:
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to call the meeting to order. I want to welcome everyone here. I especially want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses who are here before us today. This is the first public meeting of the public accounts committee in the fall session, although we did have two meetings last week. I want to welcome you back to the session.
We have this afternoon's standing order, a review of chapter 4, the Canadian firearms program, of the May 2006 report of the Auditor General of Canada. With us, ladies and gentlemen, we do have the Auditor General, Sheila Fraser. With her is Peter Kasurak, senior principal.
From the Department of Public Works and Government Services we have Ian Bennett, the acting assistant deputy minister, acquisitions branch.
From the National Police Services of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police we have Mr. Peter Martin, the deputy commissioner.
From the Canada Firearms Centre we have Monsieur François Bidal, the director general, and also with him is Denis Bilodeau, senior counsel and head of legal services.
We are expecting Mr. William Baker appearing as an individual. Of course, Mr. Baker was the former commissioner of the Canada Firearms Centre, and hopefully he will be along momentarily.
Before calling upon the Auditor General to make her initial opening remarks, I believe Mr. Nadeau has a point of information or a point of order.
:
The final report will be circulated, I believe, later today or tomorrow, and it will be discussed at our meeting on Thursday. You haven't seen the final report. At our last meeting we did make a number of changes.
The problem, Monsieur Nadeau, was that we were in a period of hiatus because the committee dissolved for a few days. As a result, the clerk couldn't send out the documentation. Now that's been lifted. The revised and amended report will go out, and I plan to discuss that at our Thursday meeting, although we haven't allotted a lot of time because we didn't spend a lot of time on it. We did make some changes. We want every member to have an opportunity to review the changes, and it will come back to the committee, hopefully for final approval, on Thursday.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting us to discuss the audit of the Canada Firearms Centre. As you mentioned, I am accompanied today by Peter Kasurak, senior principal of the public safety team responsible for this audit.
I would like to take this opportunity to provide the committee with an overview of our findings related to the operation of the firearms program. This audit was a follow-up to our 2002 audit of the cost of the Canada firearms program. We were unable to complete our 2002 audit because the financial information that was available was unreliable and did not fairly represent the net cost of the program.
This year we are able to report that the centre has made satisfactory progress in addressing our recommendations, with the exception of accounting errors made in recording the cost of its new information system. This committee and others have already conducted extensive hearings on our reports regarding the accounting errors and the implications of these errors to Parliament's control of the public purse. I will therefore focus on our other findings.
As you know, the government has announced changes to the program subsequent to our audit. The most significant changes involve the transfer of the Canada firearms program to the RCMP and the introduction of legislation to abolish the long gun registry. My comments today take these changes into account, but we of course have done no audit work since we reported in May of this year.
[Translation]
We have found that the Firearms Centre has made substantial progress in setting up a separate agency and in addressing operational and contracting problems. However, I also found some problems had yet to be addressed. The most important of these were: reporting program performance to Parliament; the accuracy of information in the Registry; and ongoing difficulties with the new information system.
In general, the reporting of performance to Parliament had improved since our 2002 audit. At the time of our 2006 audit, much more information was being provided. However, we found reporting remained at the most basic level for reporting results. The Centre had not set any performance targets and had provided few examples of program outcomes. In addition, the Centre's performance reports contained errors, which significantly overstated its improvements in the timely processing of licensing and registration applications.
With respect to the accuracy of Registry information, to support police and reduce risks to public safety, the accuracy of information in the Registry is vital. We found the information in the database to have significant quality problems:
- address information for firearms owners was frequently wrong;
- verification frequently determined that information on the weapon's action, make or serial number was wrong;
- only half of the 1.2 million restricted weapons listed in the old Restricted Weapons Registration System had been re-registered. Information on these firearms was not updated, despite the knowledge that many of the old records were incorrect. Accuracy of the data regarding these weapons is a problem which remains to be resolved;
- lastly, the Centre did not know the status of 62 per cent of the firearms that had their registration certificates revoked over a three-month period in 2005.
[English]
Let me turn now to the difficulties with the information system.
