:
Thank you, and good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, meeting number 40. Pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, November 7, 2006, we are studying Bill C-6, an act to amend the Aeronautics Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts.
Joining us today we have Daniel Maurino—I was actually going to say I've seen you play football a lot, but you're not him—who is the coordinator of flight safety and human factors. He's with the International Civil Aviation Organization.
We do appreciate you taking the time today to be here. I'm sure you may have been informed that we'll ask you to make a brief presentation, and then we'll do rounds of questions from the members.
Please begin.
:
Thank you, sir, and good afternoon, everybody.
I am about 100 kilos and several millions of dollars short of the real Dan Marino, but I wish I had them.
It is an honour to be here this afternoon. I think I could use my time in a most useful manner by providing the committee with the briefest of pictures as to what ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, is.
I believe the best way to describe ICOA is to say it is the specialized aviation agency of the United Nations. We are part of the UN system. Our basic mandate is set in a document called the Chicago Convention. It's a broad blueprint of how to conduct the business of international civil aviation in a safe, efficient, and orderly manner.
The organization was created back in 1944, in Chicago, so we've been in existence for over 60 years now.
The Chicago Convention is our guiding document. The actual implementation of the actual business of harmonizing safety in international civil aviation is conducted through the application of the requirements in 18 annexes to the convention. Each annex to the convention refers to a particular component of the aviation system. Annex 1 refers to personal licensing, annex 2 refers to rules of the air, annex 3 refers to meteorology, and so on and so forth.
Our basic job, on a day-to-day basis, is keeping these annexes to the convention up to date. These annexes define the standards and recommended practices that states have to follow in order to be members of this universal partnership.
The important thing to highlight here is that as long as a state is involved in international aviation operations, the state in question has to follow the standards in the different annexes. The states may file differences with the standards in the annexes, but it's not a ticket out of compliance. The differences can only be applied for domestic operations. The moment you're engaged in international operations, you must follow these standards.
The subject of interest to this committee, or at least to this session, safety management systems, is contained in standards that are included in three of these annexes. They are annex 6, which refers to the international operation of aircraft; annex 11, which refers to air traffic services, and that includes both air traffic control and air traffic management; and lastly, annex 14, which deals with aerodromes.
In order to implement these standards, we publish a diversity of materials, including manuals and circulars, and occasionally we get involved in training, as in the case of safety management systems.
My closing remark is to re-emphasize the point that compliance with this standard, this universal standard, is not something you might or might not elect to do; you have to do it. So there's quite a force behind these standards.
Thank you, sir.
:
Thank you very much. That was one of the briefest presentations we've had. So Mr. Maurino, thank you very much, and welcome to the committee.
The last time Canada was audited by ICAO was in 2005, and it recommended, if I'm correct, that Canada comply with international standards. We had a witness here before, Judge Moshansky, whose opinion was that Transport Canada did not, and that in fact Transport Canada might be in violation of international safety standards. Is that your opinion, too?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maurino, what you're saying is important to us and we need to understand you clearly.
If I understand correctly, the ICAO would like safety management systems to be subject at all times to regulatory oversight. In other words, the organization believes that while safety can be assured with SMS, a regulatory oversight regime must nevertheless be in place.
Have I understood your position clearly?
:
Yes, sir. In any change there is a transition period. What is the safety picture going to be in 20 or 25 or 30 years' time? Nobody really knows. If SMS evolves to the potential that we hope it will achieve, there may be a scenario in which audits are no longer going to be necessary.
But we're at the beginning. I want to reinforce a notion that I have expressed already. We're talking about SMS as if SMS were a done deal. It is not. We're at the beginning. We haven't even landed. We haven't even started this campaign. I believe that what's going on here is the fate that trailblazers suffer, which is growing pains.
In many aspects, we're learning as we move, and we become wiser as we get additional feedback. What I'm trying to say is that this early in the game, taking any radical measures, whatever they might be, would be unwise. I think the elimination of an inspectorate force, audits, or other conventional mechanisms that have ensured safety in aviation for over sixty years would not be applicable until we are absolutely certain that what we're removing is being replaced by a better system.
:
I totally agree with you. That's what this committee is attempting to find out.
