FAIT Committee Report

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOREIGN
POLICY DIALOGUE

INTRODUCTION

In January 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs launched A Dialogue on Foreign Policy, designed to engage Canadians in a discussion of Canada’s long-term foreign policy directions. The Minister invited all Members of Parliament to participate in this dialogue by holding community meetings about foreign policy issues, and noted that “the House and Senate standing committees are reviewing aspects of our foreign policy, and their reports will form part of this process.”¹ He later commented in a meeting with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that

as members of this committee, you have already contributed to the process by means of the report you presented last December on our North American relations … I understand that your next report will deal with another topic at the heart of this dialogue, Canada’s relations with the Moslem world.²

A number of witnesses argued for a full-scale review of Canadian foreign policy as opposed to the more limited dialogue process. Members agree, and would have preferred a more formal role for the Committee. Nevertheless, the Committee welcomes the opportunity to add a further degree of parliamentary input to the dialogue process. To make an effective contribution to this process, the Committee convened a number of hearings that provided expert testimony and advice on some of the most important developments affecting Canada’s role in the world and on the most pressing policy issues facing Canadian foreign-policy makers at this time. This report summarizes and also provides our views on the key issues raised during these meetings — admittedly a “snapshot” — namely:

The Committee has also considered the overall approach that it believes is necessary to effectively communicate, represent and defend Canadian interests and values abroad. While rarely the subject of public debate, issues such as the linkages between our foreign, defence and development policies, as well as the personnel, organizational and financial resources that the federal government has committed to develop and deliver policy in these areas, cannot be excluded from any serious debate about the future role Canada can, and should, play in the world.

The Committee’s hearings took place in the weeks preceding and during the recent war in Iraq. While, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs admitted to the Committee, this crisis has in some ways overshadowed the foreign policy dialogue, it has also underlined the importance of some of the longer-term issues discussed in this report. These include: the changes in U.S. foreign policy following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and their implications both for bilateral Canada-U.S. relations and the broader international system. The Committee believes that these and other issues must be part of a full-scale review of Canadian foreign policy in the near future.

THE COMMITTEE’S CONTRIBUTION TO CANADA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Following an extensive parliamentary review process, in 1995 the government of Canada published its foreign policy statement Canada in the World, that outlined three related aims or “pillars” of Canadian foreign policy: prosperity and employment; security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture. In the years since 1995, this committee has carried out a significant amount of work, that has all involved extensive public hearings, and presented specific recommendations to Parliament related to the major elements of Canadian foreign policy, including reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international financial institutions (IFIs), the G8, Canada’s policies on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and relations with countries and regions of particular relevance to Canadian interests, most recently, the United States and Mexico.

While the government has tabled responses to each of these except the last — its response to the most recent report Partners in North America: Advancing Canada’s Relations with the United States and Mexico, will be tabled soon — the Committee believes that the government needs to take full advantage of its work by revisiting the analyses and recommendations that the Committee has made in these reports as part of the current dialogue on foreign policy. The Committee also believes that its current study on Canada’s relations with the countries of the Muslim world will make an important contribution to ongoing debates about the importance of cultural and other values in international relations and, therefore, to Canadian foreign policy development.

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1995

In A Dialogue on Foreign Policy, the government notes that:

Global changes are creating challenges and opportunities that call for a renewed assessment of how Canada should pursue its foreign policy goals. Since we cannot be everywhere and do all things internationally, we must be prepared to make choices about how our efforts and resources can best promote Canadian values and interests.³

In addressing the important changes in the world since 1995, the government must incorporate the lessons, both positive and negative, learned in Canadian foreign policy since that time. Most observers would argue that the positive developments have included Canada’s role in advancing the broad concept of “human security,” which focuses on protecting people around the world as a complement to traditional state security, in achieving new levels of cooperation both with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society — notably in the achievement of a ban on antipersonnel landmines — and, increasingly, within relevant government departments themselves.

On the negative side, we share the concern that, while all departments of government saw their budgets reduced significantly during the 1990s as part of the efforts to eliminate the federal deficit, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of National Defence (DND) were especially hard hit, and the resources devoted to Canadian foreign policy goals have been inadequate. In addition to reducing the efficiency of Canadian foreign policy, many believe that the budget reductions have also deminished Canada’s influence in the world, a situation that must be addressed by any foreign policy dialogue or review.

