:
I'd like to call the meeting to order.
Welcome, everyone. Bienvenue à tous.
This meeting, colleagues, is called pursuant to the Standing Orders to deal with chapter 7, “Detention and Removal of Individuals—Canada Border Services Agency”, which was included in the May 2008 Report of the Auditor General of Canada.
The committee is very pleased to have with us today, representing the Office of the Auditor General, Mr. Hugh McRoberts, Assistant Auditor General, and Mr. Gordon Stock, principal for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. From the Canada Border Services Agency we have the president and accounting officer, Steven Rigby, accompanied by Kimber Johnston, vice-president, enforcement branch, and Barbara Hébert, vice-president, operations branch.
On behalf of all members of the committee, I want to extend to everyone a very warm welcome.
We will proceed with the opening comments from the Office of the Auditor General.
Mr. McRoberts, the microphone is yours.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to discuss chapter 7 of our May 2008 report, “Detention and Removal of Individuals”, an audit of the Canada Border Services Agency.
With me today is Gordon Stock, the principal of the public safety audit team responsible for this chapter.
Following a review of chapter 5 of our April 2003 report, the public accounts committee requested that we conduct this audit and report back on whether the management of detentions and removals had improved under the agency since 2003, when we audited those activities as part of Citizenship and Immigration Canada's control and enforcement program.
I should note that the work for this audit was largely completed in December 2007 and I cannot comment on actions taken since then.
The Canada Border Services Agency plays a key role in maintaining the integrity of Canada's immigration and refugee programs. The agency may detain permanent residents and foreign nationals who have or who may have breached the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Individuals may be detained if they pose a danger to the public, if their identity is in question, or if there is reason to believe that they will not appear for immigration proceedings.
The agency is also authorized to remove people found to be inadmissible to Canada. In 2006-07, the agency removed 12,617 persons, including 1,996 criminals, who posed a high risk to Canada.
Since our last audit, the agency has made a number of improvements in its management of detentions and removals. It better estimates the number of individuals with removal orders and has set up processes to help it remove higher-risk individuals. As of September 2007, the agency knew the whereabouts of 22,000 individuals who had been ordered to leave Canada; however, it did not know the whereabouts of a further 41,000 who had been ordered to leave and some of whom may already have left the country.
Improved case management systems would enable it to better track and prioritize removal cases to help ensure the consistent and timely removal of priority cases at the national level.
[Translation]
The Agency's policies and standards for detaining individuals are broad and give substantial latitude for decisions. We found that the Agency does not adequately monitor whether individuals, regardless of their location, receive consistent and fair decisions on their detention or release. Nor does it monitor compliance with its standards for the conditions and treatment of individuals detained.
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Canada Border Services Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada clearly articulates their respective accountabilities in detentions and removals. At the time of our audit, both organizations were in the process of determining whether improvements were needed to better support program delivery.
In the majority of cases, the Agency manages the removal of individuals on the basis of risk and has made progress in recent years. However, the backlog of individuals to be removed from Canada, who may present a lower risk or whose whereabouts are unknown, continues to grow. This growing number of individuals who might still be in Canada illegally undermines the integrity of the immigration process.
[English]
In our chapter we recommended that the agency improve its analysis of progress on detentions and removals to ensure that risks, situations, and individuals are treated in a consistent manner. You may wish to request that the agency provide an update on its action plan to address our recommendations.
Mr. Chair, that concludes my opening statement. We will be happy to respond to the committee's questions.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I appreciate the opportunity today to address the committee on our progress in addressing the Auditor General's observations and recommendations on our responsibilities for the detention and removal of individuals from Canada.
In today's uncertain world, Canada is respected as a welcoming nation and a haven for those seeking a new, safe, and better life. Canada accepts about 250,000 new immigrants each year and thousands of additional claims for refugee protection. This, together with the more than 97 million travellers processed by the CBSA in 2007-08, makes for a very active border operation.
[Translation]
In discharging our mandate to enforce Canada's immigration laws, the Canada Border Services Agency's central challenge is to strike the appropriate balance between facilitating legitimate flow of persons and closing our doors to people who are inadmissible.
[English]
The detention and removals programs are key to maintaining the integrity of the immigration program and to protecting the safety and security of Canada.
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides the authority to detain an individual who is believed to be inadmissible and who poses a danger to the public, who is unlikely to appear for immigration proceedings, or whose identity has not been established. This responsibility falls to the CBSA.
