On behalf of the Assembly of First Nations, I would like to thank you, Chair, and the members of the committee for welcoming me here today to speak on behalf of Bill .
I would like to acknowledge Karen Campbell, who is from our offices, and acknowledge as well the national chief and my fellow colleague, Regional Chief Guy Lonechild.
I'll briefly introduce myself. My name is Puglaas--Jody Wilson-Raybould--and I come from the Musgamagw Tsawataineuk people of northern Vancouver Island. I am registered under subsection 6(1) of the Indian Act, and I am a member of the We Wai Kai Nation, formerly known as the Cape Mudge Indian Band. I am on council for my home first nation and I am the regional chief for the AFN from British Columbia. For the AFN I co-lead the portfolio on supporting first nations governments, and within that portfolio is the subset of citizenship and nation building.
I know this committee has already heard a lot of the background information with respect to McIvor, and I was pleased to see that Sharon herself appeared here two days ago, so I won't go over that background information. What I wish to provide to the committee today are some general observations on what it means to belong to a first nations community and a vision for the future of first nations that goes beyond the determination of status and membership under the Indian Act to one that recognizes the authority of our first nations across Canada to determine our own citizenship and our rights and responsibilities from that citizenship.
Since the original trial decision in McIvor, I have heard from a number of first nations people, both men and women, who are genuinely excited about the prospect of becoming registered under the Indian Act as a result of the proposed amendments. At one level this is about correcting discrimination, but at a more fundamental level it is about belonging and about association with a group. For policy-makers and administrators, the issue of increasing members might be viewed simply in terms of budget pressures, service provision, and access to resources; at its core, however, this is about community, and this is powerful. Our people are our greatest resource.
As it was in the 1980s regarding Bill C-31, it is a shame that the debate over registration sometimes solely becomes focused on scarce and limited financial resources and tax exemptions rather than the benefits of inclusiveness and self-determination.
In British Columbia, as in other parts of the country, our nations are developing our own models of citizenship. The nation decides who is a part of that nation, who is a citizen, notwithstanding the legacy of the Indian Act and membership. In the context of modern claims, the determination of citizenship is a fundamental conversation that results in the collective setting the rules and the individual electing to be a citizen or not. Citizens are beneficiaries of treaties and can participate in the political institutions created through the treaty or agreement, but--and more importantly, for the collective--in exchange they are subject to the obligations of citizenship.
In announcing the proposed amendments to the Indian Act, also announced an exploratory process centred around registration, membership, and citizenship issues. I congratulate the minister on this initial step and commitment, but we can go further.
A discussion of citizenship within the broad context of nation building would be evidence of a fundamental shift in the relationship between our nations and the crown, consistent with the spirit of intent of our historic treaties, and necessary to conclude modern land claims arrangements with nations that enjoy unextinguished aboriginal title and rights. It reflects the beginning of a healthier and more mature relationship between our peoples and the crown, not only with respect to the determination of citizenship outside of the Indian Act, but also to govern through our own institutions of government, with appropriate jurisdiction and authority outside of the Indian Act. This discussion necessitates going beyond exploration and information-gathering on a wide range of issues.
There are many opportunities for first nations in this country, but there are necessary prerequisites before our nations will fully realize these opportunities.
First and foremost, there is a need for appropriate governance, which includes, of course, the determination of citizenship. There is also a need for fair access to lands and resources so that our first nations economies will be viable, with adequate own-source revenue generation, power to support critical aspects of our governance, and the provision of programs and services.
In addition to appropriate governance and lands and resource settlements, we of course need well-educated and healthy citizens. Our citizens, perhaps more than any other Canadians, are required to participate in decision-making around our own very existence and future.
Given the colonial legacy with Canada and before significant and fundamental change can occur in our communities, there is a requirement for public votes and referendums. To put it another way, to become fully decolonized we need to vote in favour of change, so we need a citizenry that can not only participate in the workforce and become active contributors to our own society and Canadian society generally, but also a citizenry that can engage in a serious conversation about social change and be part of that change. Ultimately, it will be our people's recognition of themselves as citizens of their nations and not as Indian Act registrants or members of bands that will mark the transformation of our nations.
