FISH Committee Report
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INTRODUCTION
Over the period from January 19, 1998 to January 25, 1998, the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans visited 10 communities on the coast of British Columbia to solicit the views of fishermen, fishing organizations, community leaders, community organizations, and individuals about the management of the fisheries on Canada's West Coast.
The communities visited were Prince Rupert, Sechelt, Steveston, Sidney, Ucluelet, Port Alberni, Sointula, Alert Bay, Port Hardy and Campbell River.
There were many issues on which there was broad consensus across the whole coast. However, there were others on which the Committee received a variety of views, some of which were diametrically opposed. In addition, the Committee encountered a number of area-specific concerns. Some fairly well defined issues that required more urgent attention have already been covered in the Committee's second interim report, The West Coast Report tabled in the House of Commons on April 2, 1998. A summary of the recommendations of the interim report is attached as Appendix C to this report.
SUMMARY
Changes in the West Coast fishery have caused a great deal of disruption for fishermen, plant workers and coastal communities. Major causes have included the industry restructuring imposed by the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Strategy (Mifflin Plan), increased interceptions of salmon by Alaskan harvesters due to a failure to enforce the 1985 Canada-U.S. Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST), and even changes in oceanic conditions.
Although the commercial salmon fleet still accounts for by far the largest share of the harvest, it sees itself threatened by a number of pressures. These include an increasing aboriginal share of the harvest, a rapidly growing "commercial" recreational fishery, particularly in the north, aggressive interceptions by Alaskan fishermen and increasing corporate control of the salmon harvest.
Rural, northern and aboriginal communities have been hardest hit by the changes. Jobs have been lost directly in the harvesting sector, not only by licence holders but by crew members. Shore jobs have also declined because there is a great deal less processing activity than in earlier years. Witnesses said that much of the fish that used to be processed in centres like Prince Rupert are now just being landed for transhipment to other centres for processing. The downturn in harvesting and processing activity has had a large impact on employment and economic activity in the service industries that support both the fishing industry and the community at large.
Added to this, changes to Employment Insurance (EI) regulations and less work due to reduced fishing activity have made it much more difficult to qualify for benefits. Significantly fewer people are eligible for EI benefits and, as a result, social assistance has swelled. Individual, family and community incomes have fallen markedly, compounding the economic and social problems.
Despite the difficulties facing the fishing communities of B.C.'s coast, there is a great deal of positive spirit. People are well aware of the crisis that occurred on Canada's Atlantic coast and are anxious to avoid similar mistakes. Stakeholders view B.C.'s fishing industry as a sunrise, not a sunset industry.
Most people accept that the fishery has changed and both the fishing industry and communities must also change. They believe that there is a need for a vision of the fishery of the future that makes a place for rural, northern and native communities. Several main themes were articulated that would help communities achieve a better future for themselves.
There has to be a resolution of the issue of allocation of the salmon harvest. Commercial harvesters, in particular, need to know how much of the harvest they will be entitled to so they have a basis on which to decide whether they have a viable future in the fishery and so they can plan accordingly.
The dispute with the U.S. over the Pacific Salmon Treaty must be resolved. Particularly in the northern region of the province, fishermen have suffered considerable financial losses because of aggressive interception fishing by the Alaskan fleet, which also threatens the viability of a number of salmon stocks. The federal government must make this one of its highest priorities.
Both the federal and provincial governments have failed to adequately protect salmon stocks and important salmon habitat. Most of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) conservation and management efforts have been concentrated on large runs of the Fraser and Skeena rivers. Hundreds of other smaller rivers, streams and creeks that collectively could match or exceed the production of the larger rivers have been neglected. In many cases DFO no longer has information about the condition of these rivers because they do not have the field staff. Witnesses said that environmental laws to protect the salmon habitat have not been enforced either by the federal or provincial governments. Clear cutting, urban development, pollution, road building and industry have all contributed to a loss of habitat.
There is a broad consensus that there is a great deal that could be done to restore and enhance salmon habitat on both Vancouver Island and on the mainland coast. This could enhance natural salmon productivity and provide greater opportunities for all sectors of the salmon fishery. It could also provide meaningful employment to many workers who have been displaced from the fishery.
The West Coast has a great many other biological resources that are often overlooked because of the focus on salmon. Many of these are currently underdeveloped; however, DFO does not have the resources to do in-depth stock assessments. Without this information, it has adopted a precautionary approach and is consequently unwilling to issue licences for anything beyond minimal fisheries. However, there are significant opportunities for people, including some of those displaced from the more traditional sectors, to participate in these new fisheries if this issue can be resolved.
Not everybody who is now or was until recently employed in the fishery will be able to participate in the fishery in the future. There was agreement everywhere the Committee travelled that there is a need for a long-term but finite transition strategy for individuals and communities to develop new types of employment and industry. The motivation is there, the ideas are there. What is needed are the resources to make it happen.
VISION
OF THE FISHERY
Many witnesses who appeared before the Committee pointed to the need for a "vision" for the West Coast fishery of the future. There were generally two competing visions: one supported by most independent fishermen and coastal communities and the perceived (unspoken) agenda of DFO and corporate interests.
Many witnesses believed that DFO's vision is that of a corporate-owned fishery, in which economic efficiency, through the mechanism of the marketplace, would dominate leading to a concentration of ownership, fewer high-capacity fishing boats operated by a smaller number of fishermen, with centralized processing plants in the major cities. The government's role would be reduced to primarily that of a facilitator, arranging partnerships with private interests. Witnesses indicated that the government has clearly signalled its intention to move further in this direction with the section dealing with Fisheries Management Agreements in clauses 17 to 22 of the revised Fisheries Act, tabled as Bill C-62 in the previous Parliament.
An alternative vision is that of a community-oriented fishery based on the traditional structure of the fishery that would support individual fishermen, shoreworkers and communities in a renewed and revitalized industry. Witnesses observed that unlike on the East Coast, most fish stocks on the West Coast such as herring and halibut are still in a healthy state. Many salmon stocks are also relatively healthy and others could be rebuilt through protection and restoration of habitat. Rebuilding could involve coastal communities and employ workers who were displaced from the fishery.
Some witnesses suggested that several steps could be taken to promote an alternative vision of the fishery:
(a) The development, in cooperation with all fleet sectors, of a consensus-based vision of a sustainable fishing fleet of the future;
(b) A massive program of wild stock and habitat renewal funded by loans from the federal and provincial governments that could be repaid over a 40-year period, in part through a royalty on fish harvesters' incomes; and
(c) The direct participation of coastal communities in the enhancement, monitoring and protection of the resource.
Representatives of the Community Marine Resources Transition Committee (CMRTC) of the Sunshine Coast urged the Committee to recommend that a visioning process with a 25-year horizon be undertaken in partnership with the communities and the provincial government. They also suggested that instead of planning from day one, the process should look at the end result desired for year-25, establish bench marks for the intervening periods and develop a strategy to achieve these results. They emphasized that the visioning process must include a number of elements such as regulations, harvest levels, habitat restoration, treaty negotiations, numbers of licences, research, fisheries status, conservation levels, desired employment levels, and the economic development of other aspects of the marine economy and the community as a whole.
One witness said, "Marine resource economic development must be integrated with the greater community and not developed in isolation."
The Coastal Communities Network (CCN) presented its vision of a future. Direct management of the fishery, including management plans, habitat restoration, stewardship and protection, would be done at the regional level, through regional fisheries management boards.
The Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council also lent its support to the concept of regional management boards as opposed to the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) approach espoused by DFO. In the view of the Council, the stated management goals of DFO could be achieved by a community management model rather than by resorting to privatization for the benefit of a few.
Reductions in costs to government could be achieved by making management boards responsible for many of the day-to-day management functions such as catch monitoring, licensing and quota development in consultation with DFO, stakeholders and First Nations. The Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council suggested looking at the experience of areas where regional management boards have been developed such as the Alaskan salmon fishery and Japanese coastal fisheries before accepting the ITQ/IVQ (Individual Vessel Quota) alternative. Other witnesses also suggested looking at the Alaskan approach both with respect to regional management boards and for their use of an owner-operator policy in many of their fisheries as a means to ensure the stability of communities.
Other witnesses, however, were of the opinion that none of these visions were practical. There had to be one manager of the resource, they said, and that manager should be the federal government. Because salmon migrate along the length of the coast, they could not be managed on a community or regional basis.
PART I:
DFO MANAGEMENT
DFO and Federal Fisheries Policy
Most witnesses were very critical of the general direction of federal fisheries policy and that of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Much of this appears to stem from the implementation of a variety of policies over the objections of West Coast residents and it contributed significantly to the level of alienation. Policy changes have ignored the input of stakeholders despite the appearance of consultation and have neglected the needs of communities adjacent to and dependent on the resource. These policies have lead increasingly to the concentration and urbanization of licence ownership, a decline of fishing and processing jobs in coastal communities and the loss of support and service industries and infrastructure.
Added to this has been the lack of a long-term transition program for displaced workers which has lead to a widespread perception that if comparable socio-economic dislocation had taken place in central Canada the federal government would have provided more support. The dismantling of the marine transportation infrastructure system such as the destaffing of lightstations and the off-loading of responsibility for federal docks and harbors was viewed by many as yet another example of the federal government's lack of concern for coastal communities.
These views were summed up thus by the Coastal Communities Network: "Our fisheries and marine policy on the West Coast is a perfect example of how Canada doesn't work; how unaccountable and dysfunctional our system of government can be."
Many witnesses observed, in somewhat different ways, that DFO has changed the way it operates, mostly for the worse. One witness explained that the West Coast fishery used to enjoy world-class fisheries management but recently the policy area, especially that of managing people in the fisheries, has been abysmal. Witnesses argued that there was a need for a complete review of the Department's policy formulation and its consultation processes.
Representatives of the Community Marine Resources Transition Committee (CMRTC) of the Sunshine Coast expressed the belief that during the last 30 years, DFO had become increasingly disconnected from resource workers and their communities. This distancing by DFO, even if unintentional, had served to entrench a thorough mistrust of the Department. A tangible example of the Department's inaccessibility was provided by one fisherman who asked why the West Coast head offices of DFO were located in the highest cost district of downtown Vancouver instead of Steveston or Campbell Avenue where there were actually some fishermen. The CMRTC also pointed out that the relations between the federal and provincial governments had become strained at a time when both should be striving to maintain fish stocks and sustain communities.
Witnesses alleged that those who had opposed the Department's plans had been "sidelined." DFO field staff were still held in high regard but witnesses said their morale was very low as they too had been sidelined and ignored and were being asked to do more work with fewer resources. Most of the difficulties with DFO were viewed as originating with the regional office in Vancouver and headquarters in Ottawa. One witness suggested that there was a "huge amount of duplicity at the political level and the upper levels of DFO."
A common complaint was that DFO bureaucracy often disregarded the input of fishermen and other stakeholders. There was a time when DFO would listen to fishermen but that this was no longer the case. Two reasons were given: politicians used to be more involved and there used to be a different type of manager at DFO headquarters.
Witnesses complained of a lack of accountability on the part of DFO. Evidence for this was the lack of appreciation for the consequences of Departmental policies and programs and the failure of the Department to alter its course of action even when it had been shown to have severe and destructive consequences. Examples given of DFO's lack of accountability include the re-allocation of resources and changes to the basis on which fishermen had access to the resource.
A specific example of DFO's lack of accountability was provided by one witness. At the time of the Pacific Round Table, then Minister Tobin had made a commitment to guarantee traditional access by gear type and allocation. Based on this, fishermen came up with a "definitive list" for downsizing. DFO, however, "cherrypicked" from the list. One example was the harvest of Fraser River sockeye off the West Coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands, traditionally accessed by northern fishermen. According to the witness, DFO had been trying to stop access of northern fishermen to these stocks and when Minister Mifflin replaced Minister Tobin, the DFO bureaucracy took advantage of the change in ministers to remove this item from the table. As the witness said, "where is the honour of the Crown?"
