[Translation]
I am very pleased to be here to present my November 2006 report which was tabled last week in the House of Commons. As you mentioned, I am accompanied by Assistant Auditors General Douglas Timmins, Hugh McRoberts and Ronnie Campbell.
[English]
This report covers a broad array of government activities, from the government's system for managing spending, to public service ethics, to contract management, to programs that contribute to the health and well-being of Canadians. The report includes four audits that we had planned to report last spring. Because of changes to the parliamentary calendar, as a result of the federal election, we deferred reporting them until now, with an update of our audit findings.
Let me begin with how the federal government makes decisions about spending public funds.
The expenditure management system is at the heart of government operations, because every government activity involves spending. Over the last six years, federal spending has grown from $162 billion to $209 billion a year.
An effective system to manage spending is essential to getting the results the government wants and to being accountable to Canadians for what is done on their behalf.
We found that the current system does not routinely challenge ongoing programs to determine whether they are still relevant, efficient, and effective. I am concerned that the system focuses on challenging new spending proposals and pays too little attention to ongoing spending.
Also, in many cases, the distribution of funding is not aligned with what is needed to deliver the program.
Finally, we found that departments rely more and more on supplementary estimates to get funding for some items, instead of including them in the main estimates. This means that Parliament does not see the full range of proposed spending when it approves the annual spending plans.
[Translation]
The government is reviewing the expenditure management system, and I encourage it to resolve the weaknesses we have identified.
However, good systems in themselves are not enough. They must be applied correctly and ethically. Departments and agencies can take several formal measures to ensure proper conduct. In Chapter 4, we examined key aspects of these measures in the RCMP, Correctional Service Canada, and the Canada Border Services Agency.
We found that these public safety agencies have ethics programs but that many employees are not aware of them.
Also, only about half of the employees believe their organizations would act on reports of misconduct, and many do not think those who report misconduct in the workplace are generally respected.
It takes more than formal programs alone to encourage employees to report wrongdoing by colleagues. Employees have to be confident that management will take action on reports of wrongdoing.
[English]
Heads of agencies in particular should demonstrate the highest ethical standards of integrity, and when they fail to do so, public trust and confidence in government suffer. In chapter 11, unfortunately, we report one case of unethical behaviour by a senior official, the former correctional investigator.
The behaviour we observed on the part of the former correctional investigator, and the fact that it persisted over a long period of time and was not reported, are extremely disturbing.
This kind of conduct is certainly not typical of the public service, and I would caution all not to generalize from isolated examples to the public service as a whole. In my experience, the majority of public servants adhere to the high standards expected of them.
[Translation]
In Chapter 9, we looked at the problems related to the RCMP pension and insurance plans. These problems came to light only after employees complained.
We found that the RCMP responded adequately to an investigation of abuse and waste, but we also found that broader issues remain.
The RCMP needs to find a way to ensure that investigations of its actions are -- and are seen to be -- independent and unbiased. It also needs to assess the impact of a recent court decision on cases that warrant disciplinary action.
In Chapter 3, we note that the federal government still has problems managing large information technology projects. These projects involve a lot of money, and it's important that the rules and processes in place for managing them be rigorously followed.
In the last three years, the federal government has approved funding of $8.7 billion for new business projects with significant use of IT.
[English]
Although a framework of best practices for managing large IT projects has existed since 1998, we found several of the same problems we have reported in the past. Only two of the seven large IT projects we examined met all the criteria for well-managed projects.
The persistence of these longstanding problems is extremely troubling, not only because they involve large public investments, but also because of lost opportunities to improve business practices and services to Canadians.
This report also includes two chapters on major contracts that had serious shortcomings in the way they were awarded and in how they were managed.
In chapter 5, we looked at the handling of two contracts to relocate members of the Canadian Forces, the RCMP, and the federal public service. In 2005, the program handled the relocation of 15,000 employees at a cost of about $272 million. Government contracts should be awarded through a process that is fair, equitable, and transparent. We found that these contracts were not, despite various warning signs. The request for proposals contained incorrect information, which gave an unfair advantage to the bidder who had the previous contract. The management of these contracts also had serious shortcomings, and in fact, members of the Canadian Forces were overcharged for the services provided to them.
