FISH Committee Report
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- FOOD OF THE COD
- OBSERVER REPORTS
- FOREIGN QUOTAS TODAY
- TURBOT IN 3L (AND BYCATCHES OR NORTHERN COD)
- TURBOT IN ZONE O
- TURBOT AND REDFISH IN ZONES 3L, 3N AND 3O
- SQUID
- SILVER HAKE AND OTHER "UNDERUTILIZED" SPECIES
- TUNA
- SALMON
- FRANCE'S PERCENTAGE OF CANADIAN QUOTAS
- THE FLEMISH CAP
- TAGS AND COST RECOVERY
- VESSEL EXPENSES
- VESSEL REPLACEMENT POLICY
- SEALS
- NORTHERN COD 1998
- GHOST NETS
- ECOSYSTEMS APPROACH
- TRUST AND CORPORATE VISION
- ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNICATION
PART II
Follow-up:
Observations and
Recommendations of the Committee
THE NORTHERN COD COLLAPSE
83. It is abundantly clear to the Committee after listening to the fishermen during our public meetings and reviewing the evidence, that the federal government itself is in large part responsible for the collapse of the northern cod. Even today the federal government allows foreign nations to catch a bycatch of northern cod, assigns quotas of fish considered to be the food of the cod to foreign nations inside our 200-mile zone, gives foreign nations quotas of fish considered to be in excess of Canada's needs inside 200 miles, allows Canadian companies to use foreign ships and foreign crews using destructive fishing gear to catch Canadian quotas inside 200 miles and has still not controlled, in the Committee's opinion, the foreign fishing on Canada's Continental Shelf.
84. In 1991 - one year prior to the moratorium on northern cod - Canada's quota for cod in the Labrador coastal zones of 2G and 2H was 1,900 tonnes less than the foreign quotas in the same zones. Canada assigned France 4,500 tonnes of cod and 2,000 tonnes of turbot, Denmark 2,270 tonnes of cod and 440 tonnes of turbot, Russia 1,635 tonnes of cod and 1,265 tonnes of turbot, Poland 725 tonnes of cod and 935 tonnes of turbot, and Norway 1,820 tonnes of cod. All of these foreign quotas were given by Canada inside our 200-mile zone. DFO claims in its publication Underwater World that 2G and 2H cod are a part of the 2J3KL northern cod stock: "The cod of 2G and 2H overwinter along the continental slopes off Labrador from Saglek Bank to Hamilton Bank and migrate during summer to the coastal area of southern Labrador and northern Newfoundland. Thus their distribution overlaps that of the 2J3KL cod to a large degree." The foreign quotas for this northern cod, one year prior to the moratorium, were given as fish "in excess of Canada's needs."
85. When Canadian fishermen were experiencing a collapse of the northern cod fishery, DFO scientists recommended against the re-opening of the cod fishery on the Flemish Cap, to the south. The Flemish Cap is considered to be a cod spawning zone and was under an international moratorium as a cod spawning and nursery zone. (In DFO's publication Atlantic Cod it is noted that cod "undergo extensive migration. Cod of the Flemish Cap spawn starting in March… migrate up to 800 km from their winter spawning grounds…") Yet in 1991, one year prior to the cod moratorium, Canada agreed, against the advice of their own scientists, to re-open the cod fishery on the Flemish Cap. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) records of meetings show that Canada abstained from voting on the motion in the fall of 1990. But, in the fall of 1991, Canada voted in favour of cod quotas for 1992 as follows: Canada 100 tonnes, Cuba 480 tonnes, Poland 500 tonnes, Norway 1,200 tonnes, USSR 1,270 tonnes, Denmark 2,900 tonnes, and EEC 6,465 tonnes. These same quotas remain in effect today.
FOOD OF THE COD
86. The federal fisheries department has consistently claimed over the years that there is no scientific evidence to prove that fishing the food of the cod will affect the cod stocks.
87. Fishermen claimed during our public meetings that the federal government had no business assigning fishing quotas to foreign draggers for fish that are the food of the cod and that this contributed largely to the collapse of the northern cod stock.
88. Fishermen reported during our public hearings that the capelin, considered to be a prime food of the cod, practically disappeared in 1992. It was therefore not surprising for the Committee to find after reviewing the quotas that foreign nations were the main culprits. In 1991 the foreign quotas for capelin inside Canada's 200-mile zone broke all records.
