Electoral system reform has been a subject of interest at the
federal level for almost a century, since the time when federal elections were
contested by more than two political parties. On eight occasions, dating back
to 1921, various House of Commons committees, royal commissions, and the Law
Commission of Canada have studied elements of electoral system reform.
Between the 1910s and 1970s, British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba introduced Alternative Vote (AV) or Single Transferable
Vote (STV) systems, or a combination of the two, at the provincial and/or
municipal levels. More recently, British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick,
and Prince Edward Island have all studied electoral reform.
Together these various studies have all sought to address, among
other things, two fundamental questions about how votes get translated to seats
in the House of Commons or provincial legislatures. First, when more than two
candidates run for election in a particular riding, should the victor have to
obtain a majority (more than 50%) of votes cast, or just a plurality (more
votes than any other candidate, but not necessarily more than 50%) of votes
cast, as is currently the case? Second, should the electoral system, which
currently treats each riding as its own contest, and thus does not take into
account support for a political party or interests across ridings or across a
region, in some way seek to translate this aggregate vote share into
representation in the House of Commons or provincial legislatures?
Finally, a number of these studies have also focused on the process
of electoral reform – to what extent Parliament or provincial legislatures
should consult with the public on options for reform, for example through
select deliberative processes such as citizens assemblies or through direct
votes in plebiscites or referendums.
In the words of Canadian historian Desmond Morton “cautious people
learn from their past; sensible people can face their future. Canadians, on the
whole, have been both.”[48] These histories of inquiry into electoral reform, and the insights provided to
the Committee by those who have taken part in studies of electoral reform over
the past 15 years, offer useful lessons to the Committee.
From Confederation in 1867 until 1921, federal elections were
contests between two political parties. As noted by Peter Russell in his
submission to the Committee, in this context the first-past-the-post electoral
system worked well:
As long as federal elections were contested by
just two political parties, the first-past-the-post system produced parliaments
in which there was a pretty good match between the distribution of seats in the
House of Commons and the popular vote for political parties. The majority
governments that these parliaments supported on all but one occasion were led
by leaders whose party members won a majority of seats in the House and whose
candidates won over 50% of the popular vote.[49]
However, since 1921, as Professor Russell noted, federal elections
have been contested by at least three parties, which has resulted in one-party
majority governments being elected with much less than a majority of the
electorate’s support
(and with individual candidates being elected without majority support in their
ridings):
But that situation changed in the 1921 election
that was contested by three parties – the Conservatives, Liberals and
Progressives. The Mackenzie King Liberals won the most seats (but not a
majority), the Progressives came second, and Arthur Meighen’s Conservatives
finished in third place. From that 1921 election until today, Canada has had a
multi-party political system at the federal level, with three or more political
parties competing for seats in parliamentary elections. Elections held since
then have rarely resulted in governments with both a majority of seats and a
majority of the popular vote. In fact, only 3 of the 30 elections held since
1921 have had that result – Mackenzie King’s Liberals in 1940, Diefenbaker’s
Progressive Conservatives in 1958 and Mulroney’s PCs in 1984. A much more
frequent outcome has been one-party majority governments supported by much less
than a majority of the electorate.[50]
In 1921, as more political parties were entering the fray,
alternative methods of voting were gaining popularity, particularly in the
Prairie and western provinces. Provincially, from the 1920s to the 1950s,
Alberta and Manitoba both adopted the STV for elections held in urban ridings
and AV for elections held in rural ridings.[51] As
well, in the late 1910s to early 1920s, a number of municipalities in Alberta,
British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan adopted STV systems[52],
and in one case an AV system[53].
Some observers cite the extension of the right to vote to non-property owners, the
working class and women, and the subsequent growth in popularity of progressive
and united farmers’ parties, as the reason for the adoption of these systems.[54] As
well, internationally, STV had been adopted throughout Ireland.
It was in the context of these developments that in May 1921,
months before the seminal December 1921 federal election that resulted in three
political parties being represented in the House of Commons, a special House of
Commons committee first reported on the desirability of electoral system reform
at the federal level.