The CBSA's removal priorities continue to be focused upon individuals who pose a threat to the security of Canada, such as those involved in terrorist activities, organized crime, and crimes against humanity. In order to protect the integrity of Canada's immigration program, the CBSA also removes refugee claimants whose claims have been denied and other inadmissible persons.
In her report, the Auditor General outlined a number of key issues, such as the growing number of illegal persons who may still be in Canada, the need to improve monitoring of detentions and removals to ensure that risks, situations, and people are consistently treated, and the need to improve data and data analysis to manage programs and costs in a better fashion.
The report also recognized that the CBSA has made considerable progress in its ability to identify risks, track people for removal, and focus removal efforts on higher-risk individuals.
The government accepted the Auditor General's findings and recommendations, and in the past nine months the CBSA has undertaken a number of actions to respond.
With respect to the issuance of temporary residents' permits, the CBSA and Citizenship and Immigration Canada have reviewed existing procedures and agreed on the need for clearer policy direction, enhanced training, and a monitoring framework as the means to improve on the quality of this program. Implementation of these changes is expected to commence early in March 2009.
The Auditor General also noted that no national procedures exist to address excess capacity at detention centres. Accordingly, the CBSA undertook a review of regional procedures adopted in the event that capacity is reached and ascertained best practices upon which to develop national procedures. The target date for implementation of these national procedures is June 2009.
Additionally, a national reporting requirement has been implemented to record when detention capacity has been exceeded. This reporting mechanism will assist in monitoring how well regions adhere to the national procedures and in turn whether national procedures regarding excess capacity require adjustment.
[Translation]
To better monitor regional adherence to our national detention standards, the CBSA has developed a quality assurance plan which is targeted for implementation in September 2009. In addition to existing agreements with British Columbia and Alberta, the CBSA is also negotiating agreements with the provinces to govern the terms and conditions under which high-risk immigration detainees will be referred and detained so as to promote consistent treatment and cost effectiveness. Agreements with Ontario and Quebec are expected to be concluded this year (2009), and the remaining agreements concluded by 2011.
[English]
To ensure consistency across all regions in carrying out the removals program, the CBSA has reviewed and revised its removal policy manuals to ensure they are relevant and up-to-date.
The agency has also launched a process monitoring framework, which identifies removals and detentions activities to be monitored for consistent application. Regional reporting began late in 2008.
We are also conducting a pilot project in early 2009-10 to track individual removal cases and costs in our greater Toronto region, with a view to implementing such a tracking mechanism nationally. The objective is to compare the costs of different removal cases, to identify best practices, and promote better program management nationally.
With respect to the removals warrant inventory, the Auditor General noted inconsistencies in warrant cancellations across the country and limited investigative efforts to find individuals under warrant.
In response, the CBSA is revising its warrant issuance and cancellation policies. The new policies, based on investigative merits and risk management principles, will encourage a more consistent approach and a more accurate and manageable warrant inventory.
We are also improving our investigative capabilities by enhancing data mining of additional databases to better detect the whereabouts of individuals under warrant.
As noted by the Auditor General, due to delays in systems upgrades beyond our control, the CBSA's ability to track detentions and removals cases has been limited. However, the restricted development imposed on the national case management system was lifted in June 2008, and some improvements have since been made. By June 2009, for example, we will be able to provide detailed reports on those individuals in detention as well as on the associated costs.
In the longer term, the CBSA is conducting an in-depth architectural review to identify additional systems changes required to address the remaining findings and recommendations of the Auditor General's report.
We will assess these upgrades in light of our current budget constraints and in light of other systems requirements within the agency.
[Translation]
In summary, Mr. Chair, the findings and recommendations of the Auditor General's Report have been valuable in allowing the CBSA to better manage the detentions and removals program, and we will continue to implement measures such as those I have outlined today.
[English]
These issues and efforts are critical to the success of Canada's immigration program.
I thank you for the opportunity today to discuss this progress with you.
:
Thank you all for being here.
As you aptly mentioned, Canada has a very open policy on immigration and refugees. And the world is in conflict, so there are a lot of issues we address, or try to address, through our humanitarian efforts. Sometimes we don't get it right. Sometimes we get it very right.
My question is on detention and removal, and this is in regard to permanent residents and foreign individuals who are illegally in Canada. The agency's policies and standards for detaining individuals are broad, the Auditor General states, and allow for latitude for decision-making. Could you explain to me whether this latitude has led to any unavoidable circumstances? Has it led to some risks being posed, or has it led to any unfairness or improper detention?
