FAIT Committee Report

CHAPTER III: ACTION TOWARDS A NEW
PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Africa, the NEPAD and Canada’s Role

        When Ambassador Robert Fowler appeared as the Committee’s first witness in his capacity as Prime Minister Chrétien’s Personal Representative for the G8 Summit and for Africa, he made the following compelling case:

Africa, today is the only continent where poverty is on the rise. One African in five is in some manner engaged in conflict. In Sub-Saharan Africa, almost half the population of nearly 700 million people live on less than $1 a day. Life expectancy in Africa is 47 years … 16 years lower than the next lowest region of the world and it has declined three years in the last ten. Of the 40 million people worldwide infected with HIV/AIDS, more than two-thirds live in Sub-Saharan Africa. I could go on with the litany of alarming statistics, but suffice it to say the G8 leaders agreed with their African counterparts that this widening gap between Africa and the rest of the world cannot be allowed to widen still further.⁴³

        Throughout the Committee’s hearings there has been confirmation that Africa deserves a major place on the Kananaskis Summit agenda, given the unfolding human, economic and environmental security challenges which the continent faces. Despite some examples of development successes and a wealth of natural and cultural resources, the prospects are that Africa’s global position will become further marginalized unless strong collective actions are taken and soon. The sum of the testimony which we received from across the country (see the selections from it in the "What Canadians Told Us" section) reflects a deeply felt response that was impressive in the scope of its analysis and critique. A lot of Canadians not only care about what happens to Africa, they are actively engaged in serious thinking about what those necessary actions should be that will genuinely improve the situation of Africa’s people.

        The timing of these deliberations is not coincidental, of course, and forms part of the follow up to the declaration of G8 leaders at the Genoa Summit on July 21, 2001 that they would approve a "concrete Action Plan" at this year’s summit in response to a major initiative drawn up by African leaders.⁴⁴ This "New Africa Initiative" had been unanimously adopted only days earlier by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) — which will soon become the African Union⁴⁵ — at its summit of heads of state and government in Lusaka, Zambia on July 11, 2001. A final policy framework, renamed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was put in place at the first meeting of its Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria on October 23, 2001.⁴⁶

        The genesis of the NEPAD goes back several years further. An important catalyst in drawing attention to Africa’s recovery efforts was the United Nations Millennium Summit Declaration of September 2000 which urged special support for Africa. Subsequently, in November 2000, African finance ministers asked the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to develop an African recovery initiative following up that appeal. The ECA’s work on a development "compact" was ultimately subsumed into several other Millennium responses being developed by African leaders. The presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria put forward "The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme," while the president of Senegal had introduced an "Omega Plan for Africa." At a special OAU Summit in Libya in March 2001, it was agreed that the plans should be merged — hence the birth of the New Africa Initiative which has since grown into the NEPAD.

        Beyond the changing titles and acronyms, what does it all mean? The authors of the NEPAD state that its primary goals are to "promote accelerated growth and sustainable development, to eradicate widespread and severe poverty, and to halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process."⁴⁷ While the NEPAD plan includes initiatives to address issues of peace and security, democratic governance, environment and culture, as either conditions for sustainable development or sectoral priorities, its official list of "principles and objectives" (see Box 1) emphasizes economic recovery and development within an integrated regional and global context.

        Canada’s role in the G8 context is not obvious on the basis of the size of our relationship with Africa. Canada has indeed spent billions of dollars over several decades on aid projects in Africa, and has announced a $500 million "Canada Fund for Africa"⁴⁸ to support new African initiatives in line with the NEPAD and the objectives to be set out in the G8 Africa Action Plan to be adopted at the Kananaskis Summit. An increasing number of Canadians have African ancestry, including the Chair of this Committee, or have personal experiences of living and working in African countries. There are strong relationships between many Canadian NGOs and partners in Africa, as was evident from our hearings. At the same time, some witnesses pointed out that our credibility has been hurt by a sharp decline in ODA commitments to Africa during the past decade. One of these witnesses, John Hoddinott in Halifax, observed that he is probably the first professor working on African issues to be appointed in a Canadian university economics department in the last 12 years.⁴⁹ Research by the North-South Institute also shows that Canada’s trade and investment relationship with Africa remain tiny: 0.75% of our imports and only 0.33% of our exports; total private direct investment of $1.2 billion, heavily concentrated in a few natural resource sectors.⁵⁰

        Apart from the personal commitment of the Prime Minister as Summit host, one of Canada’s potential comparative advantages in delivering timely action on Africa’s needs may be that Canada does not carry the weight of historical colonial or great-power interventions. As was observed to the Committee in Vancouver by John Atta-Mills, visiting scholar at the Liu Centre and a former Vice-president of Ghana who worked on developing the NEPAD, the presence of Canada is welcomed in Africa as that of a "genuine, loyal and trusted friend" with "a good track record." Canada, he contended, despite its quiet profile, "indeed has influence" as an important voice within the G8 and can be counted on to "seek Africa’s best interest."⁵¹ But this praise from prominent Africans also puts an onus on Canada to achieve significant results from the Kananaskis meetings.

Ensuring a Constructive G8 Response to Africa and to NEPAD as a Work in Progress

        A certain healthy scepticism is perhaps understandable approaching another plan for Africa, promising as it may seem on the surface. Previous plans have come to nought, as the submission from the Canadian Labour Congress reminded the Committee. As a case in point, Mr. Atta-Mills has noted⁵² that the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action was stillborn with the advent of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed on African debtor nations by the IFIs during the ensuing decade, the negative consequences of which continue to the present day. Yet he argued strongly that this time things will be different, not the least of which is that, as he put it: "For the first time African leaders are admitting our own shortcomings and inadequacies."⁵³ Ongoing accountability is to be addressed through NEPAD’s "peer review" mechanism. African leaders also present a posture of reaching out to the rest of the world on the basis of a continent-wide solidarity around common goals determined by and for Africans. In short, NEPAD leaders give the impression of an Africa ready and willing to forge truly mutual partnerships that will close the development gap and allow it to fully integrate into the global community. These are appealing messages which ran through the forceful presentations made to the Committee by African ambassadors on April 30.

The Committee welcomes the assurance given by Ambassador Fowler on April 25 that a group of African leaders will be participating in the discussion on a G8 action plan on the second day of the Kananaskis Summit. As former "sherpa" Gordon Smith observed, there is "a high level of expectation in Africa" going into that meeting, so much so that — "better to make no commitments than promises not accompanied by action plans — and then real action."⁵⁴ Early on in our hearings, Professor Gerald Helleiner, the dean of Canadian economists on issues of African development, outlined eight areas in which policy reforms could be pursued in conjunction with the NEPAD. But he then cautioned that: "If some G8 members will not seriously embrace the suggested new development partnership, let Canada join those — within the G8 or without it — who will. And let us, in that case, abandon the search for an inevitably watered-down ‘G8 Plan of Action’."⁵⁵

        The Committee remains confident that success under Canadian leadership is achievable at Kananaskis, and that the NEPAD process, however imperfect, must be given a chance to work in conjunction with a constructive ongoing G8 response. At the same time, we acknowledge the many serious criticisms made in the course of our hearings in regard to G8 policies towards Africa and in terms of perceived deficiencies in the NEPAD framework. These need to be addressed through open dialogue and bold actions by leaders both within the G8 and Africa.