This, of course, poses many challenges, not the least from those leaders and those in our communities who have internalized the Indian Act's identity and are overshadowed by the administrative determinism established through this colonial ordinance. Stated another way, for some first nations people, their identity has become intertwined with the colonial definition of “Indian” under the law-invested statutory rights.
Turning to , the AFN supports any amendments to the Indian Act that would rid it of discrimination. Discrimination in any nature or form is not acceptable, this notwithstanding that many of the chiefs and the communities they represent have not gone through the process to establish citizenship rules beyond the Indian Act or Indian Act membership codes, and are very concerned about the potential financial implications of implementing Bill C-3.
It will be essential that adequate resources be made available to first nations to avoid any further hardship in first nations communities and for our citizens, regardless of where they reside. There must be a realistic picture regarding additional funding requirements on the ground.
The McIvor case was started by our people. Sharon was supported by our people, and we continue to support the efforts of all our people to end discrimination wherever it may be found. I am fully aware that other witnesses before me have called to end all discrimination that exists under the Indian Act and would like the committee to broaden the scope of the bill. We support these aspirations. I am also advised that any expansion of the bill's purpose to go beyond addressing gender discrimination would probably require a new bill to be introduced, thereby delaying the rectification of gender discrimination. At the very least, if the committee is not able to go beyond gender discrimination issues in this bill, this committee, I respectfully submit, should assure itself that the amendments are being made to address all gender discrimination issues in the Indian Act and not just those applied in the case of Sharon McIvor.
In closing, long-term solutions do not lie in further tinkering with the Indian Act. Our nations have an inherent right to determine who is and who is not a citizen of our nation in accordance with our own laws, customs, and traditions. This is fundamental to self-governance. The real and ultimate solution to addressing ongoing discrimination in the Indian Act lies with full recognition of first nations' jurisdiction over our own citizenship. The contribution that will be made by our full citizenry, when legally recognized through appropriate citizenship processes and in part supported by interim legislation such as , will be profound. While some registrants or citizens of our nations may be somewhat apprehensive to return, and in some cases may initially be made to feel unwelcome by those who have an interest to exclude them, we must not forget that we are family. We will have connections and we have potential for making great contributions to our nations.
The excitement in the eyes of those who identify with being part of our nations but who, through no fault of their own, have been excluded legally from their inheritance is empowering, and it is a sign of better times to come as our nations take full control of our lives and our future. It starts with determining who we are.
Finally, Parliament is in a unique position to work in partnership with first nations to undertake a comprehensive review of the Indian Act and its related policies and regulations, to examine their intrusion into first nations jurisdiction, and to put forward mechanisms for recognition of, and staged and supported implementation of, first nations jurisdiction. We hope that you will support this critical work of supporting first nations governments.
I will end as I began: this is part of a broader process that we recommend around indigenous nation building and rebuilding.
Thank you for your time. Gilakasla.
I would happy to answer questions from the committee. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Chief Wilson-Raybould, and Ms. Campbell. I also want to acknowledge the national chief, who is with us today.
Chief Lonechild, it's good to have you with us as well, and of course all of those who are listening in.
When I listened to your comments, certainly I found little to disagree with, but I'd like to clarify a number of points that you raised.
Do you feel that Bill adequately responds to the McIvor decision at the B.C. Court of Appeal? I think our first bit of business is to make sure that the government has adequately responded to that particular decision.
In your view, after having had a look at it--and believe me, I'm no lawyer, and all these different categories sometimes can get a bit challenging--and from your analysis of it, does the bill that we have in front of us adequately respond to the B.C. Court of Appeal's decision?
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Yes. I think most of us would agree that we shouldn't have to wait another 20 or 25 years consuming another generation to get from Bill C-31 in 1985, to Bill in 2010, to some other bill 25 years from now.
In terms of the exploratory process, I understand that much of your comment was taken up with issues of self-determination, self-government--i.e., we shall determine who we are, we know who we are, we just want the means to be able to determine that in our own fashion. And I certainly agree with that.
These exploratory talks.... Very interestingly, I watched a documentary, Talking Around the Table, just last night, which featured Chief Wilson. I'm sure you're very familiar with him.
At any rate, I think it was a lesson to me. I mean, substantive talks were offered at that particular time: three first ministers' conferences with all the premiers, the Prime Minister, Trudeau at the time, and then Mr. Mulroney. But at the end of the day, many would say that they didn't advance that far.
