English]

The Chair: Do people agree with that?

Madame Thibeault.

[Translation]

Ms. Yolande Thibeault (Saint-Lambert, Lib.): Madam Chair, I have to be at the Standing Committee on Official Languages tomorrow morning at 9 a.m., as does Mr. Castonguay. So it would be a problem for us.

[English]

The Chair: Okay.

I am willing to accede to Mr. Ménard's request, provided I can get agreement, at least from those present, that at the meeting on Wednesday, if we don't finish what we've laid out, we stay a little bit later in order to get the work done. I had divided the work into one piece for Tuesday morning and two or three other little items for Wednesday afternoon. I agree with you, Mr. Ménard. I think we should be able to do it, but when we leave here on Wednesday, I want to know all that business is taken care of, because we have to give our researchers some guidance, so they can come back with that report.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Sure, that's fine.

[English]

The Chair: Is that agreed, everyone?

¹ (1540)

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, Canadian Alliance): There's a little problem on my side with going later, because private members' business on Wednesday is something I need to address, and perhaps Carol would on our side as well.

The Chair: I think the voting part of it would be in the early part of the meeting. I think we'll save whatever is just discussion until later. Do I see agreement?

Seeing that, we will cancel tomorrow morning's meeting, and we'll have the whole of tomorrow and Wednesday on Wednesday, but we may have to go a little bit later on Wednesday. Thank you very much.

We'll begin our testimony today with Donald F. Warden, who is the chairman of the government relations committee of the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs.

Mr. Donald F. Warden (Fire Chief and Chairman, Government Relations Committee, Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs): Thank you, Madam Chair.

While I'm the Fire Chief of Wasaga Beach, Ontario, I'm appearing before you today in my capacity as the chair of the government relations committee of the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs. I'm also the immediate past president of that organization.

CAFC is a national association composed of almost 1,000 fire chiefs and other fire officers. Our members are responsible for the protection of life and property in communities of all sizes in all ten provinces and three territories. On their behalf, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.

At our 2000 annual conference our members passed a resolution that urged the Government of Canada to limit the propensity of cigarettes to stay lit when left unattended or discarded. Firefighting is one of the most dangerous professions in Canada. Firefighters are regularly required to risk injury or death to save lives and property in circumstances created by carelessness with respect to unattended or discarded cigarettes that have not been properly extinguished. We see low ignition propensity cigarettes as an important step in reducing the perils of fire for the general public and firefighters alike.

Writing to Health Canada in support of the CAFC's position on reduced ignition propensity cigarettes, recently retired Toronto Fire Chief Alan Speed spoke eloquently about these dangers and their consequences on behalf of the fire service:

...we have a moral and ethical mandate to support the reduction of the ignition propensity of cigarettes. The unequivocal evidence cannot be denied--fires caused by cigarettes account for the highest number of fire-related deaths in Canada and more property damage than fires ignited by other sources. The unimaginable pain and anguish for individuals caused by fires ignited by cigarettes cannot be fully comprehended unless you are one of those victims scarred by fire forever or living with the tragic loss of a loved one.

By introducing Bill C-260, member of Parliament John McKay has demonstrated that he fully understands the fire danger posed by lighted cigarettes, and for that reason, he deserves the thanks of the fire services across Canada. By forwarding the bill to the standing committee for more detailed study, Parliament itself has signalled its interest in the need to curtail the dangers posed by lighted cigarettes that are left unattended or discarded.

Whether or not reduced ignition propensity cigarettes are important is a question that has already been positively answered. The only question that should remain, therefore, is how best this objective can be achieved. Mr. McKay's bill proposes to amend the Hazardous Products Act by adding to the list of prohibited products cigarettes that do not meet the flammability standards to be set in regulation.

The fire dangers of lighted cigarettes are already well documented and serious. I have furnished copies in both English and French of an article that appeared in the summer 2002 issue of the Canadian Fire Chief, which is the official publication of CAFC and is delivered to every fire hall in Canada. That article provides the documentation to which I have just referred. The need to move quickly to reduce these fire dangers is high, in the view of the CAFS. It is for that reason we do not support Bill C-260, regardless of its worthy intent. Rather, we endorse the work that has already been undertaken by Health Canada to prepare regulations under the Tobacco Act to require all cigarettes sold in Canada to have a reduced ignition propensity. Health Canada has also proposed a 75% pass-fail rate as a target for all cigarettes sold in Canada, and the National Research Council is actively engaged in the testing process.

Health Canada's consultation paper entitled “Regulatory Proposal for Reducing Fire Risks from Cigarettes” was widely circulated in the fire service. It obtained the full support of both the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs and the Council of Canadian Fire Marshals and Fire Commissioners. In addition, a large number of fire chiefs wrote their own letters to Health Canada stating their strong support for the regulatory approach and the proposed testing procedures.

It is the view of the CAFC that a great deal of the advance work for regulations requiring reduced propensity ignition cigarettes has already been undertaken or is currently under way. To retreat from this initiative in favour of amending the Hazardous Products Act, then having to develop flammability standards, would be unnecessarily time-consuming. In some cases delay is probably not all that important, but delay in ensuring that only reduced propensity cigarettes are offered at retail in Canada will lead directly to property loss, as well as to the injury and death of both members of the Canadian public and fire fighters. Delay with those consequences should not be permitted by the standing committee.

¹ (1545)

We urge that Bill C-260 not be endorsed by the standing committee, so that the well-advanced and broadly supported objective of regulations under the Tobacco Act can proceed to fruition as quickly as possible.

Thank you for your attention to the concerns of the Canadian fire services. I look forward to discussing them with you this afternoon.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Warden.

Our second witness is from Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, Donald McCarty, vice-president, law.

Mr. Donald McCarty (Vice-President, Law, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'm accompanied today by Mr. Gaétan DuPlessis and Dr. Stewart Massey, who are here to answer any questions of a scientific or technical nature you may have later on.

[Translation]

I just want to mention a brief technical issue. Two documents are appended to my brief : one is from the State of New York and the other from New Zealand. Both are in the process of being translated into French and I hope to distribute them to committee members within the next few days.

[English]

Before I start my presentation, notwithstanding what you may have heard about tobacco companies in the course of the previous meeting or what may perhaps be said by some of my friends later on in this presentation, I ask that you approach my presentation and our point of view on this issue with an open mind.

[Translation]

Today we want to outline why we prefer the Health Canada approach to that of this bill, why we believe that there is a more effective and appropriate way forward, and how we believe that Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. can play a key role in the area of low-ignition propensity products.

[English]

I'd like to talk a little about the State of New York. Where is the State of New York now? There has been a lot of information going back and forth. The latest is very simple: they are now extending the period for submissions to their committee until April 15 of this year. In December 2002, however, the New York Office of Fire Prevention and Control issued a regulatory impact statement in which it said, among other things, compliance with a cigarette fire safety standard will require the development of new technologies that have not yet been developed. They have not determined either if cigarettes that comply with a fire safety standard will be acceptable to consumers. They have not identified the extent to which a cigarette safety standard would actually reduce fires in a real world scenario. They have done no toxicology or risk assessment analyses of potential smoking and health effects of a fire safety standard. Even though the banded paper cigarettes, of which I'll speak more later, were described by the document as having been specifically designed to reduce ignition propensity, six out of eight of those cigarettes tested by the State of New York failed to meet the standard they themselves had set.

The country of New Zealand has also recently made a proposition not unlike this bill. The report of the committee that studied that bill is annex B of our submission. Briefly put, they decided to postpone the bill and proceed with other methods.

[Translation]

In previous submissions to the committee, much was made of banded-paper technology and specifically of Merit PaperSelect cigarettes. Samples of this product will be made available to the committee.

However, if you'll allow it, I would like to distribute to committee members copies of the labels featured on the outside of cigarette packages sold in the state of New York. The labels indicate that, in the opinion of the manufacturer of this product, the cigarettes should not be treated any differently from other cigarettes available on the market and that they are not any safer than other cigarettes.

¹ (1550)

[English]

We have also become aware of allegations made by the United States government, through the Department of Justice, in the case of the United States v. Philip Morris Incorporated, that a cigarette made with banded paper technology “actually represents a disproportionate threat of burns and fires”. We are in the process of determining how to evaluate these allegations--you understand, perhaps, that tobacco companies do not necessarily endorse everything the Department of Justice in the United States might say automatically. Inasmuch as the committee has been led to believe that this technology exists and is the be-all and end-all of low ignition propensity cigarettes, an evaluation of these allegations appears to us essential to consideration of this bill, and indeed of the proposed regulations from Health Canada.

