FAIT Committee Report

CHAPTER IV: ACTION ON PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE
INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST TERRORISM

        The tragic September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States last year shocked the world. Many feared an immediate unilateral American military response against Islamic fundamentalists, which could provoke racial intolerance, further terrorist attacks — possibly with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction — and perhaps even a "clash of civilizations." It was also widely assumed that the 2002 G8 Summit in Canada would be dominated by the fight against international terrorism.

        Thankfully, the past months have not developed in this way. Instead, they have allowed time to increase security in all G8 states, a more measured perspective on the international terrorist threat, and an appreciation of the unique role the G8 can play in increasing international co-operation in this area.

        While most interlocutors concentrated on the African and broader economic agenda of the Kananaskis Summit in their submissions and presentations to the Committee, Canadians across the country did express concerns and opinions about terrorism. All condemned the horrific attacks of September 11, and generally accepted the need to increase measures to counter terrorism. However, they also argued strongly that action in this area must be multilateral and must respect international law, including civil liberties and human rights. It must also fit within a broader foreign policy context that includes increased efforts to reduce poverty and alienation and to pursue both the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

WHAT CANADIANS TOLD US

KEY ISSUES

        The September 11 attacks were unique in that they were carried out against the United States, the most powerful nation in the world by any measure and one previously believed almost immune from outside attack on its homeland. Many expected the United States to respond with immediate and unilateral military action; but this was not the case. Instead it worked to mobilize the diplomatic support of the international community through the United Nations — particularly through the passage by the Security Council on September 28, 2001 of Security Council Resolution 1373 — and to assemble a broad-based coalition of allies for military and other action.

        This coalition-building approach is key to the successful continuation of the fight against terrorism. Although U.S.-led military action has been an important element in the response to the attacks — and although the relatively easy military victory in Afghanistan led many to conclude that the United States no longer needed to bother with allies or coalitions, either in the fight against terrorism or more generally — it has become clear that military action is not enough. As Professor Joseph Nye, Dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government told the Committee in April 2002:

What we saw in Afghanistan is that the United States was able to use military power successfully to defeat a weak state-sponsor of terrorism, the Taliban, but it was not successful in wrapping up the al-Qaeda network, of which we destroyed or caught a quarter to a third, at most. That al-Qaeda network is a network with cells in some 50 countries, many of them friendly countries, where we could not use military force even if we wanted to.

The answer to that lesson of Afghanistan is that you have to have co-operation in the civilian area. You have to have intelligence sharing, police work, tracing financial flows and so forth, to be able to cope with this.¹²⁹

        The G8 has dealt with terrorism for over two decades and, according to Robert Fowler, has played an important role as "the main catalyst" in the negotiation of the 12 United Nations conventions which form the basis of the international counter-terrorist architecture.¹³⁰ This is a role that must continue at Kananaskis. As Reid Morden, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted before the Committee, "It is clear that our public and the international community in general, particularly in light of September 11, expect that this summit in Canada will produce concrete results. I don’t think they will understand if no more than a general hortatory statement emerges from the summit."¹³¹

        The Kananaskis Summit can reasonably be expected to produce two sorts of results on terrorism. First, G8 states can share best practices in their own domestic efforts to combat terrorism, and can increase practical co-operation on a wide variety of levels. Perhaps more important in the long term, G8 leaders must reaffirm clearly that the fight against terrorism can be successful only if it is pursued collectively and according to the shared values of their societies. Doing otherwise might produce short-term gain, but only at the cost of long-term pain.

Defining Terrorism

        Terrorist acts have been carried out by states, groups and individuals for centuries. While much recent commentary has focused on Islamic "fundamentalism" in an effort to understand the terrorist threat, as Canadian commentator Gwynne Dyer has pointed out, "Terrorism is not an ideology; it is a technique."¹³²

        The international community has increased its efforts to fight terrorism since September 11, yet has fallen short in a number of areas. In the most notable, an ad hoc Committee of the UN General Assembly is now attempting to draft a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. However, as James Wright of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade explained to the Committee on April 25, 2002:

On the comprehensive convention … we are working with UN circles to try and promote this. There is no agreement to move forward. The biggest challenge for this comprehensive convention is the inability of the international community to come up with a definition of what is a terrorist. As hard as we are fighting to try and encourage others to deal with this issue in a constructive way, sadly, there continues to be a strong difference of view within the international community and it’s that one issue that is holding up movement on the comprehensive convention. I think it’s unrealistic to expect that we’re going to see movement in the short term at the UN on this issue.¹³³

        In this case, given the old adage that "one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter," the difficulty is obviously not legal, but political. As Reid Morden had noted almost three months earlier, "My understanding is that of the treaty’s 27 articles, 24 have been pretty much agreed to, in principle. The debate will now focus on the few remaining but obviously most difficult issues, including the legal definition of terrorism itself. Solving that one issue will require a real act of political will on the part of a number of countries."¹³⁴

        In recent years there has been a significant increase in the danger posed by modern terrorists. As Professor Nye argued before the Committee:

We’ve known terrorism for a long time. It goes back to roots in its modern incarnations in the nineteenth century, but it’s worth noticing the increase of terrorism. Technology is putting into the hands of deviant groups and individuals destructive power which was once reserved solely to governments. So if in the twentieth century, you had a person who wanted to kill many people — a Hitler, a Stalin, a Mao — he needed the power of a government to do it. Today it’s not farfetched to imagine terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction and being able to do that themselves … this is a totally new dimension of world politics.¹³⁵

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

        The danger of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction has probably been exaggerated, yet it is real. Chemical weapons, for example, are less lethal than nuclear or biological weapons but they are easy to manufacture; in 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo cult released nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing 10 and injuring as many as 5,000. Biological weapons are both lethal and relatively easy to manufacture, and their danger — particularly the ability to cause panic — was made evident last fall. As Professor Charles Doran of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies told the Committee in November 2001, "not only the events of September 11 are pertinent, but what followed. Nobody’s mentioned here anything about anthrax. I can tell you the concerns about what, apparently, some crackpot has done in terms of sending these letters around is such that the change of attitude and so on in the Washington community and more broadly in the United States is something that cannot be minimized."¹³⁶

        The collapse of the Soviet Union also raised the possibility that nuclear weapons, poorly secured fissile material and expertise could be acquired by terrorists. American physicist David Albright, who participated in nuclear inspections in Iraq after the Gulf War, appeared before the Committee with Project Ploughshares in Toronto. He argued that nuclear terrorism was a threat in three ways: a nuclear explosion, an attack on a nuclear facility, or a radiological dispersal device or "dirty bomb." In all cases, the goal would be terror and panic. While he argued that the chances of terrorists acquiring a working nuclear weapon were very low, radioactive material is much easier to acquire, and he believed that terrorists such as al-Qaeda would be capable of constructing a dirty bomb which combined radioactive material and conventional explosives.

        There has been some progress in safeguarding fissile material since September 11. As Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament, Chris Westdal, noted before the Committee in April 2002, "I’m more confident now than I was pre-September 11 … because I think that really was a wake-up call about the dangers of this kind of material finding its way into the wrong hands… there has not been very much at all, if any, detected smuggling and sale of fissile material on the black market. Why? Because authorities around the world are aware of this threat and are very, very sensitive to it, particularly since last fall. Governments around the world are determined to keep control of that fissile material."¹³⁷

        Minister Graham told the Committee that there "is clearly a role here for the G8…"¹³⁸ Here again, while increased resources and technology can assist in this work, multilateral diplomacy is necessary as well. Mr. Graham also confirmed that when he and the other G8 Foreign Ministers meet in Whistler, B.C. in mid-June 2002, in addition to counter-terrorism, they would discuss issues such as non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

        A number of Canadians who testified before the Committee stressed the need to take action to reduce the dangers of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including the risk of their acquisition by terrorists. Such actions may involve short-term measures to secure and dispose of fissile material in Russia and elsewhere, but they also include strengthening international co-operation on both non-proliferation and disarmament. As Ambassador Westdal noted:

There is no conflict in the goals of ambassadors for disarmament and advocates of arms control and disarmament steps, and the goals of the government more generally, with its profound and primordial responsibility for the security of its citizens … we are all seeking security and we recognize that force is obviously required in defence of the freedoms we treasure and in defence of peace.