89. Up until 1991 the largest amount of capelin recorded caught in Canadian waters in any one year was 90,000 tonnes. But, in 1991 Russian factory ships alone were allocated over 100,000 tonnes of capelin inside our 200-mile zone (65,000 tonnes under an agreement with a Canadian company; 20,000 tonnes in exchange for 3NO cod; 12,000 tonnes in 2J3K "in excess of Canada's needs", and 15,000 tonnes in a NAFO quota).
90. Even in 1992, with the Northern Cod Moratorium in effect, Canada still allowed five foreign nations capelin quotas inside our 200-mile zone as follows: Cuba 750 tonnes, Poland 900 tonnes, Japan 2,800 tonnes, Norway 9,000 tonnes and Russia 15,000 tonnes.
91. Fishermen reported during our public hearings that squid, another choice food of the cod, had grown scarce since 1980. Again, this was not surprising to the Committee after reviewing squid quotas.
92. The Canadian government has consistently given foreign nations in every year since 1980, quotas of squid inside our 200-mile zone. The choice area for those foreign ships is located on the Scotia Shelf, 80 miles east of Halifax, in a zone designated by Canada as "the small mesh gear zone". Here, foreign nations are allowed to use small mesh gear to catch so-called fish "in excess of Canada's needs". (The Committee could not find one person in Atlantic Canada or Quebec who agrees with Ottawa that we have any fish in excess of our needs.)
93. According to DFO scientific publications, squid, which are born in Florida waters, migrate north during the month of June onto the Scotia Shelf where the Canadian government allows the foreign nations to catch them. This interrupts their migration to Nova Scotia, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and Newfoundland waters.
94. In 1992, when the Northern Cod Moratorium was in effect, Canada still allowed the following squid quotas all along Canada's east coast inside the 200-mile zone: Bulgaria 500 tonnes, Poland 1,000 tonnes, Cuba 4,800 tonnes, Russia 5,000 tonnes, and Japan 14,700 tonnes. Foreign quotas have increased since 1992. (See Foreign Quotas Today).
95. According to DFO scientific material, mackerel go to the Gulf of St. Lawrence to spawn in late May and early June. In spite of fishermen's claims of decreasing amounts of mackerel spawning, the Canadian government allowed the following foreign nations to do "experimental fishing" for mackerel at the entrance to the Gulf: 1990 - Poland and Bulgaria (4 ships), 1991 -- Russia and Norway (6 ships), and 1992 - Russia (11 ships).
Grenadier and Redfish
96. Roundnosed grenadier and ocean perch (redfish) are also food of the cod and much-desired in Canada for plant processing. In 1992 Canada gave Russia 4,000 tonnes of grenadier throughout the northern cod zone. Cuba and Russia were also given 10,467 tonnes of redfish in the northern cod zone. This required dragging the ocean floor in the northern cod zone.
Silver Hake and Argentine
97. Silver hake and argentine are two more species considered to be food consumed by cod. In 1992, the first year of the moratorium, both species of fish were classified by DFO as "underutilized" and "fish in excess of Canada's needs". The following quotas were given to foreign draggers operating inside Canada's 200-mile zone in 1992: Japan 2,129 tonnes of silver hake and 3,000 tonnes of argentine; Russia 3,583 tonnes of silver hake and 4,500 tonnes of argentine; Cuba 7,279 tonnes of silver hake.
OBSERVER REPORTS
98. Upon the request of the witnesses, the Committee sought out observer reports of foreign vessels operating inside the 200-mile zone and on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. DFO refused to allow the Committee access to those reports, claiming that the information could not be released publicly because of "commercial confidentiality". However, the Committee did receive "unofficially" a small sample of observer reports of two foreign nations fishing inside the 200-mile zone for the years 1989 and 1990.
99. The Committee also reviewed an internal audit done ten years ago that concluded that attempted bribes and gifts from foreign captains were not unusual. One DFO employee reported a $10,000 bribe offered by a foreign captain and another DFO employee had $22,000 left in his mailbox at his home by a foreign captain. This is not surprising given the value of the catches involved. One foreign ship fishing for 56 days sold its cargo for $2.4 million.
100. The Committee was shocked to review the accidental catch in 1990 (bycatch) of two foreign nations listed in one observer's 1990 report on the silver hake fishery as follows: Swordfish 2.3 tonnes; crab 8.3 tonnes; lobster 33.5 tonnes; witch 22.9 tonnes; redfish 288.4 tonnes; mackerel 417.4 tonnes; herring 1,495.2 tonnes; haddock 733.5 tonnes; dogfish 2,830.2 tonnes; argentine 138.9 tonnes; squid 2,870 tonnes; skate 660.7 tonnes, pollock 2,336.3 tonnes, hake 119.8 tonnes; cusk 89.4 tonnes; cod 426.2 tonnes; angler 167.5 tonnes. This bycatch alone would be enough to keep a large Canadian fish plant operating for a whole year.
