:
Good afternoon, everyone. We will now proceed with this meeting.
I do want to say that this meeting is on a very important issue. There's no doubt about that. It's a very serious issue. I think it's obvious to everybody.
The reason we're having the meeting is that four members of the opposition, in proper process, have called the committee back. I want to read the terms as laid out in the letter from the opposition so that it's clear to everyone, members of the committee and witnesses, what we're here to discuss today and what we're not here to discuss today.
So I'll just read the notification that we got from opposition members asking for this meeting, as follows:
We the undersigned members of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources request that a meeting of our Standing committee be convened, pursuant to Standing Order 106(4), in order to study the prolonged closure of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's NRU reactor at Chalk River, which has resulted in the decrease of supply of medical isotopes and a worsening health crisis, as well as the future of isotope reduction in Canada.
It's important to note that we are not the health committee, we are the natural resources committee. We're here today to discuss these issues as laid out in this notice from members of the opposition. We are not here to discuss health issues that are more appropriately handled by the health committee. Let's proceed on that basis.
I will explain who the witnesses are for this first panel, which goes until two o'clock.
We have with us, in person, Michael Ivanco, president, Society of Professional Engineers and Associates.
Thank you, Mr. Ivanco, for being here today. We appreciate it very much.
We also have, by video conference, Robert Atcher, president, International Society of Nuclear Medicine, and Sandy McEwan, special adviser on medical isotopes to the Minister of Health.
Welcome to all of you.
First of all, Mr. Ivanco, you can start with your opening statement. Then we will proceed, in the order that they appear on the notice, to Mr. Atcher next and then Mr. McEwan.
Go ahead, please.
My name is Michael Ivanco. I have a Ph.D. in physical chemistry. I'm the vice-president of the Society of Professional Engineers and Associates.
With me today is Peter White, who's president of SPEA. He happens to be an expert in safety analysis, and he is an engineer.
SPEA represents over 900 scientists and engineers who work for Atomic Energy of Canada at Sheridan Park. Our members design the nuclear reactors used in Canada and around the world for nuclear power stations, for research, and for production of medical isotopes. Our members also provide technical support, safety analysis, and a wide range of services for the nuclear industry. We also work closely with the technicians and technologists who provide fabrication, inspection, and testing on a variety of aspects in the nuclear industry.
I'm honoured to be invited here to speak to you about nuclear science. I'm very proud to represent the scientists and engineers who work at AECL and whose qualifications are too many to list. A great number of our members have advanced degrees in a wide variety of specialties, and they've been internationally recognized as experts in their respective fields.
I've worked in the nuclear industry for 24 years, the first 12 at Chalk River Laboratories. I've been at Sheridan Park, at the commercial division in Mississauga, for the last 12 years. My areas of expertise include laser isotope separation, analytical measurement, and product development ranging from heavy water upgraders to reactors serving the maintenance systems.
The majority of our members do not directly support operation of the NRU reactor in Chalk River, but many of them were involved in the life extension beyond 2000 and also in the design and construction of the MAPLE reactors that were meant to replace it. Technical questions regarding the design, repairs, and operability of these reactors are probably best left to management representatives, who are appearing later. They can draw from the expertise of individual members, both our members and those who work at Chalk River, whom we do not represent.
I think Canada has every reason to be proud of the people who've helped make Canada an internationally recognized leader in the production of medical isotopes and nuclear technology, and also the safe, peaceful use of nuclear reactors for the production of electricity. Canada is one of only five nations in the world that can deliver a reactor project anywhere, and it's something we should be proud of.
Much of the success is owed to the support provided by successive federal governments, who have demonstrated their confidence in AECL by providing necessary investments to enable the development of research and designs that could in turn be sold to domestic and international customers. This level of support and the tangible and intangible benefits it has generated has been the subject of many debates in the House of Commons and the subject of countless news articles and commentaries. I hope to avoid repetition of those debates here today, but I won't shrink away from declaring the position of our over 900 members, the related 30,000 jobs in Canada's industry, and the hundreds of thousands of family members, friends, and the Canadian public who support them.
Canadians should be proud of our role in providing medical isotopes, nuclear services, and reactors for peaceful purposes. We've profited from this research and innovation. Canada should continue to support AECL to ensure domestic supply of medical isotopes for Canada and the world, we believe, and we should continue to support AECL to successfully complete the design and generate sales of our newest product, the ACR-1000.
We must look at this as an investment by Canadians in an industry that has paid many dividends. The research that is conducted by AECL benefits Canadians and has established us as a world leader. There are few industries where all aspects are conducted in our own borders. This is the only industry I can think of in Canada where we dig the uranium out of the ground, we refine it, we turn it into fuel, we put it in reactors that we design, build, and make almost all the parts for, and then provide services for. There's no other industry like it, and few people appreciate that.
There has been much said about the sale and privatization of AECL. For the record, our members believe that a sale is likely detrimental to the national interest. We believe that nuclear technology should not be under the control of corporate interests but held by Canadians through their government.
I'd like to point out that the main shareholder of Areva, one of our main competitors, is the French government. It's a fact that escapes many critics of AECL. Areva has been successful in producing and selling its reactors, but it has also had its share of delays and problems with multi-billion-dollar cost overruns in Europe. I raise this only because Canadians have been led to believe that delays and cost overruns are somehow unique to AECL. They're not. As I pointed out earlier, or should have pointed out, the nuclear industry is not a production line company. In our industry, we can't afford a product recall.