Those are not the issues. The issues are how that security may best be sought. Any measure of security we can secure or obtain through diplomacy, through negotiations, through agreements … those are measures of security that we and other states are therefore not compelled to seek else wise through arms.¹³⁹

        Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares told the Committee in Toronto that Canadians needed a better understanding of both the threat of nuclear terrorism and the possible responses to it. He added that it was "important to examine the threat of nuclear terrorism involving non-state actors within the context of the overall threat posed by nuclear weapons in the arsenals of states — the traditional nuclear powers, the newly emerging nuclear powers, and the threshold states."¹⁴⁰ Senator and former Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche added that G8 states control some 98% of the world’s nuclear weapons, and that it was vital that they fulfill their legal obligation to work toward the eventual elimination of these weapons.¹⁴¹

        Specific measures suggested in this area included increasing the funding available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As Senator Roche argued in a submission to the Committee, "The IAEA is currently trying to implement a plan of action to improve protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. But the IAEA is severely under-funded, and has to rely on voluntary contributions to fund its anti-terrorism program…"¹⁴² Another possibility is continued assistance for the disposition of plutonium in Russia. As Ambassador Westdal argued, "there are additional measures that can be taken. They’re not much of a mystery, but they’re expensive."¹⁴³ David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security also argued that the G8 should do a careful risk assessment of the nuclear terrorist threat, and develop a plan to prevent or reduce the threat of nuclear attack by terrorists. He added that "with a strengthened foundation for arms control and disarmament, the chances of preventing a nuclear terrorist attack will be much greater. The G8 should reaffirm its commitment to arms control and state that achieving international arms control and disarmament agreements is a vital part of the global effort to prevent nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction terrorism."¹⁴⁴

        A number of presenters argued similarly that Canada should urge the G8 to strengthen international co-operation on the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. As Ambassador for Disarmament Chris Westdal put it, "… the attacks on the trade towers and the Pentagon have surely deepened our commitment to nuclear disarmament … surely seeing what happened with that explosion [the equivalent of less than 1000 tonnes of TNT, compared to 12,000-15,000 tonnes in the bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki] — and it didn’t involve any radioactive fallout, either — should make us think hard about what the use of nuclear arsenals would entail."¹⁴⁵ Ernie Regehr argued that Canada should "… urge all G8 governments to significantly increase both political support and financial resources for a multi-dimensional, multilateral commitment to addressing the nuclear threat in all its aspects."¹⁴⁶

Recommendation 16

Given the danger of nuclear terrorism, Canada should argue that the G8 must redouble its efforts to identify, acquire and neutralize nuclear materials, especially those from the former Soviet Union, both through the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilaterally. It should also underline the need to strengthen the commitment of the G8 and other states to both non-proliferation and disarmament, including that of nuclear weapons. Finally, G8 governments should conduct a risk assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism, both to improve their understanding in this area and to educate their citizens.

The Need for International Co-operation

        All states must take legislative and other actions to improve their domestic capacity to combat terrorism. These actions may range from strengthened measures for the enforcement of immigration and other rules to increased resources for law enforcement, intelligence and even the military. After September 11, attention has focused on the military actions taken by the coalition in Afghanistan. In reality, however, effective counter-terrorism depends much more on increasing co-operation in lower-profile areas such as intelligence, improved security measures and, most importantly, closer international co-operation.

        As the target of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States will probably continue to feel the most vulnerable. Differences have also emerged between G8 states over the pursuit of the fight against terrorism and U.S. statements about an "Axis of Evil." As Professor Reg Whittaker of York University noted in Vancouver," … it is very clear that it will not be a successful war against terrorism if in fact America does persist in its unilateralist direction … it is simply not possible for even the world’s only superpower, and certainly the world’s only military superpower, to wage the long term kind of war that is necessary, particularly an intelligence war … without having co-operation."¹⁴⁷ A real difference has emerged over America’s apparent belief that the fight against terrorism should be immediately expanded to target Iraq. Gordon Smith told the Committee: "I think that this will in fact turn out to be one of the most divisive issues in Kananaskis."¹⁴⁸ He also noted, however, that summits are a good place for plain talking.