[Translation]

As we said in our first submission, any technology imposed by this bill must be acceptable to consumers. Any regulations or legislation imposing technology unacceptable to consumers will be circumvented by the phenomenon of contraband.

Mr. McKay scoffed at this possibility in his presentation at your last meeting by saying that, in any event, cigarettes that are smuggled into Canada are simply produced here and smuggled back in.

Today, many foreign cigarettes are available on the Canadian black market. If you don't want to smoke Canadian cigarettes and if you don't want to pay $80 a carton in British Columbia or $75 a carton in Alberta, all you have to do is go on line. For the modest sum of $15, you can easily by 10 packs of cigarettes which will be sent to you from abroad, and which will not feature Health Canada's warnings and on which the excise tax and the GST will not have been paid.

Contraband cigarettes in Canada come from Columbia, Uruguay, China. In fact, I could show you 15 other cigarette packs coming from various countries. We estimate that about 6% of cigarettes on the Canadian market are contraband. More and more Canadians are smoking contraband cigarettes. If low-ignition propensity technology, especially if its value is still in doubt, is imposed on the market without checking first whether consumers will accept it, smuggling will increase. This situation will work to the advantage of foreign entities, which are often illegal, and to the detriment of farmers, suppliers, manufacturers, workers, governments, distributors and especially Canadian consumers. It will also render the cigarette excise tax useless and will probably drive down the price of cigarettes, thus making them more accessible to young people, which is precisely the opposite of what the industry and Health Canada have done to discourage young people from taking up the habit.

[English]

In his submission to the committee last time Mr. McKay indicated that production of a self-extinguishing cigarette is not rocket science. Several design parameters were cited as allegedly resulting in a self-extinguishing cigarette. These were reduction in the circumference of the cigarette, reduction in the density of the tobacco in the rod, reduction in the porosity of the paper, elimination of the use of citrate in the paper as a burn additive, and reduction in the length.

Reduced circumference cigarettes are available in Canada presently. They are sold by Imperial Tobacco and by others. Our brands only account for 3% of the market. However, the big thing about a reduced circumference cigarette is a much greater tendency to become lodged in a crevice or a fold of furniture or bedding.

With respect to density, our cigarettes have a packing density well within the range of the samples studied by the TSG in New York. In our experience, density reductions below what is presently the case in Canada will result in a significant increase of coal fallout, which is in itself a potential fire hazard.

Cigarette paper porosity is something that will result in an increase of toxic emissions to the smoker, and it must obviously be looked at with great care.

[Translation]

The Health Canada consultation paper concludes that the use and level of additives is not statistically supportable as a significant or reliable method of decreasing the fire hazard of cigarettes.

Thus, the application of the design parameters referenced by Mr. McKay are either already in place or are not appropriate for reducing the ignition potential of Canadian cigarettes. Furthermore, the simplistic application of these design parameters will not result in Canadian cigarettes meeting the testing standards proposed by the state of New York.

¹ (1555)

[English]

There's a very important issue I'd now like to raise now before the committee. The United States Institute of Medicine has identified the advantages and possibility of producing a potentially reduced exposure product. This is consistent with Health Canada's product modification strategy to achieve harm reduction in Canadian cigarettes. Imperial Tobacco is actively progressing in its own research in this area and has shared the results of this research with scientists and officials at Health Canada on a regular basis over the last two years. Our last meeting was no more than a couple of weeks ago. The production of the low ignition propensity cigarette to comply with the types of standards proposed in New York will require the development and application of new and unproven technology. Such new technology may well be in conflict with and limiting to the design features required for a product modification or harm reduction product envisioned by Imperial Tobacco and, hopefully, supported by Health Canada and this committee.

[Translation]

We understand the seriousness of this issue and we do not come easily or lightly to our position on this bill, whose intention we share along with every single party presenting on this matter—to reduce the number of fires started by cigarettes.

Certainly we would support any measures that move this issue forward. These include a warning to be included in the current rotation of 16 health warnings on packages, consumer education, and enforcement of bedding and upholstery standards.

We do endorse and support the prudent scientific approach proposed by Health Canada and we are willing to help the department. But there remain a number of serious questions to be answered before imposing such technology. These need to be studied and answered.

[English]

We cannot endorse a proposed law that blissfully assumes that a simple standard can be set within six months for lower ignition propensity cigarettes, without taking into account the lack of any agreed testing method for these cigarettes, the application of any of these changes to fire safety in real world scenarios, the serious and overwhelming health considerations to smokers of any forced product design changes, the setbacks these design changes could impose on efforts now under way to develop a potentially reduced exposure product, the possibility of smokers being less careful with the disposal of cigarettes, the prevalence of roll-your-own and fine-cut tobacco in many areas of Canada, particularly the Maritime provinces, the fact that the banded paper that is proposed as a solution could in fact dramatically increase the risk of fire, and the potential dramatic increase in contraband that could result from a hasty imposition of this technology, with its concomitant catastrophic effects on the Canadian industry, without fire safety having been improved a whit.

We will and should be part of any solution going forward. We're prepared to put resources behind the initiative being driven by Health Canada. Indeed, the technical committee of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council has approached Health Canada with a view to moving these issues forward, and a meeting is set for next week.

We appreciate the opportunity to be part of this dialogue, and I thank the members of the committee for hearing our views on the subject this afternoon.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McCarty.

Next we will have Mr. Douglas Lennox, who is a lawyer with Klein Lyons, Barristers & Solicitors.

Mr. Lennox.

Mr. Douglas Lennox (Lawyer, Klein Lyons, Barristers & Solicitors): Thank you, Madam Chair, honourable members of the committee.

I'd like to commend the committee for its work on this important public safety issue and Mr. John McKay for his work in promoting his private member's bill. I come here as a lawyer with an interest in product liability law. This is the type of law that asks how we can make products safer, how we can reduce harm to consumers. It was my interest in this area of law that drew me to the issue of tobacco products, which cause so many deaths among Canadians every year. It was my interest in this area that drew me to the case of the Ragoonanan and Baboolal families, who lost three children in a fire on January 18, 1998, in their Brampton townhouse. There were not only three children killed, but two brave firefighters of the Brampton fire department raced into the burning townhouse to try to save the children, who were trapped on the third floor, only to have the second floor collapse in on them, suffering serious injury. So anything I can do to help Canada's firefighters, I pursue, and that is really the inspiration for my interest in this case.

The thing about lawsuits is that at best, all they can do is send a signal to the public and to government that there's a problem--please look at this. Whether it's cases involving contaminated blood, polluted water, or what have you, that's all a lawsuit can do. It's up to Parliament, as the ultimate protector of the public interest, to then look at what kind of regulation or what kind of reform is needed. That's why this committee is so important to this issue and to any issue of public safety.

When I talk about defective products, I like to deal with demonstrative evidence, something we can see and touch and feel, so I brought with me some cigarettes. I have a friend who's handing them out to you now. This is the Merit brand we're all talking about. You can have a look at it yourself. There isn't much to distinguish this brand from any other brand of cigarette you've seen. There's a little stamp here at the front that says “Paper Select”, which is Philip Morris' trademark on this paper they've patented that we say encourages these cigarettes to go out. When you open up the cigarette package and look at the cigarettes, they look like just about any other cigarette you've ever seen, but if you look very closely, there are these tiny bands of paper. It's hard to even notice them, and we would say the average consumer probably will not notice them, probably won't even know they're there. So as far as the consumers are concerned, this doesn't look different from the cigarettes people already smoke, but what this banded paper does, as the New York state legislature and its firefighters have shown by testing, is encourage the cigarette to go out when it's not actively puffed.

As Mr. McKay says, you don't have to be a rocket scientist. You could go back to your office or wherever, take a couple of these cigarettes out of the package, put them in an ashtray, light them, and conduct your own little science experiment. You're going see that these cigarettes tend to go out. It's really just a question of common sense. If the cigarette has gone out, it can't cause a fire.

Nobody's saying this technology's perfect. No safety technology ever is. Seat belts don't work all the time. This is the reality when we try to regulate to reduce harm. Nobody's saying it's perfect, but with this brand here, New York found in their tests that it went out 92% of the time. That's pretty good. I submit that this is something Health Canada is rightly looking at as a way to protect the safety of Canadians.

º (1600)

There's no doubt that this is going to cost the tobacco companies some money. They'll have to rejig their cigarette-making machines probably, they'll have to order this new paper. They're going to have to pay a licensing fee to Philip Morris. They don't have the patent. Philip Morris patented this in 1991. They filed the patent up here in Canada in 1992. So there is an increase in the marginal production costs, no doubt, of this product, but when you balance out that production cost--and I don't know what it will be, maybe it will be a couple of pennies a pack or whatever--against the costs to the society Parliament has to protect--the fire marshals' report of 356 deaths over a five-year period, 1600 injuries, $200 million in property damage--this technology and this sort of regulation make sense.

