I didn't recognize the member with the comments there.
Let's go on to the second item, which is the report on bulk water removals. Of course, the Bloc motion was passed by this committee. The only issue with that—and this is something I requested at the time—is that we decide on a particular length of time that would be allowed to bring forth dissenting opinions, or any opinions, any reports, to be amended to the main report.
At the time the committee decided that we would have to decide, with each report, how much time would be allowed. I suggested at the time that we just establish 48 hours, or whatever it is, so we don't have to deal with it. We forgot to deal with that when we dealt with the motion at the last meeting.
So I just want to go to the committee to ask how much time we will allow, or have allowed, for dissenting opinions to be attached to that report.
Yes, Monsieur Cardin.
:
Mr. Chair, I simply disagree with your interpretation. This was not a constitutional amendment that we adopted a few weeks ago. We said that we would give an opportunity to discuss the possibilities around issues of distance. I completely disagree with this new attempt to stonewall the work of the committee.
Essentially we have a motion that was adopted. The Conservatives are on record, and we have very clearly expressed, on this side of the committee table, that we do not believe that a dissident report is in order. We very clearly said that.
We have tried to move motions repeatedly to simply allow this report, this motion to be tabled. So we've had the discussion around whether or not it's appropriate to have a dissidence motion around a committee motion. Most members of this committee do not believe that it is appropriate, and so we have had a proposal from Mr. Bains. We have had my proposal.
What we have to do is defeat this motion, very clearly. I don't believe it's in order, because Mr. Cannan has indicated that he believes it covers all motions and all reports, which would clearly not be in order. But if it is simply referring to this particular motion that we are bringing forward to the House, it might be in order.
If we defeat it, please allow the members of this committee to then put forward a motion that allows this motion to be tabled immediately in the House. I would suggest—and I will come back to this issue in a moment, once we defeat this motion—that the vice-chair, Mr. Cardin, should be the one tabling it in the House, because he originated the motion.
:
Mr. Chair, I've been on the committee since the election of the 39th Parliament. I don't remember our authorizing any trip to Washington or any other trips. What I saw in the media, in my opinion and view, did not reflect the true numbers for the expenses the committee has authorized.
I'd like to see a financial statement of what we have spent and authorized as a committee. What was reported were some huge numbers and trips to Washington that do not reflect, I believe, the travels of this committee.
As you remember, I'm a big proponent of this committee travelling, because international trade cannot be done in Ottawa. We must travel. But it's ridiculous to see in the paper that we've travelled where we haven't travelled, I believe. Where they're getting this information, I don't know.
I'm also of the opinion that we should not be provoking them further, the media, because they're not totally aware of the operation of the committee, and their information has proven to be wrong already, I believe.
:
Well, we have the numbers here. That's another issue, I think.
So let's get on, then, with the business of the committee today.
We have about an hour and twenty minutes for the witnesses. We are dealing with a study of the machinery of government and the implementation of Canada's trade policy.
The Standing Committee on International Trade is undertaking a study examining the machinery of government and how we can create a better trading strategy that makes Canada more competitive internationally for our citizens and businesses. The objectives of the study are to evaluate how the machinery of government delivers trade and investment services and promotes Canadian products and businesses overseas and the idea that Canada is a marquee destination for investment.
We have two individuals as witnesses today. First is Carl Grenier, associate professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University. Thank you very much for coming today. Also here today, from the Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Carleton University, is William Dymond, senior executive fellow.
We will have your presentation of eight minutes first, and then we'll go directly to the questions.
Could you, Mr. Grenier, start with your presentation. But first of all, welcome here, and thank you for coming. Let's make the best use of this hour and twenty minutes we possibly can.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank Committee members for inviting me to make a presentation on this today.
I want to point out, right from the start, as I did with the Clerk, that I am appearing today as an individual. I want that to be clear because I am concerned that some Committee members may believe that I intend to talk about softwood lumber again. I obviously have discussed this with you a number of times in the past, and I do intend to use softwood lumber as an example to illustrate some of the points I will be raising today. However, softwood lumber is certainly not the main issue I wish to discuss with you today.
Having read your report entitled “Ten Steps to a Better Trade Policy”, which was passed and tabled in the House last month, I have chosen to deal with two points that you touched on in your report, but which are not really addressed in detail, and I understand why.
To begin with, I would like to talk about the federal-provincial dimension of developing and managing a Canadian trade policy. For that, I will obviously rely on my own experience, both at the federal level and working for the Government of Quebec, a number of years ago, as it relates to trade policy issues. I would then like to talk about the role of industry and how to involve it in discussions leading to the development of trade policy and in its management which, of course, includes conflict management.
