:
Is there unanimous consent to move the motion?
(Motion agreed to)
[English]
The Chair: I want to welcome all of the witnesses.
We have with us, from MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd., Mr. Iskander, the president. I want to welcome you to our committee.
We also have with us, from the University of Ottawa,
[Translation]
Mr. Donat Pharand, emeritus professor at the University of Ottawa. I can confirm that because I had the good fortune of being one of his students at this very university. You were one of my best professors, sir.
Welcome to our committee.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the committee.
My name is Mag Iskander and I am the President of the Information Systems Group at MDA Corporation. It is indeed a privilege to have the opportunity to describe for you how space and defence technologies developed by MDA Corporation are and can make significant contributions to the security of Canada's Arctic.
[English]
I am sure the committee members all appreciate that providing security and ensuring sovereignty in Canada's Arctic is a daunting task. The land and ocean areas are immense, and the climate is harsh, making it difficult and often impossible for human activities. Much of the area is in darkness several months of the year.
To secure such a vast and unforgiving area will require multiple complementary systems working together as an integrated system of systems. I'm proud to submit to you that we have outstanding technology and industrial capacity here in Canada to provide and operate such a system. In many respects Canadian technology and Canadian operational experience in this realm are unique and world-leading.
The information systems group at MDA is Canada's prime space company and a major player in the Canadian defence industry. In 2008 the group had sales in excess of $400 million, of which approximately 60% were exported outside Canada. We employ approximately 1,700 Canadians, literally from coast to coast, in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax, Gatineau, and Suffield, Alberta.
For more than 40 years, MDA has been a key contributor to most of the current and the future Arctic surveillance and communications projects in space, in air, on land, and on and below the surface of the ocean.
It's clear that the key to Arctic security is wide-area situational awareness, and it is equally clear that space-based systems are the most efficient and only way of providing that awareness.
Operational for almost 15 years, Canada's Radarsat-1 and Radarsat-2 satellites, built and operated by MDA, have been providing daily, near real-time surveillance data for use by a wide-range of Canadian government departments. These satellites are routinely used for ice monitoring, ship detection, pollution monitoring, illegal fishing monitoring, maritime security, and continuous mapping of our dynamic coastline and maritime regions.
The follow-on to Radarsat-2 is the Radarsat Constellation Mission, known as RCM, currently in the design phase at MDA under contract to the Canadian Space Agency. When the RCM satellites are launched, this system will provide frequent, all-weather, day and night, high-resolution wide-area surveillance of the entire Canadian Arctic region, a task that can only be accomplished from space.
The key component of the system-of-systems approach is communications infrastructure. In the Canadian Arctic strategy, the polar communications and weather satellite mission that is currently proposed by the Canadian Space Agency will provide high-bandwidth communications linking together many of the different Arctic systems.
While space provides a very wide area of surveillance and situational awareness, airborne systems provide persistent surveillance and the ability to respond to specific incidents.
MDA is a major player in providing Canada with airborne surveillance capabilities necessary for these tasks. MDA is currently building Canada's next generation airborne imaging radar for the DND CP140 maritime patrol aircraft, and other future Canadian airborne surveillance projects. MDA is also providing the highly operational Noctua UAV service—unmanned aerial vehicle service—in Kandahar in support of our deployed Canadian troops. Following from this experience, MDA is developing world-leading Canadian industry solutions for DND's joint UAV surveillance and target acquisition system, known as JUSTAS, as well as the Canadian multi-mission aircraft, known as CMA.
On and below the ocean surface, MDA was the system integrator and continues to provide to date the in-service support for the navy's maritime coastal defence vessels. These vessels currently patrol Canada's coast, monitoring maritime traffic and performing mine detection to keep Canada's shipping lanes safe.
Looking to the future, MDA is actively developing comprehensive Arctic situational awareness solutions for the future of the Arctic offshore patrol ships. In order to effectively meet their missions, the AOPS need to be linked with other Arctic systems, such as Radarsat-2, RCM, JUSTAS, and CMA.