How confident are you that these exploratory talks are going to shed more light or to imbue the process with something that's deliverable for first nations people? What would it take, in your view, for these to work? What would the process look like? What kind of resources would you require? You know--
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I'm going to speak to Chief Wilson-Raybould.
Grand Chief, thank you for being here with us. I agree with my colleague in recognizing Grand Chief Atleo and Chief Lonechild.
As you will see, I am very precise. I'm speaking to the lawyer. We have begun our proceedings, and I will ask you to examine one point. I don't need an answer today. I'm also speaking to Grand Chief Atleo, who I know will listen closely.
This is a draft amendment that we are going to try to introduce. I would like paragraph 6(1)(a) to be amended to read: “or if that person was born prior to April 17, 1985 and was a direct descendant of such and such a person.”
In my opinion, and I'm not the only one to think this, that is the only way to prevent the perpetuation of the discrimination you suffer and will continue to suffer if Bill is passed in its present form. I would like you to consider this amendment, to look at it and to send your comments to the committee. I already know that the government will probably not agree because this may go too far, but we can debate that here amongst ourselves. I would like to know whether the First Nations would be satisfied with that amendment. That was my first comment.
Furthermore, I don't believe—and I say this sincerely—in the exploratory process they want to put in place. In 20 years, this still will not be resolved. I would like you to talk to me about possible amendments. I'm not saying they can be introduced immediately.
Discrimination and registration are two completely separate things. I think we can address discrimination, or at least in part. However, with regard to registration, section 11 of the Indian Act should be amended. I would like to hear your comments on that subject. I think we can do part of the job with section 6, but as for section 11, that is to say registration... I don't think we need to explain section 11 to you. That concerns the power of the communities to register their members.
I would like to have your comments on that subject.
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Thank you for the question.
I recognize that there is a divergence of opinion among first nations leadership and first nations generally across the country. As I indicated in my statement, I believe that any discrimination should be eradicated in this day and age.
The question of consultation is somewhat difficult for me to address, because there is some assumption that there is a need for consultation to amend the Indian Act. I'm not saying there isn't, but as a lawyer, I look at consultation and accommodation in the legal context of aboriginal title and rights. In this case, with respect to the government changing the Indian Act, there is also a form of consultation. The Indian Act is an antiquated piece of legislation. It certainly is complicated, and there are varying degrees with respect to engagement with first nations on issues that seek to amend it.
There have been a lot of changes to the Indian Act over the years. Making fundamental changes, which are driven by first nations, to enter into a treaty or to negotiate a self-government arrangement requires a referendum within a community. In this particular case, with respect to Bill to get rid of discrimination, there is a different form of consultation.
I recognize that there have been engagements across the country with respect to Bill C-3 and citizenship, but the broader and more important discussion that the first nations leadership across the country has raised is around that citizenship issue and how to be respectful of first nations ability to determine for themselves who they are and who their citizens will be.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Welcome, Chief Wilson-Raybould—I'm used to calling you Jody, of course—and Karen.
Chief Jody Wilson-Raybould: You can call me Jody.
Mr. John Duncan: I think we all recognize that this is a complicated picture. I was struck by a couple of things you said. You said something along the lines that you should think of yourselves as citizens rather than as Indian Act registrants. There's some confusion between registration and membership, and you focused quite a bit on governance and how changes on that front would be very critical.
I'd like to reassure you that the government does recognize that governance and capacity are directions that are vitally important. We want to get there too. Doing so is in everybody's best interests.
Specific to Bill , I think it's important I get on the record that Bill C-3, of course, would not preclude further legislation. At the same time, I heard you loud and clear when you said that long-term solutions do not lie in further tinkering with the Indian Act. That puts us in quite a dilemma here, in a sense, because Bill C-3 is designed to address a very specific case, the McIvor case.
We know there are further legal actions dealing with registration that are in the system, but I'm also struck that we have negotiated agreements between the Government of Canada and first nations in various parts of Canada. Many of those were with first nations that obviously had significant governance and capacity. That's why they were involved in those discussions. Sometimes “significant” would be an understatement; “very well capacitated” might be better. Whenever we have those agreements, they tend to include as one of the provisions the fact that only those people who fit into the Indian Act registration classifications are eligible for membership or citizenship.