The centre has had continuing difficulties managing its registry information system. CFIS I, its first attempt, cost almost $190 million by March 2005, including operations and maintenance costs. While initial estimates of the system's costs were in the order of $13 million to $20 million, the extent of the cost overrun is difficult to estimate because development and operational costs were not separated. A key factor causing cost escalation was the attempt to develop a system before legislation and regulations were finalized.
In 2001, the centre determined that a new information system was required, known as CFIS II, but repeated the error of attempting to build the system before legislative and regulatory changes had been completed. CFIS II also experienced serious overruns, including delay costs of $30.6 million, when the centre put the project on hold. At the time of our audit, CFIS II was more than two years late in being implemented, was still incomplete, and had cost about $90 million.
Mr. Chair, the RCMP is now responsible for the management of the program and for keeping Parliament informed of its progress. As the firearms centre had agreed to our recommendation and proposed corrective actions, this committee might wish to obtain renewed commitment to the undertakings made by the centre regarding our report.
Mr. Chair, this concludes our opening statement. We would be pleased to answer any questions committee members may have. Thank you.
:
Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Let me introduce to you, Mr. Chair, and to the committee members Scott Leslie, who is the senior director who has worked very closely with the centre and continues to work very closely on this file with the RCMP.
In my opening remarks, Mr. Chair, I want to thank the committee and you for providing me with this opportunity to discuss federal contracting services in relation to chapter 4 of the Auditor General's May 2006 report.
[Translation]
To deliver the best value procurement services, Public Works and Government Services Canada works as a strategic partner with our customer departments. We help them throughout the procurement process from defining requirements and procurement approaches; managing the bidding process; and supporting them in ensuring accountability throughout the contract.
[English]
The Department of Public Works and Government Services has supported the Canada Firearms Centre since its inception through the provision of contracting services, including those related to IT.
The department has issued two principal contracts, both competitively tendered and awarded, to support the Canadian firearms information systems, referred to as CFIS I and CFIS II. These contracts are highlighted in chapter 4 of the Auditor General's report.
Managing these two CFIS contracts in an uncertain operating and legislative environment has proven to be a significant challenge. Numerous changes to both contracts have been required over the years to accommodate these evolving realities. We do acknowledge, however, that lessons learned from our experience with CFIS I could have been better applied to the CFIS II procurement, which has proven to be a particular challenge. Many of the assumptions upon which it was based had to be adjusted, as the environment, particularly the Firearms Act legislation, has changed.
With the assistance of third-party analysis, Public Works and Government Services Canada, the RCMP Canada Firearms Centre, and the CFIS II contractor have agreed to halt work to ensure that no further expenses are being incurred while we assess the situation.
The Auditor General cited cases dating from 1997 to 2004 in which the firearms centre retained a number of contractors for several years using PWGSC's informatics professional services database, a tool that allows federal departments to search for consultants based on skills and experience to justify a non-competitive procurement process. The Auditor General reports that in many cases, the searches of the IPS database would yield only the name of an incumbent contractor. PWGSC concurs that these contracts should not be justified as competitive, and we note that the firearms centre ceased this practice in 2004.
The Auditor General recommends that Public Works and Government Services review how client departments use its contracting tools and be better able to provide assurance that the tools are not being used to circumvent contracting policies and procedures. We take the Auditor General's recommendation very seriously and have taken corrective measures to address the issues highlighted in the chapter. Such measures include the training of users on accountabilities, policies, processes, increased monitoring and reporting of usage, and, where appropriate, restricting use of these tools. As of December last year, PWGSC has improved, rebranded, and expanded the professional services online database to allow better monitoring of departmental usage.
In conclusion, we recommend that we must continue to find ways to further improve our services to federal departments while continuing to exercise a vigorous check and balance role in the interest of Canadians. PWGSC is in the midst of transforming the way it does business, and we're seeking innovative ways to deliver services smarter, faster, and at reduced cost to Canadians. We are committed to fair, open, and transparent competitive procurement practices to meet government needs while ensuring equal access to businesses that will withstand the test of public scrutiny.
