I'm going to attend Canada's Aviation Hall of Fame dinner tonight. A couple of my former acquaintances and colleagues are being honoured. I'm going directly there from this occasion. That's why I'm all dressed up.
I'm from Fort McMurray, Alberta, the oil sands area. Of course, most of you have at least read quite a bit about what's going on there. Some of you have visited. The chair and I shared a jet boat on a nice summer day and saw Fort McMurray at its best, from the rivers. It's an absolutely fabulous place to visit in the summer, not so much in the winter. I'm pleased that Brian Jean is bringing so many of his colleagues to see the magnificent sites and the scope of what's going on in that region.
In fact, I was at one event, and it was termed “the largest industrial project in world history” by whoever was speaking. I wish I could remember. Anyway, whoever it was, I've been quoting him ever since and I haven't had anybody argue with me too much.
If you go onto the CAPP, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, website you'll see some statistics that probably would prove the point. In 25 years, Canada's economy will benefit to the tune of $2.1 trillion because we have the oil sands. It'll go from the 85,000 jobs that we have today in Canada, to just under a million jobs in 25 years. This, of course, assumes that we go from just under the two million barrels per day that are coming out of the oil sands, progressively through to six million barrels a day. Even at that rate, there are over 125 to 150 years of production that will continue this great wealth generation in the country.
Anyway, that's all happening but it's not happening easily. Your subject matter today is vitally important to the success of that particular region, as it obviously is to the success of Canada in general.
I've spent a lifetime, 53 years, in the transportation business, heavily oriented toward aviation. In that time, particularly over the last 20 years or so, I've talked often about the subject matter in front of us today. How do you approach things in a better way to get maximum bang for your buck when you're dealing with billions of dollars of spending? That's fundamentally what we're after. The problem is that we're challenged by jurisdictions, by modes, by the fact that we're all people with all of the failings that come with people and groups of people.
It would be simple if you could take the whole oil sands area and say that we understand what the problem is, so let's sit down with all of the stakeholders around the table, create a 40-year plan that would take advantage of technology, of assumptions that we can work together, and devise a multi-modal way, triggered by the amount of oil that's coming out in the growth curve, and come up with a plan to spend money efficiently and at the right time and in the right modes to facilitate the growth of that product with minimum cost and minimum investment.
Well, you know, the good news is that's actually happened. The Government of Alberta has spent three years coming up with a 40-year plan for the region. It's called the comprehensive regional infrastructure sustainability plan. It's doing the same thing for the other regions where the oil sands exist. They've approved it at the cabinet level. The bad news is that it's totally unfunded and there was no attempt in the study to say the industry will do this and the government will do that, and so on. So there it sits.
There is a high expectation, of course, because it is an approved plan, that it will be implemented. The pressure is on industry and the government at three levels to sit down and say, “Okay, this is a good idea. Let's get on with it”.
They have created a committee. It's called the Athabasca Oil Sands Area Transportation Coordinating Committee. I sit on the committee representing aviation. It is a senior enough committee. It includes three deputy ministers sitting around the table as well as all of the important people in industry and in the municipality. We've met three times, and we're having trouble getting going because of all of the failings that I talked about earlier, not to mention the provincial budget that just came down and pretty much poured cold water on the whole plan for the next three years.
We have not given up. In particular, industry hasn't given up. It's pushing the hardest to take this plan and move it somewhere. In a second charge at the issue, which is industry-led, we are looking at ways of funding to at least identify the first seven or eight years of the $11 billion that has been identified against the plan and to get some consensus around what the projects will be and who will play, and then we'll try to get down into how much and when.
I've always been an optimist. I think we've done the right things to get to where we are with this particular plan called CRISP, and with some leadership. Leadership is absolutely key in having this kind of macro push to do things the right way. I'm sure we're going to get it done.