Let me begin with the federal-provincial dimension. We all know—although I think it is worth reminding people of this—that the Canadian Constitution is perfectly clear: the federal government and the federal Parliament are responsible for trade policy. However, that was the case for a very long time without there being any real issues in terms of federal-provincial relations, up until about the 1970s. At that time, developments in multilateral trade negotiations, particularly the GATT at the time, meant that the issues being discussed for the purposes of negotiating and possibly concluding agreements directly affected areas of provincial jurisdiction.
As early as the 1970s—in April 1973—the Quebec Minister of Industry and Trade, Mr. Guy St-Pierre, as well as the Alberta Minister, I believe, asked the federal government to establish mechanisms whereby the provinces could provide input and express their views with respect to Canada's policy, as the Tokyo Round was beginning. That was done primarily through a committee of federal-provincial deputy ministers who would meet regularly to bring forward and discuss issues that would be negotiated. That process went beyond the Tokyo Round, but in mid-1980s, when the Free Trade Agreement with the United States was negotiated, things changed.
Why? At the time, it was envisaged that a very broad agreement would be reached with our main trading partner, and the provinces were even more concerned than usual about the need to be onside with the principles. As you know, the then government, led by Mr. Mulroney, had established the principle of full and complete participation by the provinces in the negotiation process. That did not mean that the provinces were at the negotiating table, but a certain number of mechanisms had been put in place, including more frequent First Ministers and Ministers meetings—that last mechanism was used only once—and even more frequent meetings of the Riesman Committee, named after Canada's Chief Negotiator. That committee met literally once a month to conduct a detailed review of positions being discussed at the negotiating table.
I have to say, having been involved at the time, that this mechanism was effective. That obviously does not mean that everyone agreed. You may remember the very strong and serious opposition expressed by a number of provinces, including Ontario and Manitoba, which continued to be opposed—adamantly opposed—to some things that were on the table, right up until the very end.
Immediately following the negotiations, in 1988-89, the provinces sought to formalize these mechanisms. It was believed—and I think the provinces were pretty well unanimous in that regard—that these mechanisms had worked very well. The idea was not to continue to hold frequent First Ministers meetings, as was the case while negotiations were ongoing, but there was most certainly a desire to maintain the kinds of consultation mechanisms that were developed at that time, particularly as regards officials.
Those discussions lasted almost a year and resulted in a codification, in a very short document, of practices followed for several years. Unfortunately, that exercise did not yield the desired results, because the then federal Minister of International Trade, Mr. Crosbie, refused to ratify the work that had been carried out by federal and provincial officials at the time. Provincial premiers made representations to the federal Prime Minister, Mr. Mulroney, who allowed Mr. Crosbie's decision to stand. Thus, the mechanisms established at the time were never formalized.
Several years later, in the mid-1990s, following the broadening of the Free Trade Agreement to include Mexico, the provinces made another attempt to formalize collaborative mechanisms. That basically resulted in the system we now know, which involves consultations and meetings. However, these consultations and meetings are never held within a formal framework. For example, there are no exchanges of letters between ministers or federal-provincial agreements. There is none of that—just minutes of a meeting chaired by an assistant deputy minister in December of 1998. In fact, that is the basis for the mechanism being used today.
I would also add that this mechanism and its description are confidential, which is strange, because they are part of the minutes of a meeting of what is known as C-Trade, the main federal-provincial consultation mechanism. This refers to a quarterly meeting of federal and provincial officials with responsibility for trade policy issues.
As regards negotiations, the mechanism is working well. However, it still poses certain problems with respect to dispute management. Let me give you an example. Federal officials have decided that there are two types of disputes: offensive and defensive disputes. With respect to offensive disputes—when Canada takes the initiative of raising an issue at the World Trade Organization—the provinces are not included in the Canadian delegation, even if they have an interest in it. If it is a defensive dispute—when a foreign country attacks Canadian policies that may, for example, be provincial policies—the Canadian delegation includes provincial officials. Of course, they do not have the right to speak, unless the head of the Canadian delegation asks them to comment.
It's strange. For example, in the case of softwood lumber, when we raised the issue with the WTO—it was perceived and defined as an offensive dispute, because Canada was challenging an American measure. So, the provinces were not included in the Canadian delegation, which is rather ridiculous. I'm sure you will agree, since provincial actions are really at the heart of this dispute. So, there is definitely a need to adjust this mechanism so that it better reflects reality.