Thank you. I'd be pleased to answer your questions, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
Accompanying me here today are senior officials of the RCMP Canada Firearms Centre.
It gives me great pleasure to meet with you today to discuss issues related to the RCMP Canada Firearms Centre.
On May 17, the Hon. Stockwell Day, Minister of Public Safety, announced some key government decisions concerning the future of the Canada firearms program. The first order of business was to transfer responsibility for the administration and operations of the Canada Firearms Centre to the RCMP. Since that time, we have employed sound stewardship principles to align management functions that have resulted in some economies of scale while remaining focused on the mandate of the firearms centre.
We continue to work toward further alignments of function and operations that will allow the RCMP to invest strategically in important initiatives related to its mandate. We have also reviewed chapter 4 of the Auditor General of Canada's report, tabled in May 2006, and RCMP management has developed an action plan to address all of the recommendations.
I would like to thank you for inviting the RCMP to appear before the committee, and I am ready to take your questions.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Martin.
Monsieur Bidal and Monsieur Bilodeau, have you any opening comments?
Okay, then. That concludes the opening remarks, colleagues. We're now going to go to the first round of questioning.
Before we do so, before calling upon Mr. Wrzesnewskyj, I want to ask members to keep their questions short and to the point. We don't need long, three-minute preambles.
I would ask the witnesses to be short and crisp with your answers. This committee has zero tolerance for long, rambling answers that have nothing to do with the question being asked.
Finally, I would ask members to be aware that this committee deals with the financial issues, with the propriety, the regularity, the economy of the issues at hand and not with the policy: whether or not this country ought or ought not to have gun control. That is a policy issue to be decided by the government of the day, and this committee has no opinion, of course, on that particular issue. I would ask members to direct their questions accordingly.
Having said that, before we go to Mr. Wrzesnewskyj, I want to point out that the auditor general of the province of Quebec is in the room. Perhaps the auditor would stand up and say hello.
Some hon. members: Hear, hear!
The Chair: Bienvenue.
Mr. Wrzesnewskyj.
I'd like to begin by going back to the May 2006 status report. On page 129, in paragraph 4.114 at the second line, it says:
The status of the CFIS project (late and over budget) is largely due to early decisions made in 2001 and 2002; the lack of compliance with good contracting practices goes back to 1997; and the current management team inherited an organizational structure that had not stabilized.
But then on the next line down the auditor continues by saying:
The current management team has made notable progress on a number of issues, including the establishment of a new department.
I note that today in the update, in point 6, the auditor says:
We found that the firearms centre had made substantial progress in setting up a separate agency and addressing operational and contracting problems.
So what we see is that there were, quite obviously, birthing problem,s and there were a number of reasons for those. Unfortunately, as was mentioned in Mr. Bennett's opening statement, managing the two CFIS contracts in an uncertain operating legislative environment has proven to be a significant challenge. Notwithstanding that, we seem to have made, in the words of the Auditor General, “substantial progress”.
Now, that same report from May, in paragraph 4.8, goes on to say that in the audit “we did not examine the effectiveness of the program or its social implications”. We can understand the difficulty of doing that sort of audit, but throughout this whole debate and discussion, where costs did overrun—unfortunately, those costs are now sunk costs—we have what appears to be a centre that has made substantial progress, and the only measure I personally can apply to whether or not this centre is effective is by looking at the effectiveness of what its intent is.
I can't help but go to the days after the Dawson shooting, when the Sûreté launched an investigation into a 14-year-old who also posted threats on the vampire.com website. They checked the registry, found his father had firearms, and they removed them. Also, we have an interesting measure here: police use the system 5,000 times a day; last year the system supported 3,000 affidavits; and thousands have had licences denied and revoked.
It's impossible to speculate how many lives we've saved as a result of this substantial progress and the existence of this centre. But I'd like to address the representative here from the RCMP and to ask him, how do you feel about some of these recent successes and some of these numbers, which speak to the effectiveness of this centre—specifically this number that says it's used 5,000 times a day and that last year 3,000 affidavits were supported by the centre?
