REAL COMMITMENT

Addressing the underlying causes of low morale and the poor quality of life in the Canadian Forces

The Official Opposition response to the SCONDVA Majority Report

October 1998

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For about one year, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs (SCONDVA) devoted itself to studying the economic and social challenges facing the members of the Canadian Forces (CF). Hundreds of witnesses ranging from Defence social policy experts to the Chief of Defence Staff to rank-and-file members of the CF testified before us. There was one common theme: Betrayal. CF members feel betrayed by their government and they feel betrayed by their own leaders. In short, the Committee spent more than a year listening to a scathing indictment of government policy.

The Committee heard heart-wrenching stories of forgotten veterans - men who had given their lives or their health in the service of their country - only to have their sacrifice forgotten or belittled by DND bureaucrats. We heard scores of tales of dilapidated houses with flooded basements, moldy walls and leaking roofs. We heard CF members tell of their having to use food banks to make ends meet and CF spouses who live with a sense of abandonment because their husbands or wives are constantly being called for duty in another part of the country or the world. We heard countless concerns about out-of-date equipment and the dangers this poses to our personnel. These were all very real stories about the impact of 30 years of decay in Canada's military.

CF members in many cases risked retribution from the leadership at DND headquarters for testifying before our Committee. Some in fact paid a price. Conditions had become bad enough, however, that they felt a duty to bring their concerns forward. All members of the Committee were moved by these stories.

These were all very real stories
about the impact of 30 years of
decay in Canada's military.

What a disappointment, then, to see the final draft of the Majority Report. Instead of addressing the root causes of the problems faced by CF members, the government members of the Committee chose to deal largely with the symptoms. Instead of examining how the Canadian Forces arrived at its current state of malaise and recommending positive, systemic changes to rectify these problems, the majority chose to recommend band-aid solutions. Even the tone of the Majority Report implies that tinkering will fix the malaise of the Forces. Unfortunately, we have seen what tinkering produces. It is 30 years of tinkering that sparked this very exercise.

The Official Opposition believes that this SCONDVA process represents a critical juncture for the Canadian Forces. The direction in which the government now moves will determine whether the problem plagued Forces will be rejuvenated, or merely thrust headlong into more years of underfunding, political correctness, infrastructure decay, dwindling capability, and the low morale and poor quality of life which flows from these.

In fairness to the Majority Report, there are a number of recommendations which we feel are constructive. These include immediate pay increases, better treatment of veterans, redesignation of special service areas for the purposes of Veteran's Benefits, changes to a wide variety of allowances - particularly making these allowances non-taxable - and a number of other common sense solutions. Nevertheless, there are still symptoms of larger and deeper problems. In this sense the overall tone of the Majority Report and the innumerable calls for increased civilian bureaucracy run contrary to the views expressed by those who testified at Committee hearings. The Official Opposition is therefore compelled to outline its own response to the hearings as well as SCONDVA's Majority Report.

In brief, the Official Opposition sees three broad themes at the heart of the Canadian Forces troubles which must be dealt with in a fundamental way:

1. Inadequate and misdirected funding

2. Crisis of leadership and military justice

3. Pursuit of a politically correct agenda

Without addressing these fundamental problems in any serious way, the government will only be toying with peripheral, symptomatic issues and is thus doomed to fail in any attempt to improve the quality of life and morale in the Canadian Forces.

Soldiers cannot take pride in a
military that is not fully combat
capable.

1. INADEQUATE AND MISDIRECTED FUNDING

In his March 1997 Report for the Minister of National Defence, University of Calgary Professor David Bercuson described the present problems in the Canadian Armed Forces as "a crisis of professionalism." This crisis of professionalism is rooted in the fact that the Armed Forces, in particular the Army, are today unable to take on an operationally independent combat mission. This fact was admitted by the former Chief of the Defence Staff General Jean Boyle and also noted by the Auditor General in Chapter Seven of his Report to the House of Commons in May of 1996. It was reiterated just this month by the current Chief of Defence Staff, Maurice Baril, in his 1997-1998 Annual Report on the state of the Canadian Forces. In that report, General Baril, stated:

"We possess a limited capability for deploying our forces... The limitations are in the areas of: troop movement and lift capacity; intelligence-gathering; and the ability to effectively lead or co-ordinate multinational operations."