        The threat of international terrorism affects all states, and the key is to find as much common ground as possible in dealing with it on a multilateral basis. As Ambassador Westdal noted, however, the key is effective multilateralism. In his words, "There is no appetite in this [Bush] administration, nor should there be, for ineffective multilateralism, for fooling ourselves, for pretending that we have measures in place that will work."¹⁴⁹ While this comment was made in the context of non-proliferation and disarmament, it applies equally to the broader fight against terrorism and to U.S. foreign policy in general. The change in U.S. perceptions of the threats to its security are particularly important to Canada given our close bilateral relationship, and this will be an important element of the Committee’s forthcoming report on the future of the North American relationship.¹⁵⁰

        The United Nations is the primary international forum for addressing terrorism issues. As Science for Peace argued in a submission and presentation to the Committee in Toronto, Canada must continue to support it in this role. As noted, the 12 counter-terrorism conventions adopted by the United Nations are the basis of the international fight against terrorism. However, as Reid Morden pointed out, most have been ratified by only 40-60 states.¹⁵¹ Similarly, Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 2001 was a milestone in the international fight against terrorism, outlining specific actions to be taken by states and requesting that they report back on their progress. Yet while some 143 states had reported to the UN on their progress as of mid-April 2002, another 50 had not.

Democracies and Terrorism

        While acknowledging the need to use military force at times to fight terrorism, former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner argued at the end of September 2001 that "the secret of dealing with terrorism lies in selecting the option or mixture of options, both pro-legal and pro-active, that will have the greatest impact on the terrorists while minimizing the intrusions into societal values."¹⁵² As one observer, a former British defence attaché in the Middle East, has noted:

Most democratic governments apply the following policy principles in combating terrorism: there must be no concessions to hostage-takers or other terrorists; the fight against terrorism needs close international co-operation; the fight against terrorism requires the highest standards of human rights behaviour; the rule of law applies equally to suspected terrorists and the security forces. These principles are not always followed, often with unfortunate results for the authorities concerned … The temptation to fight terrorism with terrorism is great but it usually leads to the discredit of the government authorizing such tactics.¹⁵³

        In terms of Canada’s response to terrorism, Reid Morden began in this way: "My basic premise is that Canada is a nation of laws: Canada and Canadians respect the rule of law, and we favour the development of a body of international law to govern the behaviour of members of the international community and those over whom they have jurisdiction."¹⁵⁴ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has pointed out that "Although terrorism has yet to be defined comprehensively and authoritatively at the international level, States have already agreed on some core elements." For example, in December 1995, the UN General Assembly declared in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism that "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other nature that may be invoked to justify them."¹⁵⁵ Foreign Minister Bill Graham was more succinct, arguing before the Committee on April 18, 2002 that "Canada has consistently condemned all forms of terrorism. No cause or requirement can ever justify innocent civilian casualties."¹⁵⁶ Such a definition is probably not sufficient for legal purposes, but is for political ones.

        In addition to the protection of civilians, other key democratic values include a strong commitment to human rights; accordingly, civil liberties must also be part of strengthened action against terrorism. The Canadian Peace Alliance argued in its submission to the Committee that "the current truism that civil liberties and the rule of law stand in the way of protection against acts of terrorism is … likely to backfire. The Canadian Peace Alliance believes that the moment we talk about civil liberties and the rule of law as luxuries, we are headed in a very dangerous direction."¹⁵⁷ The Committee agrees. To quote the High Commissioner for Human Rights once again:

The promotion and protection of human rights is central to an effective strategy to counter terrorism…. The elements of this strategy include ensuring that the fair balances built into human rights law are at the centre of the overall counter-terrorism efforts. Other essential components of this strategy are addressing in parallel the broader issue of human insecurity, particularly the need to enhance international co-operation, to take prevention seriously, to reinforce equality and respect, and to fulfil human rights commitments.¹⁵⁸

The Committee also notes Professor Stuart Farson’s argument that increased legislative and other actions to fight terrorism since September 11 also mean a need for greater oversight and other safeguards.

        While all democracies should be able to agree — even if they do not always say so publicly — that those who deliberately target civilians are terrorists, one reason for the difficulty in reaching agreement on the definition of terrorism is the conviction of many that those who turn to terrorism do so as a result of poverty, alienation and injustice. The argument has frequently been made, before the Committee and elsewhere, that a response to terrorism must go beyond law enforcement to address these "root causes," through humanitarian assistance — in the first instance in Afghanistan — development assistance and other programs.