Towards the end of the 13th Parliament,[55] a special
House of Commons committee was created to “consider the subject of proportional
representation and the subject of the single transferable or preferential vote,
and the desirability of the application of one or the other or both to
elections to the House of Commons of Canada.”[56]
In its First Report, presented to the House of Commons
on 30 May 1921, the Special Committee on Proportional
Representation and the Subject of the Single Transferable or Preferential Vote found that the first-past-the-post electoral system only worked as
intended when two candidates ran against each other. However, the Special
Committee noted that as elections in Canada increasingly had three or more
candidates contesting a seat, the candidate ultimately elected often only had
the support of a minority of voters. Indeed, the 1921 report observed that “it must be
apparent to all that the present system of election in single-member
constituencies meets fully the purpose intended only when not more than two
candidates are nominated.”[57]
While
the Special Committee did not recommend the adoption of a means of proportional
representation (PR) for the upcoming federal election, it observed that it was
impressed by the advocates for reform, and proposed that a plebiscite be held
to determine whether voters would wish to apply “the principle of proportional
representation with group constituencies”[58] (referring to the STV). However, it did
recommend that the AV be adopted for use in constituencies where more than two
candidates present themselves, as “a candidate finally declared
elected would represent the choice of the majority of the electors.”[59]
The House of Commons
continued to study the subject of electoral system reform in the 1930s. During
the 18th Parliament, elected in 1935,[60] a special committee on elections and franchise
acts was struck to examine “the proportional representation system; the
alternative vote in single member constituencies; compulsory registration of
voters; and compulsory voting.”[61] However, while the 1921 report was
open to reform, the study conducted in the mid-1930s took a more reserved
approach. In its 1936 report recommending against electoral system reform at
that time, the members of the The Special Committee on Elections and Franchise
Acts questioned whether the adoption of either some form of PR [it appears that
the focus was still on STV] or the AV would work across the Dominion of Canada
and be “conducive to good government.” In that sense it appears that the
Special Committee’s focus went beyond how electoral system change could impact
the representativeness of Parliament, in terms of how votes were
translated into seats, to what could be meant as “good government.”[62]
Following the 1930s, electoral system reform was not studied at the
federal level for over 40 years, when a flurry of royal commission reports
commented on the issue in 1979, 1985, and 1991:
- In 1979 the Task Force on Canadian Unity (the Pépin-Robarts
Commission)[63] recommended, among many significant proposals, that an element of
proportionality be introduced into the electoral system through a form of mixed
member proportional representation (MMP).[64]
- In 1985 the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada (the MacDonald Commission)[65],
following another comprehensive study, recommended that PR elections should be
introduced in the Senate, with electoral reform in the House of Commons being a
“second-best” solution.
- Finally, in 1991 the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and
Party Financing (the Lortie Commission) recommended maintaining the first-past-the-post
electoral system, though it did indicate support for the MacDonald Commission’s
suggestion for a Senate elected by PR, noting that the MacDonald Commission had
made a “persuasive case.”[66]
Electoral system reform became a topic of interest again at the
federal level at the turn of the millennium. In March 2004, the independent Law
Commission of Canada concluded a three-year study on electoral reform and
submitted its report recommending the adoption of MMP, entitled Voting
Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada,[67] to
the Minister of Justice. In determining that MMP would be a best alternative
electoral system at the federal level, the Commission looked at the capacity of
electoral systems to “maintain accountable government, most notably a direct
link between elected politicians and their constituents.” It further noted that
there was little support to substantially increase the size of the House of
Commons, and that changes to the electoral system “should be made without a
process of constitutional amendment.”[68]
Of note, over the course of its current study the Special Committee
on Electoral Reform had the opportunity to hear from the former President and
two commissioners who were part of the Law Commission of Canada’s study on
electoral reform: Nathalie Des Rosiers[69] and Roderick Wood,[70] and lawyer Bernard Colas.[71] All three expressed continued support for the Law Commission’s conclusion that
some element of proportionality ought to be incorporated into the federal
electoral system. For example, Professor Des Rosiers indicated: “I continue to
think that in whatever system we choose, there should be an added element of
proportionality in some fashion.”[72] Professor Wood added that today he would be more supportive of open lists
instead of closed lists.[73] Mr. Colas strongly encouraged the members of the Committee on Electoral Reform to
consider the Law Commission’s report in its deliberations.[74] He added that the public would support a reform initiative based on the
principle of fairness:
One basic instinct of a human being is about
fairness. If you have young kids, the kids will say it's not fair. The first
question you ask Canadians is whether it's fair for someone to be elected with
30% of the vote, or 40%, or whether it's fair if you have 20% of the vote and
you get only 10% of the seats. They will answer “no”. Then you say, “Okay,
we're here to make a proposal to correct this system and to improve its
fairness.” I think it's a good pitch to start with.[75]
The Committee also had the opportunity to hear from Brian Tanguay, who
had served as the lead author on the Law Commission of Canada’s report.