Canadian technology is considered among the best in the world. We have an exemplary safety record in this respect.
As this committee is focused on the isotope issue, I'd like to urge you to consider the broader picture and what Canada's role should be in the nuclear industry. The isotope issue is extremely important but is just one aspect of the nuclear industry. We also need to have a discussion on the future of this industry, because that is indeed the question before you. If there's not a thriving industry, there is no isotope issue; we simply would have no isotopes, or we'd be buying them from somebody else.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to make one correction: I'm the immediate past president of the Society of Nuclear Medicine, and Michael Graham from the University of Iowa is our current president. But I have been tasked, starting with Dr. McEwan's presidency, with leading a task group responsible for addressing the problems we've been having with the supply of these critical medical isotopes.
My background is that I have a Ph.D. in nuclear chemistry and I'm a radiopharmaceutical chemist. I work at Los Alamos National Lab and I have a joint appointment in the College of Pharmacy at the University of New Mexico.
I want to address specifically some of the issues associated with the outage at the NRU at Chalk River. Approximately 50% of the material that we use in the U.S. is produced by that reactor, and it presents a huge problem for us whenever that reactor is not functioning.
In addition, that reactor also has more excess capacity than the other four reactors currently producing 95% of the world market of molybdenum-99. So whenever any of those other reactors go off-line, the NRU has the capacity to make up for a substantial percentage of the market it supplies. So there's a double whammy whenever the NRU goes down; not only is its normal production lost, but also the excess capacity this reactor produces when the other major reactors in the world are off-line.
Of the imaging procedures we do in nuclear medicine in the United States, 80% use technetium-99m, the daughter product of molybdenum-99. These procedures include cardiac studies and cancer studies, which in our case are about 80% of the imaging procedures. And then we do a number of other procedures for gastrointestinal problems, genito-urinary problems, and other issues associated with neurological problems, infection, etc. So we are imaging patients across the board using nuclear medicine procedures--in particular, nuclear medicine procedures utilizing this critical radioisotope we get from the reactor at Chalk River.
One of the problems with not having technetium-99m available is we then have to use other imaging procedures, which present one of four complications as far as the patient is concerned. One is that the radiation dose they receive from the procedure is higher. Another is that the accuracy of the procedure isn't as good as the one we would get from using a technetium-based imaging procedure. We've also seen an increase in cost as a result of the technetium-99m not being available. Finally, in many cases we use a much more invasive procedure, which presents a danger to the patient of increased morbidity and, potentially, mortality.
In the U.S. in particular, we have a problem because we use a technetium-based radiopharmaceutical to do bone scans of patients who have lung cancer, breast cancer, and prostate cancer and have a very high likelihood that the cancer may spread to the bone. We have asked our centre for medicare and medicaid services to cover sodium fluoride PET imaging for bone scans, but to date we have not received permission to charge for those procedures. So for those patients with these critical cancers, we currently don't have any alternatives in terms of imaging procedures.
In addition, for patients with breast cancer, we use a technetium-based test to find the lymph node that's closest to that tumour so that the surgeon can excise that lymph node, send it to pathology, and determine whether it has spread beyond the primary tumour in that patient. If we detect there is such a spread of that cancer, those patients go on to chemotherapy and other procedures to try to keep that cancer under control. So it's a very important part of the staging procedure for patients who are undergoing surgery for a tumour.
In addition, for cardiac patients who are obese, we get much better imaging procedures from using technetium-99m than we do from an alternative radioisotope, thallium-201.
Finally, pediatricians have expressed concern about the impact on a program called Image Gently in the U.S., which tries to reduce the radiation dose the pediatric population gets from imaging procedures. Those patients who are not availed of a technetium-based radiopharmaceutical for their imaging procedures often need to have procedures that involve much greater doses and much less accuracy as far as their staging goes. So another critical population is impacted by having this material not available.
So that in summary gives you a clear idea of the U.S. practice of nuclear medicine, the problems we have when a reactor such as NRU goes offline for what appears to be an extended period of time, and the problems associated with the alternatives we are looking at in using the technetium-based imaging procedures.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
As you have identified, I'm the special adviser to the Minister of Health. My day job is as chair of the department of oncology at the University of Alberta. I'm also a previous chair of the department of radiology at the same university. I'm a nuclear medicine physician with an active therapeutic practice at the Cross Cancer Institute in Edmonton. I'm Dr. Atcher's predecessor as president of the International Society of Nuclear Medicine. I'm also a past president of both the Canadian Association of Nuclear Medicine and the Canadian Society of Nuclear Medicine.
As Dr. Atcher has correctly identified, there is an impact on our patients caused by the shutdown of Chalk River. Since the initial shutdown at the end of 2007, the community has had a working group in place that includes members of the nuclear medicine community, the oncology community, the cardiology community, as well as members of Health Canada, looking at ways of ameliorating the crisis. We have attempted to provide guidelines for our clinical colleagues on how to best utilize available resources. I think that the guidelines we have published and continue to modify have helped to ameliorate the impact of this on our patients.
