HAFF Committee Report

"In Canada, as in most liberal democratic states, civil control of the military means the control of the armed forces by civilians elected to Parliament acting in accordance with statutes passed by that legislative body

…………..

Civil control is intended to ensure that decisions and risks affecting national defense and the employment of the Canadian Forces are taken by politicians accountable to the people rather than by soldiers, officials, and others who are not."

(Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the deployment of Canadian
Forces to Somalia, Vol. 1, p.87)

"Whatever our individual views on particular issues of defense policy or operations, there was one matter on which we agreed almost from the beginning – that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defense policy."

…………..

"There would be considerable benefit to the Canadian Forces and to the government if the Prime Minister were to institutionalize regular meetings with the Minister and the CDS, to ensure a continuing flow of information at the highest level on defense policy and operations."

(Report of the Special Joint Committee on
Canada’s Defense Policy 1994, p. 57,62)

INTRODUCTION

             The matter which has been referred by the House of Commons to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs concerns an alleged contempt of Parliament by the Minister of National Defense. The matter was raised as a question of privilege on Thursday January 31, 2002 in which it was argued that the Minister of National Defense deliberately mislead the House of Commons in his responses to questions in Question Period on two consecutive days, January 29 and January 30, 2002. In the argumentation proposed, the House Leader of the PC/DR Coalition, referred to the procedural text Erskine May, 22^nd Edition, under the section on misconduct of members of the House or officers where it states:

The Commons may treat the making of a deliberately misleading statement as a contempt. In 1963 the House resolved that in making a personal statement which contained words which he later admitted not to be true, a former Member had been guilty of a grave contempt. (p.111)

             He went on to argue with reference to Beauchesne’s Parliamentary Rules and Forms, 6^th edition that a "valid claim of privilege in respect to interference with a Member must relate to the Member’s parliamentary duties" (p.25). Responses to questions in Question Period lie at the very heart of accountability in our parliamentary system and therefore within the realm of "parliamentary duties".

             On February 1, 2002, the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled on this question of privilege. In a rather unique twist, while not determining whether or not a prima facie case existed, the Speaker commented that he was faced with " a very difficult situation". He referred members to a quotation from the procedural text by Marleau and Montpetit which states:

There are…affronts against the dignity and authority of Parliament which may not fall within one of the specifically defined privileges…the House also claims the right to punish, as a contempt, any action which, though not a breach of a specific privilege, tends to obstruct or impede the House in the performance of its functions; [or that] obstructs or impedes any Member or Officer of the House in the discharge of their duties…(p.67)

He then stated: "On the basis of the arguments presented by hon. Members and in view of the gravity of the matter. I have concluded that the situation before us where the House is left with two versions of events is one that merits further consideration by an appropriate committee, if only to clear the air."

             In the 135 years of parliamentary tradition in Canada, no Member of the House of Commons has ever been found to be in contempt of Parliament. We are therefore in a position as a committee to break new ground. As Mr. J.P. Joseph Maingot, author of "Parliamentary Privilege in Canada" told the Committee "it would be very good if this committee could set out the standard to be expected of a member under these particular circumstances". He went on to say "that if during the course of your proceedings, you come to the conclusion that the misleading was intentional, then you could report that".

THE MEANING OF CONTEMPT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

             The Committee had the benefit of receiving expert advice on the nature of its deliberations from the Clerk of the House of Commons, Mr. William Corbett, from Mr. Rob Walsh, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel as well as from Mr. J.P. Joseph Maingot author of the authoritative text "Parliamentary Privilege in Canada". Mr. Corbett in discussing the nature and elements of a statement that would qualify as a contempt referred the Committee to the procedural text "Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand" where at page 491 it states:

The statement must in fact have been misleading, and it must be established that the member making the statement knew at the time the statement was made that it was incorrect, and that in making it the member intended to mislead the House.

             He went on to suggest how the Committee might come to that determination. He stated:

"I would humbly suggest to members of the committee, through you, Mr. Chairman, that they must first examine the facts of the current case to determine whether the House has been obstructed or interfered with in any way; or whether its authority or dignity has been offended. Once given those facts the committee must then decide if a contempt has occurred, and what further steps may be taken will depend upon what conclusion the committee reaches with respect to those two issues, and how the House receives the report of the committee.

             Mr. Walsh, our Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel was helpful in offering advice in relation to the proving of intent. He stated that "people are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their action". In terms of contempt the Committee has to satisfy itself that "he knew it was inaccurate when he stated it." He also cautioned that the committee should "try to avoid getting hung up on the word prove…. You can’t prove it that easily, but you might have a series of facts which lead you to draw inescapably the conclusion that the member must have known, when he said what he said, that what he said wasn’t true". The key word here for Mr. Walsh was "inescapably".