        While it is important to consider the problem of terrorism within a broader foreign policy context, it is more arguable whether a direct link exists between terrorism and these more general problems, or that either is amenable to simple solutions. As Ambassador Robert Fowler put it:

I must, however, express caution about the notion that poverty inexorably breeds terrorism … we need to be careful, I would argue, about drawing causal connections between being poor or being marginalized and becoming a terrorist … Connections between security and economics and politics are complex and don’t lend themselves to easy conclusions. We need to understand them better, but we should not jump to conclusions.¹⁵⁹

        Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gordon Smith argued in Vancouver that "while it’s clear… that poverty and despair don’t inevitably lead to terrorism, they certainly increase the risk."¹⁶⁰ Conversely, action to address these problems will not eliminate terrorism, but will decrease the risk. As noted earlier, Reid Morden, who had extensive experience in this area both in the Department of Foreign Affairs and as Director of CSIS, put the argument similarly:

… in the long term, human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are the best preventions against terrorism. Terrorism is a weapon for alienated, desperate people, and it’s often the product of despair. If human beings are given real hope of achieving self-respect and a decent life by peaceful methods, terrorists become a lot harder to recruit.¹⁶¹

        In the end, as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted, states will only achieve success in their counter-terrorism efforts when the global struggle against terrorism is seen as necessary and legitimate by their peoples.¹⁶² While the G8 states have a particular role to play in both increasing co-operation among the world’s leading economic powers and strengthening the global consensus against terrorism — which one observer over a decade ago called "the politics of murder"¹⁶³ — all democratic governments and legislators must do likewise wherever possible.

Recommendation 17

Canada should stress that, while recognizing the inherent right of self-defence contained in the UN Charter, G8 and other international action in this area must be based on the principles of multilateralism, respect for the rule of law, civil liberties and human rights. Such action must also be taken within a broader foreign policy context which addresses poverty and exclusion, seeks to resolve existing conflicts and puts particular emphasis on conflict prevention, including through the reduction of tensions and prejudice.

Increasing G8 Co-operation

Terrorism will be with us, alas, forever, because there will always be deviant individuals and deviant groups in any set of human society. What we need to do is raise the threshold that makes it more difficult for them to do these deeds that they are doing.

There are many things we can do together. One type of thing, for example, when you have systems that are transnational like the air transport system, it makes no sense for us or for you to ratchet up security in Ottawa or Toronto airports if somebody can get on an airplane in London or Bucharest at a lower level and once they’re in the system, they’re in the system. So we have to think about how we get common standards for raising thresholds.

A second thing we should do is try to learn from each other in best practices on homeland security … some of our countries have dealt with this better than others. We have a lot to learn from each other.

                                                Joseph Nye¹⁶⁴

        The G7’s first summit in 1975 dealt with macroeconomic issues, but terrorism appeared on the agenda as early as 1978. The G8 has addressed specific terrorist issues at its summits over the years, from hijackings (1980) to terrorist bombings and the need to improve international standards for airport security and explosives detection (1997). In 1996, the G8 adopted a set of counter-terrorism objectives/principles that it agreed to work towards. More important, on a practical basis G8 states led in the negotiation of the 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions, most of which were developed by the G8 Counter-Terrorism Expert Group, working under the guidance of foreign ministers. In 1997 the G8 states called for all states to join these conventions by 2000.

        Following the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the G8 took steps both to underline the political consensus that existed and to increase practical counter-terrorist co-operation among its members, based on a 25-point action plan. As James Wright of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade told the Committee in January 2002, "As president of the G8 this year, Canada is playing a lead role in the implementation of the comprehensive G8 Action Plan on counter-terrorism. This 25-point plan covers a range of issues including support for the UN role on anti-terrorism, financing, aviation security, immigration, drugs, cyber-crime and judicial co-operation."¹⁶⁵

        G8 leaders asked Foreign, Finance, Justice and Interior Ministers to meet and strengthen co-operation, and this work has continued in the months leading up to the Kananaskis summit. In particular, given the increasing links between terrorists and traditional criminals, and the fact that the tools used to fight crime can also fight terrorism, the G8 has had its terrorism (Roma) and crime (Lyon) groups co-operate closely to ensure that their work was complementary. Reid Morden had also noted before the Committee that, "In terrorism, as with organized crime, you can do far worse than follow the money trail. That trail, for both kinds of illicit activity, is remarkably similar."¹⁶⁶ G8 legal experts therefore met in Ottawa in January 2002 to discuss legal measures to combat terrorist financing. In addition, G7 Finance Ministers discussed anti-terrorist financing at a meeting in Ottawa in February 2002, and this will also be a major focus of their meetings in Halifax on June 14-15, 2002. In addition to financial measures, the list of terrorism-related subjects that could be discussed at Kananaskis includes: aviation security, arms export control, security co-operation, denial of means of support, and identification and removal of terrorist threats.