In particular, we have recognized the importance of providing as accurate a guideline as we can of the supply of molybdenum. One of the key issues at the beginning of the shortage was the unreliability of this supply prediction. Over the last four to six weeks we've been able to provide a more consistently reliable guide to our clinical colleagues on the supply of molybdenum and the generators, and a more consistent expectation of what will be happening in the following week. This has helped to improve planning, patient flow, and the way our clinical colleagues have managed their departments and changed processes.
Now that we've survived the shutdown at Petten over August, with perhaps less disruption than we feared, we have to look to the medium term. AECL has indicated that it expects to be up and running in the first quarter of 2010. Our hope is that it is up and running before the planned six-month shutdown of Petten at the end of February.
We think it's important that we now start to again understand what the implications of the AECL startup are going to be. We really need to understand what regional disparities are occurring in the country. Some parts of the country have experienced very little disruption; some parts of the country have experienced significant disruption. One of my key tasks is to understand what those regional disparities are, what is causing them, and what we can do to help.
I think it's important to recognize the degree to which the community has made very significant changes to work practices to deal with the shortages, and the very significant involvement of all members of the community in ensuring that we can actually continue to supply our patients. We hope we will be able to continue the accurate indication of future supply, and we look forward to confirmation of when AECL will be able to reopen NRU.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak.
:
If I can go through the motions in order, it might be helpful.
In regard to the first motion, as a clinician I am obviously supportive of this motion.
On the second motion, I believe we have attempted to have very broad representation in our consultation with the nuclear medicine physicians. The Canadian Association of Nuclear Medicine was actively involved in my appointment and in the conversations around my appointment, and Dr. Urbain was on the panel that agreed to my appointment.
I think the investment is important, and we have clearly started seeing that. The CIHR and the NRCan panel are important elements of that item. I think the motion that was proposed by the president of the CMA, recognizing and appreciating the responses of the clinical community, is appropriate and I enthusiastically endorse that motion.
I think the final motion, which is looking at new technologies and, most importantly, new ways of producing technetium-99m, which may not necessarily be reactor-based, is a very important one, and clearly this is now before the NRCan panel.
:
The government of the day has been supportive certainly of my employer, in the sense that it has given them considerable funds over the last year and a half to complete the ACR-1000 design. We appreciate that.
As I try to mention, the issue of isotope production, when you look at it from an industry perspective, is just one thing. Most people don't appreciate that the NRU was built as a reactor not to make isotopes, but to carry out physics experiments, to test fuel, and to do those kinds of things. The nuclear medicine business was developed over a period of time.
The bigger issue, I think, for us in the industry is that we would like to see an NRU replacement down the road, not just for isotope production, but also because a viable industry needs to have a research reactor. I don't believe the support is there for that. I think that starting the isotope production reactors—if it's possible to start the MAPLEs—would solve that particular issue, but it wouldn't solve the bigger issue, which is to have a viable industry.
Personally, no one likes to say that so much money is not enough. I think there has been money there for certain projects, and it's appreciated; but an investment in a research reactor is a 40-year investment in the future. It's an investment in physics research; it's an investment in isotopes; it could be an investment in many things. It could cost a billion or a billion and a half dollars, but we gave the auto companies $10 billion that we may never see again. This would be a billion or billion and a half dollars that would keep on giving.
:
Mr. Chairman, if I can respond to that, I find it offensive that he would regard my comments as jovial. They are not jovial. I recognize the importance of this to my patients. I practise and I see patients every day. I am actually in the middle of a clinic. I have come out of that clinic to come to talk to this panel, so I find his comments unfortunate.
The degree to which there are regional differences across this country is very, very real. When we talk to the provinces and territories at our meetings, we have an indication from them both of the degree to which there are delays in tests and the degree to which there are cancellations of tests. The provinces and territories, from their health ministries, are reporting that there are manageable delays. These are clearly not entirely acceptable for our patients, but are manageable.
What is clear to me, as I talk to my colleagues on the ground, is that there are these big regional disparities across the country. The sites that appear to have the biggest difficulty coping are small urban sites dependant either upon small radiopharmacies or upon a generator being supplied to an individual hospital radiopharmacy. Clearly, that is a very great concern to me and the physicians dealing with those patients. What I now have committed to do with my colleagues is actually to understand what is causing those regional disparities.
So, Mr. Chair, I believe I do understand the seriousness of it. I am a practising physician on the ground and am actually in the middle of a clinic as we speak. I do understand the regional disparities and I am attempting to address them. I am not underestimating the impact on patients.
:
When we get to offering Canadians confidence that these tests will be there for them in the future, we hear terms like “may”, “perhaps”, and “there might be supplies available”. To families and individuals dealing with the tragedy of having to go through cancer and heart diagnosis, that doesn't help very much.
To this point, our hospitals have been able to triage the situation and make do over a short period of time. We now hear from the government that this shutdown will last many months longer than first predicted.
You talked earlier about becoming more reliable and consistent in your estimations, but it seems to the public that you've just pushed back the opening of a possible reactor further and further. While that's being reliable and consistent, it's hardly being helpful or hopeful.
There's the suggestion that Australia can pick up the tab and fill in, and hospitals can continue to scrape together some sorts of solutions. We heard from Dr. Atcher that the accuracy of tests are much less, the radiation doses are much higher, and the procedures are much riskier. How long can Canadians expect to have no plan available from this government, other than a report that you might issue towards the end of the year, many months from now? I'm still trying to find where the competence is for this, as someone practising the medicine yourself.