101. An observer's report forwarded to Ottawa in 1990 reports that 52 foreign factory freezer trawlers operating inside 200 miles had 129 irregularities reported, including the following: 56 violations of exceeding allowable catches of cod, herring, pollock and haddock; 4 violations of hitting Canadian fixed-gear; 2 violations of retention of prohibited species (salmon); and 9 cases of dumping. No charges were laid. The Vladimir Gavrilov caught 20 tonnes more cod, haddock and pollock than they reported. The Pavel Orlov used a double log system to misreport catches. The Mys Budyonnogo forgot to report 100 tonnes of discards and the Rio Canimar did not report discards, fished on the wrong side of a legal fishing zone, had four tonnes of fishmeal not reported and used illegal gear. None of them were charged. The Committee was shocked by some of the statements made by observers about foreign vessels inside Canada's 200-mile zone. The following are examples of some of these shocking statements:
102. "Losses of ten tonnes or more of fish during haulback were routine yet no foreign captains were observed to reduce effort or take other steps to avoid this unnecessary waste."
103. "Many foreign captains caught massive bags of fish with each tow and did not appear to be too perturbed when their vessels could not haul the catch aboard without bursting the cod end."
104. "Small fish are evident in foreign catches in May and June and were so prevalent that many questioned the wisdom of prolonging the fishery. Two hundred and forty six tonnes of small cod were put into fishmeal."
105. "The June 13 quota extension made an already bad bycatch problem worse. The foreign fleet commander knew about the extension before Canadian officials did…something more than coincidence…undue politics in making decisions."
106. Of particular interest to the observers was the appearance of new foreign factory ships on the Canadian east coast starting in 1989. The observers noted that they had "sophisticated fish-finding technology and automated fish processing onboard". Each vessel processed 32 tonnes of fish per day for 112 days - from gutted, head-off, to fillets: "Nineteen eighty nine marked the first appearance of a newer, smaller freezer trawler. In May the 'Omul' class vessels appeared on the grounds inside Canada's 200-mile zone and fished alongside the 20 or so older and larger vessels. No women in the crew, just 35 men (compared to 75 men and women on the older 'Bmrt' trawlers). The processing room contains a high degree of automation-freezers that drastically reduced the time required, and sophisticated navigational aids and fish-finding equipment."
FOREIGN QUOTAS TODAY
"Why are these foreign ships fishing off Black Tickle in zone 2J in Canadian waters? I saw one dragging for turbot flying a foreign flag. It was a huge ship."
"Contrary to statements made recently there are no foreign vessels fishing turbot off Black Tickle. Black Tickle is found in NAFO division 2J and the turbot there is allocated entirely to Canadian fishermen."
107. Who is telling the truth? Is it the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans who must rely on the information supplied by DFO? Or, is it the Labrador fisherman who told our Committee that he saw the foreign vessel fishing turbot in 2J in Canadian waters?
108. When the fisherman made the statement in the public meeting in Mary's Harbour, Committee members found it difficult to believe because we were unaware of any foreign quota for turbot in 2J.
109. However, during a meeting in les Îles-de-la-Madeleine, a fisherman pointed out that Gaspé fishermen were arrested in 1993 for fishing turbot in zone 2J, that their quotas were cancelled and that now ships flying "the Paris flag" were allowed a quota in the same area where Quebec fishermen were arrested for fishing.
110. Committee members agreed with the fishermen that it would be irresponsible for the Canadian government to allow a foreign nation to catch turbot when the plant at Black Tickle was closed because they could not get permission to fish turbot in 2J and in the same area where Gaspé fishermen were charged. We agreed with the fishermen who pointed out that turbot fishing in 2J carries with it a bycatch of northern cod and that if residents of Black Tickle went out and caught one northern cod for food, they would lose their boat, motor and gear, have to pay a fine and probably end up in jail.
111. DFO has now confirmed to the Committee that a foreign dragger registered in
St. Malo, France had in fact fished turbot in 2J off Black Tickle, exactly when and where the
fisherman claimed, in 1997, and took its catch back to France for processing in the fish plant
there. In fact, these foreign draggers have a quota of turbot each year for the next ten years, with
a bycatch of northern cod, just off Black Tickle in Canadian waters in zone 2J.