Let me give you an example. As I understand it, the ICAO recommends that airports be inspected every three years. However, in March 2006, Transport Canada terminated its National Audit Program which targeted the five largest airports in Canada.
We don't't want to see safety management systems taking the place of audit and inspection systems until they've proven to be effective. We're concerned that Transport Canada has terminated its National Audit Program at the five largest airports in the country.
I realize that you have not done an analysis, but are you concerned, as we are, that existing audit systems are being replaced before SMS has proven to be effective? Audits were conducted in 2005 and Canada was probably found to be a relatively safe country at the time. Administrative decisions are being made at this time to save money, but in our view, SMS has not yet proven its mettle.
:
I'd like to emphasize the fact that I am by no means an expert in the internal Canadian situation, so I am not familiar with many of the details the committee is presenting. I don't know about Transport Canada doing certain things. I can only present a conceptual view of how an SMS system should operate based on the general direction that ICAO is following.
I can only reiterate what I've already expressed. It is a basic principle in the management of change that you must introduce change gradually, checking that whatever change is introduced does not introduce additional hazards into the system. You do not remove existing defences until you have other defences in place, and so on and so forth.
If you are presenting a scenario in which you tell me that we have a defence in the system that is a tested defence, a proven defence, and we're entirely removing that defence and replacing it with another defence that we have yet to identify as such a valuable defence, my reply would be that that's very poor management of change. But that's a basic kind of conceptual issue, and that's as far as I would dare go on this particular question.
:
So you haven't had any discussions about what has transpired most recently in Canada?
Capt Daniel Maurino: No.
:
Okay. I want to come to the report that ICAO finalized in January 2006. My colleagues have referred to it. Two elements came out of that. One was an observation:
Transport Canada's enforcement programme complies with Article 12 of the Chicago Convention by ensuring that every aircraft complies with the regulations and by providing for the prosecution of persons violating the regulations.
We have a bill before us that essentially takes away that element of prosecution of persons violating the regulation. Would that be a matter of some concern for ICAO, since it's very clearly stated in the audit done in 2005 that it is one of the advantages of the system that we currently have, or had at that time?
:
I believe that's probably one of the most sensitive and contentious issues within the entire SMS concept. SMS systems, gentlemen, are data-intensive. It's essentially replacing opinions with data, so we have to acquire the data.
Nobody--nobody--knows better how a system really works, and I underline the word “really”, than the people who operate the system: the pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics, cabin crew, and ground personnel. If you want to know how your system works beyond regulations, beyond what the book says, you've got to ask these individuals.
If we need data, who is in the best position to provide this data? I believe the reply is so obvious--operational personnel--but if we are asking people to report on what they see, to report on flaws in the system that are there and were not anticipated when the system was designed, if we're telling these people to come forward with this vital safety management information, we cannot expect them to do it if the only reward they are going to receive is punishment.
:
But the ICAO report was very specific in saying that providing for prosecution of persons violating the regulations is an important component.
I'd like to turn to another component that is specifically mentioned. My colleagues mentioned it as well. It is the national audit program. The continuous airworthiness surveillance of commercial aircraft is performed through the national audit program, ramp checks, and the inspector assigned to the air operator. This was specifically mentioned in the audit undertaken in 2005, and as my colleagues have mentioned, in March 2006 the national audit program was essentially killed.
Is that a matter of concern? We have, again, a specific recommendation, a specific observation of the existing air safety system that subsequently has been abandoned or gutted. Is that not a source of concern, given the ICAO audit of Canadian airline and air safety operations?
:
There is a contradiction between what ICAO has said in its audit and the measures that have been taken, the national audit program, and in October 2006, where all the enforcement investigations on safety violations in place, if there was an SMS in place, were abruptly abandoned. There again, very clearly, in the audit that was undertaken, there is concern implicitly, because what is very explicit is that those are extremely important components. Having that national audit program and having the enforcement components are extremely important elements of our existing safety system.