One of the things we have been discussing since the outages at NRU and now Petten, briefly over the last month and potentially four to six months in 2010, has been how we can address the rather substantial problems associated with these outages. We recently did a survey of our membership and determined that 80% of them say that they currently have had an impact based on the outage at NRU and at Petten, and many of them have no alternative sources. Some 53% said that they had no alternative source of the molybdenum-99-based generators.
So one of the things we have been trying to work with--and I just came from a meeting of an intergovernmental group here in the U.S. that is proposing to look at some alternatives to help in the short term with the shortages--is to use reactors based in the United States to irradiate targets, which would then be shipped to Chalk River for processing. That's one option.
One thing to keep in mind is the fact that we have plenty of reactors in the U.S. and around the world that are capable of irradiating these targets, but we have a limited number of sites that are capable of processing those targets, removing the molybdenum, and producing a quality of molybdenum that's qualified for use in humans. In particular, those sites have to be approved by the FDA in the U.S. and the TGA in order to have that material used in human imaging. So it's the processing facilities that turn out to be the bottleneck.
Of course, when a reactor the size of NRU is off-line, it creates a serious problem for us, as I mentioned, not only for the supplies that we routinely get from it, but also for the excess capacity that we can take advantage of when one of the other reactors is off-line.
:
That's quite all right, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Allow me to introduce to you Mr. Bill Pilkington, Chief Nuclear Officer with AECL.
[English]
Let me begin by expressing my own concern about and acknowledgement of the impact of the ongoing strain on the supply of medical isotopes across Canada and around the world. We are obviously following the news of the shortage very closely and we have daily reminders of the urgency and importance of our mission. We deeply regret the all-too-real consequences of the shutdown of our Chalk River facility. Nowhere is the deep sense of duty to remedy this situation felt as acutely as it is among the men and women of AECL, and most especially among the talented and dedicated employees at the Chalk River facility who have been working around the clock since the outage occurred in May.
As our work has progressed, we have conducted ourselves with the greatest possible transparency. We provide proactive disclosure of our progress on a weekly basis. I have directed that there be clear milestones and reporting of progress against those milestones. This is a project where there continues to be full communication with all of our stakeholders.
We in fact published our 17th status report on August 19. In that update we provided guidance on the duration of the shutdown. This guidance continues to be founded on the best evidence available, including the most up-to-date analysis of the inspection data, progress on repair strategies, and critical path requirements for restart after an extended shutdown. At this time, the selection of the band of weld buildup technique allows us to project that the NRU will return to service during the first quarter of 2010.
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's approval will be required prior to AECL's refueling the reactor. As a result, AECL and the CNSC signed the Protocol for the NRU Restart Licensing Activities on August 14. The protocol outlines the administrative framework, milestones, and service standards for the licensing activities required for restarting the NRU reactor. It is posted at www.nrucanada.ca. This protocol ensures, in that same spirit of transparency, that the full regulatory review process is followed, and when the NRU returns to service, it will operate safely while once again producing isotopes.
To recap our return-to-service plan, we have developed a three-phase program.
The first was to do a condition assessment of the reactor and to select a repair technique. We have completed this phase, but will continue with confirmatory inspection and analysis. Testing of the repair process and special tools will be carried out in the full-height mock-up now constructed in the former NRX facility at Chalk River Laboratories. The mock-up is now being used to test the specialized tools designed to perform vessel cleaning and the removal of material samples for analysis.
The second phase, of course, will be effecting the repair itself. We are using proven technology. A key challenge is accessing the repair sites through a 12-centimetre aperture that is a distance of nine metres away, all performed in a radioactive environment. This requires considerable expertise in designing specialized tooling and conducting training within a full-scale mock-up environment.
Finally, the third phase will be returning the reactor to service, as I mentioned, with the full oversight of the CNSC.
These three phases interlock and overlap to some degree. This approach ensures that we will get this reactor back into service as soon as we possibly can.
I want to state unequivocally our belief that the NRU can be repaired and is indeed well worth repairing. It is very clear in our minds that the repair program is the best available option for continued supply of medical isotopes to patients. We already anticipate looking to renew the current operating licence of the NRU for a further five years, to 2016.
To sum up, since the reactor shut down, we've always sought to communicate what we know. We have based our project plans and our communications surrounding these project plans on evidence, not speculation. We will continue to be fully transparent with Canadians based on what we know today, and we are confident that we can return this reactor to service in the first quarter of 2010.
We truly have an outstanding team of professionals--scientists, engineers, and technologists--who can get this job done. We know the eyes of the country and the world are upon us, and that is why we have the personnel, the supply partners, and the third party independent verification that is appropriate to these circumstances.
I do want to conclude with a brief comment on some of the ongoing debate about the MAPLE reactors and the possibility that they could be a solution for the near-term production of medical isotopes.
Let me reiterate the facts. The MAPLEs were never approved to be put into service. The reactors are in an extended shutdown state. The MAPLEs are not a viable solution for long-term isotope production, and they most certainly are not a solution to the current isotope shortage.
Thank you. We're happy to respond to any questions.