In chapter 10, we found that the government failed to respect basic requirements in awarding and managing a major health benefits contract. This contract, worth millions of dollars, was awarded even though Public Works and Government Services Canada did not ensure that all the mandatory requirements were met, and for the next seven years, Health Canada managed the contract without respecting basic financial controls.
I am encouraged to see that the contract management issues in Health Canada have since been corrected.
[Translation]
We also looked at how Health Canada allocates funding to its regulatory programs.
In Chapter 8, we looked at three programs that regulate the safety and use of products commonly used by Canadians: consumer products such as cribs, medical devices such as pacemakers, and drug products such as prescription drugs.
In an area so critically important to Canadians, Health Canada needs to know what levels of monitoring and enforcement its regulatory programs must carry out to meet its responsibilities, and what resources are needed to do the work.
We found that Health Canada does not have this information and therefore cannot demonstrate that it is meeting its responsibilities as a regulator.
[English]
In chapter 7, we looked at how Indian and Northern Affairs Canada manages the treaty process with first nations in British Columbia on behalf of the Government of Canada. The Auditor General of British Columbia also presented a report last week on the provincial government's role in the process. This treaty process is important to all Canadians. Among other things, it could help first nations people in B.C. improve their standard of living, and it could result in significant gains to the economy.
Since negotiations began in 1993, one final agreement has been initialled and two more are seen as imminent. However, no treaty has been signed and costs continue to grow. We found that the federal government needs to better manage its part in the B.C. treaty process. Negotiating treaties is complex, it takes time, and it can be very difficult. The government needs to take these challenges into account and rethink its strategies based on a realistic timeline.
[Translation]
In Chapter 6, we report on the Old Age Security program. Approximately 4 million people receive Old Age Security benefits, amounting to about $28 billion a year. The number of beneficiaries is expected to double in the next 25 years. Errors that affect even a small percentage of clients can still represent a very large number and be very costly.
We found payment errors in fewer than one per cent of applications. We are pleased at this low rate of error. We are also pleased to see measures such as an outreach program and a simpler application process to make Old Age Security more accessible to seniors.
[English]
We also looked at a case where the government created an obstacle to the effective operation of a foundation that it established to support its environmental goals.
In chapter 12, we noted that a clause inserted by the Treasury Board Secretariat in the government's most recent funding agreement with Sustainable Development Technology Canada prevented the board from making decisions at any given meeting where the majority of members present were federal appointees.
Finally, two chapters of this report note that we were unable to audit certain aspects of government operations because we were denied access to information and analysis collected and prepared by the Treasury Board Secretariat. Public servants based their denial of access on a narrow interpretation of a 1985 order in council that spelled out our access to cabinet documents.
After numerous discussions with government officials, the issue was finally resolved three weeks ago through the issuance of a new order in council that clearly acknowledges my need for access to the analyses performed by the Treasury Board Secretariat, and I thank the government for responding to our concerns.
[Translation]
That concludes our opening statement, Mr. Chairman. We would now be happy to take your questions.
Thank you.
:
Thanks for appearing before us.
In this brief time and in the second round, I'll be addressing chapter 9.
I was quite perturbed. Our RCMP officers put their lives on the line in their line of duty, in protecting us, and it's extremely worrisome that their pension and insurance policies were in fact abused. From your audit in chapter 9, I pretty much identified three pretty grave issues—and I'll be asking you if I'm correct on this.
One deals with Mr. Dominic Crupi hiring a consultant to circumvent government staffing regulations. I believe the person was hired for about $443,000, and over the next period of months, what took place, according to your own report, is that people were hired at double the rates for jobs that were already completed. An investigation showed that about 49 out of 65 casual employees were family and friends. That is quite disturbing.
