NDVA Committee Report

DISSENTING REPORT OF THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
REGARDING THE FINAL REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

FACING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES
THE STATE OF READINESS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS IS OPPOSED TO THIS REPORT BECAUSE:

For some time now, the Bloc Québécois has recommended a review of Canada’s defence policy. It goes without saying that this review must precede any massive reinvestment in the Canadian Forces that may take place in the future. General defence strategies must be reviewed and important choices must be made.

In the report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the first recommendation states that, “The Government [should] increase the annual base budget for the Department of National Defence to between 1.5% to 1.6% of GDP, with the increase to be phased in over the next three years, and continue to move towards the NATO average.”¹ Moreover, in the 2002-2003 Estimates — Part III, the government admits that “Defence cannot and perhaps should not sustain the current mix of Canadian Forces capabilities and levels of activity over the long term”² and that, given the current context, “the issue is not just about money — it is about choices.”

Until the principal strategies have been reviewed, it will be difficult to favour one sector of the Canadian Forces over another. Canada does not have the financial or human resources that the United States has, and cannot aspire to the same level of versatility for its Armed Forces.

EXTENSIVE PUBLIC CONSULTATION IS NEEDED

It is essential that the public take part in debates on the use of public funds in the military sector. These questions must not be left solely to a few experts.

One must not forget that additional resources were allocated to the defence sector in the last budget, that several projects to modernize equipment are currently under way and that very substantial amounts of money have been allocated to these projects.

It should also be pointed out that any defence budget measure that is based on a percentage of GDP will be approximate and fluctuating. In the last decade, changes to national accounting practices in the United States have resulted in an increase in GDP. Moreover, not all NATO countries invest the same percentage of GDP in defence spending. A spending level based on GDP and, in particular, on the average for NATO countries, would mean that, if one country decided to significantly increase its defence spending, Canada would have to follow suit. Turkey, for example, allocates approximately 6% of its GDP to defence spending. This illustrates the arbitrariness and inappropriateness of establishing a level of defence spending based on a percentage of GDP.³

As we learn that the Canadian government is negotiating possible participation in the Unites States’ new continental defence structure, other questions come to mind. Should Canada pronounce itself in favour of the U.S. missile defence system? Will it set aside certain of its cherished principles and initiatives, such as the non-weaponization of space, its significant involvement in international missions, or treaties such as the treaty on anti-personnel mines? The matter of the costs associated with increased continental collaboration with the United States must also be considered, and Canada must weigh the strategic nature of each decision made in terms of defence capabilities. Canada must determine where it is going before it can decide on how to get there. A number of the decisions to be made in the near future could have significant consequences.

NON-COSTED RECOMMENDATIONS

In its final report, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs made a number of recommendations that would have a significant budgetary impact in the short and medium term.

The first recommendation alone would necessitate the injection of close to $6 billion, and more than a dozen other recommendations would also involve the injection of addition public funds for the purchase of aircraft and vessels, the modernization of equipment and additional funding for various programs.

Added to these are other recommendations that do not directly call for an injection of public funds, but that would require spending if they are implemented.

At present, it is difficult to calculate how much all of these recommendations would cost; however, it is quite obvious that they add up to several billion dollars! Given that we are still waiting for a review of the defence policy, such massive investments could prove that decisions at the Department of National Defence continue to be made on a piecemeal basis.

Although we are not opposed to purchasing and modernizing this equipment based on the 1994 defence policy, it is important to ask the following questions: Do the policies and priorities stated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence still stand, and what are the real priorities that should be contained in the new defence policy?

While it does not deny the fact that significant needs really do exist in the Canadian Forces, the Bloc Québécois is opposed to any injection of additional public funds before extensive public consultations have been carried out. If it supported this report, the Bloc Québécois would be stating that it is in favour of the current policy of the Department of National Defence, which, as we have already mentioned, not only makes piecemeal decisions but also makes these decisions without consultation and without a true long‑term vision.

The most obvious example is, without a doubt, the 1991 purchase of a military satellite communications system that cost taxpayers $174 million, has never been used and continues to sit in a Canadian Armed Forces storage facility. Clearly, these funds could have been put to better use. A real long‑term vision and an effective administrative control body for major projects would have revealed that Canada did not really need such a communications system and that a less costly system could be found, as was noted along the way.

Another example is the purchase of four submarines from Great Britain in 1998, at a cost of $610 million plus an additional $140 million for their refit. The first submarine developed a leak during a sea trial (which was attributed to a navigational incident by some sources). The second has spent more than a year dry-docked in Halifax without ever sailing. Ironically, it was recently discovered that this submarine has a dent in its hull that could cause problems when the submarines dives! The other two submarines have not yet been delivered and are still in Great Britain.

If the federal government had had a long-term vision and had planned its acquisitions, it would not have wasted $750 million in public funds for submarines that even the Australian government would not touch!

By revising the 1994 White Book and implementing an extensive public consultation process, we would be able to establish a clearer long‑term vision for the Canadian Forces. We would be able to set real priorities for the Department of National Defence, and would have a clear picture of where the money should be spent and how much should really be spent. Until this exercise has been conducted, the possibility remains that taxpayers’ money will be wasted on equipment that the Department of National Defence does not need or that may be useless, following the upcoming review of Canada’s defence policy.

POSITIVE ASPECTS NONETHELESS

In spite of the financial issues identified with respect to this report, the Bloc Québécois would like to acknowledge the outstanding effort and work of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. For almost a year, the Committee heard dozens of witnesses and prepared four interim reports on the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces.

Although several of the report’s recommendations pertain to military equipment as such, others pertain to improving the quality of life of military personnel and endeavour to remedy existing shortcomings. For example, the report contains a recommendation regarding job protection for reservists called up during emergency situations. This recommendation aims to remedy the current situation, where the reservists who have been called up are not guaranteed that they will still have their jobs upon their return.

The Bloc Québécois therefore urges the government to adopt this recommendation and amend the National Defence Act as quickly as possible, independently from Bill C‑55 on public safety, given that the above‑mentioned situation is completely unacceptable.

The initiatives recommended at the end of the report have the full support of the Bloc Québécois. Measures to assist Canadian Forces members dealing with post‑traumatic stress disorder and other health problems are addressed in the recommendations. The quality of life of military families must be taken seriously and the support provided must reflect the magnitude of the responsibilities shouldered by members of the Canadian Forces.

CONCLUSION 

The Bloc Québécois would like to reiterate the importance of redefining Canada’s defence policy before any additional funds are spent on the Armed Forces. Better yet, the Bloc believes that the new defence policy should be coordinated with the review of Canada’s foreign policy. International trends show that a country’s foreign policy shapes its military policy, and not the opposite.

The Bloc Québécois believes that the new White Paper on defence must be the subject of extensive public consultations, with a view to identifying the government’s true priorities in terms of national defence. Furthermore, it is essential that Canada redefine the role of the Canadian forces. In the current context, and as indicated by a number of witnesses who appeared before the Committee, it would be difficult to sustain the capabilities and levels of activity of the Canadian Forces over the long term. There are choices to be made, and it is important that the government understand that these choices must follow a thorough review of Canada’s military policy BEFORE any public funds are injected into sectors that may not reflect current needs or taxpayers’ priorities.