        Among the most comprehensive and detailed of the critical assessments received by the Committee from witnesses is an April 2002 commentary on the NEPAD prepared by the coordinating committee of the Africa-Canada Forum, a working group of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC).⁵⁶ A number of other witnesses raised concerns similar to those expressed by CCIC. At the risk of simplification, the principal flaws as identified by them are as follows: (1) that the NEPAD is the product of a very top-down, leader-driven process which has not involved the participation of African civil society and is therefore little known or appreciated by African citizens; (2) that the NEPAD is too accepting of the dominant model of economic globalization and, rather than seeking fundamental alternatives to the status quo, offers what CCIC’s Gerry Barr described as "repackaged, old and unsuccessful strategies that have been tried in Africa before";⁵⁷ (3) that situations like the recent elections in Zimbabwe could make a hollow claim of the NEPAD’s promises of adherence to democratic "good governance" principles; (4) that the desire to obtain a G8 "seal of approval", and to meet donor conditionalities for new funding, could weaken elements of the NEPAD and soften pressures on the G8 to reform their own policies.

        Some of these criticisms may be overdrawn. As well, the point was well made by Mr. Atta-Mills in Vancouver that leadership has to come from somewhere, and better that it come from some of Africa’s most progressive elected leaders. The Kananaskis Summit could be a historically unique opportunity to build a better relationship with Africa. To allow that to pass by is not an option. The Committee therefore reiterates its view that the NEPAD be given a chance to prove itself in tandem with the elaboration of a G8 action plan that can, like the NEPAD framework itself, continue to be evaluated and improved over time.

        In that regard, the Committee has benefited from the substantive suggestions contributed by witnesses. Those of Professors Helleiner and Hoddinott have already been mentioned; other experts provided similarly enriching perspectives. Labour federations across the country addressed the African development agenda, with the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) submitting a detailed statement on African partnership containing 13 recommendations.⁵⁸ The CCIC submission referred to above was among a rich body of NGO input into the hearings process. Some of these submissions, notably from World Vision and Oxfam Canada, offered wide-ranging and specific practical proposals directed towards a Summit action plan.⁵⁹ In different parts of the country, knowledgeable concerned citizens also gave us valuable ideas on African development issues.

        In light of that testimony, the Committee in the sections that follow comes to a series of its own recommendations on key elements for an effective G8 action plan for Africa, understanding that these should be seen as a work in progress. But first we want to let witnesses be heard from in their own words.

WHAT CANADIANS TOLD US

Canadian Leadership on Eight Elements for an Effective G8 Action Plan for Africa

        Of the testimony cited above, the last two statements from the Canadian Foodgrains Bank and from Oxfam Canada, in particular, help to put matters in perspective. While critically assessing the issues surrounding the NEPAD and donor policies, it is not only possible but necessary to work towards getting agreement at the Summit on realistic actionable commitments. As Joseph Nye advised the Committee in another context, in multilateralist diplomacy a more inclusive result can usually be obtained when the perfect (even assuming we know what it is) does not become the enemy of the good. In that spirit, we put forward the following as priorities for making the best and broadest possible start at Kananaskis.

1.    Peacebuilding as a Condition for Sustainable Human Development

        As recognized in the NEPAD, acknowledged by African ambassadors in their testimony to the Committee, and as we heard from many witnesses, conflict resolution and prevention are essential preconditions for moving Africa on to a sustainable development path.

        Amnesty International highlighted the areas of curbing the arms trade, including through transparent international registers and accountability mechanisms and assistance for the collection and destruction of illicit small arms; control over conflict or "blood" diamonds through implementation of an improved "Kimberly Process"; corporate social responsibility measures;⁶¹ measures to deal with impunity and other gross and systemic threats to human rights.⁶² Other witnesses made similar proposals. Noting the degree to which G8 countries are implicated in Africa’s wars, World Vision urged G8 governments to table specific arms control actions and to "support the implementation in Africa of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms."⁶³ Oxfam called for "an International Arms Trade Treaty to prohibit weapons transfers to where they might be used in breach of international humanitarian law and human rights."⁶⁴ A submission from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) underscored related problems of large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, urging that their reintegration "be given more focused attention in both the NEPAD and in the G8 Action Plan, in the broader context of post-conflict rehabilitation."⁶⁵ Former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who appeared on behalf of the Liu Centre in Vancouver, also underlined regional peacekeeping contexts and tabled a report prepared to help guide CIDA’s work on security-development linkages.⁶⁶

        The complex challenges of these linkages and the economic/social/political roots of conflict were also raised by other academic witnesses. John Harker and Sandra MacLean, from Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies advocated a comprehensive human security approach for Africa. Professor MacLean argued that peace and conflict situations are not just separate or regionally specific problems, but are in fact "linked in various ways, not only in terms of the relationship between poverty and insecurity, or between poor governance and insecurity, but in terms of the illegal transnational networks that now have unprecedented opportunities for exploitation because of unregulated or inadequately regulated trade and investment routes."⁶⁷ Miriam Gervais of McGill University’s Centre for Developing Area Studies made the point in the Committee’s first panel that, while donor budgets may have dropped due to "aid fatigue," the public in donor countries would not allow them to ignore the consequences of African conflicts. So — "Paradoxically, this humanitarian aid proved very costly and placed a great deal of pressure on the budgets earmarked for development programs. In the case of Rwanda alone, Canada provided close to $75 million in humanitarian aid between 1994 and 1998."⁶⁸ The price of inaction on the causes of conflicts is likely to be high. As she put it:

It is therefore in Canada’s interest and that of the other G8 countries to reduce the major sources of political and economic crises that threaten the security of the African people by providing significant support for reforms and initiatives designed to make lasting improvements in poverty elimination and human security in Africa for all its people. This therefore involves a firm, long-term commitment on the part of the G8 member countries.⁶⁹

Recommendation 8

Canada should press for a G8 Action Plan that takes a long-term integrated approach to Africa’s peace and security challenges and that devotes particular attention to:

• Stricter multilateral controls on illicit arms transfers and the trade in small arms, starting with a G8 system of controls and restrictions for automatic light weapons;

• Implementation of a strengthened process around the trafficking in, among other resources, diamonds used to finance conflicts;

• Promotion of enforceable codes of commercial conduct especially in zones of conflict;

• Assistance for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation, including reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.

2.     Providing Aid that Benefits the Poorest

        Given the very mixed record, to say the least, of much past aid to Africa, there are grounds for close scrutiny of any additional promises of assistance. At the same time, in the Committee’s first panel both Roy Culpeper and Gerald Helleiner insisted that increased aid flows are still very necessary and that private-sector trade and investment, while offering greater potential over time under the right conditions, cannot in the foreseeable future substitute for substantial new aid to the poorest African countries. They were joined in this view by many other witnesses, who also criticized the G8 record on aid commitments (Professor Helleiner pointed to a roughly 40% drop in overall ODA flows to Africa over the course of the 1990s), its weak coordination, and the tying of aid to donor-country purchases along with other donor government policies and practices which may further increase the transaction costs of aid while diminishing its poverty reducing effectiveness.

        Some witnesses linked the issue of aid to developed-country policies in other ways. For example, Oxfam argued that in order to achieve the Millennium development targets which the Committee discussed in Chapter II, "G8 and other key donor governments should increase their aid budgets to Africa by US$40 billion each year. This is the equivalent of approximately six weeks subsidy to agribusiness in OECD countries".⁷⁰ Professor Hoddinott, who made a similar point about the cost to developing nations of rich-country agricultural subsidies, argued that proven priorities and credible policy frameworks can make aid to Africa "work". To achieve poverty-reducing growth he emphasized principally: investments in public health, "better institutions (public sector capacity, contract enforcement, infrastructure), appropriate and stable macro policy, improvements in infrastructure (people living in regions poorly served by infrastructure are unlikely to benefit from growth) and renewed investment in agriculture."⁷¹ Rural development and food production were also stressed in presentations from the Canadian Foodgrains Bank and Howard McConnell.