While it is true that “we cannot be everywhere and do all things internationally,” we must be where it counts to ensure that Canada’s voice is heard and that our interests are taken into account on an ongoing basis. This argument was made by several witnesses, including Andrew Cohen of Carleton University:

I can’t tell you today, with any kind of certainty, the kind of Canada we should be in the world. I do know that we are a shadow of what we were because we’ve stopped investing in ourselves. I do know that the way we must consider the question is we must stir a national debate, which is what this committee can do to seek to rebuild our presence in the world. The time is right; this is 2003; not 1993. We have the money today, our budget is in surplus; the question is, do we have the will?⁴

The Committee agrees. Resources are not a substitute for policy, yet policy without adequate resources cannot achieve either its goals or its potential. The pages that follow present key principles the Committee believes should guide the government as it reviews the various elements of foreign policy, but such a policy must be premised on the availability of adequate personnel, organizational and financial resources. Increased resources must first be directed to both the diplomatic and trade elements of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, as the main instrument for the development and delivery of Canadian foreign policy, but cannot stop there. In order to achieve the goals of Canadian foreign policy, the Committee reiterates the need to further increase and sustain the amount spent on all the major elements of Canadian foreign policy programs, including diplomacy, defence and development assistance.

BALANCING OBJECTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Reid Morden, formerly both Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), argued before the Committee that:

Foreign policy and the diplomacy to put it into action … [cover] a multitude of areas, political relations, economic trade policies, defence matters, cultural identity, immigration … at the end of the day, it all comes back to being a tool for the preservation of Canada’s national sovereignty and sovereignty is a concept that you either use or you lose … the problem that we grapple with today is how we exercise our sovereignty within our realistic margin of manœuvre.

… Marshall McLuhan once put a quiz to a class of his in which he’d started a phrase saying ‘I am as Canadian as,’ and the students had to complete the phrase. The winner was ‘I am as Canadian as possible under the circumstances.’⁵

While members differ on a number of important issues, they agree that as a trading nation with a strong tradition of multilateralism, Canada requires an independent foreign policy operating within a rules-based international system.

As noted above, the government’s 1995 foreign policy statement outlined three related aims or “pillars” of Canadian foreign policy: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture. Gordon Smith, who once served as Deputy Minister of DFAIT, as well as Canadian Ambassador to both NATO and the European Union, told members that “the three principles that are to be found in that … paper remain, security, prosperity and values…of course these principles need to be balanced and the real issues come in the trade-offs in the real world amongst these…”⁶

Professor Peter Stoett of Concordia University suggested specific changes to the “pillars,” dropping the third, which he argued was “… the most problematic, expendable and ultimately replaceable.” He argued that, “It would be a disservice to Canada’s diversity to argue that a uniform set of values even exists, that it determines foreign policy, except to say that we should encourage the acceptance of similar diversity abroad which is not to say much beyond a rather conventional human rights agenda promoting democratization and tolerance. That we need a pillarization, if I can use that phrase, to tell us this is quite embarrassing.” He suggested replacing this pillar with “sustainable development” as an encompassing theme that cuts across the humanitarian, ecological and human rights orientation of the human security agenda.⁷

Most witnesses did not focus on the issue of what the main “pillars” of Canadian foreign policy are, or should be, perhaps indicating implicit agreement with Andrew Cohen, who argued that “it seems to me our temple of internationalism … ought to have many pillars.”⁸ Committee members believe that sustainable development and human rights must remain central values that inform Canadian foreign policy.

UNDERSTANDING AND ENGAGING THE UNITED STATES

Professor Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia noted the overall decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world — and, more importantly, their human and other costs — along with a significant increase in the number of democracies since the end of the Cold War.⁹ Beyond this, the most fundamental change in international relations in the years since the last review of foreign policy, reflected in both the government’s Dialogue paper and the Committee’s hearings, is the unprecedented power of the United States. While its dominant position as the world’s only superpower — or “hyperpower,” as many observers now call it — is clear, the United States also feels uniquely vulnerable following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, as Harvard University Professor and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye argued before the Committee last year, in a world of increasing global economic integration and interdependence, even with its dominant military power, the United States still has to cooperate with other states to both address increasingly important transnational threats such as terrorism and manage the global political economy. A number of witnesses referred to the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, which raises profound questions related to international law and multilateralism that Canada and other states must address. However, retired Canadian diplomat John Noble pointed out to the Committee that, while many have criticized the doctrines of pre-emption and unilateralism contained in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, the fact that this strategy also acknowledged that there is “… little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world, without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe” has generally been ignored. According to Mr. Noble:

… the validity of that statement didn’t get buried in the sands of Iraq, or in the failure of our efforts to promote a compromise proposal at the United Nations on Iraq. It means we have to engage the United States on a variety of issues and be prepared to discuss their concerns as much as our own. That is how Canada’s commitment to multilateralism can be combined with efforts to influence the United States. Take them at their word, engage, rather than constant carping from the sidelines.¹⁰

This has important implications both for Canada-U.S. bilateral relations and for international cooperation and multilateralism.

On the bilateral level, Professor Denis Stairs of Dalhousie University reminded the Committee soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States that “…maintaining an effective working relationship with the United States is the only true imperative in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.” Although the bilateral relationship will remain the most important to Canada for economic and other reasons, it will always be asymmetrical, with the United States more important to Canada than Canada is to it. Indeed, much of the testimony in the Committee’s hearings focused on the issue of the “margin of manœuvre” available to Canada. Witnesses argued that this margin of manœuvre allows Canada to pursue important foreign policy goals different from those of the United States. However, they stressed that, while Canada can, and should, disagree with the United States when it judges this to be in its interest, this decision must be taken on the basis of reasoned and informed debate, paying attention both to the overall tone of the bilateral relationship and the way that our differences are communicated. The Committee agrees. This must also be a continuous and consistent effort — “24/7/365” as one witness put it. The term “quiet diplomacy” may seem quaint to some, but a number of witnesses stressed its continuing utility for Canada.

In December 2002, following extensive hearings across the country as well as in the United States and Mexico, the Committee tabled a major report entitled Partners in North America: Advancing Canada’s Relations with the United States and Mexico. While the report acknowledged many areas for increased trilateral cooperation in the future, it focused most of its attention and recommendations on the Canada-U.S. relationship. The Committee is confident that this report, with its central message concerning the need to take relations in North America seriously, consolidating and enhancing bilateral relations while encouraging trilateral approaches where possible, as well as its almost 40 specific recommendations, will provide direction to the government in this area.

At the same time, developments over the past several months, particularly related to Iraq, have strained Canada-U.S. relations. These developments have also reinforced the importance of a number of the recommendations made in our December 2002 report, particularly in regard to the need to increase Canadian diplomatic and other representation in the United States, and to strengthen relations between Canadian parliamentarians and their North American counterparts. Efforts need first to focus on strengthening existing mechanisms, such as the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, but other mechanisms we have suggested, such as joint meetings of our Foreign Affairs committees, or even public symposia, would also be useful.

MULTILATERALISM

The history of Canadian foreign policy is one of multilateralism — diplomacy and policies which support the establishment and maintenance of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, and rule-making as a means of achieving goals. A number of witnesses reminded the Committee that successive governments have decided that this is the best means of achieving Canada’s foreign policy goals, rather than simply an end in itself. It was also noted that, while multilateralism remains key to Canadian foreign policy, it must not be uncritical. Over the years, as noted above, the Committee has made specific recommendations related to institutions ranging from the WTO and the G8 to the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Arctic Council; and many of these — particularly in regard to the WTO and the G8 — have included important suggestions for reform.

In this respect, testimony before the Committee focused on the implications of the Iraq crisis for the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, for NATO. According to Reid Morden, “It seems to me that if we’re looking for something within our multilateral relationships to worry about, I think we should really turn our eyes to the very serious strains that now exist within NATO which may well speed a seminal event in post-World War II history with the run down or wholesale removal of U.S. troops in Europe.”¹¹

Most attention focused on the potentially serious implications of the recent crisis for the United Nations. After reiterating that this was his personal opinion, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN Stephen Lewis said that:

What worries me, as a person who loves and believes in multilateralism, is that this continuing focus on peace and security in the Security Council is forgetting the two other pillars of the United Nations Charter, one of which is development and the other of which is human rights. Development and human rights are at the heart of how most of the world sees the United Nations. They don’t see the United Nations as forever tussling over war. They see the United Nations as delivering food in a desperate shortage. They see the United Nations handling immunization, girls’ education, child soldiers, child labour, all of the phenomena of human interaction and all of those international human rights instruments which govern human behaviour.