Subject to any questions the members have, those are my submissions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lennox.

Our next witness is Mr. François Damphousse, who is the director of the Quebec office of Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, and he is also representing a series of other associations: the Canadian Dental Association, the Non-Smokers' Rights Association, the Canadian Lung Association, the Quebec Coalition for Tobacco Control, the Quebec Council on Tobacco and Health, the Ontario Campaign for Action on Tobacco, and the Quebec Tobacco Research Unit.

You have the floor.

º (1605)

[Translation]

Mr. François Damphousse (Director, Quebec Office, and Representative, Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, Non-Smokers' Rights Association): Thank you very much, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

I would ask you, from the outset, to please not fall into the trap set by the tobacco industry. As usual, the industry is seeking to raise doubts in your mind in order to prevent you from acting. The industry has done this in the past and is attempting to do so once again today.

With respect to the manufacturing of fire-safe cigarettes, as you know full well, research has been done in the United States by the Technical Study Group and the Technical Advisory Group. Their conclusions were unequivocal : it is technically and commercially possible to develop fire-safe cigarettes. In fact, there are already some on the market. The characteristics of fire-safe cigarettes are well known, and our colleague mentioned them earlier : a reduction of circumference, tobacco density and paper porosity and a reduction in the use of additives such as citrate on paper, etc.

We also know that there are cigarettes on the market that already have some of these characteristics. The TSG and TAG have shown that these cigarettes are neither less nor more toxic than regular cigarettes. Even the Philip Morris company, which examined the toxicity and harmfullness of its Merit cigarettes, found no difference between those and other cigarettes on the market. I will table the study here today.

Moreover, the two tests devised by the Technical Advisory Group in order to establish standards for reducing the ignition propensity of cigarettes were validated by a number of independent laboratories. Of course, the tobacco industry representatives expressed their opposition stating that the tests did not necessarily reflect what happens in the real world. For example, the use of certain fabrics in these tests could completely reverse the results. These statements were rejected out of hand by the Technical Advisory Group and the Technical Study Group. A new study published by NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, was intended to determine whether or not, in the case of one of the fabrics identified by the industry, there had been a reversal of results, that is, if safer cigarettes were more prone to ignition. That did not work; they did not demonstrate a reversal of the results. In that study, the Merit cigarette was used to determine whether or not it was safer and that was indeed accomplished. I would also like to table that study with the committee.

I had an opportunity to speak with one of the experts from the Technical Advisory Group, Andrew McGuire, who is in San Francisco, and I asked him for his opinion on the tobacco industry's statements. He felt that these were simply tactics to complicate and unduly delay the process.

We know that following these studies, the State of New York adopted its own legislation in 2000, and last December, a standard for fire-safe cigarettes was published. The second test developed by the Technical Advisory Group is used to determine compliance with the standard. It is quite simple : when cigarettes are placed on ten layers of filter paper, which absorbs the heat of the cigarettes, they must burn down completely in only 25% of cases. As far as we know, the standard should be implemented by the end of October. It was chosen because it is currently possible to achieve this standard with the technology already available on the market.

I would like to quote part of the conclusion of the report :

[English]

“This level of additional strength is achievable by banded paper technology already in production.”

[Translation]

This is what has happened in the United States. In Canada, in the meantime, there has been some headway. Two coroner's inquests were carried out in 1995, one in Quebec and the other in Ontario, as a result of fatal fires caused by cigarettes. In the Quebec case, the victims were children. I have copies of these inquests to table with the committee. Both inquests recognized that the tobacco companies were capable of producing cigarettes with reduced ignition propensity. The jury's recommendations in the Ontario inquest bear citing :

1. That the federal government of Canada require a bylaw that all cigarettes sold in Canada meet the condition of being fire-safe.

2. The federal government should issue standards regarding the manufacture and sale of cigarettes in Canada. There are presently standards in the United States which define fire-safe cigarettes that may be studied and implemented in Canada.

Last year, the Ministerial Advisory Council on Tobacco Control, which reports directly to the Minister of Health, also studied the issue and concluded that tobacco companies were able to produce such cigarettes. The council recommended that the government be asked to take action.

Unfortunately, despite the 1995 coroner's inquests, no action has been taken to date, either by the tobacco industry—through voluntary compliance with the standards—or by the government.

The industry claims to support regulation, but we believe that it is in fact opposed to these changes, for two reasons in particular. You have done a tremendous amount of work on tobacco control in Canada. You have passed legislation regulating advertising, sales, packaging and even the use of tobacco in public places. I congratulate you for that.

The government even has the power to regulate the manufacture of cigarettes, but it has never used that power. By doing so, you will be creating an important precedent. Other regulations might be introduced to reduce the toxicity or the amount of nicotine in cigarettes, for example. The industry would obviously be opposed to that.

We believe that the potential for legal action is the other reason. If the tobacco companies start manufacturing fire-safe cigarettes, it will prove that they are capable of doing so. Victims of fires caused by cigarettes could then launch lawsuits, knowing that the industry has been aware for many years of the characteristics for manufacturing fire-safe cigarettes, but that it has never produced such cigarettes. The companies would therefore be liable. In fact, one company has already been taken to court.

In view of all this information, we urge Parliament to pass Bill C-260. We do, however, wish to propose the following amendments.

We feel that subsection 3(2) in clause 1 should stay as is. Subsections 3(3) and 3(4), on the other hand, should be deleted, since these provisions indicate a timeline for the government to bring in its own regulations, and if no action is taken the government still has to table its report. Standards exist now in the United States and they simply need to be applied here in Canada.

We also propose amending clause 2 of the act by removing paragraph 5(b)1, which gives the government the power to establish the test and the standard. Once again, this is no longer necessary because what has been developed in the State of New York can be used here.

Section 41, which his set out in clause 3 of the bill, would be amended to include the standard. Our proposed wording is as follows:

41. Cigarettes that, when tested in accordance with method ASTM E2187-02b, the

Standard Test Method for Measuring the Ignition Strength of Cigarettes, do not meet the requirements of the test when more than 25% of the units tested burn over their entire length in a test consisting of 40 trials.

Lastly, we suggest adding the following:

4. If the Governor in Council does not make a regulation under section 7 of the Tobacco Act, this act shall come into force on December 31, 2003.

Health Canada will still have the opportunity to bring in its regulations, and if this has not been done by the end of the year, Bill C-260 will come into force.

Thank you very much.

º (1610)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Damphousse.

We'll begin the question and answer session of our meeting with Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'd like to express my appreciation to the witnesses for coming and entering into our deliberations on this important subject, although there's apparently quite a difference of opinion between the two sides of the table, understandably.

However, I don't think we have disagreement on the issue of fire safety, and we do want to find a way of addressing it. For the record, I would be interested in somebody commenting on the statistics. I understand it's estimated that between 70 and 100 people per year die in fires related to cigarettes. According to the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs report, from 1995 to 1999 fires started by smokers' materials killed 356 people--just about one for each day of the year--injured another 1,600, and cost more than $200 million in property damage. Mr. Warden expands that from cigarettes to cigars, pipes, or open flames of lighters and matches, so things related to smoking. These incidents resulted in at least 2,300 casualties, 557 fatalities, and property loss in excess of $400 million. So we're dealing with a very significant issue in property damage and loss and risk to lives, and I don't think any of us question that we want to reduce the risk.

Mr. Warden, I was surprised when you indicated a lack of support for this bill and that you preferred the position taken by Health Canada. I understand there's a recent paper from Health Canada. Has that paper been available to committee members? Have other members seen that paper by Health Canada?

º (1615)

Mr. Réal Ménard: We have.

The Chair: It's in this binder that was sent to you.

Mr. James Lunney: It's in the binder. Okay, thank you.

Apparently, the Health Canada consultation document is not specific about a legislative venue for its regulatory proposal, so how does Health Canada propose to make these changes? I don't know. Mr. Warden, since you're the one who brought it up first, are you aware of how Health Canada proposes to do this? And where is that process at?

Mr. Donald F. Warden: The reason we chose not to support Bill-260, although it is a great stepping stone, is that Health Canada has already done so much work in regard to this subject through the tobacco regulations. I understand they are working on tobacco regulations to be brought forward. And there's the time factor. If we now go into a new process, we're looking at another two or three years before this project comes to fruition, whereas the work Health Canada has already done on the tobacco regulations would make this happen sooner, which would do away with the injuries and the deaths and the cost. That's why we chose to support the tobacco regulation process rather than Bill C-260.