:
The number of inquiries through the centre is escalating on a continual basis. Today the centre is queried approximately 6,500 times a day, and it's going up. The centre provides important information to police officers in the field for investigative purposes, and it also assists them in ensuring they take measures to protect their own safety when they're going into premises where it's known that firearms are located. So it goes on and on.
Through the licensing process the program also carries with it a need for training and preventative measures that people are made aware of as they go through the training process. So it's quite a rigorous undertaking.
The benefits of the centre are enormous. We have examples of where the centre has been beneficial. The less tangible, the preventative maintenance aspect of this, is a little bit more difficult to pin down in very specific terms, but the fact that people can get in there, that members of police agencies right across Canada are querying the centre on an increasing basis day after day is evidence of how important they consider the centre to be.
:
Issues of legislation are for the government to address, not for the police agency to deal with.
When you talk about the quality of the data using addresses as an example, the Auditor General did point to a concern about the quality of data. We have put together a team to get into the data quality and we have looked at areas of the database where there are problems. Addresses have already been identified as one.
We have prioritized areas of risk. As you can probably appreciate, an address is an important piece of information, whereas a postal code is not as important. We focused on the high-risk points of data quality. To this point, about 25,000 addresses have been fixed. We have about 3,000 left to go, and we continue to make significant progress on improving quality of the data in the database itself.
I too would like to refer back to paragraphs 4.38 and 4.39 on page 124 of Chapter 4 of the report tabled last May.
Madam Auditor General, the Centre's strategic outcome is to minimize the risks to public safety from firearms in the community. In paragraph 4.39, you mention some financial problems and difficulties with setting up the information system. In essence, a number of activities related to firearms registration and licensing have been carried out, but little emphasis has been placed on evaluating program performance.
Did you in fact state in your report that there was not enough statistical evidence at this time to determine whether or not the program was truly effective?
:
First of all, while we all remember clearly where we were on September 11, 2001, I also clearly recall where I was on December 6, 1989. As we all know, this event ultimately led to the creation of the firearms registry, which I fully support.
Nevertheless, I felt that someone had pulled the rug out from under me when I found out how much it had cost to set up the registry.
Perhaps I don't quite understand the meaning of the words used here, but the report refers to the performance of the gun registry. To my mind, the goal here is to save lives and avoid tragic incidents. It's difficult to say exactly how many lives have been saved because of the registry and to compare these figures with those compiled prior to the registry's existence.
I'm not trying to cast aspersions on those who are experts in numbers or accounting, but I'd like to know how you can possibly compare the performance of a program like this with another not necessarily set up with the express purpose of saving lives.
Is there some way of doing the calculations, strictly from an accounting standpoint?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Often, performance measurements cannot be expressed in figures. We talk about improving public safety, but it is probably quite difficult to quantify that objective. Moreover, it's difficult to establish a link between a registry and an outcome.
We do point out in the report that currently, the performance report is heavily outcome oriented, that is it looks to the number of entries in the registry and the number of times the registry is accessed by a police officer, but it does not provide any indication of how useful data of this kind actually is.
Perhaps what is needed is something as simple as surveying law enforcement agencies to see if they have used the registry and if so, if they found the information to be accurate and useful. There are methods we could explore. You could also give examples of how the registry was useful and how it helped to improve public safety.
For now, just knowing how many entries the registry contains is not particularly useful to us. We're saying that there could be several indicators specifying the outcomes achieved by the registry.
:
The mandate of this regime that we have in place, from what I can understand, is to improve public safety. That's its overarching goal. If I accept the premise of this whole system, it's highly reliant on quality data, and it's a typical case of garbage in, garbage out: if the information is not correct and accurate, we're going to have problems.
Now, I'm from Saskatchewan. We actually have had cases in Saskatchewan. I know an individual who registered a hair dryer. I think he probably had the action and the mode and the serial number all down pat. Another individual registered a soldering gun.
I'm curious, Mr. Martin. Maybe I'll direct the question to you. Does registering hair dryers and soldering guns somehow improve public safety, in your mind?