The alternative is that it will happen haphazardly as it has in the past. There are 47 airports in the region of Wood Buffalo, of which at least a dozen are pretty busy. The top five actually have almost 2.5 million passengers—mainly workers—moving in and out of the region every year. That's an enormous number.
In building those airports—they were built by oil companies—they went to the province, and the jurisdiction that approves airports approved them. The problem was that it wasn't done on a systems basis. Transport Canada, the people who have to manage the airspace and oversee the safety of the region, were not sufficiently consulted. What we've ended up with is basically uncontrolled airspace in which you can't really see the aircraft, and for a while you couldn't talk to them. It's a very difficult situation for Nav Canada to manage.
As part of this transportation coordination committee—and I was the aviation lead—we asked for a study to be done over eight months with the right people who knew what they were doing, and they came up with a set of recommendations—with all of the oil company interests represented and the province and the federal government watching—that was bought into. The whole focus is to establish a group that will meet often with the right level of people to actually talk about the airspace and the plans, and to share information and cooperate and coordinate.
That particular committee has had three meetings already in only four months. There is great confidence.
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To make the situation safer, hundreds of millions of dollars have to be spent. They could have been spent, as I say, individually by companies going to build their own airports, and we ended up with so many.
We're going to end up with many fewer airports. We're going to end up spending on what we call the poor man's radar—a bunch of towers that can triangulate and see aircraft and that are able to make the situation much safer. By being able to see the aircraft, we're going to be able to increase the number of aircraft processing through there. Finally, we're going to be able to do all this—this is an example of what I'm talking about—with a lot less money than if we had not gotten together and agreed on a systems approach.
The same thing is going to happen with the $11 billion that needs to be spent on the ground infrastructure to have more people living in Fort McMurray and commuting to work every day, instead of the millions who are flying in and out from all over the place.
I'm a member of the Alberta Economic Development Authority. I've been a member for nine years. My term will end next year. This agency has existed for 20 years. It advises the premier every six months.
We have been looking at exactly the kind of thing you've been looking at for some time. The most recent briefing—and it went to the premier, and she liked it—was all about congestion management. Congestion management is another construct that more or less does the same thing as I described with the other example. Using technology in an extensive way, it brings together.... The City of Toronto, for instance, with the massive transportation and congestion issues that it has, probably is already using congestion management, but may not be using it enough.
This study would be very worthwhile for your staff to look at.
The National Citizens Coalition is a supporter-based organization founded in 1967 and counts tens of thousands of supporters in its ranks. Our organization is founded upon the principle of more freedom through less government. We advocate on issues of reducing waste in the public sector for the more efficient delivery of services to Canadians.
We applaud the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities for taking on an important study on how competition can make infrastructure dollars go further. Indeed, basic economics teaches that competition reduces price, while it increases quality. As competition relates to the construction industry, it should be the objective of any legislator to optimize price for the taxpayer with the quality of work. Indeed, Canada's construction industry makes up 7.1% of the Canadian workforce and accounts for 6% of its GDP.
The 2009 budget saw the economic investment of approximately 2% of Canada's GDP in stimulus projects, many of which were construction-related. With the latest budget, the finance minister has set Canada's infrastructure trajectory for the next decade, establishing long-term spending in Canada's construction industry.
Of course, many of these projects and much of the funding will be realized at the provincial and municipal levels. If so, many federal dollars are to be allocated to infrastructure projects. If they are, it is in the best interests of the taxpayer to attain the best price for these projects. With the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools, a fixed budget means that fewer projects will be completed, that is to say, fewer schools, fewer hospitals, bridges, and roads constructed when the costs are not optimized.
It is our view that closed construction procurement has the effect of inflating infrastructure costs. When projects are put to tender to a limited or restricted labour pool, competition is reduced, limiting bidding to a favoured few.