        Other important instruments raised by witnesses were micro-credit finance and various kinds of capacity-building assistance. Christopher Youé recommended promotion of knowledge transfers and exchanges of expertise. However, Professor Ian McAllister cautioned that much of the capacity-development assistance to date has been too short-term, ad hoc, and has failed to draw more than anecdotal "lessons learned." As he put it bluntly: "We really know very little about the long-term impacts of Canadian assistance that has allegedly been capacity-building in Africa or elsewhere." He argued for stronger institutional connections with Africa that would "facilitate more consistent research, training and community development activities."⁷²

        On really tackling aid effectiveness, Professor Helleiner made the point most strongly about "an absolutely critical need [for] the independent monitoring and evaluation of performance, not simply of African governments — whose performance is thoroughly assessed by donors and international financial institutions on a regular basis already — but also of the performance of external donors. Much of the perceived ‘failure’ of earlier aid effort is attributable to deficiencies and defects in delivery mechanisms, and inability or unwillingness to transfer ownership to locals. … This monitoring, assessment and reporting must be undertaken by independent people; moreover, it must be undertaken at the level of individual African countries."⁷³

        The Committee’s witnesses, like participants in the National Forum on Africa conducted by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development,⁷⁴ disagreed on how, and even whether, evaluative "conditionalities" should be applied to African aid recipients. There is much distrust of the donors’ measuring sticks, along with worries that this will lead to a process of picking aid "winners" which leaves behind many of the poorest countries. We understand these concerns but we also see merit in raising the bar for both donors and recipients simultaneously. As suggested by Professor Hoddinott:

Assistance should differentiate across countries. Where institutions and governance are weak — and where there is little meaningful commitment to poverty
reduction — assistance should focus on working to rectify those weaknesses but should not include significant financial support. Countries receiving financial aid should have a credible record with respect to governance, civil liberties, and poverty reduction. The conditions for receiving aid should be based on "outcomes" not "inputs", transparent, and consistently applied; furthermore, G8 countries must put in place mechanisms that demonstrate that they themselves will not renege on commitments to assist countries that attain these credible records.⁷⁵

Recommendation 9

• Canada should press for a G8 action plan that both establishes firm time frames for substantially increasing development assistance to Africa, and does so on a basis that takes the credible evaluation of poverty reduction effectiveness as seriously for donors’ policies and practices as it does for recipients’ adherence to these goals. Canada should ensure that its recently created fund for Africa is additional to existing Canadian ODA to Africa, while urging G8 partners to make similar commitments beyond their current aid levels.

• G8 assistance should also seek, in a consistent and coordinated way, to build permanent African capacities which can be truly owned by Africans. Food production, rural infrastructure, basic public health and education should be among the priorities for well-governed development programs.

3.     Supporting Public Health and Education Priorities

        As indicated above, public health investments were mentioned by many witnesses as being crucial, particularly given the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis from which 16 million Africans have already died and which cuts across virtually every dimension affecting Africa’s development, as described in detail by John Harker’s submission.⁷⁶ Also in Halifax, John Hoddinott put the broader case eloquently: "Improvements in health outcomes — including reductions in malnutrition and morbidity as well as infant and maternal mortality — are highly desirable, not only because better health is an important development objective in its own right, but also because better health makes individuals more economically productive and because many improvements in health status are technologically achievable in the short run at low cost."⁷⁷ Yet as Catherine Little pointed out in Calgary, the poorest African countries spend only "$5-10 per person per year on health which cannot possibly support a functioning health system…"⁷⁸ At the same time, according to Hoddinott, "concerted public action can pay off; in Uganda, [HIV/AIDS] prevalence rates among adults have fallen from 18.5% to 8.3% in the latter half of the 1990s."⁷⁹

        A number of submissions received by the Committee expressed concerns that action on health, and especially on the AIDS pandemic, has still not sufficiently registered with African and G8 leaders. For example, the letter to the Prime Minister from the Interagency Coalition on AIDS & Development and the Canadian Labour Congress observes that, "beyond water and sanitation, the strategic framework of NEPAD is silent on health infrastructure development", which was identified as an urgent priority for ODA funding. Witnesses called for full financing of, or at the very least increased support for, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, discussed in Chapter II. Oxfam wants G8 leaders to advocate that the Fund use "the cheapest, good quality medicines available, including generic drugs". The National Union of Public and General Employees demanded changes to global patent rules, support for buying generic drugs, for clinics and vaccine development.⁸⁰

        NGOs, labour organizations and others argued for a reformed post-Doha TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement at the WTO to permit low-cost drug imports in African countries lacking domestic manufacturing capability. The Committee agrees and has accordingly addressed this issue in Recommendation 6 of the recent report of its Trade Sub-Committee.⁸¹ The Canadian Labour Congress also called for G8 leaders to promote the ILO’s Code of Conduct on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work.⁸² And in Montreal, Henri Massé of the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec urged Canada to "convince the other G8 countries of the importance of encouraging their African counterparts to seriously consider how they can channel the energies of the entire society — including the union movement — into the fight against HIV/AIDS."⁸³

        Gerald Helleiner suggested that another area of "major underfunded activities carrying high developmental returns", in addition to that of "research on tropical diseases … that does not offer the prospect of profit for private pharmaceutical companies because of the poverty of the potential beneficiaries," is "improved health and education for poor African children, especially girls, through UNICEF and other channels."⁸⁴

        The Committee welcomes Canada’s support to date to the Education For All (EFA) initiative and through the G8 Basic Education Task Force as outlined to us by CIDA President Len Good on April 25. But witnesses presented strong arguments to do more. Randy Rudolph with the Calgary G6B organizing group pointed out that in Sub-Saharan Africa 40% of primary school-age children do not go to school, and that unlike other regions, this number is still rising. He argued that: "Without significant progress in basic education, few, if any, of the international goals in infant mortality, child malnutrition, gender equality, and disease prevention are likely to be achieved." He requested that Canada lead G8 countries to endorse "the principle that any country that is seriously committed to EFA and faces a financing gap will receive rapid access to the additional aid and debt relief needed to close that gap."⁸⁵ Oxfam called for a US$ 4 billion increase in donor spending on education "to fill in financing gaps in countries which have developed sound education plans. A US$1 billion down-payment at Kananaskis would ensure rapid progress in 15 to 20 countries."⁸⁶ The Committee also received a submission in Toronto from Inclusion International asking that the special needs of handicapped children be taken into consideration in G8 initiatives supporting basic education in Africa.

Recommendation 10

Canada should press for priority attention in the G8 Action Plan to:

• address the HIV/AIDS crisis through a range of measures, including education and prevention, increasing support for the Global Health Fund, and improving access to affordable medicines;

• support a TRIPS solution at the WTO to remedy the situation of drug-importing African countries, while respecting patent protection laws;

• encourage internationally coordinated efforts among public health research groups in order to advance research on tropical diseases;

• invest in health infrastructure development in areas of greatest need;

• invest in inclusive basic education initiatives in the poorest countries;

• set out specific outcome-based targets for meeting both public health and education goals.

