C-17 Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 11, 2003

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1550

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.))

Mr. Vincent Westwick (Co-Chair, Law Amendments Committee, Legal Advisor, Ottawa Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police)

Ms. Susan Dunn (Member, Law Amendments Committee, Superintendent, Ontario Provincial Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police)

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1555

Mr. David Griffin (Executive Officer, Canadian Police Association)

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1600

º

1605

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ)

Mr. Vincent Westwick

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1610

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

Mr. David Griffin

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1615

Ms. Susan Dunn

Mr. David Griffin

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP)

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

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1620

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.)

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1625

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Steve Mahoney

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1630

Ms. Susan Dunn

The Chair

Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, Canadian Alliance)

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1635

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Gary Lunn

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Gary Lunn

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Gary Lunn

Mr. Vincent Westwick

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

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1640

Ms. Susan Dunn

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. David Griffin

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1645

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. David Griffin

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. David Griffin

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1650

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. David Griffin

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. Vincent Westwick

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1655

Ms. Susan Dunn

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. David Griffin

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. Vincent Westwick

The Chair

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Griffin

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1700

The Chair

Mr. Vincent Westwick

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

»

1705

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

The Chair

Mr. Gary Lunn

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)

Mr. Gary Lunn

Mr. Vincent Westwick

»

1710

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Susan Dunn

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

»

1715

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Vincent Westwick

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. David Griffin

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

»

1720

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. Vincent Westwick

The Chair

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CANADA

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

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NUMBER 009

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 11, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1550)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order our legislative committee on Bill C-17. We have quorum, and I'm sure other members will join us as we proceed.

    On behalf of the committee let me welcome Mr. David Griffin, the executive officer of the Canadian Police Association. With him is Superintendent Susan Dunn from the Ontario Provincial Police, and Mr. Vince Westwick, the co-chair of the Law Amendments Committee and legal adviser for the Ottawa Police.

    I understand the three of you have divided your time in such a way to meet the guidelines, so the committee is most anxious to hear from you.

    We'll begin with Mr. Westwick.

[Translation]

    Mr. Vincent Westwick (Co-Chair, Law Amendments Committee, Legal Advisor, Ottawa Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police): Merci.

    Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Vince Westwick and I am Co-Chair of the Law Amendments Committee of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. With me today is Susan Dunn, Superintendent with the Ontario Provincial Police and a member of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

    The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police represents some 950 police chiefs, assistant chiefs and members of the police executive, as well as 130 police forces from across Canada.

[English]

    By advocating legislative reform and innovative solutions for crime and public issues, as well as promoting community partnerships and high professional standards, the CACP is dedicated to leading progressive change in policing.

[Translation]

    I would like to extend the congratulations of Gwen Boniface, Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police and Chair of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, as well as of David McKinnon, Chief of the Halifax Police and Co-Chair of the Law Amendments Committee.

    It is an honour and a privilege to appear before you today to discuss a very important piece of legislation.

[English]

    We are grateful that this committee and the Parliament of Canada is steadfast in its intention to consult with the law enforcement community, and we are grateful that you accord this courtesy to our association.

    The CACP supports the provisions of the bill before you. Part 1 of this bill represents a series of changes in relation to airline safety, and my colleague, Superintendent Dunn, will speak more on that in a moment.

    Parts 2 through 23 present a series of technical and consequential enhancements to other federal acts that facilitate public safety in today's world. Many of these are strictly within the federal sphere and do not impact directly on policing. To the level that they do involve policing, they make sense. For example, the creation of the offence of terrorism hoax is valuable and could have already been used in Canada.

    Before Superintendent Dunn speaks I would like to comment on proposed subsections 4.82(4) and 4.82(5) and the absence of threats to security within the parameters of the RCMP mandate. In our view, the police ought to have the same mandate in relation to terrorism as does CSIS.

    I would like to ask Superintendent Dunn to speak on a few specifics, following which we will be available for your questions. Since this is the first time Superintendent Dunn has appeared before this committee, I would like to simply advise you that in addition to her duties with the OPP as director of the Operational Planning and Research Bureau, she is a lawyer and noted co-author of the annotated Police Services Act. She is also, in her capacity here, Acting Deputy Commissioner of the OPP.

    Superintendent Dunn.

    Ms. Susan Dunn (Member, Law Amendments Committee, Superintendent, Ontario Provincial Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police): Thank you. It's a pleasure to be with you today.

    This bill raises difficult topics with very important and competing interests. It is not easy to look at these issues and determine at first blush what is necessarily in the public interest.

    First we are talking about terrorism. As of today, post-9/11, it appears that some are concerned that there is still too much worry about terrorism. With world events continuing to unfold, we can state that as of today terrorism remains a very real threat to Canada and to Canadians. We cannot become complacent.

    In the context of terrorism, I would like to speak about expectations. I want to begin by acknowledging our respect for the expectation of privacy and for those who have argued its importance before you already. But expectations do not end there.

    What are the expectations of the travelling public in relation to the information they provide to airlines? Do they know that this information is contained on the computer databases of the airline to which every travel agent in Canada has access? Do they know that this information is available to call-centre clerks who may be located in Canada or the United States? Do they know that under Canadian law this information is already given to U.S. authorities for flights that go to the United States?

    Also, what are the expectations of the Canadian public in relation to the prevention of terrorist events? Obviously they want the police to take steps to prevent this kind of harm to their communities and to their families. But do they understand that investigation and prevention are based on information? Information links to investigative leads, which link to evidence. We must accept that this is not an easy process.

    What is the public's expectation about police having access to information that is already widely available in industry in Canada and elsewhere? What is the public's expectation about balancing important privacy concerns against meaningful steps toward prevention? What are the public's expectations about industry cooperating with the police?

    On the topic of incidental access to information and the discussions you've had on warrants that might come to the attention of police through access to this data, what are the public's expectations? Will the public think the police ought not to act on information that has already been through a judicial and public process? Will the public expect that the privacy rights of a person subject to a warrant for serious crimes outweigh the need to effect lawful process?

    Perhaps most importantly, what are the victim's expectations? We ask that you consider those already victimized by such a person with an outstanding serious warrant for criminal acts and those future victims who will or may be created when police do not or cannot act on a warrant found incidentally to a lawful process. What is the public's expectation of the criminal justice system when a lawful warrant is not enforced?

    The CACP has carefully and thoughtfully reviewed these questions. We believe that the public's expectation is that meaningful steps must be made toward prevention of terrorist action. We believe that the public's expectation is in favour of the enforcement of warrants that come to the attention of the police. We therefore support the passage of this bill, as my friend has said.

    We acknowledge, as we did in the opening, that these are difficult issues, and we ask you to consider the same questions in the hope that you will necessarily arrive at the same conclusions.

    I now believe my friend, Mr. Griffin, has a comment.

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    Mr. David Griffin (Executive Officer, Canadian Police Association): Thank you, Superintendent Dunn.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Canadian Police Association welcomes the opportunity to appear today before the committee on Bill C-17. As the national voice for 28,000 front-line police personnel across Canada, the Canadian Police Association promotes community safety by raising awareness on law enforcement and justice issues. It is in this respect that we are pleased to appear in support of Bill C-17, in particular to those issues related to access to airline passenger information.