TURBOT IN 3L (AND BYCATCHES OR NORTHERN COD)
112. The 17,000 tonne foreign quota for turbot in 3L also gives the foreign draggers an allowable bycatch of 850 tonnes of northern cod.
113. During our public meetings held along the coastline of zone 3L, fishermen and plant workers expressed their total displeasure with both the quota and the northern cod bycatch. Just prior to our meetings, an 81 year-old man and his 79 year-old brother were convicted in provincial court of illegally catching northern cod for food in zone 3L. The point was made over and over that while the federal government would not allow a food fishery this year for Canadians who lived in zone 3L, they allowed a bycatch of northern cod to foreign vessels ¯ more than Canadians could ever catch in a food fishery in the same zone. DFO countered with the argument that up until May of 1997, only 70 tonnes of northern cod had been caught as a bycatch by foreign nations dragging for turbot in zone 3L. This did not sit well with the Newfoundland fishermen for a number of reasons. Apart from the obvious objection that Canadians are being arrested for catching codfish for food while the foreign boats "only caught 70 tonnes", Committee members agree with the fishermen that DFO has no way of verifying the northern cod bycatch figures or the amount of turbot caught by foreign ships in zone 3L. The northern cod bycatch figures are given to DFO by the NAFO office in Halifax; the NAFO office gets the figures from the country whose vessels caught the fish; the country gets the figures from the observers aboard the foreign vessels; the observers are hired by the owners of the vessels; the figures supplied by the observers are given only after the fish has been unloaded and processed in the foreign country in which both the observers and the owners live.
114. One fisherman could be forgiven for suspecting, as he put it, that "the fox is guarding the hen house".
115. The Committee agrees that the present agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) and other NAFO countries on straddling stocks on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks is totally inadequate. The foreign vessels monitor themselves. This practice of allowing foreign nations to police themselves is dangerously naïve. We agree with the fishermen who maintained that according to international law these stocks are Canadian stocks and should not be dependent upon the self-regulation of foreign nations.
116. In a hearing before the Committee, DFO testified that they have increased surveillance and now board every foreign vessel belonging to NAFO and that they are now able to monitor all fishing on Canada's Continental Shelf.
117. One witness suggested that Canada should immediately ratify the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and give notice of Canadian regulation of straddling fish stocks on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks including the boarding of foreign vessels.
Recommendation 1
The Committee recommends that Canada withdraw its support for any turbot quotas assigned to foreign nations in zone 3L on the grounds that Canadian fish plants need the turbot quotas presently held by foreign nations in the northern cod zone of 3L.
TURBOT IN ZONE O
118. The first correspondence that the Committee received when we announced our trip to eastern Canada was from fish companies complaining that DFO allows foreign vessels and foreign crews to catch Canadian turbot quotas inside the Canadian zone while Canadian crews and vessels are tied up to the wharf. An exchange of letters between DFO and the Canadian companies who were objecting was sent to the Committee.
119. Upon investigation we find that DFO issues foreign licences to fish Canadian stocks in fishing zones off the coast of Nova Scotia and in an area north of Labrador. DFO verified that foreign licences were issued to catch Canadian quotas of turbot in areas 0B and 0A and that some of this fish is processed in foreign countries. The practice started in July 1992 with an announcement by DFO entitled "Groundfish Development Program 1992" under which Canadian fish companies were allowed to use foreign ships and crews to catch an underutilized species. The underutilized species was identified at the time as Greenland halibut. The Committee learned that the fish is called Greenland halibut in the United States of America, but in Canada it has always been known as turbot and has been, along with cod, the mainstay of the Newfoundland fishery for decades.
120. Committee members found it alarming that DFO science claims that turbot migrate annually to this very area north of Labrador to reproduce. Yet, in July 1992 when the program began, 19 Russian factory freezer draggers received licences from DFO to fish turbot on these spawning grounds, and in the following month Ottawa approved quotas for 16 new Canadian companies to fish turbot in the same area with 9 of the companies given permission to use foreign factory draggers. The practice continues today. The Committee notes the objection of 21 Canadian fish companies contained in a letter dated November 17, 1997 to DFO: "A fleet of Faroese vessels with Faroese crews continue to enjoy Canadian quotas while Canadian vessels and their crews are forced to tie up. It is inexcusable in 1997 that foreign vessels and foreign crews are permitted to harvest turbot at the expense of Canadian fishermen…several Canadian vessels are available to pursue the turbot fishery in another zone, the new 0A turbot fishery, but DFO has instead authorized the use of foreign vessels in that zone as well".