Canada's unionized labour rate, as of 2011, was just over 31%. Closed tendering or limited bidding on contracts to contractors with collective agreements closes out nearly seven out of 10 Canadians. These Canadians also contribute taxes towards these infrastructure projects and are just as entitled to work. Indeed, many infrastructure projects are touted as make-work projects. However, this work is often only accessible to a fraction of the workforce. Further, according to Cardus, 26% of Ontario residents live in jurisdictions that are bound by construction labour monopolies.
Union status is not a guarantor of quality. Construction companies are already bound by jurisdictional regulations and bonding requirements, let alone the fact that reputational effects that follow shoddy work can result in fewer contracts in the future.
In a 2001 study of a closed-shop construction tendering process in the New York area, Ernst & Young found that, “There is no quantitative evidence that suggests a difference in the quality of work performed by union or open shop contractors.”
It is our view that the federal government, if it is to spend billions on infrastructure development, should place conditions upon infrastructure spending that are transferred to the provinces and municipalities. Opening up the tendering process makes the infrastructure dollar go farther. Closed tendered bidding processes are, at the worse end of the spectrum, a kickback scheme for organized labour in return for electing union-pandering governments. At the very worst, it's the sort of corruption that is currently being investigated by the Charbonneau commission in Quebec.
I was recently made aware of perhaps the most egregious example of Ontario's backward process for tendering contracts. Two workers in Waterloo signed union cards on some particularly tranquil Sunday, but because they represented over 55% of the workforce at work sites in the city at that particular moment, Waterloo became a closed-shop zone, binding the city to the collective agreement of that particular union.
Take the labour woes of the City of Hamilton. Because of restrictive labour agreements in that city, construction budgets are out of control, adding up to 40% in extra costs to those projects. For example, in the industrial, commercial, institutional, residential, and heavy engineering sectors, the City of Hamilton estimates an annual inflated cost between $4 and $10 million.
Even workers in other unions are shut out of closed tendering systems. The favoured few are set up and are able to bid higher on projects, shutting out the vast majority of the labour pool in both union and non-union shops. In a 2007 City of Hamilton report, only 17 out of 260 large construction firms were affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, which is the city bargaining unit. The city estimated that its closed bid association with the union would cost it hundreds of millions of dollars and harm the economic development of the city.
In 2012, Hamilton does not fare much better, with $147 million under the labour monopoly, according to the “Cardus Construction Competitiveness Monitor”. When that number is projected province-wide under restricted labour markets, it amounts to $747 million that is not accessible to seven out of 10 Canadian workers who have chosen not to join a union.
Almost everyone's understanding of economics suggests that reduced competition leads to higher costs and lower quality. We've seen Canadian and American examples where labour monopolies lead to fewer projects completed, with highly inflated budgets. The federal government is responsible for moving billions to the provinces under the building Canada fund. We recommend that these funds be allocated to projects that do not impose a restrictive closed bidding process. By imposing an open tendering process attached to infrastructure dollars, we can ensure that those dollars go further and that there is greater transparency in the process, to avoid collusion and corruption in monopolistic construction schemes.
Thank you very much.
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Mr. Clements, I take it you haven't quite finished talking about what you recommend we do.
One of the things we debated about a year or more ago, was what role the federal government should have under the Transportation Act to deal with airports that are starting up. Right now, there really isn't a specific process whereby the federal government would be involved, so it's not that coordinated, and you talked a bit about that.
At the time, we suggested that perhaps the best way is to have some kind of process whereby the local municipality or Transport Canada would have a team to look at whether the establishment of this airport complements the entire picture. But that requires changing the Transportation Act.
Is that something you are interested in? I know you talked about the 47 airports that are just growing, and sometimes it's very difficult to coordinate it.
Mr. Clements, Mr. Taylor, thank you for being here.
Mr. Clements, I want to thank you for your testimony today. It's very insightful, in terms of the growth challenges you're facing in the region.
Again, I want to pick up where my colleague left off. This time it's directly relevant to the question of value for money, in terms of infrastructure. It may not be the pointed question that I think members of the Conservative caucus would like, which is whether closed bidding systems are less value for money than open bidding systems.