The perceived direction of the Department, since the early 1990s, of centralization in the face of diminishing funds with fewer people in the field and more in Vancouver and Ottawa was viewed as a problem. A sufficient number of field staff was viewed as essential to carrying out the fundamental role of the Department. The Committee heard suggestions that most DFO staff should be moved to the East and West coasts so that they could be close to the fishery instead of being far removed from it in Ottawa. A typical sentiment expressed was that ``biologists and enforcement officers were needed on the coast rather than bureaucrats in Ottawa.''
Another criticism of DFO policies, presented by the Native Brotherhood of B.C., Prince Rupert Local, was that, for many years, federal fisheries policy makers and managers had been oriented primarily to concerns with the biology of fish and fish habitats. In the view of the Native Brotherhood, the problems in the industry had been largely grounded in social and economic issues such as over-capitalization and sectoral allocations. These problems had never been resolved despite periodic, "politically-motivated convulsions in fisheries management." The Native Brotherhood was skeptical about whether the Mifflin Plan and other current initiatives could resolve the underlying social and economic problems of the fishery.
DFO was also criticized for improperly over-riding private property rights in the Langley-Aldergrove area of the Fraser River Valley. Farmers there were expected to give up the use of large areas of their land, without compensation, because DFO was demanding it for wetland habitat. A number of witnesses called for a judicial inquiry into the conduct of DFO.
By far the most dominant issue during the Committee's meetings was the impact of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Strategy, widely known as the Mifflin Plan. (Although one witness said it would have been more aptly named the "Pat Chamut/Louis Tousignant Plan.") Other witnesses described the Mifflin Plan as the "Pacific Debilitation Strategy" because of its effect on the small boat fleet and coastal communities. Many recommended scrapping it.
The majority of witnesses were extremely critical of the Mifflin Plan. Its impact on the West Coast fishery and coastal communities was described as chaos. According to witnesses, the goals of the Plan have not been attained, which came as no surprise to many. Deficiencies of the Plan pointed out before it was implemented were ignored. As one witness said: "I stand before you today to tell you, I told you so."
The intent of the Mifflin Plan was to reduce the size of the fleet so that remaining boats would be more economically viable, fishing efforts would be more manageable, and pressure on salmon stocks would be reduced. Although a large number of boats have been eliminated, witnesses believe the Plan has not achieved any conservation objectives and "in fact, it has done nothing for the protection of the fish."
Nor, according to many witnesses, has downsizing appeared to have increased the opportunities for the smaller number of remaining boats. A commonly held view is that it has crippled the small fisherman while accommodating large fishing corporations. Although the volume of catch has increased substantially from previous years, and the number of boats has been reduced by 30% as planned, the Committee was told that few in the remaining northern gillnet fleet made a living income in 1997. Reasons for this included area inequities that have not been addressed by DFO, licence fees that have outstripped the value of the licences, and low salmon prices.
Witnesses described the impact of the Mifflin Plan as sudden and that it also had long-term implications. They criticized the speed with which the Mifflin Plan was implemented. The fleet was forced to restructure in the course of only a few months. Witnesses advised the Committee that any further restructuring should be carried out more slowly.
Despite the general criticism of the Mifflin Plan, there was also some support. A witness representing three groups: the Pacific Gillnetters Association, Area C Salmon Gillnet Association and the Coalition of Concerned Fishermen, stated that these groups offered qualified support for the Plan. The witness acknowledged that the plight of coastal communities, lack of viability of individual fishermen, financial difficulties of processors and other difficulties were often attributed to the Mifflin Plan. He pointed out, however, that many problems in the West Coast salmon fisheries were largely due to other causes. These included poor ocean survival conditions, gratuitous allocation of salmon to First Nations and other groups, political interference in management and consultation processes, poor resource management by DFO and various provincial ministries, and dwindling alternative employment opportunities in forestry and mining. The witness also said that although fleet reduction had brought some benefits including less crowding, safer fisheries and easier management, it had not gone far enough to ensure viability, adding that poor fishermen are not good conservationists.
Witnesses frequently complained about the ineffectiveness and expressed a lack of confidence in the consultation processes: "All of this is lip service."
Some recounted that they had spent years going to meetings and participating in various kinds of boards and committees, usually without any financial remuneration. They observed that the advice they had given was rarely heeded: "We've paid big money, which could have been used to rehabilitate our stocks, to have endless townhall meetings and final reports - and yet nothing changes". Witnesses told the Committee that there was a need for accountability to be brought back into the system. DFO, it was also said, had always used "divide and conquer" tactics to pit fishermen against each other, using the same DFO-appointed representatives in every process.
One specific complaint was that DFO refused to recognize the associations that were formed to represent the eight different licensing areas created in the Mifflin Plan. In the meantime, DFO continued to fund the Canadian Fishing Industry Council (CFIC) knowing that CFIC was not representative of the industry because its regulations required that an association be in existence for two years before it could have a seat at the table. This meant that, by the time an association could get to the table, all the processes and policies that affected allocations for its membership would have been already decided.
A number of witnesses complained that agreements they thought had been settled were changed afterwards as a result of lobbying.
Many fishermen criticized the process that led up to the Mifflin Plan. Some said that the Pacific Round Table Process had proceeded too quickly. A delegation of fishermen and community leaders who had travelled to Ottawa to fight against the Plan had been allowed only a 15-minute meeting with Minister Mifflin. Fishermen had also been assured that the Mifflin Plan would be based on the Pacific Round Table recommendations; however, the Plan ignored key elements made by the Round Table.
Even supporters of the Mifflin Plan were critical of the federal government's failure to keep the commitments that had been outlined in letters by former Fisheries Ministers Brian Tobin and Fred Mifflin to participants in the Pacific Round Table. One of these commitments had been a promise to practice "risk averse management." Although this had been in practice in 1996, it was abandoned in 1997. An example of this was the lack of enforcement in 1997, except on the Fraser River during the fisheries protesting Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (AFS) pilot sales fisheries.
The licence stacking "fiasco" was cited as a blatant example of the failure of the process. Stacking was not approved by the Pacific Round Table. Fishing industry groups had asked that the vote be postponed until a review could be conducted on the impact of stacking, yet DFO announced that a vote on stacking would take place, offering the possibility of a review only after the vote was completed.
The Committee was told that the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union (UFAWU) conducted its own coast-wide vote of all fishermen on this issue. The result showed that more than 90% of those who voted were against licence stacking; nevertheless, DFO still went ahead.
Witnesses also testified that the vote was itself "stacked." In order to end this practice, a majority of those eligible to vote, rather than those actually voting, would have to vote against. Thus, the voting instructions included a provision whereby any licence holder who chose not to vote (or who spoiled his/her ballot) was to be considered as in favour of licence stacking.
This undemocratic action added to the general suspicions of the motives of DFO.
Responsibility for Fisheries Management
There were a wide variety of opinions. Some witnesses argued that DFO had done a poor job of managing the West Coast. One fisherman expressed it this way:
West Coast decisions must be made and seen to be made by West Coast people in DFO. Despite my criticisms, they are the only group with the knowledge and infrastructure to handle the task. The province should be part of the decision making process only as a stakeholder.
Some witnesses argued that the province of British Columbia should manage the fishery while others countered that the province has a poor record of managing resource industries and protecting the environment, particularly the fish habitat. Some witnesses felt that there could be a greater involvement of the provincial government but that overall authority for fisheries should remain with the federal government.
The Committee heard that, despite the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the federal and provincial governments, there continued to be overlap and duplication of services. Grey areas, it was said, were too often decided on a political basis. Some witnesses said that although British Columbians had a strong desire to have their fisheries managed closer to home, the B.C. government had to earn the trust and respect needed to do the job successfully.
The British Columbia Wildlife Federation was particularly critical of political priorities. As an example, it pointed to the intention to create a Pacific Conservation Council under the federal-provincial agreement on fisheries. However, it noted that budget constraints had forced DFO to close community offices, shut down a sport fishery on the Fraser River because of a lack of enforcement capability, and threaten to close up to 18 community-based hatcheries as a cost-cutting measure. It also pointed out that provincial conservation officers and biologists had been office-bound for part of the year because there was not enough money in their operation budgets to buy gas for their vehicles. Neither agency was sufficiently funded to adequately undertake the most basic stock assessment activities. Nevertheless, according to the B.C. Wildlife Federation, politicians and bureaucrats were able to find the money to establish yet another bureaucracy that would not manage fisheries, produce more fish or restore habitat but would watchdog and critique departmental staff charged with those responsibilities who could not do their jobs effectively because of underfunding:
Watchdog agencies are great but perhaps the politicians and mandarins are unclear on the concept. The problem is a lack of fish and gumboots, not a lack of bureaucrats and armchair biologists.
In a number of locations, particularly on Vancouver Island, the Committee found strong support for various forms of regional or community management schemes. In this view, regional management groups would resolve management issues locally. The primary function of DFO would be to provide technical, scientific and enforcement support. Witnesses said that programs that integrate conservation and sustainability must be supported and administered locally.
The Committee was impressed by the commitment of both First Nations and non-native communities to working together to find local solutions that would benefit all stakeholders, communities and the region as a whole.
In Alert Bay, a representative of the Kwakiutl Territorial Fisheries Commission reported that his organization had been given assurances and encouragement about the possibility of a local management plan in an October 1997 letter from the Minister. The letter, however, had gone on to indicate that the organization would have no real authority and that a plan had already been designed. The witness asked for the Committee's support to mandate local management as a viable option. "There has to be a sanction from the federal and provincial governments to provide regional native / non-native management with support in the form of technical advice to guide the process."
Other witnesses pointed out that since salmon stocks migrate over large regions of the B.C. coast, there would still have to be a central management authority. In some areas, community-based quotas were advocated but other witnesses expressed concern over the bureaucracy that might be set up to administer such systems.
A similar model proposed that ownership of the fish from each river or coastal area could be vested in a consortium of community-based groups, including First Nations, with territories in the area as major participants. These consortia would be responsible for the conservation and enforcement for stocks from their area and would be supported by royalties from the sale of fish caught by current commercial fishermen as close to the rivers as feasible to ensure selectivity. In addition to currently licensed fishermen, the consortia could lease catch rights to other users such as the sports fishing lodges, value-added processors and even to Alaskan harvesters and sport fishermen.
One suggestion was that there should be some kind of forum, that would be free from the political pressures inevitable in a management agency, to explore proposals that had been suggested to address the long-term social and economic issues of the B.C. fishing communities.
A B.C. Wildlife Federation representative commented on the issue of bureaucratic/political interference in the production and dissemination of scientific information. He maintained that there had been some political and bureaucratic manipulation of scientific opinion - the Nechako issue being a glaring example. However, he also took the scientific community to task for implying that it was the only group that knew the facts and that anyone who questioned or disagreed with their conclusions was "politically interfering."
The B.C. Wildlife Federation representative also suggested that, if DFO science branch would stop being so secretive and allow stakeholders and the community at large to view its proceedings and review its documents before they are cast in stone, there might be a better understanding of the conclusions and more sympathy for the problems of dealing with limited data and a resource that is seldom seen until it is in the net or on the spawning grounds.
A witness, representing the Canadian Ocean Frontiers Research Institute (COFRI), pointed out that research was vital to the decisions being made by DFO and by Natural Resources Canada. Because of the dominance of federal funding in ocean research, the system as a whole suffered from a lack of competition in terms of ideas and projects that a more pluralistic structure would encourage. The witness supported the concept that the federal government fund outside groups to conduct research in parallel with its internal initiatives.
The witness pointed out that such a body would not be set up in opposition to the government research programs, but rather as a second, independent source of legitimate opinions. Such a body would be open to research proposals from all Canadian sources including the federal government laboratories and be able to draw on funding from multiple sources in the public and private sectors. It would also be able to initiate and link to international research endeavours since oceans-related research and development (R & D) had little to do with national boundaries. COFRI was an example of the kind of organization that could serve this purpose.