In order to square the circle here, to get to where you would like to get, is not passage of Bill and adoption of the exploratory process a reasonable and practical direction to try to move us forward?
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Thank you. I think that was a comprehensive question and a comprehensive answer.
I would like to mention two other initiatives that are somewhat related to this whole question of discrimination.
We amended the Canadian Human Rights Act, and as of June of next year, that act will apply to all Canadians equally. It used to exclude, of course, first nations people living on reserve. For the Government of Canada to pass that legislation, there was a lot of resistance.
We also have the matrimonial property rights initiative, which has now been put before the Senate. The Senate will be dealing with that at committee, I assume, and once again, that's a question of a vacuum in the law.
We met resistance on both of these bills, but they are there to end discrimination.
The Chair: Could you perhaps get your question in?
Mr. John Duncan: Can you offer comment as to how we as a federal government can get past these kinds of obstacles?
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Thank you for allowing me to speak, Mr. Chairman.
The Barreau du Québec's specific comments on Bill in response to the McIvor judgment concern a certain number of clauses, but the two main clauses concern the proposed paragraph 6(1)(c.1) and clause 9 of the bill. We have noted that there may be problems of concordance in clause 2(1) of the bill, that is to say that, in the French version, “une personne” is replaced by “toute personne”. And, from a reading of the present act using this new wording, we believe there are problems of concordance that must be reviewed. We therefore suggest that concordance is assured for this expression in all other sections of the Indian Act.
With respect to clause 2(2), we note that the proposed amendment restates the present test, in both the English and French versions, and we wondered about the purpose of this clause. In a very substantial manner, in paragraph 6(1)(c.1) which would be added to the Indian Act and which, according to the objective pursued by the government, is to serve to eliminate the discrimination identified by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, we note that this new paragraph concerns the children of a marriage born before April 17, 1985, which introduces a distinction between children born before and after that date. In addition, the amendment concerns only the children of a union formalized by marriage. The bill does not correct the discrimination against children born outside marriage prior to 1985, more particularly children born outside marriage to an Indian father and a non-Indian mother, depending whether they are boys with status under subsection 6(1) or girls with lesser status under subsection 6(2).
The Barreau also wonders about the proposed subparagraph 6(1)(c.1)(iv), which, to obtain enhanced status, appears to require that a child must be, himself or herself, a parent. We believe that this element should not be added as a condition for change of status, since introducing this condition creates discrimination between the members of a single group depending on whether or not they have had children. Whether or not a person has had children should not be a condition for enhanced status. In fact, the proposed subparagraph 6(1)(c.1)(iv) merely enhances the status of children who already have children. The Barreau du Québec suggests that the question of grandchildren be handled separately. We submit that the bill should offer the option of granting status in accordance with the provisions of subsection 6(1) to all children, whether or not they are parents.
Furthermore, the Barreau—
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The Barreau wonders about all the situations contemplated by the bill. Does the government want to resolve situations existing at the time the bill is adopted or is it providing for future situations as well? The present wording of subparagraph 6(1)(
c.1)(iv) seems to indicate that only those persons who already have children at the time the bill comes into force could have their status enhanced, which would create a disadvantageous distinction for persons who have children after the act comes into force.
The Barreau also notes that the case of children who are born to Indian women and whose paternity has not been declared is not resolved by this bill. These children are currently registered under subsection 6(2), and have been since 1985. It is assumed that the undeclared father is not Indian.
The Barreau is aware that the introduction of different status in 1985, depending whether it is granted under subsection 6(1) or subsection 6(2), has had a direct impact on the communities in that it determines access or lack thereof to services, as well as the benefits and programs of the federal government and band councils. We would like to draw the committee's attention to that point. This differential treatment has given rise to very difficult social situations in a number of communities where the qualifier “6(2)” is considered derogatory and synonymous with lower status.
In closing, the Barreau recalls that, when the so-called “double mother” rule was rescinded in 1985, a number of bands obtained an exemption to the act as a result of which they kept their numbers intact. The Barreau believes that the bill does not resolve the discrimination that continues to exist between those bands exempted from the act and those not exempted.
Our final comment concerns clause 9 of the bill. We want to recall that the amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act repealing section 67 was assented to on June 18, 2008. As a result, since 2008, anyone feeling they have been discriminated against under the Indian Act may seek remedy from the federal government, but a three-year grace period was granted to band councils, which postpones any recourse against them until after June 2011.