Recommendation 2
The Committee recommends that Canada cease giving permission to Canadian companies to hire foreign vessels and foreign crews to catch fish in Canadian waters as long as Canadian fishermen and Canadian vessels are available to do the same.
TURBOT AND REDFISH IN ZONES 3L, 3N AND 3O
121. Fishermen pointed out during our hearings in Quebec, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia that most of the area covered by fishing zones 3L, 3N and 3O lies inside Canada's 200-mile zone. Only a tiny portion of 3L lies outside Canada's 200-mile zone, yet foreign nations get 85% of the turbot quota in the entire zone. Fishermen also pointed out that foreign nations get 60% of the redfish quota in 3L and 3N. Even in the case of redfish in zone 3O, which is entirely a Canadian-managed fish stock, 1,500 tonnes of that quota goes to France because of an agreement signed with Canada three years ago.
122. The Committee believes that foreign nations fish their entire turbot quota in 3L in the tiny portion that lies outside 200 miles because, by agreement with Canada they can supply fish-catch figures from their home port instead of using Canadian observers.
123. Even if the figures are correct, the combined total catch in the zones including 3LN turbot and redfish and 3O redfish shows that foreign nations process 24,500 tonnes of fish and Canada only 15,000 tonnes of fish.
124. St. Pierre and Miquelon hired National Sea Products boats to catch its 1,500 tonnes of the Canadian quota of redfish in zone 3O in 1997. The fish was processed at St. Pierre and Miquelon. It was pointed out to the Committee by witnesses that not one Canadian fish plant has the same guaranteed quotas as a part of the Canadian catch that St. Pierre and Miquelon has for the next ten years.
Recommendation 3
The Committee recommends that Canada withdraw its support for redfish quotas given to foreign nations in fishing zones 3L, 3N and 3O on the grounds that Canadian fish plants could process this redfish presently allocated to foreign nations in fishing zones that lie almost exclusively in Canadian waters.
125. During several meetings fishermen complained that they could not sell their squid in 1997 because the market was glutted. They also complained that it was the federal government's fault because it allows foreign nations to catch squid inside Canada's 200-mile zone. They pointed out that two new foreign nations had just been granted squid quotas inside the Canadian zone. They claimed that Canada has now given permission to a dozen foreign nations to fish squid in fishing zones 3 and 4 which cover the Newfoundland, Quebec and Maritime coastlines.
126. The Committee discovered that once again the fishermen were correct. DFO verified to the Committee that Korea, the United States and France last year were given permission by Canada to join a host of other nations who have annual squid quotas all along Canada's east coast inside the 200-mile zone, made possible, in part by an unused Bulgarian quota.
Recommendation 4
8 The Committee recommends that Canada withdraw its support for squid quotas presently given to a dozen foreign nations inside Canada's 200-mile zone on the grounds that squid are a prime food for northern cod and other fish, and are an important part of the catch of thousands of Canadian fishermen.
SILVER HAKE AND OTHER "UNDERUTILIZED" SPECIES
127. Silver hake in fishing zones 4V, 4W and 4X inside Canada's 200-mile zone is called "underutilized" by DFO in 1998. Still considered to be a fish "in excess of Canada's needs" by DFO, the federal government has declared that under the Law of the Sea Convention, Canada must give foreign nations access to any fish Canada cannot fully utilize and that this includes silver hake.
128. As one witness pointed out during the hearings, Canada has never ratified or even signed the Law of the Sea Convention, yet feels that it is duty bound under that law to give fish away to foreign nations.
129. The Committee endorses the opinions expressed by witnesses in Quebec, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia that there are no fish "in excess of Canada's needs" anywhere inside Canada's 200-mile zone on any coast, and deplores the fact that Canada continues to be the only fishing nation in the world that has declared that it has fish in excess of its needs. The Committee endorses the opinions of witnesses who advocated the Canadianization of the silver hake fishery as soon as possible.
Recommendation 5
The Committee recommends that Canada immediately adopt the position that there are no fish "in excess of Canada's needs" anywhere inside our 200-mile zone on any coast and that any quotas given on these grounds be reverted to Canadian fish plants. (For example, the community of Burgeo in Newfoundland requested that the community be given a 5,000-tonne quota of argentine in order to reopen its fish plant. Argentine is a fish that Canada has been giving to foreign nations for years as underutilized inside our 200-mile zone. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has informed the Committee that he has granted this request.)
