FAIT Committee Report

---

• Chapter 1: The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons
• Chapter 2: The Nuclear-Weapons-Capable States
• Chapter 3: Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear and Other ''Weapons of Mass Destruction''
• Chapter 4: Nato and Nuclear Weapons
• Chapter 5: Conclusion: The Road to the
  Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

---

Chapter 1:
The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons

I have asked this Committee to address the question of nuclear weapons. The emergence of this enhanced threat of proliferation provides a new context for your work. We need to look for means to promote the policy I have outlined and ensure that it is marked by viability, integrity and sustainability. We need to resist and condemn proliferators, while avoiding justifying a new nuclear realpolitik. At the same time, we need to put pressure on the nuclear-weapon States to pursue an active disarmament agenda without validating the reasoning of any would-be proliferators. This is not an easy challenge. I look forward to receiving the Report of your deliberations.

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy
Minister of Foreign Affairs1

Debates over nuclear weapons were a prominent feature of the Cold War, and this country struggled with them as much as any NATO ally. Canada participated in the development of the first atomic bomb and accepted nuclear weapons for its military forces during the Cold War; Canada also gained a unique voice on these issues as the first country capable of developing nuclear weapons to refuse to do so, as the first to decide to divest itself of such weapons, and as a leader in the 1995 extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons hereinafter referred to as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (see Appendix B).

In the fall of 1996, the Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the Committee to conduct a review of Canada's current nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy (NACD). The general election of 1997 delayed the work of the Committee; however, between February and June 1998 it heard directly from dozens of Canadians and groups representing thousands more, as well as from expert witnesses and politicians from the United States, Europe and South Asia. While not exhaustive, this work has enabled the Committee to come to grips with the issues involved in this important area of foreign and defence policies, and to be in a position to provide the Canadian government with the views of Canadians in general and input from legislators.

The elimination of nuclear weapons, the stated ultimate goal of the entire international community, will not be achieved easily or quickly. Yet the case for pursuing such an agenda is more compelling than ever. As Admiral Stansfield Turner, a retired senior U.S. military officer and former head of the Central Intelligence Agency put it in September 1998:

The argument for disarmament has grown stronger in recent years. For some time it was advocated primarily by people with limited military experience, leaving it open to the superficial challenging of being naïve or impractical. Today more and more experts with experience in nuclear strategy - among them, Robert McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense; Generals Andrew Goodpastor, Charles Horner, and Lee Butler, all former military commanders with nuclear responsibilities - are advocating disarmament. Their reasoning is that we should not underestimate how far we have come toward the intrusive inspection regimes that would be necessary under nuclear disarmament; nor how rapidly we may move even further.2

All members agree on the need to combine short-and long-term initiatives to achieve security and disarmament goals. However, like society itself, they are not all of one view on how best to pursue the concrete steps needed to achieve lasting results. All have made compromises in the drafting of this Report in order to increase common ground, although in their party positions, they would have preferred different points of emphasis, as reflected below in their own words:

Bloc Québécois

In writing this Report, compromises were made by all parties in order to broaden the area of agreement. The Bloc Québécois members would have wanted to place greater emphasis on the inordinate cost of nuclear weaponry and to underline the fact that investing funds in developing and maintaining nuclear arsenals is inconsistent with economic, social and cultural development in the wider international community. They would also have preferred to see a moratorium placed on the sale of CANDU technology for the period of the study that Parliament is urged to conduct on the use of civilian nuclear technology pursuant to recommendation 4 of this Report. In addition, they would have wanted the Report to contain a reference to the non-first use of nuclear weapons as a subject to be discussed during the review of NATO's Strategic Concept.

New Democratic Party

The New Democratic Party would have preferred stronger, more far-reaching recommendations in some respects. For example, the NDP has long advocated phasing out of the nuclear power industry, closure of the Nanoose Bay Missile Testing Range in British Columbia, and, recognizing that nuclear weapons remain the single greatest threat to Canadian and global security, urges a "No First Use" policy for NATO.

Progressive Conservative Party

Members of the PC Party of Canada believe that the complete elimination of nuclear arms is an ideal objective that Canada should seek to achieve. However, to remain credible in its approach to nuclear disarmament, Canada must take into account current world realities.

While supporting the overall objectives of the Report, members of the PC Party of Canada are not convinced that the "soft power" concept leads to greater world security and faster nuclear disarmament, and that it holds all the answers for Canada.

PC members also believe that Canada must remain a willing participant in the North Atlantic Alliance and reiterate its support for NATO, the foremost security organization in the world, and act accordingly in its relationship with other members. Thus, Canada should approach any changes to NATO's nuclear strategy with great caution, especially the concept of de-alerting nuclear forces due to the lack of viable verification programs at this point in time.

Liberal Party

Members of the Liberal Party support the general thrust of the Report and endorse all of its recommendations. On the specific issue of recommendation 15 on NATO and nuclear policy, they agree that the issue deserves to be raised as part of one element of the examination of the Strategic Concept. In so doing, however, they do not prejudge the decision NATO States must take collectively on issues such as the First Use of nuclear weapons.

The Report therefore aims to achieve a difficult balance. Like the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, which seeks to identify "pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives," the Committee has attempted to ensure that its recommendations are practical and focused on advancing the agenda of nuclear safety and progressive disarmament in both the near and long term.

In carrying out this review, the Committee has benefited from the passionate declarations of retired political and military leaders, as well as the existence of an important body of recent work, exemplified by the 1997 report The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the 1996 Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Instead of attempting to duplicate such work, which has illuminated the nuclear debate in recent years, the Committee hopes to strengthen many of its conclusions with necessary political support. As the Report will make clear, while there are important technical questions, the challenge of nuclear weapons remains fundamentally a political one; yet, there has been insufficient input from legislators in the post-Cold War period. The Committee hopes that this Report will play an important part in providing such input, both to the Government of Canada and, perhaps, more widely. As Canadian disarmament expert Tariq Rauf pointed out in a submission to the Committee, Canada's already strong efforts in these areas

. . .could greatly benefit from visible high-level support from our political leaders and from the Parliament of Canada, all speaking from a common platform . . .on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament matters, Canada's political leadership has to take on the responsibility of working to develop a multi-party consensus. To paraphrase a well-known aphorism, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament matters are too important to be left to the vagaries of party politics.3

Beyond engaging political support and building public consensus, Mr. Rauf argued further that the policy development and decision processes within government must be improved in order to deliver a solid, coherent Canadian position. His specific suggestions cited below are worth noting at the outset since they apply to all aspects of current and future nuclear policy making. As he continued before the Committee,

Diplomats and defence planners in many NATO countries, and, I would argue, even in Canada, tend to exist in two solitudes. . .

In my view, what Canada needs is for both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence to put forward our views on nuclear weapons in a coordinated and forceful manner, reflecting both our own and our NATO allies' international commitments. In practice this may have to involve making difficult choices between our international legally binding non-proliferation arms control and disarmament commitments and our alliance obligations.

In this context, the Committee might consider recommending that an interdepartmental consultation and coordination process be established between the Department of Foreign Affairs and DND to coordinate and harmonize our policies on multilateral non-proliferation and arms control with our NATO positions, under the guidance and lead of Foreign Affairs. It would be useful if a DND representative could join Canadian delegations at multilateral non-proliferation fora, at DND's expense, in order to report back assessments of the positions of the international community, which could then be factored into our NATO interventions.4

The Committee starts by acknowledging the desirability of political consensus to support Canada's non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament efforts on the international stage, aware of the need to respond to the deep-seated public apprehensions and anxieties brought by the nuclear age. In the following pages we will therefore make recommendations for ensuring ongoing public and parliamentary input into government policy, and the highest degree of coordination among federal departments in that policy's execution. Canada's record on these issues has much to its credit; however the present challenging international circumstances call for fresh thinking and courageous leadership in confronting the nuclear dilemmas overhanging Canadian security objectives into the next century.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

I cannot believe we are about to start the 21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th century when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or national fulfilment.

International peace and security are priorities of all States, and disarmament has always been an important means toward their achievement rather than an end in itself. As Mark Moher, Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs, explained in 1997:

The overarching goal of Canada . . . is the abolition of war. In Canada's view this demands two kinds of action. The first is to use all means possible to enhance security - through conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding . . . The second is to promote as effectively as possible measures to advance arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It is in these two mutually reinforcing contexts that Canada considers the question of the future of nuclear weapons.6

The danger of nuclear weapons was recognized by the international community as early as January 1946, when the member States of the United Nations unanimously adopted as that body's first Resolution a proposal of the five permanent members of the Security Council and Canada for the "establishment of a Commission to deal with problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy." This proposal failed in the face of the emerging Cold War, which encouraged the build-up of massive superpower nuclear arsenals peaking at about 70,000 weapons; it is impossible to quantify the humanitarian, environmental and economic costs of nuclear weapons on a global basis, but a major study published by the Brookings Institution in mid-1998 estimated the cost to the United States of nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs from 1940 through 1996 at nearly $5.5 trillion (in constant 1996 U.S. dollars).7 By the late 1960s, the danger posed by existing arsenals, and the widespread prediction of the spread of nuclear weapons to perhaps 25-30 States by the end of the 1970s, demanded urgent action. Through the complex bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which we will return in Chapter 3, the international community agreed to cap the spread of nuclear weapons at the five nuclear-weapon States - the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China - that had already tested them prior to 1967. The Treaty also bound those five to work to end the nuclear arms race and achieve the eventual elimination of these weapons. India and some other States have long complained that, by legitimizing limiting the possession of nuclear weapons by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the NPT is discriminating against other countries. This view was challenged, however, by Ambassador Thomas Graham, as Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, who headed U.S. efforts to extend the NPT in 1995 and met with the Committee during its hearings in Washington. He pointed out in May 1998, that "The fact that there were five nuclear-weapon States before the world took action is a matter of historical circumstance, not special privilege."8

Post Cold-War Developments

Despite this commitment to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, the security environment of the Cold War provided little reason to believe that this was a practical objective. The end of the Cold War, however, brought what Project Ploughshares and others have characterized as a "window of opportunity" for achieving progress towards this goal. After decades of frustration, the improved security situation, public interest, and the resulting political will allow rapid and important progress on a number of fronts. Superpower agreements during the Cold War had limited the growth of nuclear arsenals, but with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, which banned all such weapons, they actually began to reduce them. The long-range (strategic) arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had dominated security discussions throughout the Cold War. Through the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) process, these arsenals would be reduced from over 10,000 deployed warheads each to 6,000 under START I, to 3,000-3,500 each under START II and, even further, to 2,000-2,500 each under the still-to-be-negotiated START III. Concerns about less secure short-range (sub-strategic or tactical) nuclear weapons deployed in the various republics of the disintegrating Soviet Union prompted the U.S. and the Soviet Union to move quickly through reciprocal unilateral measures to return most of these weapons to their national territories; all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were returned to Russia, and most U.S. weapons to the United States. Over the past decade, these cumulative reductions have almost halved the world's nuclear arsenals, from their peak of about 70,000 to some 36,000 today.9 This has been a tremendous accomplishment; however, as the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences pointed out in 1997, the destructiveness of modern nuclear weapons is such that the detonation in Russia of even 20 U.S. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles warheads could still completely destroy the 12 largest Russian cities and kill 25 million people.10

In addition to these important bilateral nuclear reductions by the United States and Russia, the end of the Cold War also saw progress at the multilateral level. After years of anticipation and sometimes stormy debate, in 1995 the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of international efforts to both prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to commit the five nuclear-weapon States recognized therein to the eventual elimination of such weapons, was strengthened and extended without condition. An important element of the extension was increased political commitment by the nuclear-weapon States and others to achievement of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) outlawing all nuclear tests. Such a Treaty was finally negotiated in 1996, though India's refusal to sign it has complicated its entry into force.

A decade-long campaign to challenge the legality of nuclear weapons also bore fruit in 1996 with a complicated Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In a split decision, with the Court's President making a casting vote in favour, the Court found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons "would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." Given the current state of international law, however, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court could not conclude definitively whether "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of the State would be at stake." Canada had not supported the reference to the Court, arguing that such fundamental matters of national and international security as nuclear disarmament are essentially political in nature and must be engaged and negotiated by governments. Canada and others did, however, welcome the unanimous reaffirmation by the Court of the obligations on the five nuclear-weapon States to, "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (emphasis added).

Reaction to the Advisory Opinion before the Committee was varied: though many witnesses argued that it had important implications for nuclear policies, Professor Paul Buteux, of the University of Manitoba, dismissed the idea that nuclear weapons could be dealt with like issues in domestic law, which he referred to as a "municipal fallacy."11 Professor Yves Le Bouthillier of the University of Ottawa argued, on the other hand, that "there is a very broad consensus that this opinion makes a major contribution to the campaign for disarmament." This consensus is based on two findings contained in the Opinion: (1) the fact that the use of nuclear weapons can be justified only in extreme situations (and possibly not even then); and (2) the duty of all States to negotiate and conclude an agreement for complete nuclear disarmament.12

Building on the end of the Cold War and the momentum generated by these other developments, the mid-1990s also saw the establishment of a number of high-profile expert commissions in this area. One was the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, sponsored by the Australian government, which made a powerful case for seizing this unique opportunity to move toward the further reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. According to its final Report,

The Canberra Commission is persuaded that immediate and determined efforts need to be made to rid the world of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to it. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is immense. Any use would be catastrophic. . .

The end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be exploited quickly or it will be lost.13

Despite these successes, after the easiest reductions had been completed and public opinion and political interest moved on to other issues, the momentum of nuclear arms control and disarmament slowed considerably. In the most high-profile case, the Russian Duma's refusal (for a variety of reasons) to ratify the START II Treaty has stalled its entry into force, and delayed the negotiations on START III. Non-Aligned States have been unsuccessful in their call for a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament has been stalled, with nuclear-weapon States even refusing the suggestion of Canada and others that an ad hoc committee be established for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues. Despite the adoption at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of a package of decisions, including a Strengthened Review Process, a statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and a related resolution on the Middle East, progress has also been very modest in the 1997 and 1998 Preparatory Committee meetings for the next review of the Treaty in the year 2000.

RAISING THE STAKES

American political scientist Bernard Brodie wrote in 1946 that "everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically great."14 Five decades later, Fred Iklé, a former Undersecretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, pointed out that the "three indisputable facts" which tower above everything that has been said and done about the problem of nuclear weapons now include: the existence of massive arsenals of such weapons, many of them a thousand times more destructive than the two used in 1945; the fact that as a result of their scientific-technological know-how, at least three dozen nations are now technically capable of building an arsenal of ten to a hundred nuclear weapons within three to five years if they so choose; and the fact that no nuclear weapon has been used destructively since 1945. In his words, "This fact goes a long way to explain the insouciance with which most people accept (and many indeed support) the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons that are being maintained in a state of high readiness. Alas, the dispensation of non-use that has now lasted for half a century can come to an end any day."15

Since the goal of reducing, and eventually eliminating, the nuclear threat is accepted by all State Parties to the NPT, on one level the question is simply one of "how to get there from here"; however, the situation is much more complicated than a choice between the status quo and eventual success. The stakes have been raised considerably by the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to commit to proceed to broader discussions of nuclear disarmament beyond the START process, the very real nuclear dangers implicit in the continuing disintegration of Russia, which we will return to in Chapter 2, and the direct challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime posed by the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. As many observers have pointed out, a possible result could be the failure to prevent the spread of not only nuclear weapons, but of biological and chemical weapons as well.16 As Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy put it in a statement prepared for presentation to the Committee in May 1998:

To preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime so critical to international security, non-nuclear-weapon States, like Canada, need to step forward and take a leading role in ensuring that an emerging tendency to defend the existence of nuclear weapons, that is based on what I would call a new nuclear realpolitik, does not undermine our efforts to support the non-proliferation regime. I use the expression "new nuclear realpolitik" to convey the complex of new and modified political and security rationales that are being used both by proliferators, such as India, and by the nuclear-weapon States to justify the proliferation or retention of nuclear weapons - even if at lower numbers.17

Having spent months considering these issues, the Committee agrees with this judgement. India and Pakistan, (like Israel) had refused to sign the NPT but were widely acknowledged as nuclear-weapons-capable "threshold states"; their tests may therefore have changed little "on the ground" as long as they can be persuaded not to proceed to deploy nuclear weapons. From a broader perspective, the NPT embodies the clear judgement of 187 of the world's States that the further spread of nuclear weapons after 1967 is contrary to the interests of world peace and security. The fact that India and Pakistan have chosen directly to challenge this consensus demands strong, united and consistent international pressure for them to follow the example of South Africa in the early 1990s, dismantle their nuclear arsenals and programs and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

While India and Pakistan bear the primary responsibility for their dangerous actions, the five nuclear-weapon States, and, indeed, all States Parties to the NPT, are guilty of not having moved quickly enough to deny them and other would-be proliferators an excuse to join the nuclear club through inaction on nuclear disarmament. In his report, the Chair of the CISAC of the National Academy of Sciences mentioned above, Professor John Holdren, pointed out after the tests,

It is not obvious that more leadership and less hypocrisy from the United States and the other established nuclear-weapon powers would have tipped the balance against testing in these two countries, given the tensions and domestic political pressures in play there. But it ought to be plain that the intransigence of the major weapon states in relation to their own nuclear arsenals strengthens the hands of pro-nuclear-weapon factions in threshold states everywhere, weakening the case against these weapons and providing an additional push toward proliferation. If we do not admit this and move finally to correct it, we markedly increase the chances that the recent nuclear follies will not be the last.18

The five legally acknowledged nuclear-weapon States, which still own almost all of the world's nuclear weapons, are not yet prepared to move away from the concept of nuclear deterrence that is the basis of their current security policies; moreover, they are probably unsure how they might safely do so. As the United Kingdom admitted in a background document accompanying its July 1998 Strategic Defence Review,

. . . Nuclear deterrence remains a controversial and complex issue because of the terrible consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. There are no easy answers here. The world would be a better place if such weapons were not still necessary, but the conditions for complete nuclear disarmament do not yet exist.19

Sir Michael Quinlan, a senior UK civil servant intimately involved with nuclear issues for decades who testified before the Committee, has argued that,

The basic concept of deterrence is a simple one: that of inducing someone to refrain from unwanted action by putting before him the prospect that taking it will prompt a response with disadvantages to him outweighing the advantages of the action. This concept has always had a part to play in the management of human relationships.20

Yet former military leaders such as General George Lee Butler, who, as Commander of the United States Strategic Command from 1992 to 1994, had responsibility for all U.S. nuclear deterrent forces, have argued that the concept of deterrence has become much more dangerous in its translation from a conventional to a nuclear context. General Butler argued in early 1998:

Now, with the evidence more clear, the risks more sharply defined and costs more fully understood, I see deterrence in a very different light. Appropriated from the lexicon of conventional warfare, this simple prescription for adequate military preparedness became in the nuclear age a formula for unmitigated catastrophe. It was premised on a litany of unwarranted assumptions, unprovable assertions and logical contradictions. . .

Deterrence is a slippery conceptual slope. It is not stable, nor is it static, its wiles cannot be contained. It is both master and slave. It seduces the scientist yet bends to his creation. It serves the ends of evil as well as those of noble intent. It holds guilty the innocent as well as the culpable. It gives easy semantic cover to nuclear weapons, masking the horrors of employment with siren veils of infallibility. At best it is a gamble no mortal should pretend to make. At worst it invokes death on a scale rivalling the power of the Creator.21

Similar, if less authoritative, arguments were made about the dangers of deterrence in the superpower context of the Cold War, and could only be strengthened by the further spread of nuclear weapons. French defence expert Camille Grand told the Committee,

A joke was made by a diplomat that makes it very clear. When the nuclear game is played by two players, it's just like chess: you know the rules and there is very little room for chance; you can make mistakes, but usually you're in a very small set of 36 black and white squares. When you play with five players, you start moving into a card game, something like poker, where you still have rules, but the chance of a problem is higher and you have to rely on your luck to get the right cards and come out with the right answers. But there are still many rules.

When we are in a world of 36 nuclear-weapon States, which is probably the number of countries that could get nuclear technology to that point, you're entering a world of roulette, in which it's pure luck and sheer luck if you don't use nuclear weapons . . . 22

General Andrew Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has pointed out that deterrence will ultimately have to be replaced by "reassurance," which ". . . means building consensus among the nuclear weapons powers and the non-nuclear states regarding the much reduced role of nuclear weapons in security plans and policies."23 This political transition will not be easy, but in the current situation a strong argument can now be made for moving more quickly to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons, even on the basis of traditional "national security" assumptions. As American scholar Michael Mazarr pointed out in 1997, "The case for nuclear arms control no longer rests, if it ever did, on flimsy appeals to the unity of humankind and the need for international cooperation. It can now call upon a hard-headed catalog of U.S. and allied interests to support its arguments."24 According to many analysts, the most obvious of these factors is the reversal of the Cold War need for United States and NATO reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority; the United States, even without its allies, now enjoys such conventional military superiority that it has no need for nuclear weapons except to deter such weapons. To argue that these retain any utility can only encourage other states to attempt to acquire them, or their simpler biological or chemical alternatives.

REDUCING THE POLITICAL VALUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The conventional view among the five established nuclear-weapon States and their allies has been that their possession of nuclear weapons is not a threat to international security. The Committee accepts that, as long as international security remains based on that nuclear status quo, immediate voluntary relinquishment may not be possible. At the same time, it accepts the warning that a commitment to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons "eventually" cannot be coded to mean "never." Members of the Committee have different views on the issue of timeframes for nuclear disarmament, but all endorse calls for substantial progress to be made sooner rather than later. The world has struggled under the threat of nuclear weapons for five decades; yet it cannot be lucky forever. The possession of such weapons by any state five decades hence should be understood by all as a fundamental threat to international security.