… we also have to be very careful not to use this word United Nations as though somehow the United Nations was a separate entity responsible for what is happening apart from the behaviour of nation states. The United Nations is a compendium of the nation states which comprise it and if France, or the United States, or anybody else wants to be bloody-minded, it can bring the activities of the United Nations to a halt but that’s not the fault of the United Nations. That’s the fault of the behaviour of member states. That’s the way this world works.

He added that “… if Canada leads the rush to reassert the primacy of international multilateral United Nations sanity, we would be playing a very strong role.”¹²

While most witnesses argued that the United Nations should continue to be a foundation of Canadian foreign policy, they also agreed that it needed reform, when and if member states agreed on this. At the broadest level, the United Nations will never be perfect, as Professor Andrew Mack, who served as Director of Strategic Planning for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan until 2001, pointed out: “You need to reform world politics ultimately in order to be able to reform the UN.”¹³ The fact that the UN will never be perfect, however, does not mean it cannot be improved to play a more effective role.

According to John Sigler,

… it is important to recognize that Canada has a deep knowledge of the weaknesses and limitations of the UN system, but it has consistently tried to strengthen and help reshape the UN and make it more effective. The recent Canadian role at the UN Security Council in trying to find a bridge between the chief differences among the permanent five is consistent with our long record … bridging the divisions rather than taking sides. What needs to be done now is to continue to work with a broad coalition of the like minded to find ways to heal the division …¹⁴

He suggested that the current crisis might finally convince member states of the need to act on a number of suggestions for UN reform, including “an extraordinarily serious” set of recommendations by the Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. In practical terms, a particularly difficult issue to address will be the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council. Even here, however, there are possibilities, according to Andrew Mack: “… there is a great deal of talk … about member states, P5 states, only using the veto in situations where their vital national interests are at stake and explaining their reasons for doing it. That would be a real improvement.”¹⁵

More generally, Andrew Cohen pointed out that the groundbreaking report (The Responsibility to Protect) of an international commission established by Canada on the issues of the right of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty has yet to be properly considered at the United Nations. He argued that this was an area where Canada had something to say. Members agree that our relationship with the United Nations must remain a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Accordingly, the government must intensify its efforts to encourage and achieve meaningful reform of the UN, in order to ensure that it plays a central role in global affairs.

THE THREE PILLARS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Security

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 resulted in a new emphasis on security, which had been discussed as the second of the three priorities in the 1995 foreign policy statement, but is listed as the first in the January 2003 Dialogue paper. In practical terms, the response of the government of Canada to the U.S. sense of vulnerability after those attacks was to significantly increase the resources it devotes to border security and intelligence, and to negotiate a Smart Border accord with the United States.

Intelligence, law enforcement and other types of cooperation are much more valuable in the fight against terrorism than military cooperation, and the Committee has made a number of recommendations to strengthen Canada’s capacities in this area, notably the creation of both a Cabinet committee on national security and a House of Commons standing committee on security and intelligence. The renewed emphasis on security issues has also led to increased criticism of the underfunding of the Canadian military, a situation acknowledged by the current Minister of Finance when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. In its December 2002 report Partners in North America, the Committee recognized the important contribution of the Canadian Forces in helping Canada achieve its foreign policy goals, and called for “… substantially increased and stable multi-year funding for the Department of National Defence.”¹⁶ The February 2003 budget did provide increases in the defence budget, yet witnesses before the Committee agreed that still more money is needed.

In addition to resources, the government must also take action to increase the effectiveness of Canada’s military forces. At the broadest level, this will require either increasing their size — the option preferred by most members — or reducing the demands placed on them. In addition, measures must be taken to increase their ability to deploy rapidly to zones of conflict. While this might involve simply ensuring prompt access to adequate transport, it could also be addressed on a more general level. John Sigler pointed out that “In the Canadian military, there have been important changes in training and deployment to stress work with humanitarian and development aid agencies, official and non-governmental.”¹⁷ NATO allies have agreed to pursue the transformation of their forces to increase their capabilities, and Canada has also done a significant amount of work with Norway, the Netherlands and other countries on the concept and development of “rapid reaction forces.” The Committee believes the government must continue to increase the capabilities of Canada’s military forces, and these questions must be considered as part of the broader foreign policy review we call for.