:
Right. Okay. I'm just raising the point.
There is another concern that arises. This is not an isolated case; there have been many examples. I refer to an individual named “Mom” Boucher, who I think is serving a 25-year jail sentence for murder and has a record that is quite scary. My understanding is that it was revealed at his trial that he had lawfully registered a number of pump-action shotguns and a revolver.
I'm asking you again, sir, is it good for the public safety of our country for people like “Mom” Boucher to be able to lawfully obtain possession of revolvers and pump-action shotguns?
:
Right, but my point is that some of these things are happening, sir.
I'm trying to emphasize the importance of the accuracy of the data in the system. I've looked at the auditor's report on the action, the mode of the firearm—I'm not sure what the hair dryer's and the soldering gun's action would be, but I guess maybe electrical—the make of the firearm, and the serial number.
On the transfers, the error rate is very high. I think any person with statistical analysis would tell you this is serious, especially when you get double-digit error rates. I think of a pilot flying into the Toronto airport who's told that the data in the air traffic control system has a 12% error rate: “But don't worry about it. Land anyway. We'll take our chances on it.”
There's a lot of error in the data in this system.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you all for your attendance today.
Let me say at the outset that as these things go, this isn't too bad. There are some problems, and we're going to talk about those. But I do want to start out on a positive by saying there were huge problems prior to the 2002 audit, a lot of condemnation, and it looks like a lot of those things have been cleaned up and are on track, if not ideal. Folks are to be commended for that. I think that is a good way to start.
Having said that, however, I want to move to an item that the Auditor General has characterized as being important in her opening remarks and that has been addressed by others. I want to revisit the whole issue of performance targets and performance accountability.
Paragraph 4.36 of the Auditor General's report says, and I quote:
In particular, the Centre has not set any performance targets and has provided few examples of its outcomes. Instead of reporting the key results achieved, the Centre describes its activities and services.
The recommendation in paragraph 4.41, on page 109, says:
The Canada Firearms Centre should improve its reporting on the performance of the Canadian Firearms Program by providing targets and evidence-based results, and by showing through the use of a results chain how these results could contribute to public safety goals.
It would seem that in 2002, in the last audit, according to a brief given to us by the library staff in their report—and it's tabled, members have it in front of them.... This is the 2002 audit that says in part, and I quote:
The Centre’s performance reports provide a fair to good overview of its organizational context and planned strategic outcomes. However, the Centre has not set any performance targets, has provided few examples of outcomes, and does not have a results chain showing how its activities might contribute to public safety goals. The Auditor General recommended improving reporting of performance by providing targets and evidence-based results and by developing a results chain. The Centre agreed.
While I ask Ms. Fraser a few questions, perhaps, Mr. Bidal, you can turn your mind to answering—because you're next—why nothing was done. Why are we getting a second audit report telling us that exactly the same problem, which existed in 2002, still exists in 2006? You can think about that for a moment.
Perhaps, Ms. Fraser, you can expand on exactly what we are talking about in terms of these performance results. In layperson's terms, what exactly is it that's lacking?
:
As we mentioned, the strategic outcome of the centre was to increase public safety or reduce risks to public safety. To make the link between the registry and public safety can be difficult. There is no automatic link, so you have to build various steps to do that. This is what we call the results chain. For example, it could be providing better information to police officers, and they would use this in a certain way that could increase public safety.
We're saying the centre had to develop that kind of results chain and then try to find indicators that would indicate what the outcomes of the registry are—not simply the licensing and registering activities and the number of hits in a day, because those are statistics on activities, as we say. They don't really give you any appreciation of how the centre is contributing to better public safety.
We can take an extreme case and say, yes, there are 5,000 hits a day, but if the information is no good, are people using it? And is that helping public safety? You could make the link and say, yes, there are 5,000 hits a day, the information is good, police officers are saying they are using it, and it has helped in these cases. It's to develop that chain and logic from the actual activity through to the results.
:
That's right, end results. Performance measures will have to be modified.