Number two, it says that the agency does not carry out certain aspects of detention and removal with due regard to cost. Could you explain what you mean by that? Because you say that few controls are in place to ensure that decisions to escort individuals being removed to their destination countries are based on risk. Could you explain that to me? Then I will proceed with other questions. Thank you.
My question is for Mr. Stock.
:
In terms of people arriving at either the land border or at airports, our officers would conduct the same level of rigour, the same sorts of questions, and make the same sorts of determinations in terms of how we are going to treat refugee applicants, as an example
In terms of the comments the Auditor General has made, I think there are some improvements we can look to--and that we have made up to now--in assuring that we are looking at consistent policy, consistent procedures at a couple of our land border points, and I think most notably that we're doing the right sorts of monitoring. In the nine months since the auditor has concluded her report we've made some inroads on that front.
In terms of where the risk lies, that will depend quite honestly on the location. We know that at certain locations in southern Ontario and the southern Quebec border, for example, we see more refugee claimants coming in. On a volume basis there tends to be a higher consequent risk that goes with that.
We also see a lot of refugee applications from Mexico coming in through the Trudeau Airport in Montreal. Again, on a volume basis we try to align our program and the number of officers and officer training to make sure we have the right sorts of skills and response to deal with the volumes we face at those individual places.
We also see time trends, quite honestly, where the level of refugee claimants will go up and fall. I think we have to be able to ensure that we can move resources to those locations to respond to the flows we see at any given point.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, you say that the Agency deported approximately 12,600 people from Canada, including 1,900 criminals, in 2006-2007. In another connection, it says here that some 22,000 individuals are being monitored, while 41,000 are not. Could some of those 41,000 be high-risk individuals?
Does that mean that the Agency is lacking major resources to monitor these people? This is a net that is being opened; we're leaving the door wide open. Other countries can criticize Canada for all kinds of things; they say it's a kind of sieve. If we're the cause of that, I believe that's important.
I also want to go back to paragraph 7.29, concerning holding cells. The Toronto facility is overcrowded. There are 10 individuals in a cell that can hold three. I find that a bit dramatic, even if these are refugees or individuals who are not necessarily high risk. Our detention centres have non-standard criteria. Why?
Once again, are we lacking resources in terms of infrastructure? We talk about Kingston, which is about to shut down because there's virtually no one there. What is the Agency going to do with that building, whereas institutions are glaringly overcrowded elsewhere?
Institutions should meet the standards of the Canadian Red Cross. Have you checked to see whether we're at least meeting that kind of standard? We're talking about the availability of beds, accessibility and provincial holding centres. What's being done with the 41,000 individuals who are walking around? Perhaps they've left the country; we don't know where they are.
First of all, on the issue of the 40,000 warrants, for the most part these are individuals who have been in the immigration system and at an appointed time they have not presented themselves for a hearing or some other process within the normal immigration process. So when they do not present themselves appropriately and legally, we issue a warrant for their arrest. The vast majority of them would subsequently be removed, although there are some who would be found, arrested, and then brought back into the immigration system.
What we have done in looking at this situation is three things. First of all, we conducted a pilot study in our northern Ontario region to determine what exactly the demographic potentially of the 40,000 has been. What we found was that in the sample we looked at upward of half of the sample were individuals who had left Canada. It is very difficult for the CBSA to make these determinations, as the Auditor General has said, in the normal course of events absent exit controls, because there is no requirement for anybody to present themselves upon exit from Canada. So we have a very large potential component of the total inventory who in all likelihood have left Canada for the United States, or back to their home country, or to another country.
Second, we have begun to look also at how we examine the demographic constituent parts of the total inventory. For example, if you have somebody who is 75 years old, it may well be that sustaining a warrant for them is not the most cost-effective approach for the agency to take, so we're looking at what we refer to as our warrant cancellation policy.
Hopefully as we complete this work it will give us a more structured view of what the really core number is within the total warrant inventory of 41,000 that we have before us now. We know for a fact that within that warrant inventory approximately 2,800 to 2,900 of these individuals have some criminal affiliation. And criminal issues, organized crimes issues, etc., people who fall into gang affiliations when they come into Canada, are consistently our priority in looking at where we can find these people, how we find them, and making them a priority in terms of our removals.
If you look at the 12,000 or so removals we have consistently done over the last two or three years, you'll see that about 16% to 17% of those removals are consistently people with a criminal background.