4.    Reforming International Trade, Investment and Finance

        Christopher Youé, President of the Canadian Association of African Studies pointed out that Africa’s share of world trade has in a sense "become less globalized in the last 30 years since independence," falling from a high of about 3% then to around 1% now. The actual figure is 1.3%, and in fact, Sub-Saharan Africa’s slice of global trade shrank by one-quarter over the 1990s. Nor has the multilateral trade liberalization of recent years prevented many poor African countries from becoming poorer or the marked deterioration in the terms of trade for African countries dependent on commodities exports excluding oil. Professor Youé also pointed to continuing tariff barriers on African goods, especially textiles and foodstuffs, which could be removed for the least developed countries.⁸⁷ However, labour witnesses tended to qualify their support for this. For example, the CLC’s submission called on the G8 to: "Ensure market access for African countries’ products within a broad development strategy, including job creation, the respect for core labour rights, increased ODA, and debt forgiveness — with proper mitigation measures taken in Canada towards Canadian workers who may lose out."⁸⁸

        Better market access is only one part of the story. Witnesses often linked trade with IFI and other reforms. As Oxfam put it: "Africa gets a particularly raw deal when it comes to trade. … Agricultural dumping and IMF and World Bank riders forcing African countries to liberalize imports have seriously undermined development efforts." At the same time, Oxfam called for G8 leaders "to take up Canada’s lead and open their markets to all Africa’s products" and to "agree to a timetable to phase out export subsidies."⁸⁹ Many witnesses also called for inclusion of a "Development Box" within the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, to, as Gerry Barr of CCIC put it, "protect the livelihoods of small farmers, encourage local food production and promote food security."⁹⁰ He and others also argued for other policy flexibility "in intellectual property agreements to ensure protection for small farmers rights to save and sell seeds, to ensure access to affordable medicine, and to stimulate technology transfer."⁹¹

        Moreover, Professor Helleiner cautioned that it is "an illusion" to expect that simply reducing trade and investment barriers will do much for poor African countries. "Rather, the poorest countries need investment, which will have to be primarily governmental, in the infrastructure, skills and other elements of supply capacity that will enable them to respond to expanded market opportunities." He called for effective "special and differential treatment" within the WTO system; "high-quality and demand-driven … assistance for these countries as they seek to negotiate equitable trade and investment agreements, implement earlier agreements in ways that meet their needs, defend their negotiated rights, and build their own legal and policy-making capacities to do these things for themselves."⁹² Others strongly agreed that a fairer as well as freer international trading system was required in order for Africans, especially the poorest, to see real and sustained benefits from liberalization.

        With respect to foreign direct investment, financial flows and debt, most witnesses also saw the need for deeper reforms. Africa’s share of global investment is less than 1% and most of that has gone into a few resource extraction sectors. There is a net capital outflow from Africa. Add to that estimates by Professor Hoddinott that some 40% of the stock of wealth accumulated by Africans in the past 30 years is held outside the continent.⁹³ Clearly creating a better investment climate has to be a consideration. However, there are also plenty of pitfalls along that path. World Vision’s submission warned that: "Competition for foreign investment often pits countries against one another, and human development goals are sacrificed for short-term financial needs." This witness therefore called for the G8’s Africa Action Plan to "set a new direction, including support for full cost-benefit analysis of all proposals to identify who will benefit and who will pay the costs [and] enforceable measures to protect the environment, comply with international human rights standards, and strengthen public accountability."⁹⁴ Noting the questionable ethics and legality of some commercial exploitation of African natural resources, the profits of which sometimes fuel conflicts, Oxfam was among those calling for the G8 to make compliance with the OECD’s Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises "a condition of eligibility for all government guarantees and export credits". As well, "G8 leaders should endorse the [UN] Draft Fundamental Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises and call for a binding international regulatory framework based on these principles."⁹⁵

        There was strong support among witnesses for additional debt relief to ease the plight of poor African countries and for reforms to IMF/World Bank structures and policies, including their prevailing poverty reduction strategies, which many see as having hurt more than helped. Some debt proposals were selectively modest; for example, the UNHCR’s that "the G8 countries could envisage debt relief measures for countries hosting large refugee populations, such as Guinea and Zambia, as well as for those to which refugees are returning in large numbers."⁹⁶ Oxfam asked that debt relief "be extended so that debt servicing does not undermine financing for the Millennium Development Goals, or take up more than 10% of government revenue."⁹⁷ Others called for fair and agreed-upon international debt arbirtration mechanisms but also went much further, supporting "accelerated and unconditional" relief (CLC brief), up to immediate full cancellation of the debts of all least developed poor and highly indebted African countries (though some of these witnesses, e.g. the CLC, may have argued at the same time for stringent human rights/labour rights conditionality to be applied to market access measures and private investment flows).⁹⁸ In the view of the Halifax Initiative Coalition, the G8 must call on the IFIs to use their own resources for debt cancellation, and should respond positively to alternative financing proposals such as that of the G77 for a "World Solidarity Fund."⁹⁹

        Other suggestions appealed for internal reforms to existing IFI structures and approaches. For example, Gerald Helleiner proposed more African representation in global economic governance systems, starting with steps like creating a third African seat on the 24-member boards of the IMF and World Bank to alleviate the "impossible" workloads of Africa executive directors. Many other witnesses were sharply critical of current IFI approaches to economic policy reform, including the process used for country programs and so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). World Vision’s submission called for changes in their content in order to incorporate "a rights-based framework, greater flexibility in macro-economic policies, and greater attention to the social impacts of economic decisions, including [on] women and children."¹⁰⁰ More generally, NGO witnesses tended to seek greater changes to donor/IFI debt and development finance policies, and a stronger challenge to the current model of economic globalization, than they currently find within the NEPAD framework.¹⁰¹

        The Committee accepts that some far-reaching international trade, investment and financial governance reforms may be desirable in order to really boost the fortunes of Africa’s poor within a more equitable world economy. As outlined further in the next section, we also believe that African governments as well as G8 governments must jointly shoulder their responsibilities in order to create better conditions for fostering the kinds of beneficial, sustainable private and public economic activity without which the cycles of debt and poverty will only be repeated. NEPAD deserves a chance for that reason alone.

Recommendation 11

Canada should promote inclusion within the G8 Action Plan of commitments on international economic reforms, specifically:

• to open their markets to Africa’s exports by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade on the broadest possible basis, especially for the least developed countries;

• to reform WTO agricultural trade rules with particular attention to the needs of Africa’s small food producers, and envisaging the establishment of a stabilization-insurance-type mechanism which would assure then of a decent income;

• to consider implementation of enforceable international business investment standards with credible monitoring and reporting mechanisms;

• to significantly enhance African capacities to negotiate more favourable terms within trade, investment, debt and finance agreements, and to increase their representation in the governing structures of international economic organizations;

• to provide faster and fuller debt relief than has been achieved so far under the HIPC process for the poorest African countries which have demonstrated a commitment to respect democratic rights and pursue poverty reducing development priorities;

• to encourage greater use of international financial assistance for micro-credit initiatives that reach the poorest people.

5.    Improving Democratic Governance and Fighting Corruption

        One of the most promising, but also challenging and potentially controversial, aspects of the NEPAD process leading to Kananaskis is its emphasis on democratic "good governance" reforms as among the preconditions for African recovery and sustainable development. Obviously, measures taken by African leaders to work towards honest, competent public administration and to combat serious crime and corruption problems in their countries will be welcomed by the leaders of G8 democracies as well as by prospective investors who may have been inclined to write off Africa as too high risk.