Soldiers of the Canadian Forces cannot take pride in a military that is not fully combat capable. Nor can they enjoy a reasonable quality of life with their families if they remain badly overtasked. The continuation of this situation has led to a steady erosion of pride and professionalism in the Canadian Forces with an inevitable result: low morale, poor esprit de corps and the emergence of serious social and economic problems. Chronic underfunding has been a major contributor to each of these problems.

Since 1993, the budget of the Department of National Defence has been slashed from over $12 billion to just over $9 billion (or a 25% cut in the Defence budget). At the same time, needless and wasteful DND bureaucracy has been maintained and even expanded. For instance, while the Regular Force has been reduced to a mere 60,000 personnel, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) still comprises more than 5% of all personnel.

There are four areas in which inadequate or misdirected funding is particularly evident:

i) Equipment shortcomings;

ii) Overtasking;

iii) Needless bureaucracy; and,

iv) Inadequate pay.

i) Equipment shortcomings

Equipment shortcomings have been well chronicled by many Defence experts, by the Auditor General, and by previous parliamentary committees. It is therefore not necessary to go into details here. Suffice it to say that budget slashing and political interference has drastically reduced the Canadian Forces' ability to replace aging equipment. Tanks are 20 years old based on a design that is 30 years old; self-propelled artillery is 30 years old; most of the towed artillery is 40 years old; Navy helicopters are 30 years old; Air Force search and rescue helicopters are 35 years old.

Those who doubt the link
between equipment, morale,
and the peace of mind of family
members might want to talk to
the families of Search and
Rescue technicians at CFB
Greenwood.

This has had perhaps the most dramatic effects on the security and morale of CF members. Those who doubt the link between equipment, morale, and the peace of mind of family members might want to talk to the families of Search and Rescue technicians at CFB Greenwood.

We therefore recommend:

1. That, by 2000, the Government of Canada restore the budget of the Department of National Defence to the minimum levels which were outlined by the 1994 Special House and Senate Joint Committee Report ($10.5 billion).

2. That by 2001, the Defence budget be restored to at least 1994 levels ($11.6 billion).

ii) Overtasking

Overtasking has led to unacceptable consequences with respect to leave. CF personnel are now frequently unable to take leave for any significant time each year. This is an unnecessary stress on families and leads to exhaustion. The Majority Report, however, makes no comment on the relationship between overtasking and dwindling troop levels. In our view, this is a glaring omission. Instead, the Majority recommends that CF personnel be allowed to take "a significant period of leave when they desire." This is totally unrealistic in a military context. This would clearly jeopardize operational readiness and compromise a commanding officer's ability to train and deploy his/her troops. The solution lies in increasing the number of troops to a level where each member is not overtasked.

The exact number of personnel should be determined by the military commanders - not politicians. However, we believe that 75,000 Regular Force members is probably minimal.

We therefore recommend:

3. That personnel levels be increased in accordance with the recommendation of military Commanders and that, in this context, a level of 75,000 is probably minimal.

4. That any personnel increases occur in the context of a major reduction of wasteful infrastructure and bureaucracy.

iii) Needless bureaucracy

So much of DND's budget is misdirected to inappropriate agencies and schemes. The Majority Report encourages this in recommendations ranging from child care programs for teenagers, to more spending on "second career" job searches. Perhaps most glaringly, it suggests an enlargement and expansion of the mandate of the Canadian Forces Housing Agency (CFHA). We strenuously disagree that expanding bureaucratic entities will do anything to address systemic problems within the CF. We believe that it is precisely this sort of bureaucratic thinking that led to the housing problem in the first place.

Housing maintenance and upgrades have traditionally been the purview of the Base Commanders. Under that former system, housing problems were dealt with locally - instead of referring those problems to a distant bureaucrat in Ottawa. In other words, the problem was dealt with by someone who had a personal understanding and interest in the environment in which his/her personnel live and work. In this respect, the former system meant that problems were more likely to be resolved. After all, if personnel were not happy with their allotted housing, it was the Base Commander who paid the price in terms of morale. This sort of pressure is clearly a positive motivator.