Finally, while the Committee’s 1997 report Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation Into the Twenty-First Century explored the social, environmental, scientific and other issues that must be addressed by Canada and other circumpolar states, it also recognized the continuing sovereignty and security dimensions. In addition to recommending that the government “reaffirm its claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago …“ it suggested exploring “… alternative technical and diplomatic mechanisms for advancing Canada’s sovereignty position.”¹⁸ One means of increasing Canada’s claim to sovereignty over its arctic waters is to increase its military presence in the north, a solution perhaps more relevant now than in 1997 in light of continuing debates over both the consequences of global warming and energy development. 

While highlighting the need to maintain adequate military forces, the past two years also featured increased discussion of the dangers of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In its 1998 report Canada and the Nuclear Challenge, the Committee argued that while it was necessary to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international arrangements to combat the proliferation of such weapons, the international community must also continue to work toward the progressive reduction and ultimate elimination of such weapons.

In its June 2002 report in advance of the Kananaskis Summit, Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit, the Committee made a number of recommendations for preventing nuclear terrorism, including increasing support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and securing and disposing of fissile material in Russia and elsewhere. G8 nations did make significant announcements in this regard at the summit; and while much work remains to be done, this type of cooperation remains indispensable. Notwithstanding the Indo-Pakistani conflict, perhaps the most immediate nuclear crisis is that on the Korean peninsula. Members welcomed the belated decision of the North Korean government to engage in multilateral talks aimed at diffusing the crisis, yet note that its provocations will also have implications for other debates, such as that over missile defences.

In addition to underlining the need for increased resources devoted to the Canadian Forces and continuing multilateral cooperation to combat the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the past decade has highlighted the importance of addressing the non-military aspects of security. Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia argued that a decade of experience and research has shown the importance for Canada and other states to continue supporting such “human security oriented policies” as peace brokering, post-conflict reconstruction, support for democratization and good governance, security sector reform and transitional justice mechanisms. In particular, the challenge is to continue to increase cooperation between departments of government working on foreign affairs. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Committee, the government has responded to this challenge by “…working in its own way to strengthen Canada’s foreign policy capacities by improving planning and coordination among the many departments whose work extends to international affairs.”¹⁹ The Minister for International Cooperation was more specific, telling members that “I’ve been speaking very often and working very closely with my colleagues from the departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and National Defence about strengthening our relationships. We’re working together around the so-called three Ds of diplomacy, defence and development.”²⁰

However valuable the concept of human security, the term itself has become somewhat controversial over the past several years because some equate it with both a neglect of traditional security concerns and a lack of adequate funding for foreign policy. Members agree that Canada’s foreign policy must address all aspects of security, but only government action in terms of both resources and improved coordination can disprove this perception.

Prosperity

Canada is the seventh-largest trading nation in the world, and as Reid Morden pointed out “our trade interests … confront us at the three essential levels of foreign policy decision making: bilaterally with the U.S., regionally with NAFTA and conceivably the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and globally and multilaterally through the World Trade Organization.”²¹ The Committee, whose mandate includes international trade as well as foreign affairs, has done significant work in all these areas: it has examined the WTO in two reports,²² the FTAA and trade relations in the Americas in two others,²³ and NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. relationship in Partners in North America, which was tabled in December 2002 and has since been translated into Spanish and distributed in the United States and Mexico.

Trade with the United States has increased tremendously since the last foreign policy review. It accounts for 87% of Canada’s exports, and about 35% of the GDP. This economic relationship is, and will remain, the basis of Canada’s economic prosperity. The government continues to work through the WTO to liberalize trading rules on a global basis — and, in the opinion of many, to curb the use of trade remedies by the U.S. (and other countries), since it did not obtain an exemption from them in either the Canada-U.S. Free Trade agreement or the NAFTA. Its practical priority, however, has been to focus on economic ties with the United States, and to consolidate the gains made in the past while still seeking where possible to improve them even further. In its December 2002 report, the Committee made a number of specific recommendations in this respect.