We've also initiated the pursuit of a couple of other things. Number one, we need to work more acutely with our American colleagues to make determinations as to when people have left Canada for the United States. We believe there is some fertile ground there that we can pursue in terms of getting information from the Americans for people who have entered the United States so we can basically take them off our inventory.
At the same time, we want to make our investigative techniques a lot more acute. When we get down to that refined number in the total gross inventory we want to make sure that we're doing proper data mining. We want to make sure we are contacting the proper authorities, working with law enforcement, working with provincial authorities, working with municipal authorities. For the most part, these people have dropped out of public view.
I would just point out that the approach we've decided to take with the remaining provinces is to target the two provinces where we have the most capacity. Obviously, Ontario and Quebec are where we have the biggest crunch when it comes to detention capacity, so we wanted to conclude those agreements first.
We already have agreements with the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta.
With respect to the remaining provinces in the prairies and the Atlantic, if you look at our detention rates, they're actually very low in those provinces, so what we decided to do was target Ontario and Quebec first. Because the remaining provinces have low detention capacities versus the number of provinces, that's the way we decided to approach it.
We've targeted 2011, but we will certainly make every effort to conclude the agreements with those remaining provinces as soon as possible. We were just looking at targeting time.
:
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair.
We do have an extensive program to recruit and train our officers. When we are going to recruit officers, we have them go through a variety of tests, essentially skill tests, behavioural tests, and we make sure they have other credentials such as first aid and are able to handle the enforcement responsibilities they would be asked to undertake.
Once they pass that screening, then they go to what is currently a nine-week training program at our national training centre in Rigaud, Quebec. There is extensive testing done when they are there, and they must pass two tests along the way. When they graduate from that nine-week training, then they will be deployed to their particular ports of entry.
Once they get to their ports of entry, we have what we call a follow-up in-service training program. That would constitute training that is more applicable to their particular geographical situation, to the kinds of clients with whom they might interact, and also to the responsibilities that they will undertake. As an example, some officers may work their entire career and never actually deal with complex commercial matters if they're in a small port of entry that is more focused on traveller processing. So if you're going to work in a commercial environment, we'll make sure that we give you that kind of training.
In addition to all of that base training, as I'll call it, we continually have other kinds of training available for our officers. If, let's say, someone is from a legacy organization, such as customs, and we would like them to become more comfortable at administering our immigration responsibilities, we will make sure that they are cross-trained in order to do that. The same situation would apply with the breadth of our responsibilities.
We also make sure that our officers are given, if necessary, linguistic training and values and ethics training; there's a whole host of efforts that are being made.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Rigby.
Before we go to the second round, there's one issue I want to clarify with Mr. Johnston or Mr. Rigby. I know you have a tremendously important and challenging job. The public wants everything to go quickly at the borders and the trade to flow, but they don't want anything bad to happen. You've got these conflicting demands facing you, and it is certainly very challenging.
Speaking as a member of Parliament, I find the one aggravating issue that does come up in my office quite frequently is that of people getting held up or turned back for offences I consider to be in the strata of minor criminality. I know you can't speak for the American border officials, but it happens going both ways. I'm talking specifically of possession of marijuana, in some cases 20 or 25 years ago—and at that time it probably was a criminal offence—as well as impaired driving, DUI in the United States. Some of these offences are quite old. These people have led exemplary lives. It happens going both ways.
There are two issues. One, I know it's an assessment of risk, but is there any way of dealing with these so they don't happen? More importantly, is there any way people can find out? People come into my office and they have an impaired driving charge that's 20 years old. They ask me if they would be allowed to go to Florida. My answer to them is I don't know. They don't want to buy a ticket and embarrass themselves by getting caught in an airport and being sent back. Is there any way they can go to an Internet site and find out exactly what the situation is? This is an inquiry we get every month, and it's becoming more and more frequent.
It happens on the border every day but with no consistency. In most cases they don't ask, but when it does happen it's very embarrassing. I've got situations where very successful business people have an old charge and there's no way you can expunge it. They won't accept the pardons in the States. You just don't get anything at all. It is a big issue.
:
I will ask my colleagues if they can comment on the situation in the United States. I'm less familiar with that.
On the situation in Canada, I'm very familiar with that because I suspect I get as many overtures on this issue as you do, Chair, or perhaps more.
It's an issue of great sensitivity. As you say, a lot of people who come to the border, northbound certainly, are regular and exemplary citizens who have an issue in their background that renders them inadmissible.