On the second issue, it appears that Mr. Crupi, once again, was involved in a scheme that circumvented regular government rules. There was an ongoing relationship with Great-West Life as the carrier of the insurance policies for RCMP officers. Mr. Crupi went to Morneau Sobeco and asked them to help write an analysis for outside contracting. Then it was arranged that Great-West Life would be the recipient of payments, for which they would get a 15% fee for doing no work. And because there was an ongoing relationship, Morneau Sobeco actually wrote the analysis for outside contracting and ended up being the beneficiary of this. We're talking about millions of dollars that have gone astray.
The third issue is that when somebody stepped forward and blew the whistle, a criminal investigation began and Commissioner Zaccardelli shut it down two days later. With a little digging, I found out that Mr. Crupi's superior, the person he reported to, a Mr. Jim Ewanovich, had a daughter who was one of the people hired straight out of university at a significantly higher rate than was acceptable. It also turns out that this Mr. Ewanovich was in fact appointed by Commissioner Zaccardelli.
So a criminal investigation began and got shut down two days later, and then a process began that would finally result, in August 2006, in the RCMP deciding not to pursue any disciplinary action, as too much time had elapsed. All the individuals involved in these three schemes, or the two schemes and the investigation, at this point have all taken early retirement and have received bonuses, and the pension and insurance funds are still out a significant sum of money.
Have I properly understood the gist of this report in chapter 9?
Welcome again.
I'm going to jump right into a macro issue before I get to the specifics. I raised this at the steering committee. Unfortunately, I've had to raise it before, the fact that part of this report was leaked prior to members having an opportunity to see it, which of course is a breach of their rights as members. It's the second time during this Parliament, and I'm referring, Chair, to a Globe and Mail article dated November 8 of this year, with the byline, Mr. Daniel Leblanc.
We've had some preliminary discussions about this at the steering committee, and I think we may have even chatted about it here. One of the things that keeps coming up is that it may not be a real leak, because somebody may have gotten a little piece of the information, but it's not all accurate.
I had my office take the actual article, what was stated in there, and review it against the actual tabled report. Interestingly enough, as you go by paragraphs, as it breaks it out in the printout, the first paragraph was correct. The second paragraph was correct. The third paragraph was correct. The fourth paragraph was correct. The fifth paragraph was correct. The sixth paragraph was opinion, but it was correct. Seven is a verbatim quote. The next paragraph was an opinion, an opinion, and then correct, correct, correct, and correct. There are only five paragraphs left that are mostly telling the story of what's there.
This is not a coincidence. This has been leaked. This has been leaked by somebody who does not have the legal nor moral right to do that. In doing so, they breached the privileges of members of Parliament. When you breach the rights of a member of Parliament, you've breached the public's rights, because we're their representatives.
On May 15, Chair, you'll recall that we held a special meeting. You were the chair, and the reason the meeting was called was because five of us signed a document asking you to do that.
At that time you said, Madame Fraser, and I'm quoting from the Hansard of the committee that day: “Premature disclosure represents a disregard for the statutory right of the House of Commons to receive the report.”
You went on to say:
As you can see, my office takes steps to protect the confidentiality of our reports before they are tabled. In our opinion, there has been no breach of a law that would require us to report this incident to the RCMP. Rather, there has been a breach of the government security policy.
Lastly, you mentioned towards the end: “The government has assured me”—meaning you, Madame Fraser—“that it will investigate the leaks. It's now up to the government to take action.”
I suggested at the time that I would bring a motion or at least have a motion ready to go that would have us call in the government to account for this, since it's not with the Auditor General's office. If somebody wants to make that allegation, do so, and let's hear it and deal with it. It's not, I would think, that this one is the same as that one. It's not a criminal matter, but it is a matter or breach of security within government. I have to tell you, Chair, I've just about had enough of this.
Again, for the benefit of anyone who is listening, this is about the fact that ministries are given an opportunity to see the reports ahead of time, but we accept that. It's the same thing as when I was at Queen's Park. That is exactly the way it's done. That's to give them a chance to—correct me if I'm wrong, Auditor General—make sure of the accuracy of information. It's an opportunity to clarify anything that they think you might have wrong by way of your assumptions and underlying fact base. And it's an opportunity to give them feedback as to what they are going to do about it, because those responses are contained in the report. In order for us to generate that, they need to see it. It's understandable that the process would involve certain high officials being given an opportunity to review this in confidence prior to the tabling. Cool.