Many witnesses expressed concern over the partnership provisions in the proposed amendments to the Fisheries Act, tabled in the previous Parliament as Bill C-62. The argument was presented that this bill would have empowered the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to grant a private right to fish for commercial or sports purposes, to any group in political favour, and without notice to the public. Bill C-62 would have changed the premise of the current Fisheries Act, that the fishery is a public resource to which all Canadians are granted equal access.
The Coastal Communities Network (CCN) noted that Bill C-62 did not define the nature of partnerships but added that it was clear from the Department's policies that this was another step in the DFO's agenda of privatization. It also noted that nowhere in the bill had it talked about communities in any meaningful way.
The CCN expressed a somewhat different view on the issue of the potential impact of the Fisheries Act on "privatization." In its view, management of many fisheries on the East and West coasts have already been privatized through quota systems and the partnership provisions of Bill C-62 would further concentrate management and conservation duties in the hands of corporations or wealthy licence holders. A consequence would be that the resource would be managed only by those with a direct economic interest to the exclusion of broader interests such as coastal communities and First Nations. Furthermore, it could become nearly impossible to get harvest and stock information from private corporations set up to manage and harvest the resource.
PART II:
PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
The Minister was widely criticized by witnesses for failing to support Canadian fishermen. His delay in visiting Prince Rupert at the time of the blockade of the Alaskan ferry, Malespina, was seen as evidence. Some witnesses said that the Minister's stance toward the U.S. was too conciliatory. One witness said: "We need a Minister of Fisheries who will fight for Canada - not someone who goes to Washington, D.C. and says if Alaska does not stop overfishing then Canada will cut its own harvest in half."
In addition to the increasing imbalance between U.S. and Canadian interceptions, the decline of the West Coast coho caused a further deterioration of the situation in 1997. While Canada was forced to further reduce its catch for conservation purposes, the U.S. refused to make any more than token changes to both its northern and southern interceptions.
Alaska had proceeded with fisheries in District 104 in southeast Alaska that were, according to the UFAWU, in clear violation of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST). In response, B.C. fishermen mounted a three-day blockade of the Alaskan state ferry, Malespina. The Committee was told that the Noyes Island fishery was perhaps the single most important cause of the Alaska ferry incident. Canada's northern fleet felt that it had been "robbed" by Alaska and sold out by DFO and the federal government. Fishermen felt they had been forced into this action over frustration with the Minister of Fisheries' unwillingness to confront the Alaskans about their overfishing.
Although it was widely accepted that, in some regards, the Canadian bargaining position on the PST was weak, there was also a sense that Canada had not made full use of the tools at its disposal to resolve the dispute. These included pressure, possibly in the international arena on the U.S., to live up to its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and legal and political pressure against the State of Alaska. Ottawa, it was pointed out, has done neither of these. In fact, if anything, the general belief is that Ottawa, and the Minister, have gone out of their way to avoid offending the U.S.
It was recommended to the Committee that Canada should marshal whatever bargaining strength and arguments it had and that the Minister should show leadership based on Canada's strong legal position. The Committee was urged to press the Prime Minister and Cabinet to elevate the issue to a level of high national priority. A "Team Canada" approach in which the people of B.C. and the B.C. fishing industry would have real input into the negotiating process was recommended: "The Americans are tough negotiators and know when to pull together in support of national interests. We must learn to do the same."
Why, asked some witnesses, when Canada was clearly in the right, did Ottawa fight B.C. instead? They said the federal government should join forces with the government of B.C.'s suit in the State of Washington against Alaskan Treaty violations and in the defence of fishermen named in the Alaskan damage suit over the Malespina incident. One witness suggested that any compensation Alaska felt it was due for last summer's protest had already been paid for by the salmon Alaska's fishermen had stolen over the past 15 years. He added that if compensation was due it should be to Canadian fishermen who had suffered huge financial losses as a result of Alaskan interceptions.
Other witnesses noted that there were also people in Washington and Oregon who shared Canada's belief in the principles of the Treaty. It was suggested that Canada attempt to find common ground with these people in fighting the hardliners in Alaska who refused to acknowledge the conservation problems they were causing by overfishing stocks that originated in B.C. and the northwest U.S.
The Strangway/Ruckelshaus Report was regarded as vindication of the Canadian position on the PST. One witness commented that, "One should not underestimate the importance of the fact that an American with the credibility of William Ruckelshaus has said that if an agreement is reached it would necessarily involve a compromise in the form of a movement of fish to Canada." The witness also noted, however, the admonition of Dr. Strangway and Mr. Ruckelshaus that there must be a willingness on the part of Canada to agree that not all the fish Canada deems to be Canada's will be returned.
In the eyes of most witnesses, the Strangway/Ruckelshaus Report corroborated the view that U.S. fishermen had been taking too many Canadian fish. It also confirmed the view of many participants that the stakeholder process was unlikely to be successful and that government-to-government negotiations were required to resolve the dispute. There was widespread support for Yves Fortier as a negotiator. (Mr. Fortier has since resigned and has been replaced.)
The U.S. was widely condemned for its double standard with regard to Article 62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It was pointed out that when the U.S. wanted to bring an end to fishing on the high seas for Pacific salmon originating in Alaskan rivers it relied on this clause for support but in its dispute with Canada, it ignores the same principle.
Impacts of the Failure of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Alaska continues to harvest salmon at a rate that is unsustainable. At the same time, DFO has taken conservation measures that make life very difficult for Canadian commercial fishermen. In Prince Rupert, a witness told the Committee that the processing company that she worked for, J.S. McMillan, had been forced to file for protection under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act in November 1997. This was due largely as a result of the mismanagement of the West Coast fishery and of the federal government's failure to enforce the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
It was pointed out that in 1993, the last year of designated quotas under the Treaty, the Alaskan fleet was allowed to catch a maximum of 160,000 fish during the first three weeks of the salmon fishing season. In the absence of negotiated annual quotas, the Alaskan catch had sky-rocketed each year and in 1997, they caught approximately 573,000 salmon. The failure to resolve the dispute had been especially devastating to the City of Prince Rupert, causing employers to go out of business and tearing families apart.
The witness stated that it was incumbent on the federal government to negotiate an agreement that would restore the Canadian quota well in advance of the 1998 season as there would be no second chance for the community.
According to witnesses, the overescapement of Skeena River sockeye was used by the Alaskans as an excuse for its interceptions of Canadian salmon. One suggestion was that if commercial fishermen from B.C. were given the opportunity to harvest the huge overescapement of sockeye, created by recent changes in fishing policy, it might be possible to develop a more satisfactory arrangement with Alaska (and the Washington State-based fishermen who travel to Alaska each season). The possibility of a system of exchanging some fishing rights on these stocks for rights of Canadian fishermen to participate in the fishery in Alaskan waters with Canadian licences was also put forward.
Another suggestion was that Canada should declare waters off the Alaskan Panhandle as a Canadian area similar to what the U.S. has done with the Dixon Entrance. It was also suggested that Canada should refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, whether or not the U.S. was willing to abide by the result. It was pointed out, the Law of the Sea was on Canada's side and Canada should make use of it.
The Committee's attention was drawn to a report prepared for the American Fisheries Society which determined that 142 stocks of salmon and trout had gone extinct in this century in B.C. and 624 more were at a high risk of extinction. Coho were among these threatened stocks. According to the report of the Pacific Stock Assessment Review Committee, coho spawning escapements of indicator stocks had been trending down for the last 12 years and were extremely low in 1997, especially on Vancouver Island and in the Thompson system. DFO, it was pointed out had been fully aware of the decline in coho stocks but had not taken action to reduce the catch.
A plea was made to the Committee on behalf of ``Speak for the Salmon'' for heroic measures to salvage the remaining wild coho stocks. Actions proposed included a pro-active approach to improving fresh water habitat to increase the survival of coho smolts, including province-wide laws to protect riparian areas that are at least equal to the Land Development Guidelines for the Protection of Aquatic Habitat, and a two-year moratorium on all recreational fishing for coho.
Other witnesses recommended up to a four-year moratorium on commercial salmon fishing to rebuild badly depleted coho, steelhead and chinook runs and a four-year moratorium on directed sports fisheries for coho and chinook salmon. Other suggestions included a permanent closure of the Strait of Georgia herring roe fishery to allow for more forage fish in this area, prioritization of more selective salmon fisheries and the phasing out of the most environmentally dangerous and socially destructive segments of the fishing fleet, namely the largest capacity seine and trawl vessels. It was noted that this kind of policy was being implemented in the U.S.
PART
III: PACIFIC SALMON REVITALIZATION STRATEGY
Fishermen told the Committee they had proposed a large buyback of the fleet that would have been self-financed and would have been carried out over an extended period of time; however, this proposal had been rejected. The way the buyback was implemented meant premature retirement for fishermen, many of whom had no opportunities for other employment. The result has been that the number of employed people in fishing communities has decreased. This has adversely affected these communities, many of which have few other economic activities they can currently turn to, and too little time to adapt.
One witness, pointing out that salmon stocks had almost been wiped out in the 1950's and 60's - argued that there were still far too many fishing boats on the B.C. coast and that there was still a need for a government buyback of boats and licences. (See also Recommendation 5 in Appendix C)
Other witnesses said that the initial $80 million round of licence buybacks had mostly taken marginal boats out of the fishery and did not reduce capacity. They recommend an additional round of licence buybacks to achieve sufficient capacity reduction for the remaining fleet to be economically viable.
Fleet Capacity and Capitalization
Witnesses contended that the Mifflin Plan has not reduced excess capacity in the commercial fleet. Some witnesses in fact argue that it has instead increased capacity since stacking has allowed licences to be transferred to larger, more capable boats.
Witnesses also argued that the Plan has increased rather than reduced capitalization of the fleet. This is largely because stacking and buybacks occurred at the same time driving up the cost of licences. Fishermen who stacked licences therefore now have a significantly greater investment in their licences.
Some witnesses said that there is still overcapacity in the commercial sector and therefore there was still a need for government-funded buybacks. They pointed out that the $80 million spent so far included only $15 million of government money as the other $65 million had been raised from the commercial fleet through an increase in licence fees implemented to fund buybacks. Witnesses cautioned that further industry restructuring should not be pursued until a thorough evaluation could be carried out.
Despite assurances given before implementation of the Plan, the Committee was told that reductions were not carried out evenly across all fleet sectors. The seine fleet suffered the least reductions, followed by the gillnet fleet while the troll fleet had been reduced disproportionately. Despite an industry agreement to share the resource on a 30-30-40 between the troll, gillnet and seine fleets respectively, the troll fleet had been limited to only 16.5% of the catch during the two years that the Mifflin Plan had been implemented. When this issue was raised with DFO, the Committee was told, its response was to compare landed values rather than pieces of salmon. Members of the fleet felt that DFO was effectively penalizing them for producing a higher quality product.
Most witnesses were critical of area licensing to a large extent because it has reduced their flexibility to fish making the fishing season much less certain. Some witnesses agreed that a fleet reduction plan was needed; however, buybacks in combination with area licensing had adversely affected rural and northern fishing communities more than urbanized centres in the south of the province. Many First Nations communities had also been disproportionately affected.
Northern fishermen were particularly critical of area licensing. Because of the low returns predicted for the Fraser River, area licensing had been responsible for crowding in the northern sector in 1997. One northern fisherman explained his problem like this, "We seem to have area licensing which, as a gillnetter in the north, seems to have locked in more boats to my area than ever before. So now, when we have no fish in the north, we're screwed. Does this make sense to someone?"
Witnesses estimated that as many as 25% of salmon-related jobs had been lost on B.C.'s North Coast. One witness described the effect of area licensing as the "ghettoization of the fishery." Again, because mobility was restricted by area licensing, fishermen in the northern sectors believed that they bore the brunt of Alaskan interceptions. As one fisherman put it, "we were left to the not too tender mercies of Alaska."