Discussing the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Sir Michael Quinlan told the Committee, "Clearly, the whole subject, the whole agenda, has become more highly charged because of what has happened. An urgency has been imparted, which I certainly don't regret, although I regret its causation, the way in which it has come about."25 The Committee agrees that a key challenge will be transforming international frustration over these tests into forward-looking policies that will increase international peace and security. According to Professor Holdren,

This calamity cannot be blamed on India and Pakistan, alone, however. The United States and the other established nuclear-weapon powers are culpable, too, for having failed so far to fully exploit the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to sharply devalue the currency of nuclear weapons in world affairs . . .26

The Committee agrees, having been told by experts in Washington and elsewhere that the most important umbrella policy for Canada or any other state is to focus on de-legitimizing and reducing the political value of nuclear weapons. More specific recommendations are included in the following chapters on the policies of the United States, Russia and the other Nuclear Weapons-Capable States (Chapter 2); Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery (Chapter 3); NATO and Nuclear Weapons (Chapter 4); and The Road to the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Chapter 5). While these recommendations will all contribute to the goal of the reduction and eventual elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons, it is only as an element of this overall approach that they can achieve their full potential.

Accordingly:

RECOMMENDATION 1

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada adopt the following fundamental principle to guide its nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy, within an overarching framework encompassing all aspects - political, military, and commercial - of Canada's international relations:

• That Canada work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.

RECOMMENDATION 2

In order to implement this fundamental principle, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada issue a policy statement which explains the links between Canada's nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy and all other aspects of its international relations. In addition, it must also establish a process to achieve a basis for ongoing consensus by keeping the Canadian public and parliamentarians informed of developments in this area, in particular by means of:

• Annual preparatory meetings - held, for example, under the auspices of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development - of the type held with non-governmental organizations and representatives of civil society before the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission;
• An annual public appearance before this Committee by the Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs;
• Strengthened coordination between the departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and National Defence, in the first instance by the inclusion of a representative from National Defence on Canadian delegations to multilateral nuclear non-proliferation fora.

PURSUING A CANADIAN APPROACH

The challenge is to create the conditions in which no state judges that it needs nuclear weapons to guarantee its security. The radical improvements in European security in recent years have shown that this is not an impossible objective. But it is not a task for the Nuclear Weapon States alone. All states have their part to play.

There is a growing consensus among experts on the need to advance quickly on nuclear arms control and on many of the key mechanisms for doing so; an example is the "de-alerting" of nuclear forces, which we will discuss in the next chapter. The next issue becomes the best means by which states can advance this agenda. As Ambassador Mark Moher explained to the Committee, Canada's disarmament and non-proliferation policies and activities are based on promoting international security in its broadest dimension. In the case of nuclear, biological and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction, ". . .Canada's policy objective is their elimination - by ensuring that those who possess Weapons of Mass Destruction reduce and eliminate them, and by preventing others from acquiring them." Ambassador Moher added that Canada pursues its activities in this area "consistently, persistently and energetically in a manner sensitive to evolving security realities."

All Canadians share the objective of the reduction and elimination of such weapons, but not all agree that ". . .the optimum and indeed only viable and practical way forward is by a continuous "step-by-step" process consisting of steadily advocating national, bilateral and multilateral steps, each as appropriate."28 The result of this approach is that the Government of Canada rejects as impractical such items as the call for a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and as premature others such as the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Critics argue that this "step-by-step" approach is fine in some circumstances, but cannot deal effectively with the current impasse, whereby the five nuclear-weapon States are unwilling to commit themselves to proceeding further on nuclear disarmament. They point to the success of the "Ottawa Process" in achieving a ban on the humanitarian scourge of anti-personnel landmines by engaging civil society, mobilizing public opinion and working together with like-minded states to move beyond traditional diplomatic mechanisms, and suggest a similar approach in the nuclear area.

Witnesses such as former Ambassador for Disarmament, Doug Roche, argued before the Committee that Canada should join other like-minded states in a Middle Power Coalition to advance the international nuclear agenda. To quote Mr. Roche,

With the end of the Cold War, the day of the middle powers has arrived. The abolition of nuclear weapons, the central element in the global governance quest for common security, must now be taken up by a new coalition of middle-power states. This preventive diplomacy can save the nuclear weapons states from the folly of their present course. This coalition must be formed by a break-out of the standard UN groupings of east, west and non-aligned that were born of the Cold War ideologies. The coalition must be of states that are important, influential, have good records in seeking disarmament and can get along. Working together, a new coalition could have the capacity to play an unprecedented role for peace.

Given its leadership at the NPT review, Canada bears a special responsibility to take a leading role in the development of a new coalition to work for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. As a firm proponent of the NPT and a member of NATO, Canada has a right and a duty to speak out for the elimination of nuclear weapons and to play a leading role in attaining this objective.29

One month after former Ambassador Roche's testimony before the Committee, a network of international citizen organizations launched a ``Middle Powers Initiative'' to pursue this work.

In fact, although their initiative was overshadowed by the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the beginnings of such a coalition already exist in the form of the "New Agenda Coalition" of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. In a June 1998 Declaration these countries highlighted the continuing problems of nuclear disarmament and called for specific steps to address them30; a resolution based on this Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly First Committee in November, 1998 by a vote of 97 in favour and 19 opposed, with 32 countries, including Canada, abstaining. In considering such action, the Committee is also mindful of witnesses who argued that, despite agreement on the ultimate goals, the international security system remains based on nuclear deterrence, and Canada must be careful not to proceed too quickly in this area. As Colonel Victor Coroy of the Conference of Defence Associations told the Committee,

Although I dislike relying on slogans in discussing such an important matter, I must remind you that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. For this reason, the CDA advises government to make haste slowly when moving ahead with processes such as nuclear non-proliferation, weapons reductions, and bids to eliminate nuclear warheads completely. To ignore caution and race ahead blindly to circumvent the alleged inefficiencies of old-style diplomacy would be a serious mistake. The consequences could be to unleash the very nuclear disasters so many activists fear.31

It seems clear that the Ottawa Process cannot be duplicated entirely in the nuclear field, for a number of reasons. First of these is the obvious fact that nuclear weapons are not landmines. Anti-personnel landmines were a militarily marginal weapon in use around the world; an international ban which has not yet been accepted by some major powers is still very useful. On the other hand, an international ban on nuclear weapons accepted only by those states that do not have them would hardly be an improvement on the current situation, in which the nuclear-weapon States are committed under the NPT to eliminate their arsenals. That said, we cannot continue in the present circumstances at a snail's pace. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs came before the Committee following India's nuclear tests, he argued that "Canada will continue to pursue its disarmament agenda with vigour. We cannot allow this process to be slowed in any way, and, in recent months, we have been actively seeking ways of speeding it up."32 The Committee believes that placing greater emphasis on identifying common ground and working with like-minded States from all regions may be one method of doing so.

Regrettably, widespread complacency has reigned in this area over the past several years. American political scientist Richard Betts asked in early 1998, "After all, what do normal people feel is the main relief provided by the end of the Cold War? It is that the danger of nuclear war is off their backs."33 At least until the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998, nuclear issues have been far from the headlines; it will be a challenge to mobilize the latent public revulsion against nuclear weapons which exists in all states and translate it effectively into policy and practice. A February 1998 Angus Reid poll found that 92% of Canadians either strongly support or somewhat support the idea of Canada taking a "leadership role in promoting an international ban on nuclear weapons."34

According to Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who spoke to the Committee in Washington, although similar polls consistently show that Americans would consider significant progress in the nuclear area as an important legacy of any government and would be well-disposed toward the politicians responsible, such convictions do not usually influence voting intentions.35 In New York, the Committee was reminded by UN Deputy Director for Disarmament Affairs, Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, that disarmament is a very practical business, and that public opinion is an important element of moving states toward consensus.36 A key to the mobilization of public opinion in the Ottawa Process was focusing on the humanitarian rather than military aspects of the anti-personnel landmines issue; such an approach is probably also the key to success in the nuclear field.

Accordingly:

RECOMMENDATION 3

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada intensify its efforts, in cooperation with States such as its NATO allies and the members of the New Agenda Coalition, to advance the process of nuclear disarmament. To this end, it must encourage public input and inform the public on the exorbitant humanitarian, environmental and economic costs of nuclear weapons as well as their impact on international peace and security. In addition, the Government must encourage the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their unequivocal commitment to enter into and conclude negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Drawing on the lessons of the Ottawa Process, it should also examine innovative means to advance the process of nuclear disarmament.

THE DOMESTIC DILEMMAS OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Attention over the past half century has rightly focused on the dangers of nuclear weapons. Former Ambassador for Disarmament, Doug Roche, told the Committee that he wanted to keep its attention ". . . very sharply focused on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world. This is while recognizing that . . . nuclear energy is a separate but related subject."37 The Committee has also heard, however, from a significant number of Canadians with more general concerns related to the support and operation of civilian nuclear power.

The foreign policy dimension of these concerns relates mainly to the sale under strict controls of Canadian nuclear technology abroad, which we will discuss in Chapter 3, and to the so-called "MOX" option, for disarmament reasons, to burn surplus Russian and American plutonium in nuclear reactors in Canada, which we will consider in the next chapter; while not related to civilian nuclear power, the Nanoose Conversion Campaign and others also raised with the Committee their concerns about the possible nuclear safety issues arising from the operation of American nuclear-powered submarines using the Nanoose Bay testing facility in the Strait of Georgia. While the Committee has neither the mandate nor the competence to address them in depth, there are also important domestic aspects to the nuclear issue which must be dealt with by Canadian society as a whole.

Domestic Concerns about Civilian Nuclear Power

The environmental and health concerns about civilian nuclear power in Canada, and, indeed, around the world, focus both on the day-to-day safety of nuclear facilities, given fears of Chernobyl-type accidents, and the continuing problem of how best to dispose of the nuclear waste produced by the operation of reactors. Canada is a world leader in nuclear technology; in 1996, about 16% of its electricity was generated by nuclear reactors, 21 of which were operating in March 1997.38 The resolution of the issues of transport and disposal of nuclear waste remain to be addressed in a coherent and definitive manner in this country. The issue of ensuring safe transport will play a key role in the event of any formal MOX proposal, as well as the eventual decision on how to proceed with long-term disposal of nuclear waste in Canada. Transport is not currently a pressing issue, however, since only about 5% of the high-level radioactive (i.e. reactor) waste produced in Canada to date has been moved to above-ground storage canisters, while the rest (which would fill several Olympic-size swimming pools) is currently stored at the reactor sites.39

Some witnesses argued before the Committee that it is impossible to separate the civilian and military uses of nuclear energy; in the words of Anne Adelson of the Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, "As far as we're concerned, there is no division between the civilian uses and the military uses of nuclear power and nuclear weapons."40 Not all critics of nuclear energy would go this far, but most do argue that it is neither as safe nor as economical as its supporters claim, and that the Government of Canada should phase it out in favour of alternative sources of energy.

Proponents of civilian nuclear power point out that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty guarantees access to the benefits of the peaceful use of the atom to all States willing to accept the international safeguards regime. On a domestic basis, they argue that Canada's already very good nuclear safety record could still be improved with more investment and better training, and that nuclear power is an economical energy source which, since it reduces reliance on fossil fuels, is environmentally friendly. As retired Canadian diplomat and long-time disarmament activist William Epstein responded to questions about civilian nuclear power and the sale of nuclear technology abroad,

On the other question of whether I favour getting rid of all nuclear energy, I don't, because until we can get alternate cheaper energy from sunshine, wind or other things, we will have to use it. It's like asking whether we should get rid of all oil and gas because they tend to pollute the atmosphere. We shouldn't, but I think we should make it a lot safer by insisting, as I said before, that they return all spent fuel to the original source. We have much stronger IAEA safeguards over the peaceful uses. They could and should be strengthened. They were already strengthened a little as a result of the North Korean thing, but not enough.41

Returning the spent fuel to Canada might decrease the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it would only reinforce the original dilemma over the domestic use of nuclear power. As a popular science book put the issue, "The question that faces us all is whether we, as a society, are prepared to accept the (admittedly small) risks associated with nuclear power to gain the advantages of electricity generated by reactors. This isn't a scientific question, but one of values - of weighing costs versus benefits."42

The Committee cannot resolve this debate, but members were struck by the universal demand of witnesses and those who submitted briefs for more information and debate on both nuclear disarmament and civilian nuclear power. During its hearings, the long-awaited report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel was released, setting a new higher standard for public policy in this area. Established in 1989 to assess Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's proposal for the deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes, the Panel noted the important distinction between the technical feasibility of the proposal, which was adequate, and public acceptability of it, which was not. The Panel also commented on the "deeply entrenched fear and mistrust of nuclear technology . . . within some segments of our society. This `dread factor' is real and palpable. It is an important element in decision-making processes concerning nuclear matters, as it will undoubtedly affect the public confidence resulting from such processes."43 Phillip Penna of the Canadian Uranium Alliance argued before the Committee that the Panel's emphasis on the need for public acceptability applies not only to that specific proposal, but equally to nuclear technology "across the board." In his words,

. . .it gives some very clear and good advice on issues around the social aspects of these technologies. We have to remember that nuclear technology has social implications. All technology has social implications. . .we need to develop a technology within a proper social framework . . .We've not yet thought through the ethical implications of using nuclear technology. We've not asked what this means for society and what we would like to have happen in our society. How should society deal with this as a whole?44

The Committee agrees that the report of the Environmental Assessment Panel has implications beyond the question of the deep geological disposal of nuclear waste.

RECOMMENDATION 4

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada explore additional means of both providing more information to Canadians on civilian uses of nuclear technology, and receiving more public input into government policy in this area. As one means of achieving this, the Committee also recommends that the Parliament of Canada conduct a separate and in-depth study on the domestic use, and foreign export of, Canada's civilian nuclear technology.

---

Chapter 2:
The Nuclear-Weapons-Capable States

We, the nuclear powers - and here I also speak about France - have to demonstrate that the apparent advantages of having nuclear weapons are above all responsibilities and do not grant us prestige or greater rights than other countries. . .nuclear and non-nuclear countries must work together on these issues. . .it must not be the preserve of the nuclear countries.

Progress toward the further reduction and eventual elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons obviously depends on the policies of the eight states that already have them. The Committee is under no illusion that Canada's bilateral influence in this area can be as significant as at the multilateral level; however, if the international community is to have any influence over the pace and content of the nuclear disarmament agenda, it is necessary to understand the situation and challenges in each of the five nuclear-weapon States - the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China - that have accepted disarmament and security responsibilities under the global bargain of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the three other nuclear-weapons- capable States - India, Israel and Pakistan - that have not. The terminology is admittedly awkward, but important: while all eight States are technically "nuclear-weapons-capable," the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China are more properly referred to as ``nuclear-weapons States" to reflect their adherence to the international non-proliferation regime.

These States acquired nuclear weapons under different circumstances, but the same argument for their reduction and prohibition applies in each case: the increased security and prestige they seem to provide is illusory; in fact, they decrease both. The May 1998 nuclear tests will not fulfil India's goal of increasing its prestige to match that of the five nuclear-weapon States; they may have the opposite effect, in fact, reducing the prestige of all eight States. As one observer put it after the tests, ". . .my conjecture is that the political and psychological, if not the military, prestige attached to nuclear weapons will be levelled downwards rather than upwards by recent events."46 These States will be considered separately in this Chapter, but their policies are closely related; continued nuclear disarmament between the United States and Russia, and increased transparency and other action by the United Kingdom, France and China, will not automatically result in safer polices in India, Pakistan and Israel, but are probably essential to their achievement.

Reducing the Value Placed on Nuclear Weapons

The fundamental problem in these eight States remains the high political and military value placed on nuclear weaponry despite its high cost and danger. Worse, since the mid-1990s that perceived value has actually increased in several States, notably Russia, the United States, India and Pakistan. As Professor William Walker has explained, after the initial arms control successes in the early 1990s, ". . .increased utility came to be attached (and was allowed to be attached) to nuclear weapons in most if not all of the eight States with active nuclear weapon programmes. Nuclear weapons did not regain the central roles ascribed to them during the Cold War - this was not back to square one - but they began to gain fresh importance in certain political and military contexts."47 This report stresses the need to reduce the political and military value of these weapons in order both to increase immediate nuclear safety and to allow the world to proceed toward nuclear elimination, or at least prohibition. A paradox exists, however: the five nuclear-weapon States have agreed in the NPT to eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons, but neither they nor the other three nuclear-weapons-capable States have seriously begun to prepare their publics (or elites) to accept such a change.48 The readiness to reduce the value of nuclear weapons is therefore highest in States, such as Canada, that do not have them, and lowest in those States where it is most required; increased public attention to this issue is therefore urgently required in those states.

Beyond "2+3+3"

The dynamics of nuclear arms control can best be understood through what has been called the "2+3+3" approach.49 Such negotiations have traditionally been carried on between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia ("2") on a bilateral basis. The nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom, France and China never amounted to more than 5% of those of the superpowers; while they are also nuclear-weapon States committed to disarmament under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, these states ("3") have essentially watched nuclear arms control, and now disarmament, negotiations from the sidelines. Not having accepted international obligations under the NPT or equivalent regimes, India, Israel and Pakistan ("3") have not been involved in nuclear arms control at all.

The United States and Russia have traditionally determined the pace and content of nuclear arms control. US-Russian bilateral negotiations resulted at the end of the Cold War in the START process, whereby strategic nuclear weapons have been reduced for the first time. Given the obvious security benefits of this process, witnesses were unanimous that it must continue, preferably through immediate Russian Duma ratification of the five-year-old START II Treaty. Should the Duma continue to be obstructionist, however, it has been suggested by Harald Müller, of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, and others that the U.S. and Russia nevertheless proceed immediately to negotiate START III. Alternately, they could follow the precedent, which they took with tactical nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, of non-binding reciprocal unilateral measures; while less satisfying, these at least have the advantage of not holding further progress hostage to the need for ratification.50 While continued progress between the United States and Russia is necessary, however, it is not sufficient; real progress demands that we move beyond the traditional "2+3+3" approach. The other nuclear-weapon States are unlikely to accept negotiated reductions in their arsenals until those of the United States and Russia have been reduced much further. At the same time, the Committee believes that Canada should urge them to follow the United Kingdom's good example of July 1998 to begin immediately to increase transparency about their nuclear stockpiles, fissile material and doctrine.

"De-Alerting" Nuclear Forces

As put to the Committee, a uniquely valuable approach for increasing nuclear safety and furthering the disarmament agenda is the concept of reciprocal "de-alerting" of nuclear forces to increase the time necessary to prepare them for launch from the current "hair-trigger" postures developed in response to the needs of the Cold War. Though open to criticism as a technical response to a political and moral problem, de-alerting provides several benefits: increasing nuclear safety in the short term without radical changes in defence policies, and building confidence over the longer term that will encourage further progress. Dr. Bruce Blair, a former U.S. Air Force missile launch control officer, and now a leading authority on nuclear command and control systems, argued before the Committee in Washington that given the continuing decline in Russia's nuclear arsenal, early warning and command and control systems, even modest de-alerting would increase current nuclear safety. Moreover, proceeding eventually to zero alert could create an international norm that would pressure all States to keep nuclear weapons off immediate launch status. There is also a convergence between de-alerting and the elimination of nuclear weapons in the long term: continued de-alerting would result in a comprehensive stage which would in effect be tantamount to elimination.51

The pages which follow contain information that has informed the Committee's position on the subject of de-alerting, and it notes the increased interest in this area - with the publication, for example, in the fall of 1998 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) of UNIDIR NewsLetter No. 38, "Nuclear De-alerting: Taking a Step Back." Of course, the full potential of de-alerting to increase safety and confidence can only be realized if it is reciprocal and verifiable; the details remain to be negotiated between the States themselves, but it is for this reason that the Committee strongly endorses the concept of de-alerting for the nuclear forces of all states.

RECOMMENDATION 5

In the interest of increased nuclear safety and stability, and as a means to advance toward the broader goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada endorse the concept of de-alerting all nuclear forces, subject to reciprocity and verification - including the arsenals of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States - and encourage their governments to pursue this option.

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

. . .despite reductions in numbers and alert levels, both countries remain capable of rapidly bringing their nuclear forces to full readiness for use. This operational availability unnecessarily exacerbates the small but significant risk of erroneous or unauthorized use.

The United States and the Soviet Union dominated the security and nuclear arms control agendas during the Cold War, and the U.S. and Russia continue to do so now it has ended; these two neighbours of Canada still account for about 95% of the world's nuclear weapons.53 The defence and foreign policies of the United States and Russia were shaped by the Cold War to an even greater extent than those of other states; thus it was expected that they would reap the benefit of its end to revise their nuclear doctrines, and proceed to address the serious Cold War nuclear legacy, which includes surplus warheads and fissile material resulting from arms reductions; as the Committee noted in its April 1997 report Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century, not the least of the Cold War nuclear legacies is the environmental threat to the Arctic emanating from Russian naval bases in the region.

Despite reductions in the size of their arsenals, however, as the Committee was told in Washington, the United States and Russia still have not seized the opportunity to re-think their nuclear policies. As Bruce Blair has put it, "No major change in the US-Russian nuclear equation has occurred - not in war planning, not in daily alert practices, not in strategic arms control, and maybe not even in core attitudes."54 Jack Mendelsohn of the Arms Control Association agreed that a classic nuclear deterrent relationship still exists between the United States and Russia; he told the Committee in Washington that, at least until the political basis of their relationship changes, this means that these two states will continue to focus on their strategic nuclear forces.

Building on the START Process

During the Cold War, strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers was thought essential for "stability." The START process continues to be based on this principle; while START reductions remain vital, however, this principle is now increasingly unrealistic, since Russia cannot afford to maintain a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States. In fact, according to a number of witnesses, the nuclear difficulties posed by these two States are largely reversed: the United States seems determined to maintain the nuclear status quo, while Russia is unable to do so.

The START process has produced real global security benefits, but it is stalled as the Russian Duma took its chance to hold hostage a policy supported by President Yeltsin. In order to address legitimate Russian concerns, the United States and Russia agreed, in March 1997, on the framework for a START III agreement to be negotiated immediately after the ratification of START II. Beyond further reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads, START III will break important new ground in such areas as transparency. The benefits of both the existing START II and proposed START III agreements are clear. While not sufficient in itself, the START process is indispensable for further progress; Canada and other states must therefore take all possible action to convince the United States and Russia to continue and expand it.

The U.S. and Russia have agreed to reduce their strategic arsenals to 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic warheads under the still-to-be negotiated START III treaty; however, they will also retain a "hedge" of non-deployed warheads. Even after all current arms reduction treaties are implemented, the United States plans to preserve indefinitely a total arsenal of some 10,000 nuclear warheads; as we noted in the last Chapter, less than 1% of this total can still kill millions of people. Russia's plans are less clear, but it will probably remain as close to the U.S. level as it can afford. Even more striking than the numbers is the fact that their basic operational and other nuclear policies have undergone very little change.