Where we're at now, though, unless the Auditor General's office—and again, somebody else make the accusation—is not telling us the truth and it's leaking like a sieve and it's their problem...what it's telling us is that there are government officials, whether it's elected people or appointed people, who are abusing members' rights for political gain. It's not such an unusual concept in this place, but it's not allowed.
One of two things has to happen, Chair. One, the leaks have to be plugged, this has to be stopped, and people need to be held accountable because somebody broke the law of the House of Commons. Somebody has to be held accountable. And if we can't get to the bottom of it, then, Chair, we'll probably have to take a look at the process, because I'm not going to let go of this, and I'm sure there are other members that aren't either, which might mean that we can't give the document to at least ministers, deputy ministers, and other senior officials, which is a crying shame because the whole system will not work as well.
Either we find out who did this, change the system, or accept the fact that we really don't have members' privileges around these reports and that it's fair game the minute it goes out of the Auditor General's shop--and that doesn't work either.
This can't continue, Chair. I believe the clerk has a copy—if not, I'll make sure he has one—of a motion that will probably not be debatable until maybe even the meeting after next, because there'll have to be interpretation and that. But just by way of advising my colleagues, the motion I'm going to table will say:
I move that the government provide a representative to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts to explain the investigation process, timelines, and results regarding the leaked Auditor General reports of May 14, 2006 and November 8, 2006.
I would hope that members would agree that we have to do something. I'm not on a witch hunt here. If it stops, I'm off this issue. If we find out who did it, we plug that hole; we're off this issue. But we can't let this stand. We can't. We have an obligation. That's what we're about. We're about accountability.
This just infuriates me. I could be wrong--I stand to be corrected--but I'm not sure that this sort of thing is widespread across the country or in other parliaments. There have been only eight times, I believe, in total--nine, if you include this one--since 2001. Out of about 130 reports that have been tabled, it's not acceptable, but it shows two things: one, it's still happening; and two, it's happening with more frequency. I don't think it's a coincidence that because we didn't act more firmly in May, we have another problem here in November.
We have to do something, colleagues. I'm open, wide open, as to how we go about this, but the first thing, it seems to me, is that if we determine that the leak is somewhere within the government process, then we ought to call in government representatives to give us an accounting of what they've done, how they've done it, the timelines and the results. Then we need to satisfy ourselves as to whether or not what they've told us is acceptable and whether that's the bottom of the issue or not.
Chair, that's coming. I would hope that we would get off this, because it wastes our time too. In every way it's wrong.
:
Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Before we go to round two, I have one issue I want to talk about briefly, Mrs. Fraser, and that is chapter 11, “Protection of Public Assets--Office of the Correctional Investigator”.
I will not focus my questions on the actions of Mr. Stewart specifically, but on the systems. This went on for 14 years, and there was a whole host of different breaches of what I would consider the Financial Administration Act, Treasury Board guidelines, the use of the car, his cashing of his so-called vacation pay, expenses. You name it, it went on and on and on. It went deeper than Mr. Stewart, apparently, according to your report.
At the end of the year, if there was money left over in the budget, they divided it among the employees and called it overtime pay. To me, that really borders on fraud, if it's not fraud. If you didn't do overtime and somebody gave you a cheque and said it was overtime and you went and cashed it, certainly if it's not fraud, it's clearly unethical behaviour, and it shows a breach of organizational values and personal ethics.
My question is, where were four people here? The executive director or the financial officer, obviously, was not doing his job. Was Treasury Board not providing any oversight at all to this particular department? Were there any instances where the internal audit went into this department? If so, were they asleep? What role did the deputy minister have in this particular department, because it was the deputy minister who was responsible for the management and administration of that particular department?
We live in a society in which one would expect that this could not happen, and if it happened it would be an isolated instance. But this went on for 14 years. Where were these groups of people? Was there anyone behind the cash register? I guess that's my question.
:
I think it's a very good question.