Re-establishing Base Commander control over housing would eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy, allow more flexibility, and restore confidence in a system which is by all accounts broken.

We therefore recommend:

5. That an `Infrastructure Renewal' committee be formed within DND by April 1, 1999. This committee would establish a timetable for the renewal of essential Armed Forces housing, bases, stations and other immovable assets to ensure that CF members are given the best possible conditions in which to live and work. This committee would have until April 1, 2000 to fulfill its mandate.

6. That unessential DND land be sold with the proceeds of these sales going directly into DND revenue. This revenue should then be spent on infrastructure upgrades.

7. That the Canadian Forces Housing Agency be scrapped and Base Commanders be once again given control over their local DND housing.

iv) Inadequate Pay

For too long, CF members and their families - particularly those of lower ranks - have suffered low pay and little chance of promotion. The Official Opposition strongly supports the recommendations of the Majority Report with respect to pay increases. The government must demonstrate its commitment to CF personnel and their families by immediately providing them with substantive pay increases.

We therefore mirror the Majority Report when we recommend:

8. That, effective April 1, 1999 the pay for Privates, Second Lieutenants and Lieutenants, essentially entry level ranks, be increased by approximately 10%.

9. That, effective April 1, 1999 the pay for Non-Commissioned Members be increased by approximately 6%; for Captains, through and including Lieutenant-Colonels, by approximately 3%; and for Colonels and above by approximately 2%.

We reject, however, the notion that pay levels should be tied in any way to pay levels of the Public Service. (Few, if any, NATO countries do this.) The military is not and should in no way be comparable to the Public Service. The commitment that CF members make and the environment in which they operate put the military in a class of its own. Pay increases should be granted in a timely fashion and should keep pace with inflation and market forces.

In addition, posting and other allowances should be increased to levels which can realistically be expected to cover the costs associated with moves. The levels of these allowances must also take into consideration the local geographic/economic conditions of where the CF member and his/her family are posted.

2. CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP AND MILITARY JUSTICE

Too much careerism, too little operational experience, too many double standards and too many cover-ups. This is a message we heard time and time again during the Committee hearings. The leadership of the Canadian Forces is in crisis. This is not addressed at all adequately in the Majority Report. The report makes merely passing references to the problem. That is unacceptable.

Leadership

Leadership is a central issue and has been so identified by other analysts of Canadian military affairs. Professor David Bercuson who, in his report to the Minister of National Defence wrote:

"The present crisis in the Canadian armed forces is primarily a crisis of leadership ... Each of the several notorious incidents which have come to the attention of the public in the last four years - the murder of Shidane Arone in Somalia, the mental hospital abuses in Bosnia etc. - have occurred because of leadership failures in both the senior NCO and officer ranks. Other problems which have come to light have included senior officers lining their pockets at public expense, loss of respect by the troops for the high command, low morale, and a consequent undermining of public confidence in the Canadian Forces."

The same problem is referred to in Professor Jack Granatstein`s Report to the Minister (March 25, 1997) when he quotes a retired Air Force Colonel who remarked:

"There has been a demonstrated lack of ethical oversight, governance, supervision and leadership on the part of the General Officers at NDHQ and elsewhere. This, coupled with a propensity to line their pockets with unbecoming perks and emoluments creates a moral climate unsuitable for the leadership of the armed forces. The troops are watching them and the troops know."

Yet another Report completed for the Minister in March 1997, focused on the collective views of a range of experts on defence policy issues. The majority of these experts concluded that: "Military leadership values have been eroded because of the imposition of civilian bureaucratic values in the military".

Despite the obvious widespread recognition that a serious leadership problem exists in the Canadian Forces, there are no concrete recommendations in the Majority Report to address this problem. In fact, some of the Report's sections seem oblivious to the fact that any leadership problem exists at all.