Mr. James Lunney: I appreciate your perspective on that, but some of us who've observed how government moves in these things realize that this could easily take a couple of years, given the way Health Canada moves on other issues. I wonder if you would be interested in the proposal of Mr. Damphousse that we could make an amendment to the bill that if the government has not acted by December 31, 2003, this bill will come into effect. How would you respond to that, Mr. Warden?

Mr. Donald F. Warden: Hopefully, it would not get to that stage, it's going to be done before that, but if that's the way it goes, I guess we'd have to reconsider our position at that time. Health Canada has produced a consultation paper already. They've already got the answers back on that from a number of stakeholders across Canada. It's a regulatory proposal for reducing fire risk from cigarettes. The process is well along the way, and again, that's why CAFC is supporting that venue. Hopefully, it will come to fruition and we don't have to go the route of the Hazardous Products Act.

Mr. James Lunney: Okay.

I'll just go on and maybe pick up a few comments and ask for a response from Mr. McCarty. I was curious about your objections that there's no information on the reduction of fires in a real case scenario with the improved cigarettes, no information on the safety of a new product for smokers. It reminds me of objections I heard from the Canadian Medical Association on the smoking of marijuana; I heard the head of the Canadian Medical Association say there's no evidence that decriminalizing marijuana would lead to increased use, nothing in the literature. It seems to me that that's a bit of an empty argument. We know there are concerns about the existing product, and there's a bit of a red herring in that one.

With your objection about its being acceptable to consumers, I understand there are cigarettes that have already been tested in this capacity, and consumers really couldn't tell the difference. Who was it who developed these things?

º (1620)

Mr. Donald McCarty: Phillip Morris.

Mr. James Lunney: Phillip Morris. And I see here that R.J. Reynolds produced low ignition propensity prototypes that were similar to their Camel brands, and they found that the results indicate that the Camel Lts 85 smokers have an overall acceptance of blend variation prototype similar to the control. So the results indicate that the smokers found no significant difference between the prototypes with different levels, with the inherent porosity, and so on. I'd be interested in your response to that.

Mr. Donald McCarty: There are a couple of questions built into your question. Merit, first of all, the cigarette you're talking about, which uses banded paper technology, is a commendable effort by Phillip Morris to address the problem. I think some of my friends said the state of New York already thinks this works 92%. I refer you to the first annex in our submission. I did give it to the clerk.

The Chair: We can't distribute it when it's only in one language.

Mr. Donald McCarty: I'm sorry. We are working on a translation, but it was a bit difficult.

What I'll tell you is that when the New York Office of Fire Prevention and Control applied their test to these cigarettes, their test said 75% of these cigarettes flunked. Are they fire-safe, to use the wrong term, are they a low ignition propensity cigarette? I think we need to look at that. The Department of Justice in the United States has said these cigarettes, for some reason I am not entirely sure of, lead to a tremendously increased incidence of coal fallout. I don't know whether that allegation is true or not, but I think we should look at it before we mandate a product for the market that might actually be increasing the risk of fire. That's the only point I'm trying to make about this product. I think it's a commendable effort by the company to do something. Maybe it went astray, maybe it didn't, but if we do as Mr. Damphousse suggests, simply take the legislation from New York and adopt it here, simply take the regulations from New York and put them here, simply adopt the tests from New York, we don't need a health committee any more--just take everything from New York and put it here. We need to study these things ourselves and make up our own minds.

Mr. James Lunney: So you're saying these banded, low propensity cigarettes, as they're called, flunked the test 70% of the time, yet I think I heard Mr. Lennox say a few minutes ago the same product goes out 80% of the time. Did I misunderstand you? Are you referring to a different product?

Mr. Douglas Lennox: I'm referring to the exact product you have in front of you, the Merit Ultra Light 100, tested by New York state. I think Mr. Damphousse said he even provided a copy by e-mail of the New York state results. It scored a 92% pass on the standard they're using. Mr. McCarty is correct to say there are a variety of cigarettes out there under the Merit brand that use the banded technology, this special paper. New York has said all the eight different varieties performed better than cigarettes without the banded design, but there was some difference even within the Merit category. The cigarette I've given you is the best of the eight brands that fall under the Merit name. Mr. McCarty and I are talking about the same study, we're just using different figures. You have the study yourself, so you can draw your own conclusion.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you.

Let's come back to Mr. McCarty. You mention here--and also Mr. Lennox was involved in this discussion--among the other issues, that the increased cost, if I understood you correctly, might lead to increased smuggling, and you drew out the mail order products coming in, products from Columbia and China, and so on. I heard Mr. Lennox remark that the cost might be pennies per pack, we really don't know. Do you have any indication of what the costs are estimated to be to produce low propensity cigarettes?

Mr. Donald McCarty: It doesn't matter how much more they would cost. If they are regulated, if they are shown to be low ignition propensity cigarettes, I don't care how much, we'll do it.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: There are very different viewpoints here, and we will have to decide where the truth lies. On the one hand, we are being told that the technology is available in New York. On the other hand, we are hearing that it is not available or at least that it is not as effective as it is claimed to be. And someone else said that it is not the right vehicle.

On that last point, the first thing that we were told by the Health Canada officials was that the Hazardous Products Act was not the right way to go and that it would be better to amend the tobacco regulations. That is something that the committee will have to look at, but it is only a means to an end.

The committee should perhaps go to New York or invite people from the fire prevention service there to come to meet with us here. If I understand correctly, the tobacco industry is not challenging the objective, which is to get a product like this on the market, but it is saying that the technical conditions that exist right now make it impossible to manufacture the product and that it needs more time for research and development. Does that summarize your position fairly well? Is it true that you want to cooperate on this with Health Canada, but that you need to do research and development in order to be successful?

º (1625)

Mr. Donald McCarty: Yes, that is our position. I feel that our position is very much in line with that of Health Canada and Chief Warden.

I would like to emphasize the fact that I do not want a fire-safe cigarette to prevent us from developing a product like this one. This is called Advance Light. It is currently being test-marketed in Indianapolis, Indiana, in the United States. It is produced by our sister company in the United States, Brown & Williamson. This cigarette offers consumers reduced quantities of certain toxic substances. It is sold with all the necessary warnings. But in order to have this, I do not want to make it impossible to have that.

Mr. Réal Ménard: So your position is very much related to the risk of smuggling.

Mr. Donald McCarty: Very much.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You understand that, even though the legislators may be concerned about that issue, the problem we are dealing with today stands on its own because of the objective involved, which is to reduce the fire hazard. We naturally have to keep that in mind.

However, if Mr. Damphousse's analysis turns out to be correct... If we go to New York, we should perhaps go to San Francisco as well for good measure, Madam Chair, but you know that this committee is very staid in its approach. Now, if the New York fire prevention authorities came here and showed that the technology exists and that it meets the New York State standards in 92% of cases, I imagine that you would be prepared to accept that the legislator has a responsibility and a duty to move ahead on this.

If it is proven to you that the technology exists, your arguments are no longer valid, to the extent that you recognize the need to have safe cigarettes on the market. Do I understand you correctly?

Mr. Donald McCarty: If it is proven to me that a given cigarette passes the tests, that there is in fact a cigarette with reduced ignition propensity that does not increase the level of toxins absorbed by smokers, we will be pleased to produce it, sir.

Mr. Réal Ménard: There's a great difference between your position and that of Mr. Damphousse. I do not want to ignite a debate between you; in fact, I will even try to extinguish it. You say that in the state of New York, despite a desire to establish standards and to have safe cigarettes on the market, the test failed 75% of the time.

Mr. Donald McCarty: We must be careful here. Unfortunately, I cannot refer to the document. Like all other cigarettes, Merit comes in different formats. Mr. Lennox has a 100 millimetre format, which is king size. There are the light and extra light formats as well. Eight tests were carried out in the state of New York on eight different brands. Two of the eight brands passed the test and the other six failed.

Mr. Lennox's cigarette, the ultra light 100, passed the test, but six of the other seven failed.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Are you referring to the same test, Mr. Damphousse? Do we have a communication problem here?

Mr. François Damphousse: A standard has been introduced in the state of New York, and a test did confirm that many of the cigarette brands on the market did not meet the requirements of the standard. The standard was established in order to improve all the cigarettes that did not pass the test. The idea is to apply the standard, as in the case of Merit cigarettes.

This was done with cars. Manufacturers were required to adopt a number of safety features. The state of New York decided that a standard was necessary and that manufacturers would be required to produce lower ignition propensity cigarettes.

º (1630)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ménard. You'll probably have another turn.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East): Thank you, Chair, and thank you, witnesses, for coming this morning.