:
It's all about location. So the drawings that you were handed out are really images taken from 3-D CAD models, and if you look at the first one, it's a model of the complete reactor. And what's important to note is the holes at the top, on the deck of the reactor, which in fact are the access points. These are the 12-millimetre diameter access points, and then anything going into the reactor must go through the tubes that go down to the vessel. And then you have the cutaway, which shows the base of the vessel and shows the actual location of the leak. So the challenge here is that all of the inspection and repair tooling has to be operated and inserted through these small holes in the top and has to carry out automatic operations at the base of the vessel.
On the next slide, which I think is on the back of yours, is more detail of that area. So there is an area in the order of four centimetres in a band around the vessel where we see the corrosion, and so that is the location.
And then finally, the third picture depicts the two repair techniques that we're pursuing. So on the left you have the weld repair technology—and recognize that all of that equipment has to come through this 12-centimetre opening—and then we have to be able to actually do the weld at the base of the vessel, have cameras monitoring that, and then have inspection equipment to inspect it.
Then on the other image is a mechanical repair technology, which would appear relatively simplistic, but again, there's the tooling to implement that from the distance we're carrying out all of the operations.
So it's the location where we need to do the repair, in a high-radiation environment, remote, and accessed only through a very small opening, that makes this a very large technical challenge.
:
I'm very happy to do that.
First, when the decision was made just over a year ago, that was based upon third party advice and our own internal expertise, applied against a very challenging problem, which was to try to resolve a technical and licensing issue that up to that point in time had defied resolution.
When we looked forward at the pathway and asked, what do we need to spend, how long is it going to take, and what kinds of risks do we have to assume in order to go further and try to bring the MAPLEs to a position where they are able to be licensed, we made the decision that it was not the right way for us to go, it wasn't an appropriate expenditure of taxpayer money, and it was indeed chasing a possibility that had a relatively low probability of success. In our view, that decision and that judgment still holds.
As a result of that, we took steps to bring the reactor into an extended shutdown state, and that's where it resides today. It is, in our view, years away. Even if we decided tomorrow morning to restore the MAPLE reactors to some state whereby they could potentially produce isotopes for medical purposes, it is years away, hundreds of millions of dollars away, and entails very, very high technical risk. We don't believe those are appropriate pathways for us to follow, and there is no scenario we can imagine whereby the MAPLEs could be brought out of their current state and be any solution to the near-term isotope shortage.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last time I was given a little more time than usual. With your permission, I won't do the same thing; I'll try to be brief instead. We sent the committee some notes for a statement from which I am simply going to go over certain points.
First of all, on the basis of what you've heard for a number of weeks and months, we all acknowledge the impact of an extended outage of the NRU on Canadians and Canada's health system. It's a serious problem and the health and safety of Canadians are still the government's top priority.
You have heard from the representatives of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited about their efforts to bring the reactor back into service reliably as quickly as possible. In addition, the president and CEO of Atomic Energy of Canada has already mentioned that the minister has clearly said the safe and reliable return to service of the NRU is AECL's top priority. He also said that the minister was trying to ensure that the corporation made every effort to achieve that objective.
Today I'm going to talk about the efforts being made under the leadership of the minister of Natural Resources to improve the security of supply in the short, medium and long terms.
[English]
When I last had the honour of appearing before the committee, I outlined the fragility and complexity of the global supply chain and spoke of Canada's role in mobilizing major producing and consumer countries toward enhanced security of supply.
On January 28 and 29, 2009, at Canada's instigation, an international workshop was convened in Paris under the auspices of the Nuclear Energy Agency. Eighty-five participants from 16 countries participated, including representatives from governments, industry, regulators, and the medical community.
A consensus was reached on the need to improve the coordination of reactor schedules, increase transparency, improve the efficiency of the distribution system, and provide timely notification of available supplies to the medical community. This was on the basis that the security of isotope supply is a global problem requiring a global solution.
Following this workshop, the steering committee of the NEA agreed in April 2009 to establish a high-level group to carry the international agenda forward. It includes representatives of all of the countries that own the five aging reactors producing the bulk of the world's medical isotopes--Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and South Africa--along with Japan, the United States, and Australia, which is an emerging producer. Canada chairs the high-level group. Australia is vice-chair.
I note that all of these steps were undertaken before the unplanned NRU outage. Our message was simple: collectively, we rely on aging reactors and a fragile supply chain. There is a collective responsibility to bring forward additional sources of supply and manage available supplies responsibly, particularly in periods of shortage.
From our perspective, these efforts and relationships have paid off. Less than two days after AECL announced a prolonged and unplanned outage in May, we convened our global partners by conference call, and the minister addressed the group to encourage a supply response. Contacts have been maintained since then through conference calls and a first face-to-face meeting of the high-level group in Toronto on June 17 and 18.
[Translation]
When the Petten reactor of the Netherlands underwent an extended outage, from August 2008 to February 2009, Canada increased its supplies from the NRU. Our international partners therefore did the same. Since May, the Petten reactor has stepped up production by 50% and the South African reactor by 20%. Processing capacity was expanded in Belgium to accommodate larger volumes of irradiation by nuclear reactors. Australia intensified efforts to bring its OPAL reactor on stream. We noticed, when the Petten reactor went down for one month near the end of July, that the Belgium reactor went into production and helped reduce global shortages. The Petten reactor has now been brought successfully back into service, which will be very useful as we head into the fall.