I'll move on, then, to the next issue, which is the number of inspectors. We have data that clearly shows that the number of civil aviation inspectors has gone down, and we've had previous witnesses who have testified to that as well. In fact, within the next few years we will see a serious shortage in the number of civil aviation inspectors because of retirement. The number has gone down, and through attrition we're going to lose even more. Could that not be a source of concern to ICAO, given the report that we would have fewer inspectors in place and the functions they had seemingly have been abandoned or gutted?
:
There are two questions there.
First of all, going back to the question of enforcement, if you were to tell me that Transport Canada or the Canadian government is considering totally discarding enforcement, my comment would be that it's a very bold measure. I'm not sure I would agree with that. If you're telling me that Transport Canada is considering somehow changing or adopting its enforcement policies to reflect a more contemporary approach to enforcement underlying SMS, that's a completely different matter. They are not the same, as I'm sure you realize.
Secondly, you might have a million inspectors and be absolutely ineffective, and you might have 100 inspectors and be absolutely effective. So I couldn't comment on numbers. To me, the safety performance of the system should be the parameter, not the number of people manning the system.
There is no other civil aviation administration among the 190 contracting states to ICAO that has progressed implementation of the concept of safety management systems to the extent that Transport Canada has progressed it.
I know there is a perception that the Australians, the New Zealanders, and the British have not gone beyond the production of a couple of manuals and some guidance material. There's nothing in their regulatory systems that somehow conveys the notion that they are going to react like the other 189 contracting states to the ICAO SMS requirement in annexes 6, 11, and 14. Canada is the only civil aviation administration that was ahead of the game before ICAO produced these requirements.
:
He has a letter to the Minister of Transport, the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, and every member has a copy of this letter, and we'd be delighted to give you one too.
He writes towards the end of his letter--it's a long one:
In summation, the fact that, in March, 2006, Transport Canada suspended its National Audit Program, which is an integral part of any regulatory oversight program, belies any suggestion that an adequate regulatory oversight program is now in place in Canada. In my view, in order to assure the safety of the Canadian air travelling public...
--and I'll say that is the purpose of our being here today--
... in order to assure the safety of the Canadian air travelling public, Bill C-6 must be amended to:
--and he raises two points in particular--
Protect air carrier employees who report safety violations to the regulator with an effective “whistleblower” amendment. Failure to do so will be the Achilles heel of SMS.
Severely limit or rescind the Bill C-6 provision that allows Transport Canada to delegate safety oversight to an industry association.
Would you comment on those recommendations from Judge Moshansky, please?
:
Therein lies the problem, Mr. Maurino. The bill makes no provision for regulatory oversight. We have a bill on SMS without any guarantee of adequate regulatory oversight. That's a fact. Regardless of how you look at it, the bill contains no guarantee that a regulatory oversight regime will be maintained. That's what has us worried.
What you don't understand is that at the same time that this bill was introduced and that we were working on Bill , the National Audit Program was cancelled. Right now, the eight largest airlines are not inspected annually and the five largest airports in Canada are not subject to inspections every three years, as recommended by the ICAO, the reason being that this program was abolished in March 2006. We are concerned about these developments.
I'm not saying that things are going badly. However, since the bill makes no provision for regulatory oversight, there is a danger that one day, the entire safety system will be at risk, because it could be found that ICAO standards are not being respected when the next audit takes place. I believe that will be in five years' time.
We'd like to hear you views on this matter. We don't want to see Canada head down the wrong path because Transport Canada thought SMS would replace regulatory measures.
:
I'm not sure what the question is, sir. But if the situation is that you're telling me Transport Canada has totally eliminated the proficiency check-in and any other requirement in annex 6, without an alternative method of compliance, then it would be a case of a violation of international standards.
I cannot comment, because I don't know if that is the case. I'm not aware of it, and I'm not familiar with the internal situation in Canada.
If it has happened that way, yes, it is a difference, and we should have been notified. If one means of compliance is replaced by an alternative means of compliance, there is ample latitude in the annexes for interpretation. It would be a question of analyzing this alternative method to see whether or not it complies with international standards.
:
Yes, sir. I certainly agree, but I'd again like to warn the committee that it is important that the ICAO standards give considerable leeway to states in terms of implementation. They are generic because we need to take into consideration the different possibilities and constraints of an audience and membership that go from states with resources, such as the U.S. and Canada, to Montenegro. These are very generic standards. There is leeway for states to implement these standards in ways that are appropriate to their resources and limitations.