I think we have to recognize, too, that these are not easy things to do, and it takes time to develop the chain to find indicators that really do tell the story. Sometimes they can modify behaviours in an improper way. It does take time to develop these results chains. I think, though, in the current context, where there is a lot of discussion about the program, it would have been very helpful to have that kind of results information.
When we arrived, the new team, in 2003, we had a number of problems, frankly, including that we were still very heavy on the production cycle; that's number one. We had very little confidence in the basic data. Unless you know how many licences there are, how many registrations, how many hits on the system, you're hard pressed to take the analysis any further and start suggesting impacts and effects on public safety. Our priority was to do what we could to get the data as accurate and up to date as possible.
Of course, it wasn't the only thing we were focusing on, as you can appreciate, including production, improving service to Canadians, and so on.
We had gotten to the point, probably toward the end of 2005, where we were starting to build some of the analytical tools to do this. That was not evident at the time of the audit; it was just in its infancy. And as Mr. Bidal has mentioned, further work has proceeded since then.
:
I hear all that. I'm still having a little difficulty understanding, though. Concerning what you just said you needed to do first, I just heard Ms. Fraser for the most part say that those are different things, and you're mixing apples and oranges when you do it; that the number of hits, in and of itself, doesn't tell you anything.
It's the whole idea—I'm trying to get this right—of this chain to link all of these things. So it would seem to me that even in the absence of having those accurate numbers at the time you started, after this report came out you should have at least started on the template, begun the process to ensure that once you have those numbers and they're reliable, you have a context to fit them in, if I'm getting this right.
My time is up, so there you go.
:
I think some of the information is already there, and a lot of good work has already been done. The introduction of new analytical tools that allow us to analyze will help in that regard.
But just to give a couple of statistics, right now there have been 17,861 firearms licences revoked. One of the things that happens within the centre is that the database goes back through the Canadian police information system and checks to make sure that any licensed individual hasn't taken part in an activity that would prohibit the person from having a licence. In those cases, we go back through the system; that's just one of the examples of how a licence would be revoked.
I think it's a matter of reporting some of those things.
The other link that I believe was missing is some of the reporting on how it actually benefits operational cases. Again, linking the centre with police operations facilitates that kind of reporting.
I can give you an example of an actual case out west where an individual was apprehended in the commission of a crime. He had a weapon in his possession that was not used in the actual crime. We checked the registered owner through the centre. It was not this individual; it was somebody else. We checked into the background of that registered owner. That individual had a number of weapons in his possession—an unusual number—so in partnership with the centre we acquired a warrant and went into his premises. No weapons were there. He was actually a gunrunner. We were able to bring that case to a successful conclusion based on the information we got from the centre.
:
First off, I'd like to thank you for making the linkage the Auditor General was looking for.
I don't know. I would have to assume they've gone to Statistics Canada. If I heard the Auditor General right, she didn't say the data wasn't there; she said the linkages weren't being made. As I just pointed out, there is some very valuable data in the database on the revoking of licences. I think part of the challenge is that we have to get out there and pull all this together and report it.
I agree that some of the data has to be cleaned up, but some of it is very good and very valid.
:
I would encourage Ms. Ratansi to table that paper. I'd be very interested in reading it. I share the questions about the ability of any group to show attribution between a registry and lives saved, considering that the firearms office has not been able to make that attribution itself.
I'd like to discuss this continual statistic you've referred to that officers access the registry 5,000 times a day. Supporters of the registry have consistently used this statistic, and I believe it to be very misleading.
I've spoken to numerous officers—some are very close friends of mine—and have asked them about it. I have not been able to find a single officer who has ever accessed the gun registry, nor have I been able to find a single officer who knows anyone who ever has accessed the registry. In fact, I had one officer, who's very competent serving in the community, who told me he wouldn't even know how to access the registry, and he's very well trained and highly respected in the community. This is someone for whom I have a lot of respect.