He noted that the analysis and recommendations of the report “have continued to
inform recent debates over electoral reform in this country,” and that “the
only way to address the significant defects in our Westminster model of
government is through fundamental electoral reform, by adopting a system that
ensures both demographic representation and proportionality in the translation
of votes into seats in Parliament.”[76]
In 2005, the year following the publication of the Law Commission
of Canada’s report recommending MMP, the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Procedure and House Affairs tabled a report[77] to
“recommend a process that engages citizens and parliamentarians in an
examination of our electoral system with a review of all options.”
The report recommended a two part process, that would “involve a
special committee of the House of Commons, and a citizens’ consultation group,”
and that “the purpose of both the special committee and the citizens’ consultation
group is to consider and make recommendations on strengthening and modernizing
the democratic and electoral systems.” The citizens’ consultation group was to
“make recommendations on the values and principles Canadians would like to see
in their democratic and electoral systems,” while the special committee “would
make recommendations on the specific components of Canada’s democratic and
electoral systems.”[78] The special committee would take into account the report of the citizens’
consultation group to then “make recommendations on Canada’s democratic and
electoral systems”[79] to
the House of Commons.
In a supplementary opinion, the Conservative members of the
committee indicated that they “would have preferred to establish a national
Citizens’ Assembly on the model of the one that was used to design electoral
reforms for British Columbia,” as they found that model to be “distinctly
superior, by every measure of inclusiveness and openness (geographic balance,
gender balance, etc.) to the process that has been advocated by the committee.”[80] As well, the supplementary opinion indicated that “a Conservative government
would not implement any proposal for substantial change to the electoral
system, until the change is endorsed in a national referendum.”[81]
In a second supplementary opinion, the Bloc Québécois indicated
that while they supported “most of the report’s recommendations, and especially
those dealing with the striking and mandate of a special House of Commons
committee,” they would have appreciated “more time to determine how the
consultation and direct participation of the public in the reform process” was
to be set out.[82]
Finally, in March 2007, the Government
held a citizens forum on democratic reform in each province and territory,
along with one national youth forum. From these forums, the Government prepared
a report entitled Public Consultations on Canada’s Democratic Institutions
and Practices.[83] The report indicated that, among other things,
Canadians appeared to prefer the current FPTP electoral system to a system that
includes PR. However, the consultations also found that respondents were open
to considering change, including a voting system in which every vote for a
party counts.[84]
As noted above, from the 1920s
to the 1950s, Alberta and Manitoba both adopted the STV for elections held in
urban ridings and the AV for elections held in rural ridings.[85] As well, in British Columbia, the governing Liberal-Conservative
coalition adopted AV for the 1952 provincial election, though the system
reverted back to FPTP after the Social Credit Party won the 1953 election.[86] Finally, in the late 1910s to early 1920s, a number of municipalities in
Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan adopted STV systems,[87] and in one case an AV system.[88]
In his appearance before the Committee, Harold Jansen provided the
Committee with an overview of his research into the use of AV and STV in
Canada, and what lessons may be applied to the current process of electoral
reform. His comments on the use of AV and STV in Canada are included in the
corresponding sections of this report. He noted the political contexts that led
to electoral reform (and reversion to FPTP) in Alberta and Manitoba:
The lead-up to this was that in the decade of 1910
to 1920, there were big discussions on the Prairies on this. A lot of the
complaints they were having about their electoral system were exactly the kinds
of things you've been hearing here and we've been talking about today, around
the lack of fairness in terms of representation. The single transferable vote
was seen as the British form of PR, so it had a particular popularity, but
there was this populist element to western Canada. The idea that it was
candidate focused was attractive.