To maximize their efficiency and operational value, all of these surveillance systems must be tied together in an operational network and information fusion centre. MDA has built, and continues to maintain today and upgrade, the Canadian navy's maritime command operational information network, known as MCOIN. MCOIN is a key element of the maritime security operations centres, which provide secure maritime information fusion and situational awareness to Canada's navy and other Canadian agencies.
Through the government's efforts and the work done in Canadian industry, I believe we now know the parameters for each of these systems. We also know how to network and integrate them in an operational and efficient system of systems to meet Canada's Arctic security and sovereignty requirements.
I urge Canada to move these projects forward as quickly as possible. Furthermore, given that the fundamental objective is Canada's Arctic sovereignty, it's critical that these projects are controlled and implemented here in Canada and by Canadians. This can be achieved through a strong partnership between the Government of Canada and Canada's world leading space and defence industry. To achieve these objectives, we recommend the development and implementation of a strong Canadian defence industry strategy, and a Canadian long-term space plan.
[Translation]
As a proud Canadian, I am pleased to be leading MDA's Information Systems group which is a key contributor to Canada's Arctic security and sovereignty. I look forward to continuing our long productive relationship with the Canadian Government.
Thank you very much for your time.
:
I was supposed to take between five and seven minutes. Hopefully, I can take a few more minutes than that. I have seven points here, which you're supposed to have in front of you. I will simply enumerate those points. Also, I will suggest to you what I could spend a few more minutes on.
The first point is the meaning of what I call key terms. The second is about sovereignty over the islands. Well, I'll cover that in thirty seconds. The third is about Canada's rights, which we call sovereign rights, over the continental shelf in the Arctic basin. The fourth is Canada's sovereignty, and I emphasize sovereignty, over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. Number five is the legal status of what we call the Northwest Passage, which has six or seven different routes. In number six, I suggest a few measures to prevent what I call the internationalization of the Northwest Passage. Number seven is Canada's cooperation with the other Arctic states. Those are the seven points, which you're supposed to have in front of you, as well as sub-points on each of the seven.
Now, you might wonder why the key terms. Well, I can tell you that this convention, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, after all, took some 12 years of negotiation to arrive at this text, so that nearly every word has a very special meaning; certainly a good number of them have. It's quite important for us to get our vocabulary straight before we have any kind of discussion. I repeat this, because sometimes I've heard it said that those are guidelines. They're not guidelines. This is a legally binding treaty among the 155 parties to the convention. As I said, it was adopted in 1982 after some 14 years, and then it did not come into force until 1994. You can understand just from that how important this text is.
Now, on the meaning of key terms, I have six terms here, which I do believe are most important, even though this is not the energy committee. It's the national defence committee, and of course you're mainly concerned, I would presume, about naval navigational rights and that sort of thing. Nevertheless, I do believe you must be interested in the definition of those terms.
The first term is sovereignty. Everybody talks about sovereignty. Sometimes, I'm afraid they do so inappropriately. Sovereignty can be very simply defined. We're talking about territorial sovereignty. Political sovereignty is presumed. Territorial sovereignty can be simply defined as the totality, the whole bundle, of state jurisdiction. That is the jurisdiction that a state may exercise within its territorial boundaries. It applies horizontally, but it also applies vertically. It's usque ad caelum et ad infernos, subject of course to the rights of aircraft passage as provided in treaties and conventions.
The second term is internal waters, not to be confused with territorial waters. Internal waters are the waters landward of the baselines from which you draw your territorial waters. And those internal waters landward of the baselines include--and this is important in the case of Canada--the waters that have been enclosed by straight baselines across various indentations in the coast or along a coastal archipelago. That's the case for Canada, as I mentioned a moment ago.
Then you have territorial waters. Territorial waters are seaward of the baselines, and now it's generally accepted and provided for in the convention to be 12 miles. Of course, you have sovereignty, but subject to--and this is important for naval people--the right of innocent passage of foreign ships. But subject to that right, the coastal state has sovereignty over the territorial waters of 12 miles.