    We have consulted with Mr. Westwick and Superintendent Dunn of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in preparation of our submissions, and we concur with the observations they have made in respect to this issue. We maintain that it is a reasonable expectation of Canadians that passenger lists will be screened in the interest of airline safety and security.

    While this legislation is particularly important in regard to current security concerns, in our view these concerns were of no less importance prior to September 11, 2001. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Canada or abroad. According to the Solicitor General's office, in 2000 alone, 16 in-flight incidents, 24 attacks on aircraft on the ground, and 33 hijackings were recorded worldwide.

    There are several points we would add for consideration, and a few other issues I would like to stress. First is the issue of warrants.

    We find it disturbing that critics of the bill would limit police ability to screen air passenger information for security purposes, and consequently limit their ability to act upon information identifying a passenger as the subject of a judicial process such as a warrant.

    We believe the public interest and the apprehending of persons wanted for criminal conduct outweighs any perceived privacy rights of the wanted person. A warrant compels a police officer to apprehend the person named and return that person to court. To do otherwise places others at risk and is not, in our submission, in the public interest.

    The second issue I'd like to talk about is parole violators. Persons on parole have been permitted to serve the final portion of their sentence within the community; however, these offenders are still subject to reasonable limits and constraints. We find it ludicrous that a person known to be in violation of parole would not be intercepted prior to boarding a plane, or at least subject to notification of their parole officer. In far too many instances, the inability of our corrections system to deal with offenders released into the community has had tragic consequences, including the murders of police officers and law-abiding citizens.

    On any given day in Canada there are approximately 800 fugitive parole violators on the run, and few resources are dedicated to their apprehension. We submit that a parole officer should be automatically notified when any person released on parole is identified on a passenger roster, and where there is an international flight the circumstances should warrant intervention and further investigation.

    The third issue I'd like to address is accountability. Concerns have been raised about the accountability of law enforcement officials who are alleged to have violated the restrictions under this legislation. We would like to remind the committee that police officers and members of the RCMP are sworn to uphold and abide by the law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Privacy Act, and the Canadian Human Rights Act. Police officers are subject to extraordinary oversight systems, including internal investigation and discipline and external review by the Public Complaints Commission.

    The circumstances leading to an arrest and prosecution are also subject to full disclosure and examination in a court of law. We must ensure, however, that the limitations and restrictions on the use of information obtained from passenger lists are not in conflict with the lawful duties and obligations of a police officer.

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    The fourth and final issue I would like to touch on deals with efficiency and effectiveness. As with any public agency, the RCMP and CSIS are continually under pressure to achieve success in complex investigations within the constraints of available resources. While technology is available to further enhance investigative and security efforts, it is important to balance the use of such technology with the legitimate privacy concerns of law-abiding Canadians. Regrettably, constraints are often placed upon the police that exceed the reasonable expectations of law-abiding citizens, requiring police to follow more labour-intensive and costly processes with little regard to efficiency and effectiveness.

    We believe it is a reasonable expectation among law-abiding Canadians that someone who boards an aircraft will have been checked for terrorism risk, for public safety concerns, for outstanding warrants, and for risk of flight while on parole. Such checks do not infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy for law-abiding Canadians and are reasonable to protect public safety and security. To do otherwise would be negligent and may have tragic consequences. It is in the interest of public safety to do so. It is in the interest of other passengers on the aircraft. And finally, it is in the interest of the administration of justice.

    Thank you very much.

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    The Chair: Does that conclude all of your remarks?

    Thank you very much.

[Translation]

    We will begin the first round of questioning with Mr. Laframboise.

    Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for agreeing to appear before the Committee.

    Let me go directly to my first question. This bill, Bill C-17, is a follow-up to Bills C-42 and C-55, the first drafts of which were tabled in December of 2001, three months after the events of September 11th. So, it is clear that this bill is not a national emergency. Had it represented a national emergency, it would have been dealt with earlier, as the others were. This bill makes improvements to a lot of existing statutes.

    But when you look at it closely, you really get the feeling that a lot of civil servants dream of nothing better than turning this country into more and more of a police state. That seems to pretty well reflect your objective, since there is no urgency here. I feel an obligation to make that point because you are telling us that it is important for warrants to be covered under this legislation. I will not quote the views of the Privacy Commissioner, who is dead set against this, but I would like to refer to the presentation made by the Canadian Bar Association, a group that is used to defending and protecting the interests of its constituents. People often call on lawyers to protect themselves against the sometimes rather excessive--although we certainly would prefer that was not the case--actions of police. That fact is you don't always win your case when you decide action is necessary.

    I would just like to read you one paragraph of the brief and get your reaction. This is what the Canadian Bar Association said:

Bill C-17 retains sub-section 4.82(11), which still gives any peace officer the right to disclose information if he or she has reason to believe that this information would assist in the execution of a warrant. Although there is a more precise definition of the term “warrant”, it still applies to offences that are not particularly serious and have no connection to terrorism.

    The Association is recommending that everything relating to warrants be completely removed from the bill. What worries me is that you are intent on keeping these provisions, whereas the Canadian Bar Association says we should remove them, because they are not directly linked to terrorism.

    When I see that you are taking a completely opposite position and that rather than proposing that the bill be amended, you are saying we should pass it as is, I must say that gives me some concern. I would like you to comment on the position taken by the Canadian Bar Association. Help me to understand why, in the name of terrorism, we should act on warrants for “offences that are not particularly serious and have no connection to terrorism.” Why should we do that?

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Mr. Laframboise, my view is that the overriding principle behind this bill is prevention.

[English]

    Whether the matter is urgent or not urgent is a matter best answered by you and your colleagues. Parliament will address that with the respect it deserves.

    In terms of whether or not it's urgent, the policing community thinks the important focus concerning terrorism now is with prevention, not just response. We see in the provisions included in this bill a focus on prevention in the data matching contemplated when information comes from the airline industry to the RCMP and to CSIS. This presents, in our view, a realistic opportunity for prevention, which doesn't exist often in the world of terrorism. The opportunity for prevention isn't always there.

    That would be our response with respect to your concerns dealing with urgency.

    Concerning the remarks of Mr. Potter, we reviewed them as well. As a member of the bar, I have great respect for Mr. Potter, but I would suggest that on this point we disagree with him. I can understand and am not without sympathy for the point he puts before the committee, and that of the privacy commissioner. But I think the forgotten voices when you're dealing with warrants are those of the victims and the communities that might be victimized. Those are the voices we would like to put before the table.

    For example, if this process identified a person for whom a warrant for an offence dealing with pedophilia had been issued, and by course of legislation the police were unable to act on this warrant and this person went forward and committed a new offence, victimizing a different child in a different Canadian city, what would that victim say to Parliament about this situation? How could such victims say the police had this information and yet were unable to act? We would put forward the voice of victims with regard to that.