When the liberal progressives came in—actually the
Liberal Party in Manitoba brought it in in 1920—they were facing farmers suddenly
becoming active, and they figured that if they gave them this one demand, then
that would help. So they brought it in to Winnipeg. The other thing in Winnipeg
was that there had been the general strike. It also helped, they thought, to
contain some of the labour radicalism a bit because the labour parties might
have absolutely swept Winnipeg.
In 1922 the United Farmers of Manitoba came in,
and they extended AV to the rural areas, which was a bit of a betrayal because
everybody had argued about STV. This helped to preserve their power base, and
it was a blend of idealism and political self-interest. It was the same with
the United Farmers of Alberta [UFA]. They brought in STV in Edmonton and
Calgary. They lifted whole parts of the legislation from Manitoba and just
copied it in Alberta. It was the same thing. UFA was strong in the rural areas
and weak in the urban areas. This fragmented their opposition, but they were
partly keeping their promise. Everybody saw that eventually this would get
better and that it would switch. This was a stepping stone to STV everywhere,
and it never happened.
The big concern was over the size of the
districts. At that time, where you're travelling by horse and buggy to places,
that's a big concern. You can't use Skype.
The reason it ended was slightly different in each
province. In Alberta it was strict political self-interest for the Social
Credit. They were starting to lose. The Liberals and CCF [Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation] finally figured out that they could use this to defeat
Social Credit.
Manitoba is a little more complicated. In
Manitoba, the big issue was about the rural overrepresentation. There was a bit
of a trade-off. If they solved this problem and started to bring in independent
boundary commissions, then they would get rid of this. They had another big
complaint, and this is a very important one, because I've seen people come
before you and suggest that we should adopt this model. If you do AV in the
rural areas and STV in the cities, the problem is that going from 30% to 40% in
a group of 10 single-member districts is going to pay off big time in seats.
Going from 30% to 40% in Winnipeg, which had 10 districts, is going to get you
one more seat.
Where did parties spend their efforts and focus
their attention? In the rural areas. Winnipeg complained they were being
ignored.[89]
Over the past 15 years, electoral reform has been a topic of
interest and study at the provincial level, often being spurred on by the
frequency of lopsided election results, whereby the seat counts in the
provincial legislatures do not match vote share. The Committee heard from numerous
witnesses involved in electoral reform in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, as
well as in New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, where the issue is
currently being considered.
British Columbia explored provincial electoral system reform
between 2003 and 2009.[90] In
2003 British Columbia’s government
established a citizens’ assembly on electoral reform, an independent,
non-partisan assembly of citizens with the mandate of examining the provincial
electoral system and making recommendations on reform.[91] In December 2004, the Citizens’ Assembly recommended the STV system, termed
“BC-STV,” as the best choice for the province[92], and in May 2005 the STV proposal was put to the
voters of British Columbia as a referendum question in the provincial
election. However, in order for the proposal
to pass, it needed to be approved by 60% of all voters, and by a simple
majority of voters in 60% of the 79 constituencies. In the referendum,
the STV proposal received 57% support – short of the required 60% majority –
and was therefore not approved. However, as
a result of the considerable support across the province for the proposed
STV system, the Government indicated that another referendum on STV would be
scheduled. In the second referendum, held
at the same time as the 2009 provincial general election, the STV
proposal was supported by 39% of all voters and received sufficient support in
only 7 of 85 electoral districts, far short of the 51 required to ensure its
implementation.
The Committee heard from a number of witnesses involved in British
Columbia’s electoral reform process, as well as from 140 individuals who presented
at open mic sessions in Victoria and Vancouver, many of whom spoke about
electoral reform in their province. Four main messages emerged from the
testimony. First, British Columbians who spoke to the Committee supported the B.C.
citizens’ assembly process to make recommendations on electoral system reform.