That said, the situation will remain fragile and potentially volatile, and our medical community will have to be disciplined and vigilant at all times to ensure the best possible use of available supplies. We of course hail all the efforts that have been made in that direction.
[English]
We're also looking beyond the immediate or short term. We're engaged in discussions with the United States government, the Oak Ridge and Idaho National Laboratories, and the Universities of McMaster and Missouri on the possibilities of putting in place back-up arrangements to augment supplies when the NRU has to be down for periodic maintenance, as would be the case under a program of life extension.
Three technical meetings, co-chaired by NRCan and the U.S. Department of Energy, have been held since June to develop options for replacing part of the NRU supply, beginning as early as September 2010. Significant work is needed to complete the requisite analysis and safety cases. We've been impressed to date by the level of commitment shown by the U.S. administration in these efforts, facilitated by positive exchanges initiated by our minister.
I would add that jurisdictions around the world are reviewing options and supply scenarios. The U.S., which is by far the largest global consumer, is determined to develop domestic supply capacity. The Europeans and Asians, likewise, are assessing new and alternative sources of supply. This is a welcome development, because a reliable, resilient global supply chain cannot be overly dependent on any one source, whether Canadian or other. The U.S. and other global partners recognize that the supply of isotope—a radioactive product that cannot be stored and must be distributed in real time, as we discussed last time—must be more diversified and more distributed geographically.
Canada too must review its options and how our needs in the medical system may be met over the medium to long term. To this end, the Minister of Natural Resources appointed the expert panel you have already heard about. I would simply mention the names of the four eminently qualified individuals serving on this panel—Peter Goodhand, Richard Drouin, Dr. Thom Mason, and Dr. Eric Tourcotte—who have agreed to prepare a report for the minister by November 30.
As you have heard, 22 expressions of interest have been received and are being reviewed by the panel. These proposals deserve careful consideration. The decisions to be taken in regard to future supply will shape our marketplace and how we serve our needs for the next 20 years or more. There is a range of factors to consider, including determining carefully the role of the public sector in achieving the necessary security of supply for Canadians and commercial interests in bringing forward supply capacity.
The panel is being supported by a secretariat staffed with officials from Natural Resources Canada and Health Canada.
While some of the proponents have chosen to publicize their proposals, I would note that others have explicitly asked that the submissions remain commercially confidential with the panel. The panel and secretariat have respected these requests.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, we are making every effort to minimize the impact of the current disruption in the global supply of medical isotopes on Canadians. We have taken measures consistent with our means to improve the collaboration and coordination between international partners and reactor operators. We have worked domestically and internationally to find alternatives to the supply of isotopes.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to any questions the committee may have.
:
First, I would make very clear that the panel will be reporting to the minister, not to AECL. So I think the minister is certainly looking to get their best advice, and I don't think the minister is starting from any presupposition about what may be the best alternative.
That said, in 2008 the government had to make a very hard decision, based on the evidence presented to it at the time about the MAPLEs, and face the situation where there were considerable further costs to be incurred, considerable uncertainty, and timelines that made it no longer attractive to pursue that option. If the panel comes back and suggests that on the basis of evidence presented to it, this is worth another look, I'm sure the minister will be looking at that.
As regards the other technologies, I should make two points of clarification. The minister has not explicitly asked the panel to advise on MAPLEs. The minister has asked the panel to look at the proposals submitted to it, and we expect—and there is, obviously—some proposal related to the MAPLEs. There is, therefore, an expectation that the panel will take that under advisement.
Second, you mentioned other technologies, and in terms of what we heard from the medical authority earlier, I want to make a distinction. I was talking about different technologies to produce technetium, which could be done through accelerators, cyclotrons, or another research reactor, so not the alternatives to technetium for medical purposes.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, witnesses, for coming out this afternoon.
I'll be sharing my time with Mr. Anderson.
I have one quick question. Before that, I'm of the view that, if not all, most of us agree to two things. One is that Canada has been the world leader in isotope supplies, and the second is that the shortage of isotopes is a serious concern to all of us.
Coming back to my question, while our government explores the options, I have noticed one thing: that there are some concerns about the government examining the options of the private sector participating in the commercial operation of AECL. My question is, if the commercial operation of AECL is participated in by the private sector, regulated and monitored by CNSC, as it is today, would it be a compromise of the safety, security, and well-being of Canadians in any manner whatsoever?
:
Again, in terms of replacement of the NRU, if we're talking about building a new research reactor, in rough numbers, that's $1 billion, and it is an investment for the next 50 to 60 years. That would be deserving of some time to make sure that you get it right. There are other supply alternatives when it comes to isotopes, but as regards a new research reactor, that is an important consideration.
Is it necessarily better than a self-standing Canadian kind of solution? We think so. The reason is that, whatever solution you will have, to have the world dependent on one supply chain when there cannot be inventory of any kind held for any reasonable period of time is not healthy. There has to be more distributed supply.
It is also somewhat uncharacteristic for the U.S., for example, to be the largest consumer in the world, have no indigenous production capability, and rely fully on its international partners. It is perfectly normal, and I think salutary, for the U.S. to look at its own production options.