For example, the Majority Report states that "Military culture may explain to some extent the awkwardness and insensitivity the Forces have demonstrated in the past in these matters (ie. looking after wounded soldiers)". This is simply not true. The military has always stressed `looking after its own'. It is in fact only relatively recently as senior officers have become more detached from the rank and file, that an `every man for himself' attitude has predominated. Honour and compassion are not easily taught. The only way to ensure that the military leadership looks after its own, is to maintain a professional fighting force which extols a soldier's code centered on values such as duty, honour, and respect for every soldier in the ranks. The military justice system plays a central role in building, encouraging, and enforcing these values. Unfortunately, the present CF justice system is hopelessly broken.

Military Justice

Perhaps the most horrifying example of military justice gone wrong is the recent revelation of apparently widespread sexual abuse in the CF. Botched investigations, cover-ups, insensitivity, unprofessionalism, and downright incompetence have become common descriptions of the way the Military Police and its sidekick the National Investigation Service conduct themselves. Investigations, prosecutions, legal defence, and courts martial must all be seen to be competent, professional, fair, impartial, and independent.

We therefore recommend:

10. That the military justice system be reformed to ensure a level playing field, with penalties for inappropriate or illegal behaviour being equally applied to both Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

11. That the military justice system be reformed to ensure independence in investigations, prosecutions, legal defence, and judging. The cornerstone of these reforms would be the creation of an office of Inspector General.

12. That all investigations of violent crime in the CF be conducted by the RCMP.

It should be noted, that the government recently introduced amendments to the National Defence Act in the form of Bill C-25. They squandered that opportunity - the first chance in over 50 years to make substantive changes to the military justice system - so it is not surprising that there is no mention of military justice in the Majority Report.

3. PURSUIT OF A POLITICALLY CORRECT AGENDA

Gone are the days that merit was the basis for selection for service in the Canadian Forces. Instead, politically correct planners have instituted race and gender quotas which belittle the notion of equality and, perhaps more frighteningly, undermine our military's combat capability. In addition, political correctness - and the artificial quotas which result - are extremely damaging to morale, cohesion, and confidence among CF personnel, particularly in the combat arms.

In his recent Annual Report on the state of the Canadian Forces, the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Baril noted:

"For fiscal year 1998-99, Land Force Command has a recruiting target of 1,000 people, of which 25% are to be women. ... In addition to the recruiting target for women, the CF has established targets of 7% for visible minorities and 3% for Aboriginal people."

This is in marked contrast to the Liberal approach of just a few years ago. In 1982, the Senate Sub-Committee on National Defence (composed of a majority of Liberal members) stated that:

"The Sub-committee believes and recommends that military viability - that is to say the capacity to execute competently the military tasks which are demanded of them - remain the essential criterion for judging the operations of the armed forces."

How is it that common sense has been allowed to slip so badly in just 16 years? Despite the fact that SCONDVA heard nothing in support of quotas during its hearings, the Majority Report nevertheless parrots the politically correct line in statements such as:

"The Army has requested that 25% of those recruited to combat arms be women, in order to obtain a critical mass for training and employment in various units."

One must ask the following questions: How do quotas for the entry of certain categories of persons into the Forces (or the combat arms) contribute to the maintenance of a combat capable force? How does the lowering of standards to allow for the integration of women into the infantry, armour, artillery and combat engineer roles improve the combat effectiveness of the Army?

The answer, of course, is that gender/racial/religious or any other demographic quotas do nothing to improve combat capability. In fact, quotas by necessity have a negative effect on combat capability since the achievement of these quotas is dependent on altering physical or other standards that would otherwise be required for entry to the Forces.

The foundation for much of the current political correctness in the CF is the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Commission Tribunal ruling which stipulated that the CF must have "complete integration" of women in the combat arms within 10 years. This raises the further question: Should the Canadian Forces be exempted in some way from Human Rights Commission rulings?

In light of the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the consequent legal implications of ignoring Human Rights Commission rulings, the Defence Department finds itself in a precarious position. On the one hand it must protect its combat capability. On the other, it is forced to lower its standards in order to implement artificial demographic quotas. Clearly the solution to this problem is beyond the control of the Department of National Defence. Only the federal government has the power to exempt the Department from externally imposed quotas.

Unfortunately, the Liberals'
worst fears have been
recognized.