             Mr. J.P. Joseph Maingot attempted to clarify the concept of contempt. He stated "it is incumbent upon the members to decide what is in their view a contempt. By all of what you’ve heard a contempt can be that you felt a person intentionally misled or the conflicting statements were such that really reflected on the integrity of the House, the dignity of the House. Was it an affront to have done that?"

             Through these witnesses, the Committee gained solid knowledge of the task at hand, what it had to do and the various yardsticks against which it had to measure the testimony given to it by various witnesses.

THE ISSUE OF DELIBERATELY MISLEADNG THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

             The facts in this case are simple and straightforward. On two consecutive days, the Minister of National Defense gave contradictory statements in the House of Commons as to when he first learned that Canada’s commando group, Joint Task Force 2 took prisoners in Afghanistan. The issue before the Committee is whether the first statement, which was incorrect, made on Tuesday January 29, 2002 was made knowing that it was incorrect, for the purpose of misleading the House of Commons.

             Three witnesses appearing before the Committee were able to shed light directly on these statements. These were, the Minister himself, the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff, Vice Admiral G.R. Maddison, and the Chief of Defense Staff, General Raymond Henault. Other witnesses were helpful in explaining the reporting relationships or lack thereof, among the Department of National Defense, the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This latter group of witnesses were also quite helpful in explaining the policy confusion of the government which surrounded the issue of treatment of prisoners by the United States military.

(i) Evidence of Minister of National Defense.

             The evidence given to the committee by the Minister of National Defense on the subject of his contradictory statements is problematic for a number of reasons. He did admit that he became aware of the taking of prisoners by the Canadian commando group JTF-2 through an oral briefing via secure telephone provided by the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff when the Minister was in Mexico City. He was also quite categorical in describing the reporting chain in relation to the work of the JTF-2. The reporting line goes from the commander in the field to the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff (DCDS) to the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) to the Minister. In the absence of the Chief of Defense Staff, as was the case in the matter before the Committee, briefings are given to the Minister by the DCDS. This reporting procedure was put in place, we were told, prior to deployment of JTF-2 to Afghanistan in order to ensure the utmost secrecy and security.

             The Minister also told the Committee that the taking of prisoners by JTF-2 was brought to his attention on Friday January 25 by his executive assistant Mr. Young, who showed him the photograph that had been published the previous Tuesday, January 22, in the Globe and Mail. Mr. Young informed the Minister that he believed this to be a picture of members of the Canadian JTF-2 force. The Minister told us he then summoned the DCDS to his office who provided the Minister with further details on JTF-2 and confirmed that indeed these were Canadians depicted in the photograph. Mr. Young also at this time informed the Minister that the issue of detainees was on the cabinet agenda for the following Tuesday, January 29, 2002. This is important because on a number of occasions, the Minister, in his testimony indicated that knowing that this subject was on the cabinet agenda, he focused his mind on this issue throughout the weekend. He stated:

Now in the week that I was away, comments by officials in the United States resulted in a heightened debate about the status determination process for detainees. So to prepare for the cabinet meeting on the following Tuesday, I determined that further discussions with officials were necessary, both to get a better understanding about the mission that I had been advised about the previous Monday, but also to talk about the whole question of detainees and government policy in that respect. So I began a series of meetings and conversations by telephone, everybody from the Chief of Defense Staff to the deputy chief of defense, the deputy minister and Judge Advocate General, who is the chief legal adviser and most knowledgeable person on this subject in our department.

             The Minister also explained the statement made by the Prime Minister on Monday January 28, that the taking of prisoners was "hypothetical". Mr. Eggleton had not informed the Prime Minister that prisoners had been taken the previous week by the JTF-2 and the Minister told the Committee "When learning of his (the PMs) comment, I regretted not having told him earlier, and subsequently, I apologized to the Prime Minister".

             He explained his misstatement in the House of Commons in Question Period on Tuesday January 29 was due to his understanding that the questions as to his knowledge of when prisoners were taken were actually references to when he first saw the picture of the JTF-2 commandos on the front page of the Globe and Mail.

             Two paragraphs from the Minister’s prepared text are instructive on this point.

Of course, in the larger context of the operation involving our troops, I should have said Monday. But in the cut and thrust of question period, I connected the two questions from the two members, which had come in quite rapid succession.