Area licensing and stacking were said to have reduced fishing opportunities and caused a number of fishermen to lose their boats because they could not repay their loans. The Committee was told that many of these individuals had low levels of equity and, with no effective programs to help them, those with low levels of formal education and little experience outside the fishery faced a bleak future. Fishermen told the Committee that they need the flexibility to fish the whole coast in order to survive. They also suggested that this would benefit conservation as it would reduce the fishing pressures on weaker stocks.
Some witnesses from the gillnet and troll fleets argued that under area licensing, two-thirds of the area which they used to fish had been expropriated. Many felt that they should have received some form of compensation for this.
There were also other unintentional adverse effects. The Committee was told, for instance, that speculators who "grabbed" licences just before the changes had seen the value of those licences triple due to the demand created by area licensing and stacking. On the other hand, there were skippers of company-owned seine vessels who owned their own fishing nets and who were displaced by area licensing. These skippers were left with no way of recouping the investment made in their nets since there was no program for them and very little demand. New nets cost about $65,000 but the price of used nets had fallen to $15,000 from $30,000.
Some witnesses said that if area licensing had to be implemented, it should have been for a term longer than four years.
The small boat fleet consisted primarily of what is termed "combination boats." Although the Committee was told that the recommendation of the gillnet panel of the Pacific Round Table (PRT) was to phase out combination boats over a period of 10 years, combination boats were eliminated as a result of the Mifflin Plan. Operators of combination boats were forced to choose between gear types. Some combination boat fishermen told the Committee that neither they nor their colleagues could troll any longer since they had opted for gillnets; the problem was that these vessels were a compromise and did not make good gillnetters.
Buybacks were offered only to the licence holders. Crew members did not receive anything although they felt that they too, had had a stake in the fishery. The Committee was told that when the Alaskan fishing fleets were restructured, crew members had been included. Although it was recognized that some downsizing had to take place and that crews would be displaced as a result, crew members should have been consulted and included as stakeholders. A DFO official was alleged to have promised that crew members would be compensated but this did not happen.
Many communities, including Prince Rupert have been hit by the successive losses in the number of crew jobs. A representative of the B.C. Deep Sea Fishermen's Union observed that crew members used to make good money but that, over the years, they had suffered horrendous job losses. One witness said: "My 20 years of livelihood has been taken away and traded as a commodity on the Toronto Stock Exchange". For example, crews had been fired when the derby system was changed to a quota system; when a quota system was introduced for black cod, the number of boats was reduced from 146 to 12; and, when area licensing was brought in for herring, half the crews in that fleet lost their jobs.
The Committee was told that the Minister was changing the rules of the Mifflin Plan before the four years of reaction time had elapsed. The Committee was told that unless it and the rest of the government force DFO to fulfil its obligations the result would be increasing chaos and civil disobedience. Fishermen have made decisions on the basis of announced policies, whether or not they agreed with those policies; however, they need stability. If, for example, some sectors such as the trollers are permitted more relaxed rules on area licensing and risk averse management, then other gear types will demand the same treatment. If this were to happen one witness said, "the Mifflin Plan is dead."
Many witnesses were critical of the lack of government action to address the social and economic disruptions caused by the Mifflin Plan. Many witnesses saw this as the abandonment of both individuals and communities dependent on the fishery. Witnesses frequently referred to the unfulfilled promise by the former Minister of Fisheries, the Honourable Fred Mifflin, to provide "$30 million or whatever it takes," to assist displaced fishermen and shore workers.
The claim by the current Minister that the federal commitment to those displaced had been met by $136 million of federal spending was disputed by many. Witnesses said most of the $136 million was not spent on retraining and adjustment programs. Most of the money - about $80 million - was spent on the licence buyback program as well as other programs including the $7.7 million early retirement program that was conditional on matching funds from the province. The actual commitment to transition programs was estimated closer to $24 million. This, it was noted, fell far short of the funding for adjustment programs on the East Coast, and far short of needs.
A number of witnesses commented on the refusal of the province of B.C. to match the federal government's offer of $7.7 million for an early retirement program. They felt that as the fishermen had been displaced as a result of federal policies, it was the federal government's responsibility to fund an early retirement plan. The concern was also raised that there might be a danger of Ottawa reneging on its $7.7 million commitment to a retirement program if the province did not contribute its share. Witnesses confirmed that there was a definite interest in a retirement plan as many fishermen were not prepared to make the extra investment in stacking licences.
The Sunshine Coast Community Marine Resources Transition Committee (CMRTC) commented that the two levels of government must examine two very different components to a strategy of transition: mitigation and opportunities. While there must be compassionate and realistic mitigation strategies, areas of opportunity must be given equal consideration. As the transition committee put it: "It makes no sense to mitigate by encouraging someone to jump from one sinking ship to another."
A number of witnesses pointed out fishermen who sold their licences under the $80 million licence buyback scheme had been unable to retire gracefully from the industry. Because of the depressed market for fishing vessels and gear, fishermen who left the industry had been forced to sell these assets at much less than their true value. According to witnesses, capital gains taxes, income tax, and EI/pension clawbacks had reduced the value of these assets still further leaving insufficient equity to invest in another business or to provide retirement income. Witnesses emphasized the need for some form of tax relief to allow fishermen to retire.
Representatives of the Community Fisheries Development Centre (CFDC) estimated that over the previous 12 months, Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), had spent approximately $20.5 million funding a variety of program activities targeted at fishery workers in B.C. According to the CFDC, not only had just 18% of the $136 million been devoted specifically to transition funding, but the bulk of the 18% would have been paid out as EI benefits in any case. According to the CFDC, only the $20.5 million HRDC program funding and $3.79 million of the habitat and enhancement funding actually went to meeting the federal commitment.
One of the major problems with HRDC job transition fund programs was that they were only available to those who qualified for assistance under HRDC rules and regulations. The Committee was told that as many as 75% of the CFDC's applicants were ineligible for any funding or training from HRDC because of these rules.
A large number of workers, who as a result of federal policy had been displaced from the industry and despite having been promised ``whatever it takes," were receiving no assistance whatsoever. The Committee was told that a broadly held view in B.C. was that the reason for the lack of assistance for B.C. fishermen and industry workers was the perception in Central Canada that B.C. was an "endlessly rich province" that could take care of its own.
Many witnesses pointed to the inequality of treatment between displaced workers and afflicted communities on Canada's East and West coasts. The argument by politicians and bureaucrats that this was justified since the problems on the West Coast were neither as extensive nor as severe as those on the East Coast was widely challenged. Witnesses pointed out that it made little difference to an individual fishing industry worker whether he or she lived in Bonavista, Newfoundland or Sointula, B.C. The sea was where you had made your living and you had been divorced from your livelihood through no fault of your own.
The comparison was drawn to the federal government's commitment to extend long-term funding for fisheries transition programs on the East Coast. B.C.'s fishing community was encouraged by this and was eager to see a similar commitment made on the West Coast.
The CFDC told the Committee that people previously on training and a growing number of new applicants were waiting for the opportunity to pursue training, work experience and skill enhancement. This would enable them to either exit the fishery, diversify their off-season employment opportunities or to enter new areas of the fishery.
They confirmed that there were more than 4,500 people currently registered with CFDC offices throughout the coast who were hoping for support from HRDC program budgets to fund existing and new transition program activities in order to help meet the need for a comprehensive industrial adjustment program in B.C.
The CFDC had calculated a maximum budget estimate of $375 million for transition program funding over a three-year period. This funding would cover 5,000 participants and provide the necessary training, work experience and skill enhancement to generate renewed economic independence for displaced fishery workers in B.C's coastal communities. This Industrial Adjustment Program would use attachment to the industry as qualification rather than the "arcane and nonsensical hoops that one must jump through" of the present system. It was suggested that such a program could easily be funded from the surplus in the EI fund, which would exceed $14 billion in 1998.
One problem brought to the Committee's attention by the Chair of the Cowichan Regional Fishers Co-operative was the lack of employment opportunities facing displaced workers after training initiatives. In this instance, 33 fishermen from the Cowichan region had participated, during 1997, in 26-week training on environmental inventory, habitat assessment and watercourse mapping through Job Creation Partnership funds from HRDC. Despite the valuable skills learned, this had not led to jobs. In January 1998 another 12 fishermen from the Cowichan Region were about to embark on the same training. A preliminary market and employment survey with forest companies, developers and local government had revealed that although there was some demand for these services there was not enough work realistically to keep 45 people employed year-round in the Cowichan region. As a result, a local group of fishermen had introduced the idea of forming a new worker's cooperative that would provide supplementary income and employment alternatives for fishermen and promote, create and enhance the sustainability of the fishing industry.
PART IV:
ABORIGINAL ISSUES
A witness representing the Tsimshian Nation of Northern B.C. (approximately 10,000 members) explained to the Committee that Tsimshian communities were suffering as a result of restructuring. Many of these communities were satellites of towns such as Prince Rupert, Terrace, and Kitimat. "As these communities suffered", he said, "our communities suffer tenfold". These communities experience an average year-round unemployment rate of 63%, one has 96% unemployment.
One of the principles going into the process of restructuring was to ensure the viability of those remaining in the industry. This principle was not working. Since it was not feasible for harvesters to achieve viability, the communities were losing licences. One community had lost all its licences.
The north needs good economic development but science is greatly needed before there is any further development to ensure that it is sustainable.
The funding to assist displaced industry participants has been handled in such a way that displaced native fishermen, especially those in remote First Nation communities, have not had equitable access. First Nations peoples need to be involved at all levels in such initiatives including delivery of services.
On the Sunshine Coast, the Sechelt Indian Band has taken a very progressive step by establishing, in 1993, a Fisheries Consulting Service (FCS). The FCS provides a "one-stop" fisheries/environmental assessment service that covers a wide range of consulting services in fisheries, environmental and other resource related areas. The FCS provides services to a range of clientele in both the private sector and government and is a strong supporter of the community and of non-profit groups in fisheries restoration projects.
The Huu-ay-aht First Nation described to the Committee, the status of streams in their territory. Stocks of all five salmon species and steelhead which were historically present have been devastated by poor logging practices and overfishing. A representative described the restoration and enhancement work the Huu-ay-aht had carried out was now beginning to pay off. Despite their time and effort, however, the Huu-ay-aht were not reaping the benefits.
The band had purchased two fishing boats in 1997 to help resurrect interest among the younger generation in fishing for a living through a "Mentorship by example" program and to preserve the knowledge of the elders which was in danger of being lost. The Huu-ay-aht indicated that they were ready to work with DFO to set management objectives for salmon. They suggested establishing community-run board for this purpose, similar to the clam management boards that were in pilot phase. They also recommended that salmon management should be directed more toward terminal fisheries as this would afford greater protection to less abundant stocks.
Many witnesses were critical of the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (AFS) although some of those who objected to aspects of the AFS conceded that it contained a number of good policies.
The objections voiced were specifically directed to the Pilot Sales Program of the AFS. A number of witnesses criticized DFO claims that the AFS was the result of the "Sparrow" decision. They pointed out that native people had the right to fish for "food, social and ceremonial purposes" but it did not state that natives had any special rights to sell fish.
One of the most objectionable features of the Pilot Sales Program was that it had created a racially-based division in the commercial sector of the fishery which was seen as being socially divisive. There was a widespread consensus among the non-native commercial sector that commercial fishermen should all be treated on the same basis. Two commercial fisheries would not work.
Specific criticisms by some witnesses of the AFS Pilot Sales Program were:
- that it had increased racial tensions among fishermen;
- that it caused widespread "laundering" of (illegally caught) salmon;
- that the Supreme Court of Canada had placed limits on aboriginal rights to a commercial fishery;
- that every Canadian had the right to fish based on the Charter of Rights; and,
- that it caused additional administrative problems for DFO which was already strained to manage the B.C. fishery without the AFS.
A specific charge concerned buybacks of commercial licences. The Department was quoted as saying that 75 licences had been retired by DFO at a cost of $5.95 million, representing a catch capacity of 1.6% of the total allowable catch (TAC) in sockeye equivalents. In 1995, however, the AFS took half the TAC on the Fraser River, some 25 times the amount that the Minister and DFO had stated would be taken. Furthermore, the licences purchased had not really represented 1.6% of the TAC since they came from old, dilapidated, poorly equipped and inefficient vessels operated by fishermen that had never caught their share.