        African ambassadors who appeared before the Committee on April 30 were at pains to stress that real change is taking place in Africa in this regard. The NEPAD Implementation Committee’s elaboration of a "mechanism for peer review and good governance," spearheaded by South Africa, were described to us by that country’s High Commissioner to Canada, André Jaquet, who contended that this accountability mechanism will be "credible, transparent and all-ecompassing", with real "African teeth." According to Jaquet, it will have an "organic link" with democratic and good governance principles in the constitution of the African Union (which the CLC submission on the same day noted is eventually to include "a pan-African parliament, a court of justice, and a central bank"¹⁰²), members of which have also called for the appointment of a "special commissioner" on governance. Mr. Jaquet mentioned a next meeting on the peer review mechanism in Maputo, Mozambique on May 16 and the possibility of a further announcement by the time of the G8 Summit. The important thing, he stressed, is that the developed world accepts that "we, in Africa, are serious. We don’t like conditionalities imposed by others. We find it easier to live with conditionalities imposed by ourselves even if they are tougher than the ones that were before."¹⁰³

        All that can be taken by the Committee in good faith. But questions remain as to whether these new promises of democratic governance will in fact be toughly applied in the toughest situations, such as in Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes region, or other zones of civil strife. And how will African citizens be involved in ensuring that the appearance of these reform conditionalities will really lead to changes that advance their rights?

        Some Members of the Committee met informally on April 11 with two members of Zimbabwe’s democratic opposition following that country’s recent "stolen election," including Mr. Gibson Sibanda, a Vice-President of the Movement for Democratic Change and the leader of the opposition in the Zimbabwean Parliament. Given the horrific reprisals and human rights violations taking place in his country, he was not overstating
the case in regretting that there is "still a lot more to do to ensure that democratic processes … are enshrined in the African way of doing things." Understandably, he saw Zimbabwe as being a critical test for NEPAD’s good governance provisions, stating that for them to have credibility, "the route is via Harare." In the Committee’s subsequent dialogue with African diplomats, the South African High Commissioner suggested that his country’s and Nigeria’s agreement to some Commonwealth sanctions against the Mugabe government demonstrated that the NEPAD will further leaders’ resolve to come to terms with the continent’s crises of democracy, even if not through "megaphone diplomacy."¹⁰⁴ The Committee hopes he is right but remains to be convinced.

        Of course, G8 countries also need to examine their approaches to promoting freer exchanges, democratic accountability, open and transparent governance, lest they be accused of "do as I say not as I do" inconsistencies if not double standards. John McConnell’s submission in Saskatoon spoke for the sceptics: "Donor countries are asking the countries receiving aid to set up more open markets and to eliminate corruption. This same request could be made to some donor countries. Some maintain harmful practices that are hurting international trade and/or contributing to corruption. When it comes to aid-dependent countries in a weak bargaining position, donors suddenly become righteous and emphasize the need for better governance."¹⁰⁵ World Vision’s submission was even harsher: "Poor governance is used as a rationale to reduce foreign aid, while the policies of G8 leaders, through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have stripped many African governments of their capacity to govern and reduced millions of people to a survival mode of existence". Linda Tripp added that: "A more promising approach would be to reinforce governance and democracy by redirecting significantly more ODA to African unions, associations, human rights groups, etc."¹⁰⁶

        The Committee takes the view that neither automatic trust in nor suspicion of declared intentions by governments and international agencies in this area is warranted. Instead, the more constructive focus, if we are to give a new partnership any chance to succeed (and we must, for both Africa’s and the G8’s sake), is to act on practical measures — including experimenting with incentives for good behaviour as well as conditionality-based sanctions¹⁰⁷ — aimed at realizing shared democratic governance, anti-crime and anti-corruption goals. The G8 must become as tough in complying with higher standards of conduct as it expects Africans to be in applying them.

        The G8 should also be supporting initiatives to strengthen the democratic capabilities of African societies for sound administration and public accountability. As Linda Ross of Oxfam Canada put it, "around government and the level of corruption, I think one of the things that can’t be overemphasized is the strong role that civil society organizations need to play in holding governments accountable … the other thing is the need to continuously support civil society organizations. We’ve seen some of that around what’s happened in the history of South Africa and the ability of organizations to actually take strong leadership roles at various levels within their own country."¹⁰⁸ Miriam Gervais of McGill University observed that concrete donor support in this area of good governance should "provide financial support for the decentralization process underway in many African countries, and provide financial support to strengthen the democratic association movement, which would also empower women through these associations … Our past experience has shown that providing financial support for infrastructure and strengthening public administrations were not enough. There must be more comprehensive dialogue with all the parties involved, including the rural people who are the majority in these countries."¹⁰⁹

        G8 initiatives could also include interparliamentary overtures, as John Harker indicated in stating that: "Hopefully the G8 Summit and its interaction with African leaders will find ways of halting and reversing the erosion of state capacities in Africa. Among them must surely be one in which Canada has substantial experience: training and development of the human resources necessary to enable the effective and efficient functioning of state machinery, including legislative and representative instruments vital to good governance. … Canadian legislators, understanding that their African counterparts are anxious to meet the challenges set out in the NEPAD documentation, could press our government to place a priority on training and capacity building for African legislators, and could play a part in its delivery."¹¹⁰

        The Committee agrees that partnership on democratic good governance and anti-corruption cannot be just a matter for G8 and African government officials and businesses, but must involve parliamentarians and the citizens they represent.

Recommendation 12

Canada should work towards an Action Plan that incorporates shared-responsibility, rather than one-sided conditionality, with measures aimed at genuine democratic governance reforms in Africa, including independent judiciaries, and at meeting the expectations raised by NEPAD’s peer review mechanism. In setting high standards, the G8 should lead through their own compliance with multilateral good governance and anti-corruption norms such as those of the OECD. G8 assistance should focus on strengthening both state and civil-society capacities with the aim of achieving sound, transparent public administration that is democratically accountable. Further to that, consideration should be given to a joint G8-African Union interparliamentary initiative to strengthen legislative oversight capabilities

6.     Making Development Environmentally Sustainable

        Given that we are only a few months away from the World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held in South Africa, which also hosts the NEPAD Secretariat, it is perhaps surprising that the Committee did not receive much testimony specifically on environmental issues in Africa. Desirée McGraw in Montreal did call for a focus on environmental sustainability goals at the G8 Summit, and did express the hope that the proximity in the timing of the Kananaskis and Johannesburg summits would stimulate renewed Canadian leadership on this agenda. The submission of World Vision also included an appeal that: "Land, water, forests, precious minerals — God’s gifts to Africa — risk being squandered between foreign interest in cheap raw materials and the survival needs of African people. Everyone shares in the calling to reverse this trend. Changes are need in G8 countries as much as in Africa to make this happen. The G8 Summit in June can lay the groundwork for the upcoming World Conference on Sustainable Development by including support for practice measures to reduce pollution and conserve resources in the Action Plan for Africa."¹¹¹

        Clearly the state of the African environment, like that of global environment as a whole — climate change, for example is no respecter of regions — is not as healthy as it should be. And unlike the variability of weather, the chief factors are usually man-made. Poverty, demographic pressures, shortsighted commercial exploitation, wars and repressive rule, all can combine to exacerbate environmental stresses, as well as creating humanitarian crises such as the food emergency now facing millions in parts of southern Africa. The NEPAD does acknowledge to a degree the environmental dimension of a sustainable recovery strategy for Africa. Ambassador Philémon Yang of Cameroon, the dean of Ottawa’s diplomatic corps, observed in his presentation to the Committee on the NEPAD that:

Environmental protection projects are also a priority for us. No one country can protect the environment in any part of the world. Environmental protection has become an international problem which should always be faced on a continental or regional basis. This could include the protection of forest bio-diversity, marine and coastal ecology, and in fact reduce pollution which is becoming increasingly a problem for us. I dare say that environmental degradation generally ends up creating a lot of misery and causing underdevelopment.¹¹²