        In terms of specific initiatives, both Professor Nye and Stephen Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations argued that the G8 should focus on increasing the security of international transportation networks. As noted above, Professor Nye gave the example of the air transportation network; Dr. Flynn focused in his testimony in the fall of 2001 on the vulnerability to terrorism of international commercial container traffic, particularly maritime traffic, which accounts for the bulk of international trade.¹⁶⁷ Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, who is also chair of Cabinet’s ad hoc Committee on Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism, and responsible for liaison with U.S. Homeland Security Director Governor Tom Ridge, agreed on the need for action on container traffic in May 2002. As he put it, "… if the terrorists had wanted to really deal a blow to the world economy they would have left the World Trade Center alone and created a real fear about a biological or nuclear device in container traffic because we just aren’t prepared to deal with that in a large way … I think that if you’re worried about terrorist activity, that’s a place that your worry is not mis-spent."¹⁶⁸

        International action to increase security of container traffic must obviously be designed so as not inhibit trade, and Dr. Flynn focused on the need both to increase the use of technology and to develop common standards for security and reporting on container traffic.¹⁶⁹ The Committee’s December 2001 Report, Canada and the North American Challenge: Managing Relations in Light of the New Security Environment, agreed, observing "… that the vulnerability of many international systems to terrorism cannot be reduced through a narrow focus on control activities along national borders …" and that the G8 process was one way in which multilateral co-operation could be advanced.¹⁷⁰ As Peter Haydon told the Committee in Halifax:

… if you’re going to make your port secure, you have to be prepared to ask yourself, What is in all those containers that are coming in? I think one of the keys to this … is intelligence, not just intelligence within the Canadian system but intelligence all the way around — against terrorism and against crime generally, from the maritime side as well as the land side. Intelligence and good surveillance will do as much as anything to keep you a little more secure and a little less vulnerable than you would be otherwise.¹⁷¹

Recommendation 18

Canada should encourage further G8 efforts to develop common security and reporting standards for international transportation networks. In particular, while improvements since last September 11 in the security of air transportation have been welcome, much more remains to do in the area of maritime container transportation.

Strengthening G8 Solidarity

        In the months since September 11, the G8 has worked with the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, largely to prepare to help states sign and implement the 12 conventions. As Foreign Affairs Minister Graham told the Committee, "As for long-term counter-terrorism aims, the G8 will work together with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to provide capacity-building assistance such as technical training and legal assistance to those countries that are unable to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373. This Resolution includes measures for suppression of terrorist financing and the implementation of the 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions."¹⁷²

        While co-operation on capacity building is important, so is political leadership. The G8 would be in a stronger position if the eight states themselves had heeded their own call and ratified all of the UN conventions. Canada and the United Kingdom are the only two G8 states that have done so. In addition, some have argued that the fact that only three of the G8 countries sent their Justice ministers to a mid-May 2002 meeting in Canada is evidence that there is a lack of political commitment to the fight against terrorism within the G8 itself.¹⁷³ This may not be the case, but, once again, actions speak louder than words.

Recommendation 19

Canada should stress the need for all G8 states to ratify the 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions without delay. In addition, G8 states should encourage and assist others to do so as well, both diplomatically and through capacity building. All states must also redouble efforts to conclude the negotiations on the omnibus Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism now under negotiation.

---

129       Evidence, May 2, 2002, Meeting No. 74, Ottawa, 9:25.

130         Evidence, January 29, 2002, Meeting No. 53, 9:15.

131         Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:45.

132         Gwynne Dyer, The Taxonomy of Terror, April 15, 2002 (pre-publication version).

133         Evidence, April 25, 2002, Meeting No. 72, 10:30

134         Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:45.