I would like to move on now to mechanisms for consulting industry. At approximately the same time, in the mid-1980s, two additional mechanisms were also formalized—
:
There were two mechanisms, including a very broad based committee dealing with more horizontal issues, called the International Trade Advisory Committee, or ITAC, and 15 or more sectoral groups established with a view to gathering more detailed feedback on the issues under negotiation. That mechanism worked for a certain number of years. It has fallen out of favour in recent years, which means that there is no longer any real formal mechanism in place. However, there is more of an opportunity for industry groups to use websites and the Internet, for example, to present their views to government. That is not a bad thing, but it does not replace the mechanisms that were in place previously, and it most certainly does not provide an opportunity to bring together different points of view.
Once again, I will use the softwood lumber example. Unfortunately, there is no industry organization that represents the entire Canadian softwood lumber industry. That means that a lot of people have to be invited if you want to know what the industry's views are. In the case of the last dispute, the last meeting where everyone was around the table was in April of 2003. As you know, the issue remained on the table until October of 2006. In those three and a half years, there has not been a meeting which brought together all the stakeholders. I believe that is a partial explanation for the amount of time the dispute lasted. There again, I believe there is a need to restore these same consultation mechanisms and change them, if need be. There is absolutely no doubt, however, that the current approach is really not satisfactory.
I would like to make one last point. When anti-dumping measures are being discussed and we have to come before the WTO, the Canadian team does not include industry lawyers, unlike the U.S. team. That is clearly a problem, given that the expertise with respect to dumping is within the industry, as opposed to federal departments here in Ottawa.
I read your report with great interest. It makes a lot of points that I would like to comment on, but I don't have the time to do that now.
I am now available to take any questions you may have.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and my thanks to the committee for the opportunity to appear.
I should say at the outset that I bring to this committee on this question much of the same background as my old friend and colleague Mr. Grenier. I could not count the number of hours I spent with him in the sea trade and other manifestations.
The question of machinery and implementation raises, in my mind, the question of the basic objective of Canadian trade policy. You cannot shape the machinery until you know what the objective is. So I'd like to offer a few reflections on that and then just comment on one aspect of Mr. Grenier's presentation.
In my view, Canadian trade policy now rests on some very outdated assumptions about how international trade is conducted. That outdated assumption is essentially that trade is a matter that occurs between firms and individuals in one country and unrelated firms and individuals in another.
It leads us to a view that a successful trade policy is one that expands exports, minimizes imports, and generates a positive trade balance, and following from that—as this committee has done, repeating in fact, I think, what the government has thought over many years—that there is a need to increase the resources for trade negotiation and increase the resources for trade promotion, all with a view to expanding Canadian exports. It's that assumption that I think is outdated.
How is trade actually taking place these days? That is the question.
It's now taking place within firms or among related parties or in related networks. We know, for example, that as much as two-thirds of Canada-U.S. trade is of this character. We know that trade increasingly comprises parts and components for assembly into end products. We know that the global fragmentation of production to take advantage of low-cost labour and specialized skills and access to critical inputs is now the dominant characteristic of international trade.
We can see the spread not only in sectors that we know well reflect this dynamic, such as the auto sector or the aviation sector. We're now seeing it creep into the resource sectors, as indeed we learned during the BSE affair with the United States. In fact, this old model of international trade, which we could witness in softwood lumber—which Mr. Grenier mentioned—now applies to an ever-diminishing number of sectors where the export sales from Canada are virtually wholly the production of Canada.
What are the new dynamics of international trade, what should our policy be, and how should we structure our machinery to reflect it?
In my view, the critical factor is the intersection of firm value and location value. Countries now compete in promoting policy settings congenial to mobile slices of production by removing barriers and providing incentives. Trade negotiation priorities, trade promotion priorities, and resources allocated to them that focus on particular countries could lead to serious policy errors and adverse economic consequences.
Just to give one example, if a Canadian firm—and we know this exists in the aerospace industry, for example—is part of a supply chain supplying components to other firms, which intend to further manufacture them and assemble them into final goods that are then blocked through trade barriers in third markets, with which country does the responsibility lie to negotiate the elimination of those trade barriers? If Canada were to decide, in order to favour the development of that sector, to negotiate free trade agreements with countries that are three or four steps down the line in the production process, rather than focusing on attracting that investment itself, we would probably lose it.
What are the issues, then, that we have to deal with in thinking about the trade policy for today?
Participation in global value chains is the key to the future, in my view. Canadian participation in global value chains is inevitably anchored in the United States, as producer, as consumer, as a source of inward investment and a destination for outward investment, and as a source of technology.
We have to understand that imports in this mix are as important as exports. If we orient our trade policy and the machinery related thereto to what happens on the export side while ignoring the import side, we will deny the opportunity for Canadian firms to participate in the value chains.
What are the issues, then, that we have to get our minds around? They are no longer those of the classic market access issues—tariffs, quotas, and so forth. They are issues of border administration. How well does your border work? How well does your customs system work? They are issues of product standards. They are even issues of immigration. What is your access to critically needed skills? They are issues of investment. They are issues of intellectual property enforcement.