I guess I'd say a couple of things quickly. We endeavour to make sure our officers have the best guidance and the best training to effect a decision on a temporary residence permit, if that's applicable. Generally speaking, I think the bigger challenge for us is to make sure those decisions, point to point to point, are consistent. We often hear stories of people coming up saying they couldn't get in, yet the year before they got in, they had been given a permit. I think our challenge is to make sure we are doing all we can to ensure consistent processing of these decisions.
The one thing we're trying to do through tourist associations and other fora is to ensure people know what the requirements are when they're coming into Canada. If they contact us in advance, we can make sure they get good, full consideration of their case and a proper and due-deliberate decision regarding the issuance of a temporary residence permit. In the event that we do not find we're able to issue the permit, they are at least spared the embarrassment and hassle of potentially being turned away at the border.
I'll just ask whether either of my colleagues could comment on the U.S. situation.
:
Thank you all for appearing before us today.
As I read through the material, I just wanted to acknowledge that you have had some significant challenges, and I'm glad to hear you're slowly working your way through them as well.
I'd like to focus on two areas. One is the need for fair and consistent policy and procedures. I also note that, as was brought up by my colleague across the bench, we need better data for exit controls. We also talked about better monitoring of individuals who are released, better resource allocation, more effective information management, and consideration to costs and risks.
Specifically, you've had some challenges with lack of procedures and lack of controls, the lack of clear roles in accountabilities between CIC and Border Services, and the lack of consistency in decision-making with respect to the detentions. So there has been a lot of latitude in decision-making on detaining persons who pose a risk. How do we know whether those policies are being applied fairly and consistently across Canada? Is there an effort to put more procedures and policies in place? I acknowledge you've said there has been.
Have the decisions been based on experience, or on risk assessment, or sometimes just on capacity and limitations? What about this monitoring framework that's been discussed? Is it in place, and do we have quality assurance checks?
:
Thank you for those questions.
One of the things that I've made a separate priority is making sure our national programs are armed with three things primarily: clear policy based on the legislation, procedures that flow from the policy, and monitoring to make sure those policies and procedures are being applied equitably and consistently. The fourth thing I might mention is training to make sure that people understand the policies and procedures we've got in place.
I think we've made some headway on these things. There's more work to be done, but we have amended and tightened the policies and procedures in a number of the areas that are touched on in this audit. The program monitoring framework you referred to is something we have deployed. It is not completely evolved yet, but I'm satisfied it's going to provide the kinds of information that I think we need at the national level to make adjustments to the procedures that are out there, the resources that we deploy, and the actions of our officers.
The other thing I would say is that the flow of information that's available both to management and staff is pivotal in making some of the gains we've undertaken to making in response to this audit.
So the work we're doing now in the national case management system, which is the data and statistical underpinning to our work going forward, is going to be fairly pivotal to our success here. We've identified about 40 specific areas where we would like to make some changes in NCMS. We've done about 20 of them and we have about 20 more to go. At the same time, we're looking at our complete architecture to see how the long-term evolution of NCMS or its replacement will be situated among the suite of systems that CBSA administers, and there are about four dozen of them.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to the committee.
I'm not an official member of this committee, but I've listened to your entire presentation. I sincerely have to tell you that I wanted more. In fact, I've been here in this House for more than 16 years, and, when you meet people of your calibre, who know their files, but who can't give us answers when they come to meet us once a year or every two years, we expect more. I don't feel we're getting enough information. For example, you told us that you had deported 12,617 persons. Where were they? We'd like to have a more detailed report on that.
You referred to 1,996 criminals. Where did they come from? Could we get that information so that we can have some idea? Do they come from Quebec, Ontario or British Columbia?
There are services in Quebec, for refugees and immigrants, among others, whose purpose it is to help them integrate or to provide a temporary welcome when they file their claims, so that they don't wind up piled on top of each other in cells. We have that back home. There should be more services or this should be known. For it to be known, we have to know how many we have here. We have to have a complete report. And, in my view, this report isn't complete.
It was also mentioned that there are 40,000 individuals working without any status in Toronto alone. These people are taking part in economic activity. They are earning wages; so they are taking part in the economy. What are we going to do with these people? Do they have status somewhere? It's up to you to tell us that because we aren't specialists in the field.
There's also the entire question of the appeal division that we're very keen on. We've been working on that for a number of years. My colleague has previously introduced a bill to enable refugees to file appeals when their applications are dismissed. It was reintroduced by Thierry St-Cyr, of the Bloc Québécois. These people have to be able to be represented and to appeal their cases. It's possible, but it isn't being enforced under the act. I'd like to hear what you have to say on that point.