I think the most troubling part of all of this story is the fact that it went on for so long and no one ever did anything or said anything about it.
Because of the nature of the office, as an ombudsman, I think there has been a hesitancy on the part of the central agencies to be seen interfering in the management of these offices. I think this is also true for some of the quasi-judicial bodies, the tribunals. I'd say it also holds true for the deputy minister.
For example, this office was a separate employer—the staff weren't unionized—and probably had little to do with the Treasury Board Secretariat on human resource issues. To our knowledge, we saw no indication that an internal audit had ever been done.
I think there's an issue around governance. How do you maintain the independence that these agencies and offices need to carry out their functions and yet ensure good accountability?
We are starting an audit on small agencies, and it's one of the issues I want us to look at. I think the central agencies need to play a more active role in this. We tend to blame them for not catching this stuff. But I think they will tell you they're often told by the agencies that the agencies are independent and they can't interfere in agency operations.
It doesn't hold true for the executive director and other senior officials who were in that office for a very long period of time and clearly knew what was going on.
I think there was also some confusion or at least purported confusion because the department of public safety, formerly the Solicitor General, did the processing for this office and paid the bills. For example, Mr. Stewart would send his expense accounts directly to them and did not go through someone in his office. But we all know you're not supposed to sign your own expense accounts, and they should have been returned.
There was confusion about who the senior financial officer was. But to me, even that is almost irrelevant. If people saw invoices coming through that were clearly inappropriate, someone should have said something. I think there's a broader question on why no one said anything for so long.
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
I don't think it's been touched on yet, which quite surprised me, but I want to move to chapter 8, dealing with allocating funds to regulatory programs, although I have to say, and I think Mr. Fitzpatrick raised it, I wasn't expecting it from that angle. I don't want to misquote him, but I do believe, Chair, he was making reference and thanking you for raising it, because it was somehow feeding into the argument that there are too many regulations.
Anyway, I'll take a very different tack, probably a little more consistent with where I think you were going, which is that we have these important regulations--well, sometimes you need laws--and these are the words of the Auditor General, “in an area so critically important to Hamiltonians”, certainly Hamiltonians and Canadians. So I want to move straight to it. I want to move to the product safety program, because this really blows me away.
If we take a look at the chart you've provided on page 9 in chapter 8, it points out where there is “Insufficient level of activity”, and in everywhere except “Not applicable” or “Not raised as a concern”, it's insufficient. What are we talking about here? As I'm understanding this, the public safety program is the actual part of Health Canada's mandate to ensure that products, up to and including medical devices like pacemakers and hearing aids, things we put inside our bodies, products we buy for our kids, cribs, strollers, things of that ilk...this is the department that ensures they're safe for the public. Public safety is more than police, jail terms, and fighting terrorism. Public safety is also making sure that products people buy, particularly those they ingest as medicine, are safe for them. I mean, that's public safety.
Here we have a report, a devastating report. Really, I'm shocked that the media haven't picked up on this more, because it is a public safety issue. It's rife through this whole report that there's not enough money. Not only is there not enough money going into the protection of these things, but it was the managers themselves who pointed out, after they reviewed the work they were expected to do, that they didn't have the funding to cover those activities.
Nothing here is satisfactory. I ask colleagues to look at the charts. Nothing is satisfactory in every area.
I'm looking at this, and I'm looking at things such as are on page 11, where it's talking about core funding for product safety, for the drug products program, and medical devices. The core funding has been reduced over the years by, I believe...well, take a look at the numbers. Under product safety, it was $8.1 million in 2003-04, and now it's $7.3 million; for drug products programs, $7.1 million, down to $4.8 million; core funding in the medical devices program, $2 million, and now it's half of that at $1 million.
If I'm understanding the chart on page 10, for instance, let's go to this: “Compliance and enforcement activities, Conducting inspections of manufacturers of drug ingredients”--that's prescription drugs. That's to check to see what ingredients they're using in the production of prescription medicine that we all get from our pharmacies. This is telling me that there is insufficient activity from Health Canada to meet the needs that Canadians have to inspect the contents of these prescription drugs. Is that correct? Is it that black and white?