I want to thank Mr. McCarty for sending me his brief. My bill is relatively modest, but his brief is 50-odd pages long and 161 paragraphs, and I think you might have used up a few lawyers in writing it. It's quite thorough, a little bit like the sledgehammer for the fly. But it must have stirred up a little industry concern, because you felt it necessary to call a press conference this morning to give your version of the bill prior to the hearings. And there was a certain amount of skepticism I heard from the press afterwards.

You start off by saying in your summary you support Health Canada's goal, and I suppose that's true, and you are a socially responsible company, you've always acted in a socially responsible fashion. And for proof of that you indicate that you've donated 1% of your pre-tax profits annually. I don't know much about the cigarette business, I don't know what the annual profits might be, and I don't know whether that's a generous donation or not. You say your company represents 60% of the cigarettes that are sold in Canada, and you seek constantly to exceed public expectations, making responsibility the hallmark of your attitudes and actions. I would have hoped for a more positive brief than we've received thus far.

In paragraph 19 you complain that regrettably, no cigarette design parameters have yet been identified. So apparently, you don't like the test. New York appears to have a test, but you don't seem to like that test either. In paragraph 20 you don't like what they use as a canvas, apparently, to test the flammability standards; they should have used different kinds of furniture. It strikes me a blame the victim idea--blame the furniture for the way it burns, rather than what started it burning. In paragraph 21 you don't like the standard paper that was used. In paragraph 22 you assert that we should develop our own standards, rather than using American standards. Apparently, some patriotism still burns bright here. In paragraph 24 you are concerned about consumer acceptance being of overarching importance. One might be a little concerned that this has to do with whether cigarette sales might go down as a consequence. Then in paragraph 33 you appear to be worried about the kinds of people who might be attracted to smoking these kinds of cigarettes, namely, those in the lower income scale.

In paragraph 42 you're worried about contraband cigarettes. Correct me if I'm wrong, but my recollection is that the Government of Canada has sued you. Am I wrong about that?

Mr. Donald McCarty: That is a deadly wrong assertion.

Mr. John McKay: Okay, you're here to correct me. But there has been some concern raised that cigarettes that originate in Montreal seem to do a U-turn and end up back in Canada.

All of these concerns lead one to a level of skepticism, Mr. McCarty, with respect to the willingness of your company to participate in meaningful testing. You've tried to demonstrate in your brief that the test is no good, the paper is no good, these are American standards, the New York thing doesn't work, yet it appears from other evidence, from Mr. Damphousse and Mr. Lennox, that this is a relatively simple thing and it can be done by the industry. That industry is largely represented by you. So those of us who don't live and breathe--not to put too fine a pun on it--cigarettes each and every day are left with a bit of concern about your brief here, which seems to say there is no possible way in which fire-safe cigarettes could meet market standards.

º (1635)

The Chair: Mr. McCarty.

Mr. Donald McCarty: I'm trying to figure out what the question was in all that. My brief has been gone over in some detail. I disagree with the tone you put on it. If we point out difficulties or inconsistencies in an American approach or another approach, it's not because we want to prevent Health Canada from going forward with any proposition, it's because we think it is our duty to point problems out.

We do think this is possible. We do think what is as important, if not more important, is the development of a product that produces fewer toxins for the smoker. We are working extremely hard on that. We go to see Health Canada regularly with our progress. We could do exactly the same thing with respect to low ignition propensity cigarettes. We have a meeting set up with them next week on this very topic. We are prepared to do what it takes. You may choose not to believe me, you may choose to discount that, but that is what it is and that is where we will be.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay.

I think we come back to Mr. Lunney, and then go to Dr. Castonguay.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I wanted to pursue comments that were made by Mr. Damphousse, perhaps Mr. Lennox as well, regarding the two cases in Quebec and a jury in Ontario that were calling on government to establish standards. Someone, I think it was Mr. Damphousse, referred to a 1995 coroner's report--I hope I have the date right.

Mr. François Damphousse: Yes.

Mr. James Lunney: Nothing has happened since. Can you tell us something about that coroner's report in 1995?

Mr. François Damphousse: The inquest in Ontario was first. I think it was a handicapped person who died after dropping her cigarette. In Quebec it was in Montreal's east end, where three small children died from a fire caused by the mother dropping a cigarette. We approached the coroner's office to see if they would look into this issue, considering the facts and the information coming from the technical study group and technical advisory group, and we presented those facts to them. They were very much interested in looking into the issue. In the Ontario case we invited Andrew McGuire, who is the president of the Trauma Foundation in San Francisco, to testify. He was one of the key members of the technical advisory group and the technical study group. He showed both coroners that this is possible from the work they've done. I would like to remind you that people from the tobacco industry were part of those groups, and they signed the first report, claiming that it is technically and commercially feasible to make these cigarettes.

So both the coroners' inquests have ruled that the tobacco industry is capable of doing this, but there is something blocking it. In Ontario they've recommended that the federal government move on this issue. In Quebec, where the ruling was handed down at the beginning of 1996, they've recommended that the public security minister look into this issue more deeply, but there was no follow-up to those two coroners' inquests. I'm submitting them here today to the committee so that you can look for yourselves at what's been said there.

º (1640)

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you.

On the question of the low propensity cigarettes, the objection was raised about coal fallout. Mr. Lennox or Mr. Damphousse, are you familiar with that or any problems concerning these cigarettes with the burning part falling off? Does that have to do with the porosity or the paper? Perhaps you could comment on that.

Mr. François Damphousse: I've never heard that argument.

Mr. Douglas Lennox: As I understand it, if you lower the density of the tobacco, you make it really loosely packed. The concern is that the burning tobacco comes out of the paper, and maybe that's a problem. I've not seen any study myself in the voluminous reading I've done to substantiate that. I suppose, again, you can conduct your own test to see if it comes out, but I don't know that it does.

Mr. François Damphousse: There's one argument, though, that I'd like to raise. In Imperial Tobacco's brief they claim that in Health Canada's consultation process, which finished at the end of January, one key question was to see if consumers would be more negligent if these products were to appear on the market. R.J. Reynolds did their own focus group project on ignition propensity, they checked with their own consumers to see if people would be more negligent, and no. Obviously, these cigarettes still represent a risk, a lower risk, but they still will take care with their cigarettes. They won't leave them on furniture to see if it's going to catch fire or not. They're going to put them in an ashtray. They're going to be very careful with the ashes.

Mr. Donald McCarty: The simple point I was trying to make in my exposé earlier was that among the hundreds, if not thousands, of cases against the tobacco industry in the United States there is one important case taken up by the federal government, and in their preliminary findings of fact, a 1,500-page document, they have made certain allegations against that brand of cigarette. Those allegations are to the effect that the coal falls out a lot more easily than with other cigarettes. This is in itself, as anyone will tell you, a fire hazard. Whether or not those allegations are true I have no idea. I commended before the effort made by this company to do something, and now someone says that may have backfired. They may be right, they may be wrong, I don't know. My point is, let's study it before we legislate this into existence.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Castonguay.

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay (Madawaska—Restigouche, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today. Let us try to shed a little light on this matter. My question is for Mr. McCarty.

The brief we were given states :

We cannot endorse a proposed law which blithely assumes that a simple standard can be set—within six months—for lower ignition propensity cigarettes, without taking into account the following :

And then you list a series of points. Further on, you say :

Imperial Tobacco Canada will and should be part of any solution going forward and is prepared to put resources behind any initiative being driven by Health Canada. Indeed, the Technical Committee of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council has already approached Health Canada with a view to moving these issues forward.

It is interesting that everyone seems to want a less flammable cigarette, which could protect people's health, but they disregard the fact that this is a toxic product to start with. But that is a different debate.

Is your company currently doing any research in an effort to offer safe cigarettes? Second, in your opinion, what would be a reasonable length of time in which to draft regulations on manufacturing such cigarettes? The danger of having no deadline is that it will be postponed indefinitely and nothing will ever get done. That is the concern of some of the individuals from whom we have heard.

Mr. Donald McCarty: With your permission, I will ask Mr. Duplessis to answer that question.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: No problem.

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis (Director, Product Development, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited): If I understand correctly, your question is in two parts. The first is about the work underway at the moment, and the second is about the time required.

Yes, we are working on this. Of course, we are also following very closely the work being done at the moment by a sister company in the United States, in particular, and there is also a great deal being done currently by our suppliers with respect to developing the “strip paper” type technology. However, it remains to be seen whether this could work on a regular basis and at an acceptable level. Everything depends on the standards laid down in the regulations.