RECOMMENDATION 6

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada take all possible action to encourage the United States and Russia to continue the START process. In particular, Canada should encourage Russia to ratify START II, should provide concrete support towards achieving this objective, and should encourage like-minded states to work with Russia to ensure increased political and economic stability in that country. Beyond this, Canada should urge both parties to pursue progressive and reciprocal reforms to their respective nuclear postures.

The Norwegian Incident

Concerns over the continued high alert level of nuclear forces and the deterioration of Russian warning systems came together on January 25, 1995, when the Russian missile early warning system detected a scientific rocket launched of the coast of Norway. This area is frequented by U.S. submarines, whose ballistic missiles could scatter eight nuclear warheads over Moscow within fifteen minutes.55 Norway had informed the Russian Foreign Ministry about the upcoming launch, but this information had not been transmitted to the military. Over the next several minutes President Yeltsin was informed of the possible American attack, and, for the first time ever, his "nuclear briefcase" was switched into alert mode for emergency use, allowing him to order a full Russian nuclear response. Tension mounted as the rocket separated into several stages, but the crisis ended after about eight minutes (just a few minutes before the procedural deadline to respond to an impending nuclear attack) when it became clear that the rocket was headed out to sea and would not pose a threat to Russia.

Subsequent commentary stressed the dangers of relying on Russia's deteriorating missile early warning and nuclear command and control systems. This misses the fact that Russia's systems actually performed as planned in this case, enabling President Yeltsin to order a retaliatory response within minutes, even before it had been confirmed that an attack was actually underway. The need to ensure that such decisions could be taken within minutes sprang from the Cold War fear of surprise nuclear attacks; yet, despite the end of the Cold War years earlier and tremendously improved relations between the U.S. and Russia, Yeltsin operated at the same level of stress and uncertainty. The danger resulted more from the continued high level of alert rather than the functioning of the Russian system itself. Previous false alarms had activated U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the Cold War, yet, as the designer of Russia's "nuclear briefcase" system pointed out shortly after the incident,

What is important is that this happened not at the time when U.S. Pershings were deployed in Europe but now, when Russia has signed the START Treaty and agreements with the United States, Great Britain, and China on the "mutual non-targeting of missiles." . . .The security of mankind cannot depend on anybody's sloppiness in notifying about launches or negligence in transferring information.56

This continued Cold War alert level is unnecessary and dangerous in the late 1990s, particularly, as we shall see, given the diverging nuclear situations in the United States and Russia.

THE UNITED STATES

We are determined to seize the opportunity history has presented to reduce further the roles and risks of nuclear weapons. There could be no greater gift to the future.

. . .the heart of the issue for this Committee and for the Government of Canada is how to influence the United States. They are our friend; they are our ally. . .The U.S. administration needs help, because they have their own recalcitrant elements within the United States itself. They need help from like-minded states. They need help from public opinion.

In April 1996 U.S. President Bill Clinton reaffirmed that the United States remained committed to the pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons; he added before the United Nations General Assembly in September that he hoped that during the next century "the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be even further reduced - and ultimately eliminated." Frank Miller, then Acting US Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), (now Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction) told the Committee in Washington in March 1998 that nuclear weapons play a smaller role in U.S. national security policy than ever before.59 The Committee accepts this fact; the question is whether the U.S. can safely go further on this path to increase the security of all. In the opinion of most witnesses and many others, the answer is clearly yes. Russia and the other nuclear-weapons-capable States share equal responsibility for modifying their own policies, and, wherever possible, further steps must be reciprocal. Yet while responsibility for further progress cannot rest with the United States alone, in the opinion of many witnesses and others, as the world's sole superpower, it is uniquely able to lead by example.

The past decade has seen significant reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal; however, a combination of modernization programs, increased flexibility and a decrease in the number of Russian targets (through reduction of Russian strategic missiles), means that U.S. nuclear forces are in fact more capable than ever.60 They peaked at about 32,000 in the mid-1960s, stood at 23, 510 by the mid-1980s, and now number some 12,070, of which 1,350 are awaiting dismantlement and disposal.61

The U.S. military had substantially reduced the number of targets in its nuclear warplan immediately following the end of the Cold War, but the first true review of nuclear policy was to be the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), begun under the Clinton administration in the fall of 1993, which was to "incorporate reviews of policy, doctrine, force structure, operations, safety and security, and arms control all in one look." Conduct of the Review was much narrower, however, and reportedly dominated by bureaucratic infighting. While the NPR noted "the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security," and formalized the strategy of "hedging" strategic nuclear forces, it concluded by, in the words of Dr. Janne Nolan, ". . .recommending that there be no significant changes in the nuclear weapons policies of Clinton's predecessor. Forces would go no lower than START II levels, nuclear weapons would be retained in Europe at current levels, and there would be no serious alterations in U.S. operational policies." She added that "As was apparent after the conclusion of the 1994 nuclear posture review, an international climate which seemed highly propitious for disarmament measures was not sufficient to counter entrenched U.S. domestic perceptions of the continued importance of large-scale and activated nuclear forces."62 The results of the Nuclear Posture Review were reaffirmed by the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.

As we will see throughout this Report, the five nuclear-weapon States are widely believed to be protecting the nuclear status quo in their refusal to begin substantive discussions of nuclear disarmament. To witnesses it seemed that the United States has been attempting to preserve the nuclear status quo at lower and lower levels of warheads, yet without adequately considering supporting changes in its broader political or operational policies. In fact, in recent years as concern has mounted about the possible proliferation of biological or chemical weapon and their means of delivery, the U.S. has followed a strategy of deliberate ambiguity: reaffirming the Negative Security Assurances concerning use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, yet arguing that the legal concept of "belligerent reprisal" might nevertheless allow such a response. As Jack Mendelsohn explained in Washington, the driving force behind the nuclear status quo in the United States is not money or the defence industry, but the sense that nuclear weapons can still have some utility in U.S. security policy.63

Despite the fact that it was directly contradicted by the START I and START II treaties, until late 1997 U.S. nuclear doctrine remained based on Ronald Reagan's 1981 nuclear guidance, which required that the U.S. be able to fight and prevail in a protracted nuclear war. As the Clinton administration began to consider moving below START II levels in 1996, the U.S. military argued that it could not do so and still fulfil the 1981 guidance. In response, President Clinton signed a new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-60) in November 1997 to resolve this problem. As Joseph Cirincione told the Committee in Washington, PDD-60 was a "mixed bag" which involved one step forward and two steps back: on the one hand, it carried out a necessary revision of the 1981 policy and allowed the United States to contemplate lower levels of warheads. On the other, it locked the U.S. into still-high levels of warheads, and reportedly (the Directive is highly classified) raised the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack.64 While it is impossible to verify the latter point, this was the perception, and in public discussions of PDD-60, U.S. officials certainly did not go far in dispelling the deliberate ambiguity which surrounds this issue.

The fact that the U.S. is in a much stronger position than Russia means that, whether it welcomes the role or not, it will continue to be looked to for leadership on nuclear disarmament. As Professor William Walker argued in mid-1998,

The attitude of the United States may be decisive. In the past two to three years, if one is blunt, its international reputation as the responsible overseer of nuclear arms control has been damaged. The U.S. government has been seen as treating too lightly its obligations after achieving the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995, as being too quick to give concessions to right-wing constituencies inside and outside Congress, and as failing to respond constructively to justifiable concerns of other states, not least in regard to security assurances and to Israel's stance on nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This may be considered unfair: others may be equally or more guilty, and hegemonies often face the most difficult choices. But as the world's most powerful and creative nation-state, and as the progenitor of nuclear arms control, it must always face high expectations. One hopes that the U.S. government will now be prepared to take an imaginative lead - and some political risks.65

At the same time, the Committee accepts the arguments of Professor Douglas Ross of Simon Fraser University and others who warned that, while Canada and other countries must continue to be frank in their views with the United States and encourage it to toward further progress, we must be careful that this does not feed isolationist currents there.

RUSSIA

. . .the Russian defense establishment is more suspicious of the West than most observers imagine, the nuclear threshold is lower than commonly perceived, and the domestic and international context is a more pivotal factor in Russian threat assessment than is normally recognized. Worse, perhaps, the danger of Russian nuclear miscalculation is not as remote as many suppose, and the progressive deterioration of Russian early warning and control represents a more serious threat than either of our governments is willing to acknowledge.

What little attention to nuclear issues survived the end of the Cold War focused on the situation in Russia, where the chaotic pace of political change coincided with severe military budget cuts and a massive return of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, resulting in fear of loss of authority over them or the leakage of nuclear expertise and material out of that country. An important Harvard University study captured the preoccupations well in its title, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy.67 Retired General Alexandr Lebed, who served briefly as Secretary of Russia's National Security Council in 1996, rekindled such "loose nuke" fears in 1997 with suggestions that at least 84 Russian nuclear "suitcase" bombs remained unaccounted for.68 The past several years have thankfully not yet shown clear evidence of such "anarchy," but this remains a real danger, which cannot be ignored.

Russia bears the primary responsibility for the security of its nuclear arsenal and the disposition of its excess nuclear warheads and fissile material. Russia is obviously in the interests of the international community to assist it as much as possible, however, and the West was generally slow to do so in the immediate post-Cold War period. The United States did, however, implement the important Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn-Lugar) program to help Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics to dismantle former Soviet nuclear strategic systems; early bottlenecks have been improved over the years, and the program widened to include all Weapons of Mass Destruction. By the end of 1997 the CTR program had approved some $1.8 billion in assistance to all of the former republics, $973 million of which was to go to Russia. The U.S. and other states also support the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow as a means of ensuring the productive employment of nuclear experts. Canada has focused much of its support on the similar Science and Technology Centre in Kiev, and, as we shall see in Chapter 3, has also contributed to nuclear safety and non-proliferation objectives in the region through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

A Weaker Russia

The scale of the changes in Russia's military over the past decade have been astounding; as one recent study has noted, "In Russia, treaty reductions, technological obsolescence, a lack of finances, and new concerns about physical security as a result of the break up of the Soviet Union have resulted in even more dramatic changes than in the US."69 The traditionally elite Russian nuclear forces have not suffered to the same extent as other services, but even they have not been immune; In 1996-97 Russian Defence Minister Rodionov warned that funding problems and bad management were making Russia's nuclear forces dangerously "unmanageable." The Central Intelligence Agency similarly claimed in 1997 that antiquated Russian central missile-command systems had accidentally gone to full "combat" mode several times since 1991.70

Russia's nuclear arsenal peaked at about 45,000 warheads in the mid-1980s, yet the Soviet Union was unable to modernize these forces to keep pace with the United States. Russia currently has about 22,500 warheads, some 10,240 of which are thought to be operational. The START II treaty limit for U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads was 3,000-3,500 each, but Russia's inability to maintain this level led it to press for a START III level of 2,000-2,500 each. As President Yeltsin explained in a May 1998 speech to Russian diplomats, "We have to reach lower levels of strategic weapons that would ensure our security and be equal to those of the United States. This will be a major breakthrough, a complete balance with the United States. Nobody will be in a position to threaten us."71 Yet even this is probably beyond Russia's means to sustain; Bruce Blair told the Committee in Washington that most experts believe that the Russian strategic arsenal will fall to perhaps 1,000 warheads in ten years, and perhaps even as few as 500 in fifteen years.72 President Yeltsin added in early July 1998 that "the fact that reports appear here and there in the media that we have got weaker on the nuclear front, first of all, they are seriously mistaken, and second, they do not help the state."73

Russia has seized on nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period as a means of offsetting the decline in its conventional forces, and as one of the few remaining symbols of its superpower status. As Dmitri Trenin, a former Russian military officer now affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put it in May 1998,

. . .there's been an about face in the Russian elite's attitude on nuclear weapons. The proposals of the Gorbachevian era to create a nuclear free world are dubbed reactionary romanticism by some of the very influential Russians. And if you look at the state of the nation which is ranked sixteenth in terms of GDP, which has male life expectancy just under sixty years, there's not much left besides nuclear weapons to substantiate the claims to a status of great power. If you would throw in conventional military weakness and a number of other issues then you would see that there is some logic to those who de facto renuclearize Russian security policy or at least Russian defense policy. This may be counter productive for Russia but that seems to be the case.

This does not mean, however, that there is a lack of interest in arms control. That Russia is on the verge of reversing itself on nuclear downsizing or reversing its nuclear posture. Not at all. But the reliance has certainly increased.74

In 1991-92 Russia formally reversed the Soviet Union's previous "No First Use" of nuclear weapons pledge, adopting instead a policy of first use if necessary closer to that of the United States; as the U.S. State Department explained in written answers to a U.S. Senate Committee in 1997, "The likeliest scenario - albeit still extremely unlikely - for a Russian use of nuclear weapons would probably be a small war on Russia's periphery which threatened to escalate beyond the Russian ability to prevent a catastrophic defeat with only conventional weapons''.75 Russia's December 1997 National Security Concept rightly emphasized that future threats to Russia's security are more likely to be internal ones resulting from economic factors rather than external and military. Yet the May 1997 appointment as Defence Minister of Marshal Igor Sergeyev, who had spent most of his career in the Strategic Rocket Forces, probably means that greater reliance on nuclear weapons will continue at least for the medium term, as Russia's badly overdue military reform is finally carried out under a nuclear umbrella. Yet U.S. nuclear policy exists in combination with strong conventional forces, which Russia no longer has; as one observer put it, "this ushers in a new era of `flexible response,' but without much flexibility."76

Frank Miller told the Committee in Washington that the increased Russian reliance on nuclear weapons does not alarm the United States: he agreed with Sir Michael Quinlan that the Soviet No First Use pledge had been propaganda which would have had little impact in practice, and added that the new Russian policy is also clearly defensive in orientation, which is fine since the United States does not plan to attack Russia.77 The State Department also downplayed the practical importance of the Russian change:

As a matter of declaratory policy, Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons in its strategic planning increased in 1992-93 and appears likely to increase again in the wake of NATO expansion or as a result of the military reform debate. However, the likelihood of Russia actually using nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future remains extremely low for two reasons. First, Russia is unlikely to find itself embroiled in any war of sufficient magnitude to warrant the use of nuclear weapons. Second, no matter what Russia's declaratory policy, any sane future Russian leader would weigh very carefully the possibility that his first use of nuclear weapons could have extremely negative consequences, threatening at least Russia's future political standing, perhaps even its physical existence.78

Most witnesses agreed, however, that Russia's deliberate lowering of the nuclear threshold as a result of weakness was a disturbing development; it will probably not be quickly changed, but it cannot be ignored.

De-Alerting U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

In a situation of increased American and decreased Russian nuclear capability, the questions are whether means exist to increase nuclear safety and stability, and whether Canada can play a useful role in advancing them. Most witnesses argued that the answer is yes to both.

As we have seen, while the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals has been reduced since the end of the Cold War, their alert status and operational procedures are largely unchanged. During the Cold War both countries concluded that they could not be certain of their ability to absorb ("ride out") a surprise nuclear attack and still respond with a second strike. They had therefore developed systems that focused on launching very quickly. These alert levels could perhaps have been justified during the Cold War, when a surprise nuclear attack might have been possible, but they are difficult to justify now. In the case of Russia, at least, whose command and control and other nuclear infrastructure continue to deteriorate in physical and other terms, they are dangerously high. As the U.S. National Academy of Sciences pointed out in 1997,

The issue is one of balancing risks. During the Cold War, reducing the risk of a surprise attack appeared to be more important than the risks generated by maintaining nuclear forces in a continuous state of alert. With the end of the Cold War, the opposite is now the more credible view, and this has important implications for U.S. nuclear policy, making dramatically reduced alert rates possible and highly desirable.79

De-alerting, previously suggested by experts as a means of increasing nuclear safety and building confidence for further measures, really entered the mainstream of the U.S. debate in mid-1997, when Sam Nunn, a pragmatic and highly-respected former U.S. Senator and Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, joined with Bruce Blair to advocate the idea. Their June 1997 argument is worth quoting at length:

It is time for the United States and Russia to cast off the mental shackles of deterrence, to "de-alert" our strategic forces and embrace a new formula that makes our nuclear relationship more compatible with our political relationship.

The United States and Russia are no longer enemies, but almost six years after the end of the Soviet Union and communist rule there, we remain stuck in the Cold War logic of "mutual assured destruction." By this formula, the security of each side depends upon the certain knowledge in Washington and in Moscow that their strategic forces could survive a nuclear attack by the other and answer with a devastating retaliatory strike. Accordingly, each country still maintains roughly 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads poised and ready to launch. These deterrent practices may have been necessary during the Cold War. Today they constitute a dangerous anachronism...

After explaining that the continuing budgetary and other problems in Russia mean that it is progressively less able to continue this situation safely, Nunn and Blair advocated the reciprocal and verifiable de-alerting of strategic forces:

By de-alerting, we mean adopting measures that increase the amount of time needed to prepare nuclear forces for launch. Although such measures could be reversed if circumstances change and national security requires it, de-alerting would create a judicious delay in the capacity for launch in order to assure more reliable control over nuclear weapons, to reduce daily nuclear tensions, and to strengthen mutual confidence in each other's nuclear intentions. De-alerting does not mean the elimination of nuclear weapons, but it would eliminate their hair trigger, unlike the "de-targeting" steps taken under the 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin agreement which can be reversed in a matter of seconds...

De-alerting would lead to much safer nuclear postures. It would not solve the world's problem of safeguarding detached nuclear warheads, nuclear materials and know-how, but it would greatly reduce the serious dangers associated with the deterioration of Russian nuclear control - as well as relegate to history the already remote threat of a sudden deliberate nuclear first strike.80

Recent developments have kept attention focused on this idea: Britain's July 1998 Strategic Defence Review announced limited de-alerting measures, and the eight States which comprise the "New Agenda Coalition" featured de-alerting prominently in their June 1998 call for further action on nuclear disarmament.

Having discussed these issues with Bruce Blair and others in Washington, and heard witnesses' strong support for the concept, the Committee fully endorses prompt action towards de-alerting. Any allied support would help, since the Committee was told in Washington that while U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen reportedly favours action on de-alerting, given the political backlash such a policy will likely provoke, he is attempting to strengthen the case before taking a public position.

NORAD and Nuclear Stability

Canada can do more than simply add another voice to the call for de-alerting by supporting related action within the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Command, in which this country is an equal partner with the U.S. in the aerospace defence of North America. As Dr. Blair explained in an August 1998 submission to the Committee, during the Cold War the bomber and missile attack early warning operations carried out by NORAD were vital to deterrence, and therefore stability. Yet given the strong case now for de-alerting strategic nuclear forces:

NORAD procedures would be revised accordingly. De-alerting would downgrade the role of launch-on-warning and thus NORAD's role in supporting this increasingly dangerous option would decline. NORAD could assume greater responsibilities for supporting the operational safety of strategic forces, including Russian forces.

A direct link between NORAD and its Russian counterpart near Moscow would serve this purpose. A direct feed of NORAD warning information into the Russian warning network could partially compensate for deficiencies in the Russian warning network. A reliable stream of timely data on global missile launches could reduce the otherwise growing susceptibility of Russian warning to false alarms and other performance degradations. Of particular concern is the Y2K problem, the so-called millennium bug, that may afflict Russia's early warning network. According to U.S. officials, this bug could cause the Russian network to blank out or to generate false positive indications of enemy attack. Sharing warning information through a direct, real-time link could mitigate this effect. . .

Canadian support, both diplomatic and military, in achieving a functional "hot-line" between NORAD and Russia's main missile warning centre would be welcome. It is a prudent position on a matter of serious concern. It would promote nuclear safety without eroding deterrence.81

This proposal is very much in keeping with the arguments of Professor Douglas Ross, who similarly suggested to the Committee:

Advocating the provision of multilateral (and if need be unilateral Canadian) financial and technical assistance to Russia for restoring and improving its missile early warning capabilities so that the Russian leadership will not be driven to resorting to "launch on warning" procedures - with a faulty, error-prone warning system - or, even worse, relying on the largely automated and therefore inherently unstable "dead hand" retaliatory launch system.82

The Committee agrees that such action would be valuable both in the case of short-term safety and longer-term progress on disarmament. At their Moscow Summit in September 1998 the United States and Russia agreed to share, on a "continuous" basis, early warning information on the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles by any nation; announced that a joint early warning centre, the first of its kind, will be established on Russian territory; and agreed to establish a multilateral pre-launch notification regime for ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles - so that any state which chooses to participate could provide advance notification of a missile launch. Officials from the U.S. and Russia must now work out the details of these agreements. While Russia is not, of course, a party to NORAD, the Committee believes that NORAD can play a useful role in helping implement these agreements.

RECOMMENDATION 7

Given its potential contribution to nuclear safety and stability, and the need to act promptly to address the possible implications of the millennium bug, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada explore further with the United States and Russia the feasibility of establishing a NORAD "hotline" to supplement and strengthen Russia's missile early warning system. Canada should also strongly support the idea of broadening such a mechanism to include other nuclear-weapons-capable States.

Surplus Fissile Material and the MOX Option

Another key aspect of the nuclear problem is the surplus fissile material - mainly highly-enriched uranium and plutonium - which will become available over the next decades as a result of current and future arms reductions. This issue affects both the United States and Russia, but is of particular concern in Russia, which is less equipped to deal with it. Tariq Rauf explained to the Committee that as a result of sweeping arms reduction agreements, Russia will be releasing about 89 tonnes of plutonium and nearly 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium from dismantled warheads, whose safety and security is very much in doubt as a result of the collapse of the former Soviet nuclear infrastructure. He continued:

There are a number of proposals on how to deal with it. The United States is buying the entire 500 tonnes of uranium coming out of dismantled warheads. The problem that still remains to be resolved is what to do with excess weapons plutonium. Canada, Japan and France have all expressed interest in burning up such plutonium once it has been converted into mixed oxide fuel. While the French proposal calls for MOX burn-up in Russia with French technical assistance, there are certain doubts about this given the lack of proper controls in Russia. Therefore, building a new plutonium-burning reactor in Russia would not be recommended.