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    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you very much for appearing. It's nice to have someone here who actually supports the bill. This is quite a change.

    I'm amazed, because we've had the privacy commissioner and the bar association and Clayton Ruby and the various existing charter challenges. I guess what we, as a committee, are looking for--certainly what I'm looking for--is some assurance against things like racial profiling and privacy of information; information sharing and the sale of passenger lists to a third party; the safekeeping and/or destroying of the information.

    I also have questions about peace officer access, how far the information goes down the line and who those peace officers would be. How would the above information impede the work of peace officers? How much of it is already available? How much more information will be added to police databases? How much power will be added to the existing powers of police forces under this particular piece of legislation? I suppose that's the bottom line of all my questions.

    I have to declare that I was formerly a member of the parole board, so I do have some thoughts on that too, but we won't let that bias come forward.

    Mr. David Griffin: From our perspective, the primary purpose here is obvious to everybody. I find it ironic that every time we take a flight we go through airport security and surrender our nail clippers, which are never to be seen again. We identify ourselves three times going through with the expectation that these checks and balances are reasonable to protect not only ourselves but other people who are on the aircraft. Yet to have the privacy commissioner or somebody else suggest that it's not reasonable to check the names of those people boarding the aircraft to see whether or not there's a risk not just to the people on that aircraft but to other Canadians seems inconsistent with what we do every day when we board that plane.

    I'm concerned as well then about the suggestion made about information obtained while checking, situations where it comes to your attention that this individual is on parole or that this individual is wanted by the courts. Now, the courts have issued a warrant for this person's arrest. The usual words at the top of the warrant are something like a police officer shall arrest this individual and deliver them forthwith to a court of competent jurisdiction. It seems absurd to us that the police officer would be instructed not to act on that information, that once information is known that this individual is on the aircraft, we would prevent the police from doing that.

    If we take that one step further, if we take that out into our streets, where people are stopped every day for minor traffic violations or in some other involvement with the police, are we going to suggest then that in those circumstances as well the police should not be able to check information to see if that individual is wanted or has other security or safety concerns for the police officer?

    We understand the need to respect personal privacy and the need to protect that information, but we don't have the resources available to send out search parties for every individual who is the subject of a warrant or who is on parole and has violated their parole. It's only logical to us that, in the course of using this information for one purpose, if you become aware of another problem, you will act on that other problem.

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    Ms. Susan Dunn: If I may, I'll speak on your question around racial profiling. I believe you've heard from Commissioner Zaccardelli, and I can speak on behalf of Commissioner Boniface for the OPP and with respect to the CACP.

    Professional policing does not condone racial profiling in any type of behaviour or actions on the part of a police officer. That would of course be subject to scrutiny under the various accountability mechanisms we currently have in place, which Mr. Griffin touched on. Swift action would be taken if any of that was found to be taking place.

    However, we look at this bill as not being the answer to everything, not the answer to all issues that are outstanding, but we certainly look at it as one more tool for police officers to use to fight these issues, specifically terrorism. What is also critical, the key issue for us in law enforcement, is information sharing. This bill allows us to do that in another way.

    Mr. David Griffin: I'll speak on racial profiling as well. It's my understanding that the information that is contained in airline passenger information would not allow you to profile somebody by race because it's not the type of information airlines collect. I think that there is some protection there.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: The type of meal you order on an aircraft can give that information. That would basically be racial profiling because they'd know what your religion was, so I disagree with you on that.

    The Chair: Ms. Desjarlais.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): Thank you.

    A number of comments have been made, and there seems to be some suggestion that even if there was a judicial warrant, there would be an objection to being able to remove from a plane someone who's found to have committed a crime. I don't think I've heard any testimony to that effect, and I wanted to make sure that is clarified. I am just curious, Mr. Griffin, because you've indicated that all this information is available on airline lists already. What would be the problem with going through it and finding someone who has possibly committed a crime?

    I'm wondering how you would sort that out as to how someone has committed a crime, because apart from your name and possibly how you paid for the ticket.... I know I don't give my age though they may have it. I don't give my age, I don't give the colour of my hair, I don't give my height, I don't give my weight, but I do give my name, so is this distinction just going to be based on a name? If you see a Beverly Desjarlais there, you're going to say, okay, we have to run her through the police check and see if any Beverly Desjarlais has committed a crime. Is that what you're indicating, Mr. Griffin?

    Mr. David Griffin: I'll read Mr. Westwick's notes.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: No, I'm asking you the question. You're here with the police association and you made the comment, so I'm asking you, how would you make the distinction based on the information that's available to the airline industry?

    Mr. David Griffin: From my looking through this, my understanding is that it's information such as name and date of birth that is available, depending on the type of flight--if it's a domestic flight versus an international flight--but certainly that information is the type of information the officers--

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay, so if you saw that and you saw a name, you would automatically key in on that person. Then would you check and see if I had committed a criminal offence just from seeing a name?

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    Mr. David Griffin: Again, our understanding of the bill as it's written is that it would allow the police to do checks such as checking the individual on CPIC, which is the Canadian Police Information Centre system.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So you're not seeing the name of a terrorist and making a check. You're seeing the name of any passenger and then checking those passengers to see if they have committed any kind of offence?

    Mr. David Griffin: I understand that it would be database against database. It would be an automated screen that would check one list against the police record system. Where there were issues identified, then that would be the information those individuals would act on. There may be several different databases: the police information system, security databases, and the types of databases CSIS maintains. They would cross-check individuals against those databases.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You're saying that for anyone who is boarding you're going to check for a terrorist risk. It's not for anything else, just a terrorist risk?

    Mr. David Griffin: The point is, as a consequence of doing those checks to determine if there's a safety concern, if this is somebody who is of interest from either a terrorist or a serious crime perspective or is somebody who is known to operate within organized crime and has been, say, a drug importer or that type of individual, then in doing that you may come across individuals who are subject to other lawful processes.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: My understanding is, as you mentioned different databases, that there is a specific database for known terrorists. Now, would that be the database of choice you would check, or would you start with just the regular CPIC check or maybe a motor vehicle offence check? What would be your first choice?

    Mr. David Griffin: I think that would be a good question for the RCMP witnesses who come before the committee, because ultimately they would be administering this. My point is that it's a reasonable expectation that before somebody boards an aircraft, we would do that check.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So you think it's a reasonable expectation that everyone is considered a terrorist before they board and that you check them all?

    Mr. David Griffin: No, but we check everybody through their--

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You're going to have to excuse me, but when you said that about the nail clippers, I also made a little note. I hope the information about my little nail clippers isn't being sent to the U.S. or somewhere else.

    They don't take your nail clippers any more, you know, but they do take your knife. Nobody argues about those kinds of things, about that kind of safety, but an individual's information being passed on from here to there and everywhere is a concern.

    Mr. David Griffin: But it's not going everywhere. You're essentially looking at a closed office where that initial screen is done. If as a result of that screen there are concerns raised because of something such as a warrant or the possibility of terrorism, then it will be up to that next authority to make a determination. Otherwise, that information is going to be processed and is going to be discarded within the seven days.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: It wouldn't be passed on anywhere else within that seven days, and nothing would happen to it? That's not the impression we're getting here.