Most commercial fishermen had no objection to greater participation by First Nations in the commercial fishing industry but they believed that Aboriginal fishermen should participate as part of the regular commercial fleet, not as a separate race-based commercial fishery. Commercial fishermen also believed that they should be compensated for any reallocation of the harvest from the commercial sector to aboriginal fishermen. One approach, known as the "industrial solution," proposed that the federal government buy back existing commercial licences to be transferred to First Nations fishermen.
Licences transferred to native bands under the AFS that were supposed to have been equivalent to less than one percent of the commercial allocation were now said to be the largest user of Fraser River salmon.
Another criticism was DFO's practice of allocating quotas as fixed numbers of fish in the AFS fishery. The witness referred to a report by Drs. Pearse and Larkin commissioned by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans after the 1992 fishing season, Managing Salmon in the Fraser. The report recommended that if quotas were to be assigned they should be as a percentage of the catch. According to the witness, the 1995 "debacle", where the AFS fishery took as much sockeye salmon as the gillnet, troll and seine fleets combined, was a direct result of assigning fixed numbers of salmon at a time when it was impossible to know how large the returns are going to be. It was argued that the aboriginal commercial fishery should be subject to the same restraints as the commercial fishery, which is used to fluctuating numbers of fish allocated to each gear type during the fishing season depending on the strength of the runs.
Some witnesses were critical of a recent policy review of the AFS, pointing out that it had been carried out by the same people who were responsible for the program.
A number of witnesses were critical of native in-river fisheries. In part, they were concerned about the growth of this type of fishery. The view was also expressed that in-river fisheries had a devastating impact on salmon that were headed for the spawning grounds. Witnesses also questioned the economic soundness of in-river fisheries, since by the time the fish have entered the river, the quality has already begun to deteriorate so that their commercial value is much lower than sea-caught fish.
A witness representing the Sts'wan Society, however, argued that the Minister has a legal obligation to allocate salmon to interior native fishing peoples. He said that native peoples who lived above the Fraser River Canyon had been able to catch an average of one fish a year. This had sparked deep anger and had been one of the reasons for the incident at Gustavson Lake. He also accused DFO enforcement of "illegal terror tactics" such as low helicopter flights.
A witness representing the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia (NBBC) indicated that following recent court decisions (Sparrow, Gladstone, NTC Smokehouse, Van der Peet and Delgamuukw and others), that it may be necessary to examine the question of the priority accorded to aboriginal commercial fishermen in the north. The witness indicated that the Northern waters adjacent to the territories of the Haida, Tsimshian, Nisga'a and Haisla had always been the source of their livelihoods and that their rights to make a living from these resources should take priority over both sports and non-native commercial fishermen.
The NBBC noted that the AFS did not benefit existing commercial fishermen since the ``surplus'' escapement had been allocated to First Nations bands and tribal councils and not individual commercial fishermen. They noted that recent judgments from the Supreme Court of Canada had opened the possibility that First Nations people may have the right to make a moderate livelihood from fishing in their territories if they had done so in the past. They asserted that their members had that right and that it should be addressed politically to avoid further litigation. They also recommended that any future AFS initiatives should involve First Nations commercial fishermen directly.
Some witnesses said that the federal government is "paying" for the settlement of the Nisga'a Treaty on the backs of northern residents and fishermen. This was seen by many as unfair and unjust. They insisted that all Canadians should be paying for the settlement of Native Treaties, not just B.C. fishermen and their families.
Nimpkish River Fisheries Resource Management Plan
In Alert Bay, a representative of the `Namgis First Nation described their proposal to increase the production of chum salmon fry from its state-of-the-art Gwa'ni Hatchery from its current level of 2 million fry up to 10 million fry per year. The hatchery had been primarily designed for the production of chinook, coho and chum salmon to assist in the rebuilding of these stocks. Uncertainty of funding had, however, hampered long-term planning and operation of the hatchery to its fullest capacity.
The witness pointed out that North Vancouver Island communities have suffered with declining activity in the resource extraction industries. Given the state of the government's present fiscal situation, the witness indicated that their proposal represented the most viable option for achieving the goal of a self-supporting hatchery operation, a viable local aboriginal food fishery and a lucrative commercial and sport harvest.
The `Namgis First Nation had already begun the process of support from local communities, sport and commercial fishermen and local governments with positive response; however for the project to go ahead, they still required support from all other interest and user groups and especially from DFO. The `Namgis First Nation asked the Committee to review its proposal and to assist them if it was able.
PART V: CONSERVATION
One of the most consistent issues during the Committee's hearings on the West Coast was conservation. The Committee encountered a broad consensus that all levels of government had failed in their responsibilities to protect and restore the salmon habitat. The loss of salmon habitat has contributed significantly to the problems of the West Coast fishing industry. As one witness put it "Not less fishermen, more fish!"
At the same time as governments are failing to adequately protect the fish habitat, there is an impressive grass-roots and community commitment to correct these ills. These include such projects as: the impressive restoration of the Campbell River, the largely volunteer run operation of the Goldstream Salmon Hatchery, the Craig Flower Habitat Restoration and educational programs and practical projects in the schools to educate students and the public about the importance of salmon.
Despite these valuable activities, there is a broad sense that much more could be done to protect, restore and rehabilitate the salmon habitat. Much of the restoration work could be carried out by displaced fishing industry workers. This could serve a dual role of providing meaningful employment in a related activity and ensure greater productivity of West Coast rivers that would benefit all users of the resource. A number of organizations have been successfully training displaced workers to do needed assessment and restoration work; however, there is currently insufficient funding to keep all of these newly trained workers fully employed despite the fact that there is no shortage of work to be done. Another suggestion the Committee heard was for the implementation of a "fish unlimited" organization modeled after Ducks Unlimited Canada. The function of this organization would be to buy habitat and raise public awareness which would be preferable to one-year, make-work projects that were little more than band-aids.
Although many of the concerns for conservation were shared up and down the length of the coast, there were also many regional issues that were brought to the attention of the Committee. These are discussed in greater detail below.
Many witnesses felt that DFO has concentrated all of its efforts in managing the major stocks of the Fraser and Skeena rivers and that it has done a poor job of conserving the salmon stocks from the multitude of smaller rivers and streams of the B.C. coast. Witnesses said that the central coast stocks used to produce a huge amount of fish (more than the Fraser) but they had been dead for 20 years. The Department was accused of being very negligent. "So far the DFO has sat on its hands when it comes to addressing this loss."
A representative of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia suggested some elements of the current fishing management strategy that are presented as conservation issues, are in fact covert political decisions to re-allocate fish among sectors. The shutdown of commercial fishing on the Skeena was presented as a measure to preserve endangered, small stocks of wild steelhead and coho; however, this has resulted in immense escapement over spawning needs. This was entirely at the expense of the commercial fleet, which has harvested these fish until the past few years. This strategy did not address the root cause of the problem which was seen as the enormous imbalance between the large, enhanced sockeye runs and the extremely small runs of wild steelhead and coho stocks. There was no fishing plan or technology that could address this imbalance. DFO did not enhance these favoured sports species because of pressure from sports fishermen and others who prefer wild stocks. It was argued that it was impossible to have a successful commercial fishery without enhancement of the smaller runs. An additional side effect has been that it has allowed Alaskan fishermen to justify their interceptions of Canadian stocks partly on the basis that there have been huge overescapements of sockeye on the Skeena.
Although much of the concern over conservation was focused on the loss of habitat suitable as salmon spawning areas, in Steveston, it was drawn to the attention of the Committee that there are other areas such as the Lower Fraser estuary that are of vital environmental importance. The Lower Fraser estuary is vitally important as prime salmon rearing habitat. At peak rearing time, somewhere in the neighborhood of one billion juvenile salmon inhabit the lower estuary, feeding and acclimatizing to salt water. On the return, the marshes of the estuary provide a key resting area for adult salmon before they make the final journey up river to spawning beds that may be as much as a thousand kilometers away. The area is also an important habitat for a wide range of other wildlife, notably waterfowl.
Much of the estuary's habitat has already been lost to urban and industrial development and the remaining areas face imminent threats due to residential, commercial and industrial development and increasing recreational use. (The north arm of the Fraser River, the Committee was told is already dead.) The invasion of exotic plant species such as purple loosestrife and blackberry has added to the problems. The Pacific Coast Cannery Society emphasized that it is critically important to restore and maintain the remaining salmon habitat. The Lower Fraser Estuary Stewardship Program, launched in 1996, was formed to encourage local stewardship and as a means of giving people who live in the area a direct role in its conservation.
The Pacific Coast Cannery Society criticized DFO's Small Craft Harbour divisions for demolishing the Pacific Coast Cannery building which could have housed an "Estuarium" promoted by the Society and the Stewardship Program. The Estuarium was to serve as an educational and research facility for the Lower Fraser estuary.
The Steveston Group of Coastal Communities Conservation made a presentation to the Committee that criticized DFO for its failure to adequately protect sensitive habitat. The presentation raised several major issues concerning the protection of the Fraser River estuary.
The Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP), funded by federal and provincial grants, the two harbour commissions, the Greater Vancouver Regional District and others, has not encouraged stakeholder participation in decision making but has instead become a tight bureaucratic system run by the province and Ottawa.
The FREMP decided to re-define habitat protection in sensitive "red-coded" habitat zones from "no development" to "development," despite reports by numerous scientists, including DFO biologists, that these last, highly productive riverfront zones be protected.
Ocean dumping (managed by Environment Canada) is still allowed to happen during salmon migration times at two Fraser River sea disposal sites, despite numerous violations in the past and numerous studies by Environment Canada. It was pointed out that these dumpsites are located around rich shrimp and crab grounds.
DFO has allowed the continuous discharge of toxic leachate from numerous contaminated sites into the Fraser River, allegedly in breach of the Fisheries Act.
There was scientific concern that gravel mining in the main stem of the Fraser River down river from Hope, which is regulated by DFO would result in the long-term deterioration of salmon, trout and sturgeon habitat. These gravel operations, it was argued, run contrary to current DFO policy of maintaining crucial habitat.
A witness representing the T. "Buck" Suzuki Foundation told the Committee that, since the provincial government had enacted legislation to cancel the Kemano Completion Project in 1997, the federal government no longer had an excuse for shunning its responsibility for the restoration of the Nechako and Stuart River systems. The witness indicated that the federal government should match the $50 million contribution that the provincial government and Alcan had already committed to the Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund and support the building of the Kenny Dam Cold Water Release Facility. It should also ensure sufficient water flows in the Nechako River to protect salmon and that it should become involved in the Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund by appointing a senior DFO representative to sit on the three-party committee. Some witnesses called for an independent inquiry into the Kemano Diversion Project.
Both DFO and B.C. Ministry of Environment (MoE) were criticized for their lack of action over severe erosion causing clay and silt to fall into the Chilliwack River. For example, although DFO with the (supposed) cooperation of the MoE had sampled the river to determine the extent of the impact of a January 1997 slide at Slesse Park, the results had not been made public. The apparent guiding principle of the MoE and of DFO to let nature take its course was criticized as an excuse for doing nothing.
Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council
It was pointed out that it had been 36 months since the Report of the Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board recommended establishing a pacific fisheries resource conservation council to report to the federal and provincial ministers and the public on the state of fish stocks and their habitats. In order for the council to best represent the public interest, it was emphasized that it must remain at arm's length from political and stakeholder interests.
Independence of such a council was echoed by another witness who called for the immediate establishment of a new pacific fisheries scientific conservation council, with appointed members who would be completely independent of political or multi-stakeholder influences.
The impact of logging on salmon habitat was raised in a number of locations. Most witnesses believed that logging practices had contributed to the loss of habitat through increased runoff and siltation and higher water temperatures in salmon streams. One witness described the practice of clearcutting as an euphemism for deforestation which results in less, hotter water in streams to the detriment of the salmon. The witness suggested that a ban on deforestation and changing to "ecoforestry" standards for forest management would mean more salmon and more work in fisheries.