Ironically, it was the Liberals who first recognized this. In the same 1982 Senate Sub-Committee Report, the Liberal led Committee suggested using the "notwithstanding" clause of the Charter to "extend to the Armed Forces the essential exemptions required to fulfill their role...."

The Senate Report then made the following recommendation:

"The Sub-Committee recommends that DND urgently package its requirements for exemptions from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and draft such consequential amendments to the National Defence Act as may be necessary. The Minister of National Defence should then present those amendments to government and Parliament for serious and prompt consideration."

In other words, the Liberals recognized that the primary role of the Canadian Forces - combat readiness - was going to be affected by the introduction of race and gender based hiring quotas. They also recognized that it was incumbent on the government (a Liberal government) that special exemption be made for the Canadian Forces.

Unfortunately, the Liberals' worst fears have been recognized. Not only has the combat capability of the Forces already been compromised, but the apparent urgency with which DND is implementing its quota policy is, in fact, picking up steam.

While the Department is very careful about making written statements about dropping physical or other aptitude related requirements, one gets an occasional glimpse at the reality of the quota policy. In December of 1996, then Deputy Army Commander of the Army, (now Chief of Land Staff) Major-General Leach, issued an order which signalled the reduction of physical standards requirements. The order stated that:

"Doctrine or practices that are incompatible with unrestricted participation (of designated groups) will be changed."

At what point did we depart from the notion that we should restrict participation in the combat arms to the most capable?

In light of the potentially devastating effect of quotas on the military in general and on the combat arms in particular, we echo the 1982 Senate Sub-Committee on National Defence when we recommend the following:

13. That DND urgently package its requirements for exemptions from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and draft such consequential amendments to the National Defence Act as may be necessary. The Minister of National Defence should then present those amendments to government and Parliament for serious and prompt consideration.

14. That DND formally adopt hiring, placement, and promotion policies which are based on the principle of merit and which, at their core, protect equality of opportunity.

Political correctness must play no role in military planning. The results are not only detrimental to combat readiness, they tend to have a snowball effect. Political correctness has spiraled out of control at DND. Incredibly, in September of this year, the Canadian Forces announced that it would underwrite the costs of "gender-reassignment" surgery for CF members.

Other groups in society at large may argue that there is something positive to be gained from `re-assigning gender', but it is pretty hard to imagine any positive military gain. This surely represents the height of absurdity. Even the choice of language used to describe the operation betrays the stupidity of the policy.

We therefore recommend:

15. That DND put an immediate end to any social experimentation policies which impair combat readiness.

The bottom line is that Canada needs strong, combat-ready and combat-capable Armed Forces. This must be the primary guiding principle behind any government or DND policy. Political correctness and its cousins: hiring quotas and social engineering, must be removed from the realm of the military. Those who advocate these choices should fight their battles in civil society and be thankful that their ability to do so is protected by the military.

CONCLUSION

We were genuinely shocked and disappointed by the SCONDVA Majority Report. Members of our Committee heard first-hand accounts of the grim circumstances under which many current and former CF personnel live and work. Even the most hardened skeptic would have thought that the government members of the Committee would be moved to press for fundamental, systemic change within DND and the Canadian Forces. Unfortunately, the government members chose to stay the course. They rejected substance in favour of window dressing. They rejected change in favour of the status quo. In so doing, the government members of the Committee are sending a terrible message to those who testified. They are saying, "We weren't listening."

The government now stands at a crucial crossroads in the life of the Canadian Forces. The government is faced with two options: It can continue to reject substantive change and continue to allow the proud Canadian Forces to flounder, or it can seize this opportunity to reinvigorate Canada's military. We hope the government chooses the latter. The Canadian Forces are too important to let slip away as a result of neglect.

We acknowledge that positive change will not be easy. Such reforms will be fraught with considerable controversy and will require determination to implement. While it would be politically easier to look the other way, we feel that it is incumbent on the government to live up to its obligation to the serving members of the Canadian Forces. The time for idle promises has past. The Official Opposition urges the government to take immediate, substantive action to set the Canadian Forces on the road toward renewal.