Similarly, Japan does not have the reactors to burn such plutonium. Canada does. Without any major engineering modifications, our CANDU reactors could burn up this mixed oxide fuel and the spent fuel could then be kept under international safeguards.83

As we noted in the last Chapter, Canada's agreement-in-principle, at the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, to consider burning surplus Russian and American plutonium as MOX fuel, has been very controversial; a number of witnesses criticized this option, and the preliminary Parallex or MOX fuel "test burn," which has been repeatedly delayed. As Lorne Green of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade noted before the Committee, "Part of the problem is that we're grasping at air here in a way, because there isn't a MOX project at the moment. It's something that's been out there for a couple of years now, and the United States and the Russians are looking at it, but they're looking at a lot of other things as well."84 He continued, "Let me be clear: there currently is no proposal from either the United States or from Russia to consume fuel produced from surplus weapons plutonium in Canadian reactors. It is one option, and only an option, that is out there for consideration. If there were such a request in the years ahead, then it would have to be assessed in great detail."85

A number of witnesses were not satisfied with this argument. On the concept itself, Professor Franklyn Griffiths of the University of Toronto admitted that,

On the surface, indeed, you could say, well, not a bad idea; there's a lot of weapons plutonium out there, and surely something has to be done with it. You could say on the surface that to convert it into electricity here in Canada and to get it out of the hands of those who might use it once again for weapons purposes would be a great thing. On the surface there were advantages, it seemed to me, and yet I sensed this thing was not all that it appeared to be.

After studying the issue carefully, however, he came to a very different conclusion:

The initiative is wrong-headed. It does not produce the benefits that are claimed for it in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament . . . In fact, in some respects it is counterproductive and actually promises to make things worse if implemented in its present form.

He argued that this proposal promised to deliver costs to Canadians in the areas of safety, security, financial cost, and also governance:

On the governance costs, I take these seriously. These have to do with the integrity of the Canadian environmental and regulatory process, which is going to be very severely strained if this proposal goes through and we have actually to conduct an assessment on what will be indeed an utterly unique international security proposition for which there is no assessment procedure in existence. There's nothing set up to deal with this. We'll have to create a new one from scratch. You could say that would be a good opportunity, perhaps. I'm not sure we're up to it

. . . In any case, I come down against this proposal firmly and say it should be withdrawn forthwith.86

Even Tariq Rauf, one of the few non-governmental experts to support MOX as the best of several poor options, admitted that,

Politically, yes, I would argue that this would be a difficult thing to sell to the Canadian public, particularly the routes along which trucks would pass carrying this material, but I think this is an issue where, again, there needs to be a multiparty debate and hopefully consensus on this issue. We're helping to reduce proliferation dangers.87

He added, however, that, given the global non-proliferation and other benefits of the MOX concept,

. . . the responsibility should not be Canada's alone. This Committee could consider a recommendation that the government approach the NATO allies and Japan to put in place a multilateral program to provide the technical expertise and the funding to facilitate the safe interim storage of excess weapons fissile materials, to assist the Russian Federation in converting excess weapons plutonium to MOX, and to underwrite the subsequent burn-up of this material in Canadian CANDU reactors, followed by permanent storage under IAEA safeguards.88

As the Committee learned in Washington, while MOX remains a fall-back option, it is not now among the mainstream choices in the United States.89 Russia has traditionally supported the MOX option in the hope of recouping some of its investment over the years; it remains to be seen what it, and the United States, decide. In any event, it seems likely that if a formal MOX proposal is eventually submitted to Canada, it will be less extensive than was assumed in 1996.

The Canadian Government has given assurances that any future MOX proposal will be subject to all licensing requirements for safety, health, security and environmental protection. To this, we add the common-sense caveat that if the benefits of any MOX proposal will be widely shared, so too should the cost of, and responsibility for it. In addition to the in-depth study recommended in Chapter 1, in the interest of accountability, the Government must also ensure that Parliament plays a role in future debates and decisions over how best to address the global problem of surplus fissile material.

RECOMMENDATION 8

The Committee recommends that the Government reject the idea of burning MOX fuel in Canada because this option is totally unfeasible, but that it continue to work with other governments to address the problem of surplus fissile material.

THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND CHINA

I would also emphasize that these reductions also affected the European powers, therefore France and the United Kingdom. I believe that it is interesting to note that the countries that had only a few hundred nuclear weapons also agreed to important reductions . . .

In fact, today only China is not following this general reduction scenario for arsenals. I allow myself to underline this because it is not generally stated. In fact, China leads very much in speech in disarmament issues, but not in fact.

The United Kingdom, France and China are in a unique situation among the nuclear-weapon States. These permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have accepted the same disarmament and security undertakings as the United States and Russia under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; however, the fact that their arsenals - which range from about 450 operational warheads for France, to 400 for China and about 260 for the United Kingdom - never approached those of the U.S. and Russia in size has meant that they have not yet participated in nuclear disarmament negotiations such as START. Given that the arsenals of these "second-tier" nuclear-weapon States are not comparable to those of the U.S. or Russia, they will probably not accept negotiated reductions in their arsenals until after further U.S. and Russian reductions. Yet the issue is not simply a quantitative one, since these States join the United States and Russia in refusing to discuss substantive disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament. In fact, it has therefore been argued that they are in the best of all possible nuclear worlds: reaping whatever symbolic benefits unfortunately still accrue from being nuclear-weapon States, while at the same time allowing the U.S. and Russia - and now India, Pakistan and Israel - to take the brunt of international pressure to disarm. Despite having smaller arsenals than the United States and Russia, these States have a responsibility to demonstrate their willingness to act on their disarmament commitments.

Traditional European great powers, the United Kingdom and France acquired nuclear weapons as NATO members during the Cold War, partly to serve as a "second centre" to supplement the U.S. deterrent within the Western political grouping, and partly for other reasons. Since the end of the Cold War, they have both made significant unilateral reductions in both the size of their arsenals and the number of delivery systems: according to Camille Grand, French reductions have been on the order of 30% - from about 500 warheads to less than 400. While important and welcome, unilateral reductions are less satisfying because they are reversible.

Having tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960, France chose not to join the NPT in 1968, although it pledged to act as if it had. Public support for an independent (and therefore more costly) French nuclear deterrent has always been very strong, and remains so today. France's 1995 decision to break an international moratorium on nuclear testing and complete a final series of tests resulted in strong international criticism; yet, as promised, France moved in the following years to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In 1998 France and the United Kingdom became the first two nuclear-weapon States to ratify the CTBT.

With the U.S. and Canada, the United Kingdom had been involved in the early research which led to the atomic bomb, and tested its first nuclear device in the 1950s. As Sir Michael Quinlan pointed out in 1997, since the early 1960s the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent has mainly been based on the simple ("Mark I") desire for operational independence within NATO, rather than broader reasons; unlike France, it did not go so far as a to create its own nuclear procurement system ("Mark II").91 While it did not go as far as some critics had hoped, as one element of the new Labour government's "ethical" foreign policy, the UK's July 1998 Strategic Defence Review took a number of welcome steps in the area of nuclear policy: reducing the UK's nuclear deterrent from the previous maximum of 300 operationally-available warheads on Vanguard submarines to less than 200; adopting some de-alerting measures (while rejecting more comprehensive ones); and, especially, increasing transparency about the UK's nuclear arsenal, fissile material and doctrine.

Isolated from both the Western and later Eastern blocs during the Cold War, China has only recently begun to integrate itself into international non-proliferation and other fora; throughout the 1970s, in fact, it advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a means of limiting the power of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since it continues to keep secret details of its nuclear program, China is the nuclear-weapon State about whose nuclear program the least is known; as Sir Michael Quinlan argued before the Committee, ". . . there could be much more openness about nuclear armouries, about numbers and types and yields and delivery systems and deployments. . . it does seem particularly desirable to persuade China, which is much the most secretive, to also engage in this endeavour." 92 China has traditionally refused to engage in such openness, but Harald Müller argued that it has been making greater efforts of late, and also that the May 1998 South Asian nuclear tests may actually encourage it to go further still:

With respect to China, I would assume that the interest in nuclear arms control and disarmament has disproportionately risen over the past two weeks because of the new situation in which China finds itself.

It is quite astonishing what efforts the Chinese have made in the last two or three years to understand what arms control and disarmament is all about, efforts such as the number of new experts they have trained and the new institutes they have created . . . I think this is really one of the few things that can be done to at least influence the mood in South Asia, particularly in India.93

Preparing for Nuclear Disarmament

It has long been accepted that, despite their NPT disarmament commitment, these three nuclear-weapon States would only accept negotiated reductions in their nuclear arsenals following further substantial reductions in those of the United States and Russia. Camille Grand argued that:

I think they will get involved at some point; that's for sure. It's not clear yet whether it will be somewhere between a START II and a START III, or somewhere between a START III and a START IV, or later. I think the proper answer would be that they should get involved right away when it comes to transparency, when it comes to confidence-building measures. . .

When it comes to actual disarmament measures, I think the proper thing to do would be, when the United States and Russia decide on the next step, which is already almost planned, 1,500 warheads - the whole process started in Helsinki - France and Britain and China should say they seal at a certain level. It could be 500; it could be 400; it could be the existing level at that time. So they would make public their position and seal at that point.

Then, when Russia and the United States go below the 1,000 warhead point, we should accept, probably, a lower ceiling. Then, when we all come in the hundreds, we should determine if there should be a difference between France and the United States. Probably there should be, because we don't have the same responsibilities.94

RECOMMENDATION 9

In view of their responsibilities as nuclear-weapon States under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and as Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada encourage the United Kingdom, France and China to: increase transparency about their nuclear stockpiles, fissile material and doctrine; support the call of Canada and other States for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament; and explore with the United States and Russia means of preparing to enter nuclear disarmament reductions at the earliest possible moment.

INDIA, ISRAEL AND PAKISTAN

Let me start with the consequences of the events in South Asia. They have fundamentally changed the parameters of world politics, and nuclear disarmament in particular. These events are as significant as the fall of the Berlin Wall nine years ago. Unfortunately, they direct us in the opposite direction, away from cooperation, arms control, and disarmament, towards confrontation, arms racing and eventually nuclear war. The world community must make its utmost efforts to stem this fateful tide.

The three nuclear-weapons-capable States of India, Israel and Pakistan have much smaller nuclear arsenals than the other five States; estimates vary considerably as a result of the clandestine nature of these programs, but, according to the Arms Control Association, these may range from 70 to 125 weapons for Israel, 60 to 80 for India, and 10 to 15 for Pakistan.96 These States are in regions of longstanding conflict, however; since they have not accepted limitations on their nuclear programs which would reassure their neighbours, their nuclear programs risk provoking proliferation to hostile neighbouring States. While smaller than those of the five nuclear-weapon States, then, use of these arsenals is unfortunately perhaps more likely.

Regional Security and Nuclear Weapons

Much has been written about the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Since they occurred at the end of the Committee's study, little of the testimony related directly to these events; yet far from invalidating earlier testimony, the Indian and Pakistani tests highlighted the need to reduce the perceived value of nuclear weapons, increase the safety of current nuclear programs through de-alerting and other measures, and encourage all States to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

South Asia

In the case of South Asia, India had demonstrated a nuclear capacity in 1974 when it broke written assurances to Canada and detonated what it referred to as a peaceful nuclear device; as we shall see in the next Chapter, this incident was to have important implications for the evolution of Canada's nuclear export policy. While it has long argued that the NPT is discriminatory, India did not attempt to justify its May 1998 tests on this basis, but on that of security needs; the Committee does not accept either argument.

Pakistan reportedly began its clandestine nuclear program shortly following its defeat and dismemberment by India in 1971;97 the Committee was told by senior Pakistani politicians in June 1998, in a meeting planned before Pakistan's nuclear tests, that while Pakistan had reached the nuclear "threshold" by 1984-85, it did not assemble or test such weapons until forced to do so by the Indian tests 14 years later; in the words of Senator Muhammad Akram Zaki, Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, "We thought balance of terror was better than terror of imbalance."98 That Pakistan responded to the Indian test is not in dispute; however, the Committee believes that in doing so it reduced rather than increased both its security and its international reputation.

These nuclear tests have greatly worsened the regional security situation in South Asia, yet it is important to recognize that the basic issue remains one of regional conflict rather than nuclear weapons; these weapons increase the danger of the situation, yet India and Pakistan did not need them to fight three wars since 1947. The situation in South Asia also underlines the geographic and technical fact that the concept of "deterrence" which evolved during the Cold War between two superpowers thousands of miles apart cannot be assumed to apply in quite different circumstances, such as those in South Asia or the Middle East, where States with histories of conflict share long common borders and operate with less highly developed military command and control systems.

The Committee's few witnesses following the nuclear tests expressed various opinions about their possible consequences to international security and the non-proliferation regime. While all expressed concern about the developments, Sir Michael Quinlan added that, ". . . I hope that our governments will not proceed on the assumption that all is now lost and it has to go right on through weaponization to large deployments to arms-racing with China as well as Pakistan."99 It is worth noting, in fact, that India and Pakistan reportedly came quite close to a nuclear confrontation in 1990, yet succeeded in diffusing the crisis.100 Once again, there is complete agreement that if these regrettable tests are to have any positive effect, it will be because they shatter international complacency over nuclear issues.

The immediate need is to ensure that India and Pakistan do not weaponize or deploy nuclear weapons, and proceed over the longer term to roll-back their nuclear programs. At the same time, the international community must be willing to undertake all possible mediation and other measures to diffuse the volatile security situation in the region. Recognizing the difficulty of the issues involved, the Committee supports any Canadian or international action which can help these States reduce tension and develop a regional security dialogue and confidence-building measures in the region.

Influencing India and Pakistan will also demand partnerships which go beyond Cold War diplomatic groupings. Canada demonstrated the ability to help forge such coalitions during the Ottawa Process. The South Asian nuclear tests underline the fact that while the traditional political-diplomatic groupings within which we still tend to approach nuclear security issues remain useful, they are no longer sufficient; agreement on fundamental principles is more important than geographic location or political grouping.

The Middle East

The issue in the Middle East, similarly, is not fundamentally a nuclear one, but one of regional conflict made more dangerous by nuclear weapons. Yet the importance of nuclear weapons cannot be underestimated. At a May 1998 meeting, Dr. Faisal Husseini, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, told the Committee that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, and the threat they imply, complicates and restricts efforts to achieve both a settlement of the Palestinian issue and a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Israel has long been considered a nuclear-weapons-capable State, although it has not overtly demonstrated a nuclear capability, preferring instead a policy of "nuclear ambiguity." Israel has always linked the issue of nuclear weapons to broader regional security concerns. In 1995 it stated for the first time that it would negotiate the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Middle East following the achievement of a comprehensive peace: Foreign Minister Shimon Peres stated that Israel "would begin negotiation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone two years after bilateral peace agreements were signed with all States, including Iran." As Professor William Walker has noted, however, ". . .Israel's subsequent retreat from the regional peace process increased its psychological reliance on military power and entrenched its determination to avoid restraint on its nuclear arms and to negate any attempt by another regional power to threaten it with Weapons of Mass Destruction." He adds that this hardening of Israeli policy has also contributed to the similar shift within the United States.101

RECOMMENDATION 10

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to support all international efforts to address the underlying regional security issues in South Asia and the Middle East. Working with like-minded States, it should take a more proactive role in stressing the regional and global security benefits of immediately increasing communication and co-operation between States in those regions as a means of building trust. In both regions - but particularly in South Asia given the recent nuclear tests - Canada should also stress: the freezing of nuclear weapon programs; adhering to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and participating in the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and; joining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

---

Chapter 3:
Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear and Other
''Weapons of Mass Destruction''

With respect to values, you are right to talk about the links between, say, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, and also biological and toxic weapons. We are talking there about fundamental values of maturity and restraint. We're talking about one of the values that's in the UN charter, that we should defend our security with the least diversion of human and financial resources. I think in a way we can look at the work of disarmament ambassadors as trying to accelerate the process of maturity in that respect, that is, the maturity of foresight and the maturity of restraint.

Coming at the end of a decade that has seen increased attention paid to the threat of the further proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons and missile delivery systems, the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan seemed to some to symbolize the failure of international attempts to prevent such proliferation. Yet, while states must take effective, coordinated action to strengthen and enforce mechanisms for preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and missile delivery systems, attention must not be diverted from the central priority of reinforcing the international regime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The success of this regime to date far outweighs the failures, and the 1990s have seen it strengthened significantly, particularly through the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the adoption of a statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

Yet India and Pakistan, like Israel, never accepted the "bargain" of the NPT; the critical issue now is whether the further challenge posed by the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia can be seized by the international community as an opportunity to complete and consolidate this regime, particularly through a rededication to both the NPT itself and to the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which provide an already-agreed framework for doing so. With the nuclear status quo having been rudely broken, renewed political leadership will be necessary to both contain the fallout from the May tests and spur further progress towards a viable global non-proliferation regime. We believe Canada can play an important element in providing that leadership.

The threat of the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and missile systems is increasingly used as a justification for nuclear weapons; this Chapter therefore begins with an overview of this issue and global responses to it. It then considers the global nuclear non-proliferation regime through a discussion of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, highlighting the NPT's compromise in preventing states from acquiring nuclear weapons, yet guaranteeing them access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology subject to international safeguards.

"WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION"

I think there is a wide spread view. . .in most of the things one reads about CBW proliferation, that the threat is getting worse, the problem has taken on sort of more serious form since the end of the Cold War and the threat is continuing to grow. I disagree with this. I think what has changed is the perception of the threat, not the reality of the threat.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Warsaw Pact CBW capabilities dominated our attention. But the reality is that CBW programs existed outside Europe. We just didn't pay a great deal of attention to them because our direct national security issues were most affected by the Warsaw Pact threat. In fact, if you look at the CBW proliferators club, most of these programs date back to the 1970s, 1980s, some of them even go back to the 1960s. In fact it's hard for me to think of a single CBW program that has emerged since the end of the Cold War and I can think of several that have been terminated.

Biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems pose real dangers which must be addressed by the international community. They are included in this report on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for two reasons. First, an overview of international efforts to prevent the proliferation of these weapons underlines how similar attempts to control nuclear weapons are complicated by the compromise nature of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obliges states to facilitate international nuclear cooperation. Second, as Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy noted before the Committee, "As a manifestation of the new nuclear realpolitik, we have started to hear that other weapons of mass destruction - chemical and biological weapons - provide a justification for nuclear weapons."104 By providing a new role for nuclear weapons, this dangerous argument will reduce the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their NPT obligations and pursue further nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are increasingly considered as part of a single problem of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD). Such shorthand is convenient, but as witnesses in Washington and Ottawa told the Committee, by obscuring real differences between these weapons, it tends to legitimize nuclear weapons. There exists a clear hierarchy among these weapons: nuclear weapons are the most difficult to construct, and their proven destructive and lethal capacity is tremendous; biological weapons are simpler to make than nuclear ones, and while they might be able to approach nuclear lethal capacity in specific circumstances, this is not easily accomplished; chemical weapons are the easiest to construct and have been used much more often, but fortunately their lethal capacity is not comparable. As Richard Betts summarized succinctly, "Nuclear arms have great killing capacity but are hard to get; chemical weapons are easy to get but lack such killing capacity; biological agents have both qualities."105

Weapons of Mass Destruction were first used in this century when Canadian troops were attacked with chemical weapons at Ypres in 1915;106 chemicals were used extensively by both sides thereafter during World War I. Despite the prohibition of their use by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, chemicals were again used to a limited extent by the Japanese in their invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s, reportedly by Egypt against Yemen in the mid-1960s, and by Iraq in the 1980s, first in its war with Iran, and, later, against its own Kurdish citizens.107 Biological weapons have not been used in warfare in modern times, though both the United States and the Soviet Union developed large offensive biological warfare programs and arsenals during the Cold War. The U.S. program was ended after the negotiation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC); however, the status of the former Soviet program is less clear.

After decades of effort, the international community has concluded treaties explicitly banning the possession and use of biological and chemical weapons; attention is now focused on improving transparency and verification of compliance with these norms. The United States has also taken the lead in conventional defence and other measures to counter the use of such weapons. As Frank Miller pointed out to the Committee in Washington, the U.S. has spent billions of dollars on conventional technologies to respond to chemical and biological weapons since 1993 under its Counter-Proliferation Initiative.108

The situation is more complex with nuclear weapons, since international law, in the form of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, accepts their possession, pending elimination, by the five nuclear-weapon States. As we have seen, despite attention and debate by legal scholars and others over the years, the International Court of Justice noted in 1996 that the current state of international law did not allow it to conclude definitively on the legality of the use of such weapons in all cases.109 This distinction between biological and chemical weapons on one hand and nuclear weapons on the other has important consequences for international attempts to prevent proliferation. As Sven Jurschewsky, Senior Advisor on Nuclear Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, explained to the Committee as early as 1995,

Countries disarm, not because of legal injunctions, but because of their security circumstances. That expresses a fundamental difference between the CWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the NPT. The Chemical Weapons Convention outlaws chemical weapons, period. The NPT does not, and that reflects a difference in the way those weapons are used and the character of those weapons. This has to be taken into account. That they are terrible abominations and should be gotten rid of is beyond question. The question is, how do you get from here to there?110

Post-Cold War Dangers

Professor Jim Fergusson, of the University of Manitoba, told the Committee in February 1998 that, "I'm not going to get into the question of why or why not and under what conditions - there are various arguments - states will decide to go down a nuclear route or a chemical-biological one. Of course, if there was a harmony of interests among all states we wouldn't have this problem, but the reality is that there is conflict."111 The end of the Cold War has been a mixed blessing in that regard: while reducing the threat of global nuclear war, it has also removed many of the disincentives which had previously discouraged states from attempting to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and advanced delivery systems.112

In addition to these political and strategic considerations, modern technology and "globalization" have tended to simplify the manufacture or purchase of the technology needed to produce biological or chemical weapons and missile systems - and, some would argue, even for nuclear weapons. This has led to increased fears of their proliferation to so-called "rogue" states, especially since revelations following the Gulf War of Iraq's large-scale programs to manufacture such weapons. As Professor Douglas Ross argued in a submission to the Committee written before the South Asian nuclear tests of May 1998, "WMDs continue to proliferate ... without disarmament and arms control measures to bring stability to the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, it is highly likely that some of these weapons will be used with catastrophic casualties - in the millions, not the tens of thousands. Nor should politicians be under any illusions that such use would be confined to the global South."113

The Lessons of Iraq

A turning point in international understanding of both the threat of proliferation and methods of preventing it came in Iraq in the 1990s. As noted above, Iraq had used chemical weapons in its war with Iran and against its own people in the 1980s. Arguing that Iraq was also attempting to develop a nuclear capability, Israel had unilaterally attacked and destroyed Iraq's plutonium-producing Osirak research reactor in 1981. The full extent of Iraq's attempts to acquire NBC weapons and missile systems was revealed only following the end of the Gulf War, through the work of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), established to verify the dismantling of Iraqi biological, chemical and missile programs; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was similarly charged with dismantling Iraq's nuclear program.

