INST Committee Report
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BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS DISSENTING OPINION
The Lobbyists Registration Act is one component of the measures used to make the public policy process more transparent. The Bloc Québécois has studied every aspect of lobbyists' work and each section of the Act from this perspective; it has listened to all the witnesses, always bearing in mind the importance of transparency for reassuring the citizenry that public policy decisions and the awarding of contracts reflect their interests as a whole and not those of powerful lobbies.
Despite some promising recommendations, the Bloc Québécois had no option but to voice its dissent to the Liberal majority’s report, because it is much too timid when it comes to regulating lobbyists’ activities. In addition, it says nothing about certain important aspects of the Ethics Counsellor’s work.
The Committee refused to make recommendations about the process of appointing the Ethics Counsellor or about the different roles the Counsellor plays within the government. In the eyes of the Bloc Québécois, this is fundamental.
The recent Grand-Mère Golf Course affair ? in which the Prime Minister may have been in conflict of interest when he approached the President of the BDBC about a loan for the Auberge Grand-Mère, next door to the golf course ? made the spotlight on the Ethics Counsellor's role brighter than ever.
The affair effectively demonstrated to the public at large that the Ethics Counsellor (responsible for application of the Code for Public Office Holders as well as the Lobbyists Code of Conduct) is not independent and does not have the teeth that the public was entitled to expect. The majority report goes so far as to say that nothing prevents the Prime Minister from "appoint[ing] an Ethics Counsellor to advise his government. In fact, any party is free to do the same."
That second sentence is clear proof of the Liberals are confusing two concepts as separate and distinct as the internal management of a political party and the administration of public funds. They refer to the Ethics Counsellor as though he were a POLITICAL adviser to the Prime Minister and the government.
And yet it is logical that an ethics counsellor would have a mandate to carry out public inquires into conflicts of interest and ethical shortcomings on the part of holders of public office, with a view to informing the citizenry about them. Unlike the Liberals, the Bloc Québécois does not regard ethics, transparency, and public confidence in democratic institutions and the management of public affairs, as the private concerns of a political party, a government or a Prime Minister. Rather, they are the responsibility of democratic institutions ? the House of Commons ? and the elected representatives of the people.
According to Sean Moore, a public policy and public affairs adviser who was a witness to the Committee’s hearings:
I don’t think it's credible any more to have an ethics counsellor with the terms of reference such as exist at the federal level in Ottawa right now. I don't think off Parliament Hill, and certainly for at least half of Parliament Hill, that’s a credible option any more. (…) Well, I think the political cost to pay for not having some office to look independently at things is probably much greater than any government should have to bear in the future.
In an effort to restore the credibility of the Ethics Counsellor's position, the Bloc Québécois recommends that the Ethics Counsellor be appointed by Parliament for a five-year term, that the Governor in Council not be empowered to repeal this appointment except on an address by the House of Commons, and that the term be renewable for no more than one further five-year period.
Obviously, a perfectly independent ethics counsellor who must report to Parliament must necessarily hold public inquiries and report on both his investigations, his conclusions and the reasons underlying those conclusions, to the House of Commons.
In this perspective, the Bloc Québécois scarcely finds reassuring the recommendation in the majority report calling for the creation of a "new office" responsible for investigating alleged violations of the Lobbyists Code, which would report to Parliament. As the report notes, "The Act does not prescribe penalties for breach of the Lobbyists Code; neither does it specify how Parliament is to respond to a reported breach of the Code."
In short, this "new office" would not be able to impose any penalties. It is as though, having concluded his investigation, Columbo could not arrest the suspect! That is why the Bloc Québécois recommends that the Lobbyists Code be made a statutory instrument, so that breaches of it could be pursued before the courts, as is the case for multitude of other professions.
In this report, the Bloc Québécois suggests a number of approaches that would make it possible to improve the Lobbyists Registration Act and would be likely to increase public confidence in the public policy process. Unfortunately, the Liberal majority did not see fit to adopt any of these recommendations. In other cases, the Committee preferred to procrastinate by calling for more in-depth consideration of certain issues role, rather than taking action now.
The Bloc Québécois recommends that lobbyists be required to disclose their meetings with a minister or senior public servants, in addition to disclosing the name of the department concerned.
The Bloc Québécois recommends that lobbyists be required to disclose the amounts spent on lobbying campaigns.
The Bloc Québécois recommends that both consultant and paid lobbyists be required to disclose their fees.
The Bloc Québécois recommends that a provision be included explicitly banning any form of contingency fee for any activity whatsoever.
The Bloc Québécois recommends that consultant and paid lobbyists both be required to disclose all positions occupied and all corresponding periods of employment with any federal body or any political party; all unpaid executive positions with any political party; the number of hours of volunteer work (in excess of 40 per annum) done on behalf of any political party, any would-be candidate or any riding association; any terms of office as an elected representative at the federal level, as well as any unsuccessful election campaigns fought; and all contributions to any political party or candidate.
The Bloc Québécois recommends that the Code for Public Office Holders be made a statutory instrument, and that the Code be revised by a committee of the House of Commons to safeguard against abuses. For example, the post-employment cooling-off period for holders of public office, discussed by the Committee, would become subject to penalty in the event of violation.
Although the current study was not designed to cover this issue, the Bloc Québécois cannot conclude its dissenting opinion without referring to the secondary role reserved for Members of Parliament in the establishment of public policy. Many witnesses affirmed that lobbyists’ time and attention is essentially directed towards the bureaucracy and the executive branch. Here is what one witness told the Committee about legislative issues:
[MPs] are usually much farther down the list of people you need to deal with, because the genesis of legislation in this country usually is two or three years prior to the date it hits the floor of the House of Commons. (Sean Moore)
However, the Bloc Québécois knows that the citizenry would be the winners in a system where their elected representatives had more power, because it is the Members of Parliament who have direct contact with the people and are the most likely to speak for them. The Bloc Québécois hopes the government will recognize the importance of parliamentarians, and the essential contribution they make, to the public policy process.