For example, as noted by Gordon Gibson, who helped design the structure and
mandate of the Citizens’ Assembly:
Central
to the B.C. success was the developmental and consultative machinery for the
new electoral proposal.… The government … mandated a citizens' assembly and
gave me the honour of designing the machinery. Through the efforts of the
chair, the staff, and its members, it worked supremely well.[93]
As well, former B.C. Citizens’ Assembly member Diana Byford
commented on how the physical space where meetings took place, the Wosk Centre
in Vancouver, had a positive impact on the process:
I don't know how many of you might be familiar
with that place, but it's circular. There are circular tiers of seats.
Everybody felt equal. There was no head table.… That centre is an amazing
place. It enabled us to settle in and to feel that all voices were equal, all
voices were heard. I don't think they have anything similar to that facility in
a lot of the provinces. I think that would have a big impact on the results.[94]
Second, the Committee heard ongoing support from the witnesses and
a number of open mic presenters in B.C. for STV as an option for electoral
system reform. As explained by former B.C. Citizens’ Assembly member Craig
Henschel,
If we could solve
the problems of exclusion and unequal representation, we could solve the
problem of disproportionality. The single transferable vote solves this problem
directly. STV uses multiple MPs in a district to represent multiple points of
view. This greatly reduces the amount of voter exclusion, while at the same
time keeping MPs as local as possible. STV is a preferential ballot, so that
strategic voting isn't necessary and so that the voter can give the counting
system a clear portrait of their desires. STV also uses a fair counting system
that elects each MP in a district with about the same number of votes.[95]
Third, the Committee heard numerous criticisms of
the 60% threshold set for the B.C. referendum on electoral reform. As observed
by Mr. Gibson, the B.C. referendum did not fail, as it “received the
affirmative support of almost 58% of the electorate,” had a turnout of 61.5%,
and “secured an absolute majority in 77 of 79 ridings.” Indeed, as
Mr. Gibson concluded, the “referendum passed by any reasonable test, but the
provincial government had set a 60% hurdle rate, so a marvellous opportunity
for a natural experiment in thoughtful electoral reform was lost.”[96] Mr. Henschel added that members
of the Citizens’ Assembly were particularly concerned about the 60% threshold,[97] and fellow Citizens’ Assembly member Diana Byford saw the threshold as a
failure on the part of the B.C. government.[98]
Finally, the Committee heard concern about the lack of public education
following the Citizens’ Assembly process and the recommendation of STV through
the conduct of the referendum. As Diana Byford explained, there had not been
any funds set aside for public education on the choice of STV, a number of
Citizens Assembly members “took it upon themselves to do so”:
Not everyone, of course, could do this. It was
done on our own time and money. We spoke to groups and organizations. We
debated sometimes and we provided answers to many, many questions. This we did
from December 2004, when our report was delivered to the legislature, until the
referendum in May 2005. My last speaking engagement was the evening before that
election.[99]
Indeed, as noted by Professor Kenneth Carty, who had served as the
Director of Research for the B.C. Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (and
subsequently served as a senior consultant to the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly),
the substantial support for reform in the B.C. referendum was due to the trust
that voters placed in the
Citizens Assembly process, rather than a deep understanding of the mechanisms
of electoral system reform.[100]
Ontario explored provincial
electoral system reform between 2003 and 2007. Following British Columbia’s
lead, in 2006 the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform was formed to
examine the current electoral system and recommend possible changes.[101] In
May 2007, the Assembly released a report entitled One Ballot: Two
Votes – A New Way to Vote in Ontario, which recommended a MMP system. A province-wide referendum to decide
whether to implement this new system was held in conjunction with the
provincial election in October 2007. The proposal did not receive
the requisite voter support – at least 60% of the total referendum ballots cast
and more than 50% of the referendum ballots cast in at least 64 electoral
districts – as prescribed in section 4 of the Electoral System
Referendum Act, 2007.[102]
In his testimony before the Committee, Jonathan Rose, who had
served as the Academic Director of the Ontario Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral
Reform, highlighted how a citizens’ assembly or “some kind of deep deliberative
exercise” is useful as part of the process of engaging in electoral reform.[103] He also stressed the importance of the “public learning component of electoral
reform” as part of “the overall strategy of engagement” with the public.[104]
Brian Tanguay, who had served as the lead author on the Law
Commission of Canada’s 2004 report titled Voting Counts: Electoral Reform
for Canada, and appeared as an expert witness before the Ontario and Quebec
legislatures to discuss electoral reform, noted that a “lack of education, a
lack of information, confusing signals put out by the parties themselves, all …
led to a less than optimal context for the conduct of the referendum vote
itself.”[105]
Quebec explored potential provincial electoral system reform
between 2004 and 2007. In December 2004, the Quebec government
introduced a draft bill in the National Assembly that, among other
reforms, proposed a new mixed electoral system that would combine elements of
the existing FPTP system and a new PR approach.