A reading of the provisions of clause 9 of the bill leads the Barreau to question the possibility of instituting the proceedings recently provided for under the Canadian Human Rights Act. Although recourse against discrimination is of a public nature, the Barreau du Québec believes that the wording of clause 9 limits its application.
In conclusion, we believe that the bill as introduced is incomplete and avoids the entire issue of discrimination in registration in the Indian Registry.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Yes, and I'm with the aboriginal bar section, not the criminal bar section.
I should add that I was counsel for one of the intervenors in the McIvor case as well, so I've been involved in this issue for a bit of time.
The committee has the legislative summary before it that gives a history of not only the McIvor case, but also the preceding amendments to the Indian Act for section 6, namely, Bill C-31, and before that, although it never was enacted, Bill C-47. I'm not going to rehash that. We've given you a written presentation giving some background from our perspective.
I'd like to focus, in my limited time, on the four recommendations we make. They're all substantive, but one of them is more substantive than the others. Let me briefly go over the three lesser substantive ones and then we'll get to the main point we want to make.
We asked the question, does Bill C-3 eliminate sex discrimination? The answer is, sort of but not quite, so we want to focus on trying to figure out what can be done.
We appreciate that the B.C. Court of Appeal provided a very narrow interpretation of section 6, and to some degree the government has responded with an equally focused piece of legislation. However, the opportunity to look at section 6—this is the first time in 25 years—shouldn't be passed by and this opportunity taken merely to respond to the court of appeal, but maybe look a little deeper to see what can be done given the constraints of the existing court order.
I'm beginning at the middle of our paper, page 4 in the English, and I believe it's page 5 in the French portion.
Our first point—and this is one the previous speaker just mentioned—was that under the proposed paragraph 6(1)(c.1), there are four conditions in order to gain section 6 status under the bill. The fourth condition is that you also have to parent a child. The CBA's first recommendation is that this last condition be removed.
The legislation, so far as we understand it, was designed to reflect the fact pattern in the McIvor case. So with Sharon McIvor's adult son, Jacob Grismer, how do we ensure his children have status? The point was made before, so I'm not going to go into it in depth.
The fact is that by requiring people in Jacob Grismer's situation to have a child before their own status is improved from a 6(2) to a 6(1) seems frankly to be a bit silly. It also adds some administrative inefficiencies, because you then have to have two different applications for re-registration under different status, as well as the child.
The Jacob Grismer generation has to apply to improve their status in order for their child to then get section 2 status. It seems that's unnecessary because that's covered in a different part of the bill. So our first recommendation is that subparagraph 6(1)(c.1)(iv) be removed from the proposed amendment to the Indian Act.
Our second recommendation—and this was addressed at length by Chief Wilson-Raybould earlier, so we just want to note that the CBA supports this—is that there should be adequate funding provided for first nations to address the influx of new members given the passage of this bill. That's our second recommendation. Sorry, I got that backwards. That was our third recommendation.
Our second recommendation also goes towards clause 9, which was raised by my colleague, and that is that it precludes people bringing actions against the government. Again, this seems like a bit of a parting shot at potential litigants. With the repeal of section 67 of the Human Rights Act, I think it does call into question how those proceedings will go given this prohibition and whether opportunities will be there for future litigation.
There are also several cases already in the courts that will have to be judged as to whether they'll be shut down by this or will be able to proceed.
The discrimination has been there, and the government has known about it, since 1985. It was well canvassed in the committee reports of the day. The government shouldn't be able to avoid liability now, in our view, just because of the passage of time, for something it has known about--this residual discrimination within the Indian Act.
I'd like to get to our last recommendation, which is our main one. I would encourage committee members to look at the table in our report. This is where we say that within the confines of the focus of this legislation, there is still residual sex discrimination. I think you heard from Ms. McIvor yesterday, and we say in our brief, that this bill does not eliminate all sex discrimination. We have provided a comprehensive list of the sex discrimination it doesn't address. Even within the four corners of the bill, there is still some residual discrimination.
What we've done here in the table is set out three scenarios. The first is prior to 1985. That would be before Bill C-31. If a woman married out, she lost her status, as did her children and her grandchildren, but the hypothetical brother did not. In fact, everyone kept their status, except in this peculiar situation, from 1951 to 1985, when the double mother rule was in place.