The fourth term, exclusive economic zone, is new since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Before that, you had the high seas immediately beyond territorial waters. Now you have an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles. Those 200 nautical miles are measured from the baselines, and the coastal state does not have sovereignty at all over those. The freedom of navigation applies in principle, as on the high seas. However--and this is where the continental shelf comes in--the coastal state has sovereign rights, not sovereignty, exclusive rights over the resources of the continental shelf, both the water resources and those of the continental shelf. We will say a few words about that later. Beyond the 200 miles you have the high seas, complete freedom of navigation, of course, and all the other freedoms of the high seas.
The last key word I have put on this list, which you don't have, is continental shelf. The continental shelf is the continuation of the land territory under the sea. You have, as a coastal state, at least 200 miles, but you can have more than that. If it is established that it is the same geology, it is therefore the continuation of the land mass under the sea, and it can go quite a bit further. We will say a word about that later. I'm talking about the seaward limit.
Those are the key terms.
Number two on my outline is sovereignty over the islands. There is no question whatever about Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic Islands. On only two occasions in history has Canada's sovereignty been questioned. The first was in 1920, when Denmark espoused the point of view of its explorer, Rasmussen, who said that Denmark's Eskimos, as they were then called in Greenland and everywhere, can go across and shoot muskoxen on Ellesmere Island; it's no-man's land. Great Britain, who was looking after Canada's foreign affairs at the time, sent a note to Denmark and that was the end of that. There was never any question after that.
The second time, when there was a little bit more serious question, was in 1928, with respect to the Sverdrup Islands, west of Ellesmere. Sverdrup, a Norwegian explorer, had spent some three or four years exploring three huge islands. This one was more serious. Norway could very well have claimed those islands on the basis of its nationals' explorations and the spending of quite a bit of money. However, in 1928....
I'm sorry. I drove some 400 miles yesterday, and I don't know how I got a cold.
In 1928 we arrived at a settlement of this question with Norway. In 1930 we had an exchange of notes whereby Norway recognized Canada's sovereignty over the three islands called the Sverdrup Islands, subject only to the non-recognition of the so-called “sector theory”, about which I can say a word if you want me to. So that's the end of that.
The basis of our title of course is doubled: number one, the transfer of the islands in 1870 to Canada; number two, the explorations that we, Canada, made after the transfer in 1870. So there's absolutely no doubt about Canada's sovereignty over the islands.
Now, number three, Canada's sovereign rights over the continental shelf, is more complicated. Mr. Chairman, I was very pleased to see on the agenda I received from this committee that Ron McNabb was to appear. I don't see Ron here. He's not here, is he?
:
Okay. He's really, in my humble opinion, the authority on the question.
I will limit myself simply to saying this. We have two problems. We have a problem, of course, an old problem, of lateral delimitation—that is, with our neighbouring states. We in Canada have one problem with the United States through Alaska in the Beaufort Sea, and we tried to settle that in 1984 and 1985 by negotiations. We had four maritime boundary problems with the United States, and we tried to settle the four of them during about a year and a half of negotiations. We didn't succeed, so we went to court on the Gulf of Maine and we left the other three. They're still there, and that's one of them.
The second problem of lateral delimitation we have of course is with Denmark--that is, Greenland. We did arrive in 1974 at a continental shelf delimitation, up to Lincoln Sea, and we left a little gap in the line. The reason for the little gap is because there is a big rock right in the middle of the medium line that is called Hans Island, named after Hans Hendrik, a Greenlander who was on an expedition as part of the expedition of the American Elisha Kane, who was an American explorer. It was Kane—and you have Kane Basin—who named the island after Hans Hendrik.
In any event, that's not a serious problem, and that's why I said a moment ago that we have no sovereignty problem, properly so-called, it's so minor.
In any event, and so far as—
:
Okay. I'm awfully sorry, Mr. Chairman. Let me go directly to the waters of the archipelago of the Northwest Passage.
In 1985, after the passage of the Polar Sea, the American icebreaker that had refused to ask Canada's permission to go through from Lancaster Sound right to the other side.... They refused to ask permission, so after that we drew, in September 1985, as the Soviet Union had done in January, straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.
Those straight baselines were drawn on the basis not of this convention—we were not parties—but on the basis of customary international law as interpreted and applied in 1951 by the International Court of Justice in The Hague in a dispute between Great Britain and Norway. The decision of the court—with, I might add, the concurrence of the American judge Hackworth—was that all of the waters within the baselines were internal waters, through which, I might add immediately, there is no right of innocent passage.