In June 2005, the National Assembly adopted a motion to appoint a nine-member special
commission to study and make recommendations on the draft bill. The Special
Commission on Electoral Act was assisted by an eight-member citizens’ committee. [106] Public consultations were held across Quebec beginning in January 2006.
The Commission reported its findings to the National Assembly in
April 2006.
Its report rejected the Government’s draft bill and proposed an MMP system similar
to that of Germany. The Commission’s main criticism of the Government’s draft
bill was that the proposed one-ballot system did not accurately reflect the
wishes of the voters and would encourage strategic voting.
In December 2007, the province’s Chief Electoral Officer released a
report that discussed the characteristics of a “compensatory mixed system” and
compared different scenarios through simulations and analyses.[107] No alteration of Quebec’s FPTP electoral system have occurred since the tabling
of this report.
Benoît Pelletier, who served as the Quebec Minister for Reform of
Democratic Institutions from 2005 to 2008, explained that Quebec’s MMP draft
bill, which involved a single ballot and a dual candidacy option (allowing
candidates to run both in specific districts and on party lists), with
subsequent openness to change to a dual ballot option, attempted to reconcile
various factors, including regional representation and simplicity.[108] While there was interest in reform, there was disagreement about the details of
reform, including the dual candidacy option that had been put forward, and
increasing the size of electoral constituencies.[109] Still, Professor Pelletier opined that today Quebecers might “be more open” to
the MMP proposal that had been put forward 10 years earlier by the Government
of Quebec.[110]
New Brunswick first explored electoral system reform at the
provincial level between 2003 and 2006, and is currently undertaking another study
of the issue.
In December 2003, the New Brunswick government established the
Commission on Legislative Democracy and instructed it to propose an appropriate
PR model for New Brunswick. In January 2005, its final report recommended a
regional MMP system and advised that a binding referendum be held no later than
the 2007 provincial election.[111] The provincial government responded to the Commission’s final report and
recommendations by issuing Improving the Way Government Works in June 2006.[112] After a change of government in the fall of 2006, a new response to the Commission’s
recommendations was released in June 2007. Entitled An Accountable and
Responsible Government, it included 20 initiatives the province planned to
undertake to improve and enhance legislative democracy in New Brunswick
between 2007 and 2012.
Between 1999 and 2005, David McLaughlin served as the deputy
minister to New Brunswick Premier Bernard Lord. In this position, he launched
and oversaw the province’s Commission on Legislative Democracy. In his
appearance before the Committee he explained how the Commission arrived at its
recommendation for MMP and for a referendum:
The key principles we used to decide upon a new
electoral system included local representation, which is the principle of all
geographic areas of the province having a particular representative in the
legislature to represent their interests; fair representation, ensuring all New
Brunswickers' voices were fairly represented in the legislature; equality of
the vote, ensuring each voter's ballot had equal influence in determining the
election's winner; and effective government, the ability of the system to
result in the easy selection of a stable government that is able to govern the
province.[113]
He added that they “recommended a mixed member proportional system
as optimal for the province, based on a consideration of all the alternatives
in relation to the roster of democratic principles.” It was hoped that adopting
an MMP system would help correct what “was a peculiar outcome of provincial
politics: big majority governments and small, weak oppositions.” MMP also
seemed appealing to help ensure “equality of representation between the English
and French linguistic communities” in the province.[114]
Mr. McLaughlin noted two conclusions from the work of his
Commission that could aid in the Committee’s work, related to system design and
public legitimacy of a new electoral system:
First, FPTP has good
features and is both familiar and legitimate to most voters. After all, we do
accept election night results, and Canada has progressed. However, it does have
clear drawbacks and inadequacies that an MMP system could mitigate. MMP, we
know, is more reflective of the democratic values of fairness, inclusiveness,
choice, and equality of vote. However, MMP at the national level has never
really been modelled or analyzed in a comprehensive way that I've seen, except
for one Law Commission of Canada report. There are real consequences that we
found in outcomes, based on the specific design of that system, that you will
need to research and consider should you decide to recommend it.