When returning to my Department of National Defense office that afternoon, I was reminded that I had received a briefing on the operation on Monday, January 21, 2002, while I was in Mexico. Having realized my omission in not connecting the two briefings, I returned to question period the next day, Wednesday, January 30, 2002, and put the matter in the correct context.

             In response to questions posed by committee members, the Minister reiterated the confusion he had caused for the Prime Minister stating "I regretted that I hadn’t told him in advance so that he wouldn’t have given the answer that he did give". He also referred to his preoccupation over the weekend on the subject of treatment of detainees as he prepared to discuss this with cabinet. The Minister stated:

But I felt the issue [the treatment of prisoners] was really more the policy question. It was really more determining that the Geneva Conventions were being followed. It became a very challenging legal question with different interpretations. We saw on Monday, January 28, in particular it reached a new level with the apparent disagreements between two members of President Bush’s cabinet.

So it was necessary for me to discuss this matter. Throughout the days from my return on Friday night up until Tuesday morning when I went into the cabinet meeting, I was still assessing information, getting information, asking questions of our staff so that I would have, myself, in the best position to advise the Prime Minister and my cabinet colleagues about the issue. Because that’s what I felt was really the important issue. The question of detainee policy and what was happening to them after they were turned over to our United States allies.

             It is also important to note that the question of the treatment of detainees had bothered the Minister since at least January 17 when he appeared before a joint meeting of the House of Commons Defense and Veterans Affairs Committee and the House Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee. The Minister admitted he was concerned with the question raised at committee by two Liberal members, so much so, he telephoned the Prime Minister and "talked with him about this whole issue of detainees."

(ii) Evidence of the Chief of Defense Staff, General Raymond Henault and, Deputy Chief of Defense Staff, Vice Admiral G.R. Maddison.

             The testimony given to the Committee by both the CDS and DCDS was very helpful in interpreting the remarks of the Minister of National Defense. It was the DCDS who briefed the Minister by telephone when the Minister was in Mexico City on January 21, 2002. He conducted the briefing as the CDS was out of the country between the evening of January 20 and the morning of January 29. The DCDS told the committee that he informed the Minister on January 21 that "we [JTF-2] had captured suspected terrorists, they had been transported and were turned over to American authorities". The DCDS explained that he had briefed the Minister on many previous occasions and described the Minister as "one who always asks questions whenever he’s briefed in terms of points of clarification". The DCDS let the committee know that he believed the Minister fully understood not only what he was told but the full implications of what he was told in relation to the taking of prisoners by Canadian troops. The DCDS stated "I’ve had the opportunity to brief the minister on a fairly regular basis and certainly after my briefing on the phone with him in Mexico, I didn’t have any doubt that the message I wanted to pass to the Minister had been passed".

             The DCDS went on to tell the Committee of his meeting with the Minister on Friday, January 25, after the Minister returned to Ottawa. He described it as follows:

I also had an opportunity to speak to the Minister on January 25, on the Friday, when he had returned. He was shown the picture on front of the newspaper, and I clarified to him that those were not Americans as depicted in the picture, but those were our people. So I told him that on January 25 and related it to the briefing on January 21.

             As the Chief of Defense Staff was still out of the country over the period of the weekend, January 26 and January 27, it was the Deputy Chief’s task to brief the Minister. This he did on the mornings of those two days, but nothing was said of prisoners or detainees. It is also quite clear that after their meeting on January 25^th, no further details were provided by the DCDS to the Minister. As the DCDS stated:

Mr. Chairman, with respect to all the details from our perspective – in terms of how that mission unfolded – some of the information in terms of the major information [was given] on January 21, but the rest of the details on January 25.

             The next relevant date is January 29. It was on that date that the Minister in Question Period gave the wrong date as to when he was first told that prisoners were taken by the JTF-2. The DCDS described the meeting of the Minister of National Defense, the Chief of Defense Staff and himself in quite graphic terms in an exchange with Mr. Geoff Regan, M.P.

"Mr. Geoff Regan: Through you, Mr. Chairman, let’s go back to the 29^th for a minute. Would you go over how it came to your attention what the minister said and how you brought it to his attention what you said to him that day.

Vadm. G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, on the 29^th, Mr. Regan?

Mr. Geoff Regan: Yes.

Vadm. G.R. Maddison: As I recall it was after question period.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Did you watch question period?

Vadm. G.R. Maddison: Yes I did and subsequently when the Minister came back took the opportunity to discuss this matter with the Minister, with the Chief of Defense Staff, the three of us, and to go over with the Minister in terms of what had transpired previously to indicate that he had been briefed on this issue on the 21^st.