Furthermore, this is a word of caution regarding the audits. You might end up with a different file because you've done better than the standards.
I'll give this committee one specific example. Annex 6 clearly indicates that flight crew members should undergo periodic training every six months. The Federal Aviation Administration devised a program, which is called the advanced qualification program. It is a state-of-the-art training system that allows airlines in very controlled environments to have their crews trained once a year. It is a superior system, and it's so complex and sophisticated that it has only been implemented in a few carriers within the United States.
But the fact remains that those carriers cycle their flight crews through the training system once a year, not twice, as annex 6 imposes. Even when the system is superior, in the audit of the FAA, it was marked as a difference.
Not meeting standards does not necessarily mean substandard performance. It simply means you're not ticking a box.
It's my understanding that this legislation also brings forward amendments that go above and beyond and would make the Canadian civil aviation sector even more green than it already is.
I'd also like to talk to you a little bit about the process of which you were speaking earlier. Unfortunately, many of our colleagues have decided to talk about the process in a negative light, but I think it's important to talk about this in a positive light, the process of change going towards the SMS system and how Transport Canada is doing it in a very positive fashion by actually overlaying it and interlocking it with the regulations that are already in place.
Do you see this as a positive?
:
If you're talking about any specific event, no. But generally speaking, we could broadly talk about two different legal frameworks, the Anglo-Saxon or common law system, and then the Napoleonic code system, typical of Mediterranean and Latin countries. Where we see safety initiatives progressing above and beyond, it's in those countries that are under the Anglo-Saxon law because the Anglo-Saxon law or code is friendlier to the objective of protecting sources of safety information.
As a general statement, in those countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, their transportation safety or their accident investigation acts are more flexible. They allow going deeper into event investigation because they breed a degree of confidence between the investigator and the investigated. So there are definite advantages.
And I don't recall using the word “reward”. I'm not talking about rewarding people for reporting. I'm only talking about not punishing them for reporting, which I think is a big difference.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maurino, I wanted to see if you could help me understand this matter of the standards and whether a country is obliged or not.
When we had a presentation from Mr. Holbrook, who was representing the Canadian Federal Pilots Association, he said in his testimony that some decisions regarding the PPCs—the pilot proficiency checks—are putting Canada in violation of international standards. Then he referred us to some tabs. Essentially, some of this is highly technical, but there are some statements from Transport Canada in one of its circulars saying that Transport Canada will eliminate the current provisions for PPCs conducted by inspectors by December 31, 2007.
Then in the final report on the safety oversight of your association, there is a reference made that indeed pilot proficiency tests in Canada are only going to be every two years now.
For your organization they're every six months, I believe. Does that mean that a Canadian pilot who only has a proficiency check every two years cannot operate internationally?
:
It's clear now. Again, with touch and see on a line check, inspectors do not capture what really goes on in unmonitored conditions.
I'm a pilot and I may be dumb, but I'm not stupid. If I have a Transport Canada inspector on my back, I'm on angel behaviour. I won't read the paper; I won't amend my Jeppeson binder; I'll go by the book.
What I get through those inspections is simply ticking the boxes. If you believe that regulatory compliance is the only way to achieve safety, then there you have your answer: do regulatory compliance. But by no means do I believe that simply complying with regulations is enough to ensure safety.
This is the crux of the matter, sir. Safety management systems aim at capturing what really goes on in the real world beyond regulatory compliance; regulatory compliance is only one part of this system, which tries to capture life as it is, not as it should be.
:
Thank you, Mr. Zed and Mr. Bell.
Mr. Maurino, I want to quote a paragraph in the letter, the same letter I was quoting before. This is a letter dated March 14, 2007, from the Honourable Justice Moshansky concerning the previous set of questions you just heard about Dryden:
I therefore wish to make it clear, beyond any possibility for misinterpretation of my position, that, based on the Dryden experience and evidentiary record, I do not for one second believe that SMS, without effective regulatory oversight, would have prevented the accident at Dryden.
That needed to be read to set the record straight as to what the judge is effectively saying, sir.
Now would you care to comment on that?