        Yet the "Commentary" on the NEPAD prepared by the CCIC’s Africa-Canada Forum coordinating committee, criticizes the NEPAD’s Environment Initiative as being "very weak" and as failing to "offer concrete measures to ensure that industrialization and energy projects will not harm the environment … [or] to call for climate justice." The authors of this document argue that more emphasis should be put on developing renewable energy resources, and on strengthening adherence to environmental protection standards in economic infrastructure plans and investment decisions, especially those of transnational corporations and large donor-funded energy and resource extraction projects whose past record leave much to be desired. They also take the NEPAD to task for not challenging the fact that industrialized countries account for 80% of the global greenhouse gas emissions that could have costly impacts for Africa if some predictions of an increased probability of floods and droughts are borne out.¹¹³

        Other witnesses expressed concerns that prescriptions for boosting Africa’s economies not be at the expense of environmental sustainability. Several ideas were suggested for more sustainable utilization of resources, notably in rural areas which also have the least access to safe drinking water and the greatest need for investments in basic education and health. In the area of continued development of safe water resources, Tony Haynes in Saskatoon proposed that Canada might help to establish an "African coordinating agency" with international assistance and monitoring.¹¹⁴ Also in Saskatoon, Mary Day and John McConnell emphasized the need for an ecological conversion of sorts in the approaches taken by G8 donors to development co-operation that does not only focus on capital flows but more fundamentally respects Africa’s indigenous natural and human "capital" on which these ultimately depend. Mr. McConnell made the point that:

For African countries to have sustained growth and better standards of living for people, considering the fragile ecosystems of Africa, policy experts from donor countries who are drafting policies and programs for African countries should know more about ecosystems — to know "the what" to do and "the how" to do it — for more successful projects. There is a wealth of knowledge on African ecosystems and cultures among NGOs that could be shared. … If market approaches are to provide solutions to African development then both government and corporate market managers need to be aware of the risks to the earth’s ecosystems — and support accountable and transparent policies that reduce the destruction of ecosystems … [which] will increase extreme poverty and both public and corporate cost of activities.

        The Committee agrees that environmental sustainability is a necessity not an option, and on the importance therefore of making new partnerships for African development more sensitive to, and knowledgeable about, ecological impacts, especially on the majority of rural poor.

Recommendation 13

Canada should work to ensure that the Africa Action Plan includes environmental sustainability as an essential component of economic recovery and development. Specific attention should be devoted to:

• sustainable utilization of resources, building on the positive example and best practices from projects of this kind already being carried out in some African countries;

• access to safe water especially for the rural areas;

• sharing of knowledge on African ecosystems;

• affordable renewable energy alternatives;

• responsibility for climate change impacts;

• multilateral agreement on environmental and social impact standards, with provision for transparent public assessment and enforcement procedures, especially for large-scale infrastructure and resource extraction projects.

In addition, leaders should consider ways to promote concrete G8-African Union follow up on objectives to be addressed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development taking place this September in South Africa.

7.      Building a True Partnership with Civil Society

        As will already be clear from testimony cited so far, one of the most often repeated criticisms of the NEPAD process to date that the Committee heard from witnesses was its top-down rather than bottom-up nature. Indeed as Serge Blais, a co-president of the Africa-Canada Forum told us at the end of February, Forum members soon realized "that the [NEPAD] document was virtually unknown in Africa" and so took it upon themselves to have it distributed to hundreds of African partners who were invited to take part in dialogue and discussion on its elements.¹¹⁵ The Forum’s resulting April "Commentary" on the NEPAD makes the following important observations:

NEPAD is a starting point for discussion in Africa, but did not result from participatory local, national and regional strategies, appropriate to the particular concerns of the poor and marginalized in African countries. The absence of prior discussion and debate with African citizens raises issues of commitment to democratic participation, and is also reflected in the content and priorities established in the document. …

The primary focus for the Democracy and Governance initiative of NEPAD is the political and administrative framework of the participating countries. But the worthy goals of NEPAD (poverty eradication, democratization, human rights promotion) will not be achieved through technical and administrative measures. Rather, it is critical for the long-term promotion of democracy and for the equitable distribution economic benefits that civil society actors be able to monitor their own government and demand accountability. Yet NEPAD is largely silent on civic engagement.¹¹⁶

        The Committee would add that the NEPAD is similarly silent on engagement and oversight by parliamentarians, who must also have a primary role to play as the elected representatives of civil society.

        In calling for the NEPAD to be "sent back to Africa for consultation," Gerry Barr of CCIC inferred that a more democratic political process is essential before it becomes the fait accompli of an already set G8 African action plan needing only to be implemented.¹¹⁷ Other NGO and labour witnesses expressed similar concerns based on their contacts with African partners. Hence Rights & Democracy’s call for G8 leaders to hold off on any endorsement of NEPAD until it has had the benefit of wider public review within Africa.¹¹⁸ The Halifax Initiative Coalition reminded the Committee that if G8 governments want to follow through on their statements supporting more developing country "ownership" of development programs — strongly emphasized by Professor Helleiner in our first panel — they should avoid decisions which are imposed rather than being the product of participatory domestic processes in the affected countries.¹¹⁹

        Linda Tripp of World Vision Canada made the point that "respect and inclusion for the rich associational and community life of African people are essential to democratic governance in Africa." Their submission calls on the G8 to assist with a range of tools for broadening public participation, inclusive of the voices of women and youth, and for strengthening capacities for public accountability — through such things as citizenship education and training, independent media, better access to information and affordable communications technologies, exchanges and linkages among activist and research communities throughout Africa and in other regions.¹²⁰

        Witnesses extended that call for wider African perspectives to be listened to in formulating G8/NEPAD next steps to the need for continuing public input within Canada on how the G8’s response to Africa should evolve. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s commendable efforts at putting forward in the public eye an African development agenda for the Kananaskis Summit, probably fewer Canadians than Africans have heard of the NEPAD much less know much about its content. It was not only NGOs with partners in Africa who made a point about promoting popular support for an Africa action plan. University of Windsor business professor Fritz Rieger argued that a public awareness campaign around the G8 plan would be both very useful and feasible, possibly leading to voluntary donations matched by public funds.¹²¹ Linda Tripp reinforced the case that popular support is critical in G8 countries and the developed world generally, as well as in Africa, adding that:

In Canada, as new roles in relation to Southern counterparts emerge, Canadians need to expand their roles in information-sharing, structured learning and building policy and research capacities. Canadians can support the Action Plan through strengthening North-South connections, through direct overseas exposure of Canadians in both community-based projects and policy change initiatives arising from these projects; through an approach called deliberative dialogue (uncovering shared values through structured discussions); using ICT [information and communication technologies¹²²] to facilitate collaborative learning, solidarity networks and increased participation in both cultural exchange and policy dialogues; and, forming new and diverse partnerships that involve youth in volunteer placement programs.¹²³

        Participants in the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development forums on Africa also called for a greater effort on the part of the government, and DFAIT in particular, to cultivate "the skills and expertise of its domestic Africanist community and Canadians of African descent. The Canadian government should also keep people informed of progress on the Africa Action Plan and other developments in Canada-Africa relations after the G8 Summit."¹²⁴

        The Committee believes that this expanded ongoing public engagement must also include parliamentary channels. The depth of knowledge and concern about Africa testified to in our hearings across the country is encouraging. Beyond the tabling of this report specific to the G8 meeting, there are other parliamentary avenues which could be enlisted in following up G8 and Canada-Africa initiatives, including the Canada-Africa parliamentary group and the Canadian Association of Parliamentarians on Population and Development, both of which have been headed by the Chair of this Committee.