Another witness raised concern over logging old and second growth timber on private lands on the steep slopes of the Alberni side of the Beaufort Range mountains. The witness pointed out that there is no legislation in B.C. that regulates logging on private lands and that the B.C Forest Practices Code does not apply on private lands so that there are no regulations enforcing mandatory leave strips on the riparian zones along the headwaters of creeks and streams lying on private land. The witnesses stated that any initiatives to minimize damage to headwaters is voluntary on the part of the logging company.
In addition, according to the witness, Section 35(1) of the Fisheries Act which prohibits the destruction of fish habitat, leaves the interpretation of "fish habitat" open to the judgment by the courts and the headwaters of fish-bearing creeks are not always judged by the courts to fall under this definition. The witness asked the Committee to recommend to DFO, an amendment to the Fisheries Act that would specifically include the headwaters of fish-bearing creeks. The witness further asked for DFO to press for provincial legislation that would regulate logging on private land.
Habitat Protection and Pollution Prevention under the Fisheries Act
In view of the fact that destruction of habitat was widely seen as a major contributor to the loss of salmon stocks, many witnesses expressed frustration with DFO's failure to lay charges against those responsible for habitat destruction.
Witnesses pointed out that although the federal Fisheries Act is a very strong piece of legislation regarding the protection of fish habitat and water quality, there are few consequences for breaking the law. The B.C. Wildlife Federation noted that, despite the contention of those who administer the act, it has the legal authority to prevent habitat damage; however, "its sanctions are only applied, on those all-too-rare occasions when applied at all, after the damage has been done."
The Department was criticized for failing to take a more pro-active role in prosecuting those who violate the act. For example, it should not fall to private citizens and groups to prosecute major polluters such as municipalities that continue to discharge untreated sewage into salmon river estuaries.
Provincial and municipal governments also came in for criticism. The point was made that given the shortage of enforcement and habitat personnel at both levels of government and the need to standardize habitat protection, competent legislation was required at the provincial level. British Columbia's recent Fish Protection Act was described, however, as woefully inadequate, the original draft of the legislation having been watered down in order to pass the legislature.
Provincial legislation that enabled municipal and regional governments to protect fish habitat within their jurisdiction was described as a waste of time and effort as the municipalities already had this power under the B.C. Municipal Act. The real problem was the lack of political will, either because too many politicians failed to understand the value of fish habitat or were afraid to offend developers or other vested interests in the community.
Some of the suggestions put before the Committee included:
- putting more enforcement officers in the field;
- directing fines from successful prosecutions under the Fisheries Act to habitat restoration;
- employing a DFO enforcement officer specifically to enforce habitat policy in large projects like the Vancouver Island Highway Project;
- making DFO financially accountable for its lack of enforcement of habitat protection policy;
- having DFO put more money into restoration projects; and,
- recognizing volunteer habitat "partners" as an important source of watershed information.
Reporting on Habitat Protection
The Department was criticized for failing to live up to its mandate which requires that it release a comprehensive report each year on their work done to protect the fish habitat and water quality. According to witnesses, the last report issued by the Department was written in 1994. This was viewed as unacceptable as not only should there be greater public accountability on the part of DFO but the reports should include more detail and depth than the last report. (In 1997, DFO released two annual reports to Parliament on the Administration and Enforcement of the Fish Habitat Protection and Pollution Prevention Provisions of the Fisheries Act for the years 1994-95 and 1995-96. The report for the year ending in March 1997 was tabled in the House of Commons in May 1998.)
It was also recommended that the Department should undertake a "State of the Habitat Report," which would document where salmon habitat, particularly coho habitat, has been destroyed and where it has been threatened. It was pointed out that a great deal of research and mapping has been undertaken by the Fraser River Action Plan (FRAP) but that this information remains inaccessible to the public who paid for it. As FRAP was in its final funding stage, it was felt that making the information available should be a priority.
Various groups asked for greater support for salmon enhancement programs and the support of salmon hatcheries. The Committee was advised, however, that habitat improvement and hatchery enhancement must be applied to all wild stocks to ensure a balanced mix of fish. Enhancement of some stocks while keeping others ``natural'' will not work.
PART VI:
STAKEHOLDERS' ISSUES
Many witnesses felt strongly that the issue of allocations should have been dealt with before the Mifflin Plan was implemented. Fishermen had been required to make decisions on selling out, stay in the fishery with a single licence and be restricted to one fishing area or buy additional licences. In addition, DFO might prevent the further stacking of licences. As one fishermen said, "How in heavens name are fishermen supposed to make rational business decisions?"
Most witnesses felt that sectoral allocations have to be dealt with soon. There is a major issue of allocations between the commercial, aboriginal and "commercial" sport sectors. There is also an issue of allocations between the three gear sectors (troll, gillnet and seine) of the commercial salmon fleet.
Intersectoral allocations is a contentious issue. Most witnesses believe that there has been a substantial reallocation of salmon from the commercial fleet to the recreational and aboriginal sectors. If there is to be reallocation there should be compensation.
In his report on intersectoral allocations of salmon, Dr. Art May proposed that, in years of low abundance, the sport fishery be given priority access to chinook and coho salmon but that anglers should be required to compensate the commercial sector through an increase in licence fees when the sports allocation exceeded a predetermined proportion of the total admissible catch (TAC). This concept was soundly rejected by the B.C. Wildlife Federation (BCWF), which claimed that fish are a common property resource, not owned by private interests, and that the owners of that resource should not be required to compensate commercial fishermen because the greatest economic and social benefit from the few fish available would be derived by allocating them to the sport fishery.
One of the most contentious issues brought to the attention of the Committee was that of allocations. It was pointed out that support for the Mifflin Plan had been based on promises by the federal government to settle two allocation issues - intersectoral allocations and intergear allocations in the commercial sector.
Witnesses felt that the Art May/Samuel Toy process had already taken too long and had lost its original focus. It was widely felt that there was a pressing need for a resolution of allocation issues. One witness said that "since the Mifflin Plan, we have had Dr. Art May, Mr. Stephen Kelleher and Mr. Sam Toy trying to unscramble the eggs.'' There was skepticism that they could succeed, especially if they were already directed to arrive at a specific answer.
Despite a promise by Minister Mifflin, the "gratuitous" reallocation of salmon from the commercial sector to the Pilot Sales Program was still continuing.
Some witnesses were critical of the Art May allocation report. They pointed out that economic efficiency was not the only concern. They also noted that whereas environmental groups were asked for their input, chambers of commerce were not.
Witnesses expressed disappointment in the report. They stated that it had failed to guarantee access to all sectors, and quantify each sectors share and that it ignored the aboriginal sector and had quantified nothing. In addition, it had failed to develop transparent methods of share transfers.
Dr. May was accused of basing his recreational recommendations on the ARA Report1 and on what the Sports Fishing Institute fed him. The Committee was told that if Mr. Tousignant had wanted a comprehensive intersectoral allocation study done, he could have called on a number of independent experts such as Mr. Donald Cruikshank who knows the B.C. situation2.
Retired B.C. Supreme Court Judge Samuel Toy, it was noted was charged with implementing the May report: "Now we have the Judge Toy show to try to sort out the Art May show." It was argued, however, that Judge Toy had not been provided with the background leading up to the Dr. May report.
The Kelleher process on allocations between the three commercial gear sectors was also criticized because of the weakness of DFO management to make decisions. Instead, it was argued, lobbying had become the "order of the day and rules or fairness be damned." An additional complaint was that Minister David Anderson had instructed Mr. Stephen Kelleher to expand the commercial allocation process beyond the commercial sector to include any interested third party, contrary to what had been promised.
The Kelleher process had become too inclusive and unwieldy as a result of the Minister's direction. This was seen as a major policy shift regarding allocations. It was alleged that the change allowed the most effective lobbyists to control allocations.
Mr. Stephen Kelleher was criticized by some witnesses who claimed he lacked knowledge of the fishery and failed to travel north to meet with the people.
Sport and Recreational Fishery
Commercial fishermen are very concerned about the rapid growth of what was described as the "commercial sports fishery," which is distinguished from the recreational sports fishery where individuals fish for their personal recreation. Few witnesses took issue with the recreational fishery, although a few commercial fishermen criticized the notion of killing for sport. The commercial sports fishery in question means primarily the dedicated fishing resort industry.
Over the last dozen or so years, the recreational sports fishing industry has grown very rapidly and, in the opinion of commercial fishermen, primarily at the expense of the commercial fleet. The commercial fleet has been increasingly hemmed into small pockets of its former fishing areas. In Area 6, the Committee was told, commercial fishermen have seen a reduction in the number of days open from 30, 20 years ago, to the present 1 to 3 days, a tenfold decrease.
There has been a de facto reallocation of the salmon harvest from the commercial sector to the recreational sports fishery. This raised several issues: reallocation had occurred without consultation or planning, there was still no end in sight; and it had occurred without any compensation to the commercial fishermen who had lost opportunity and income as a result.
Commercial fishermen claimed that the recreational sports resorts are commercial enterprises that exploit salmon stocks, particularly coho and chinook, yet, unlike the commercial fleet, they are not required to pay licence fees for this privilege. In addition, they are able to fish all year-round and are not subject to the same kind of conservation measures, such as closed seasons or total allowable catches that the commercial fleet must operate under. Commercial fishermen claimed that the sport fishery does not accurately report its kill rate. The "hail numbers" were said to be low and one witness said "You have to know what is being taken out of a stock to manage it." Many witnesses felt strongly that the commercial sports sector should be required to play by the same rules as the commercial fishery, including reporting requirements.
Some witnesses claimed that the lodges are not regulated by DFO. The reason for this, it was explained, is that they call themselves hotels rather than fishing lodges and as such they are regulated by the province. Some witnesses suggested that this situation is also frustrating for DFO.
Competition has affected some sectors of the commercial fleet more than others. The northern troll fleet has been prevented from fishing some of its traditional grounds off Langara Island and Naden Harbour, at the north end of the Queen Charlotte Islands. Witnesses complained of the concentration of lodges that have developed in the last 10 years. A hundred skiffs were said to be operating out of four large lodges. Each skiff could carry two fishermen and up to four rods. According to witnesses, guests of the lodges could take up to two spring salmon per day so that the potential catch could be substantial. The catch was said to have increased by 5,800% in the last 10 years in this area.
Another incident cited was the 1996 closure of the Skeena River. Although the escapement requirements for sockeye had been met, the fishery was closed over concerns that coho might be caught despite low interception rates, so that a few recreational fishermen could catch Skeena coho. The Committee was told that 2 million sockeye, worth $28 million to commercial fishermen and closer to $60 million to the industry, were electrocuted in the river to prevent overcrowding of the spawning channels.
The Mayor of Masset, a village on the north coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands observed that the sports lodges had brought no economic benefits to the people of the Queen Charlotte Islands or to the community of Masset. In addition, the lodges represented a corporate tax write-off, amounting to a government subsidy of the lodges. This was another factor not taken into account in the ARA Consulting Group Report. Witnesses also raised the issue of "floating lodges" that are able to avoid paying taxes.
The reallocation of chinook salmon from the commercial sector to the sports sector was identified as a major factor for B.C. Packers pulling out of both Masset and Skidegate and contributed to the closing of the Petro Canada bulk fuel terminal in Masset. This last item had pushed Masset into a downward spiral that was almost impossible to stop.
The effectiveness of catch-and-release as a conservation measure in the sports fishery was questioned by witnesses from the commercial sector. They pointed out that although fish may be released alive, they are exhausted and therefore more likely to fall victim to seals or to die from the effects of other stresses before they can make their way up river to reproduce. Several witnesses suggested the use of barbless hooks to try to reduce mortality.