I should say that the double mother rule was in fact really only operative for 13 years. It came into effect in 1951, but you had to have people who were becoming age 21. So it wasn't until 1972 that the first people could actually be struck as Indians from the register. There was evidence before the court of appeal--I don't have the reference handy--that in fact of the 2,000 or so people the double mother rule could have affected, only about 100 were in fact taken off. There were two reasons for this. One was that over half of the first nations in the country were exempted from the double mother rule. The other was that the minister was able to pass ministerial orders exempting provisions of the Indian Act, including the double mother rule, from applying to first nations. Several first nations were able to be exempted from that rule. So it actually affected a very narrow group of people for a very short period of time.
The middle part of the table shows what happened after Bill C-31, and this is the problem Bill C-3 is trying to remedy and what the court of appeal grappled with. This is exactly Sharon McIvor's situation. She was reinstated. Her child got subsection 6(2) status, but the grandchildren born before and after 1985 did not get status, whereas the hypothetical brother had full status under subsection 6(1), and so did the second generation. There was a distinction, then, between the children born before 1985 and those born after 1985. If they were born before 1985, they actually kept full subsection 6(1) status, but if they were born after 1985, they got subsection 6(2) status.
With this proposed bill, there is residual discrimination. Everyone is equal, more or less, in terms of whether they have subsection 6(1) or 6(2) status, except the grandchildren born before 1985. If they were born before 1985, this bill would confer on them subsection 6(2) status. But the hypothetical brother's children would have paragraph 6(1)(c) status.
Again, we want to emphasize that Parliament should take this opportunity to end all sex discrimination. At the very least, within the four corners of this bill, it should try to be consistent and try to eliminate the sex discrimination. We have a recommendation for an additional clause, which would be subparagraph 6(1)(c)(ii).
I'd like to begin by thanking the chair and the honourable members for inviting the Métis National Council to appear before you today. The Métis National Council represents between 350,000 and 400,000 Métis people from Ontario westward.
The Métis have a major interest in issues of citizenship within aboriginal nations. While the court of appeal case of the Queen and McIvor held that determination of status under the Indian Act was indeed the domain of Parliament, the court also held, and the Métis Nation does agree, that section 35 of the Constitution Act offers relevant principles and perspectives not argued in that case.
The Métis Nation submits that citizenship is also an issue of aboriginal rights. The Métis Nation views the determination of citizenship as an inherent right of the aboriginal peoples protected under section 35. Canadian constitutional law accepts this premise. Canadian common law establishes that customary aboriginal laws, which would include laws of citizenship that survived Confederation, are indeed enforceable. Binding international law also supports the principle that identity is an inherent right.
Canada's 1995 inherent right policy on aboriginal self-government recognizes that membership in an aboriginal community is the proper subject matter of self-government negotiations under section 35.
The Supreme Court in the Queen and Powley set out a legal framework for recognizing distinct Métis communities and the inherent right of those communities, by virtue of their prior occupation and distinct cultures, to define their own citizenship. In determining the lawful implementation of Métis aboriginal rights, the right to hunt for food, the court held that the process of identifying Métis people, based on community self-definition and objectively verifiable criteria, was not an insurmountable task. The Métis Nation is in agreement with this premise.
Since 2004, the Métis have received federal support under the post-Powley initiatives to register its citizens through its governing member structure. The Métis Nation believes it is fair and just that Canada, through Bill C-3, amend its legislation to end discrimination against Indian women and their descendants.
Issues of citizenship under the Indian Act, however, extend far beyond that legislative domain. In addition to being the proper subject matter of self-government negotiations between aboriginal nations and Canada, the Métis Nation believes it is also the proper subject matter of negotiation within and between aboriginal nations.
Pursuant to the announcement of Minister Strahl on March 11, 2010, Canada has proposed to initiate, in partnership with Métis and first nations, an exploratory process to discuss these broader issues of citizenship. INAC has proposed that the process be based upon principles of collaboration and inclusiveness. The Métis National Council agrees to engage in these principles in partnership with Canada, but seeks also to ensure that the exploratory process also be based upon informed and respectful dialogue.