A modification was made in the 1982 convention, which didn't come into force, as I said, until 1994. The modification is that now there is a right of innocent passage. It remains if it existed prior to the establishment of the straight baselines.
I can go into more detail.
Concerning the legal status of the Northwest Passage, of course the main route of the Northwest Passage is the one at the entrance of Lancaster Sound, the McClure Strait, and the Amundsen Gulf. This will definitely become, in a matter of a few years, according to the scientists—in particular
[Translation]
Mr. Fortier, who is an eminent authority on the subject, —
[English]
the main route, and not the others.
I was in an icebreaker for 28 days, the Sir John Franklin, and this is the route we followed. It is, shall we say, not as dangerous a route insofar as the presence of ice is concerned, but a much longer route. It is a particularly slow route because we do not have up-to-date hydrography; we do not know precisely everywhere where the bottom is.
:
Mr. Chairman, I will share my time with Mr. Bagnell.
Professor Pharand, I enjoyed your presentation. I hope we can have you back so that you can complete it. I certainly found it most interesting.
Our major concerns have to do with climate change, economics, and defending the Arctic. Some have suggested that we haven't been as quick off the mark as other circumpolar nations in responding to the needs of the Arctic, in terms of climate change, adaptation, defence, etc. How would you respond to those concerns? How do you feel that we can capitalize on the economic benefits of the north?
Secondly, can you indicate to us, on your point with regard to the Northwest Passage.... There was some concern raised before as to whether we actually control the waters in the middle—yes, along the side of the islands, but not necessarily the passage itself.
:
Thank you for your question. It's a very fundamental question.
Your two questions actually are interrelated, in that they both relate to measures that Canada should take and has not yet taken to exercise effective control over navigation through the various routes of the Northwest Passage. There are seven of them—I have distributed a map, though unfortunately you don't have it—but in future, in particular there will be passage through the two routes I am indicating.
Times have changed, with the melting of the ice. It is diminishing in thickness and in extent—it's a sort of two-component kind of affair—and immediately we have a tendency to jump to saying that navigation is going to become possible very soon and Canada can capitalize economically on it.
It's not as simple as that. Why? No shipping industry will take the risks involved—and I'm talking about money risks, in the end—unless they are assured that the coastal state, in this case Canada, has the appropriate infrastructure, which means all kinds of things that, by the way, Russia has completely on the other side. Not only has it 12 nuclear-powered polar icebreakers, but it has within its regulations the obligation imposed, if it sees fit, on foreign ships to use a Russian pilot once they get into difficult, ice-covered waters.
By the way, Russia concluded a six-year study—the research papers it produced occupy about four feet on my shelf—that ended about four years ago, paid for mainly, as I understand, by Japan. The eastern countries, China and Japan, are after all interested in the possibility of saving 4,000 or 5,000 nautical miles and going through what's called the northern sea route on the other side of the pole, and possibly ours as well.
But I repeat, to summarize my answer to your question, that the first part is yes, Canada can theoretically benefit considerably from the melting of the ice and the freeing particularly of those two main routes, but certainly the main one, the McClure.
On the other hand, with respect to your second question, the answer is, not until we can prove that we have the necessary infrastructure to protect foreign shipping.
:
No. I think I list twelve here. I'm not sure. I had limited myself—you would have seen on my outline—to six of them. The first one I think is the most important one; that is, to make the present voluntary system of northern regulation compulsory, but particularly to enforce it.
What Prime Minister Harper said in August 2008 was that he intended to make northern regulation compulsory, which some of us have been advocating ever since the beginning, some 25 years ago. That's all well and good. It's a good intention. He's expressed a number of good intentions. But first you have to do it. Secondly, you've got to have appropriate regulations in order to support your enforcement measures. And as I understand from an officer of Transport Canada, it is expected to have the regulations in place by 2010. So good intention and good expectation are the only things I can say that are good about this.