Recommendation 14

Canada should insist on a commitment in the G8 Africa Action Plan to submit the NEPAD framework to wider public consultation within African countries as an integral element of its implementation process. The G8 Plan, which should also be communicated widely to the public in the G8 countries, should remain open to change and adjustment responding to additional input from African and G8 citizens following the Kananaskis Summit. The Government of Canada should promote ongoing civil society participation around the Action Plan agenda, seeking especially to involve Canadians of African ancestry, and recognizing also the role that parliamentary processes ought to play.

8.    Evaluating Mutual Responsibilities and Accountabilities for Results

Just as there is expectation that Africa under NEPAD will make certain detailed commitments in terms of good political and economic governance, peer review and conflict resolution, so there should be an equally detailed commitment from our G8 partners. Not Canada, but other countries have made good pronouncements and wonderful words, but often those promises have not been backed up with action. So unlike previous programs, the G8 action plan must be premised on mutual accountability and a joint monitoring mechanism. … The action plan must involve concrete, measurable and predictable programs that will enable Africa to meet the agreed international development goals.

André Jaquet, High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa¹²⁵

        Another refrain which emerged powerfully from the Committee’s testimony in Ottawa and across Canada was that the Kananaskis Summit must deliver some serious action on real commitments with specific targets and within specific time frames. Moreover, this cannot be just a list of "good things to do" as determined by G8 leaders for Africa; it must be an action agenda that is mutually agreed upon, elaborated and implemented with African leaders, and as part of a public political process that is open to ongoing citizen participation and subject to public accountability through both peer-reviewed and independent evaluations.

Without these disciplines, the risk is that the fine intentions and promises of a G8 Action Plan for Africa will, as former "sherpa" Gordon Smith put it, "just simply deceive people and end up creating more and more scepticism."¹²⁶ There is never any perfect guarantee of results, of course, even with the best will and most inclusive process. But it is important to avoid another major disappointment. As Pierre Adjété of the Marché International Africain du Millénaire observed, "the many initiatives by the United Nations and the international financial institutions have brought only very modest relief from underdevelopment and, in many cases, have generated less hope than widespread controversy."¹²⁷ It is even more important, if African "ownership" of any action plan is to be serious, that conditions incorporated for the purpose of getting effective
results — on better and more democratic governance, for example — not be perceived as a G8-driven imposition, and that the NEPAD’s nascent peer review mechanism be allowed to prove itself. As Smith indicated, the nexus of African expectations and G8 donor conditionalities could become a point of tension at Kananaskis. The Committee sees G8 acknowledgment of past mistakes and acceptance of evaluation of donor performance, as part of a mutual partnership that shares responsibility and accountability for Action Plan outcomes, as crucial to building the new relationship with Africa in deeds and not only words.

        It was another witness with long experience in policy matters, African development economics expert Gerald Helleiner, who made rigorous and even-handed performance evaluation an overarching rallying cry during our first Ottawa panel:

… what has been missing from all prior plans of action, global coalitions for Africa, UN special programs for Africa — the last couple of decades are strewn with failed programs that the international community has announced — is independent evaluation of the performance of the Northern participants, in particular evaluations of what they do at the country level. They are answerable to no one. There is some peer review within the OECD, in which donor countries assess one another’s performance, but that’s a recipe for mutual back-scratching. It’s not independent. It doesn’t suffice. … we simply must achieve a more balance relationship between those who offer and those who receive financial resources. … I would put evaluation of what is being done, independent evaluation of everyone on an equal basis, on a par with increased resources.¹²⁸

        The Committee appreciates this as sound advice which is in the spirit of our first Recommendation calling for Canada and the G8 to provide a full public accounting for Summit outcomes.

Recommendation 15

Canada should urge G8 and African leaders to collaborate on building into the Africa Action Plan a credible process for evaluating each other’s performance on realizing the specific objectives that should be incorporated into all elements of the Plan, while at the same time giving the NEPAD’s peer review mechanism a chance to work. In addition, Canada should propose consideration of an independent review mechanism, with non-governmental and African participation, including for the G8’s implementation of its African partnership commitments agreed to at Kananaskis.

---

43         Evidence, January 29, 2002, Meeting No. 53, 9:15.

44        The themes for a G8 partnership with “committed African leaders” were identified as democracy and political governance;
            prevention and reduction of conflict; human development by investing in health and education, and tackling HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria,
            including through the Global AIDS and Health Fund; information and communications technologies; economic and corporate governance;
            action against corruption; stimulating private investment in Africa; increasing trade within Africa and between Africa and the world;
            combating hunger and increasing food security.” (“Genoa Plan for Africa” http://www.g8.gc.ca/july-21-01-1-e.asp).

45         The 54 countries of the OAU decided to recast the organization as the African Union in 2000. As explained to the Committee by
            South Africa’s High Commissioner to Canada, His Excellency André Jaquet, “the OAU did a good job of helping us get rid of colonialization,
            but it’s not a structure that can cope with the challenges such as globalization and modern challenges we face and so the new streamlined
            African Union has been created,” with South Africa assuming the first presidency in July 2002. (Evidence, April 30, 2002, Meeting No. 73,
            Ottawa, 10:40).

46         The NEPAD’s Implementation Committee, currently chaired by President Obasanjo of Nigeria, is comprised of 15 states (that include the five
            initiating states of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa), three from each OAU region: Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon and the
            Republic of Congo); East Africa (Ethiopia, Mauritius, Rwanda); North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia); Southern Africa (Botswana, Mozambique,
            South Africa); West Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Senegal). There is also a smaller “Steering Committee”, composed of personal representatives of the
            five initiating presidents, which oversees a secretariat based in South Africa. (More details can be found at http://www.africainitiative.org).

47         From the document NEPAD in brief, NEPAD Secretariat Web site, January 2002, p. 2-3
            (http://www.africainitiative.org/Documents/AA0010102.pdf).

48         Legislation authorizing the Fund was passed by Parliament in March 2002 as part of the Budget Implementation Bill C-49.
            The Minister for International Co-operation was subsequently designated as the Minister responsible for its operations. According to
            the testimony of CIDA President Len Good to the Committee on May 23, the Fund will be managed as a separate fund within CIDA.

49        Evidence, February 27, 2002, Meeting No. 61, 9:15.

50        Chantal Blouin, La politique commerciale du Canada envers l'Afrique, Presentation to the National Forum on Africa, February 9, 2002
            (http://www.nsi-ins.ca/news_views).

51        Evidence, May 6, 2002, Meeting No. 76.

52         In an address to the Africa/NEPAD Conference organized by CIDA in Montreal, May 4-5; submitted to the Committee in Vancouver, May 6, 2002.

53         Evidence, May 6, 2002, Meeting No. 76, Vancouver.

54         Submission, Vancouver, May 7, 2002, p. 1.

55         Submission, Helleiner, “New Challenges in Global Development: How Canada and the G8 Should Respond,” January 31, 2002, p. 5.

56         Received by e-mail on May 13 further to the appearance by CCIC President and CEO Gerry Barr in Toronto on May 7, 2002.

57         Submission, Toronto, May 7, 2002, p. 6.

58         Submission, “Labour and Africa: The Way Ahead through Real Partnership,” Annex, Ottawa, April 30, 2002.

59         Submission, World Vision Canada, “Obuntu: Eight for the G-8 — New Directions for the Action Plan for Africa," Toronto, May 8, 2002;
            Submission, Oxfam Canada, "Taking Action on Africa: Proposals for G8 Leaders," presented by Trevor Mackenzie-Smith in
            Saskatoon, May 10, 2002.