I want to take it, in your words, to 40,000 feet. There is this CRISP process you mentioned. Has the federal government been involved in any of this at all, or has it been observing from the sidelines?
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There are a lot of examples of private infrastructure combinations.
We have a private highway near Toronto, the 407, which has been very successful. Mr. McGuinty, who is giving a strange look to me right now for that, might find it interesting to learn that his brother, the premier, actually expanded the private road, the 407, after witnessing the success of private sector infrastructure. The number one shareholder in that road, it turns out, is actually the Canada Pension Plan. So when Canadians drive on the 407, they're actually contributing to their pension at the same time.
The Canada Line in B.C. had a third of its money come from the private sector. In Coquitlam, a pension fund that owns a shopping centre actually has agreed to build a station on the light-rail project so that it can bring more traffic to its retailers. So this is being done in other parts of the country.
Mr. Taylor, do you believe that we will see more attempts to impose construction labour monopolies across Ontario as we've seen in Hamilton and now Kitchener?
I would like to thank our guests for being here today.
You know, it's rather interesting. Over the last number of weeks, as we have studied this issue of how competition can make infrastructure dollars go further, we've had a wide range of perspectives. The Union of Quebec Municipalities was here, and CUPE, FCM, Merit Canada, Linden Concrete Forming, Canadian LabourWatch, Melloul-Blamey Construction, and Canadian Construction Association, just to name some. I share those with you because we have discussed at some length the issue of competition. Mr. Taylor, I understand that the National Citizens Coalition's credo says, and I'll quote from what I believe is your documentation, “free enterprise, free speech and government that is accountable to its taxpayers”.
I kind of have a sense of where you may be going in this perspective, but aside from just the issue of competition, making infrastructure dollars go further, one of the things—and I thought you started to touch on it—is the issue of fairness. I look at it, and frankly, to me, it doesn't matter who does the infrastructure work, whether it's labour, organized, closed shop, or open shop. That's not the issue to me if they all bid, and they all bid fairly. My concern is that when there is an organization that includes taxpayers who contribute to the moneys—and it is just one taxpayer who contributes those moneys that allow those projects to be built—and those taxpayers are somehow excluded because they aren't part of a group, and again, frankly, I don't care which group it is, to me that becomes an issue of fairness.
I've spoken in the past at some length about the moral imperative—in other words, the responsibility that we have as those responsible for the public purse—that there be a fairness quotient in this so that all qualified labour has the right to quote on this.
I didn't hear you comment much about that, but I would be grateful if you could give me some sense of your view on that, please.
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Thank you, Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this afternoon.
I want to begin my line of questioning with Mr. Clements.
I was in Fort McMurray last year, and one of my colleagues, the MP for Fort McMurray, , whom you probably know, gave us a comprehensive tour of the Fort McMurray oil sands.
What is striking about that part of the country is just how significant, when you see it first-hand, the amount of natural resources is that is being extracted from the ground and supplying the North American market, with a hope to supplying beyond it. I was really surprised to learn from Mr. Jean also that Fort McMurray is one of the most highly unionized cities in the country—I think the most highly unionized in the country. What would it do, if the Americans, as the NDP would want them to do, just stopped buying our natural resources?
As you know, they sent the delegation down to Washington about a year and a half ago, and their leader was just down there a few months ago talking down the Canadian oil sands. What would this do to the economy of Fort McMurray, the economy of the oil sands, the Canadian economy?
Clearly, it's a benefit to both unionized workers and non-unionized workers to have a booming resource sector in our country. What I don't understand—and I'm trying to wrap my mind around this—is this whole concept of closed-shop tendering. Maybe, Mr. Taylor, you could jump in on this.
We used to read about this, I remember, in university. We learned about the Soviet Union. They had these lists called “protectia”. The workers would have to get on these lists in order to be eligible to work.
How did we get to the place we are now, where 70% of Canada's workers are being excluded because they're not on a union list? How did we get to this point?