You see, it's no good to know that a ship is there and you might not have given it permission to enter. By the way, the northern reulation presently is not actually a permission that is given; it's an acknowledgement. And the distinction is made very specifically that Canada says “Yes, okay, fine, here are the regulations. We will inspect your ship.” It's an acknowledgement that you've notified us, but not that you've asked permission and that we gave you permission. It leaves very much to be desired when one thinks of the requirements for the effective exercise of control over navigation.
Another matter, of course, is that of the polar icebreaker. As you know, in 1985, shortly after the baselines, Mr. Clark, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided and a firm decision was taken to have a class 8 icebreaker. It was better than nothing at all. It's not as good as a class 10, but it was a good class 8. And then the next government said it was too much money and we didn't need it, so it was cancelled. So we have none. We have three moderate icebreakers, the old Louis S. St. Laurent and a couple of small ones besides that.
So certainly with that you cannot control the multi-year ice. Even though it's not quite as thick and not quite as extensive, the multi-year ice, which comes down the McClure and down the McClintock.... We were stuck there for two days just because of the polar ice that came down. So it's all well to say that it is melting, but the huge pieces of ice resulting from the melting constitute a very considerable hazard, so that you have to be prepared with the adequate polar icebreaker.
:
Radar capabilities are unique, because they operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They are not obstructed by clouds. They are not obstructed by light--that is, the absence of light. The area of interest, of course, is in darkness most of the year, so you can see the advantage of using radar.
When it comes to monitoring waters, because of the nature of the flatness of the water, and because ships are very small objects relative to the size of the ocean, optical devices really do not give the optimum observation value. Radar has capabilities for spotting ships via detecting the wave behind the ship. Radar can understand the angularity of the water and can actually see waves of water and can then detect ships through the wakes behind the ships.
Combined with identification means, such as the AIS of the ship, and fusing other data, you can get timely, accurate information to make a decision and have the enforcement the professor spoke about. The only way you can do that in such a massive area is through radar based in space. That's really the advantage of radar.
With regard to land, actions on land, and information related to land, of course, airborne radar is again of significant value. The same characteristics, again, because of the clouds and the absence of light, whether it is airborne on a CP-140 patrol aircraft or on an unmanned airborne vehicle, give you the same thing. In this case, in the latter case, you can get it near real time. As you're passing over, you can actually get the imagery.
The idea is that it's a phased approach. You have radar that is in lower orbit to give us the overall picture. Radar data is really not that useful if you don't have the techniques and the algorithms to analyze the data and detect the change. Here in Canada we are leaders, without question, in the world. Again, change detection is one of our strengths. So you get the overall picture, and once you spot an area of interest, you deploy more localized radar surveillance to determine the nature of the activities, and you decide, based on that, whether you want to take an action.
:
We have capabilities on Radarsat-2 to go down to a one-metre resolution. A one-metre resolution, presented in normal language, means that any object that is more than one metre by one metre in surface will be detected by the radar. This is what we call a spotlight, which is the tight lens. In normal operations, we can go to three metres. RCM is expected to be between three and five metres, which is ample for detection of an average ship or a small ship, for that matter.
Of course, just to add, the CP-140, as you may know, is also used to detect subwater activities as well, as part of their current missions.
I just want to remind the committee that the RCM, although we're working on Radarsat Constellation Mission, is only partially funded. This is not funded through the completion of the program. It's funded only through the next phase. We are in phase B, and it's only funded through phase C.
I also mention the polar communication weather satellite. That is also not funded. These are programs that need to be addressed by the government. They need to be approved. They need to be fully funded in order for this to be realized in the next decade.
:
They mean nothing, absolutely nothing. The Russians are no fools and they know this very well. It's all for show, for the media.
That said, from a scientific standpoint, I have to say that the Russians are far more advanced that the other four Arctic states in terms of their knowledge of the geology of the Arctic polar basin. It began with the Papanine expedition in 1937 and, if I'm not mistaken, they have now reached station 45. They know the geology of the Arctic polar basin.
In 1974, the Russians published a geological map showing the location of the Lomonosov Ridge. The Americans maintain that this ridge contains approximately 25% of the world's oil reserves. The ridge is a disputed area. Russia is claiming ownership of this shelf, a position disputed by Denmark and Canada.