Second, public legitimacy
of a new electoral system is highly desirable and surmounts party and
politician interests. It is about the citizen and voter in a citizen-centred
democracy. A referendum is the simplest, clearest, and most acceptable way of
conferring legitimacy for the long term, not just on the system but more
importantly on the outcomes it produces.[115]
Finally, Mr. McLaughlin suggested an
alternative to holding a referendum before introducing a new electoral system,
what he referred to as a “validating referendum.”
I know this is contentious, so let me offer a
second best but still viable option to you: provide for a validating referendum
after two elections, based on a Parliamentary review of the system, and give
Canadians the chance to accept it, perhaps with improvements, or revert back to
the previous system.[116]
Lise Ouellette, who served as co-chair of the New Brunswick
Commission on Legislative Democracy between 2003 and 2004, also appeared before
the Committee. In her testimony she reiterated support for the Commission’s
study and conclusions, noting that “the discrepancy between the number of votes
and the number of seats obtained in the Legislative Assembly or in Parliament”
is a “major flaw in our electoral system that needs to be addressed, whatever
our convictions are in other respects.”[117]
Of note, in July 2016, the New Brunswick government released a
discussion paper on electoral reform[118] that is being
submitted for further study to a select committee on electoral
reform. Additionally, the Government is in the process of establishing a
commission on electoral reform to study: barriers to entering
politics for underrepresented groups, improving participation in democracy
(including preferential ballots and online voting), the voting age, political
contribution rules and political spending rules.[119]
Prince Edward Island first explored potential provincial electoral
system reform between 2003 and 2007, and is currently in the process of
exploring different electoral systems to elect the 27 members of its
Legislative Assembly.
In December 2003, the Prince Edward Island Electoral Reform
Commissioner recommended that the province adopt an MMP system. However, the
Commissioner also recommended further study of the issue, including more public
consultation and public education, and he directed that any changes to the
province’s electoral system be made by “referendum.”[120]
In December 2004 the Legislative Assembly established the
Commission on Prince Edward Island’s Electoral Future, with the task of
developing a clear plebiscite question and recommending a date for holding the
plebiscite.[121] In May 2005, the Commission released its proposal for an MMP system for the
province. The plebiscite was held in November 2005, with a threshold for voter
approval set at 60%. The proposal for electoral reform was approved by 36% of
the voters.
More recently, following Prince Edward Island’s 65th general election, held on
4 May 2015, the new government’s June 2015 Speech from the Throne committed to
examine electoral reform and democratic renewal.[122] In July 2015, the Government released the White Paper on Democratic Renewal,
which pledged to create a special legislative committee to explore whether to
replace the FPTP system by a preferential ballot or a PR voting system and to
“define the plebiscite question to be presented to Islanders with regard to the
future voting system … by November 30, 2015.”[123]
Following initial consultations, the Special Committee tabled its
second report in April 2016, in which it recommended that voters be able to
rank the following electoral system options in order of preference in a
plebiscite to be held in November 2016:
- Dual Member Proportional Representation;
- First-Past-the-Post (the
current system);
- First-Past-the-Post
Plus Leaders;
- Mixed Member Proportional Representation;
and
- Preferential Voting.[124]
In accordance with the Special Committee’s recommendations,[125] the plebiscite on the five electoral system reform options took place in P.E.I.
between 29 October and 7 November 2016.[126] Anyone aged 16 or older was considered eligible to vote. Islanders were able to
cast their vote via Internet or telephone, as well as in person.
The Committee had the opportunity to hear from Leonard Russell, who
had served as the Chair of the Commission on P.E.I.’s Electoral Future, formed
in December 2004, as well as from Jordan
Brown, the current Chair of the Special Committee on Democratic Renewal.
Both offered the Committee extensive analysis of what had happened around the
2005 plebiscite, and the considerations made in designing the current reform
process (the Committee heard from both on 6 October 2016, the month before the
plebiscite).