Mr. Geoff Regan: And how did the Minister react?

Vadm. G.R. Maddison: I think if I could put it in sort of visual language, there was a click and right, you’re right, that did happen that way.

Mr. Geoff Regan: So what was your sense of the Minister’s understanding of the situation prior to that click?

Vadm. G.R. Maddison: I’m not sure I can answer that, Mr. Chairman. I think he recognized, "I think I made a mistake here".

Mr. Geoff Regan: No, before the click. In other words before you reminded him of the 21^st, what was your impression of his understanding of the thing?

Vadm. G.R. Maddison: From my perspective, Mr. Chairman, my understanding was that I thought it was clear to him that what had transpired on the 21^st."

             The evidence given by the Chief of Defense Staff is quite categorical as to the knowledge that the Minister should have possessed about the capture of prisoners on January 21. General Henault stated, "I would say that I have full confidence in the ability of the DCDS to provide the details of the mission to the minister and have no reason to believe that there was any requirement for me to add any details to the briefing".

             The CDS also stated that no further specific details were provided to the Minister after January 25 on the subject of detainees. He also stated that he did not have any conversation on any matters with the Minister over the January 26-27 weekend. He stated:

"Mr. Chairman, I can confirm for you that I did not talk to the Minister between January 21 and 29 when I met him in the afternoon with the deputy chief of defense staff. I can’t necessarily tell you why he would have said that because I can confirm for you here that that was not the case on my part."

             The General went on to confirm what happened at the meeting with the Minister and the DCDS on the afternoon of January 29 after Question Period . He explained:

"Mr. President, like I said before, it looks like the light was turned on and that the Minister now remembers the sequence of events and the sequence of information transfer involving the taking of prisoners."

             By way of contrast, the General explained that in "his experience in briefing this particular minister, (Minister Eggleton), that Minister Eggleton is always very quick to ask for clarifications where required. He’s very inquisitive and he does not stop questioning, or at least finish his questioning of statements of fact or of details until, in my experience, he clearly understands the issues at hand".

(iii) Other testimony relevant to the issue of contempt.

             While other witnesses appeared before the Committee on this matter, to a large extent, their evidence dealt with the reporting structure or lack thereof, among the Department of National Defense, the Privy Council Office, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This structure will be the subject of comment later in this report.

             However, certain issues were raised, albeit briefly, that relate directly to the issue before the Committee. Mr. Mel Cappe, the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Secretary to the Cabinet attempted to explain the statement made by the Prime Minister on Monday January 28, that the taking of prisoners by Canadians was hypothetical as a reference to the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry who at that point were still in Canada.

             Mr. Jim Judd, the Deputy Minister of Defense was able to tell the Committee that he was not involved in any of the briefings of the Minister on the subject of detainees. "They were between the Minister and his military staff." He also confirmed that to his knowledge briefings for the Tuesday, January 29 cabinet meeting were completed in written form. He stated:

Our normal practice with preparation of the Minster for cabinet meetings is that it’s done in the form of written briefings. We rarely, I think, sit down in person with him on issues in advance of cabinet meetings.

             In his oral testimony before the Committee, he was unable to recall whether he advised the Minister after Question Period on January 29 to go back into the House of Commons to correct the record.

             In a letter to the Committee after his appearance, Mr. Judd attempted to correct his oral testimony by stating "I met with the Minister late on the afternoon of January 28 and twice on January 29". Mr. Judd provided no details as to the contents of those meetings.

             Mr. Richard Fadden, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council was helpful in telling the committee that after he became aware on Tuesday, January 29 that the JTF-2 had taken prisoners, he, at the request of Mr. Cappe started "to pull together a view on the legal situation respecting their status and their determination". He went on to say on this subject:

Very few of us thought that there was a serious possibility that a sophisticated western nation like the United States would refute the law of armed conflict. Having said that, there were a number of questions were raised. It’s a subject matter that’s quite specialized, the JAG has part of it, justice has part of it, Foreign Affairs have part of it. I think it was a reasonable thing for the clerk to do to just ask me to pull them together so we could get a bit of a picture of where we were and that’s what I tried to do.

             He was also able to shed some light on the issue of the so-called change in the reporting procedure for the JTF-2. He was quite clear that there was no policy to change. As he said "This is the first time that it’s been deployed in this capacity, so there was no policy in the area because it had never been deployed in a military capacity before".