Generally speaking, from a scientific and legal standpoint, the level of cooperation is fairly good. Not long ago, on Mary 28, 2008 to be precise, the five coastal Arctic States made a declaration in Greenland. These five States get along very well. Despite the Russian flag-planting spectacle, the States do get along.
[English]
The Law of the Sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf. The protection of the marine environment, which of course is immensely important there, includes ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. This is the important part. We remain committed to this legal framework and the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.
[Translation]
It's important to emphasize that although the United States are not yet a signatory to the convention, they have expressed their support for the declaration of the leaders of the five coastal Arctic states.
So then, to answer your question, the gesture is meaningless.
:
I apologize, but I didn't quite catch the name.
Joseph-Elzéar Bernier made four trips to the Arctic and on one of these trips, he erected a plaque. He was a proponent of the sector theory, which, I can assure you, carries no legal weight. Nevertheless, I'm not saying that his gesture was meaningless.
He proclaimed Canadian sovereignty over the land, not the waters. He explained this in a book that he later wrote. He claimed all of the lands inside this triangle for Canada, that is from longitude 141 degrees to latitude 69 degrees, detouring around Greenland.
If the Canadian sovereignty claim involved only the lands and islands, then this gesture might mean something. However, it has no bearing in terms of our claim to Arctic waters, or especially in terms of the legal status of the routes through the Northwest Passage.
:
First of all, it is important to distinguish land territory, strictly speaking, from maritime territory. A reference to the waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the waters of the Northwest Passage, is a reference to maritime territory.
While the Inuit can claim that they have occupied the land territory since time immemorial, they cannot establish a similar claim in the case of the maritime territory.
In my humble opinion, as I have written—and the Canadian government does not fully agree with my position on this matter—Canada cannot establish historic title to the waters of the Arctic archipelago. However, we can establish our sovereignty on the basis of customary international law as interpreted by the court in 1951. As I said earlier, I am confident about that claim.
Not only can we invoke the fact that we have occupied the land territory, but we can also point to the fact the Canada's Inuit have used certain waters as if they were land territory to fish, hunt seal, and so forth, and that they have done so since time immemorial.
I think Canada can follow Norway's lead and invoke these facts to consolidate, but not establish, its sovereignty. Establishing sovereignty over waters is more difficult than establishing sovereignty over land. The same three things must be proven.
:
You mentioned submarines and their detection. We have the responsibility when we claim full control over these waters to have full control over these passages throughout. We must be in a position to show full and effective control, and that includes of course the stopping of foreign ships. These are sovereign waters of Canada. Do you have our permission? If you say yes, okay, fine; now we inspect and see if you conform to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and regulations of 1970.
One of the six measures I mention here is submarine detection. Normally, when you determine if a strait is an international one or not, and it makes all the difference in the world, you of course count only the transits of surface ships. However, I have to add that if you, as the coastal state, have reason to believe that you might have submarines using your waters, it might very well be held against you, and it might very well count as a foreign transit for which you did not ask permission. That is the reason why I have been suggesting for years that we should have submarine detection at both ends: Lancaster Sound and the McClure Strait and Amundsen Gulf. Here there's not much of a problem, because the submarine couldn't go far, but it's been proven that American submarines have been in the McClure Strait and Lancaster Sound, and we know about that, and that's fine. It's counted in the list of 69. I counted the foreign transits from 1905--Amundsen made the first trip in a fishing boat, from 1903 to 1905--to the end of 2005. In one hundred years, 69 crossings have taken place. That counts both ways, like in 1969, the Manhattan, a reinforced tanker, as a test made one way and then the other. I've counted that as two.
Since then, I have not the precise count, but we've had perhaps something like seven or eight tourist ships per year in the last two or three years. But this is certainly not enough to make the Northwest Passage an international strait or, as it is called in the convention, one used for international navigation. Relating to submarines, the difference is this: if it is an international strait, you have the new right, since the convention, called “transit passage”. It looks very innocent. It was fabricated by the U.K. delegation. It looks very innocent: transit. Transit passage means that as a foreign ship and a submarine, you do not even have to surface. The convention says right of passage in the normal mode of navigation. Well, the normal mode of navigation is under water. That is the big difficulty between the Americans and ourselves. They pretend that this is an international strait.