Although Iraq had been thought a member in "good standing" of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and had declared a small nuclear power program (which was therefore subject to IAEA inspection), it had in fact broken its NPT obligations and carried out prohibited nuclear weapons work at other sites within the country. With the 1995 defection of senior Iraqi General Hussein Kamal it became clear that, despite several years of IAEA effort with the extraordinary investigative powers granted by the Security Council, Iraq had still managed to conceal the full extent of its nuclear activities.

The experience in Iraq served as a wake-up call for the international community. It heightened international understanding of the threat of the proliferation of NBC weapons and missile systems, and led directly to significant improvements in the regimes designed to prevent this. From a broader perspective, however, the growing debate over whether sanctions should continue until UNSCOM and the IAEA have completed their work underlines the need to agree on how best to respond to such future cases, and to generate and sustain the political will to do so.

Terrorism

These political and technological developments, combined with continued fears of leakage of NBC expertise or material from Russia and elsewhere, have also increased fears that terrorists could gain access to such material; the 1995 use of nerve gas in the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult confirmed these fears, as did later revelations that the same group had attempted to acquire uranium mining property in Australia in 1993 and that Chechen rebels had placed non-explosive but radioactive material in a Moscow park as a warning. As the August 1998 American missile attacks on alleged terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a chemical weapons production facility in Sudan show, the danger of terrorist acquisition of such material is real, and must be addressed through increased intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. Elisa Harris of the U.S. National Security Council pointed out in May 1998, however, that it must also be seen in context:

It is striking to me in the three years since the Aum Shinrikyo did their attack in Tokyo that there has not been a copy cat incident involving other CW or BW. All of us feared three years ago that this would damage the taboo so that we would see an incredible upsurge in domestic terrorism incidence, but this hasn't happened and there are probably a number of good reasons for that. It is not so easy to make these things. It is not as easy to disseminate them, to protect yourself, and there are other much more accessible technologies, high explosives, much more predictable, that terrorists can and do use. While we need to be conscious of the terrorist threat and be preparing domestically for it, we need to be careful to keep it in its proper context.114

The Need for a Coordinated International Response

Despite the success to date of non-proliferation regimes, they are not foolproof, and are best seen as means of warning the international community of any attempt to acquire NBC weapons and missiles. The technical elements of these regimes must be continually strengthened; however, the more difficult tasks will be to generate the political unity in the international community so that it can respond appropriately to the acquisition or use of biological and chemical weapons, and to reject attempts to use the threat of such weapons to justify the possession of nuclear arms.

Some feel that this role for nuclear weapons is an obvious evolution of deterrence policies. Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command, General Howell Estes III, admitted in the summer of 1998, however, that while deterrence had worked in the past against the Soviet Union and now Russia, in the future nuclear missiles "will be in the hands of people who are not going to be deterrable," for such missiles are "really a terrorist type of weapon."115 Such comments should probably be seen in light of the ongoing debate in the United States over the desirability of missile defence systems; however, the basic point about the limits of deterrence remains. Camille Grand argued before the Committee that the use of nuclear weapons to respond to a chemical or biological attack would in fact be unnecessary and highly unlikely. Even so, this threat will undercut the willingness of the United States and other nuclear-weapon States to pursue further nuclear disarmament. Canada and other non-nuclear-weapon States must therefore stress that the dangers of biological or chemical weapons cannot be used as a justification for retaining nuclear weapons. As we shall see in Chapter 5, a number of witnesses added that effective international efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological or chemical weapons, without recourse to nuclear weapons, will demand increased commitment on the part of all States to collective diplomatic and, if need be, military action.

While there must be international ability to respond appropriately after the fact to the use or acquisition of such weapons, prevention is clearly the preferred choice. First, existing non-proliferation regimes, which focus on the denial of technology and materiel and the monitoring of potential production facilities, must be strengthened. More important, however, is the confidence-building value of such regimes; in addition to reinforcing the global norm against their acquisition or use, they assure States that their neighbours do not have access to such weapons, thereby helping reduce regional tensions.

Tightening Controls on Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) and Missiles

While the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of both biological and chemical weapons, it did not prohibit their possession or have any enforcement provision. Attention focused on chemical weapons in the 1980s following their use in the Iran-Iraq war. In 1985 the informal Australia Group was established to prevent the proliferation of such weapons while negotiations were undertaken to complete a more comprehensive Chemical Weapons Convention. Over the next several years, the mandate of the Australia Group expanded, first to include biological weapons, and, after the revelations of the extent of Iraq's CBW programs and the Tokyo subway attack, to consideration of sub-State groups as well as States themselves. The 30-member Group now applies collective decisions through national export control systems to limit the transfer of items that appear on a warning list, including: chemical precursors, equipment used in the production of chemical and biological weapons and biological warfare agents and organisms.

After years of negotiation, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the development, manufacture and possession of such weapons, entered into force in 1997. In addition to capping CW proliferation by law in over 100 countries, and being the first global, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreement to ban an entire class of weaponry, the Convention has begun to roll-back programs in a number of States, such as China, India and South Korea, that unexpectedly declared having chemicals weapons production facilities or stockpiles. Above all, the Chemical Weapons Convention has established a new standard for intrusive international verification procedures, which are administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The first year of activity under the Convention saw progress in advancing its goals, but several suspected chemical weapon States have still not signed it. Also, since they have not yet submitted the data required by its transparency regime, a majority of CWC States-Parties were in "technical non-compliance" with the Convention at the one-year mark.116

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibited the manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons, although it permitted research in order to develop defences. A serious flaw in this Convention was its lack of the verification provisions included in more recently negotiated treaties. Efforts have been underway since 1994 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to strengthen the transparency and verification procedures of the Convention, using the Chemical Weapons Convention as a model. These efforts have to date produced the "rolling text" of a proposed Verification Protocol, but much disputed language remains to be negotiated, leaving the timing and content of any result far from certain.

In 1987, following the "War of the Cities" between Iraq and Iran, Canada and other G-7 States established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to restrict transfer of nuclear-capable missiles. In 1993 the scope of the MTCR was expanded to cover unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying chemical or biological weapons. In addition to the growth of formal membership in the regime, which now stands at 28 States, others, such as Israel and Ukraine, have announced that they will adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.

Canada and other States must remain aware of the new post-Cold War dynamics which have altered the threat of NBC proliferation and ensure that the international community is united on the need to respond forcefully to breaches of its security in this area. In the first instance, however, attention must be focused on strengthening existing international mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons. Though, spurred by events in Iraq, the past decade has seen success in this area, we cannot become complacent.

RECOMMENDATION 11

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work to strengthen international efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missile systems and to ensure adequate funding for verification purposes. In addition to strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through the negotiation of a Verification Protocol and continuing to support the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Government should also examine methods of increasing the effectiveness of the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement to prevent terrorist acquisition of such weapons.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Although the non-proliferation regime has suffered two serious shocks with the latest nuclear tests in South Asia, it is essential to look to the long-term with patience and policy steadiness. In reality, the seemingly fragile non-proliferation regime is quite resilient, and will remain so as long as the worldwide trend of reducing the stockpiles and moving away from reliance on nuclear weapons continues. Keeping the regime strong has always depended on attention, reinvigoration, and innovation. This long-term perspective gives reason to be optimistic that focused diplomatic efforts can minimize and even reverse proliferation. Still, as the Indian and Pakistani breakout shows, the challenges ahead will require giving non-proliferation higher priority as well as vision, determination and ingenuity.

The global nuclear non-proliferation regime built up over the past three decades consists of a complicated series of interlocking international treaties, bilateral undertakings, and multilateral inspections, all aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition to the all-important nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the major elements of this regime are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which essentially verifies the NPT, and the export control systems of key nuclear supplier States.118 While not perfect, this regime has so far been very effective in limiting proliferation, and has been strengthened in the 1990s, particularly in response to events in Iraq and the decisions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

While these technical elements are critical to the success of the non-proliferation regime, as we have seen throughout the report, the real issues remain political. Reducing the perceived value of nuclear weapons is central to persuading States not to pursue them. As we saw in Chapter 2, this will not be easy in either the five nuclear-weapon States, or the three other nuclear-weapons-capable States of India, Israel and Pakistan. Yet in the 1990s a number of States have decided that pursuing or retaining nuclear weapons would detract from their security rather than add to it.

Challenges remained, but until the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, the growing strength of the nuclear non-proliferation regime was obvious: before joining the NPT, a number of States went beyond simply pledging not to construct nuclear weapons and actually chose to give up nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), destroy nuclear stockpiles (South Africa) and roll-back nuclear programs (Brazil and Argentina). The negotiation of two further Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ) during the 1990s, in Southeast Asia and Africa, means that by the time all the existing and new NWFZ treaties take effect, nuclear weapons will be banned from all of the southern hemisphere except the open oceans, as well as portions of the northern hemisphere.119

The NPT itself was strengthened through its indefinite extension by consensus at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. The States Parties at the Conference also decided to strengthen its review process, adopted a Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and called for the negotiation of a zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. As Ambassador for Disarmament Christopher Westdal, who led Canadian efforts at the Conference, explained to the Committee a month later,

The key thing is that permanence enshrines the treaty's values. We, that is, the global community, are now unequivocally committed to nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and safeguarded peaceful use. These are not principles we are going to reconsider every once in a while; they are now among the permanent proclaimed values of the world community.

Permanent values, not temporary, irremediably uncertain provisions, now join the forces of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. That's the extension decision.

The principles and objectives are like a template; they are a political commitment to a program of action - that phrase has been resisted for a long time, and it's unprecedented - toward ultimately complete nuclear disarmament. We are to pursue that program determinedly and progressively.120

The key indicator of this strengthened regime is the fact that not only have no new nuclear-weapons-capable States emerged in the 1990s (India and Pakistan, like Israel, were already widely considered nuclear-capable in 1990), but the number of States actively pursuing nuclear weapons has been reduced. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explained in July 1998 in its authoritative guide Tracking Nuclear Proliferation,

. . . today, only seven countries remain on the active nuclear proliferation "watch list": Israel, India and Pakistan, all of which are deemed capable of deploying or launching nuclear arms; and Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, which are less advanced in their quest for nuclear arms but nevertheless remain states of significant proliferation concern.

. . . considerably fewer countries are currently attempting to acquire nuclear weapons (or the ability to make them) than were trying to do so during the 1980s. The seven states that are of greatest concern today were already then considered proliferation threats.121

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests constitute an important political challenge to the global norms supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and must be answered resolutely. As Professor William Walker of the University of St. Andrews in Scotland wrote in an August 1998 submission to the Committee,

Our greatest enemy at this time is pessimism. Claims are being made, especially in the United States, that events in South Asia show that the non-proliferation regime has failed, that further nuclear proliferation is unavoidable, that adherence to the Test Ban Treaty and development of further arms control measures are undesirable, and that only nuclear deterrence is dependable. These claims are unfounded. Indeed, the shocked reactions to India's and Pakistan's behaviour have shown the strength of commitment to the norms and institutions that constrain the acquisition and usage of nuclear weapons. Sadly, however, such claims have political appeal and express powerful vested interests. If given credence, they could inflict serious damage on those norms and institutions. Their centrality to international security needs to be reasserted, especially through rededication to the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that were agreed by all States Parties to the NPT at the 1995 Extension Conference.122

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the centrepiece of the international regime to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and eventually ensure their elimination. Witnesses before the Committee were unanimous in their recommendations to both preserve and strengthen this Treaty, without which there would be no legal or political restraint on any nation that decided to acquire nuclear weapons, or any obligation on the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate them. Ambassador Thomas Graham told the Committee in Washington that, in his opinion, the NPT is probably the most important international security agreement after the Charter of the United Nations.123 Tariq Rauf expanded on this point before the Committee:

. . . the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Without the NPT, there would be no strategic arms reductions and no reductions in nuclear weapons. Without the NPT, we would not have the assurance that the many countries - 38 countries or so - with civilian nuclear programs are not diverting those technologies and materials toward nuclear weapons use.

The non-proliferation treaty is the only multilateral legal commitment that has been undertaken by the five nuclear weapons states to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons.

This commitment was reinforced in 1995 . . . when the NPT was made indefinite. Also, under UN Security Council resolution 984 of April 11, 1995, the five nuclear weapons states gave binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear members of the NPT that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.124

The NPT is a complex bargain, negotiated over years in order to achieve several goals: ensuring that the number of nuclear-weapon States was capped at five (Articles I and II); ensuring that States that gave up the nuclear weapon option could still cooperate in developing the peaceful potential of nuclear energy and have access to the peaceful use of such energy under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Articles III, IV and V); and ensuring that nuclear-weapon States negotiate to end the arms race and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons (Article VI). As Lorne Green, Director of the new Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade summarized for the Committee in February 1998,

. . . a kind of compact is implicit - perhaps explicit - in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a three-way compact. First, those countries which do not have nuclear weapons agree never to acquire them. Second, those countries which have nuclear energy capability, whether it be to produce electricity or to assist in medicine or agriculture, make the fruits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy available to those countries, particularly developing countries, which could benefit from them. The third part of the compact is that those states which do have nuclear weapons work very deliberately to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. That is the three-way compact.125

A key aspect of the NPT is that it now has near-universality: while about 60 States - a third of the world's total - remained outside the Treaty in 1990, that number has now dropped to four: India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba;126 with 187 States Parties, the NPT is the most widely-adhered to arms control treaty in existence. Apart from demonstrating the strength of the global norm against nuclear non-proliferation, this means that in a sense the international community can focus on the more practical issue of ensuring compliance with the Treaty.

An International Obligation

Canada has been one of the strongest supporters of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and of the disarmament measures it requires of the five nuclear-weapon States. Yet the NPT was by necessity a compromise; another key element, which was reaffirmed in 1995 and raised a number of times during the Committee's hearings, is the explicit link in the Treaty between agreement by the majority of States not to acquire nuclear weapons and the obligation of all parties to facilitate the fullest possible sharing of peaceful nuclear technology, under strict international safeguards. As Ambassador for Disarmament Christopher Westdal told the Committee in 1995, following the consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and to increase the accountability of the nuclear-weapon States, "Having played a central role in persuading States parties that permanence would deepen accountability, Canada will bear a particular responsibility in work to ensure that the treaty's promises are indeed kept."127

While Canada has the right to establish the conditions under which it will permit international nuclear cooperation, as long as it has a domestic nuclear industry it is obliged to assist such cooperation. Critics before the Committee and elsewhere argue that Canada's role as the world's largest exporter of uranium, and a major exporter of nuclear technology undermines its non-proliferation objectives. As Kristen Ostling of the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout put it in a submission,

The problem with Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy is that fundamentally it does not work. Over the past 50 years, Canada's role as an "honest broker" in efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament has been continually compromised by its efforts to promote civilian nuclear programs at home and abroad. Federal and provincial efforts to market CANDU reactors and uranium under the guise of the "peaceful atom" actually contribute to a reduction in global security.128

While the Committee understands the frustration of those who feel that global non-proliferation objectives are undercut, the commitment to the sharing of nuclear technology is a fundamental aspect of the Treaty. The priority must therefore be to ensure that such international nuclear cooperation does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to increase public understanding of and confidence in the system.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Guaranteed access to the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy was eventually included in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; however, the need to devise a safe means of doing so had been acknowledged as early as American President Dwight Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations, which also suggested a cut-off in the production of fissile materials.

In principle, there are at least five types of peaceful use of nuclear energy: propulsion; civil engineering and mining; research; medical, agricultural and industrial uses of isotopes; and electricity production.129 The use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity was seen as an attractive option for developing and other nations as early as the 1950s, and over the decades it became the most significant application of nuclear energy worldwide. Initially it was assumed that the plutonium created in the efficient operation of power reactors could not be used for explosive purposes; when this proved incorrect, the International Atomic Energy Agency was created to monitor the operations of power reactors, their associated facilities and the nuclear materials they utilized. As Dr. Gordon Edwards of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility pointed out before the Committee, the system has its limitations. In his words,

We all know by common sense that auditing books does not prevent theft; what it does is detect theft after the theft has occurred. We do not have any systems in place to absolutely prevent the theft of money, the theft of diamonds, the theft of heroin, the theft of gold, the theft of anything you care to mention. To say that these inspections are going to prevent the diversion of plutonium is self-deception.

The fact of the matter is - and when Trudeau was Prime Minister he made this quite clear - that ultimately these safeguards rest on one thing only, and that is good faith, the good faith of the people who give their word. You heard yourself that Iraq didn't keep its word. Well, neither did North Korea, neither did India, and I suppose in the future neither will other countries.130

The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation accepted as much when it argued in 1998: "The IAEA never aspired to prevent the misuse of such facilities or materials in this context: rather its aim was, and is, to deter such misuse by providing the international community with early warning of any diversions from declared uses."131

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Created in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency is an international organization whose principal missions are to facilitate the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to implement a system of audits and on-site inspections (collectively known as "safeguards") to verify that nuclear facilities and materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosive purposes. In addition to monitoring all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, the IAEA also monitors individual facilities and associated nuclear materials in non-NPT States, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, at their request, and ensures that these facilities cannot easily be used to support nuclear weapons programs.

While most Committee members accept that the IAEA is the body best qualified to ensure that nuclear activities remain civilian-related, some witnesses disagreed. As Irene Kock of the Nuclear Awareness Project put it,

This, as you know, is a UN agency. It has a dual mandate of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and running our safeguarding regime internationally.

We have great concerns about this schizophrenic role. We believe it's fundamentally a problem that the IAEA is trying to run in both directions at the same time. We think the IAEA should be reformed, and I would urge you to advise the Canadian government that we push for those reforms to make the IAEA strictly a safeguarding organization and to work to strengthen those mechanisms and to split or stop entirely the UN promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear power.132

Until 1991, the IAEA monitored only facilities "declared" by the country in question. Following its discoveries in Iraq, however, the IAEA announced that it would thereafter exercise its previously unused authority to conduct "special inspections," demanding access to undeclared sites where nuclear activities were suspected. The worth of such surprise inspections was proven the next year, when the IAEA attempted to conduct them in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), which had signed the NPT in 1985, but had not finalized a safeguards agreement with the IAEA until 1992. Following the Republic's initial declaration of its nuclear materials and facilities, the IAEA carried out a series of inspections which revealed evidence of discrepancies. In 1993, the IAEA call for a special inspection of two undeclared sites, resulted in a North Korean announcement that, as provided for in the Treaty if a country's "supreme interests" are jeopardized, it was withdrawing from the NPT. Despite a 1994 Agreed Framework accord, which saw North Korea suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and freeze its nuclear program in return for safer reactors and heavy fuel oil from the United States, South Korea and Japan, the issue has yet to be fully resolved, and in fact is again of increasing concern.

As Tariq Rauf pointed out before the Committee, while the case of Iraq was a failure of the non-proliferation system (though it led to improvements), the experience of North Korea should be seen as a success. In his words,

We have had only two instances, and of those two Iraq was the more serious. This was a failure of the international community not to detect that program earlier, but it was also collusion of the international community. The United States actively supported Iraq in the Iran war. They shared satellite reconnaissance information with Iraq. The Iraqis had very good information on how to elude U.S. satellites. . .

DPRK was not a failure. It was the IAEA that found the plutonium problem in time.133

The IAEA went on to develop a new set of safeguards under "Program 93+2" (begun in 1993 and finished in 1995), that would be significantly more efficient and effective. In essence, rather than its previous focus on detecting the diversion of material at declared nuclear facilities only, under the new program, the IAEA could detect undeclared activity throughout the country in question. According to Dr. John Hodgkinson, of the Atomic Energy Control Board:

The protocol . . . will give the agency considerably greater powers. It will give the agency greater access to information associated with a state's nuclear cycle and nuclear endeavours, and it will also give the agency enhanced access to locations in the state in order to be able to look at nuclear sites in more detail and even go to areas that don't have nuclear sites, on the basis of information coming in from other sources and analysis of detailed safeguards information.

The safeguard system will be considerably strengthened and will be very much better, I feel, than the previous system, which was based on agency verification of declared material only, and the restriction, essentially, of inspectors and inspection activities to certain parts of declared facilities. The new protocol will give the agency a lot more ability to sort out situations like those in the Iraq business.134

A draft Model Additional Protocol to implement the new safeguards has now been developed, but implementation of this strengthened system will require all NPT States Parties voluntarily and individually to negotiate with the IAEA an Additional Protocol which will supplement and supersede any existing agreements. Canada deliberately moved to be among the first major nuclear energy States to begin discussions of a new Protocol with the IAEA; in June 1998, the Committee was told that it hoped to adopt such an Additional Protocol in the fall of 1998;135 the Protocol was signed in September 1998, and is expected to enter into force in the first half of 1999.

Even with these improvements, the safeguards system cannot be perfect; however, its deterrent effect will be strengthened since, once it is implemented, would-be violators cannot be confident that their misuse of nuclear materials will go undetected. Since adoption of a new Protocol is voluntary and negotiations are time-consuming, however, full implementation will not happen quickly. In addition to leading by example, it will be necessary for Canada and other States to apply political pressure wherever possible to encourage full participation and speed up the process.

RECOMMENDATION 12

The Committee recommends that the Government, having strengthened the international safeguards regime by signing its new Model Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, use all means at its disposal to convince other States to do likewise. Before entering into a future Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with any other State, the Government should, at a minimum, require that State to adopt the new Model Protocol.

Nuclear Export Controls

The two complementary multilateral mechanisms for restricting the transfer of nuclear materials are the Non-Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, usually referred to as the Zangger Committee, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or London Club. The Zangger Committee was established in 1971 as a means of coordinating restrictions on the export of nuclear technology among nuclear exporters who were NPT signatories, ensuring that such export took place only under IAEA safeguards. In 1974 the Committee adopted a set of guidelines and a "trigger list" of items whose export would be permitted only to States willing to accept IAEA safeguards. The 33-member Zangger Committee continues to operate, but has largely been overshadowed in recent years.