I wanted to bring you back to this touch, see, hear, and look, because that is essentially the nuts and bolts of regulatory oversight. If one shifts from one system that we currently have to another one that's done by someone else and where you see paper, that seems to be where we're having a difficulty. How can you be so sure that the delegation of regulatory oversight, since Canada is at the forefront of this according to you, is not a mistake? How can you be so sure of that?
You may be right, but I want to know what makes you sufficiently satisfied that you assert that indeed delegation.... But you put some qualifiers on it. In the time I have left, I'd like you to explore that, because those are some of the concerns we have. You know as well that when this was presented to us, it was said that the SMS will be “in addition to”. Since then we've heard—and we'll hopefully wrap that up at the end—testimony saying that this is not quite the case, because we're delegating it.
You're right. That is the nub; that's where we are. So your comments in terms of that evolution, as you call it, would be useful.
:
If you are going to replace the hands-on inspection and all you're going to do is check papers, we're not going to be any better off; we're going to be worse off, actually.
If you're going to somehow complement, reinforce, and replace to a certain extent the visual personal inspection with a system that clearly gives you a reading of system performance, it's an entirely different question.
But I'm talking about real system performance; I'm not talking about reading a piece of paper and saying, it's okay, we have a reporting system. It wouldn't do any good to change one system of ticking boxes for another system of ticking boxes.
:
In line checks, in training, what you see are perfect behaviours, because you know you're being checked; you know your licence is on the line. Furthermore, there is a very important component: there is a misperception that in aviation, safety is first, and that is not true. Safety is the result of a compromise between trying to achieve protection goals, safety, and production goals, because this is an industry.
The true professional in aviation is the person who has managed to accomplish this balanced compromise between producing—that is, achieving the organizational goals—while protecting. In training, and to a large extent in checking situations, you're only interested in protecting, in the safety component. There is no production pressure. That is why training behaviours are only an indication of what real life behaviours are about.
By deploying systems that capture real time performance, you are capturing realistic operational behaviours, not idealistic behaviours, because then you're capturing how people manage this compromise between producing and protecting.
:
Not only avoid them, but sometimes cutting corners represents.... It's a representation of the collective expertise of a profession.
We've both been in this situation. You show up for your first flight and what do they tell you? They tell you, forget everything they taught you in training; I'm going to teach you how to fly this airplane, how this system really works. You know what that is? That is the collective expertise of the situation; that is, making systems that do not work like they're supposed to work, really work.
Imagine if we could capture that through formal systems instead of the rumour mill. That's what SMS does.
:
And that will allow us to reinforce the idea of, don't forget what you were trained or what you were taught in the manual. Very good.
You talked about unlocking the potential of SMS, and there are some keys to unlocking it. It has to build on a regulatory framework. Is that correct?
We've heard testimony before this committee that in fact we have more regulations than we did before. And SMS is a reality, though not a formalized reality, in Canada already.
One of the other keys for unlocking the potential of SMS is adding those who run the system at the operational or ground level to the inspectorate. We have written evidence from the assistant deputy minister that there are in fact more safety inspectors than there were five years ago.
So we are achieving some of the keys to unlocking the potential of SMS. Is that correct?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maurino, contrary to what you seem to be telling us, safety management systems aren't new to Canada. ICAO officials told us that the members of the association have been using SMS for four years now, and that these systems have resulted in fewer procedures and lower administrative costs. This association, which manages safety systems for 270 carriers and 500 corporate aircraft, believes that the both the paper burden and costs have been reduced as a result of SMS.
The fact is that Transport Canada has audited this association only once in four years. Another audit is scheduled to be done in the near future. Moreover, Transport Canada has not audited association members, whether airline owners or companies, since the SMS was implemented for this type of corporate aircraft.
That situation worries me, because the bill that was introduced does not guarantee any independent regulatory oversight. Could that give you cause for concern one day?
Thank you very much for coming here today.
We've had, basically, two types of witnesses. We've had witnesses who've spoken largely to the theory of SMS, like you--and we appreciate your presence here--but every single witness who spoke in detail about how this is actually being implemented has very clearly come out against what Transport Canada is doing.