Although John Noble and others pointed out that geography and other factors make large-scale diversification of Canada’s trade unlikely, the Committee believes that Canada must also work more aggressively to develop other markets. For this reason, its subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment has investigated ways of strengthening Canada’s trade relations with Europe and Latin America,²⁴ and is currently doing the same for the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

Values

Whether or not they should be a separate “pillar,” witnesses agreed that the values shared by Canadians must continue to inform all aspects of the country’s foreign policy. While Professor Stoett pointed out that values such as human rights, democracy and good governance are widely shared, others have suggested that a particular Canadian strength, pluralism, is less so. In his testimony before the Committee, John Sigler quoted the Aga Khan, who argued in 2002 that:

Canada is today the most successful pluralist society on the face of our globe … that is something unique to Canada. It is an outstanding global, human asset … it is amazing what can be done if you go in with economic support, social services, dialogue, bringing the community together, focusing on hope in the future rather than looking backwards in despair. ²⁵

Many believe that the most direct expression of Canada’s values in its foreign policy is development assistance, and many witnesses addressed both its quantity and quality. The Minister for International Cooperation told members that “you can be sure that I will be there to push the case for development and cooperation to remain a central pillar for our foreign policy. I don’t believe it will be a tough sell because survey after survey tells us that Canadians want to help correct the gross global inequities that confront us today.”²⁶

CIDA’s mandate is to support sustainable development in order to reduce poverty and contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. In doing so, it must operate within a context often characterized by conflict, corruption and lack of indigenous capacity. Immediate crises will always demand humanitarian and other action, and our subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development is currently examining the urgent humanitarian crisis in Africa. Yet as one CIDA official recently commented before that subcommittee, “when we're talking about humanitarian assistance, we're talking of failed development. If development worked we would not need to have humanitarian assistance. That's an important starting point.”²⁷

Gordon Smith, who also chairs the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre, agreed with the need for longer-term approaches, arguing for capacity-building in the developing world in the following terms: “… apart from it being morally questionable, it’s now virtually impossible to be well-fed in a hungry world, to be healthy in a sick world and to be wealthy in a world riddled with poverty… even a short-term viewpoint shows the mutual vulnerability of all humanity.”²⁸

Canadian development assistance does make a difference, yet witnesses suggested that CIDA has the worst of both worlds. On one hand, it suffers from a lack of resources: although it accepts the international goal of a 0.7% ODA/GDP ratio recommended by Lester Pearson over 30 years ago, Canada has never come close to reaching it, and now ranks among the least generous of OECD donors. On the other hand, CIDA continues to provide assistance to some 100 countries around the world.

Recent years have seen some progress on both rebuilding resources and increasing focus, although witnesses argued that much more needs to be done. The government has now committed itself to doubling its aid budget by 2010. While this is welcome, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation estimates that at the rate of current funding increases it will still take until 2040 to reach the 0.7% target. In March 2003, the Minister for International Cooperation told the Committee:

Canada has said that as a minimum that we will continue to increase by 8% per year. That’s very good news. Will it go higher than 8%? That will depend obviously on the will of the Canadian people … on the effectiveness that we’re able to show with the dollars that we’ve now been given … I’m very optimistic that our aid dollars will more than double by the year 2010.

In its June 2002 report Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit, the Committee argued that Canada should encourage its G8 partners to “increase substantially” their official development assistance for Africa, and propose “a realistic timetable” for achieving the 0.7% target.²⁹

In terms of focus, in 2000, CIDA announced four social development priorities: health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, basic education, and child protection, with gender equality as a cross-cutting theme. In 2002, it outlined new policies for increasing the effectiveness of Canada’s development assistance, including untying aid, increasing donor cooperation and beginning to focus new resources toward countries that practise good governance and mobilize their own resources for development. While the Minister told the Committee that “this was only the beginning,” a number of witnesses argued for more fundamental change, such as reducing sharply the number of countries and/or increasing support for particular areas.

