NDVA Committee Report

CHAPTER 1: THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The tragic events of September 11th have taught us that we cannot take our security for granted. We are vulnerable at home and may need to go far afield to help ensure our safety. Afghanistan is not about peacekeeping, nor about peacemaking. It is war. The troops we have sent are, by all accounts, acquitting themselves admirably. However, there were some controversial moments at the outset.  We are facing a “new” enemy; one that has forced us to rethink the ways in which we deal with security. The international strategic environment in which we now find ourselves has complicated rather than simplified the missions, organization and strategy of the armed forces. Our military needs to look at how best to restructure itself to deal with the non-traditional or asymmetric threats we now face. Superpower rivalry has been replaced by internecine strife, transnational terrorism and failed states. Such conditions do not provide the clear war-fighting missions that militaries prefer and for which they have traditionally trained.

Afghanistan is representative of the types of conflict in which Canadian Forces will most likely be involved for the foreseeable future. “With its rugged terrain, and intransigent foes, Afghanistan poses great risks. It is also fairly representative of the kind of environment, both in terms of terrain and politically, that military planners have to think about as their primary expected area of operations.”¹

This type of conflict is not well-suited to an armoured force trained to fight large‑scale engagements. It is best-suited to a light infantry force — one well trained, equipped, led and in possession of good intelligence.² It is an environment in which special forces personnel would prove most effective. If we are to continue to fight in these types of campaigns we may well need to adjust our force structure and to enhance the capabilities of some of its components. Flexibility and rapid deployment will be the requirements of the future.

The so-called “new world order” will not arrange itself to suit the preconceptions of force planners working with yesterday’s assumptions or those of politicians who naively believe our forces require no more than what they now possess. If September 11th has taught us anything, it is that we cannot withdraw from the world or refuse to participate in interventions with like-minded allies.

A.     Threats

It is very unlikely that Canada will, in the foreseeable future, be called upon to participate in a war between two or more major powers. While we cannot completely discount such a possibility, its likelihood lies well beyond any horizon we can envisage. However, it is reasonable to expect, given our experience over the last decade, that there will certainly be serious conflicts of sufficient magnitude to warrant our maintaining a combat capable multi‑purpose military — a force that can “fight alongside the best against the best.” Our national security dictates that we have a military capable of responding, in conjunction with our allies, to:

Even a cursory reflection on the foregoing dictates that “human security” is something we must continue to address. Our responsibilities are not only to our own security and well-being but also to that of others. We cannot, in the long term, hope to stem the tide of terrorism without addressing the structural determinants that lie at its roots. But, while granting this, our first priority must always be the sovereignty of our own nation and the security and well-being of Canadians. In the final analysis, we can only ensure this as a significant participant in coalition with our closest allies.

B.     Terrorism

The most disquieting lesson of September 11th was the ease with which the terrorists were able to exact their toll. Too often, when we think of weapons of mass destruction, we conjure up images of the “nuclear suitcase” or of biological and chemical agents; all requiring a rather sophisticated degree of technological or scientific knowledge for their production. Some of these may well be available on the open market but, one suspects, not too readily.

We do not wish to suggest that such methods would never be used. Quite the contrary, we must be increasingly vigilant about such possibilities for the consequences could well prove even more catastrophic than those of September 11th. At the same time, we must recognize that, given the nature of our modern-day open society, great damage can be inflicted with very low-tech everyday means.

“Airliners and skyscrapers by themselves are benign. Bring them together at speed, guided by the world’s most sophisticated computer — the human brain — and driven by that most powerful source of motivation — the human will — and you have a binary weapon of mass destruction.”⁴

The tragic events of September 11th were made possible by: cell phones, open borders, easy travel, our open society, international banking, etc. Indeed, it was made possible by the very values upon which our modern society is based.

Asymmetric techniques target the vulnerabilities of a state. As the techniques have changed so, it seems, have the motives of terrorists. Thirty years ago the aim of terrorism was to publicize a cause and to mobilize support on its behalf. Groups that carried out attacks would claim responsibility for them, wanting the wider public to know what and why they had done what they had. Casualties and fatalities tended to remain low and hostages were generally released. To do otherwise might only have led to alienating potential supporters or to severe countermeasures that might have destroyed the group.⁵

According to Dr. David Charters, since the early 1980s, things have changed. Many terrorist incidents have gone unclaimed, suggesting a change in motivation from mobilization to punishment. Some groups no longer feel the need to publicize their cause and to rally support. Today, “…their primary motive is to strike a major, damaging, physical, and psychological blow against their enemies.” This has resulted in much higher casualties, with the 1980s and 1990s witnessing incidents wherein hundreds died and many more were injured. The most recent attacks, however, represent a quantum leap in lethality, leading Charters to conclude that the playing field has been levelled, putting “…the most effective terrorist groups on a par with the states that are their enemies.”⁶

This is not to argue that terrorist groups are in any sense on a military par with mature states. It is only to recognize that, given sufficient funding and organizational skill, terrorists can “…create weapons with the destructive power equal to the major weapons of a state, use them to strike at centres of gravity…and thus inflict catastrophic human, psychological, political and economic damage on a state, with major ripple effects on global security and stability.”⁷

We need to understand that the war against terrorism is bound to be a long one and that complacency in this struggle is something we cannot afford. Having been surprised once does not mean we cannot be surprised again. September 11th clearly demonstrated that there are no longer any limits to which terrorists will go in pursuit of their objectives.