I'll take your second question first. Yes, transit passage means not only the right of navigation on and under water, but also the right of navigation over it as well. It means aircraft. You're absolutely right. I didn't mention that in my answer, but that is another dangerous component, as it were, of that new right of transit passage.
As for your first question, I would not dare.... I study that quite a bit. When we tried to settle the four maritime boundary problems about 20 years ago, I was called an academic in residence in foreign affairs, and I advised the government on these four maritime boundary problems. I wouldn't dare say that we are absolutely right and the United States is absolutely wrong. What is going to happen, I would dare say, is that if we go to the court, it's going to be a line somewhere in between, and if we don't go to the court and arrive at an amicable settlement, it will be somewhere in between.
What we are doing is using the 141st meridian. We say we have been using the continuation of the 141st meridian for quite a while. We say that our legal basis is therefore an historical use of a particular meridian of longitude.
The Americans have a better departing point. The Americans say that it is the median line. Well, this used to be, in the 1958 convention on the continental shelf, the rule. It is no longer the rule. Nevertheless, it is still considered an equitable factor, and because of the concavity of the coast here on the Canadian side, a median line beginning here goes about like this, on the inside.
The beauty of it is that perhaps--and I don't know--it might not be, as we progress, more of a disadvantage to Canada at all. Why? It's because, if you look at a modern geological map, lo and behold, the equidistance line goes like this, but then look at the archipelago: then the median line comes back and crosses the 141st, over to the American side, shall we say.
By the way, I don't think you could find a better description on the map than the last number of the National Geographic. From a legal point of view, I think you will find that chart very accurate.
As I say, I would not dare to answer your question or to make a guess. All I would say is that somehow we're going to compromise on the basis of a number of equitable factors, and I could make a list.
:
The expert on the financial side tells me to go ahead. Well, it's going to be very short, because I really don't know.
I suppose I could say that insofar as the exploitation of natural resources, it is a very, shall we say, delicate matter to deal with. I am pleased, however, to say this: Within the Arctic Council, which Canada helped create in 1990, I believe it was, or 1992, the five Arctic states together are developing a polar code. It was changed to “guidelines”; somebody objected to “code”. Those guidelines are specifically intended to protect the marine environment in case of either a spill from a ship or, eventually, a spill from the exploitation of the continental shelf resources.
It is a very important matter. How long is the damage going to last? We don't know. All we know is that it's going to last a hell of a long time. To clean up there, it's not like.... Even for the Exxon Valdez, as you know, it took years to clean up. This is much worse, insofar as it's a difficult environment.
I couldn't say any more than that. I'm sorry.
:
On your first question, you cannot determine in advance how many transits are necessary in order to say it is now an international strait and therefore that the new right of transit applies. I can only tell you—and somebody mentioned a moment ago the Corfu Channel case—there is no definition in the convention for what is a strait that's used for international navigation. The expression is used, as I have just stated.
There is only one case, the Corfu Channel case of 1949 in the International Court of Justice. In that case, over an 18-month period, there were close to 2,000 ships that put into the Port of Corfu. Those were the only ships that were counted as transits.
Now, of course this is not an area like the Port of Corfu. We're talking about a remote area, and we have to take that into account.
The Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933 in the East Greenland case did take that into account, insofar as determining what acts of occupation were sufficient, either by Denmark or Norway. In that case, Denmark won.
What I'm saying to you is that I don't know. Nobody knows how many transits are necessary. But I can tell you that over a period of 100 years, 69 transits are certainly not sufficient.
:
Thank you, Professor Pharand.
At this time, I'd also like to thank Mr. Iskander for his presentation. Thank you both very much for taking part in our proceedings.
Before we adjourn, I have a motion, further to our discussion at the start of the meeting.
[English]
Unless the Auditor General appears on June 1 or June 3, the committee will hear witnesses in relation to its study on Arctic sovereignty.
Do we have the agreement of the committee on that?
We have support from Mr. Wilfert and Mr. Hawn.
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Wilfert.