So, yes, there is work being done. There is still a tremendous amount of work to be done on some of the toxins given off by cigarettes. For example, the paper being used in Canada at the moment considerably reduces the amount of carbon monoxide that is given off. This was done in the 1980s, I believe, when there was a lot of work done jointly with Health Canada to try to reduce the amount of carbon monoxide.

With the paper used at the moment on the Merit cigarette, for example, there is a risk of an increased level of carbon monoxide in the smoke. This is one of the aspects that we will have to review with Health Canada before proceeding.

º (1645)

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Have you been carrying out research for a number of years to try to find a safe cigarette, or is this quite recent?

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis: Most of the work has been done in the United States at Brown & Williamson. We did not want to duplicate what they had done. As you know, we are part of the British American Tobacco group.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: But have you been doing research on this for several years?

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis: Yes, we have been doing research for several years.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: And you have not yet found a solution to the problem?

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis: The problem has always been to determine whether it was possible to develop a test that would give us a fairly consistent idea of what happens in the laboratory and what could happen in the real world. That has always been the problem. Before proceeding, we must ensure that our measurement system applies in the real world. Otherwise, we would be developing something based on a measurement system that is completely unrealistic, and would ultimately not help us to achieve our objective. In this case, the idea is to reduce the potential fire hazard when cigarettes are left unattended in places where they should not be.

The whole problem with developing cigarettes of this type lies in the way in which the test should be established. In recent years, the Americans have done some very good work in this area. Many tried to develop various approaches that could establish a better relationship between a laboratory test and the real world. We have not yet achieved that, unfortunately, and that is what all the reports show.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: In the real world, where I come from, people often say that if we try to achieve too much, we may end up achieving very little. It is utopian to think that we are going to develop a zero-flammability cigarette. That is what concerns many people. They wonder whether this will be postponed indefinitely once again, which will mean that we will never have anything better than what we have at the moment. I am talking about a timeframe, and you tell me that research has been underway for several years already. Will we still be here discussing the same subject 10 years from now, Madam Chair? That is what worries me.

We asked the representatives from Health Canada the same question. They spoke to us about regulations. We asked them what they thought would be a reasonable timeframe. That is really what I'm after. We want to be reasonable here, but...

Mr. Gaetan Duplessis: You are looking for a reasonable timeframe. In its proposal Health Canada raised three main issues, if I remember correctly. I think that we should first address these issues. I hope that everyone agrees that these are the three issues that must be addressed. I can assure you that in our work with Health Canada, we are not going to drag our feet. These are valid concerns and they must be addressed. Will there be an increase in the quantity of certain substances in cigarette smoke? What will these substances be? Do we know at this moment? Can Health Canada tell us what chemical substances will be more present and less present? If the content of some of these compounds goes up, is it acceptable?

We already have important regulations regarding the information that must be provided to the public on toxic substances in cigarette smoke, and these regulations exist for a good reason. If we take an approach that leads to a rise in the content of these substances and we are told afterwards that it is not important, why did we need these regulations in the first place? I believe we have to do a careful examination of this issue and address these very valid and fundamental questions that have been raised by Health Canada. Let's start with finding answers to those questions. I don't think we need 10 years for that.

º (1650)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Castonguay.

Mr. Ménard, followed by Ms. Bennett.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Thank you, Madam Chair. You know that although I am the youngest member of this committee, I am the senior member, since I have the most seniority.

[English]

The Chair: Yes, but you left your heart in San Francisco, obviously, and you're trying to get us to go back.

Mr. Réal Ménard: I'd like to go with you--but not on me.

[Translation]

When the government started talking about compulsory identification, the tobacco industry was dead set against it. Had we listened to the industry, we would never have gone ahead. However, we have to live in the real world, and I understand that.

Would Mr. Duplessis agree that the modifications that have been made to cigarettes in laboratories to reduce their flammability, that is reduction in circumference, reduction in tobacco rod density and in paper porosity as well as the elimination of the use of certain additives such as citrates, constitute the basic formula? Would he agree that it is possible scientifically to do all those things?

You do not seem to agree on the facts. I would not go so far as to say that there has been false testimony, because we are all friends here, but if New York State will be enforcing the sale of fire-safe cigarettes starting in July 2003, these cigarettes do exist, unless that is not what is going to be happening in the state of New York. Since you are in the export market, do you know if the state of New York will be passing such a law?

M. Donald McCarty: I will let Mr. Duplessis answer your first question and I will answer your second question.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Very well.

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis: Your first question was on usage, circumference, density, paper, etc.

Mr. Réal Ménard: These were presented to us as the characteristics of low ignition propensity cigarettes. I believe these were listed by Mr. Damphousse or Mr. Lennox.

Mr. Gaétan Duplessis: Most of the results that we talked about were for cigarettes made with strip paper which does not require the use of citrate, etc. This strip paper has a very low porosity. I could tell you that certain types of paper used in those tests required a greater use of citrate, but that is another thing. I am dealing only with the tests.

As for making this type of cigarettes without creating problems of ignition or coal fallout, I believe that even Health Canada has recognized that using these technologies only will not be enough to produce real fire-safe cigarettes.

Mr. Réal Ménard: In other words, when Mr. Damphousse tells the committee that cigarettes with those characteristics exist, he's wrong. In any case, we will come back to that. He will be tabling studies and members of the committee can look at them. I imagine he will be kind enough to send you a copy too.

That said, what about my question on the state of New York, which, starting in July 2003—

º (1655)

Mr. François Damphousse: The latest news is that the regulation was tabled in December and there is now a consultation period which will end on April 15. The regulations will come into effect 180 days after the end of the consultation period, at the end of October.

Mr. Réal Ménard: If the members of the committee go to New York in mid-October, the only cigarettes they will be able to buy—

Mr. François Damphousse: At the end of October.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The only cigarettes that will be sold will be low ignition propensity cigarettes.

Mr. François Damphousse: These are the standards that were approved.

Mr. Réal Ménard: These are the standards of the Technical Advisory Group that you talked about.

Mr. Donald McCarty: I believe Mr. Damphousse is forgetting the fact that the government said there would be consultations; the government did not say it intended to ignore all of the submissions that will be made during these consultations. I imagine they will be taken into account.

Mr. Réal Ménard: So you are not convinced that in October—

Mr. Donald McCarty: No, I am not convinced. Mr. Damphousse may be right when he says that these new regulations will come into force in October, but it is also possible that the government may decide otherwise after hearing the submissions.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You are saying that the process is not yet completed.

Mr. Donald McCarty: That's right.

Mr. François Damphousse: Didn't you say in a press release that you will refuse to sell your cigarettes in the state of New York if...?

Mr. Donald McCarty: The questions were asked by committee members, Mr. Damphousse. Please address your question to Ms. Brown.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Well, let me ask the question. Did you say in the press release that you would not sell your cigarettes in the state of New York?

Mr. Donald McCarty: That is correct. If the state of New York passes regulations requiring cigarettes to meet certain standards and if our cigarettes do not need these standards—and they do not at the moment—we could simply not sell them there.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you Mr. Ménard.

Ms. Bennett.

Ms. Carolyn Bennett (St. Paul's, Lib.): Thank you.

I understand the health committee in 1969 suggested that something should be done with flame retardant or it should be explored, and I very much, therefore, want to follow up on the questioning of my colleague. Are you comfortable that what you're doing now is best practice, Mr. McCarty? Your brief is very much, yes, but--yes, but New York's not doing anything, yes, but New Zealand withdrew, yes, but the banded may be worse than what we've got now. So in the yes part of it, what are you doing to actually get going on this file?

Second, lighting things tends to cause fires, right? We don't put candles on our Christmas trees any more, because they light up. I understand there is clean nicotine available in various places in the world. The WHO has been looking at that. You can get people nicotine in nice tidy little inhalers, and maybe we could even make them sexy, so addicted teens would do that instead of lighting things.

Mr. James Lunney: Let's not go there. You bring sex into everything.

Ms. Carolyn Bennett: It's a perception problem for some of our Alliance colleagues.

In little neat inhalers that you didn't have to light up, could it indeed be a choice, like caffeine or anything else? It's a legal product. What we don't like is that it actually kills people, either by burning them up or by killing them slowly. The real question I've always wanted to ask tobacco executives is, do you guys sleep at night? I promise I won't ask that. How, in the product development, are you going on clean nicotine and moving this into something that is recreational and doesn't kill people.

Mr. Donald McCarty: If the committee wishes to retire in camera and hear the confidential submissions we've made to Health Canada about what we're doing to make the cigarette a safer product, I'll tell you what we're doing. I'm quite prepared to do that. It's not easy.

Ms. Carolyn Bennett: Are you saying the paper you're using is as good as it gets?