We have the Federal Pilots Association, the inspectors, and 90% of them, who have 40 years' experience or more, have indicated that this proposal from the government would actually prevent them from addressing and correcting certificate holder safety problems. And 86% of all inspectors are very worried about the implementation of this system.
So I have to ask you this, and then I'll ask a second question as well.
First, do you simply disregard what those who are closest to the aviation industry and aviation inspectors are actually saying regarding their concerns about the system?
Second, we have these clear violations. You mentioned one of them, driving without a licence, where we're not in conformity with ICAO regulations. The second is around flight times, flight duty periods, and rest periods for cabin crews, something that was a violation that was raised in the safety audit in 2005 and not corrected. In fact, Bill actually stops the implementation of what ICAO has clearly indicated is required.
My second question is, are violations of the ICAO standards important, yes or no?
:
Are violations important? They may or may not be. The example I gave in terms of the Federal Aviation Administration's advanced qualification program, which is a violation to ICAO standards, but it's a violation in excess, I think pretty much sums it up.
If we're talking abut some country in the middle of nowhere, then you can't come down and say you've got to follow regulations because this system really does not exist. The only way to build this system is through enforcement of regulations.
When you have an ultra-safe system like you have in the U.S., Canada, and in western Europe, regulatory compliance to the exact letter of the law is a matter that is not really a black and white safety situation, but greyish. In many cases, again, like the example of the advanced qualification program, the violation underlies superior performance.
First of all, I want to correct something.
Mr. Julian referred to the union that represents the inspectors. In fact, they did testify before this committee that their primary purpose is to represent the interests of their members and not aviation safety. They were pretty clear about that.
I'd like to focus on another statement that was made at this table, and that is the suggestion that the SMS that is being proposed under is intended to replace regulatory measures.
I don't understand the bill to suggest that. I haven't heard any Transport Canada members suggest that. Is that your understanding of what this bill intends to do, that SMS would simply replace an existing regulatory structure, or is it more typically an integration of SMS with the current regulatory structure?
:
Now we'll all expect compliments, Mr. Chair.
I will quickly go to my motion. I don't think it will be controversial at all.
There's a National Marine and Industrial Council, as many members know, which is comprised of deputy ministers of Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, and Transport Canada; an associate deputy minister from Industry Canada; and nine industry representatives selected from the chief executive officers of Canadian companies only. This National Marine and Industrial Council advises the government on marine policy. There is about $140,000 a year of taxpayers' money that goes into supporting the NMIC. Very clearly we have a committee that advises the government on policy--a very important, high-powered committee--and it doesn't involve workers from the industry itself.
The motion is simply to rejig the National Marine and Industrial Council so that it will include labour, a broader base of marine and industry stakeholders, and will provide an inclusive forum for Canada's national maritime transportation policy development. It's simply a way of giving better, more inclusive advice to government.
As I say, given that this is funded by our government, it really needs to respond to the stakeholders within the marine industry. I hope it will get support from all four corners of this committee table.
:
I have done some inquiries with respect to this. One of the questions--and we don't really have any staff here to comment--is just how effective this committee has been. I'm referring now to the existing committee. I know we have CMAC, which reports I think twice a year, and then this committee, which meets more often.
Some of the members I spoke to suggested that in fact 's recommendation--and whether it's a replacement committee or an expansion of the existing membership, the concept is to perhaps add more stakeholders, labour in particular--would be appropriate. These were informal comments; nobody really wanted to go on the record. But in the discussion I had with them, they felt this would benefit the discussions by having a greater range of input.
From a pragmatic point of view, I don't know whether the recommendation is to simply expand rather than replace...in effect by the portion of 's motion stating “labour, a broader base of marine and industry stakeholders”, or to do as he suggests, which would result in a name change from National Marine and Industrial Council to the National Marine Policy Advisory Council. The feedback I've had from those involved is that the concept of expanding it would be good.
If there's no one who has any particular suggestions, I'm prepared to support the motion the way it is, or a variation that would simply expand the existing NMIC to include the recommendations in 's motion.
:
Certainly, I would like to comment on that anyway.
The objective of the council, I understand, is to promote the benefits of the Canadian marine industry as an economic generator. Certainly, I think that's important.