Following India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974, the United States called for the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group, which went further than the Zangger Committee by including France, which was not then an NPT signatory, and restraining transfers of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group moved following the Gulf War to "harmonize" itself with the Zangger Committee trigger list, modify its export control guidelines to include 65 "dual-use" items as well as purely nuclear items, and to preclude nuclear commerce with States, such as India and Pakistan, that do not accept IAEA safeguards on their entire nuclear infrastructure.136

Bilateral Agreements

Nuclear exporting countries such as Canada have also developed national systems over the decades. In the weeks following the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, attention in the press and elsewhere focused on the Canadian role in providing nuclear technology to both countries decades ago. While critics accept that Canada acted in good faith in the 1950s and 1960s, and that India broke written undertakings to use this technology only for peaceful purposes by detonating a so-called "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, the real question is whether Canada learned from this experience to strengthen its nuclear export control system sufficiently.

As explained to the Committee in June 1998 by Ralph Lysyshyn, Director General of the International Security Bureau at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada's modern nuclear export control system has been shaped by its experience with India, whose actions in breaking its commitments and using Canadian technology for explosive purposes led to Canada's current stricter system for regulating nuclear exports.137

Beginning in the mid-1950s, soon after President Eisenhower had launched the "Atoms for Peace" program to provide access to peaceful nuclear technology in exchange for promises that it would not be used for weapons, Canada agreed to provide India, a fellow Commonwealth member and a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, with a CIRUS (Canada-India-United States) nuclear research reactor under the Colombo plan. In exchange, India gave written "peaceful assurances" that the reactor would not be used for weapons purposes. Two power reactors, RAPS I and II, were similarly provided in 1963 and 1966. By 1971 it became clear that India would not become a party to the new nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or accept the new "full-scope" (comprehensive) safeguards developed by the IAEA. While it agreed to accept more limited facility-specific safeguards on the two RAPS reactors, it refused to do so for the original CIRUS reactor. In 1974, violating its commitments to Canada and other nuclear suppliers, India detonated a nuclear device using plutonium reprocessed from the spent fuel in the CIRUS reactor. Canada immediately suspended all nuclear cooperation with India, and, following a review that strengthened Canadian policy for nuclear exports, in 1974 terminated all bilateral nuclear cooperation with that country.

Canada had similarly agreed to provide Pakistan with a KANUPP power reactor in 1965 in exchange for assurances that it would be used only for peaceful purposes. In 1969 Pakistan agreed to apply facility-specific IAEA safeguards at the site. When it was not willing to agree to requirements of the strengthened Canadian policy after 1976, however, Canada ended nuclear cooperation with that country. According to the IAEA, no material from these three facility-specific safeguarded reactors in either India (two) or Pakistan (one) was used in the May 1998 nuclear tests.

The strengthened Canadian policy requires that, before this country will consider entering into nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear-weapon State, that State must make a legally binding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by becoming a party to the NPT or an internationally legally binding equivalent, thereby accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards on all of its current and future nuclear activities; and enter into a legally binding bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Canada which covers non-proliferation and other commitments, including: Canadian control over the re-transfer to a third party of any Canadian items subject to the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and consent that, should the IAEA be unable to apply safeguards in the country, Canada would be permitted to carry out bilateral safeguards. These requirements also apply to non-Canadian equipment or nuclear material used in conjunction with Canadian nuclear items.138

Each export of a nuclear item requires an export permit from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and a licence from the Atomic Energy Control Board; these are issued only after the responsible official is satisfied that all requirements of Canadian policy have been met. Finally, while compliance with these minimum requirements are necessary for Canada to enter into nuclear cooperation with a given country, ministers must still decide whether the country will be a suitable nuclear partner. The government has refused cooperation in the past; one Committee member recalled Iraq's attempts to enter into nuclear cooperation with Canada, "They met all the prerequisites . . . but we had made a decision not to sell to them and today we are saying we made a wise decision."139 While the majority judged it beyond the scope of this Report, in the course of considering how best to ensure the strength of Canada's policies in this area, some members of the Committee would have preferred to open the broader question of whether or how to increase the role of Parliament in approving international agreements.

These initial requirements and decisions are much stronger than the policy in place when Canada originally provided nuclear technology to India and Pakistan, but it is also necessary after agreeing to cooperate to maintain constant dialogue with partners. Mr. Lysyshyn added that,

As part of our ongoing nuclear relationship, Canadian officials carry on periodic bilateral nuclear consultations with our partner countries. These provide an opportunity among other things to reconcile the detailed records of transfers of nuclear items subject to the agreement and to ensure that Canada's partners remain fully conscious of Canada's high priority to ensuring that nuclear co-operation is used only for peaceful and non-explosive end uses.140

The Committee does not believe that "periodic" meetings - which in practice are annual with our larger partners and less frequent with others - are sufficient given the need to ensure the integrity of the system and convince Canadians of its rigour.

RECOMMENDATION 13

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada meet annually with the other parties to all Nuclear Cooperation Agreements to review the application of such Agreements, and table a report on the results of such meetings in Parliament.

Nuclear Safety

An important element of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is obviously nuclear safety. During the Committee's hearings, Canada's actions on this front were questioned on two counts: with respect to CIDA nuclear activities, and Canada's decision to provide nuclear safety assistance to India and Pakistan even after it had terminated bilateral nuclear cooperation.

In the case of CIDA, Charles Bassett, Vice-President of the Agency's Central and Eastern European Branch, explained that

The Canadian Technical Assistance Program in the nuclear sector is a response to the priority given to nuclear non-proliferation by the international community, particularly since the break-up of the Soviet Union. It embodies one of the Canadian government's priorities concerning foreign policy, that is, to promote Canada's interests and security, including nuclear safety.141

Since this Program is funded under CIDA's Technical Cooperation mandate, he pointed out that it does not reduce the amount available for development assistance. The priorities of the Program are enhancing the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, helping Ukraine deal with the aftermath of the Chernobyl explosion and non-proliferation, and most members supported these priorities and related projects. Some, however, questioned whether support for any nuclear activities was a proper use of CIDA funds. As we saw in Chapter 2, one of the most controversial issues in this area is the question of MOX; some witnesses and members expressed particular concern about CIDA's decision to fund a $1.6 million study by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. of the feasibility of converting plutonium to Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel.

Mr. Lysyshyn explained to the Committee that it had been in response to growing international concern about nuclear safety following the Chernobyl accident in 1986 that Canada had allowed Pakistan and India to participate in the CANDU Owners' Group program for sharing public domain, non-proprietary, safety-related information. At the urging of the IAEA, in 1990 Canada also authorized limited assistance under international auspices to address "serious and urgent" safety concerns at the Canadian-supplied safeguarded reactors in Pakistan and India. India had rejected this assistance, Pakistan had accepted it; it was largely diagnostic in nature and aimed at identifying any serious and urgent safety concerns.142

Sustaining the NPT and Pursuing Disarmament

In recent years, international nuclear relations have been bedevilled by controversy over global nuclear disarmament. Events in South Asia have made disarmament both more difficult to achieve and more desirable and inescapable as a political objective. A mechanism has to be found which will enable states to address nuclear disarmament in an intergovernmental setting. The NPT will be endangered if the opposition of the nuclear weapon states, and of the United States in particular, to such an endeavour is not lifted. However, the attitude towards disarmament must be pragmatic - it is easy to preach disarmament but difficult to achieve it. Disarmament can only be approached patiently through the progressive marginalization of nuclear weapons: it will only be achieved through a step-by-step learning process rather through a grand time-limited project of elimination. In my view, the question that deserves to be addressed collectively by states is how to manage and give energy to this evolutionary process, rather than how to draw up a detailed disarmament plan.

Much has been written about the changed nature of the global nuclear agenda in the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, yet no such change has taken place. While it may now be more difficult to achieve, the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda - based on the thirty-year old nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as reinforced by the 1995 statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament - remains the same. The aim is to ensure that no more states acquire nuclear weapons while those which have already done so eliminate them. Some prefer to distinguish between "non-proliferation" and "disarmament" measures, yet the dual nature of the NPT makes this distinction more artificial than real; continued progress on disarmament is critical to supporting non-proliferation.

In light of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the international community must obviously be prepared to pursue creative multi-level policies for reducing regional tensions in South Asia, ensuring that nuclear capabilities are not weaponized or deployed and re-engaging all States in the process of global nuclear disarmament. The basis of these policies, however, must remain the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Committee rejects suggestions that the NPT might be re-opened in order to acknowledge India and Pakistan formally as "nuclear-weapon States"; such action would undermine the Treaty itself, and in any event, the opinion of the 187 states that have accepted its compromise must take precedence over the four that have not. Even if India and Pakistan are currently unwilling to renounce their nuclear programs and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, the goal of the NPT remains universality. The Committee notes that France, in 1968, even though it did not join the NPT until more than two decades later, stated that it would "behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty"; in the current situation it would be helpful if India and Pakistan did likewise and would commit themselves to behaving as if they were NPT parties.144

In the time remaining before the next NPT Review Conference in the year 2000, it is essential that member States continue to vigorously pursue the strengthened review process agreed to in 1995. Despite attempts by Canada, South Africa and other states to ensure that the Preparatory Committee meetings consider substantive rather than simply procedural issues, however, the nuclear-weapon States have so far been unwilling to honour their 1995 commitments. This has contributed to a further polarizing of the debate and, if it continues, may lead some non-nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their support for the NPT. As Harald Müller pointed out to the Committee, the success of the 1995 Review Conference had also been increased by the decision to set interim goals to help sustain momentum in the disarmament agenda:

. . . there's one thing that could be done, which is what the 1995 NPT extension conference did - namely, to identify one or two priority measures that the nuclear weapons states are supposed to implement during the forthcoming five years. That was done in 1995, the CTBT was concluded, and a serious effort was made to get cut-off conventions rolling. All five observed the moratorium on fissile material production. I think it would make enormous sense if the NPT conference in the year 2000 would again identify one or two or at most three steps that the nuclear weapons states would be supposed to tackle during the coming five years. That is the only sort of timeframe that I deem sensible.145

Witnesses discussed the merits of various disarmament treaties and mechanisms, ranging from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty to a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Their comments before the Committee differed in emphasis, but were unanimous on the need to re-invigorate the multilateral disarmament agenda, which has seen little progress in recent years in either the Conference on Disarmament or the Preparatory Committee meetings for the next review of the NPT in the year 2000. In addition to overcoming the increasing polarization of recent years, the international community must also ensure that the South Asian nuclear tests are used to further the disarmament agenda rather than hamper it. As Harald Müller pointed out,

It is unlikely to me that China will ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, not until India's plans have become clearer. This means, presumably that Russia and the United States will not ratify either. I cannot conceive of this U.S. Senate agreeing to ratification if the two supposed nuclear rivals hold back.

Of course, this reaction would be wrong. A clear and unambiguous signal from the nuclear weapon states that the incremental approach they have taken towards nuclear disarmament will continue unabatedly is badly needed in order to contain the negative consequences of Indian and Pakistani actions.146

He continued that "Steps are required toward nuclear disarmament along each of four different front lines": sealing the end of the nuclear arms race, continuing further reductions through the START process, reassuring others through such mechanisms as de-alerting, and increasing transparency through mechanisms such as the nuclear arms register to cover both weapons and fissile materials that Germany proposed in 1993.147

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which will prevent all nuclear tests, and thus experimentation with warhead technology, must enter into force without delay; Canada should act as quickly as possible to ratify it, and encourage the United States and other states to do likewise. The Treaty provided that a Conference of the States which had already ratified it be convened if it had still not entered into force by September 1999. The international community should endeavour to convince India and Pakistan to accept the CTBT unconditionally. If they refuse to do so by September 1999, however, the States assembled at that Conference should follow the advice of Ambassador Thomas Graham and others, and take all means consistent with international law to bring the Treaty into force nevertheless.148

Witnesses before the Committee also stressed the importance of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which will place limits on the number of warheads which can be produced. While an agreement had been reached to pursue such a Treaty, it had been stalled for years at the time of our hearings. Camille Grand argued,

I believe that a country like Canada has a role to play in this Ottawa-type process because it is true that the nuclear powers may be poorly positioned to push for this type of treaty.

. . . non-nuclear countries with a strong nuclear industry, such as Canada and Germany, have a role to play to get this treaty out of the kind of rut in which it is blocked in Geneva for regrettable procedural questions. . . I believe that a real push on the part of the non-nuclear western countries with a tradition of disarmament would be beneficial.149

The Committee therefore welcomes the August 1998 agreement to finally pursue negotiation of the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament, both as an exciting opportunity to approach these issues from a fresh perspective, and as a positive sign that entrenched positions may still be changed. It particularly welcomes the choice of Canadian Ambassador Mark Moher to chair the negotiating committee; as in the case of Canada's chairmanship of the Rome Diplomatic Conference which achieved agreement on a statute for a strong and effective International Criminal Court, Canadian leadership must now help achieve a broad Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

RECOMMENDATION 14

The Committee recommends that the Canadian Government intensify its efforts, in cooperation with like-minded States, such as our NATO allies, to advance the global disarmament and security agenda:

• Canada should reaffirm its support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the centrepiece of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and should reject any attempt to revise the Treaty to acknowledge India and Pakistan as "nuclear-weapon States" under it. It should also continue to strive to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States honour their commitments to a strengthened review process for the NPT, which will lead to an updated statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the 2000 Review Conference.
• Canada should complete the process of ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as quickly as possible and urge all other States to do likewise. Should India and Pakistan refuse to accept the Treaty unconditionally, Canada should nevertheless encourage the international community to ensure the Treaty's legal entry into force.
• Canada should play a strong role at the Conference on Disarmament in the forthcoming negotiations for a broad Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which will serve both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.
• Canada should support the establishment of a nuclear arms register to cover both weapons and fissile material as proposed by Germany in 1993.
• Canada should support the call for the conclusion of a nuclear weapons disarmament convention.

---

Chapter 4:
Nato and Nuclear Weapons

First and foremost, an outdated nuclear policy suggests an outdated NATO. Here I'm really talking about the public perception. There's a very strong and continuing public perception that NATO continues to cling to its nuclear policy because if it doesn't it will no longer have any justification. I believe nothing could be further from the truth. The kind of role that NATO is now playing, the cooperative, security-building role it is playing, working with the former Warsaw Pact countries in Europe, the cooperation for example among these countries in the peace operation in Bosnia, is a testament to the extremely important role that NATO can play in the post-Cold War without a nuclear first-use policy.

. . . we can never ignore the lack of public support or public cynicism about an institution, especially when the continuation of the institution requires substantial resources. . . NATO must show that it is keeping up with the times with respect to its nuclear policy.

Since Canada has no nuclear weapons of its own, its most high-profile link to them is through its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is now engaged in a "re-examination and update as necessary" of its 1991 Strategic Concept for completion by April 1999. The Alliance was therefore the focus of much attention during the Committee's work.

Since the end of the Cold War NATO has evolved significantly, both externally, through enhanced relations with Russia and other former adversaries, and internally. On the nuclear front, it declared in 1990 that nuclear weapons were to be "truly weapons of last resort," and by 1993 had moved to reduce significantly both the number of American nuclear gravity bombs stationed for its use in Europe and the alert status of the dual-capable aircraft which would carry them. Later in the decade, however, NATO members focused on other important issues, such as NATO enlargement and peace support operations in Bosnia, and put to one side the question of the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance. In 1997, NATO member States addressed Russian concerns about its enlargement by reiterating that they had "no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members," and continued, "nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so."151

Some, however, consider that NATO unwillingness to re-examine the basic principles of the Alliance's nuclear policy - in particular, the refusal to rule out the right of first use of nuclear weapons in response to even a conventional attack - illustrates the global failure to adjust attitudes to nuclear weapons to match the revolutionary changes in the international political and security situation. Some witnesses, such as former Ambassador for Disarmament Doug Roche, went further, arguing that supporting this NATO position despite non-proliferation and disarmament developments since 1991, including the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, has placed Canada on the horns of a dilemma with respect to its foreign and defence policies.152

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Committee members are agreed on reaffirming Canada's commitment to enhancing security in what NATO and Russia have jointly called the "Euro-Atlantic area." Some Committee members have reservations about the future role of NATO, yet the majority feel strongly that a united and relevant Alliance with a suitably updated Strategic Concept will emerge from the Washington Summit in April 1999, and will be key to achieving enhanced security in cooperation with other organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. Canadian public opinion supports this: the March 1998 Angus Reid poll which demonstrated strong concern among Canadians about nuclear issues also showed that a majority supported membership in the Alliance.153 This does not mean, however, that Canadians automatically agree that NATO's nuclear policies do not need to be re-examined. As Doug Roche explained some of the views advanced in 1996, during cross-country roundtables sponsored by Project Ploughshares, "Many Canadians feel there's a question mark about NATO's long-range future, but in any event, it's here and it's expanding. If it is expanding, at the very least, the bottom line is that NATO must get rid of nuclear weapons. I would say there's a strong public opinion in Canada that would support this."154 A similar series of cross-country hearings was held in September 1998.

After months of considering the global problem of nuclear weapons, the Committee has concluded that the Alliance, recognizing that further disarmament and confidence-building in the Euro-Atlantic area are in the best interests of all, must seize the opportunity to play a key role in advancing this agenda, especially through the new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This Chapter will briefly review the development of NATO and its nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War, and then set out arguments made before it to justify a re-examination of various elements of this policy. The decision as to how and when best to adapt NATO nuclear policy and posture must be made collectively by all NATO members, but such action must be taken in the context of new evolving international security priorities. NATO remains a key mechanism for enhancing regional and global security, but it is a means to this end rather than an end in itself.

In addition to increasing regional security, such a NATO initiative would send an important signal to the rest of the world about reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, and that the will to do so exists within the Alliance. As Dr. Harald Müller, of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, argued before the Committee, "I believe that NATO just does not tackle the issue of how its own posture can influence the thinking elsewhere, and that, I believe, is a very serious mistake."155 NATO enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority over any likely threat; its members include three of the world's five nuclear-weapon States and a number of respected middle powers, such as Canada, that have taken a lead in advancing global non-proliferation and disarmament. It remains an alliance which carries out the collective policies of its member States rather than a forum for arms control; yet, if NATO cannot act in these circumstances, no one can realistically be expected to do so.

COLD WAR NUCLEAR POLICIES

NATO was founded in April 1949 with three important roles: to be a collective defence organization directed against a possible "Soviet threat" to Western Europe; a mechanism to restrain Germany militarily; and a means of ensuring a continued U.S. commitment to European security. As Lord Ismay, the Alliance's first Secretary General put it, the aim of NATO was to keep the Soviets out, the Germans down and the Americans in.156 Collective defence based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stated that an attack against one ally would be seen as an attack on all, remained the dominant element of NATO throughout the Cold War. As early as the mid-1950s, however, it accepted that "NATO must become more than a military Alliance," or else "it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it."157 While political consultation never reached the level desired by Lester B. Pearson and other Canadian advocates of Article 2 cooperation, increased emphasis was thereafter placed on it within NATO; over the decades, the proper role of nuclear weapons would be at the forefront of both its military and political preoccupations.

Given the Cold War context of NATO's birth, the nuclear weapons of its member States played a key war-fighting role in offsetting the perceived conventional superiority of, first, the Soviet Union and, after 1955, the Warsaw Pact. In 1967, NATO replaced the doctrine of "massive retaliation," which had envisaged an almost automatic nuclear response to any attack, with that of "flexible response," whose aim was ". . . the timely use of the minimum force, whether conventional or nuclear, adequate to deny an aggressor success in his objective."158

The operation of U.S. nuclear weapons by allies in Europe was also seen as a visible symbol of shared responsibility for possible nuclear use and a means of ensuring a continued U.S. commitment to European security; during the Cold War nuclear weapons were often seen as the "glue" which held the Alliance together. As Sir Michael Quinlan has argued, the fact that NATO nuclear doctrine had to win the support, or at least acquiescence, of many different nations meant that the Defence Ministers' Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) had to take great care to think through the issues raised by the existence of nuclear weapons. In his view, NATO's nuclear policies were as a result, "the most thoroughly-debated and explicitly-presented official doctrines about the role of nuclear weapons in preventing and managing war...," and "...the leading public-policy product of the world's first half-century in thinking through the impact of the irreversible nuclear revolution upon the idea of war."159

Like other elements of Cold War excess, however, U.S. nuclear weapons available for NATO use in Europe grew far more than necessary over the years, peaking in the late 1960s at over 7,000 warheads on a wide range of delivery vehicles owned and operated by various Alliance members, including Canada. As Sir Michael has admitted, "there can be no doubt that an ample range of options to fulfil the doctrines of possible use evolved by the NPG did not need anything like 7,000 warheads. . ."160

POST-COLD WAR NUCLEAR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

As Daniel Bon, the Director General of Policy Planning at the Department of National Defence (DND), told the Committee in February 1998, "After the Cold War, the nuclear elements of NATO strategy were the first to undergo review, and were subjected to the most radical changes."161 For all the internal debates caused by nuclear weapons during the Cold War, however, NATO member States were faced with such a vast range of issues at its end - the future role of the Alliance after the break-up of the Soviet Empire, NATO's relationship to the soon-to-be-renamed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other organizations, the implications of continuing European integration, the future of the transatlantic link, whether and how to undertake operations beyond the territory of member States - that these significant changes were accomplished relatively quickly and easily, especially as they followed the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and a unilateral U.S. decision to radically reduce its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

At the London Summit in July 1990, NATO adopted the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, which acknowledged that, while NATO remained an Alliance for collective defence, it had to adjust to changing circumstances. Nuclear weapons were to play less of a role in NATO's new strategy, becoming "truly weapons of last resort." The London Summit also initiated a fundamental strategic review, which culminated with the publication at the Rome Summit in November 1991 for the first time of NATO's political strategy, the Alliance Strategic Concept. Recognizing that the risks to allied security were "multifaceted in nature, which makes them hard to predict and assess," the new strategy introduced a broad approach to security with three mutually reinforcing elements of Alliance security policy: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability, focused on enhanced mobility, flexibility and augmentation.