    Mr. David Griffin: No, because the bill gives the criteria, the only circumstances under which that initial officer can disclose it to anybody else.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay, so say you think that Bev Desjarlais is a terrorist risk or some other risk and you pass it on to someone else. You may or may not pick me up at that point in time--I'm just guessing--but then you pass it on to someone, say, in the U.K. or the U.S. How do you ensure that they don't do anything with that information? How do you ensure that I'm given the right of a fair trial if I'm ever charged with anything?

    Mr. David Griffin: Again, there are criteria in legislation in terms of when the initial officer can disclose that information to another authority. There are specified criteria in the bill saying there has to be some bona fide belief that there's a risk to safety that warrants the disclosure. It's not only going to be lists of people.

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you for coming. Sorry I missed your presentation. I gather it was to my detriment, since it was fairly positive. We're not used to that in this committee. I'm sure it's thrown the opposition into a tizzy.

    In any event, let me ask a couple of questions.

    Mr. Ruby came before us and said, to paraphrase, that basically if a police officer identifies the existence of a person on an aircraft where a warrant is outstanding, etc., the police should have to get what amounts to a second warrant. In other words, he raised the point that because you suspect there is a person with a warrant outstanding inside a house, you can't go up and kick the door down. You have to have a warrant, unless there is very serious problem where the person's shooting at you or something like that.

    How do you react to the suggestion that there be what some people would call a safeguard that would require police, even though they've acquired this information through actions in the bill that would require you to ask for information on a specific flight or a specific individual and then, as a result of doing it, you discover this other person...? How do you feel about his suggestion that you have to take this extra step? What problems might it create?

º  (1625)  

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Yes. Mr. Mahoney, with full respect to Mr. Ruby, I think he's kind of tiptoeing through Canadian criminal law to bolster his argument.

    The situation where a police officer has to get a second warrant only exists if the person who was subject to a warrant is in a dwelling house. That's recent law. It arises out of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Feeney and has been addressed in subsequent legislation for a process to deal with that.

    For a person who was subject to a warrant, who was anywhere else in the public domain, there is no need for a warrant. In fact, I would suggest that it's a mandatory direction. As Mr. Griffin said earlier, it's a mandatory direction from the courts that the warrant be executed.

    The concern in Canadian law has not been that the police have been too zealous in executing warrants. The criticism is that they have not been zealous enough. There are too many people at large in Canada against whom warrants have been issued and the police haven't enforced them.

    You have to remember what a warrant process is. This is not something that's handed out willy-nilly by courts. A warrant is arrived at usually following a judicial process, certainly a public process. To suggest that a second warrant would be necessary to enforce the first warrant on an airplane I don't think makes a whole lot of sense. Quite frankly, I don't think the Canadian public would accept that kind of duplicitous action being foisted upon police.

    I think the point that is critical in this discussion about warrants, because we sense that there's a fair bit of confusion about this, is we do not understand that Bill C-17 could be creating a system for the benefit of Canadian police to enforce warrants that may be outstanding. The issue is, in the process of determining data matching for counter-terrorist purposes, if you incidentally in the process of the data matching come across a warrant, what do you do with it?

    The object is not to search for the warrant. The result is, as I say in the description, inadvertent. The problem is, what do you do now that you have this information? It's not that you're searching for the information, but what do you do with the information? That's the point.

    We think that not acting on the warrant would in fact be downright irresponsible.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: It would be a breach of duty perhaps.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: It would be a breach of duty. I'd hate to be there when a victim comes forward and says “Are you telling me the Canadian police had information that this person was subject to a warrant for a serious criminal offence and the police did nothing about it?” They did nothing about it because the law prevented them from doing it, and this person went on and raped or murdered someone, or whatever.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: And I'd hate to be the MP who got the call from the victim's family, so I think we're on the same page.

    But what we're hearing from those who are raising concerns, whether it be Mr. Radwanski, Mr. Ruby, or others, is fundamentally that they seemingly don't trust you--not you personally, but the police. There's a fear the police will in some way see this as a highway to information, that the Peel Regional Police Force--one of the best in the country, of course--would see it as an opportunity--just a little commercial there--to use a request to the RCMP. They could be hunting for an individual who has nothing to do with terrorism or national security, but they suspect he's on flight 222 coming in from Vancouver, so they call up the Mounties. They don't even have to call them, because Peel Regional Police happen to be the police at the airport, along with a few of the Mounties. They'd just go to their buddy, have a coffee, and say “Can you get me the info that you have the authority to request through Bill C-17 on that flight that's coming in so I can verify he's there and get this guy?”

    That's what they're expressing to us, that there is a possibility of abuse. I just want to be clear--I'm telling you what they're expressing, I'm not expressing it.

    I'd like your reaction to that.

º  (1630)  

    Ms. Susan Dunn: I'll take this one, or at least start it.

    The possibility of abuse is an issue that's always raised for us in law enforcement. I'll take you back to the comments we made earlier about the accountability mechanisms that are already in place in policing, which are very much supported by CACP. We believe we should be accountable to the public. We believe there should be mechanisms put in place that can test whether our officers are or are not doing things lawfully.

    That being said, if we gather or use information for improper purposes, the risk to us and to public safety is extreme, because ultimately we lose the case and the alleged offender will go free. That doesn't serve any of our purposes, and it's not the way we, in professional policing, conduct our business. Our mandate is very clear--it's public safety.

    On the issue of information sharing, within this new global environment that we are policing in, information, as I said in my opening remarks, is key to our success. Information sharing is key to winning this battle of terrorism. And it hasn't gone away. This many months and years after 9/11, the battle continues. It's a different world. We need to be armed differently and prepared differently to tackle this new law enforcement environment.

    The Chair: Mr. Lunn.

    Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I apologize for missing your presentations. It's been a crazy time right now, with too many commitments all at once.

    I echo Mr. Mahoney's and Mr. O'Reilly's comments on the positive sense of this. I'm going to start off with a short comment, and then two quick questions.

    As a person who flies a lot, I see this as a positive step. It's not about trying to find a guy you're going to arrest who has a warrant on him. I know that if I get on a plane and you're taking these extra measures, I have much more security. I welcome that. So it's about protecting all the other people who are getting on this plane. If you have a couple of people who raise a lot of red flags, and maybe you want to talk to them, it gives me that added security. I actually see it as quite a positive thing.

    So there are two questions.

    The one concern we have in the whole bill relates to some of the data in the PNR. Do we need that? Is it a bit of an intrusion on someone's privacy, i.e., what they ate, who they're travelling with, how they paid? Is there a way of limiting a few of those fields? Maybe you don't need to know who a person is travelling with, or if they're in a window or an aisle seat. You could just get a name, address, and date of birth.

    In the Canadian Alliance, that's the one issue we seem to have a bit of concern over. Are we collecting a little more data than we need to for this purpose?