As for citizenship, it is recommended by the Métis Nation, when an aboriginal nation touches upon and affects self-determination, Canada's approach to dialogue on citizenship must be undertaken on a nation-to-nation basis. The Métis National Council protocol agreement signed between Canada and the Métis Nation in September 2008 provides a workable mechanism for implementation of this dialogue with the Métis. Canada should also provide reasonable capacity for the Métis Nation to engage in dialogue with first nations.
As well, the Métis National Council seeks that Canada ensure a broad-based educational process is established that will provide the necessary background information for aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians to have an informed discussion on citizenship within aboriginal nations. This information must acknowledge that aboriginal citizenship falls within the inherent right of self-determination. It is our submission that Canadian law and policy require such an approach.
In 2002, after several years of consultation with the Métis community, the general assembly of the Métis National Council, as part of its governance development, passed a resolution regarding the registry within the Métis Nation. It provided that Métis means a person who self-identifies as Métis, who is of historic Métis Nation ancestry, who is distinct from other aboriginal peoples, and is accepted by the Métis Nation. The Queen and Powley is not inconsistent with that definition.
Self-identification for the purposes of registration, under the amendments proposed by Bill C-3, must be premised upon free and informed consent. For example, some siblings may apply for membership under the Métis Nation registry and others may not. Some siblings may apply for registry under Bill C-3 or under the Indian Act and others may not. The choice is, unfortunately, not always just based on cultural identity.
It is a reality in Canada that aboriginal people, including the Métis Nation, suffer severe social and economic hardship. Hunger, disease, poor housing, unemployment, and low education attainment are realities in our communities. It must be understood that the lack of recognition for the Métis has created situations of inequality within the aboriginal community. Decades of marginalization and exclusion of the Métis have placed Métis Nation citizens with a difficult choice when facing these hardships. Bill C-3 will create a means to address social and economic hardships with a cultural cost.
Because of this situation of unequal access and benefit, Métis citizens may have to choose to register under the Indian Act in order to access necessary benefits such as health medication, support for travel to receive medical attention, educational opportunities, and the right to hunt, fish, and trap for food, etc. They are entitled to the basic information needed to make such a difficult decision.
It is our recommendation that Métis citizens are entitled to reasonable information in order to make free and informed consent as to whether or not to register under the Indian Act through the Bill C-3 opportunities. The Métis Nation requires the capacity to advise Métis citizens who qualify under Bill C-3 for registry under the Indian Act of their options and the ramifications of such actions as they pertain to this piece of legislation and to their registration as a Métis citizen.
A person registered under the Indian Act or on a band registry would not be eligible to be enrolled as a citizen of the Métis Nation or included on a Métis Nation registry. Métis Nation citizenship requires that the person self-identify as distinct from other aboriginal peoples for cultural and nationhood purposes. Ancestry is only one part of the criteria. This is in keeping with the historic and contemporary fact that Métis have always maintained and displayed a collective consciousness and identity as distinct aboriginal peoples. The inter-marriage of Indian and Métis peoples is a historic and contemporary reality.
During the implementation of Bill C-31 in 1985, many Métis people, some of whom were minors at that time, registered under the Indian Act without full information as to the ramifications of that registration. Many of these people, now understanding the reality of that decision from experience, want to withdraw from the Indian registry, and currently no mechanism exists for this withdrawal. It's our submission that free and informed consent was not in place at the time of registration under Bill C-31. This history should not be repeated with Bill C-3.
It's our recommendation that Canada establish a means by which individual persons identifying as Métis Nation citizens, who wish to be removed from the Indian Act registry and regain their status in the Métis community, can seek to do so. As well, we seek Canada to remove the age discrimination component of Bill C-3 on McIvor to eliminate the status of those individuals who would otherwise be entitled to register but for the 1951 cut-off date. The response from the community to date suggests that this is an issue of age discrimination.
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I'm going to try to be precise. First, I want to thank Ms. Dupuis, the Barreau du Québec, the Canadian Bar Association and Ms. Hodgson-Smith.
I thank the people from the Barreau du Québec, who have made us aware of a problem. We are going to re-examine clause 9. I also very much appreciate the position of the Canadian Bar Association.
I'm going to read you the text of an amendment. I don't need a response from the Barreau du Québec or the Canadian Bar Association today. However, if possible, I would like you to send us a written opinion on a possible amendment.