Should Canada be a significant contributor to the world market in the long term? We certainly have skills, we certainly have capacities, and we have a history. What we have not had to date is a reasonable business model. Frankly, this has not been an attractive business for Atomic Energy of Canada. It may have been for some of the other parties in the supply chain. As I mentioned earlier, the real public policy imperative, number one, is to ensure that the needs of the health care system are met. If, as well, there could be commercial opportunities realized through the export of that capacity, the production in Canada and export, that's great. But the judgment is still out on that, and I think that's what we hope to hear as well from the panel.
Thank you, witnesses, for being here.
In your remarks, Mr. Dupont, you talk about your medium-term actions and being engaged in discussions with the United States government, Oak Ridge, and McMaster with a view to replacing part of NRU's supply beginning as early as September 2010. Some of the testimony that we heard previously from McMaster in relation to the safety cases and the analysis that would have to be done made it sound to me that the timeline, if they were selected, would be a little bit longer than that. What do you see as the most logical types of solutions that could be implemented for part of NRU's capacity as early as September 2010?
As well, do you look at the medium term as being, realistically, what you can do within the next two to three years? Obviously, as you've said, we have to change the whole strategy, and that probably involves a much longer timeframe.
:
That's not a point of order, Mr. Chair.
First of all, I'd like to make the point that the opposition couldn't even get their witnesses organized before they called this meeting. That's one of the things that have ticked me off about this whole thing, and particularly their attitude today.
I'm glad Mr. Regan brought this up. I don't think they've treated this meeting seriously at all, and evidence of that would be the fact that they released their news release earlier today before the meeting was even half over. On Monday morning we heard from the opposition that they wanted to have a meeting. We're required to have it within five days. That basically gave us three days to set it up--Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday--so we could have it today. We did that. The clerk worked very hard, worked overtime to try to put this together. We set up a three-and-a-half-hour meeting today. It's hardly a short meeting, as Ms. Bennett called it. We've been here.
There is concern over witnesses, apparently. We have used the opposition's witness list. That's what we used to set this up. We brought as many new witnesses into the hearing as we possibly could; it was set up that way. There was apparently some concern over five witnesses, and it gets awfully ridiculous, Mr. Chair, because three of those five witnesses have already appeared at either this committee or at the health committee. One person--and they don't even know this themselves, because it's in their news release--declined. This is their witness who declined. They don't even have that much knowledge of what went on this week to know that.
I think that is probably a pretty good sign of why this meeting was held. It wasn't to find out about isotopes; it was to set up some sort of political charade, which we've seen this afternoon.
Mr. Chair, we're having a health minister here even though this is the natural resources committee. I think we've gone the extra mile for these folks. Clearly, the opposition has been poorly organized right from the beginning, and that's evident by the fact that the witnesses were not even called prior to their deciding that they had a witness list and submitting it to us. A good number of those witnesses were not available.
So between that and the Liberals' having released their news release earlier today, I think it shows what they really intended to do with this today, which is, as Mr. Cullen said earlier, to make it into a spectacle, and they've been able to do that. We probably are not going to get a lot of this testimony out into the public view, because these folks are more intent on trying to make this into, as Mr. Cullen called it, a spectacle rather than dealing seriously with this issue.
So we don't need to meet again, and we don't need to meet again in the near future, and we're going to happily decline Mr. Regan's offer.
:
There may be some further discussion on this, but I would like to thank the witnesses very much for coming this afternoon.
Mr. Dupont and Mr. Wallace, you may leave the table, if you like, so that you don't have to take part in this discussion.
Mr. Regan has asked for unanimous consent. Before I go to that, I'd like to say that there seems to be some misunderstanding about who was and who wasn't invited to this meeting. As chair, I've been in discussion with the clerk. He has pointed out to me that there was a press release put out by the Canadian Association of Nuclear Medicine this afternoon. One of the people who signed off on that was Mr. O'Brien, complaining that he wasn't allowed to come to this committee. In fact, he was invited and he declined.
So I don't know what's.... There are, I guess, some very strange things happening in terms of what's being said and what actually happened.
Mr. Regan, you have a right to come and ask for unanimous consent.
I will ask, is there unanimous consent for the proposal that Mr. Regan has put forth?
Some hon. members: No.
The Chair: No, there is not, Mr. Regan.
We will now suspend this meeting. We have one more witness this afternoon, and that is the Ontario health minister. He has chosen to appear not in person, not by video conference, but by telephone only.
We'll allow a little time for set-up, about two or three minutes, and then we'll go to our last witness.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I want to start by thanking you for inviting me to appear before the committee. I'm glad to be able to bring Ontario's voice to the table, and I'm here because I am concerned. Our province has relied upon the National Research Universal reactor at Chalk River for 95% of our supply of medical isotopes, but over the past few years, we have become increasingly anxious about the sustainability of the supply. As I believe you all know, it can be disrupted suddenly and with little warning, and because of the just-in-time way that isotopes are produced and delivered, health care providers feel the effects of critical disruption almost immediately and, of course, the effect on health care patients.
As you can imagine, the shutdown of the Chalk River nuclear reactor on May 15 has had significant implications for Ontario patients and Ontario health care providers. Since the week of July 26, supply has been cut in half, and now even as low as 40%. As a province, we have been challenged. That said, I want to assure the members of this committee that Ontario is doing everything it can to respond to this disruption.