             Mr. Jim Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, confirmed throughout his testimony that the treatment of detainees or prisoners by the United States was a serious policy issue throughout the entire period in question. It was only settled by the statement of the President of the United States on February 7 when he said that the United States "were prepared to go ahead and treat the prisoners in question humanely and in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention".

COMMENTARY ON THE EVIDENCE GIVEN ON THE ISSUE OF CONTEMPT

             A review of the evidence set out above leads to a number of comments and observations by the PC/DR Coalition. These observations and comments in turn lead "inescapably" to the recommendation set out at the conclusion of this section of the Report.

             We believe the following comments and observations raise significant issues regarding the integrity and competence of the Minister of National Defense.

1. There is no question in the mind of either the CDS or the DCDS that this Minister on all previous occasions was a model Minister to brief. He is described as inquisitive, wanting detail and thoroughly engaged in the subject matter. It is therefore quite strange that in these particular circumstances, in a matter which was the subject of great controversy both in the Liberal party and in the country at large that the Minister just did not get it until the third time the matter was brought to his attention. The DCDS described it as a click and the CDS as a light going on. The Minister made it clear in a scrum after question period on February 27, that he understood the briefings perfectly and is quoted as saying "First of all, it did not take me three times, three briefings, to understand the point, I understood the point the first time". In that case the question remains, why did he get it wrong?

2. There is an inherent contradiction in the evidence given by the Minister and by the CDS, the DCDS and the Deputy Minister of National Defense regarding briefings given to the Minister during the January 26-27 weekend. It is the evidence of the Minister that he was in continuous briefings on the subject of detainees during that period while it is the evidence of the CDS that he did not speak to the Minister as he was out of the country. It is the evidence of the DCDS that he did not discuss prisoners or detainees with the Minister during the weekend briefings. It is also the evidence of Mr. Jim Judd, the Deputy Minister of National Defense that briefings conducted by his department are in written form and not oral.

3. The Minister did not explain, after he met with the CDS and the DCDS after question period on January 29, his reason for not returning immediately to the House of Commons, or why he did not rise before Members Statements on the next day, to explain that he had conveyed erroneous information to the House of Commons on the previous day. Both Mr. Corbett and Mr. Maingot in their evidence stated that this is the normal procedure followed by parliamentarians when they give incorrect information in the Chamber. The question that must be asked is what would have happened if the Minister had not been asked a direct question regarding the first time he became aware that Canadians had captured prisoners in question period on January 30 (the following day). As it was, he waited until this question, the sixth question he had been asked in question period that day, (January 30) before revealing the true date on which he received the information from the DCDS

4. In his testimony the Minister refers to the leaked memorandum which detailed the chain of command as a Cabinet Document which changed the reporting structure with regard to the JTF-2. It is the evidence of Mr. Fadden that there was in fact no change in policy, a new policy had to be devised as this was the first time the JTF-2 was deployed in a combat situation.

5. The Clerk of the Privy Council, Mr. Cappe tried to explain away the Prime Minister’s comment that the taking of troops was "hypothetical" by stating that the Prime Minister was referring to the Princess Patricia Regiment which had not as yet left for Afghanistan. This is not the interpretation put on the Prime Minister’s remarks by the Minister of National Defense who stated that he should have told the Prime Minister about the taking of prisoners on January 20 by the JTF-2 and who apologized to the Prime Minister for the embarrassment this caused. In these circumstances, it is more important to consider what the Minister thought

6. It was the evidence of Mr. Jim Wright of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade that the issue of the treatment of detainees or prisoners by the United States was of great importance to the government throughout the period in question. This was also the evidence of Mr. Fadden, the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council. The Minister after the joint meeting of the two House of Commons Committees on January 17 was so concerned about it, he phoned the Prime Minister. It is almost inconceivable that given his own stated concerns, and the public controversy concerning this subject that the Minister would not inform anyone including the Prime Minister that prisoners had been taken by JTF-2 until the cabinet meeting on January 29 and then get it wrong when he explained it in question period in the afternoon following the morning cabinet meeting unless there was some reason for getting it wrong which was not set out for the Committee.

7. The Minister explained his incorrect statement made to the House of Commons on Tuesday January 29 as occurring because he thought the questioner was asking him "when he first saw the newspaper picture of prisoners being taken". Even if this was so, it does not excuse the Minister, as he should have been completely forthright and answered fully giving the information as to when the capture actually took place and the date upon which it was brought to his attention by the DCDS.