Mr. Donald McCarty: You were asking about what we're doing in that area, so that's one question.

Ms. Carolyn Bennett: For 30 years we've been asking for investigation of flame retardant, whatever. You've said the new Philip Morris papers may be worse. Do you think you've got the very best paper there is in respect of combustibility and causing fires?

» (1700)

Mr. Donald McCarty: If you want to know what has been going on since 1969, I might ask my colleague Dr. Massey to answer the question. I think I'm going to ask Stewart to go over what has been done in the development of papers since 1969. Is that your question? You want to know what we're doing with respect to developing new papers?

Ms. Carolyn Bennett: Are you comfortable that this is the best paper you could have and that all these other posers aren't really better?

Mr. Donald McCarty: We are comfortable that what we are doing now is the best practice and we have done what we can do so far. What we're saying is that it may not be enough, we're prepared to do more, we're prepared to work with Health Canada to do that. You may choose not to believe that, but maybe Stewart you can tell a little about how it has gone since 1969.

The Chair: I would ask Dr. Massey to try to stick to the flammability issue, which is the subject of this meeting, as opposed to all the other kinds of research I assume you're doing on the toxicity issue. We're talking about flammability here today. Thank you.

Dr. Stewart Massey (Director, Scientific Affairs, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited): I do think your comment with regard to candles on Christmas trees is probably quite revealing, in the sense that there seems to be a misunderstanding as between fire-safe cigarettes and reduced ignition potential cigarettes. We and the bill are talking about reduced ignition potential cigarettes. That does not mean to say such cigarettes, if they do indeed exist, will eliminate fires, and that is the issue. That is the issue that has been struggled with in the United States, whether it be industry or the technical study group or the Department of Consumer Product Safety. What has been dealt with is whether or not it is going to reduce fires per se and the standards that exist to do that. It is all very well for us to evaluate papers and see whether they pass tests, but does that in fact mean we're going to eliminate the fire safety problems? I very much doubt it.

The question is what papers are available and what can be tried, and all this takes time. Work has been going on now, to my knowledge, since the early 1980s looking at all sorts of different matters, banding paper, putting metal sleeves on cigarettes, etc. We have to consider if it meets the objective and, as in any of these developments, if it does go some way toward meeting the objectives, whether people are going to buy that. If they reject it and choose not to purchase such cigarettes, it is a waste of time, because it does not meet the objective of reducing levels of fires.

It's a very active issue with our associate company in the United States. They have done a lot of the basic research, which we have followed very closely. We have worked and had regular meetings, certainly over the last 15 years, with the paper suppliers and evaluated the papers they have come up with, and we have in more recent times evaluated these sorts of papers on our products, looking at whether they produced a genuine reduced emission propensity and whether they provided a product consumers are going to buy.

The Chair: Madame Thibeault.

[Translation]

Ms. Yolande Thibeault: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Gentlemen, you said that New Zealand had withdrawn its bill in 2002. Can you give us any details? Can you tell us why New Zealand decided not to go any further? Does that country intend to do something different? Can you give me any information?

Mr. Donald McCarty: Unfortunately, the New Zealand report is not yet available because the translation has not been completed, but it will be shortly. I will see that you get a copy of it.

Essentially, the bill was withdrawn because the committee felt that there were other ways to achieve the same objectives. I will not necessarily list all of them. There was a commission on consumer products which, I believe, was quoted. I think they also wanted to make use of their own regulators, if I may use that expression.

It has not been put off indefinitely. They withdrew their bill but they want to use other means that are already available within their system of government. There are, however, no existing standards at this time in New Zealand.

» (1705)

Ms. Yolande Thibeault: Are you saying that they are trying to find a product to achieve the same results, that is to say, to reduce the ignition propensity?

Mr. Donald McCarty: That was the aim of their bill.

Ms. Yolande Thibeault: Directly.

Mr. Donald McCarty: Yes.

Ms. Yolande Thibeault: Mr. Damphousse, you spoke of the many studies done to determine to what extent the risk of fire could be reduced. I have a concern. In testing the different types of paper, was any thought given to the health aspect of the products? Was that criterion taken into account?

Mr. François Damphousse: The first research group included a member from the National Cancer Institute who was chosen precisely in order to determine whether or not the harmfulness of the experimental cigarettes could be compared to that of regular cigarettes. The noxiousness of all cigarettes was comparable.

The second research group was tasked with examining this matter even further. However, due to budget restrictions, they were unable to develop a four-stage protocol to determine the toxicity of fire-safe cigarettes as compared to regular cigarettes already available on the market. Some tests were conducted on a few of the cigarettes in order to see whether or not they could be compared to other cigarettes and the results were comparable. Therefore, there was no problem.

As I said, the Philip Morris company itself examined its own Merit cigarette in order to see whether or not the toxicity level could be compared to that of regular cigarettes. The company came to the same conclusion. I believe it used the protocol that had been developed by the technical advisory group.

Therefore, a great deal of research has been done in that area. Even here, Health Canada regulations compelled the industry to submit a number of reports on the level of toxic substances in cigarette smoke. It would be possible to determine whether or not there is a big difference between fire-safe cigarettes and regular cigarettes. We could adopt the New York State standard or the protocol that has been established by the Technical Advisory Group. All of that can be found in the documents that I have tabled.

[English]

Mr. Donald McCarty: Madam Chair, may I beg your indulgence? I would like to add to the answer I just gave to Madame Thibeault on the question of New Zealand.

[Translation]

Ms. Thibault, at paragraph 123 of our original brief, on page 41, there is a quote from the New Zealand report which states the following :

The Health Department feels that the scientific data are inconclusive. In the opinion of the department, there is no proof that changes aimed at producing fire-safe cigarettes would increase their toxicity, and, in so doing, cause a greater number of deaths due to the use of tobacco.

Like us, they were not certain that the product could be manufactured at this time.

Ms. Yolande Thibeault: Thank you very much. I think we need a made-in-Canada formula.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

With the committee's indulgence, as Ms. Skelton does not want to ask a question, I would like to have a turn before we go back to the list.

I'm impressed by the fact that Mr. McCarty would like to have a Canadian solution, a Canadian test, Canadian standards, etc., and yet I heard Mr. DuPlessis say, every time he referred to research of any kind, the sister or brother company in the States. So I'm going to ask Dr. Massey, who's title is director of scientific affairs, how many scientists he has doing research in Canada, how much that costs the company, in the sense of a Canadian research budget that is spent in Canada, and what percentage of that budget is assigned to this low ignition potential development.

Dr. Stewart Massey: I can answer one of those questions. I believe two scientists are working on this, with probably three technicians.

» (1710)

The Chair: Would that be full-time, or would they have other assignments?

Dr. Stewart Massey: They would have other assignments, but it would be probably 50% of their time. There would be other resources put into it for the analysis of the products and the preparation of the products, and that I can't give you numbers for. I can't give you numbers off the top of my head for the dollar value of all that or, indeed, what percentage it would be of total expenditures on research.

The Chair: How many scientists do you have in all working in Canada in your lab?

Dr. Stewart Massey: It's probably 22 or 23 professional scientists, but in regard to research activities, I think there are six. The others are either engineers employed in other aspects of the technical part of our business or in strictly technical service aspects, analytical chemistry, etc.

The Chair: Thank you.

I think Mr. Lunney, Mr. McKay, and Mr. Ménard for one short one.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you, Madam Chair.

In the document “Regulatory Proposal for Reducing Fire Risks from Cigarettes”, the Health Canada document, I'm on the section dealing with the burn additives and I'd like to quote a bit from this. It's on page 7, for those who are referring to the document, item D:

Considerable controversy has surrounded the tobacco industry's use of burn additives to enhance the burn rate of cigarette paper. It would appear logical that the removal or reduction of burn additives would reduce ignition potential.

We certainly agree on that.

Further, all three of the experimental cigarettes with the lowest ignition potential in the TSG study had no burn additives in their papers.

So no burn additives, lowest ignition potential.

I'm rather surprised by the following comment, though. It seems very clear, but it then says:

However, the reduction of paper burn additives has been found to have a highly variable effect on ignition propensity and is thus not statistically supportable as a significant or reliable method of decreasing the fire hazard of cigarettes.

That seemed a little inconsistent with the first two remarks, but it seems consistent with the hedging and dodging we sometimes do see when the government wants to avoid an issue.