Do you believe, as I do, that, if we pass Bill as it stands, the discrimination against aboriginal women will continue? We won't have resolved the discrimination problem and it will continue. Do you agree with me? That's perfect.
Now I'm speaking to the representatives of the Canadian Bar Association. If we amended paragraph 6(1)(a) to read: “or if that person was born before April 17, 1985 or was a direct descendant of such and such a person”, do you believe that might solve the discrimination problem? That's what I understand from your recommendation, which appears on page 9 in French and in English, with regard to the amendment to Bill .
Do we agree? If possible, I would like you to analyze that. I'm not asking you for an immediate answer, quite obviously. However, would your recommendation be consistent with my recommendation or our possible recommended amendment?
I will close by putting another question to the representatives of the Canadian Bar Association. I wonder why you are proposing an amendment. You propose to delete the proposed addition of subparagraph 6(1)(c.1)(iv) to the Indian Act, and you then propose a number of interesting criteria. Wouldn't it be better to simply stick to your last recommendation?
There, I hope I didn't lose you, but I would like to hear what you have to say on the subject.
:
May I take advantage of that question to draw your attention to one element that struck us, but that I did not focus on?
There is a long history of discrimination against women, and it is set down in the Indian Act. The judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia retraces the reference points back through time.
In 1969, there was talk about abolishing the Indian Act. In 1985, there was talk about amending it, and something very decisive happened with the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the revision of the statutes. Parliament undertook a revision of its statutes. In a way, a revision was carried out and gave rise to Bill C-31, the act of 1985. Thus, in 1985, despite the adoption of the Charter, we witnessed a shift in discrimination, but also a maintenance of discrimination.
Earlier I talked about section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. In 1987, all recourse against the Indian Act was ruled out. In addition, we did not emphasize the fact that, in 1985, the opportunity was created for the First Nations, the bands within the meaning of the act, to adopt membership codes. Everyone recalls the circumstances of that exchange. The First Nations were opposed to Bill C-31, but they were told they would have the opportunity to apply membership codes and that that would enable them to exclude people who were going to be granted or regranted Indian status.
You can see that there is a history there that was constructed in a piecemeal manner. We want to tell you today that you, as legislators, must pay attention. You must respond to a judgment, but not by introducing a Bill C-McIvor. You must bear in mind that there are constraints, charters of rights, a federal act, and so on, and that, in 2010, you cannot legislate by disregarding those fundamental instruments.
:
I would say two things. First, unlike the court of appeal, Parliament can cast its net somewhat wider than the narrow confines of the bill. To the extent that there is a distinction within the communities between people who have 6(2) status as opposed to 6(1) status, this amendment would try to eradicate that.
There are very overt distinctions made. Looking forward again, with the repeal of section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, it could well be that people who have 6(2) status but are otherwise entitled to 6(1) status, but for the fact that they don't have a child, could face discrimination in some way from their band council. So I'm anticipating future litigation there.
What we say is that, first of all, the registrar has to deal with complex registration questions all the time. The first nations have to put together their package, their application form, and they have to be able to prove their situation.
The administrative inefficiency that we've identified is actually in the situation where the person does have a child. They've already been registered as 6(2); they've already gone through that process. Now they're going to have to go through it again in addition to registering their child. It's doubling up.
The objective is the transmittal of status to that grandchild, but in order to do that you actually have to change the registration status of two people, not just one, not just the grandchild but also of the child's generation, the Jacob Grismer generation. We say that creates administrative inefficiencies. Why deal with two applications in front of the registrar when in fact you only need to deal with one?
First of all, thank you, witnesses, for your briefs and for taking the time to be with us to share your thoughts. It will certainly inform our committee's work as we go forward.
There are just a couple of things for committee members before we adjourn. Mr. Lemay presented a scenario around an amendment, and the bar association from Quebec and the Canadian Bar Association had indicated that they might want to respond.
To put this in a timeframe, we might be going to clause-by-clause next Thursday. So if you have something additional that you would like to present, that is the sort of timeframe we may be working within.
Secondly, to all committee members, if there are amendments that people are looking to put before the committee, it may help administratively if we have them by Wednesday so that they can be distributed. It doesn't preclude, of course, as I understand from the clerk, amendments coming from the floor. But if you have them written and at least some time to consider them, that may facilitate the process.
That said, have a good weekend. Bonne fin de semaine.
The meeting is adjourned.