There is also a widespread belief throughout the commercial sector that the sports fishing lobby exerts undue influence at DFO and that the recreational fishery is accorded priority by DFO. The commercial sector disputes the claims made of higher economic returns per fish made by the sports sector. This was described as "inflated industry propaganda." Witnesses referred to the ARA consulting group study, The Economic Value of Salmon, on which the recreational fishing industry has recently based its claim that it generates a greater economic return per fish than the commercial fishery. This report was "being waved about by DFO like some holy grail."
The analysis and the conclusions of the report were criticized for being highly flawed. Amongst other things, witnesses argued that the ARA report did not take into account the indirect economic activity generated by the commercial industry. One witness estimated, using standard multiplier factors to account for indirect economic activity, that the commercial fishery generated about $4 billion annually compared to about $1.5 billion generated by the recreational sector. For example, one witness pointed out that a 20-pound smoked chinook salmon, by the time it was sold in a supermarket in Toronto, could potentially be worth as much as $2,560, compared to the ARA's judgment that it was worth only $26.
Concern was also raised that under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), if the resource was managed on a purely business level, Canada might not be running the show in 10 years time: "With a $40 million plum like Langara Island, some foreign interest will move in and suddenly you don't even have a say."
A suggestion put before the Committee was that catches of spring salmon by sports fishermen should be limited to one per day and two per week. The suggestion was also made that a tag should be required for spring salmon costing $100 for non-residents of B.C. and $25 for residents. In addition, "commercial" sports fishing vessels should pay a licence fee of $1,000 per year.
Witnesses representing the recreational sector including the commercial sports fishing industry took a very different view. The recreational sector acknowledges that it is blamed by some segments of the commercial fishery for its problems but it disputes the claims of the commercial sector that the sports sector is growing exponentially at the expense of the commercial sector.
They pointed out that, while the industry takes only 3% of the aggregate salmon harvest, it generates economic activity that is now believed to equal that of the commercial sector. The sports sector claimed that, coastwide, it took less than 20% of the coho and 30% of the chinook harvests and less than 1% of chum, pink and sockeye harvests. They asserted that sport fishing in tidal and non-tidal waters was the greatest single factor in attracting visitors to B.C. and that this brought new dollars into the country.
Citing the ARA report on the economic value of salmon, the B.C. Wildlife Federation claimed that the B.C. sport fishery generated more than $1 billion in economic activity annually, with the tidal fishery alone worth $700 million. The contributions to government coffers in direct and tax revenues were estimated at almost $70 million. By comparison, the federation also claimed that the part of the commercial industry that targeted chinook and coho, the mainstay species of the sports industry, ended up costing government $2 million a year.
Sports fishery representatives pointed out that stability in the industry was not directly dependent on numbers of fish harvested but on the twin principles of the opportunity to go fishing and of a reasonable prospect of a catch. One witness emphasized this point claiming that non-retention regulations imposed in 1996 for chinook off the west coast of Vancouver Island and in the Queen Charlottes had had a larger impact on the British Columbia economy than the implementation of the Mifflin Plan.
The recreational fishery wanted a policy that would give it priority of access to chinook and coho stocks, after food, social and ceremonial requirements for First Nations have been met. They supported the recommendation by Dr. Art May in his report, Altering Course, that the recreational sector should have priority to chinook and coho in years of low abundance but they did not agree with his recommendation that the recreational sector should compensate the commercial sector for this.
Other suggestions from the recreational sector was that if the commercial catch for halibut was increased for 1998, the recreational sector should also get an increased catch. The recreational sector currently takes about 5% of the annual catch; however, the Committee was told that the Canadian commercial sector is seeking to reduce the share allowed to the recreational sector. The witness pointed out that halibut are a common property resource, not owned by the commercial sector, and that the current trend of consolidating the ownership of individual vessel quotas (IVQs) into the hands of smaller and smaller groups does nothing for small coastal communities.
The Committee was also told that various species of rockfish and lingcod that inhabit inshore waters are important recreational species. These, however, have been subjected to heavy exploitation by commercial fishing. These species are long-lived and once overharvested are slow to regenerate. The witness said that the recreational sector agreed with the recent Pacific Stock Assessment Review Committee's recommendation that fisheries for groundfish should be greatly reduced for inshore fishing and further recommended establishing areas of exclusion near some coastal communities. The example of commercial long line overfishing which destroyed the lingcod and rockfish stocks of the Strait of Georgia should not be allowed to repeat itself. The witness also suggested setting aside areas for the recreational fishing of crabs, prawns and shrimp.
A witness representing the B.C. Wildlife Federation countered the allegation by the commercial sector of delays in reporting by sports lodges. He noted that questions on this issue had been asked in the House of Commons as a result of which legal action had been pursued by the Department of Justice. On the other hand, in the 1997 season commercial sales slips pertaining to the catch of a million sockeye salmon had yet to be received by DFO, despite a legal requirement that they be submitted within seven days. According to the witness, the annual catch report was always late since sales slips did not show up for up to two years after the fishery. Furthermore, it appeared that neither legal action had been taken on this matter nor had questions been raised in the House. The witness emphasized that all sectors of the fishery must submit accurate catch records promptly and urged the Committee to pursue this issue with the Minister.
Representatives of the recreational sector also disputed the allegation of undue political influence, claiming that only in recent years have they received any more than minimal attention by DFO.
Many fishermen told the Committee that there is insufficient income to keep towns viable any more. In Prince Rupert, a representative of the local Community Fisheries Development Centre (CFDC) outlined the impact of restructuring on the B.C. North Coast. Since its start on August 1, 1997, the Centre had had more than 500 applicants. Combined with earlier applicants to the North Coast Fishing Industry Jobs Program, the Centre's contact list included more than 900 names.
The Centre estimated that, based on feedback from HRDC regarding qualification as EI reachback, at least 40% of applicants were not qualifying and were thus ineligible for sponsorship on training and work programs. The social impact on families and communities was described as immense. The witness asked how the government could implement the Mifflin Plan that drastically reduced the size of the fishing fleet impacting in turn the employment of shoreworkers, and then question the need for a transition program.
Representatives of CFDCs in other areas echoed these types of concerns. In Campbell River, it was pointed out that displaced workers face a series of hurdles that include low academic skill levels and limited opportunities for retraining. Non-licence holders faced even greater difficulties as they had no equity to reinvest in other career options. Younger workers frequently had the added burden of young families to support. As a result, many industry workers who had previously enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle had been relegated to subsistence levels. General economic conditions as a result of massive downsizing in other resource-based industries had compounded these problems and pointed to the need to attract new industry and for a viable transition program.
In Alert Bay, a witness representing the North Island Fisheries Initiative pointed out that the effects of the Mifflin Plan had devastated the town. Unemployment rates were up and benefits were running out for many people who would then be forced onto social assistance which was already at a "staggering 85% on North Island." He pointed out that a community like Alert Bay was unlike large urban centres where there were job opportunities in other sectors. Here people lived on an island where they were totally dependent on the surrounding resources. Real jobs had to be created in the community where people actually lived. Consequently, the community desperately needed market development assistance for its fish and diversification to support its sustainability and it was important for the federal government to start recognizing this.
There is a need for training and work programs that provide new employment opportunities outside the fishing industry or in the off-season. Although important initial steps have been taken toward a successful transition, the current criteria (such as EI reachback) let too many people fall through the cracks. The witness emphasized the need for a long-term transition program with much more flexibility.
Witnesses said that the government has an obligation to help those who have been displaced as a result of restructuring and who have lost their entitlement to Employment Insurance benefits as a result of changes to the EI regulations. Witnesses said they did not accept a response from the Honourable Paul Martin that the surplus in the EI fund should be retained by the government. They said that using this surplus, in part, to reduce employer and employee contributions did nothing to help the people who are unemployed as a result of the government's inability to resolve the dispute over the Pacific Salmon Treaty with the U.S. They urged the Committee to support their demand for the re-instatement of EI benefits that had been taken out of the pockets of workers in the West Coast fishing industry. They also asked the Committee to support the B.C. Federation of Labour in its position calling for an immediate resolution to the Pacific salmon dispute and amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that would protect workers to the same extent as creditors and employers.
The 1997 season was dismal on the north coast with few fishing opportunities for the fishing fleet resulting in little work for shore workers in the plants. The lack of work resulted in a large number of people who did not meet the minimum requirements to qualify for EI benefits and who were thus forced onto welfare. In August 1997, the application rate for welfare was up by 30% over 1996 and the number of people on welfare in Prince Rupert in December 1997 was 1,560 out of an estimated workforce of approximately 8,000. Why, asked the witness, should people be punished for bad government policy that created these problems? If the federal government is creating these problems it should provide transition funding to assist displaced fishing industry workers who choose to leave the industry.
The threat of the closure of the J.S. McMillan (Fisheries Limited) plant would only add to the crisis in Prince Rupert. Witnesses were critical of Minister Anderson and his staff. They alleged that he is either ignoring or denying the crisis in Prince Rupert and British Columbia. At meetings with the Minister's staff, witnesses reported that all they had received was "angry responses and empty promises" when they raised these issues.
Local representatives also recounted meeting with the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Human Resources Development who had explained that there was still $35 million for assistance programs; however, they had not heard from him or the Minister since. Witnesses asked for a commitment from Ottawa to join them in partnership in solving the crisis.
Viability of Commercial Fishermen
Many commercial fishermen felt that their continued viability was threatened. The livelihoods of many commercial salmon fishermen have been adversely affected by the changes taking place in the fishery. Many fishermen who used to make a decent living are now barely scraping by. One gillnet fisherman who used to make an average net income of $45,000 told the Committee that in the 1997 season he did not make a single dime:
I don't know whether to get out of bed in the morning. I used to be viable as a commercial fisherman but I don't know if I can make it for another year. ... I have a privilege that gives me the opportunity to fish. It's not a right. I can live with that but I can't live without the opportunity.
Several factors have affected the viability of fishermen, particularly in northern B.C. The Nisga'a Treaty Settlement has guaranteed them a certain number of fish rather than a percentage of the returns. The consequence is, that in a year of low returns, commercial fishermen might have no fish to catch. The recreational sector has also been impacted. Commercial fishermen agree that people have a right to go fishing but the commercial sports fishing industry, in particular, has developed unfettered.
The Committee was asked to consider what a realistic size might be for the troll fleet. Witnesses pointed out that it had been cut 37%, just in the last two years. As one witness put it, "a death of a thousand cuts." He said that he would like to see a conscientious effort made to determine what was needed to make sure that the commercial fleet was left with enough fish for it to remain viable.
Another factor affecting the economic viability of fishermen is the low price of salmon. Prices have been depressed, particularly because of competition from farmed salmon. Fishermen complained that they used to get good prices for salmon but that now they get practically nothing. The negative aspect of low prices has been exacerbated by the Mifflin Plan which has removed some of the flexibility fishermen used to have to make up for price differentials by fishing in other areas. One fisherman in Sointula stated that he felt he was forced to stack licences. He said that he had no choice, "It was eat or be eaten!"
A number of fishermen voiced concerns over the apparent ability of large corporations to influence fisheries policy. A relatively commonly held view was that DFO policies had been designed to allow fisheries resources to be bought up by the corporate sector. Some fishermen wondered why large companies appeared to have had so much control over the fisheries. For example, it was suggested that since the seine fleet is effectively controlled by large corporate interests, DFO's bias toward this sector was motivated by the view that a user-pay system would be easier to implement and administer in this sector.
It was also suggested that the Mifflin Plan had worked to the advantage of the large companies. As a result of the Plan, these companies' share of the catch was said to have increased from 50% to 75%.
Some witnesses spoke out against large, international companies such as B.C. Packers, saying "Can't let capitalism walk all over us." The Committee was told that the companies got gillnetters out of the way. As one witness asked, "When all the gillnetters are bankrupt, do you think the processors will have any less fish?" Many witnesses believed the end result will be that only companies will be left fishing and harvesting fish as cheaply as possible.
There was some support for quota systems that would provide more security to fishermen, less stress, greater safety, better quality of product, potentially better prices and less capitalization of fleets. It was suggested that an indirect benefit of a quota system was that it could help to facilitate intersectoral allocations.