135         Evidence, May 2, 2002, Meeting No.74, 9:20.

136         Evidence, November 29, 2001, Meeting No. 47, 9:55.

137         Evidence, April 25, 2002, Meeting No. 72, 11:35.

138        Ibid., 9:15.

139         Ibid.,11:20.

140         Evidence, May 7, 2002, Meeting No. 78, Toronto.

141         Submission, Senator Douglas Roche, Edmonton, May 9, 2002.

142        Ibid., p. 3.

143         Evidence, April 25, 2002, Meeting No. 72, 11:35.

144         Evidence, May 7, 2002, Meeting No. 77, Toronto.

145         Evidence, April 25, 2002, Meeting No. 72, 10:45.

146         Evidence, May 7, 2002, Meeting No. 77, Toronto.

147         Evidence, May 6, 2002, Meeting No.76, Vancouver.

148         Evidence, May 7, 2002, Meeting No. 78, Vancouver.

149         Evidence, April 25, 2002, Meeting No. 72, 11:30.

150        Intelligence co-operation is particularly important, and a number of witnesses before the Committee concentrated on intelligence
                issues. As the authors of a major study published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington — which the
                Committee visited in March 2002 — in November 2001 noted: "With good intelligence, anything is possible; witout it, nothing is
                possible." Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism,
                Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington, November 2001, p. 78.  

151          Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:50.

152          Stansfield Turner on Terrorism and Democracy: Ten Steps to Fight Terrorism Without Endangering Democracy, Center for
                International and Security Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, September 30, 2001,
                p. 2 (accessed at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM).

153          Andrew Duncan and Michel Opatowski, Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 2000, p. 19.

154          Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:45. Canada’s response to terrorist threats or incidents has been based on the following
                policies, as contained in the 2000 version of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan: Terrorist incidents are criminal offences; the “rule of
                law” shall be maintained; every effort shall be made to seek a peaceful resolution to a hostage incident; no substantive concessions shall
                be granted; terrorists will not gain from their criminal actions; and a hijacked aircraft shall not be permitted to become airborne except under
                extraordinary circumstances. The National Counter-Terrorism Plan, ATIP (Access to Information and Privacy) Version.

155         Cited in the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights
                E/CN.4/2002/18, February 27, 2002, para. 3.

156          Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Situation in the Middle East, Notes for a presentation to the Committee,
                Ottawa, April 25, 2002, p. 3.

157          Submission, Canadian Peace Alliance, Toronto, May 8, 2002, p. 6.

158         Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2002), para. 7.

159          “Address to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade by Ambassador Robert Fowler, Personal Representative
                of the Prime Minister for the G8 Summit, and Personal Representative of the Prime Minister for Africa,” April 23, 2002, p. 3.

160          Evidence, May 7, 2002, Meeting No. 78, Vancouver.

161          Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:55.

162         Cited in Ibid., 9:50.

163          Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflict Since 1945, Vintage Books, New York,
                1990, p. 526.

164          Evidence, May 2, 2002, Meeting No. 74, 10:55.

165          Evidence, January 17, 2002, Meeting No. 52, 13:45.

166          Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:50.

167         See “When Trade and Security Clash,” The Economist, April 6, 2002, p. 59-62.

168         David Rider, “Manley Feared Attack Against Commercial Container Traffic,” The Ottawa Citizen, May 14, 2002, p. D2.

169          Evidence, November 27, 2001, Meeting No. 46, 16:20. The Vancouver Port Authority had argued similarly in a submission focused
                on bilateral co-operation between Canada and the United States that “inter-agency data sharing, joint risk assessment and common
                databases are needed to provide intelligence, security and interdiction capabilities. An ‘Integrated Information System’ is proposed
                by the [Perimeter Clearance Coalition] as the backbone for linking multiple sources of information and positive identification systems to
                greatly increase … security …. ”Submission, The Vancouver Port Authority, p. 2.

170          Canada and the North American Challenge: Managing Relations in Light of the New Security Environment, December 2001, p. 16.

171          Evidence, February 26, 2002, Meeting No. 59, 15:35.

172          Evidence, April 25, 2002, Meeting No. 72, 9:15.

173         See Jeff Heinrich, “Missing: G8 Justice Ministers, Absence of Top Lawmakers at Summit Raises Questions about Terrorism Fight,”
                The Gazette, Montreal, May 16, 2002, p. A8.