    Second--I keep coming back to this--with this one, you have to destroy the data in seven days. The Canada Customs Act is very similar, but they can keep it for up to six years. It seems a bit odd. With an international flight, we give this data over to the U.S. authorities, and they can keep it forever, but we have to destroy it in six days. It's okay to give it to the Washington police forever, but the Ontario police can have it for only six days. It's inconsistent with another act. I think we probably should get them more in line.

    I'd like your comments on that as well, please.

º  (1635)  

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Sure. Maybe I'll try, Mr. Lunn.

    The first thing I should say is that, in terms of the actual process of how this will work, I would refer you to the commissioner of the RCMP or to the director of CSIS. I understand Mr. Elcock is speaking to you later this week as a witness before the committee. I would certainly defer to their information on the details of the process. I understand Mr. Elcock is going to speak in detail about the process and how the machinations of this will work. I clearly defer to him. The IT aspects of it become quite technical.

    Our understanding is that not only are the kinds of fields you are talking about--what seat number it is and the meal and all that--not something the police want, this information may present certain problems for them. There are 60 million or 70 million flights a year, and the police don't need all of that information. The management and filtering of it is going to present significant technological problems.

    I'm not so sure there is disagreement on this. But again, I would defer to them on the mechanics of it.

    As far as the seven-day issue is concerned, once the data has been searched--again, as I understand it--it's not of much value, unless there is some kind of hit and it's needed for evidentiary purposes.

    Mr. Gary Lunn: Let's say you get a hit and you don't use it within seven days. Do you have to destroy that data?

    Let's say there's a person who is quite suspicious. You might want to track his movements. All of a sudden, on the ninth flight in two months it all starts to form a pattern. Do you have the ability to retain the information just because you think he's a bit suspicious?

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: First of all, when you say do we have the ability, we don't have the ability to retain any of it here.

    Mr. Gary Lunn: After seven days....

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: As far as the policing community is concerned, it's the RCMP that will be managing this. My understanding is that provisions within the bill allow for the retention of information for evidentiary purposes.

    Mr. Gary Lunn: I'm coming back to that grey area. If there's a suspicion, you have a guy who's a bit shady--let's say there's not a warrant but he has a funny background--and as in many crimes, a pattern evolves when you track this person's whereabouts and things start linking up, you would think it may be of some use to retain information like that.

    Let's say he has a long criminal record but he's not wanted under any warrants on anything right now, but it's known he even has terrorist activities in his background. I would think it may be of some useful purpose to retain that a little longer. The other thing is, we do it in the Customs Act for up to six years, plus we're giving the same information to authorities outside of our country.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: I defer to Mr. Zaccardelli or Mr. Elcock to answer that. I don't feel I'm in a position to answer. I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you.

    The Chair: We'll move on.

    Ms. Jennings.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): I believe, just to answer Mr. Lunn's question, it would be proposed subsection 4.82(14), which says that it “...must be destroyed within seven days after it is provided or obtained, unless it is reasonably required for the purposes of transportation security or the investigation of 'threats to the security of Canada'...in which case a record must be prepared and kept setting out the reasons why the information is being retained.”

    So it can be retained, but they would have to have a written record of the reasons or grounds as to why it's retained.

    Now I'll come to my questions. I apologize for not being here when you made your presentations. I was still in the House.

    Coming to a subject my colleague Mr. Mahoney raised on some of the objections to proposed subsection 4.82(11), the disclosure to a peace officer for the execution of a warrant, there has been some issue raised about what is the reasonable expectation of privacy of a fugitive from justice who is using public air transportation--and I'd like to hear what that reasonable expectation is--using the standard developed under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms against unreasonable search or seizure.

    We're being told by some witnesses that it is in fact an unreasonable search and seizure to disclose that information to a peace officer in order for that peace officer to execute a pre-existing warrant and that people have an expectation of privacy that they are guaranteed under the charter by a whole slew of Supreme Court decisions and higher-level court decisions on unreasonable search and seizure.

    So the issue is what is the reasonable expectation of privacy of a fugitive from justice, someone against whom an arrest warrant already exists--whether it's for forgery, threats to bomb a plane, or a threat against a former spouse, like “I'm going to beat the crap out of you”? An arrest warrant already exists. What is a fugitive's reasonable expectation of privacy who is using public airline transportation?

º  (1640)  

    Ms. Susan Dunn: I'll start, Ms. Jennings, but I think my friends are all happy to jump in on this one.

    In our opening comments we talked about expectations, and you are talking about the reasonable expectation of privacy and balancing charter rights. Fundamentally, we believe, from the CAC perspective, that this legislation does a nice job of balancing those rights.

    I would take you back to Mr. Westwick's earlier opening comments. He talked about thinking about the expectations of someone who's been convicted, who's been through an open judicial public process and has been found guilty through the administration of justice--and I think this point is very important to keep in mind.

    This process has resulted in a warrant being issued that clearly directs the police to take action. It's mandatory; it's not discretionary. We shall do this when we have this knowledge.

    So using this as a foundation, and also balancing this with our understanding of how this system will work--which is that all the information relating to transportation security and information already floating around and available through various business entities in airline travel may go in, and information that is being shared with our colleagues in the U.S., again through lawful process--we have to ask the question another way.

    What is the victim's expectation of the police if they do not act when--after it's been narrowed down and narrowed down and narrowed down--this information comes to their knowledge?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I want an answer to the critics who are saying that this is a violation of privacy, even in the case of an individual who is a fugitive from justice where there is an arrest warrant outstanding. Ultimately, what they're saying is that this individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, if travelling by public air transportation, that the information will not fall into the hands of the police. They have a legal obligation to execute the warrant by all legal means, unless there's a prior judicial order allowing them access to the airline flight information and data concerning passengers, or there are exigent circumstances.

    Mr. David Griffin: I would argue, but I'm not a lawyer.

º  (1645)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That's okay. Sometimes some of the best legal minds come from non-lawyers.

    Mr. David Griffin: I would argue that there's absolutely no reasonable expectation of privacy for someone who is flying on a public airline. Any limitation that's seen on the person's privacy in terms of their information, from my point of view, is more than justifiable under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a reasonable limitation on freedom under section 1.

    It's in the public interest to ensure that people who are boarding the aircraft have in fact been screened. We're talking about a fairly limited screening process here, but from our perspective it's in the public interest. Indeed, we believe, as my colleagues said earlier in their presentations, that the public expects it's going to be done.

    The Chair: Mr. Laframboise.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have another question on a different subject, but I have to come back to my initial question. Some witnesses are dead set against this legislation, and yet you defend it to the death. The question of balance continues to be a problem for me.