So I did a little bit of research. What I found is that this statistic, 5,000 times a day, is not the number of times a day an officer actually goes into the system and says, “H'mm. I'd like to investigate whether so-and-so possesses a firearm.” It includes all of the incidental occasions when someone's name in the registry is brought up for a different reason. For example, if someone is brought over to the side of the road for cross-walking and their record is brought up and they happen to own a firearm, that is counted in this 5,000 number.
I would like to know how the 5,000 number has any pertinence whatsoever to the discussion on the registry when it includes all of these incidental occasions that records are brought up.
I have had this confirmed by officials in the department, and I would be very encouraged to hear your response to it, because if it's not the case, then there is a disconnect in the information we're being given.
:
Thank you very much for that question.
As a matter of fact, this one came up when I accompanied Minister Day at a meeting of the Treasury Board. The thing about information in the police environment.... What we're trying to do is be as efficient as possible with information and avoid duplication. People do not get checked in the registry for jaywalking; however, in certain areas of the country—Toronto, the Lower Mainland of British Columbia—for certain types of offences there is an automatic checking through CPIC into the registry. If I've been involved in certain types of activities and somebody queries me in either Toronto or in British Columbia, the CPIC check will automatically generate a check into the firearms registry.
The operational procedures—
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Poilievre.
Thank you very much, Mrs. Fraser.
Before we go to the second round, I have a question for you, Mr. Martin.
There had been fairly significant concerns, prior to the actual reporting to Parliament, on the firearms program. One of the main things that all departments and agencies report to Parliament on are the plans and priorities. Today, we have released to Parliament 70 or 80 fairly significant plans and priorities. We've made a quick check of the RCMP release, and we can't find anything at all on the firearms registry.
Is it being reported by another department, or can you elaborate on that?
:
I'm glad you have in fact acknowledged that what this entails is public mischief. That this act of public mischief was used to undermine something as important as a gun registry, the intent of which is to save lives, is quite astounding.
Once again, I'd like to come back to something I was talking about. I am very concerned that of the 1.2 million restricted weapons that have been registered, only half have been re-registered, meaning 600,000. I know it's impossible to connect. It dates back to the promises of an amnesty by the present government.
I was just curious. You're now deputy commissioner of the RCMP, and you're in charge of making sure that this system works to protect Canadian lives. What is your feeling? It has been suggested that there will be an amnesty for the breaking of laws. How do you feel when you've now been mandated to make this registry more effective? How do you feel about this particular policy and the job you've been given?
:
It's not my place to comment on where the government wants to go. My place is to do as I'm told when they decide where they want to go, and that I will do.
As far as the information in the system goes, the amnesty is there, but the old information is still there as well. The dates on a current licence or registration may be an issue. The government must decide what they want to do about it and then tell us what their wishes are in that regard.
I'd also point out that the Canada Firearms Centre is more than just a registry. It's a program that involves training and education on the safe use and custody of firearms. It deals with the storage of firearms. There are a lot of pieces to this program that provide an ongoing benefit.
:
I think there are two issues: one was the mechanisms that were in place to verify the data that came in, and secondly, the information system that was used. They are separate in many respects.
I can say that when one looks at the history of the program, in particular, the deadline for registering firearms, which was December 31, 2002--and of course there were a few extension periods built in after that--the centre received millions of registration applications in a brief period of time. This period actually predated my arrival, but I was living the tail end of it.
Prior to my arrival, a decision was made not to do extraordinary validation of that information because our concern was about getting a registration certificate in the hands of the firearms owner so they could prove that they complied with the Firearms Act. In order to ensure the quality of the data, what we did--and I don't know if this is still the practice--is that every time that firearm changed hands, we would then use the occasion of the transfer to verify the information and ensure that the database was correct. We do not see it as administratively feasible to contact existing firearms owners and try to verify the data on the firearms that are in the possession of two million Canadians. Because of the natural turnover of firearms, that was the approach that was taken.
:
Since its inception in 1995, the gun registry has generated considerable public controversy. In spite of this, there have been some beneficial collateral effects. I' m convinced that the public at large -- users and non users alike -- is more aware of the dangers of firearms than in 1995. The ultimate outcome is enhanced public safety. We've also observed that users and non users alike are better informed about gun registration, storage and handling procedures.