By introducing these kinds of tools, we would be improving matters; we would be moving matters forward more quickly, and we would be able to resolve a lot of cases. People who come here don't necessarily come to do harm, but because they're often really in danger in their country or because they have chosen an immigration country where they can be well-off, happy, where they want to work, earn a living, raise their children and take part in economic life.
You still have a lot of work to do. I—and my colleagues as well—would like there to be a lot more information, a more complete report focusing on each province, because people don't necessarily do things the same way everywhere. I know that this is done differently in Quebec.
We can certainly provide the committee with more details in terms of the constituent elements of the number of removals that we do in a year--perhaps the most recent year, and perhaps as much information as we can generate in terms of where they fall across our various regions.
In terms of who's in the 12,000 or so that we might remove in any given year, probably the largest amount will be failed refugee claimants. These are people who have been through the system and have not been granted refugee status and are being asked to leave Canada as a consequence of that.
In terms of the number that enter into so-called criminality, a large number of them would be people who have come to Canada, have lived in Canada while they are awaiting assessment of their status--refugee or otherwise--and for one reason or another have turned to criminal activity while they're living in Canada.
A number of them will enter the criminal justice system and we have to wait for them to exit that system. We try to track them very, very carefully so that when they do leave the criminal justice system, we generally try to get them, detain them, and then remove them appropriately so that they're not lingering in Canada after they've left the criminal justice system.
In terms of the 40,000, these are generally people who have come to Canada, they've entered into the immigration refugee process and then they have failed to pursue the process appropriately. So they've failed to present themselves for some aspect, either a hearing or an interview. They've basically gone truant on the system and it's our obligation to then find them.
The situation--
:
To Mr. Rigby, if you wouldn't mind, I'm interested in the actions following the May 2008 audit, which isn't that long ago, I guess. I know that Minister Day and Minister Van Loan have taken some steps on this.
I read in your presentation that on the temporary resident permit, the CBSA and Citizenship and Immigration Canada are working together. There's approval in terms of a monitoring framework, which is now coming out in early March 2009. That's the direction that has been taken.
The Auditor General noticed that “no national procedures exist to address capacity”. We talked a little bit about that. You talk here about target dates of implementation for a procedure, again for June of this year.
I'm looking at number three, which is a reporting requirement. This again has to do with detention capacity, where it has been exceeded. It appears to me that you're developing a quality assurance program for implementation in September of 2009, which is just six months or so up the road.
In number four, your agency has negotiated, and there was discussion by my colleague Mr. Christopherson about the length of time taken to reach the agreements. It would appear that those are going to be concluded in 2009, and then with the remaining provinces, hopefully—and I think Ms. Johnston referred to this—by 2011. In the past, although there have been fewer numbers, these don't always make it easier to negotiate, because each province has its own issues to deal with, I would suspect.
In number five, the agency has launched a process to monitor the framework and identify key removals and detention activities. I think this is a key one, to be monitored for consistent application. That reporting began just at the end of 2008. Then you are conducting a pilot for 2009 to track individual removal cases. Is that the one that will try to get a handle on the exit of those who leave? You targeted Toronto as a pilot project area.
Now for my two questions. Are these a result of the concerns that have obviously come about from the AG, and on which you're now moving ahead? And second, has Toronto been picked for a particular reason?
Then I have a question about page 10 and the pre-approval programs to speed up the entry of low-risk people. I think these are good, but is there an increased risk of people slipping through the cracks when you have a preregistration or a pre-approval program? Does it raise that risk?
I'll leave it at that, Mr. Chair.
You had raised, Mr. Rigby, the issue of the national case management system and the global case management system. I'd like to visit that a little more closely.
The GCMS was supposed to replace the NCMS in 2005, and you held off doing a lot of things, believing that the system was going to come in. And then it didn't happen, and now you're in some ways starting over.
On April 22, 2006, The Toronto Star ran an article that reads as follows, under the headline “Computer Revamp Costs Soar. Program Goes Up 25% and Lags Far Behind Schedule. Immigration and Border Officials Scrambling”.
The article says, in part:
A $48 million increase in the cost of a federal computer project is raising the spectre of another financial fiasco sadly reminiscent of the infamous gun registry. Bureaucrats in the three departments are whispering about the political cash and career implications of a massive program that has risen 25% to almost $243 million, won't deliver all that was originally promised and lags far behind schedule. Not surprisingly, immigration and border officials are losing confidence in the Global Case Management System while their superiors are struggling to contain what is even by Ottawa standards a mess.