    Let me give you an example. Sub-sections 4.82(4) and 4.82(5) allow the Commissioner and Director to access information. Supposing I am in the unfortunate position of being in the same plane as someone against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued--because he or she has links to organized crime, for example--and that you have decided to go ahead and make the arrest. Under sub-sections 4.82(4) and 4.82(5), for the purposes of transportation security, the Commissioner of the RCMP and the Director of CSIS may retain information, not only about the person in respect of which a warrant has been issued, but also about me, who happened to be on the plane, because someone wanted information about whomever was travelling with that person. Sub-section 4.82(14) provides that this information can be kept for seven days, unless it is determined that they point to a threat to the security of Canada or that an investigation is necessary. The information can be kept for up to one year, but once the year is up, under sub-section 4.82(15), the Commissioner and Director are required to review all the information and decide either to destroy it or not.

    The problem I have, like a lot of other people, is that I have no way of knowing whether information has been retained about me, simply because I was unfortunate enough to be on the same plane as someone subject to a warrant. There is no way for me to find that out.

    I would just like to come back to the presentation made by the Canadian Bar Association, which supported the position set out by the Privacy Commissioner, who said that he would have liked for any retained information to be handed over to him--that he be given a copy of all records in other words--so that someone operating independently of the police could protect my interests. The same point was made by both the Canadian Bar Association and the Privacy Commissioner, and yet you are not suggesting any amendments to the bill. You have every confidence in the Director and the Commissioner, and ultimately, in yourselves. Supposing I am an ordinary citizen not subject to a warrant but I have the misfortune of taking the same plane as someone who is. I will not know that information has been collected about me until I am charged, and will not have the option of challenging that under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

    That is basically what all the other witnesses have been saying. There is no safeguard mechanism. You say there is one, but there isn't. In your view, is there some mechanism, completely independent of the police, whereby I can determine whether information has been collected about me or any other Canadian who is not subject to a warrant and considers himself to be a law-abiding citizen?

[English]

    Mr. David Griffin: I have two thoughts. First of all, in the situation you've described where one individual is arrested or is going to be arrested as a result of a warrant, the retention of other information is almost a no-win situation for the police, because if they discard that information they will be accused later in court of not having disclosed that information, or having kept that information for the purposes of disclosure of any evidence that may be used against the individual--who they were travelling with, was there a case of mistaken identity, or that type of thing.

    I think it's reasonable to expect that information concerning who that person was travelling with at the time they were apprehended--specifically travelling with--is information that not only the police are going to want, but perhaps others in the judicial process will want it at a later time.

    With respect to the privacy commissioner suggesting that in addition to the database he doesn't want the RCMP and CSIS to collect, he should then keep his own database of the same information, this seems to be doubling the potential for concern. There are limits under the law under which the RCMP or CSIS can use this information, retain this information, and all of that is subject to annual reporting by the commissioner of the RCMP and by the director of CSIS. And ultimately, the privacy commissioner has the right to go in and audit how those records are kept and maintained. So certainly there is reasonable protection there, without creating a second database of information.

º  (1650)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: The Privacy Commissioner has suggested that we amend sub-clause 4.82(14) to say that all information kept for more than a year should be handed over to him. He wants those records. He does not want the entire database; only the information kept for more than a year. He expressed the desire to have a copy of those records simply to ensure that the database does not contain information about law-abiding citizens. It's as simple as that.

    Would you be prepared to support that? The Canadian Bar Association is prepared to support such an amendment, and the Privacy Commissioner is requesting it. There is a reference in sub-clause 4.82(14) to information retained for more than a year. All we want to do is ensure that honest citizens have appropriate protection.

[English]

    Mr. David Griffin: The Canadian Police Association would not support that. We view it that the RCMP or CSIS can be trusted with that information.

    If, during the course of his audits of their process, he's not satisfied that the information has been properly protected, then certainly there are mechanisms for him to remedy that situation and there are mechanisms to hold the police officers and CSIS members accountable for any violations.

    To be perfectly candid, it is offensive for the privacy commissioner to suggest that perhaps he conducts his affairs at a higher standard than the commissioner of the RCMP or the members of the RCMP who work on behalf of Canadians.

    A voice: Hear, hear.

    The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I guess what I want you to define, in each individual view, is just exactly what Bill C-17 adds to what you're currently able to do and what impediments there would be if it did not exist.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: I'll....

    Mr. John O'Reilly: I can ask longer if you aren't ready.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: No, I'm quite ready. It just takes me a moment to get going.

    What it adds that the police community does not have now is a realistic tool toward prevention. Information and intelligence gathering, as I said in my opening remarks, deals with the linkages between small pieces of information. Mr. Lunn referred to that earlier. What this brings that is not there is prevention.

    Prevention is the most difficult aspect in any kind of policing, and it is infinitely more difficult in the context of terrorism. We believe that the Canadian public should rightly have an expectation that some meaningful steps will be taken toward preventing the terrorist activities that can wreak such havoc.

    That would be my answer.

º  (1655)  

    Ms. Susan Dunn: I can't add a lot to what Mr. Westwick has said, other than that we accept in law enforcement that post-September 11, we have to do business in a different way. And I believe I've mentioned information sharing is key, so I won't go on about that.

    Our officers believe that this type of legislation will enhance our intelligence-gathering capabilities. It's just that fundamental, and it is key to success.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Griffin, are you ready to jump in there?

    Mr. David Griffin: I don't have anything to add.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay.

    What assurances then can you give me that the information doesn't...? How far down the line does it go before it's not shared any more? Where does it stop down the line? Is it the small-town bylaw officer who has access to police department records? Are they going to be able to access this? Can you assure us that this isn't going to happen? That seems to be the scenario other people have brought in.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: I can try.

    I think the answers that would be more meaningful are going to come from Mr. Zaccardelli and Mr. Alcock, but my reading of the legislation is that it can only be given in the first instance to designated officers. That means the commissioner of the RCMP and the director of CSIS must identify officer A and officer B and agent A and agent B, and that the information will be accessible only by them and that they will be at peril of their careers and discipline and whatever else if they disclose it. To have a statutory designation as a police officer puts an even higher onus on them to hearken to their duties.

    I agree with Mr. Griffin that police in Canada are professional. And when they're not professional, there is no shortage of mechanisms, both internal and external to the police community, to call them to task.

    The question you may want to ask yourself is why would a police officer want to do something nefarious with this information? Could you imagine if you were the police officer? Put yourself in the shoes of a police officer who would abuse this information and disclose it and then run the risk--never mind to his own career--run the risk of having a case against a major terrorist thrown out because of the charter violation that would be argued. Could you imagine the impact that would have on that police officer?

    Police officers, if nothing else, do not want to be put in a position where they would, by their own actions, undermine the prosecution and conviction of a case they're working on, particularly when it's a terrorist.

    The Chair: Ms. Desjarlais.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Your comment is that there is no shortage of mechanisms by which to do this. However, I would suggest to you that under this bill there does come about a shortage of mechanisms. The access to information officer has indicated they will no longer have the same access to information. There will no longer be the same subject investigation in a court of law for actions the police take under sections of this bill, because it will be considered in national security. So your suggestion that it's going to have the same overview as exists now under law is not correct. And that's coming from the people at the top level.

    I must apologize, but I have a plane to catch, and I want to get these points in.