Of course, statistics don't tell the whole story. I'll give you an example. I personally know some people who were involved in a firearm-related accident before the registry was set up in 1995. Two teenagers were playing with a gun that had not been stored properly and one was killed. I believe this accident would not have happened if the new firearms registration program had been in place. There is a tendency to evaluate the registry solely on the basis of the number of times it is referenced each day, the number of firearms registered, and so forth. However, the program overall has had a number of other positive effects, in terms of public safety and fewer accidents or incidents.
Mr. Martin, you stated earlier that the Firearms Centre also offers a training program. Is this program intended for the general public, or solely for gun users? I believe there would be many positive benefits if the program were to contain a component where the general public was informed of the dangers associated with firearms and with using them -- after all, we must respect gun users. The general public needs to be informed of the dangers of guns and of overly restricting their use. People should be allowed to use guns, but the registration system makes their use much safer.
Ms. Fraser, shouldn't there be a better education program in place, where outcomes could be measured?
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
I have one question to the deputy, and it's an easy one. The Auditor General, in the eleventh point in her statement today, recommended to the committee that we consider asking the RCMP to make formal commitments, similar to those made by the centre when it was stand-alone, vis-à-vis these recommendations. In other words, they've agreed they are going to implement them.
For the record, on behalf of the RCMP, which is now responsible, would you be good enough to give us the undertaking that you also agree with the recommendations and will follow up on them the way the centre did previously?
:
Yes, we can give you the address. That's not a problem. You can also arrange to have it translated.
Numerous discussions have also taken place about the number of times police officers have accessed the registry. Our Conservative friends have engaged in a few semantic debates as to whether police officers had accessed the registry, and whether the process was automatic. Regardless, the registry is consulted 6,600 or 6,700 times a day. In other words, it's a useful tool.
Is that a fair statement?
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I'm glad our colleagues from the Conservative Party would like to have more detail about officer deaths from firearms. This table can be provided, but I think just to help illustrate...and this is tragic, but it's very important information in this discussion.
In 2006, Officer Marc Bourdage, unfortunately, was killed by a long gun in Saskatchewan. The same day, Officer Robin Cameron, also from the RCMP, was killed by a long gun in Saskatchewan.
In 2005, Officer Brock Warren Myrol, Officer Anthony Fitzgerald Orion Gordon, Officer Leo Nicholas Johnson, and Officer Peter Christopher Schiemann were all killed by long guns and a combination of guns.
In 2004, tragically, Officer James W. Galloway, from Edmonton, Alberta, died as a result of a long gun.
Unfortunately, the list continues.
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Your time is up, Mr. Wrzesnewskyj. We appreciate your information.
Again, members, a lot of this information and the questions really have to do with policy issues. We have a firearms registry, until it's changed by a democratically elected government. Our job here is to look at the functioning of it, the regularity, the propriety, the economy--how it's being managed from a taxpayer's point of view.
Again, I haven't interrupted too many people.
The last intervention is from Mr. Fitzpatrick for five minutes.
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I want to make another observation. In 1995 we put into place a system on the pretext that it would prevent these sorts of tragedies that have occurred. And let's be clear: in September of this year, that tragedy did occur, and this system we created did not prevent it from occurring. Let's be clear on that. No matter how you spin it, that's a fact.
The follow-up on the 14-year-old was good police work, quite honestly. They went to the Internet and found the blogs where deranged people were making threats, and that's what they acted on. It was irrelevant whether the firearms in that home were registered or not. It was good police work to identify that 14-year-old by going to the Internet blogs. Too bad they hadn't found the other individual a few weeks before, but we learn from our bad experiences. So I think trying to make that the panacea misses a very important part--the good police work done before we even get to that stage.
I think this is a serious concern. For the police to assume that all the long guns in the country are in that system would be a big mistake. I suggest that in most of the cases this individual has referred to, we're probably talking about guns that were never registered in the system to start with. So I don't really know what that proves.