If the tobacco industry, for all of its scientists--you do invest in scientists, as we've just heard, 22 or 23, 2 in Canada--not just your company, of course, puts these additives in there, I have to believe they do increase the burn propensity. You certainly are not going to put money into an additive that has no effect. It seems to me quite simple. If you want to reduce the burn propensity, just drop the additives. That seems quite logical and simple. I understand that if cigarettes go out, it's annoying to the one who has to find another match; I was with somebody on the weekend whose lighter ran out of fluid, and they were asking somebody for a match. Is that the concern you have in your industry? If that's the case, maybe there's a way for smokers to overcome that obstacle, by just carrying a back-up.

Mr. Donald McCarty: I'll let Dr. Massey respond.

Dr. Stewart Massey: You've read the paragraph from the Health Canada consultation paper yourself that says the use of the additives as a means of obtaining a reduced ignition potential cigarette is not statistically supportable. That, in fact, is not their conclusion, but the conclusion of the technical study group after their experimentation with additives.

Mr. James Lunney: We can conclude, then, that the tobacco industry puts things in there just thinking that they actually assist in combustibility, when in fact they don't. Is that the conclusion we're supposed to come to?

Dr. Stewart Massey: No, because that's not why they're put there. They're put there to form a clinging ash on the cigarette and to adjust the burn rate of the cigarette paper, which is not the same thing as the ignition potential. You have to be clear on what we're talking about with reduced ignition potential, and I think this is where there is some confusion over the report put out by the Office of Fire Protection in the United States. Yes, you can measure reductions, they may be statistical, but when you apply the criteria of a test, as they have proposed in New York, passing that test will not be achievable with conventional cigarettes with no citrates or whatever additive. That is why the Phillip Morris company, with Merit, has moved to a different technology, and even with that technology, of the eight cigarettes that were tested in the November 15 report only two would be acceptable for sale in New York.

» (1715)

Mr. James Lunney: Dr. Massey, of course, you're referring to the bands, and I understand the bands are of varying effectiveness, depending on how thick they are and how wide. But if you found only two of eight that were successful, then, eureka, you have found a model that works. If two of them passed the test, why don't we use the model that works?

Dr. Stewart Massey: The variability of the test does not allow it to be certain. On the occasions they did this test with forty cigarettes only two passed, those are the results they published. With the variability, there may be none the next time, or it may be three or four the next time. It's the test, the variability of the test, and the criteria that are set for passing or failing that test.

Mr. James Lunney: Are you saying only two cigarettes of the ones tested passed or only two brands? I understood it to be saying two brands.

Dr. Stewart Massey: That's right, two brands.

Mr. James Lunney: I presume that means two brands consistently pass the test.

Dr. Stewart Massey: The test was done once, on 40 cigarettes for each brand.

Mr. James Lunney: Gosh, maybe it's something that could be repeated.

Dr. Stewart Massey: That's exactly why we hold the view we do hold with regard to the straight implementation of a test, which, in fact, is not even regulated at the present time in the United States or in New York. You've made exactly the point we would like to make ourselves.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Damphousse, we have on our desks a paper put out by the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs, and it says categorically:

The Fire Administrator of New York State is legislatively required to implement a standard of fire-safe cigarettes no later than January 1, 2003. Within six months of that implementation date, all cigarettes sold in New York State will have to meet the standard for extinguishing.

I understood Mr. McCarty to say something that's not quite true. Can you elucidate on that point? It seems pretty straightforward to me: either it's January 1, 2003, plus six months or it's not.

Mr. François Damphousse: What the legislation says is that as soon as the standard has been developed, which was made public in December, they have 180 days to comply. But there is, if I understand correctly, a consultation process, which will end April 15. That's the latest news I gathered from New York. From April 15 you have 180 days, and if nothing changes, they have to comply with that at the end of October. After that all the cigarettes sold on the market in New York state have to comply with the standard that's been approved and adopted in New York state.

Mr. John McKay: The second point has to do with toxicity. I must admit, one of the surprising arguments was that changing the paper, changing this, changing that would actually increase the toxicity for a consumer. With an industry that sells a highly toxic product, I have some reservations and concern about that. I still don't understand how changing the paper increases toxicity for consumers. Can you help me on that?

Mr. François Damphousse: That's one of the issues the technical study group looked at. Andrew McGuire, who would be very willing to come and testify in front of the Standing Committee on Health, was part of the technical study group and the technical advisory group. Maybe Monsieur Ménard will not be able to go to San Francisco, but we could bring San Francisco to Ottawa. As part of the Ontario coroner's inquest, Andrew McGuire testified, and he was asked that question: if the physical characteristics change for a cigarette, will that change the toxicity? Obviously, logically, no, and it's been tested. You're not adding something to make a product safer if, under combustion, it could release more toxic chemicals. It's physical characteristics, the density of the tobacco, the paper, the circumference. These characteristics in and of themselves, logically, will not release more toxins. Let's not forget that these products are very toxic. It's the only legal consumer product that kills when used as intended.

I have Andrew McGuire's testimony here and I'm submitting it to the committee. He has claimed under oath that there is no problem through changing the physical characteristics of cigarettes.

Mr. John McKay: Not to put too fine a pun on it, this is a bit of a smoke-screen, as far as you are concerned.

Mr. François Damphousse: As far as I'm concerned, yes.

» (1720)

Mr. John McKay: Mr. Lennox, you're engaged in a lawsuit, and the standards simply don't exist at the present time. If you are representing the defendants in this particular instance, what is it you're actually worried about, other than a pay-out on your lawsuit?

Mr. Douglas Lennox: First, Mr. McKay, I'm simply here as a concerned citizen. I'm not here to represent anyone other than myself.

Mr. John McKay: Okay.

Mr. Douglas Lennox: Certainly, there are documents from U.S. tobacco companies and lawyers for U.S. tobacco companies that talk about the litigation risk, and if the industry were required by a government at any time to make a safer product, whatever the safety improvement might be, that decision might then be used in some court to say the product sold previously was unsafe. If you kill 45,000 Canadian a year in various ways through the sale of tobacco products, that is a big concern. I don't represent tobacco companies and I don't know what goes on behind closed doors, but as any lawyer defending in a product liability action would say, that's a big damage claim, and if you have to pay that and if you have to pay government health care costs and if you have to pay this, that, and the other thing, maybe your company won't be around in its present form. So an understandable legal strategy would be to oppose regulation, as a means of defending lawsuits. I have no idea whether that's at issue here, and I'm sure Imperial Tobacco can speak for themselves, but that would be an understandable legal strategy for any company with a litigation risk.

Mr. John McKay: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you..

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I have two brief questions to ask before we rise.

This is the last opportunity for the tobacco industry to see whether or not a timetable might be set for research.

Secondly, Mr. Damphousse, if the committee were to recommend that the bill not be passed, since the Dangerous Goods Act is not the appropriate vehicle to meet our objective, and if we were to rely on the regulatory framework of the Tobacco Act, while giving the tobacco industry a timeframe to work with Health Canada, would all of that be acceptable? I mean a specific, prescribed deadline. I believe it would be difficult to rely solely on the Dangerous Goods Act. You did not raise that particular point, but what do you think?

My first question deals with the timeframe and the second one was for you.

Mr. Donald McCarty: I believe that it would be up to Health Canada to set the timetable.

Mr. Réal Ménard: And would you agree to abide by it?

Mr. Donald McCarty: We would abide by any reasonable timetable set by Health Canada.

Mr. François Damphousse: I think we should act as quickly as possible. The longer we delay the adoption of a regulation, the more fires will occur and the greater the risk that there will be innocent victims of these fires. We are talking about children. Mr. Lennox explained the case in which he was involved. There's also a coroner's inquest. The newspapers are full of stories of fires and victims.

» (1725)

Mr. Réal Ménard: But why do we need to use the Dangerous Goods Act? We need a proper vehicle. If we make law, it must be done properly.

Mr. François Damphousse: As long as the measure is effective, I don't really care whether it is in the Dangerous Goods Act or the Tobacco Act. It must be done as quickly as possible. If an amendment is made to the Tobacco Act which does not suit our purposes, then we will not be satisfied. If Mr. MacKay's Bill C-260 represents an effective measure similar to the New York standard, we will support it.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Health Canada says that it is not a good vehicle.

Mr. François Damphousse: I am saying that we have to act as quickly as possible. That is what we would find most suitable.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee members, I'd like to thank our witnesses for coming, making their presentations, and answering our questions so graciously.

For the committee members, in the early part of the meeting we cancelled tomorrow's meeting, for which you have received a notice. You'll probably receive a little cancellation notice too, but you're informed here. I'm wondering if I could ask you to come on Wednesday at 3:15, because I have a feeling that 3:30 to 5:30 isn't going to be quite long enough. So if you could come out of QP at 3 and come directly, we could begin at 3:15 with our examination of that report.

Thank you very much.

This meeting is now adjourned.