The role of nuclear weapons was also further reduced in line with U.S. PresidentGeorge Bush's unexpected reciprocal unilateral measures with the Soviet Union to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. According to the Strategic Concept, "the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression." It might have seemed sufficient to repeat the "weapons of last resort" phrase from the London Declaration of the previous year; however, as was pointed out by Rob de Wijk, who participated in the internal NATO debates as head of the Concepts Division of the Defence Staff at the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, it was not that simple. In his words, "The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany were concerned that continued use of this term could lead to calls for a "No First Use" declaration and a debate on the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Europe."162 In the end, the Strategic Concept stated that, given the radical changes in the security situation, the circumstances under which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be considered were "even more remote" than they had been. According to de Wijk, "This formulation showed how much nuclear weapons had lost in significance. In the years to follow nuclear weapons would become a non-issue in the political debate."163

Deterrence was the basic rationale for NATO nuclear policy, but the retention of a "minimum level" of nuclear forces in Europe was also a visible demonstration of risk and burden sharing among Allies, and a link between Europe and North America. According to Paragraph 56 of the Strategic Concept:

A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.164

The question remains, of course, what is this "minimum level," and how can Canada best help create the circumstances within Europe in which it could actually be brought down to zero?

A NEW NATO

...NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. . . Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states.

As the threat of deliberate strategic attack disappeared and the role of nuclear weapons was downplayed, NATO moved from focusing solely on the protection of its members' territory to slowly adopt a broader "collective-security" role beyond that area. In June 1992, for example, following the Gulf War and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, it agreed to support peacekeeping activities on case-by-case basis under the responsibility of the CSCE, and in December of that year agreed to support similar operations under the authority of the UN Security Council. After long and frustrating internal debates, NATO also moved to support peace operations in Bosnia, significantly working side-by-side with Russian and other troops. Rob de Wijk went so far as to argue in NATO Review in the summer of 1998 that, "During the 1990s, NATO has evolved to the extent that crisis management and conflict prevention are now its primary missions."166

In addition to these internal adaptations, NATO also established a framework for political dialogue with its former adversaries in 1991 through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (and, in 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), followed in 1994 by defence-related cooperation through the Partnership for Peace.

While proposed enlargement of the Alliance caused great controversy both internally and in relations with Russia, by 1998 it appeared that the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, the establishment of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and NATO's announcement at the Madrid Summit that it would re-examine its Strategic Concept, had done much to assuage Russian objections. Unless the political and military security of the Euro-Atlantic region is improved still further, however, most observers expect these objections to resurface if any former republics of the Soviet Union seem likely to join NATO in a future enlargement.

Some critics have argued that these adaptations were merely the action of a large bureaucracy intent on identifying a role for itself, and that enlargement in particular was unnecessary and antagonistic - "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era" in the words of former American diplomat George Kennan.167 Most members of the Committee, however, and in particular those who visited Bosnia in November 1997 and observed the valuable work of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), are convinced that NATO's evolution thus far has increased rather than decreased regional security. For the Alliance, the updating of its Strategic Concept is a chance to both explain its successful transformation since the end of the Cold War and ensure an overall strategic coherence to its future mission.

AN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR RE-EXAMINATION

Throughout its hearings - and in particular those in Washington with U.S. State and Defense Department officials - the Committee has been told that there is broad agreement within NATO capitals that nuclear issues not be included as part of the re-examination of the Strategic Concept. The costs of thereby possibly reopening the divisive nuclear debates of previous decades, it is thought, would outweigh any conceivable benefits. As Sir Michael Quinlan told the Committee:

On the question of NATO nuclear doctrine, I haven't consulted my ex-colleagues on this, but I can see frankly a good deal of sense in not loading the agenda with a revisiting of matters that were sorted out pretty carefully, unless there is reason to suppose that some of it needs changing. There's an onus of proof, as it were, on those who would wish to change it.168

As we shall see, however, witnesses before the Committee, and experts elsewhere, have in fact made strong cases for revisiting various aspects of NATO nuclear policy and posture. Whether or how NATO member States finally agree to adopt any of these suggestions remains to be seen, but in doing so they must consider developments since the publication of the Strategic Concept in 1991. In addition to the emerging global consensus on the need to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons described throughout the report, these include: the collapse of the Soviet Union only weeks after the publication of the Strategic Concept, the adoption of new NATO policies and activities in Bosnia and elsewhere, the forthcoming enlargement of the Alliance, and the continued evolution of the European Union.

The Committee does not believe that advocating willingness to work within the Alliance to continually update its nuclear policy would automatically marginalize Canada, as some witnesses feared. Professor Jim Fergusson was one witness who argued strongly that given its interests and multilateral tradition, Canada should not deliberately break with NATO on this issue; yet even he agreed that, "There is nothing difficult or wrong for any member nation such as Canada to make its views known in the NATO council."169 Indeed, he went on to argue that, "In terms of specific policy considerations, I do believe that Canada should go into the councils of Europe and raise the issue and discuss the question of first use, the reservation of first use. I believe there are several European like-minded nations within the Alliance who would likely also agree to a serious look at the question of first use."170

Given the improvements in the international security situation since 1991, the pressing need now is for States to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and demonstrate their commitment to limiting reliance on nuclear weapons. NATO failure to address the nuclear issue within its re-examination of the Strategic Concept would be taken as evidence of a fundamental lack of political will and leadership, and tend to decrease, rather than increase, international security.

THE CASE FOR CHANGE

Nothing in the present and foreseeable European security situation stands in the way of forceful steps towards nuclear disarmament. NATO holds a vast superiority in conventional weapons. That the alliance still keeps the option to use nuclear weapons first against a conventional challenge - and appears to continue with that doctrine even within the new strategic framework that is presently under consideration - is an unbelievable anachronism. It flies in the face of NATO's own non-proliferation goals. How can we ever explain to countries in much more difficult security environments that the mightiest military agglomeration the world has ever seen cannot renounce nuclear use under any circumstances, while they, in contrast, are supposed to stick to their non-nuclear status?

A number of observers have pointed out that, even as NATO continues to evolve and contribute more broadly to security in the Euro-Atlantic region along with organizations like the OSCE, it attempts to ensure that it is still capable of defending its member States. In the words of American Professor David Yost:

The U.S. and its Allies will have little choice but to pursue a two-track policy: pursuing collective-security aspirations to the extent that they are feasible and prudent while maintaining a collective-defence posture as a hedge in case those aspirations cannot be fulfilled. The challenge is to find a middle course that maintains collective-defence capabilities in good order, given the risk of future threats to Alliance security, while seeking to deepen cooperation and transparency in security matters and to contain the risks inherent in emerging or ongoing rivalries.172

The Policy of Deterrence

Deterrence, based upon the refusal to limit the possible first use of nuclear weapons and the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe were key aspects of NATO nuclear policy during the Cold War. Conventional wisdom is that these elements of the Alliance nuclear policy remain essential for collective defence now that NATO has reduced both the numbers and readiness of these weapons. Yet witnesses before the Committee made strong arguments against that view.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, while a debate exists over the costs and benefits of deterrence in the post-Cold War world, this policy will not be changed in the short term. The question becomes whether deterrence requires either a refusal to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons or their deployment in Europe. Though NATO argues that any limitation on its right to first use would undermine deterrence, a number of witnesses before the Committee disagreed, citing the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the Canberra Commission and others, who have argued that deterrence can be effective even with nuclear weapons relegated to their "core" function of deterring nuclear use by others.173 As Simon Rosenblum of the World Federalists of Canada pointed out to the Committee, Joseph Rotblat, who both worked on the Manhattan Project and won the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize for his work as co-founder and President of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, argues that "the most important step at the present time - and this can be taken virtually overnight - is for the nuclear powers to declare that the only purpose of possessing nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack."174

Some felt NATO had already implied this posture. As former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs Peggy Mason put it, "NATO heads of state and government in 1990 - this was the London Summit, the first post-Cold War summit - declared that they would ensure that NATO nuclear policy would be revised to ensure `that nuclear weapons were truly weapons of last resort.' Yet the policy that emerged in 1991 did not meet this high-level political commitment. The resulting policy . . . leaves all NATO's nuclear options open, including first use of nuclear weapons."175

No First Use

Following this argument, a number of witnesses also called for NATO to enter into negotiations with Russia to adopt joint declarations of No First Use of nuclear weapons. As we saw in Chapter 2, this would be complicated by Russia's increased reliance on nuclear weapons, but it is difficult to argue that the possible security benefits of such an agreement among four of the world's five nuclear-weapon States are not worth attempting to achieve. Calls for "No First Use" declarations, a perennial element of the Cold War debate, have been repeated in recent years by, among others, the Canberra Commission, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and a group of high-profile Canadians, whose call for a NATO policy of No First Use was tabled with the Committee by the World Federalists of Canada.176 Even among those agreed on the need for substantial nuclear disarmament, however, there is not yet unanimity on the question of No First Use. The powerful February 1998 Nuclear Weapons Abolition Statement by Current and Former Heads of State argued that States should immediately undertake such actions as de-alerting nuclear weapons and halting production of fissile materials; however, a commitment to ``No First Use of Nuclear Weapons" was included only as one of a series of possible additional steps that "should be carefully considered, to determine whether they are presently appropriate or feasible."177

NATO could, however, preserve its policy of deterrence yet support the need for progressively limiting reliance on nuclear weapons by declaring that it would not use these weapons to respond to a conventional attack, a highly implausible scenario in any case. A similar proposal was made in the U.S. context in a 1995 study by RAND. According to its authors:

The United States has emerged from the Cold War as the world's preeminent conventional military power, which suggests that the United States is well equipped to deter or defeat conventional attacks using conventional weapons alone. A U.S. promise not to use nuclear weapons against conventional attacks would go far toward refuting the criticism of non-nuclear-weapons states that the United States unfairly insists that others forswear nuclear weapons while remaining free itself to use them whenever it sees fit.178

If this case can be made for the United States alone, it is even more valid for the United States in concert with its NATO allies. Dr. Harald Müller agrees, arguing before the Committee that the adoption by NATO of a declaration of No First Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction would be a step in the right direction. As he put it, "Under the present circumstances, new thinking is in order. At least a declaration that NATO will not use weapons of mass destruction first would be a small step forward."179

Such a declaration would still not resolve the contentious issue of whether such weapons could be used to respond to chemical or biological attack. As we saw in earlier chapters, this issue has been a contentious one in the United States, and, according to Dr. Müller, ". . . we should also recognize that a nuclear response to a biological or chemical weapons attack is also implicit in present NATO doctrine. So in a way, our countries are implicated here."180 While the Committee has not been told that this issue has been contentious within NATO, this may be because it has not yet been publicly raised in that context. NATO has only begun to address the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction since the publication of its Strategic Concept in 1991; at its January 1994 Summit it formally acknowledged the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction and associated delivery means, and pledged to intensify both political and defence efforts against it. Former Ambassador for Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Peggy Mason argued that this was another important reason for NATO to re-examine its nuclear policy:

Another reason why it seems to me that a meaningful review of NATO's nuclear policy is very much in the interest of the alliance is the fact that a lack of meaningful debate coupled with the lack of clarity in the strategic concept - what NATO's nuclear policy is called - as to when nuclear weapons might be threatened or used could mean that by default in a crisis U.S. counter-proliferation policy will dictate the actual content of NATO nuclear policy.

It is no secret that the United States believes in and is developing strategies for countering the use of biological weapons, for example, with a nuclear deterrent. Surely that is something that should be debated actively by the members of NATO, particularly the non-nuclear members. This is a new mission for NATO for nuclear weapons and is quite outside the international treaty regime we have, which seeks to ban them, not find new missions for them. Surely we should debate this meaningfully within NATO rather than having American-driven American policy developed in the United States become the policy of NATO by default.181

Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Also of concern to many witnesses was the continued stationing of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for use by Allies. As Tariq Rauf reminded the Committee:

Non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons have largely been ignored following the successful conclusion and implementation of the 1987 intermediate nuclear forces treaty and the fall 1991 Bush-Gorbachev unilateral initiatives.

. . .Non-strategic nuclear weapons traditionally have been deemed the most dangerous and the most destabilizing due to their proximity to zones of conflict, lack of strong permissive action links, the danger of pre-delegation, and the risk of early pre-emptive or accidental use.182

The U.S. nuclear gravity bombs still in Europe present few of these problems, but, as we saw in Chapter 2, the same cannot be said of the thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons there, whose unilateral consolidation in 1991 was not subject to verification. Russia may not be willing to eliminate all of its tactical nuclear weapons; however, Tariq Rauf suggested that it might consider a reciprocal arrangement with NATO on treaty limits or the removal of all such weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals (the zone of application already accepted in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty). Such an agreement would obviously be tremendously asymmetrical; Russian tactical nuclear weapons in this area could outnumber U.S. weapons by as much as 100 to 1. Even given this huge difference in numbers, however, Russia might see political and security advantages in removing these weapons from the territory of an enlarged NATO, and the Alliance should recognize the security benefits of its subsequently increased knowledge and confidence about the location and security of Russian tactical nuclear arms. Camille Grand went further, arguing that

It . . . makes no sense today to have stocks of tactical weapons. The unilateral withdrawal of 1991 should be formalized as a treaty so that we need not fear a Russian blackmail in response to a further expansion of NATO. That would seem to me to be a positive thing that would also allow us to not get into useless debates on the deployment of strategic arms in Poland, which has no strategic usefulness and only worries the Russians.183

Even within NATO it is widely acknowledged that tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have little military utility, particularly now that the countries on NATO's eastern borders are all its partners in the Partnership for Peace and elsewhere. While warning members not to underestimate the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons still in Europe, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Frank Miller told the Committee in Washington that, the "political value far exceeds any potential military value these weapons could ever have."184 Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy was even more blunt, commenting in the context of India's May 1998 nuclear tests that, "It would appear that India has not learned the lessons the Cold War participants learned by the mid-1960s, that nuclear weapons have no tactical value."185

The most important reasons for retaining these weapons in Europe, then, would seem to be to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and a continued transatlantic link. As Professor Paul Buteux of the University of Manitoba explained in response to a question about No First Use declarations:

No first use I don't think is that terribly important in NATO at the present time. There aren't any targets for those weapons. They're there for symbolic purposes. They're there in fact to meet the very different political needs of the French, the British, the Americans, the Germans and some others.

In my view, NATO doesn't have a strategy for nuclear weapons these days. It has nuclear weapons and there are other reasons for having them, but it doesn't have a strategy.186

While nuclear weapons may continue to fulfil this political role as they did during the Cold War, many question the cost of such symbolism, and whether it is still necessary. By refusing to re-examine the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, NATO loses an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. These weapons represent only a small fraction of global nuclear arsenals, but assume added symbolism because of their Cold War history and because they are the last nuclear weapons still deployed outside of sovereign territory.187 The International Institute for Strategic Studies commented in May 1998 that the cost/benefit calculation of nuclear weapons has been undergoing a rethinking with the end of the Cold War:

. . . with the end of the Cold War many have dramatically changed their view of the cost-benefit calculus associated with nuclear weapons. Increasingly it has become apparent that many, including, in particular, many military officers, accepted nuclear weapons only as a repugnant necessity of the Cold War. The abolitionist coalition is being swollen largely because of a growing belief that the costs, dangers and risks associated with nuclear weapons exceed any conceivable benefits they may have in the post-Cold War era.188

It is obviously for the member States of the Alliance to decide the extent to which the continued symbolic deployment of nuclear weapons strengthens their relationship. As Tariq Rauf put it before the Committee:

I would recommend that . . . Canada, within NATO circles, recommend an honest and fundamental re-evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe. We can do away with . . . non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe because there will always be American nuclear missile submarines that would be devoted for the use of the allied commander in Europe should the situation require it.

Tactical nuclear weapons do not add to European security. If tactical nuclear weapons are needed in Europe to provide the glue to hold this alliance together, then I think this alliance has outlived its utility, and it's time to recognize that.189

Harald Müller agreed, arguing that, ". . . the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is unnecessary. Those who believe this is the true glue for the Alliance have much less faith than I do in the values that keep our democracies together and give each of us a keen interest in the security, survival and well-being of each other. It is time to finish with the old-fashioned nuclear coupling theology."190

Sir Michael Quinlan felt differently about the need for change, yet agreed that it was up to member States to judge the need to re-examine these issues:

The presence of those systems in Europe doesn't raise any great strategic question. They are in some degree. . . political statements, but political statements genuinely have their value. They underline again the unity of the alliance - the fact that NATO's territory is a single security space and the fact that the systems are located in one part rather than another isn't reflective of any fundamental difference in purpose. . .

At a purely technical level, I think it is indeed open to debate, if there were pressures on other grounds to change, whether it is wholly essential to have these systems there rather than back in the continental United States. But while these other purposes are served, and while no one objects deeply, I really don't see merit in elevating this high up in the agenda.191

The Committee has concluded, however, that many Canadians and others do object to the status quo. An open discussion of these issues, and the related issue of burden sharing, could also go toward clarifying myths and preconceptions. As Dr. Jo Husbands, Staff Director of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences told the Committee in Washington, American officials generally argue that European allies will not accept changes to the NATO nuclear status quo, while the Europeans argue the same thing about the Americans.192

UPDATING THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Canada is already playing a most constructive role in the international non-proliferation system, as well as in multilateral disarmament negotiations. It is a bridge builder between the dangerously different positions of north and south, and all the more credible in this world as it is a faithful and unwavering NATO ally. I hope Canada will pursue this political path with even enhanced determination under the present deteriorated international conditions, and I might wish that Canada will challenge the European countries more to emulate its own good example.

The Committee prefers to believe that, while the Allies may ultimately decide to retain much of NATO's current nuclear policy, at least for the present, the evidence now runs counter to NATO's earlier rejection of the need to change any aspect of this policy. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued in May 1998, "Debating ideas is fundamental to free speech. But debate is also fundamental to making progress. Only if you constantly challenge your own assumptions can you break new ground."194 The Committee believes that the modern Atlantic alliance is strong enough to survive and benefit from an open discussion of these issues. For this reason it believes that NATO must acknowledge these developments in updating its Strategic Concept.

Some witnesses before the Committee argued that since Canada was unlikely to be able to convince the Alliance to re-examine its nuclear policy, it should leave NATO. In the words ofDavid Morgan of Veterans against Nuclear Arms ". . . working from within NATO to change its policy is an illusion. It hasn't worked in the past. I don't think it's likely to work in the future. On the key issues of NATO retention of nuclear weapons, I don't think Canada will have any chance to change the policy from within NATO."195 A majority of the Committee, however, agrees with most of its witnesses, who argued that Canada should work from within the Alliance to ensure its continued relevance.

Ideally, such a re-examination would involve what Tariq Rauf argued should be a "blank sheet" review of NATO nuclear policy. This may not be acceptable at present to all member States, but NATO must at least recognize that its nuclear policies have to be continually re-examined to ensure that they contribute to, rather than detract from, regional and global security. It must also decide the extent to which it is willing to show leadership in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, thereby lessening the political value of such weapons, preventing their proliferation and assisting in their eventual elimination. Reducing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons without undermining confidence in the Alliance will not be easy. Yet, given the importance of the objectives and the political strength of NATO, difficulty is not an adequate excuse for inaction.

RECOMMENDATION 15

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada argue forcefullywithin NATO that the present re-examination and update as necessary of theAlliance Strategic Concept should include its nuclear component.

---

Chapter 5: Conclusion:
The Road to the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

As you examine the vital question of how Canada, this extraordinary nation of diverse peoples and great friend of the United States, should align itself on the continuing role of nuclear weapons I encourage you ponder deeply the opportunity and the stakes at hand. My country is badly in need of a new moral compass on this issue. We have committed the fatal sin in public policy making of becoming cynical and arrogant with respect to decisions affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. We have trivialized the likelihood that deterrence might fail, thus providing easy moral cover for ignoring the consequences. We have learned to live with a weapon that numbs our conscience and diminishes our humanity. We need to hear voices of reason, urging us to a higher standard of rectitude and global leadership. We await your call.

The Committee's Work

The Committee undertook its examination of Canada's nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Following months of hearings with a range of Canadians and others, it has reached a number of conclusions that must underlie this policy, and recommendations to strengthen it, into the twenty-first century.

Despite the vast improvement in international security since the end of the Cold War, continued progress is essential with respect to the reduction and eventual elimination of the threat posed by the world's 36,000 nuclear weapons, thousands of which remain on unnecessarily high alert. As retired U.S. Air Force General Lee Butler wrote to the Committee, "This is in my view the dominant security issue of the post-Cold War era. It will shape the foundation of international conflict resolution for decades to come. More importantly, it will govern the pace and the prospect for nudging higher the norms of civilized behaviour among nations and peoples."197 A similar point was made to the Committee by Janet Somerville, General Secretary of the Canadian Council of Churches in February 1998. She spoke on behalf of Canadian religious leaders of ". . .the hope and longing that in our lifetime the last nuclear weapon will be disabled and dismantled and the human family will reject as unthinkable, as unchooseable, the nuclear option, as something that simply must not be inflicted by some human beings upon others."198

Despite similarities with debates of previous decades, the current nuclear debate is not simply a replay of them. Fear of deliberate nuclear attack has now been replaced by a recognition of the need to ensure the operational and physical safety of nuclear arsenals. This has led to increased emphasis on such valuable concepts as the "de-alerting" of nuclear weapons, and efforts to prevent the failure of authority over nuclear weapons and materials. While the emphasis may have changed, the goal remains increasing confidence and security on a global basis through the principles of reciprocity and verifiability, and adequate funding for verification purposes must be ensured.

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been remarkably successful to date; three decades ago it was widely assumed that 25-30 States would have such weapons by the end of the 1970s. Today, only eight do so. Notwithstanding this success, if this 30-year old international consensus is not to unravel, there must be renewed political commitment and prompt action by all States, and particularly by the five nuclear-weapon States identified in the Treaty - the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China.

Following an understandable lull in public attention to the issue immediately after the end of the Cold War, Canadians remain deeply concerned about nuclear weapons. They also demand that their government build on its strong record in this area, and also on its recent experience with the Ottawa Process, whereby an international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines was achieved, to play an even stronger part in non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Canada already favours the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear, biological and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction, but its policy in this area can and must be strengthened in a number of important respects.

Finally, while not strictly a foreign-policy issue, there is also an important domestic aspect to the nuclear issue which the Government of Canada must work harder to address. No simple solution exists to this issue, but the Committee has been struck by the universal demand, from witnesses and those who wrote submissions, for more information and debate in this area. The Committee has made a number of recommendations to improve this situation, and encourages further government action to create and support an ongoing process of public education and debate.