In the case of HIV/AIDS, Stephen Lewis argued that, despite the fact that this pandemic “… is overshadowing anything we know in human history”³⁰ in terms of its consequences and we know how to turn it around, no country — particularly among G8 states — is taking a lead on the international scene. He argued that Canada should significantly increase its commitment to the UN’s new Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and champion the cause internationally by urging G8 and other countries to do likewise.

The Committee welcomes both the clearer focus of Canadian development assistance and the government’s commitment to double its aid budget by 2010. However, it believes still more is necessary, and agrees with the unanimous call of witnesses for substantial increases in the development budget. Recent commitments are a step in the right direction, but the government should continue to focus CIDA resources, promote good governance and capacity building, and commit itself to an additional increase in the development budget to enable it to reach the 0.7% target with all deliberate speed. The Committee also agrees with Stephen Lewis that one area where Canada can make a real difference is by being a leader in the global fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Finally, while increased resources and coordination among relevant departments are necessary for an effective foreign policy which reflects the values of Canadians, they are not sufficient to ensure that it considers their opinions and enjoys their confidence on an ongoing basis. The period since 1995 has seen a valuable increase in public consultations dealing with foreign policy, particularly with NGOs. Yet, as the elected representatives of the people, parliamentarians also have a unique role to play in canvassing, communicating and evaluating the views of Canadians and of the government. The Committee has played a role in this respect over the years, for example through its public hearings and, more formally, in such ways as instituting an annual appearance before it of Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament, and recommending —successfully — annual consultations between the government and civil society on policies related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Consultations are not a panacea, however, and may in fact camouflage or even create other problems. Annette Hester, Director of the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary, pointed out that while the Canadian government has significantly increased its consultations in the area of foreign policy, it has done this without providing core funding for academic research, education and training through a rules-based process. In her words:

… this has happened without any allocation of funds for research in this area. The consequence in the short-term is that the quality and availability of the presentations made before your various forums are greatly compromised. In the long-term, the consequence of these policies are that we have a whole generation who have not been schooled to think of Canada's strategic position, but who are nevertheless asked to voice opinions on the matter. Needless to say that this opens a wide space for special interest groups to sway opinions, possibly leading to polarization of public opinion in ill-informed ways.³¹

A key element in maintaining the support and confidence of Canadians in their foreign policy involves increasing transparency in its formulation and delivery. Canada has taken the lead in this respect at the international level, for example, by convincing its partners in the FTAA negotiations to publish the draft text. Yet transparency at the international level is not sufficient.

Reid Morden argued before the Committee that “… you can review and rewrite foreign policy to the extent of our margin of manœuvre, but we will not regain the respect I believe this country has earned in its international relations without engagement, constancy of purpose and, above all, leadership, political leadership.”³² Members of the Committee acknowledge the responsibility of all parliamentarians to encourage and contribute to informed debate in this area, and will continue to do so. The government has an equal responsibility, however, to continue to increase transparency.

Consultations must be combined with ongoing parliamentary scrutiny to ensure that Canadian foreign-policy makers remain accountable to Canadians, through their elected representatives. This accountability is needed now more than ever, in an age where the processes of globalization have speeded up, and their resulting impact has considerable consequences on the ability of any nation state — Canada as much as others — to decide on policies and programs in isolation. That is the reason that this committee encourages all dialogue with Canadians on issues related to foreign policy, and decided to go beyond its work already underway to contribute to the government’s Dialogue process. In order to further contribute to parliamentary oversight in this area, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should appear before the Committee at the earliest possible opportunity to discuss the results and implications of the dialogue process.

THE NEED FOR A FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

While engaging Canadians in a dialogue on foreign policy is a valuable exercise, the Committee believes that a full-scale and transparent review of Canadian foreign policy remains essential. The Committee has already addressed a number of the issues that must be part of such a review. Its hearings have underlined the need to address several in particular depth: the implications of the war in Iraq, both on Canada-U.S. bilateral relations and on the foundations of international law and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations; the implications of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States; the question of missile defences; the future of official development assistance; and the need to explore means of further integrating the three Ds of Canadian diplomacy, defence and development assistance.

Overall, Reid Morden was undoubtedly correct when he told the Committee that “it really is a world that impacts us more than we can impact it;”³³ however, an adequately funded, broadly supported and transparent Canadian foreign policy will not only serve the interests of Canadians within this context, it may also succeed in surpassing it.