130. During several meetings, fishermen complained that they could not get a tuna quota while Japan had big tuna and swordfish quotas in Canadian waters. "Allow me to catch one bluefin and I'll be happy", was a familiar call from unemployed fishermen. They pointed out that one bluefin tuna is valued at about $25,000. They objected strongly that the Japanese tuna fleet had a much higher quota than the fishermen had in their own province. The Committee took note of two Japanese tuna ships tied up in St. John's Harbour and were told by DFO that the Japanese quota for bluefin tuna in Canadian waters was 113 tonnes for 1998 compared to only 35 tonnes for any one Canadian province.
131. The Japanese fleet is also allowed to catch as many of other types of tuna as it wishes. The Japanese fleet also catches swordfish at the same time. Japan's only catch limit is the 113 tonne bycatch of bluefin for this year in Canadian waters while fishermen in each of the eastern provinces are restricted to 35 tonnes.
132. The Committee expresses concern that they were denied travel status by DFO to the ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas) negotiations in Spain in November 1997. The Committee has received information that northern bluefin tuna breeding populations have fallen by 90% since 1975 and that the ICCAT-negotiated, four-country catch of 2,354 tonnes of bluefin tuna is four times the catch recommended in order to rebuild stocks over the next 20 years.
Recommendation 6
The Committee recommends that Canada immediately stop issuing licences to Japanese ships to catch tuna and swordfish in Canadian waters on the grounds that these resources are needed by Canadian fishermen and plant workers and should be available to them, after taking conservation into account.
133. Committee members were shocked to learn at public meetings on the south coast of Newfoundland that France was carrying on a commercial salmon fishery around the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon and in the 80-mile long corridor that extends southward from the islands. The Committee was also informed that they were using commercial salmon gear purchased from Newfoundland fishermen who were retired from the salmon fishery by the federal government.
134. The Canadian commercial salmon fishery was closed along the south coast of Newfoundland many years ago because the federal government claimed that it was interfering with salmon that were returning to rivers in Newfoundland, the Maritimes, and Quebec. The federal government offered a cash buy-out to the fishermen. The Committee was shocked to discover that the federal government has been aware of this foreign commercial salmon fishery for four years and has never objected to it.
Recommendation 7
The Committee recommends that Canada demand that the government of France
close the commercial salmon fishery around St. Pierre and Miquelon on the grounds
that they are intercepting salmon that are destined for spawning rivers in
Newfoundland, the Maritimes, and Quebec. (The Committee notes that there are no
salmon rivers on the islands of
St. Pierre and Miquelon.)
FRANCE'S PERCENTAGE OF CANADIAN QUOTAS
135. In 1994, Canada signed an agreement in Paris which gave France a percentage of several Canadian fish quotas stretching along the entire east coast of Canada from Baffin Island to southern Nova Scotia.
136. It was because of this agreement that the "metropolitan" fleet from St. Malo, France now has access to a percentage of Canadian quotas ranging from 30% of the Canadian roundnosed grenadier quota up north to 15% of our redfish quotas in the south. Although St. Pierre and Miquelon receives some of this Canadian fish to process (for example it processed 1,500 tonnes of redfish caught by National Sea trawlers in 1997), the agreement does not specify that the fish must be landed in St. Pierre and Miquelon (the aforementioned 1997 turbot catch in 2J off Black Tickle was taken back to France for processing).
137. The fishing agreement will give France percentages of Canadian quotas for ten years following the lifting of the Northern Cod Moratorium.
Recommendation 8
The Committee recommends that Canada withdraw from present agreements that give France a percentage of many Canadian quotas in Canadian waters off the coasts of Baffin Island, Labrador, eastern Newfoundland, Quebec, P.E.I. and the coast of Nova Scotia on the grounds that this fish is needed to sustain Canadian fishermen and plant workers and their families, while still maintaining appropriate conservation standards.
THE FLEMISH CAP
138. Many fishermen complained during our meetings that foreign nations were catching over $100 million worth of shrimp each year on Canada's Continental Shelf while Canadian fishermen were being refused licences. The Flemish Cap, the area in question, is recognized internationally as a part of Canada's Continental Shelf. It is managed by NAFO, of which Canada is a part.
139. The Committee verified that although the Flemish Cap is a part of our Continental Shelf and Canada agrees each year to the fishing quotas, Canadian fishermen do not reap much benefit. The official figures given to the Committee by DFO verified the fishermen's claims. The landed value of shrimp alone, caught by foreign nations on this part of Canada's Continental Shelf for 1997 was in excess of $100 million. This landed value figure came from the foreign vessels' home ports and its accuracy is questionable. The Committee suspects that the landed value could be substantially higher than that reported by the foreign nations.