If the conditions giving rise to a particular brand of fanaticism are rooted in poverty or some other form of unjustifiable deprivation — the loss of historically held territory or the yearning for democratic self-rule — then we can have an idea of how to address the “structural” problems of root cause. If the determinants are those of religious or ideological zealotry, then matters become more complex. Here the application of reason and compromise will likely produce little in the way of results.

Military preparedness is an indispensable prerequisite for dealing with the realities of the new strategic environment. Those who suggest that the world will “order itself” and that we can, because of our privileged position, remain apart from its conflicts, with no cost to ourselves, are simply misguided and naïve.

The CF is only one component in the fight against terrorism. Overall success will depend on the effectiveness of interagency coordination and on partnerships between these and domestic and international law enforcement agencies. As relevant government organizations adjust to meet new challenges, the CF will need to do the same.

C.     Homeland Defence

The increased importance of interagency cooperation is, in part, due to the current emphasis on homeland defence. Until September 11th, the tendency was to argue that defending the homeland was something that was done from “over there”; not along our land borders and coastlines. While we have had the occasional squabbles over fishing rights, these were more often with close allies rather than with what might be defined as potential foes. Even in the United States, where homeland defence has always been prevalent in debate and planning, the air defence squadrons that used to investigate suspicious aircraft or to escort Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft had been reduced to four reserve squadrons.

The shape of homeland defence will largely be determined by the following:

When we speak of the homeland defence of the United States, we are invariably speaking of our own. And when speaking of our own we cannot do so without taking U.S. realities into account. Any large scale attack which has significant economic impact on the U.S. will inevitably be felt in Canada. The fact that our homeland defence is inextricably bound up with that of our southern neighbour, means that we must be willing to bear our fair share of the burden. One suspects our neighbours remain sceptical about our willingness to do so.

Our desire to provide for our own security and sovereignty has always been a matter of concern in light of U.S. willingness to do it for us. In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt noted that: “The people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.” Prime Minister Mackenzie King replied that “Canada shall remain as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably expect to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.”

This is a piece of common sense we do well to heed today. Both nations need to protect each other in order to protect themselves. In our case, however, we are also protecting ourselves from potential U.S. intervention in Canadian affairs.

The United States is in the process of creating a new mechanism for continental defence and will do so, largely, on its own terms. For us, the question will be how far we go along with some of the more obvious initiatives. The answer to this may well depend upon how much the government values our role in NORAD and the special relationship this alliance has afforded us. Over the years, our defence relationship with the United States has proven of great benefit, far outstripping the costs to us.

Thus, we should not be overly concerned with changes being made to the U.S. Unified Command Plan. The revised plan creates a new combatant command, U.S. Northern Command, and assigns it “…the mission of defending the United States and supporting the full range of military assistance to civil authorities.” Effective October 1, 2002, the plan also designates geographic areas of responsibilities for all combatant commanders and assigns them responsibility for security cooperation and military coordination with all countries in the region. Northern Command’s area of responsibility will include the continental United States, Canada, Mexico and portions of the Caribbean region. While Alaska will be included in this assignment, Alaskan Command forces will remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. The commander of U.S. Northern Command will also be responsible for security cooperation and military coordination with Canada and Mexico.⁸

There are those who have argued that any participation, on our part, in Northern Command, would weaken our sovereignty. Nothing could be further from the truth. As a sovereign state we can decide to participate or not to participate — that is a sovereign decision. What we need to do, when making our decision, is to engage in a careful calculation of our national interest. Will that interest be best served by having a seat at the table when decisions are made, as in NORAD, or, will it be best served by absenting ourselves and leaving matters of strategic decision to the Americans?

Our view, as a Committee, is that our long-term interests will best be served by engaging the Americans on this matter. Having a presence will allow us to affect the decisions being made. But, we cannot allow ourselves to come empty handed. If we are to engage the Americans, then, we need to do so on the basis of a significant partnership — one wherein we carry our fair share.

Here it is also important to note that, while we usually concentrate on the sovereignty protection aspect of the Canadian Forces Mission, the CF is also there to ensure internal security. Their mission includes aid to the civil power. We have seen how that mission has been discharged, in 1970 during the October crisis and in 1990, during the Oka situation.  As well, there was the extraordinary help provided during the Chicoutimi and Winnipeg floods and the Ice Storm in Eastern Canada.⁹

We often tend to forget that the military, in democratic societies, is the final guarantor of the rule of law. This is possible because, in performing that role, the military itself remains subject to the rule of law — it never pretends to rise above it. In Canada, the CF are an important guarantor of the constitutional principles of “peace, order and good government”.¹⁰ The CF have then always been an important part of “homeland defence”, that is, of helping to guarantee our freedoms as citizens while also ensuring our physical safety.