The Committee was told that DFO has been leaning toward quota systems for most fisheries in order to stay within tight financial restraints with their ultimate goal being "user pay." "The Department is so focused on cost recovery to pay for management, that they are willing to privatize the entire fisheries resource to meet this goal." The point was made that this approach was driven not by the best interest of coastal communities or the resource but by the best interests of DFO.
Other witnesses and organizations including the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia and the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council opposed individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council expressed the view that ITQ licensing systems had serious consequences which impacted primarily coastal communities, both native and non-native and small, low-impact fishermen: "We believe that if more fisheries are made into ITQ, it will be disastrous to fishermen and our coastal communities." One of the main reasons for this was that the transferability of licences greatly increased their value so that all but wealthy new entrants to a fishery were excluded. The Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council made the additional point that if an ITQ fishery were to be part of a future treaty settlement, then the cost of buying back that part of the TAC in the ITQ fishery would be much more expensive for both First Nations and government.
Many fishermen expressed concern to the Committee about the level of licence fees, which were seen as having little relationship with the ability to pay. There was also concern over perceived inequities between licence fees for trollers, gillnetters and seiners.
There was a suggestion to change the current system from one that sets an almost fixed fee for all fishermen to one based on a minimum, plus a rate based on the amount of fish caught by the licence holder. One witness suggested a "stumpage" type system similar to that used in the forestry industry.
A number of witnesses were critical of the practice of leasing licences. One fisherman explained that when limited entry had been introduced it was not realized at the time that the licence itself would become a commodity that could be held by a non-fisherman for the purpose of leasing. The effect of this was to siphon off profits from the industry. For example, the owner of a herring licence, the Committee was told, could make a year's income simply by leasing the licence. Another example quoted was halibut quotas where fishermen had to pay $2.40 per pound for the quota rental while the landed value was $3.40 per pound. This meant that 70% of the value of the catch was going somewhere other than the community.
Many witnesses felt that there should be a way of restricting the ownership of the licence to the harvester. One recommendation to counter the problem was to implement a recommendation from fishermen contained in the Cruickshank report that would make owner-operator a condition of licensing. This would put licences back in the hands of fishermen and in coastal communities and revitalize the fishery. One witness observed that even DFO bureaucrats supported this policy - what was lacking was the political will to implement it.
It was suggested that caps should be put on the accumulation of quotas, as had been done in the halibut fishery.
PART VII:
EMERGING FISHERIES
A prawn fisherman expressed urgent concern over DFO's policy regarding the cost of prawn licences and its impact on the fishery. Prawn fishermen pay a fixed price for a licence as a result of which the cost per pound decreases with increasing catch. This resource pricing policy, it was pointed out, is opposed to conservation as it encourages fishermen to harvest more product through double and triple hauling of traps, to invest in larger and faster boats and to pursue non-stop fishing throughout the open season. Consequences had been the shortening of the fishing season and a decrease in the proportion of market-preferred quality prawns landed. Continuation would produce a decrease in market price and an overall decline in the quality of the landed product.
According to the witness, prawn fishermen currently roam the full range of the coast with no concern or sense of responsibility for the future product. Controls on harvesting such as trap sizes and types, number of traps and the length of the season have not been effective since the volume of non-market preferred product continues to rise.
The witness recommended a different approach based on an alternative pricing policy that would encourage fishermen to conserve the resource and also generate a satisfactory return on the resource to the people of Canada. In this scheme, the proposed fee structure would comprise a nominal fee to permit vessel registration and a volume-based component based on a fixed price per pound. The other aspect of the proposal was the designation of specific harvesting areas for fishermen with some common ground. Fishermen would be responsible within their own areas for harvest quality and conservation. The Crown and the people of Canada would obtain a reasonable rate of return on the prawn resource as well as a no-cost fishery.
In a number of locations there were potential new fisheries that could be developed. Because of the policy of risk averse management, DFO would not sanction anything beyond minimal harvest rates without a biological assessment of the sustainability of the stock. DFO, however, did not have the necessary staff to carry out these assessments. Consequently, plans to develop these fisheries had been stalled.
DFO had been unresponsive to requests for licences for several potential shellfish fisheries. These include an experimental mussel and whelk fisheries in Port Hardy, box crab fisheries and abalone farming in Sointula.
With respect to abalone farming, witnesses pointed out that abalone fetches $30/lb on the market and that it could be processed in Sointula. The reason for DFO's reluctance to allow abalone farming was said to be that it would encourage poaching. DFO shut down the abalone fishery coast-wide in 1988 and there has been no recreational or commercial harvest since. However, poaching continues rampant and there is less abalone now than when the moratorium was put in place. In many parts of the Coast (particulary the South Coast) there are so few abalone that the populations are non-breeding.
The Malcolm Island Abalone Co-operative (Sointula) pointed out that they are not looking for government handouts.
We have seen others get government handouts, use up the money and then have nothing. We want an assurance from the bureaucracy that if we invest, we will have a reasonable probability to grow at the other end. We have no one high enough up the bureaucratic food chain to be of any help, we are shuffled from one desk to another, letters go unanswered, and it amounts to deliberate discouragement. There is so much potential that we keep plugging along hoping that with a bit more effort we can break the log jam.
The group pleads for one high-placed advocate for the West Coast.
The Malcolm Island Abalone Co-operative explained how red kelp feed rather than the preferred green kelp, can be strictly utilized in the farmed abalone diet so that their shells develop a red stripe (or more than one if desired). This would resolve any problem DFO might have with concerns about the identification of farmed vs. wild abalone. This technology was pioneered previously by Guy White in Saanich Inlet.
Witnesses in Sointula also said they would like to develop into oyster and clam farming but that DFO was afraid to permit this. One of the factors was a lack of enforcement officers from DFO. But, as a witness pointed out, "We permit all these Atlantic salmon farms, despite all the problems."
Representatives of First Nations indicated that any initiatives involving new stocks and new techniques should not be pursued without the full involvement of the First Nations in whose territorial waters these activities would take place. The disastrous experience with the federally licensed abalone fishery that almost obliterated abalone stocks, despite the protests of First Nations communities, should serve as a clear warning.
Native representatives recommended a clear policy guideline, that if DFO is reviewing proposals for experimental fisheries, it should be an open process, with a fair opportunity for aboriginal commercial fishermen to make proposals. The witness noted that this had not always been the case. It was also recommended that if devices such as fish traps were to be implemented, even on a trial basis, that they should be operated by licensed vessels and fishermen to ensure that benefits go to those whose livelihoods depend on the fishery and not to new entrants or bureaucracies.
Many commercial fishermen voiced a number of concerns over net-cage salmon farms. These included the potential for the transmission of disease from farmed salmon and impacts on water quality. Some witnesses told the Committee that contrary to assurance from DFO and the industry that the Atlantic salmon reared in the cages do in fact survive outside the pens and that they have been caught, in some cases several hundred kilometers from the nearest salmon farms.
It was suggested that the fish farming industry was in direct conflict with the conservation of wild salmon. Wild salmon also transmit disease to caged salmon. It was alleged that it was in the interests of the salmon farmers to see the eradication of wild salmon as fresh wild salmon in the market place would pose a major economic threat to the salmon farming industry.
A specific concern brought to the attention of the Committee was that night lights on the cages attracted other fish into the cages that were then consumed by the salmon.
The NBBC opposed fish farming for reasons of stock degradation and the transmission of disease from farmed fish to wild stocks. The only acceptable place for fish farms would be land-locked artificial environments where the fish would be completely isolated from the ecosystem and wild stocks. Other witnesses also supported this concept.
Other witnesses recommended phasing out the net cage industry altogether because of its potential for the destruction of the wild salmon resource, the people and industries that depended on it.
A representative of the Area C Clam Harvester's Association fishery complained that DFO's refusal to abandon its "legislative mandate" had created a brick wall of federal policy that was preventing the development of this fishery. The current value of the fishery to the fisherman was estimated at $1 million while the cost of governance was estimated at closer to $2 million. The witness argued that there was the potential to create an economically viable fishery worth $10 million to the local economy. This could be best achieved by empowerment of community management boards, which would be responsible for such functions as control over openings and closings, quota determinations, water quality and stock quality control, licensing and enhancement. The Committee was told that federal and provincial bureaucrats would never divest themselves of these responsibilities and that it must be done for them.
A legislative framework was recommended that would clearly define the federal, provincial and community management board roles and responsibilities and allow DFO to enter into legally binding, long-term management agreements with user groups in the form of community-based management boards. "Real community empowerment is at the base of sustainable fisheries."
The Committee received several presentations from representatives of the shellfish farming industry. This industry, the Committee was told, shows a high potential for growth without harming the environment. The wild shellfish industry, by comparison was said to be highly lucrative but the resources were becoming overexploited.
The principal advantages cited of the shellfish farming was that it was more productive and environmentally friendly than the wild harvest and that it created more full-time jobs. Clam farming, however, is more like agriculture than conventional aquaculture; however, DFO's mandate is to manage the wild fishery, which works to the disadvantage of the clam farming industry. So far DFO has been unresponsive to concerns of the shellfish growers.
The shellfish industry in B.C. consists of 423 shellfish aquaculture sites spread over 1,750 hectares of coastline, less than the area occupied by the new runway at Vancouver International Airport, and equal to 0.5% of the total tenured foreshore in the province. The value of the cultured clam industry, it was pointed out, now exceeded the wild fishery from an area less than one-tenth the size.
The industry has a very high potential for growth. With even a modest increase in its land base from 1,750 to 3,500 hectares it could increase revenues from $10.9 million in 1995 to $100 million by 2006 creating 1,000 direct jobs in BC's coastal communities and creating opportunities for aboriginal communities.
A major force limiting the growth of the industry, however, is the burden of government regulations and the uncertainty created by various levels of government. The Committee was told that there are currently no fewer than 10 federal and provincial ministries and departments that influence the business climate for shellfish aquaculture in British Columbia. It was pointed out that it was difficult to see how aquaculture could flourish under a department focused on the management of traditional fisheries.
A major concern of the industry is a restriction on new foreshore leases for clam farming. All existing clam farms are on previously existing oyster farms.
Witnesses pointed to a promise in a Liberal Red Book that a study would be carried out on the impact of all the cost recovery fees levied on the aquaculture industry. Not only had this promise not been fulfilled, but the industry was facing area closures as of April 1, 1998 as a result of budget reductions to Environment Canada's water survey program. Environment Canada wanted to levy $80,000 from the British Columbia Shellfish Growers Association for water assessments as part of its cost recovery initiative. Not only did the Association have no legal mechanism to raise these funds, but it would not be raised from all the groups who would benefit. The primary reason for EC's action, it was alleged, was to protect jobs within the department.
Industry representatives were critical of both levels of government for their inaction in support of the industry. In order to emphasize that governments must come out in support of this industry if it is to advance at all, they quoted the last recommendation of the Report of the Liberal Task Force on Aquaculture: "We recommend that enough has been said, written and discussed. The time to act is now."
A witness in Prince Rupert promoted a mariculture industry. As mariculture is labour-intensive, northern B.C. could easily provide a 1,000 jobs for technicians and fishermen. Development of mariculture could take pressure off the federal government; however it needs a new mindset.
Industry representatives recommended changing DFO policy to create an advocate for shellfish farming within DFO in order to assist shellfish farming to prosper on the West Coast.
1 ARA Consulting Group, The Econimic Value of Salmon, Chinook and Coho and British Columbia, 1996. Generally referred to as the ``ARA Report.''
2 Fisheries and Oceans the Hon. Romeo LeBlanc. The second report, published in 1991, was produced by the Commission of Inquiry Into Licensing and Related Policies of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. This inquiry was conducted at the request of a group of eight fishing industry organizations on the basis of complete independence" from government. Mr. Cruickshank was the sole commissioner. Titled The Fisherman's Report, it is widely referred to as the Cruickshank Report".