140. The Committee tends to agree with some of the fishermen's observations that the amount of fish taken by foreign nations on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap could keep every closed Canadian fish plant open if this Canadian fish were landed in Canada. These same fishermen advocated that Canada take control over the fish on Canada's Continental Shelf.
Recommendation 9
The Committee recommends that Canada immediately turn its attentions to gaining control over fish stocks that lie on Canada's Continental Shelf, on the grounds that foreign nations are currently overfishing the stocks on the nose and the tail of the Grand Banks and on the Flemish Cap and that those stocks rightfully belong to Canada and could keep many fish plants open year round, while still maintaining appropriate conservation standards.
TAGS AND COST RECOVERY
141. Fishermen and plant workers displaced by the collapse of the northern cod stock made compelling arguments for the continuation of TAGS payments and early retirement and licence buy-back programs. They also called for changes in the clawback provisions and an overall reduction in the new licence and other user fees recently brought in by DFO.
142. Witnesses even brought in their bank books to show the financial devastation that their families have suffered. Witnesses equated TAGS to support payments made to western farmers when they experienced difficulties. Countless accounts were given the Committee of modest family budgeting up to May 1999 based on several commitments given to them in writing by Cabinet Ministers and federal government bureaucrats. They expressed shock and disbelief that a commitment made to each person in writing could be so cruelly shortened by one year.
143. Several witnesses pointed to the counterproductivity of a recent clawback imposed on fishermen. When the fishermen's total income for the year reached $26,000, every cent over that amount had to be paid back to the federal government, regardless of the expenses associated with fishing. It was explained to the Committee that after a fisherman's expenses were paid that the fisherman had little or no profit if everything over $26,000 had to go to the federal government. Witnesses advocated a clawback similar to the EI clawback of $39,000 threshold.
144. All fishermen complained about the unprecedented increase in licence fees, boat fees, Coast Guard user fees, etc., and the untimeliness of these huge increases that coincided with the moratorium on fishing cod.
Recommendation 10
The Committee, having been persuaded by the testimony of the fishermen and overwhelming evidence reviewed of the large role played by the federal government in the collapse of the northern cod stock, finds it incumbent upon the federal government to support the fishermen and those whose jobs were directly affected because of the downturn of the fishery on the east coast of Canada. This support should include:
a) The continuation of TAGS up to at least the date of the original written commitment of May 1999.
b) The immediate redirection of foreign fish quotas to Canadians with priority given to those fishermen and fish plants most heavily affected by the downturn and collapse of the fishery off the east coast of Canada.
c) The continuation of the voluntary TAGS retirement program and the voluntary TAGS licence buy-back program for all cases that reduce fishing capacity.
d) A rearrangement of the income clawback level for fishermen receiving TAGS to mirror the system used under the EI program.
e) A reduction of licence fees and related charges recently increased by the federal government affecting fishermen out of all proportion to their ability to pay.
f) A new federally-funded, multi-year infrastructure and job diversification program, administered under established practices which must be directed towards the people most affected by the downturn in the east coast fishery and which must have community input. Canadianization of the fishery should be a major target area.
VESSEL EXPENSES
145. The Committee agrees that the 25% nominal allowance for vessel owners' expenses under TAGS is unfair and counterproductive.
Recommendation 11
The Committee recommends that vessel owners be allowed to return to filing the actual expenses incurred, in place of the 25% allowance.
VESSEL REPLACEMENT POLICY
146. The Committee repeatedly heard evidence that DFO's rules on vessel replacement are too restrictive. These rules can prevent fishermen from gaining access to resources on their grounds and compromise their safety even though there may be no significant conservation reason to limit vessel size.
Recommendation 12
The Committee recommends that the vessel replacement policy be reviewed in consultation with fishermen, and suitable amendments be adopted.
147. The Committee agrees with fishermen that the expanding seal herds now pose a potentially serious threat to the recovery of cod and capelin stocks and that it is vitally important to resolve this issue as soon as possible. The Committee also agrees that seals represent an important primary resource and economic opportunity for many communities on Canada's Atlantic coast.
Recommendation 13
The Committee recommends that fishermen along the Quebec and Labrador coasts be permitted to continue their traditional method of netting seals and that the fishermen on the east coast be permitted to sell the pelts of blueback seals that they have legally harvested under existing fisheries regulations. (The present regulation that forbids fishermen from even keeping a seal found dead in fishing nets and forbids fishermen from selling the pelts of bluebacks that are legally harvested is inexcusably wasteful.)