CONCLUSION

             As was pointed out by the Clerk, the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, as well as Mr. J.P. Joseph Maingot it is very difficult in these types of situations to prove to a very high standard that the House of Commons has been deliberately mislead and therefore the Minister may be cited for contempt of the House. It could be said in this case that there are, as Mr. Walsh pointed out, a series of facts that lead "inescapably" to the conclusion that the Minister "must have known, when he said what he said, that what he said wasn’t true". There are questions that linger as to why he did not return immediately to the House to correct the record and why he waited until confronted with the sixth question put to him in Question Period the next day before offering the true set of facts.

             We are also left to speculate why, at a time when many Canadians, including some of his own colleagues on the Liberal benches were questioning the government’s lack of a definitive policy as to the treatment of prisoners, the Minister, after two in-depth briefings by the DCDS could not get his facts straight. He delayed telling the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the people of Canada for eight days that prisoners had been taken by the JTF-2 and handed over to the United States.

             The PC/DR Coalition has been drawn "inescapably" to the conclusion that the Minister of Defense in giving false information to the House of Commons must have known "when he said what he said, that what he said wasn’t true". This constitutes contempt of the House of Commons.

             In any event the PC/DR Coalition believes that the Minister of National Defense is not competent to fulfill this role in cabinet and act as the civilian head of Canada’s armed forces.

 

RECOMMENDATION

             The PC/DR Coalition recommends that the Minister of National Defense, immediately submit his resignation from cabinet to the Prime Minister.

THE SHARING OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES

AMONG SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

             These hearings have provided valuable insight for Parliamentarians into the operation of the highest levels of Canada’s public service during a period when Canada is a partner in a Coalition of nations fighting a war against terrorism in Afghanistan. We are mindful of the need for secrecy and security in order to protect those involved in the undertakings of JTF-2. However, it is completely beyond our comprehension that at a time when many countries including Canada were expressing concern over the treatment of detainees or prisoners by the United States, that the Deputy Minister of Defense would find out by "happenstance" (a phrase he repeated three times in his testimony) that the JTF-2 had actually taken prisoners and handed them over to the United States.

             In his written answers to written questions submitted by committee members, Commodore Thiffault, Canada’s representative at the operation control center in Tampa Florida, actually got the date wrong as to when he learned of the taking of the prisoners and had to send a fax to the committee correcting this error. He stated in the fax that he learned of the capture on January 30.

             The Clerk of the Privy Council, Mr. Cappe, one of the closest and most senior advisors to the Prime Minister only found out at the Tuesday January 29, cabinet meeting, more than a week after the event had occurred. Mr. Cappe’s immediate reaction was to order an investigation at the Privy Council Office to determine if anyone else knew of this event.

             We learned that Mr. Judd regretted not informing Mr. Cappe when he himself became knowledgeable about the prisoner-taking and we learned that Mr. Cappe and he discussed this lack of sharing of information thoroughly. No one at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade knew of the taking of prisoners and this was the department that was taking the lead role dealing with the United States on the application of the Geneva Convention to these prisoners.

             At the beginning of the hearings Jay Hill, M.P. proposed a motion for the production of documents relating to the deployment of the JTF-2 to Afghanistan. While over 200 pages of documentation were produced in response to this motion, most of the information was "whited-out" for security reasons. However, three documents appear to shed light on the issue of information coordination. An undated memorandum being an "After Action Report" states that "the passage of information within the … was poor". Two documents dated November 28, 2000 and December 8, 2000 both refer to a "War Cabinet". If this had been kept in place regarding the deployment of the JTF-2, information may have actually been passed on, at least, among certain members of Cabinet.

             As well, there even seemed to be confusion as to who was designated as the acting Minister of National Defense while the Minister was traveling outside of Canada. Mr. Cappe did not know and subsequent documentation shows that it was Mr. Graham and then Mr. Manley if Mr. Graham was not available. All of this points to a level of confusion and a general lack of interdepartmental cooperation which should not exist at any time, but certainly not in a time of war. It is as if the Prime Minister and Cabinet supported by the senior bureaucracy made the decision to send our armed forces, especially the JTF-2 to Afghanistan and then lost interest.

             This is why the quotes from the Somalia Commission Report and the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Defense are so important and relevant to this situation. There must be competent, interested civilian leadership of our armed forces answerable and accountable to Parliament.

RECOMMENDATION

The PC/DR Coalition recommends that the Prime Minister conduct a thorough review of the reporting structure on the civilian side in relation to Canada’s armed forces to ensure, within the bounds of safety and security, that information is shared at the highest levels with the Government of Canada.