In April 2007 the government cancels the program, or at least cancels it in terms of your participation in it. It's obviously wasted money, wasted time, wasted staff effort, wasted work, and continuing risk for a longer period of time than was necessary.
Please tell me why this failed, why the decision was made to not go with the GCMS and to return to the NCMS, how much more it is going to cost, how much money you have spent so far, and how long it is going to take until you get up to where you should have been had the government gone ahead with the original plan of 2005.
:
A couple of my colleagues and I went to the wrong room, so please forgive us for that.
Mr. Chair, I would like to follow up on Mr. Saxton's comment.
I travel back and forth across the border a lot and I travel internationally. It is purely anecdotal, but consistently my wife and I have observed that in crossing to the American side there's a professionalism but a friendliness, and crossing to the Canadian side a professionalism. I don't know what the training difference is, but there's a clear difference after tens and hundreds of anecdotal experiences. So it is just something for you to consider.
My question goes to the enforcement side. I see in the Auditor General's report that the CBSA is primarily responsible for the enforcement provisions of the act in section 7.3. Then in your remarks, Mr. Rigby, you say at page 3:
The CBSA's removal priorities continue to be individuals who pose a threat to the security of Canada, such as those involved in terrorist activities, organized crime and crimes against humanity.
You've mentioned that there have been 2,800 to 2,900 who have gang or criminal connections.
What is the status of the carrying of firearms by our border guards? I recall that this was something new. It was brought in certainly since 9/11. There is no mention of this in the Auditor General's report or in your remarks.
:
The project to deploy armed officers is one that will span approximately ten years in total. At this stage we're into starting our third year, and we have about 720 officers deployed with weapons. The bulk of them are at the border, but some of them are inland officials. These would be officers who would deal with a lot of the cases we're responding to here.
So when people go to a residence to find somebody who may be there, arrest them and remove them, often times there can be some difficulty and occasionally some violence that's associated with that. So we are interested in making sure that as we deploy the weapons over the coming years we have a good blend between front-line officers and inland enforcement officers.
I think I can tell you that we are on time and on budget in terms of the deployment schedule. We are often asked why is it taking so long. Part of the reason is that in the fullness of time we'll arm approximately 4,800 officers, but in order to train them we have to bring them off the front line, send them for significant firearms training, use-of-force training, make sure that they pass the appropriate qualifications, and then get them their weapon and deploy them.
We cannot remove officers from the line in huge numbers, obviously. We are doing that in a very systematic way that responds, we think, to prudent risk management but also ensures that the highest-risk ports and the highest-risk areas of our program get the weapons first.
:
In an increasingly dangerous world, I think it's a good thing that we're doing this. It was very controversial when it began. I was just surprised that the auditor's report didn't touch on that, because it seems to be an important thing, especially given the allocation of responsibility between Parliament and our bureaucrats.
The other thing I am going to point out is that in many of your plans I don't see timelines there. I noted, for instance, on page 4 of your report, Mr. Rigby, that it says, “The Auditor General noted that no national procedures exist to address excess capacity at detention centres.” We talked about that a little bit. There is a timeline target date for implementation of June 2009.
Flipping over to the next page, it states that the CBSA is also negotiating agreements with the provinces, and you mention Ontario and Quebec. We touched on that a little bit in answer to another question. It just seems to me that it would be easier to understand what was happening and for a future committee to follow up if there had been timelines.
I know you put your neck out when you do that. In several cases, I would have liked to have seen some sort of a target date for what you're doing. I also realize that because you only have six months under your belt, that perhaps may have been a bridge too far.
I have a few questions. The Auditor General found that though the two departments, CIC and CBSA, have a memorandum of understanding, they have not come to an agreement on the consistency and quality of information supporting decisions to issue temporary resident permits.
I used to chair the Standing Committee on the Status of Women. With the Vancouver Olympics coming, we have a huge problem with trafficking, and as people come to the border there is a subjective decision made by border guards. What protocols have you put in place that will ensure the safety and security in terms of those trafficked women or children? I think the minister said that if we think they are trafficked, we will give them a temporary resident visa. But what do you do with the person who is trafficking? That's the first question.
The second question is how do you gauge what you're going to do? It's a tricky question. It's very judgmental, but I'd appreciate your input into this.
Secondly, there was a project “Hide and Seek”. Could you explain how much that project cost? Is it still active? How many people were on the unwanted list? How many have disappeared? Have they gone underground, or have they gone to the U.S.?