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Mr. Adler was kind enough to say that we should take an economics lesson, and I'd like to give him one right back. In 1998-99, the provincial Liberals were running in Nova Scotia, and they promised that they would build schools through a P3 system. They built 23 schools with three different contractors. All those schools were paid for within seven years of completion. The Nova Scotia taxpayer now still has over 20-something years of paying for those schools.
The Liberals put that in. The PC government under John Hamm got in and cut that immediately, knowing full well the extreme high cost of those schools down the road. At the end of it all, we're going to get those schools for $1 and they probably won't be worth anything. So it doesn't mean that a P3 system, where you go to a public-private partnership, is necessarily always successful.
Waste Management Inc., now in Nova Scotia, controls all the waste in Nova Scotia. When that was privatized, the cost skyrocketed, and it's still skyrocketing, because of the long-term objections to it. So it's not necessarily that the private sector does everything perfectly.
One last thing about unions, Mr. Taylor, is that Polar Seafood had three fish plants in P.E.I. They were going to shut down two of them and keep one open. The one they kept open was the unionized plant. Why? Because the workers were organized. The workers had an investment in that plant, and the company kept that one open because they had a very good relationship with those unionized workers. So yes, there are examples of where unions do very well.
But my question for both of you is this. I find that one of the most frustrating things in this country is that we have 10 provinces and three territories and we put up walls among ourselves. Isn't it true, in your opinion, that one of the major costs of infrastructure and infrastructure concerns is the lack of mobility for workers in all sectors? These provincial trade barriers that we put up among ourselves are historic in nature, and I don't blame any government for that. They've been around for a long time.
If we could knock down some of those barriers and move to something more uniform in terms of regulations, in terms of taxes, and in terms of mobility of workers, etc., would that not bring down the cost of all of this and then open up competition? For example, a firm in Manitoba could bid on something in Nova Scotia. A firm in P.E.I. could bid on something in Alberta. Would that not bring down the cost in some regards?
I thank you both for coming.
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Thank you. It's great to be here. It has been a while.
Certainly, I'll lead off with Mr. Sullivan's last strategy question. As a business person my whole life, and we're talking about competition here today, I love competition.
First of all, I love competition in the things I buy because it means I can increase the quality of the things I buy and lower the price of the things I buy, because there's more than one person trying to offer it to me. On the other side of the equation, as a business person I love competition because I love to say that as long as one of my competitors is still doing $1 in sales, I have room for growth, because by being better than him, I can take the business.
That's really all we're talking about here in infrastructure, and the competition level in infrastructure. It's not about who it is. I don't think about who the competitor is. I think about whether I can get a better price for a higher-quality piece of goods.
Would either of you disagree with what we're saying? That's all we're trying to say here. Whether it's municipal, provincial, or federal dollars, it all comes out of one taxpayer's wallet. Why would we ever not want to spend that dollar as thinly as we possibly can?
Mr. Scott Clements: Hear, hear.
Mr. Joe Preston: Right.
We talked about P3s. I like to think of myself as a P1. I don't have to have the public-private partnership. As a private businessman, I can make those types of decisions. It's seldom in the P3 situation that the private business part gets in the way of the success of it. It's quite often the “let's add government to the mix and see what happens”.
I'll leave it at that, but I just really wanted to make clear that what we're talking about here is spending money wisely, when there are fewer dollars to spend wisely.
Thank you.
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Yes, it actually came back to me.
I'd just like your view on this issue, because with the cost of infrastructure and development in especially Fort McMurray.... We just spoke to the Nova Scotia home builders here, and they have difficulty finding tradesmen in that regard. The issue of temporary foreign workers came up.
Mr. Taylor, I'd like to know what the NCC's view is on the use of temporary foreign workers in terms of making projects like the oil sands or anything else that happens out there.
Mr. Clements, if you have any thoughts on that, that would be helpful as well.
Thank you, and I thank the chair for his indulgence.