60         Submission intended for Toronto, May 8, 2002, received by e-mail May 16, “Summary of Recommendations”, p. 1.

61         Submission, May 8, 2002. In Calgary, Clint Mooney argued that a G8 commitment to best practice in terms of an international code of
            business ethics would not only “assist African entrepreneurs and governments to build a base that is just and sustainable. Such an
            enforced Code would promote security be ensuring suspension of business operations in zones of conflict where protection of human
            right, for example, could not be guaranteed.”

62         Submission, April 4, 2002. Rights & Democracy in its May submission also called for high-level attention to the “human rights of
            women in war zones” and for G8 leaders to “use their diplomatic, political and financial resources toward resolving key conflicts and
            strengthening peace processes in Africa.”

63         Submission, “Obuntu: Eight for the G-8,” p. 5.

64         Submission, “Taking Action on Africa: Proposals for G8 Leaders,” p. 1-2.

65         Submission, “Issues Related to the 2002 G8 Summit: Durable Solutions for Africa’s Refugees and Displaced People,” April 9, 2002,
            p. 5. The UNHCR estimates there are 3.6 million refugees and 13.5 million displaced persons in Africa. It also notes that resettlement of
            refugees to third countries is “exceptional and limited in scope. During 2001, only roughly 20,000 African refugees were resettled to
            other countries, of whom 2,631 to Canada.” p.4.

66         Development, Conflict and Peacebuilding: Responses for Canada, Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2002.

67         Evidence, February 26, 2002, Meeting No. 59, Halifax, 13:00.

68         Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 10:10.

69         Ibid.

70         Submission, “Taking Action on Africa,” p. 2.

71         Submission, Halifax, February 27, 2002, p. 1-2.

72         Submission, Halifax, February 26, 2002.

73         Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 9:15.

74        Putting Africans First: A Way Forward for Canada’s Africa Policy, Report prepared by the Centre, Department of Foreign Affairs
            and International Trade, May 2002, p. 4. (For information on the forum sessions held in four cities in January and February see
            http://www.ecommons.net/ccfpd-africa).

75        Submission, Halifax, February 27, 2002.

76         The submission of the National Union of Public and General Employees, which focused on this development challenge above all,
            noted that in 2001 AIDS claimed the lives of 2.4 million Africans and there were an estimated 3.8 million new HIV infections bringing the
            total to 25.3 million, of whom 55% are women (“The G8 in Kananaskis: Time for Change”, March 21, 2002, p. 21).  Within those statistics
            there are also paradoxes. Botswana, which has impressed many donors with its stable democratic political leadership and which
            John Hoddinott singled out for having the fastest growing economy of any country in the world since 1965, is also noteworthy for having the
            world’s highest rate of HIV infection at 38.5% of the adult population (Cf. “Aids in southern Africa — Fighting Back", The Economist
            special report, May 11, 2002, pp. 25-27).

77         Submission, Halifax, February 27, 2002, p. 2.

78         Submission, Calgary, May 8, 2002, p. 2.

79         Op.cit., p. 1.

80         Submission, “The G8 in Kananaskis: Time for Change,” Ottawa, March 21, 2002, p. 22.

81        Building an Effective New Round of WTO Negotiations: Key Issues for Canada, May 2002, p. 22.

82         Submission, “Labour and Africa: The Way Ahead through Real Partnership,” April 30, 2002, p. 15.

83        Submission, Montreal, February 27, 2002, p. 3.

84        Submission, Ottawa, January 31, 2002, p. 3.

85         Submission, Calgary, May 8, 2002, p. 4-5.

86         Submission, “Taking Action on Africa”, Saskatoon, May 10, 2002, p. 2.

87         Evidence, February 25, 2002, Meeting No. 58, St. John’s, 14:10.

88         Submission, “Labour and Africa: The Way Ahead through Real Partnership,” April 30, 2002, p. 16.

89         Submission, “Taking Action on Africa,” p. 2.

90         Submission, Toronto, May 7, 2002, p. 9.  See also footnote 23, supra, and Recommendation 2 in this report, as well as
            Recommendation 2 in our Nineteenth Report, op.cit., p. 17.

91        Submission, Toronto, p. 9.

92         Submission, Ottawa, January 31, 2002, p. 4-5.

93         Evidence, February 27, 2002, Meeting No. 61, Halifax, 9:45.

94         Submission, “Obuntu: Eight for the G-8,” p. 6.

95         Submission, “Taking Action on Africa,” p. 1.

96         Submission, April 8, 2002, p. 6.

97         Submission, “Taking Action on Africa,” p. 2.

98         See Statement by the Canadian Labour Congress, April 30, p. 6 and Annex, p. 12.

99         Submission, May 14, 2002, p. 3-4.

100       Submission, “Obuntu Eight for the G-8,” p. 7.

101      See especially, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A Commentary, Africa Canada Forum of the Canadian
            Council for International Co-operation, April 2002; also the statements adopted at several NGO and expert forums on NEPAD held
            in Africa in April and presented as background submissions to the Committee by Kairos in Toronto, May 7, 2002.

102      Submission, “Labour and Africa: The Way Ahead through Real Partnership,” p. 14.  Among two of the declared principles set down
            in the Constitutive Act of the African Union  are: “Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
            Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments”.

103     Evidence, April 30, 2002, Meeting No. 73, Ottawa, 10:45.

104      Ibid.

105      Submission, Saskatoon, May 10, 2002, p. 9-10.

106      Notes for presentation in Toronto, May 8, 2002 (dated May 9), p. 5.

107     This point was made by University of Windsor business professor Francis Rieger, Submission, Windsor, May 9, 2002, p. 4.

108      Evidence, February 25, 2002, Meeting No. 58, St. John’s, 14:40.

109      Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, Ottawa, 10:10.

110     Submission, “Human Security in Africa: A Way to Recovery,” Halifax, February 26, 2002, p. 7.

111     Submission, “Obuntu: Eight for the G-8,” p. 11.

112      Evidence, April 30, 2002, Meeting No. 73, Ottawa, 10:35.

113      “NEPAD: A Commentary," CCIC, April 2002, p. ii and 10.

114       Submission, Saskatoon, May 10, 2002, p. 2.

115       Evidence, February 28, 2002, Meeting No. 64, Montreal, 11:30.

116      Africa-Canada Forum, “Commentary — Executive Summary," p. i.

117       Submission, Toronto, May 7, 2002, p. 7-8.

118       “Summary of Recommendations,” May 8, 2002, p. 1.

119       Submission, May 14, 2002, p. 1.

120      Submission, Toronto, May 8, 2002, p. 5 and Submission, “Obuntu: Eight for the G-8,” p. 8.

121       Submission, Windsor, May 9, 2002, p. 5.

122      On the application of ICTs to African development partnerships, it should be noted that the G8 DOT Force met in Calgary May 6-7,
             just prior to the Committee’s public hearings there on May 8, and will be presenting a report card on implementation of their Genoa action
             plan to the Kananaskis Summit.

123      Submission, Toronto, May 8, 2002, p. 6.

124      Putting Africans First: A Way Forward for Canada’s Africa Policy, p. 7.

125       Evidence, April 30, 2002, Meeting No. 73, Ottawa, 10:50.

126       Evidence, May 7, 2002, Meeting No. 78, Vancouver, 10:55.

127       Submission, “Mentoring for Development: The Wind from Kananaskis,” April 11, 2002, p. 3. Mr. Adjété put forward an intriguing
             suggestion for how G8 and African countries might distribute lead responsibilities for the various sectoral priorities emerging from
             a G8/NEPAD action plan.

128       Evidence, January 31, 2002, Meeting No. 54, 11:00.