We are taking action to ensure that we can continue providing patients with the high-quality scans that they depend upon. For example, in June of this year, we provided $1.4 million to fund the production of an alternative isotope called 18F sodium fluoride. Using PET technology, this alternative allows Ontario to provide 2,000 patients with needed bone scans. It's an innovative solution that is ensuring that Ontarians have access to important diagnostic procedures during this challenging time.
We are also providing guidance to the nuclear medicine community to make sure health providers are maximizing available isotopes. By modifying scanning techniques, prioritizing patients, and using alternative diagnostic tools, I am very proud to say that we have been able to minimize the effects of the disruption. We have done that by being responsive and proactive and by anticipating the challenges to come.
Ontario has one of the most comprehensive medical isotope disruption plans of any of Canada's provinces. It is a plan developed based upon the advice of the Ontario Isotope Working Group. The working group is made up of key stakeholders and physician leaders, including the Ontario Association of Nuclear Medicine, Cancer Care Ontario, and the Cardiac Care Network.
Our plan establishes three levels of response, with tier one representing a minor reduction in supply and tier three representing a critical disruption. Ontario is currently operating at a tier two response level. There has been a significant reduction in isotope supply, but our providers have been able to continue managing the disruption locally and we have been offering guidance to our health care professionals.
Tier two triggers the partial activation of the ministry's emergency operations centre. The operations centre monitors isotope supply with the federal government and ensures that all of our health care providers have the tools and information they need to be able to respond.
I want to stress the importance of coordination and collaboration with our federal government colleagues, because Ontario, like all provinces, is relying upon advice, guidance, and information from the federal government as we develop our own response plans, and I want to assure this committee that we are in regular communication with Health Canada officials, because we depend upon them to keep us up to date on the status of the NRU and to share best practices and contingency planning. These, however, are short-term measures.
I am present here today because I'd like to seek clarification about the federal government's plans. By sharing Ontario's story, I hope to foster a federal understanding of the difficult situation I'm sure many provinces now face.
Ontario is operating under the assumption that the Chalk River nuclear reactor will be repaired and that it will continue to produce medical isotopes until a suitable and affordable alternative can be arranged. It's disappointing that Chalk River will remain closed, we are told now, until the spring of 2010.
I would like the government's assurance that it is committed to repairing the NRU. To help us plan, I would ask for regular updates from the government on the progress of the repair, as well as clarification about when we might again expect the nuclear reactor to resume producing isotopes.
Also, given that we are now reliant on international isotope suppliers, I would ask for regular updates on outages at other international reactors.
Finally, our front-line health care partners have informed us of higher-than-normal costs for medical isotopes. Clearly the federal government should compensate Ontario health providers for these additional costs that they are currently facing as a result of the shortage.
I want to finish my formal remarks by emphasizing my willingness to work with health care partners and all levels of government to ensure that we can find solutions to this problem. Chalk River is a valuable national resource, providing a critical diagnostic tool to all Canadians who need it. It is important that the federal government show leadership and develop a comprehensive, clear, and coordinated plan. Our health care providers, indeed all Canadians, deserve and depend on access to a stable and affordable supply of radioisotopes.
I want to reiterate my thanks to this committee for offering me this opportunity to be able to present, and I eagerly await any questions or comments that committee members might have.
Thank you very much.
:
Thank you, Monsieur Malo.
I'm going to go to Mr. Julian, but I want to read the letter that was sent by five members of the opposition to the committee clerk, and this meeting is a result of that. I want to point out what the opposition asked, what you asked, for the committee to discuss. The last two questioners have been questioning outside the line of questioning that was directed by the opposition members themselves. Let's try to stick to the issue that we are here to discuss. Let's not get onto issues that are better dealt with by the health committee. Certainly if you want to take it to the health committee, you are welcome to do that.
I'm going to read this short letter again to remind members what this committee is here to deal with. This is what was asked for by the opposition.
We the undersigned members of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources request that a meeting of our Standing Committee be convened, pursuant to Standing Order 106(4), in order to study the prolonged closure of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's NRU reactor at Chalk River, which has resulted in the decrease of supply of medical isotopes and a worsening health care crisis, as well as the future of isotope production in Canada.
I would ask that the members stick to the direction given by the five members of the opposition and also stick to the mandate of the natural resources committee. Again, the health committee, I understand, is going to deal with this issue again. That's great. They've dealt with it in the recent past.
Ms. Bennett, order, please. I've asked you not to speak over the chair when I'm making a statement that I believe is important for this committee to hear.
Now we will go to Mr. Julian's questions.
You have up to five minutes, Mr. Julian, on topic, please.
:
That's a very good question.
In fact, this is one of the areas in which we have taken incredible leadership. I think the Canadian Institutes of Health Research have verified that Ontario leads Canada regarding being able to drive down wait times in certain areas, cancer among them. In fact, that's why we're building additional radiation bunkers in your end of the province, in Ottawa, but also in Sault Ste. Marie, in Kingston, and in southwestern Ontario as well.
So we are extending capacity to provide radiation and provide it on a more timely basis. We have been seeing, in fact, steady reductions in the wait times that patients have to wait.
The fact of the matter is that in this case, when there is a delay or disruption in the time for diagnosis of cancers, that obviously means that there will be a delay in the treatment of those cancers. This is, I think, of concern to this committee: what leadership is being provided by the federal government in order to mitigate and to lessen the delay that patients and their families are inevitably seeing?