Recommendation 14
The Committee recommends that all seals harvested be fully utilized and that the harvesting of seals for single body parts be prohibited.
Recommendation 15
The Committee also recommends that a conference between fishermen and scientists be organized by DFO immediately to air publicly the evidence concerning the types of fish that seals eat, and if the fishermen are proved to be correct, as the Committee believes they are, to make recommendations to increase seal quotas and to foster the sealing industry and the marketing of seal products. This conference should be open to the public.
NORTHERN COD 1998
148. Many witnesses claimed on the east coast of Newfoundland (a part of the northern cod zone) that codfish were now more plentiful in the bays than ever before. The Committee heard accounts of cod being so plentiful that they could be seen from the shoreline. Seasoned fishermen claim that they were so plentiful that they were getting caught up in lobster gear and lump nets.
149. The only scientific evidence on the abundance of northern cod that the Committee obtained during the hearings was the Sentinel Fishery results of cod traps. The Committee examined the results of cod traps set at the same location and during the same week for 1995, 1996, and 1997. The results confirmed the presence of a large amount of large cod in the bays of eastern Newfoundland. The catches rose dramatically year over year with the highest presence of cod in area 3L off the east coast of Newfoundland, which is a part of the northern cod zone.
150. Fishermen complained that foreign nations have an 850-tonne allowable bycatch of northern cod in 3L and that DFO scientists were now using an inaccurate method to count the northern cod. The acoustic method of counting cod, to which the fishermen objected, along with the Sentinel Fishery results, would determine whether a test or food fishery would be allowed in 1998. The fishermen explained that the new method being used by DFO scientists involved counting the presence of cod in random straight lines from the shoreline straight out five miles, rather than on the shoals where the fish congregate.
Recommendation 16
The Committee recommends that Canada take immediate steps to reduce the present allowable bycatch of 850 tonnes of northern cod given to foreign nations fishing for turbot in zone 3L. After taking into account conservation measures this may allow Newfoundlanders to have a food fishery and a test fishery on the east and northeast coasts of Newfoundland starting in the summer of 1998.
Recommendation 17
The Committee recommends that DFO organize a conference between fishermen and scientists, fully open to the public, to resolve the dispute over the cod counting methods and to determine the set of conditions that would permit the reopening of the northern cod fishery.
GHOST NETS
151. The Committee heard persuasive evidence that fishing by ghost nets is a major conservation issue in some areas. Retrieval of these nets has the potential to make a significant contribution to the recovery of groundfish stocks and, at the same time, provide badly needed work for displaced fishermen.
Recommendation 18
The Committee recommends that the federal government establish a pilot project for finding and retrieving ghost nets.
ECOSYSTEMS APPROACH
152. Witnesses said that the federal government should devote resources to study the interactions between the species which all form part of the marine ecosystem. They felt that DFO is guilty of compartmentalizing the fishery into individual fish stocks without consideration for the impact that fishing one species has on the entire food chain. They felt that DFO must take a more integrated approach to resource management.
Recommendation 19
The Committee recommends that DFO be subjected to an independent review of the methods by which it sets total allowable catches and manages fisheries.
TRUST AND CORPORATE VISION
153. The Committee is gravely concerned by the evident alienation of the fishing industry and coastal communities from the senior management of DFO. The Committee believes that the entire corporate vision of the Department has to change and that everything possible must be done to rebuild lost trust between DFO and the fishing community.
Recommendation 20
The Committee recommends that senior DFO personnel who are viewed by the fishing community as being responsible for the crisis in the fishery be removed from the Department.
ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNICATION
154. The Committee heard time and time again that local DFO officials are doing the best they can under difficult circumstances but that there are not enough people to perform essential duties adequately. This issue is particularly acute in the areas of enforcement and communication.
Recommendation 21
The Committee recommends that additional human resources be provided at the local level to carry out necessary tasks. These resources could be provided through restructuring at DFO headquarters in Ottawa. (More and better enforcement is needed and DFO must improve communications dramatically so that all relevant information reaches the communities and the people affected when it is needed.)
Recommendation 22
The Committee recommends that the federal government's decision to close the Coast Guard radio station on les Îles-de-la-Madeleine be put on hold and that DFO hold public hearings with fishermen and other users, and community leaders in the area.
Recommendation 23
The Committee recommends that DFO immediately review the safety concerns of small vessel owners who are concerned that large boats will no longer monitor VHF16 or the Marine Frequency Channel after implementation of GMDSS on February 1, 1999 and publicly report its findings.