The thing to recognize as well in this particular case is that they meet a couple of times a year. As Mr. Julian said, taxpayers are footing the bill for a portion. All the time of the industry people is voluntary. I understand the wage component is simply staff from the government, not any of the marine industry stakeholders. This council was put in place because of a request by the stakeholders, the marine council stakeholders, and it was a Liberal initiative to do so.
I'm curious as to why, if labour is a component they want to put in now, it wasn't included at the time. Certainly, the government at that time responded to the request of industry and didn't include labour, and why they'd want to change that now, I'm not really sure.
I did some research. It does have transparent reporting of all its activities on its website. They've stated they've seen a considerable improvement in the exchange of information between the government departments and between government and industry in particular.
Finally, the membership itself was determined by the people who asked for the industry council to be set up, and that is the stakeholders. That's why I was wondering about what Mr. Bell said, because they're the ones who asked for the membership to not include--or at least they didn't ask for labour or union representatives to be included, so why are we now getting a conflicting message? That's why I was asking Mr. Bell, because I just don't understand that.
I wonder how they would feel about that representation being made now, if indeed they may feel it would work contrary to the purpose of what we're trying to do, and that is a better exchange of information between the government and industry, which they say is very effective, to date.
So I think the motion is a good motion, depending of course on what the council will bring forward. I'd like to hear from them, either as a group or informally, as to whether or not they want this motion, because they're the ones who asked for it to be set up. A Liberal government supported it to be set up. It seems to make sense that if we're hearing contrary opinions today, we should wait to hear from the horse's mouth to find out whether they want it to be. Very possibly, it would hinder the continual good exchange of information.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We're not often in a position where we take accolades for actions done in the past, while we were wearing a different hat.
The motion is really quite inoffensive. It says this committee would make a recommendation, and government is always free to say yea or nay. In the wisdom of this committee, perhaps the decisions made in the past with respect to the composition of the council, to which the government would be going for advice, might not have been as inclusive as the start-up members expected it would be when they looked around the table and saw themselves and said they should be the council and we said fine. A lot of things have happened since then.
The suggestion that you might have another interest at the table or at least another dimension of the industry at the table is not an offensive one and it's not one that's negative or takes away from anything. All in all, I think the motion really says, from the perspective of the committee, from what we've learned over the course of the last year, the last two years, whether we have had ongoing conversations with every one of the council members or whether there are people who now see that council is having an impact on public policy and would like to be a part of that dynamic, it's secondary. The motion really says, why don't we as a committee recommend that the government expand the horizons of the composition, and then the government can make whatever decision it wants?
So I think as a motion it fulfills a good initiative, and I'd support it.
I'd like to take Mr. Jean's argument one step further. Obviously, labour has other means of communicating with the minister. They may feel they're not as effective as perhaps doing it through this council; however, if in fact the current stakeholders of the council feel it's helpful to have labour involved as a member of the council, it seems to me that this should be forthcoming from the members of council at this point in time. This motion, of course, compels or certainly recommends that the minister change the makeup of this council, to compel that there be a seat for labour.
My concern is this. If in fact the council welcomes the involvement of labour, we should hear about it from the current council members. They can confirm what Mr. Bell has already said, and everything is fine. We probably won't even need a motion.
However, if the council and the current stakeholders say there are things they would like to dialogue on and that such a dialogue would be hindered with the involvement of labour, at that point in time, even if we do appoint someone from labour to the council, the members of the council will likely say they have no need for this council, that they don't feel comfortable within it, and it will disappear on its own.
We're frustrating the process by moving ahead with a motion today. I would love to follow through on Mr. Bell's suggestion. It's his indication that in fact the current members of the council would welcome labour's involvement. If that's correct, we as a committee should know that. We can go ahead and vote for the motion if that's necessary. Likely, the minister would act unilaterally to do that because of the request from the current members.
With what we're doing here, we may be biting off our noses to spite our faces by actually imposing the will of this committee or the will of the minister on the council, when the council members may in fact say they don't welcome labour's involvement and are just going to walk away from the council altogether.
I would ask Mr. Julian to agree to deferral of this motion until we've had a chance to hear from the current council members.