    I'm somewhat concerned that you would give these suggestions that somehow there will be oversight, because under this bill, there won't be oversight.

    I just want to make a comment, because I think it's crucially important. A comment was made that you don't have resources available to do your job. If the issue here is that police forces here in Canada do not have the resources to do the job, I'm a little concerned that we would look for a public safety act that's supposed to be addressing the issue of terrorism to take up the slack in the police forces being able to do their job.

    I must apologize, because I can't stay, so I just wanted to make that comment. That's what you call getting the last word in. I'll read the minutes.

    Mr. David Griffin: Having raised the issue of resources, my concern with resources, particularly when I hear comments by Mr. Ruby and Mr. Radwanski with respect to how they believe the police should be doing it, and the systems of double checks and double balances and hoops and hurdles and somersaults and flips the police are supposed to go through when the information is readily available and there's not a reasonable expectation of privacy....

    My comment is that the police in this country, particularly the RCMP and CSIS, are under incredible pressure to prevent terrorism and to prevent serious crimes such as organized crime and criminal activity in this country, and they are expected to do that within the system of checks and balances we've provided. Our concern is making sure that those checks and balances don't become so onerous that the police officers can't properly do their jobs. Ultimately, it's the criminal or the terrorist who benefits from that.

    On the question Ms. Jennings asked about what's a reasonable expectation of privacy, if I board a public aircraft or any other form of public transportation, or if I'm in a public place, the reasonable expectation of privacy--particularly if I'm a fugitive--should be somewhat different from if I'm a law-abiding citizen in my own home.

    My concern is that in some of the court decisions we've seen, some of the requirements on the police now--the binders of information they have to put together to get a wiretap order or to get a search warrant.... In some cases we've imposed such high standards on the police that it does deter their ability to do their job properly and consistent with the wishes of Canadians.

»  (1700)  

    The Chair: Briefly, Mr. Westwick.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: I have some trouble with the discussion about oversight, because the other hat I wear with the Ottawa police is I'm responsible for the investigation of and dealing with public complaints. I invite any member of this committee to come down to our office and meet the officers who every day investigate public complaints, and I challenge you to find a careless or capricious attitude on the part of these officers. They take their role of investigating fellow police officers--and it is indeed a very difficult role--very, very seriously, and in their careers they pay a high price for it. I feel it does a disservice to the men and women who do these kinds of investigations when they say there's no oversight.

    The other thing is I think if the RCMP Public Complaints Commission, the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, or any of the other provincial authorities involved with police oversight, and the members of the Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement were asked that question, they would take umbrage with the fact that there is no oversight of police. In fact, to the contrary, there's a great deal of oversight to police.

    It seems that each and every time we appear before a parliamentary committee we have to not just assert, but defend the integrity of our profession. I find it difficult, quite frankly.

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: I don't know if it's fair to ask you to respond to what might be a technical section in dealing with clause 108 at the back of the bill.

    Clause 108, in my understanding from talking to our researcher, deals with a huge list of offences that are put here that come right out of the Criminal Code and that are being amended in this clause of the bill. It has to do, I believe, with wiretapping or the ability or the reason the police might have for tapping someone's telephone: high treason, sabotage, forgery, sedition, hijacking. There's a whole long list. There are some that have been added, like the issue of a “hoax terrorist”, for example, which has been added under this clause. What I wasn't clear on was that these are not the crimes that are being referred to with regard to outstanding warrants, but rather they are to deal with the police authority to intercept, to basically wiretap.

    Could you give the committee your understanding of how this clause would work in practice, how you see it working, and if you have any comments or concerns about it?

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Mr. Mahoney, would it be permissible to say we will get back to you with an answer on that because it is a very technical area? I'm not afraid to venture an answer, but in such important surroundings I don't want to be wrong. Perhaps it would be better if we could take your question and provide an answer to it.

»  (1705)  

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: That would be very helpful.

    The committee was given an additional list--I'm told it was last December--of the crimes that referred to the outstanding warrants. I want to make sure we're not confusing these lists and how they would be implemented and how you, as people in the police profession, would see using those lists.

    I'd also be interested in comments you could bring back to us on how you would purport to train your officers. This may go to the resources issues. For example, how would it work in terms of a hierarchy if an officer was involved with the RCMP in looking at a specific flight and discovered that someone on it was suspected of endangering the safety of an aircraft or having offensive weapons, a breach of duty...? I don't know how this works. This even goes into such things as municipal corruption. If an officer suspects there's someone who might have committed a crime, how would he or she go about actually enacting this section of the bill to order a wiretap? I'm presuming officers would have to go before a judge under the Criminal Code to get permission to do that. Maybe you could give us, as much as possible, an explanation of how this would work.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: I'd be pleased to do that, but by way of preliminary answer I will just say that you have to understand the way the police service operates--and it would be the same for a local, provincial, or federal police service. The kinds of investigations we're talking about in the context of this bill are not being conducted by officers you would see driving patrol cars. They are being conducted by the major crime unit in my department. In the OPP it would be called something else. The RCMP have special squads set up for this purpose.

    This is very specialized work. There are in police services people who specialize in writing up the authorizations to obtain wiretaps. It's very specialized work. This information is not going to be tacked up on a bulletin board in the police cafeteria.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: It's not being given to Detective Sipowitz to go out and chase down a suspect. But all the more reason, at least in my mind, that we get as detailed an answer to my question as possible on how it would work so that we can perhaps allay fears that somehow police officers in cars are running around with this data and information or are listening in on private telephone conversations.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: We would be happy to do so. I suspect that some of those answers may be forthcoming from Mr. Elcock in his presentation.

    The Chair: Mr. Lunn.

    Mr. Gary Lunn: I have a brief question following up on Mr. Mahoney's. If it's possible, Mr. Chair, could you have that answer distributed to all the committee members?

    The Chair: Definitely. It will come to the clerk or the chair and it will be distributed.

    Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): Except for Mr. Lunn.

    Mr. Gary Lunn: Now, Beth, behave.

    I have another practical question, and I don't know if you have the answer. I'm thinking about its practical application.

    Once this is all up and running and they're doing the automated interaction with other databases trying to find hits, how quickly would they act? If a hit came up, and it actually looked like we had somebody who is wanted for known terrorist activities--you actually thought there could be a threat to that actual flight--there would have to be a fairly quick reaction before the flight left.

    If you had a warrant for someone but you didn't believe that person was going to endanger the flight, there would still have to be another type of fairly quick action, again, reacting on the back end to pick up such a person. Is that how this would happen?

    Obviously, to make this work you have to have the tools in place to actually be able to act within a half an hour or an hour.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Maybe I can answer it in this way, and my colleagues may want to add to it.

    One of the positive benefits of September 11--and I hate to put it in that context--one of the things we have learned in the police community is there is a higher level of cooperation between police services than has ever been seen before. The police community has historically had its turf wars and jealousies and what not, like every other sector of a community, but those are falling by the wayside in droves.