That is where I'll stop.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm really sorry that I didn't hear all your statements. However, some people in the room know that I sat on the Immigration Committee, where I had the honour of hearing these speeches on undesirable persons on a number of occasions.
For my colleagues, I would point out that we're putting a great deal of emphasis on refugees; we always come back to the refugee question. However, as you are no doubt aware, the board, the IRB, is short of board members. The number of people waiting for decisions is currently increasing. Unfortunately, the government has been immobile for a number of years and is not appointing or renewing the terms of the IRB members quickly. That's a bit of an answer to Mr. Young's question concerning the number of people.
As you are also aware, there have been regulatory changes regarding the borders between Canada and the United States. It's entirely normal, when there is a change to regulations, that there is an increase in the number of applications. People are afraid that the legislation doesn't provide for any transition. These people are also arriving at the borders more quickly than expected. So we have to manage a larger number of newcomers.
I've had the opportunity to visit the places where people are held temporarily, sometimes for a little longer. Action has previously been taken to make the agency aware that pregnant women were being held for long periods of time and that there were a number of deficiencies in that regard, such as access to physicians, access to translators. You are well aware of that situation.
In addition, my colleague spoke about the number of travellers: 97 million travellers; that's enormous. He also added that we're having trouble locating 41,000 individuals or that we've lost all trace of them. It should be pointed that a removal order can be issued against a person for a number of reasons, and that those 41,000 individuals are not necessarily criminals, although some of them are.
According to Minister Day's statement, we are probably right to be concerned about the large number of these individuals because they are harder to find. It's always a challenge to find people when you let them go. On the other hand, most of them aren't criminals, even though they are ineligible.
In those cases, we find people, like students who haven't renewed their permits or who are waiting for a permanent residency decision. Sometimes, the file is lost in Vegreville. In other cases, the person has forgotten to renew his temporary work permit. In the system, there's a human factor that must remain that way. In fact, if we consider the people in the field, whether they be immigration lawyers or people working with refugees, or even the Canadian Bar Association, on the whole, they think you're proceeding with removal too quickly in a number of cases, and they would like to have more time to intervene.
I simply wanted to clarify that point because, based on our understanding of the issue, you have to be aware of all those factors that reflect the complexity of the immigration system.
:
Perhaps I can start with the last subject you raised.
[English]
Your point is absolutely well taken. It's important to make a distinction between the warrant cases and regular removals, people who are failed refugees.
The warrant cases are people who have left the system and are at large. We have to find them, and we have to make the appropriate response. There are a large number of other people who leave Canada voluntarily. Often they come back and they will try again to make refugee claims, or they might make permanent residence applications, etc. But your point is absolutely well taken. There is a distinction to be made.
In terms of the holding-centre conditions, a number of members have commented on this. We consider this to be very important. Obviously we pay close attention to the advice we get from the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Red Cross, etc., in terms of those conditions. We try very, very hard to make sure that overcapacity is handled properly and only in very short-term situations.
Concerning border changes, the major border change this year will be the implementation of the western hemisphere travel initiative at the land border, which will be the enhancement of documentary requirements in the United States. We have worked very closely with our American colleagues to prepare for this implementation, which is scheduled for June. But you're right, when these changes do occur they can have an impact on how the immigration process proceeds.
And finally, on the issue of Immigration and Refugee Board members, I think it is recognized that there has been a shortage of members. I can't comment for the board, but it is my understanding that steps are being taken to name new members now.
:
Okay. I have a couple of points of information before I adjourn the meeting.
I want to bring to everyone's attention that our next meeting is Thursday afternoon. It's in Room 237. I think a few people were confused as to the location of this meeting. They do move us around, so you have to check your notice. In fact sometimes we may be in the building on Sparks Street.
So it's back in Room 237 on Thursday afternoon, and the meeting is in camera. We're going to deal with two reports. Those reports have been prepared by the analyst. They have been translated in both official languages, and they're being circulated to all members electronically, either later today or first thing tomorrow morning. You'll have them by tomorrow morning.
I urge everyone to come on Thursday. For the benefit of the new members, we go paragraph by paragraph. I'd urge everyone to read them and ask yourself whether that reflects the mood and decisions of this committee.
Those are the items on the agenda for Thursday afternoon. We may try to do another report, depending on how we get along, but that will be our first effort with respect to reports.
If there is nothing else, I will adjourn the meeting.
The meeting is adjourned.