Jordan Brown observed that following the 2005 plebiscite there were
complaints that the MMP option was overly complex, that there were not enough
polling stations set up for people to vote, and that there was only one day to
vote.[127] Mr. Russell added that in addition to the polling station issues, which caused
some frustration, there was
a realization among the main political parties regarding the potential
consequences
of reform:
The other thing that surfaced partway through our educational
program was that I think both of the mainline parties in the province realized,
for the first time, the ramifications of mixed member proportional.
It was an unspoken issue
around our commission table. There were reasons for that.
We had party people sitting at the table, nominated by the two main parties. We
just didn't talk about that. But again, away from the official spot, several
people would talk about what they knew.
The thing that happened
was that as the parties realized that it could be possible under mixed member
proportional for those who might have the majority under the
first-past-the-post portion to indeed not have a majority standing…
…
We
began to get undermined by the very folks who put us in place. I don't quite
know how to back that up, but I do know it was discussed within parish
situations, church situations. Parties collectively were advising the general
public about the pitfalls of looking at mixed member proportional.
My own view was that the parties of the day
realized that the power they could hold under first past the post might not
exist under mixed member proportional, but they indeed had asked that mixed
member proportional be pursued.[128]
Turning to the current process, Mr. Brown noted that an appetite
for electoral reform remained in P.E.I. following the 2005 plebiscite, given
that “in the last seven elections on Prince Edward Island we have had five
legislatures in which there has been a fairly big imbalance in terms of
government versus opposition,” including
“two occasions out of those seven where we've had one member oppositions.”[129]
The decision to consider four electoral system options in addition to FPTP
related to the different principles that the Special Legislative Committee had
heard about. According to Mr. Brown, inviting voters to rank different options
was an attempt to “encourage people to go beyond picking their favourite by
essentially tipping voters off to the fact that their favourite might not be
picked first and that they might want to have a say in the overall choice
through a second, third, fourth, or fifth choice.”[130] However, Mr. Russell expressed concern that having too many options on the
plebiscite ballot could cause confusion both for voters[131] and for the Government (in terms of interpreting the results).[132] He suggested that the public would trust the Committee to come up with a single
best alternative option for electoral system reform.
Finally, Mr. Brown emphasized the focus on engagement in the
current process. The rationale to allow online and telephone voting in the
plebiscite was to increase engagement, with a time frame to vote (spanning 10
days) that would be long enough to enable anyone to vote.[133] Mr. Brown further explained that the vote was opened to 16 and 17 years olds as
“they will vote in the next election,” they are in school, and “they will be
engaged in a setting where, effectively, there's some structure to how they
learn about politics and democracy and they're able to participate in it.”
Ideally, he said, “they'll go home and educate their siblings and parents and
grandparents and all the rest of it about the process, and carry that forward
through their life in a good, structured, educated way.”[134]
A total of 37,040 Islanders, representing 36.46% of eligible
voters, participated in the plebiscite held over the first week of November
2016. Following four rounds of
counting,[135] results showed that 52.42% of voters supported MMP over the current system.[136] In a statement released on 8 November 2016, P.E.I. Premier MacLauchlan
indicated:
In combination with the low voter turnout of 36.5
per cent, it is debatable whether the plebiscite conducted between October 29
and November 7 produced a clear majority. Among the five options on which
Prince Edward Island voters were asked to express their preference, Mixed
Member Proportional Representation received 52.42 per cent support during the
fourth round of counting. During the first three rounds of counting,
First-Past-the-Post (the current system) received the highest number of votes.
By the fourth and final round of counting, the support for MMP represented 19
per cent of eligible voters, or fewer than one in five. It is doubtful whether
these results can be said to constitute a clear expression of the will of
Prince Edward Islanders, to adopt the language of the Special Committee on
Democratic Renewal.[137]
The statement added:
When the Legislative Assembly meets in its fall
session starting next Tuesday, the question of democratic renewal and the
results of the plebiscite will be on the minds of all legislators. We look
forward to learning in greater detail the results, including levels of support
in various parts of the province, ideally by electoral district, as soon as
Elections P.E.I. can provide the information.[138]