    For example, in the national capital region, the level of cooperation among the RCMP, the OPP, the Ottawa police, the police service of Gatineau, and the Sûreté is unprecedented. In fact, as we keep telling people, if you make a phone call in the city of Ottawa asking for a police officer to come to your door, it's possible that the person who arrives at the door will be an RCMP officer, driving an Ottawa police vehicle seconded to our organization, doing community work in our city. Five years ago, to suggest such a thing, you would have been laughed at.

    Now, I know that's a general answer to a very specific question, but let me say that when you take that kind of cooperation and the level of professionalism that has been put into this and the kind of consultation that has been going on and the kind of consultation that is ongoing--particularly in the national capital region--it is unprecedented. And I can assure you, and I'm sure my colleagues can as well, that when the police community has to act in a matter of importance, they will act with dispatch.

»  (1710)  

    The Chair: Ms. Jennings and Ms. Phinney could share the final round.

    Ms. Jennings.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I'm pleased that you mentioned the high level of oversight and civilian governance of law enforcement. My experience has been that there is no other sector of professional activity that is as highly governed with oversight--not the judges, not lawyers, not accountants, not engineers. There is no other sector of activity that has such a high level of well-established oversight. I think that's very important to have on the record.

    When I came in earlier, there was a question of racial profiling and there was a statement that police don't do racial profiling. There hasn't been sufficient access, in my view, to actual police files, incident records, to be able to make that case. Therefore, there is the issue of simply being able to identify on the basis of name. The information about food likes and dislikes...I think you made a very good case that that's information overload.

    In terms of simply name, many names are indicative and jump right out--either the person's religious affiliation or possibly their racial or ethnic background. “Marlene Jennings” would not be any indication that I am in fact a black woman; but if my name were Fatima Ioub, there would be a good chance that you would immediately assume that I am of Arab descent, etc., etc. So I think you need to address that issue in a little more depth, simply to allay those fears that there would be racial profiling. And that's used as a catch-all for religious and ethnic profiling. So I think you need to address that a little more in depth to attempt to allay those fears, which are very real.

    Ms. Susan Dunn: I agree.

    In our organization, and I think it's fair to say on behalf of CACP as well, I don't know that we as police leaders would say there is no racial profiling. I think what we would say--and I can speak on behalf of my commissioner--is it will not be condoned. Illegal racial profiling will not be condoned.

    On the other hand, there is legal profiling that goes on in this world that we live in that has to address terrorism. And I agree with you that in law enforcement communities we do need to communicate better on what that distinction is and why we need to make the distinction. But be very clear that we will not condone illegal profiling by any of our officers, and swift action will be taken.

    Thank you for that.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Ms. Phinney.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: We only have 15 on this committee, or whatever the numbers are, and won't get a lot of questions in for other MPs. It's difficult for us, because we'd all like to sit on every committee and have some input—

»  (1715)  

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: No, we wouldn't.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: One question I've been asked two or three times by people who aren't on the committee and are not getting a feeling for how the bill is going has to do with reviews. They say “Whatever you do is okay, because we can review this later on. We can have a parliamentary review of certain sections in three years or five years, if we don't like it.” That's not in there now. Can you see any section where, hopefully, this worry about terrorism will die down and might not be there in three years, or five years? Do you know of any section in there that maybe should be reviewed in five years or three years? It's not in there now. I'm just wondering if there's any....

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: No, I don't think I can answer the question. Perhaps your researcher might be able to answer it better than I.

    As I understand the act, there's not a review mechanism built in, as there has been in—

    Ms. Beth Phinney: No, there isn't; I know that. I'm asking if there's any part of it that you feel we only need right now, because this is what we're worried about. Is there any part that after five years...?

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Personally, I would love to be able to tell you that in two or three years all these crises will be over and there'll be nothing to worry about. I wish I could stand before you and say that, but I can't. There's so much talk about review. What I would say is you have to acknowledge that the courts in Canada, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, have not shown the slightest reluctance to step into the police world and exercise their powers of review.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Or into the political world.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: Or into the political world.

    The Supreme Court of Canada has very much been an aggressive court. I'll leave it to other commentators to determine whether that has been positive or negative. But the fact remains that the Canadian courts are extremely attuned to reviewing these kinds of practices on a daily basis. As parliamentarians, I suspect you will hear loudly if the courts are reviewing the kinds of actions that might occur under this bill. That message will get to you very clearly.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: We have a number of bills where we need that now. To make sure it's being done properly, or just to look at it in a few years, we put in the clause that there should be a parliamentary review in three years or five years to see if it's working correctly. That's why I'm asking. You don't see anything that needs to be a temporary thing, that needs to be looked at again in a few years?

    Mr. David Griffin: No. In fact, I would concur with Mr. Westwick that this isn't an issue we should look at as confined to an immediate timeframe and that is going to change in several years' time.

    If we're relating it to the sunset clause that was in the terrorism bill, our association opposed the use of a sunset clause for that very reason. We saw a concern about limiting it to a defined window of time. But those were fairly extraordinary powers of being able to arrest somebody for a preventative purpose and to be able to have an investigative type of hearing.

    With this legislation, I think if you were to survey Canadians, a lot of them would think we were doing this today. They would see that as a reasonable expectation. I don't see this as something about which people are going to turn around five years from now saying “We wish we didn't do this”. As Mr. Westwick has said, if the courts have concerns about how this marries up with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, I don't think it will be too long until we find out.

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, you may have two minutes.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Thank you very much.

    I think the review is going to take place, God forbid, when the next tragedy occurs, because we'll be reviewing it to find out if we went far enough.

    My question is—and I'll ask for the chair's indulgence, because it might be a stretch—do you see the issue of a national identity card being something that would be supported in, say, the implementation of this bill in your work?

    The Chair: This puts the chair in an awkward position.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: It's not really a stretch. It's about ID being on it.

    The Chair: Without prejudice, without anticipation, our witnesses have come before us, and sometimes colleagues on either side of the table might have been tempted to question outside the relevance. I think future witnesses might be subjected to the same, and I would hope to be just as judicious then and rule the question out of order.

    So let me conclude by thanking the witnesses for their indulgence.

»  (1720)  

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: You can put that in your answer, by the way.

    The Chair: Mr. Westwick, on another note, not on that one--that question is not in order.

    Mr. Vincent Westwick: I just wonder if I could make a very brief concluding remark.

    We think these are difficult issues you're dealing with, and we applaud the deliberations you're bringing to this. It is a difficult issue and it involves balancing. I can certainly assure you that we were very thoughtful in our review. We hope we always are, but we were particularly thoughtful because we think this raises difficult issues, and I think your questions were well founded.

    I just want to say that I have appeared before committees on several occasions. Personally, and on behalf of the CACP, I want to say we appreciate each and every time we're offered the courtesy of appearing, and we never lose sight of the fact that it is indeed a high honour to come to speak to parliamentarians about the law that is being created. We very much appreciate the courtesy that is extended to our organization.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Superintendent Dunn, Mr. Westwick, and Mr. Griffin, particularly for your indulgence with our delay at the start.

    Merci, chers collègues.

    The meeting is adjourned.