Beyond Nuclear Apathy

The end of the Cold War saw significant progress in beginning to reduce nuclear arsenals under the bilateral US-Russia START process and near-universal political commitment at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 to the continued reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. With the end of the danger of all-out nuclear war, public and political attention understandably turned to other issues. The past several years have therefore seen progress stall in this area and, worse, the emergence of what Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy referred to before the Committee as a "new nuclear realpolitik," which threatens both further progress and past gains. It is tempting simply to lay the blame for this state of affairs on the five nuclear-weapon States committed to eliminate their arsenals under the NPT and the three other nuclear-weapons-capable States that have not accepted international norms in this area. The blame must, however, be shared by all States, including Canada, for not sustaining the political pressure necessary to keep this issue at the forefront of international concerns. The Committee accepts that the five nuclear-weapon States entered into their NPT commitments in good faith; given the importance of the issues, their friends and allies also have a responsibility to encourage them to pursue these commitments with vigour, and to remind them of the cost of not doing so. If the regrettable and dangerous Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 are to have any positive result, it will be in their signal that the nuclear status quo cannot be taken for granted, and in the degree to which they encourage renewed commitment and greater action on the part of all States.

As we noted in Chapter 1, the international community has already agreed on the goal of the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons; however, this can be accomplished only by deliberately reducing the political and military value placed on these weapons. This will not be easy, and will likely involve difficult political choices and ongoing creative tension. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference showed that it was possible, under pressure, to generate the level of political commitment necessary for progress in this area; we must now accept the challenge to sustain such commitment and carry it through both in international forums and at the domestic level.

A key element in generating this level of political will and commitment will be mobilizing public opinion. As UN Deputy Director for Disarmament Affairs Evgeniy Gorkovskiy reminded the Committee in New York, disarmament is a very practical business; the key to success in the nuclear field is the mobilization of public opinion, which can best be done by following the example of the Ottawa Process and focusing on the humanitarian rather than military/technical aspects of this issue. The unique nature of nuclear weapons means that the Ottawa Process, which succeeded in bypassing stalled diplomatic mechanisms to achieve agreement banning anti-personnel landmines, cannot be duplicated in the nuclear field. Yet its lessons, such as the need to focus on the humanitarian aspects of issues, engage civil society and non-governmental organizations, and move beyond traditional political-military groupings in the search for like-minded States, can surely help overcome the current frustrations with respect to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

NATO is currently engaged in a re-examination and update, as necessary, of its 1991 Strategic Concept, to be completed by April 1999; as we saw in Chapter 4, NATO nuclear policy received much attention during the Committee's work. Members do not all have the same view of the future of NATO, but all agree that for both practical and symbolic reasons the Government of Canada must work to convince its NATO allies that the updated Strategic Concept must reflect the changes in the international landscape and security priorities since 1991, including recognition of the need to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons wherever possible.

The NPT, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Witnesses were unanimous that the key to preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving the international goal of their reduction and eventual elimination is following the obligations contained in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as reinforced by the 1995 Declaration of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. As we saw in Chapter 3, this Treaty must be properly understood as a compromise; it imposes obligations on all States that are party to it, but, as long as the vast majority of those States honour their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, attention will remain focused on the obligations of the five nuclear-weapon States identified in the Treaty. At present, these refuse even to discuss substantive disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament. The Committee rejects the argument of some that, since the commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons is the responsibility of the nuclear States alone, it is for them to determine how best to do this safely. It is the responsibility of all parties to a contract to ensure that its terms are respected; failure to secure such respect may bring the value of the contract into question.

A controversial issue during the Committee's study has been the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the NPT obligation to share the benefits of such peaceful use with other States. While it is not directly within the Committee's mandate, all members recognize the need to address public concerns about safety, health and environmental issues with respect to the domestic operation of nuclear reactors in Canada and the transport and disposal of nuclear waste. Foreign policy dimensions arise, however, in connection with the sale of Canadian nuclear technology abroad, and the suggestion that this country could contribute to non-proliferation by disposing of surplus Russian and American plutonium, in the form of mixed oxide or "MOX" fuel, in reactors in Canada. The Committee has made recommendations on these issues in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Report.

Some members feel that such sales are inappropriate, but most acknowledge that as long as Canada has a domestic nuclear industry, they are part of its commitments under the NPT. Members are unanimous that if such sales are to continue, they must be carried out under the strictest possible safeguards. Canada strengthened its nuclear cooperation policies following India's 1974 decision to break its written commitments and explode a nuclear device. The lesson here was not simply the obvious one that the previous Canadian policy needed strengthening, however, but that the international community can never become complacent about this issue. The purpose of the international safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to provide notice of any attempt by an NPT State to divert nuclear material for explosive purposes, rather than to prevent such diversion. The Committee has concluded that, in order to strengthen the system and allow Canadians and others to have confidence in it, priority must now be placed on persuading all NPT states to accept the new strengthened Protocol developed by the IAEA as soon as possible.

In addition to highlighting the need to strengthen existing mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery systems, the Committee recognizes that we must go beyond technical questions to develop and maintain political consensus within the international community for acting collectively and resolutely to address these issues. A number of witnesses pointed out that creating an international system in which States are ready and willing to take concerted diplomatic action, and even conventional military action when necessary, is important in preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and essential in creating the conditions enabling the eventual elimination, or prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The international community has accepted the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons; the status quo cannot be assumed to be tenable forever, but in some respects the issue is thus how to safely get there from here. The post-Cold War debate over these issues has produced a number of significant roadmaps, including: the Declaration of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, accepted by all States party to the NPT in 1995; the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use or Nuclear Weapons; the 1996 report of the Australian-sponsored Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; and the 1997 report of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. None of these alone can ensure further progress, but taken together, their whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

Sir Michael Quinlan and other witnesses pointed out the obvious fact that, while the international community has agreed on the goal of the "elimination" of nuclear weapons, nuclear knowledge, once discovered, can never truly be eliminated. Recognizing the need to balance idealism and practicality in this area, and in order to deny advocates of the nuclear status quo an easy avenue for dismissing its recommendations, the Committee has chosen to follow the example of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which speaks of the more practical but equivalent goal of the "prohibition" of nuclear weapons.

Prohibiting nuclear weapons as a key element in ensuring international security will not be achieved quickly or easily, but the requirements for it are clear. These are: the recommitment on the part of all States to the principles and obligations contained in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; commitments on the part of the United States and Russia to continue and go beyond the bilateral START process, of the United Kingdom, France and China to increase transparency about their nuclear arsenals and doctrines, and of all five States to accept the substantive discussion of disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament; a commitment on the part of Canada and other States to emphasize the importance of these issues at all opportunities, even at the risk of tensions within the NATO Alliance or bilateral relationships; and the need to redouble international efforts to reduce regional tensions in South Asia and the Middle East, and to convince India, Pakistan and Israel to accept the global nuclear non-proliferation consensus and, following the recent example of South Africa, roll back and eventually dismantle their nuclear programs.

A Role for Canada

Since Canada is not itself a nuclear-weapon State, some would discount its ability to encourage and influence further progress in this area. The Committee strongly disagrees. Canada, we believe, is uniquely qualified to lead, as the first State capable of developing nuclear weapons to decide not to do so, later as the first State to divest itself of nuclear weapons, and finally as a leader in the 1995 extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a key player in the Ottawa Process which highlighted the need for creative diplomacy with respect to security and arms control. Ambassador Mark Moher will now put this leadership to good use as he chairs the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Despite its technical aspects, the challenge of moving toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons remains fundamentally political and moral. The Committee is convinced that Canada has the vision, talent and credibility to play a leading role in finally ending the nuclear threat overhanging humanity. Our goal entering the next millennium is a more secure and better world for all. We can think of no higher foreign policy imperative.

---

1 Notes for a Statement by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "India's Nuclear Testing: Implications for Nuclear Disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 98/40 Ottawa, May 26, 1998, p. 4.

2 Stansfield Turner, "The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation" in Security Dialogue, September 1998, p. 300.

3 Tariq Rauf, "Canada, NATO and Nuclear Arms Control," Statement before the Committee, February 12, 1998, p. 1.

4 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 4-5. (All subsequent references in the text to Committee proceedings will use this abbreviated notation.)

5 "Quote. . .Unquote," the Montreal Gazette, May 31, 1998, p. A8.

6 Mark Moher, "The World Court, NATO and Canada: The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Implications for Canada," Speech to the Canadian Pugwash Group Special Forum, Ottawa, October 18, 1997, p. 2-3.

7 See Stephen I. Schwartz, "Overview of Project Findings," June 30, 1998, in The Hidden Cost of Our Nuclear Arsenal, Brookings Institution Webpage. This briefing is based on the book, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, Brookings Institution Press, 1998.

8 Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., "South Asia and the Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, May 1998, p. 3.

9 The traditional secrecy of nuclear weapons programs means that it is necessary to rely on estimates, such as those contained in the Natural Resources Defense Council's March 1998 Report, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998.

10 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. (1997), p. 43.

11 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, February 10, 1998, p. 22.

12 Professor Yves Le Bouthillier, "Canada's Policy on the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Light of the Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Lawfulness of Threats to Use or the Use of Nuclear Weapons," February 1998, p. 1-2.

13 Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996, "Executive Summary," p. 9-10.

14 Quoted in Fred Kaplan The Wizards of Armageddon, Simon and Schuster Inc., New York (1983), p. 32.

15 Fred Iklé, "Foreword," in Michael J. Mazarr, ed., Nuclear Weapons In a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals, St. Martin's Press, New York (1997), p. IX-X.

16 See for example Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, "Dismantling the Concept of `Weapons of Mass Destruction'," Arms Control Today, April 1998, p. 3.

17 Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, May 26, 1998, p. 2.

18 John P. Holdren, "Nuclear Proliferation and United States Responsibilities," May 29, 1998, reprinted in slightly edited form in the Chicago Tribune, June 2, 1998.

19 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essay Five: "Deterrence, Arms Control and Proliferation," July 1998, p. 1, Ministry of Defence Website.

20 Sir Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, RUSI Whitehall Paper Series, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (1997), p. 12.

21 General Lee Butler, "The Risks of Deterrence: From superpowers to Rogue Leaders," Washington, D.C., The National Press Club, February 2, 1998, p. 4-6.

22 Evidence, Meeting No. 67, June 11, 1998, p. 15.

23 General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Shaping the Nuclear Future: Toward a More Comprehensive Approach, Occasional Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States, December 1997, p. 1.

24 Michael J. Mazarr, "The Notion of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals" (1997), p. 4.

25 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 25.

26 Holdren (1998).

27 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (1998), p. 8.

28 Presentation by Ambassador Mark Moher, Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, to the Committee, February 3, 1998, p. 2-3, and 7-8.

29 Evidence, Meeting No. 23, February 5, 1998, p. 5.

30 "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda," June 9, 1998.

31 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, February 24, 1998, p. 6.

32 Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, May 26, 1998, p. 3.

33 Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," in Foreign Affairs, January/February 1998, p. 26.

34 Canadians' Views On a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons, Angus Reid Group Inc., March 26, 1998, Table 2.

35 James Lee and Gerald Schmitz, Report on Committee's Meetings in Washington, D.C. and New York City, March 29-April 1, 1998, p. 5.

36 Ibid., p. 31.

37 Evidence, Meeting No. 23, February 5, 1998, p. 38.

38 Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel, Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, February 1998, p. 9.

39 Lynne Myers and Alan Nixon, "Nuclear Issues in Canada," Issues Highlights for the 36th Parliament, Parliamentary Research Branch, September 1997, p. 73.

40 Evidence, Meeting No. 39, March 17, 1998, p. 3.

41 Evidence, Meeting No. 39, March 17, 1998, p. 43.

42 Robert M. Hazen and James Trefil, Science Matters: Achieving Scientific Literacy, New York, Doubleday, 1991, p. 114.

43 Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel, Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, February 1998, p. 18.

44 Evidence, Meeting No. 39, March 17, 1998, p. 30.

45 Evidence, Meeting No. 67, June 11, 1998, p. 5.

46 William Walker, "International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions," International Affairs, 74, 3 (1998), p. 520.

47 Ibid., p. 509.

48 Ibid., p. 514.

49 Ibid., p. 512-13.

50 See, for example, George Bunn and David Holloway, Arms Control without Treaties? Rethinking U.S.-Russian Strategic Negotiations in Light of the Duma-Senate Slowdown in Treaty Approval, Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, February 1998.

51 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 8.

52 The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997), p. 36.

53 According to William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris and Joshua Handler, the U.S. and Russia account for about 34, 570 warheads out of about 36, 000 worldwide. This does not include the arsenals of India, Pakistan or Israel, but even generously estimating their strength would not change the totals much. See William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris and Joshua Handler Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998, Natural Resources Defense Council (1998).

54 Quoted in Jonathan Schell, The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons Now, Metropolitan Books, New York (1998), p. 28.

55 See Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, "Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert," Scientific American, November 1997, p. 74-81.

56 Quoted in Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Nuclear Countdown after The Soviet Fall, (1997 Galley), forthcoming, p. 307.

57 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Commencement Address to the United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut, May 20, 1998, p. 3.

58 Evidence, Meeting No. 23, February 5, 1998, p. 26.

59 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 14.

60 William M. Arkin and Hans Kristensen, "Dangerous Directions," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998.

61 Arkin, Norris and Handler (1998), p. 14.

62 See Janne Nolan, "The Next Nuclear Posture Review?" in Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War, Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming.

63 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 2.

64 Ibid., p. 4.

65 William Walker, "International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions," International Affairs, 74, 3 (1998), p. 526.

66 Bruce Blair, "Loose Cannon," The National Interest (Summer 1998), p. 88.

67 Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, Centre for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1996.

68 Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe, Doubleday, New York (1997), p. 250-51.

69 Arkin et al. (1998), p. 2.

70 "Nuclear Weapons First in Russia's Defence Policy: Gambling on a Dangerous Reform Plan," Strategic Comments, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, Issue 1, January 1998, p. 1.

71 "President Yeltsin's Address to Russian Diplomats," May 12, 1998, International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1998), p. 4.

72 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 8.

73 Reuters, "Yeltsin Says Russia Nuclear Force Not Weaker," July 3, 1998.

74 Transcript of a Proliferation Roundtable on: ``A Report From Moscow," May 19, 1998, p. 5. Available on the Website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non-Proliferation Program.

75 Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Wednesday, February 5, 1997, written responses included in the hearing transcript, p. 99.

76 "Nuclear Weapons First in Russia's Defence Policy: Gambling on a Dangerous Reform Plan" (1998), p. 2.

77 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 16.

78 Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Wednesday, February 5, 1997, written responses included in the hearing transcript, p. 99.

79 The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997), p. 41.

80 Sam Nunn and Bruce Blair, "From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety: As Russia's Arsenal Crumbles, It's Time to Act," The Washington Post, June 22, 1997, p. C 1.

81 Bruce Blair, "Canada's Role in NORAD and Contribution to Nuclear Stability," Submission to the Committee, August 1998.

82 Professor Douglas A. Ross, Containing the Nuclear Threat: Canada's Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Objectives: Risks, Opportunities and Constraints, Submission to the Committee, April 1998, Addendum point 4.

83 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 7.

84 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, February 19, 1998, p. 12.

85 Ibid., p. 4.

86 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, February 19, 1998, p. 13. See also Franklyn Griffiths, MOX Experience: The Disposition of Excess Russian And U.S. Weapons Plutonium in Canada, July 1997.

87 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 10.

88 Ibid., p. 7.

89 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 12.

90 Evidence, Meeting No. 67, June 11, 1998, p. 2.

91 Sir Michael Quinlan (1997), p. 75-79.

92 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 7.

93 Ibid., p. 22.

94 Evidence, Meeting No. 67, June 11, 1998, p. 18.

95 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 2.

96 The State of Nuclear Proliferation, Fact Sheet, The Arms Control Association, May 1998.

97 Rodney W. Jones et al, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts 1998, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington (1998), p. 131.

98 Evidence, Meeting No. 64, June 9, 1998, p. 6.

99 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 13.

100 See Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," The New Yorker, March 29, 1993.

101 Walker (1998), p. 510.

102 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, First Session, Thirty-fifth Parliament, June 20, 1995, p. 16.

103 Transcript of a Proliferation Roundtable on: "Deterring Chemical and Biological Weapons," May 7, 1998, p. 4, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non-Proliferation Program Website.

104 Evidence, Meeting No. 54, May 26, 1998, p. 6.

105 Betts (1998), p. 32.

106 "Proliferation: Weapons of Mass Destruction and NATO," Strategic Overview 1996, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Policy Group Project Report 9625, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, November 1996, p. 71.

107 Panofsky (1998), p. 4.

108 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 15.

109 One such scholarly work was undertaken by a former President of the International Court of Justice in conjunction with a former member of the Committee: see Nagendra Singh and Edward McWhinney, Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989.

110 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, First Session, Thirty-fifth Parliament, June 20, 1995, p. 16.

111 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 10.

112 Ibid., p. 2.

113 Ross (1998), p. 2.

114 Transcript of a Proliferation Roundtable on: "Deterring Chemical and Biological Weapons," May 7, 1998, p. 10, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non-Proliferation Program Website.

115 Quoted in Harry Summers, "Protecting the Homeland," The Washington Times, August 6, 1998, p. 18.

116 Erik J. Leklem, "At One Year, CWC Progress Tempered by Limited Transparency," Arms Control Today, April 1998, p. 27-28.

117 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Book Release: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, Non-Proliferation Project Website, July 1998.

118 Jones et al. (1998), p. 15.

119 The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997), p. 50.

120 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, First Session, Thirty-fifth Parliament, June 20, 1995, p. 3.

121 The authors add that, while not now on this list, Algeria and Syria may bear watching in the future. See Jones et al. (1998) p. 3.

122 Letter from Professor William Walker to Bill Graham, M.P., August 6, 1998.

123 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 6.

1244 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 18-19.

125 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, February 19, 1998, p. 16.

126 This formulation is from John Simpson, "Smoke and Mirrors," The World Today, July 1998, p. 180.

127 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, First Session, Thirty-fifth Parliament, June 20, 1995, p. 7.

128 Kristen Ostling, Canada's Nuclear Policy and Proliferation Risks, Submission to the Committee, Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, February 19, 1998, p. 1.

129 Emily Bailey et al., Briefing Book Volume I: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (1998), p. 17.

130 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, February 19, 1998, p. 3.

131 Bailey et al. (1998), p. 17.

132 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, February 19, 1998, p. 10.

133 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 9 and 13.

134 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, February 19, 1998, p. 17.

135 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, June 2, 1998, p. 7.

136 Jones et al. (1998), p. 307-309. The 1995 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies also aims to complement and reinforce without duplicating existing control regimes for Weapons of Mass Destruction.

137 The following is based on the explanation of Canadian policy given to the Committee in June 1998, by Ralph Lysyshyn, Director General of the International Security Bureau at DFAIT. See Evidence, Meeting No. 59, June 2, 1998, p. 3.

138 Canada currently has 22 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with 36 countries - one agreement covers the 15 countries that are part of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

139 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, June 2, 1998, p. 20.

140 Ibid., p. 4.

141 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, February 19, 1998, p. 9.

142 Evidence, Meeting No. 59, June 2, 1998, p. 6.

143 William Walker, Letter to Bill Graham, M.P., August 6, 1998, p. 2.

144 Quoted in William Walker, "International Nuclear Relations After the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions," International Affairs, 74, 3 (1998), p. 522, note 49.

145 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 11.

146 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 3.

147 Ibid., p. 3.

148 See Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., "South Asia and the Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, May 1998.

149 Evidence, Meeting No. 67, June 11, 1998, p. 7.

150 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, February 10, 1998, p. 8.

151 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, May 27, 1997, p. 7, available on the NATO Website.

152 Evidence, Meeting No. 23, February 5, 1998, p. 5.

153 See Angus Reid Group, Canadian's Views on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons, March 26, 1998.

154 Evidence, Meeting No. 23, February 5, 1998, p. 29.

155 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 25.

156 Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, London (1997), p. 2-6.

157 Ibid., p. 1.

158 Sir Michael Quinlan (1997), p. 21.

159 Ibid., p. 20.

160 Ibid., p. 25.

161 Daniel L. Bon, Statement to the Committee, February 12, 1998, p. 1.

162 de Wijk (1997), p. 38-39.

163 Ibid., p. 39.

164 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" in Appendix IX, NATO Handbook, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995,p. 247-248.

165 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, May 27, 1997, p. 1-2.

166 Rob de Wijk, "Towards a New Political Strategy for NATO," NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 14-18 WEBEDITION, p. 3.

167 Quoted in Jack Mendelsohn, "Tranche Fever," Arms Control Today, Volume 28, Number 3, April 1998, p. 2.

168 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 26.

169 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 24.

170 Ibid., p. 24.

171 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 3-4.

172 David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 150.

173 The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997), p. 72.

174 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, February 24, 1998, p. 2.

175 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, February 10, 1998, p. 7.

176 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, February 24, 1998.

177 Nuclear Weapons Abolition Statement by Current and Former Heads of State, State of the World Forum, February 2, 1998.

178 David Gompert, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, "US Nuclear Declaratory Policy: The Question of Nuclear First Use," RAND, 1995, Summary, p. 2, available at RAND Website.

179 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 4.

180 Ibid., p. 11.

181 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, February 10, 1998, p. 9.

182 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 6.

183 Evidence, Meeting No. 67, June 11, 1998, p. 7.

184 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 15.

185 Evidence, Meeting No. 54, May 26, 1998, p. 5.

186 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, February 10, 1998, p. 30.

187 Arkin, Norris and Handler (1998), p. 1.

188 "Nuclear Weapons: The Abolitionist Upsurge" in Strategic Survey 1997/98, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (1998), p. 51.

189 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, February 12, 1998, p. 26.

190 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 4.

191 Ibid., p. 25.

192 Lee and Schmitz (1998), p. 3.

193 Evidence, Meeting No. 61, June 4, 1998, p. 5.

194 "NATO and European Security into the 21st Century," Speech by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, to the Oxford University Union Society, May 13, 1998, p. 1.

195 Evidence, Meeting No. 23, February 5, 1998, p. 43.

196 General Lee Butler, Letter to Bill Graham, M.P., July 1998 (see Appendix A).

197 Ibid.

198 Evidence, Meeting No. 35, February 26, 1998, p. 2.