A good many of the issues we need to confront in order to have a coherent and successful trade policy are within the power of the Government of Canada and the government of our provinces to deal with, and what we need to do is start hacking away at those barriers that impede it.
Let me offer you a quote from the executive chairman of IBM, Mr. Palmisano. He points out that the new dynamic means putting “people and jobs anywhere in the world based on the right cost, the right skills and the right business environment. And it integrates those operations horizontally and globally—work flows to the places where it will be done best, most efficiently and to the highest quality. The forces behind this are irresistible. The genie's out of the bottle and there's no stopping it.”
What about our machinery? I entirely agree with what Mr. Grenier has said about what we do with the provinces. I think now there is a critical gap, and let me reinforce this moment on the private sector. We have now no regular mechanism of consulting the private sector on these issues. Departments that I talk to are fearful of convening meetings, because it gives a suggestion that a particular government initiative is in play on which views are needed.
I was one of the officials at the origin of the SAGIT and the ITAC mechanism, developing proposals for the government to consider. I think it functioned extremely well, because what it enabled you to do was to consider issues without attaching expectations to them, without attracting attention to them. These would occur in quarterly or semi-annual meetings.
The previous government gave this up in favour of a multi-stakeholder consultation. In my experience, the business sector will not participate effectively or substantively in that. One recommendation I would make is the system of private sector consultations, with whatever changes to update it, since it was invented 23 years ago, ought to be urgently reconsidered by the government.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
Again, I'd like to thank the witnesses. This is the second meeting in a row where we've had to deal with some housekeeping matters and it's gone a bit longer than we anticipated, but I guess it's a reflection of this committee and its eagerness to move forward on some key issues.
Mr. Grenier, in your testimony, not only today but also in the Senate, you mentioned the machinery of government, and you talked about the softwood lumber agreement in your remarks. I'm glad you brought that forth, because that's something I want to use as an example, to talk about the machinery in government and lessons learned from that particular agreement.
You indicated in your testimony in front of the Senate committee this month that “the agreement is overly complex, it has needless punitive measures against Canada, and left too many loose ends that are open to interpretation.” That was one remark you made, followed by:
I guess the biggest frustration from our perspective is that the federal government viewed the signing of the agreement as the end of the process, it was just the beginning. The government has offered minimal help to industry in interpreting the agreement, resolving tax issues. In the six months since the pact was signed, they weren't around. They disappeared.
The concern I have—and I was trying to discuss this in the last meeting as well when we discussed the machinery of government with Mr. Siegel, the president of EDC—is about the refund process. He indicated some of the success stories around that and how industry received its refunds in time.
There's another concern that was raised, which is the misunderstanding of how the surge provisions were calculated in the province of British Columbia, for example. They interpreted it giving one perspective and the federal government had a different perspective on it, and my understanding is that the U.S. had a different perspective on it.
So how can departments better coordinate that? First of all, I want you to comment if there was a misunderstanding, and secondly, if there was a misunderstanding, how was it resolved?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Bains.
You quoted some of the comments I made before a Senate committee, approximately a week and a half ago, with respect to the history of the softwood lumber dispute. However, I did not make the comments you attributed to me. In fact, they are comments made by the former Canadian negotiator, Mr. Waddell, and a representative of Weyerhaeuser, and I obviously fully endorse them. In a way, you are right to attribute them to me.
As regards the differences in perspective that you have referred to with respect to a part of the Softwood Lumber Agreement that was implemented on October 12, I was not intimately involved in discussions on those matters, for obvious reasons. All I can say is that this is second-hand information. As a result, I prefer not to make detailed comments in that regard. As was reported in the media, I believe there is still a difference of opinion and that this difference of opinion will eventually—and, most certainly very quickly—be referred to a board of arbitration, as provided for under the agreement.
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Mr. Benoit, we shouldn't be changing all the Committee's rules at this meeting.
Mr. Grenier and Mr. Dymond, I was very interested in your comments with respect to international trade institutions and our trade. I have a question for Mr. Grenier, and Mr. Dymond may want to add something.
We believe there needs to be greater democratization of the results of our processes for negotiating and ratifying trade agreements by Canada and, of course, by the Quebec nation, by requiring, for example, that important agreements be approved by the House and that the civil society be consulted through the work of a parliamentary committee, before Parliament decides on an important treaty. Furthermore, in both offensive and defensive situations, the national government should hold mandatory consultations with the provinces and the Quebec nation before negotiating an agreement that falls within their jurisdiction.
Mr. Grenier, you gave us a few examples. Perhaps you could say a little more about that and Mr. Dymond can add some comments of his own, if he likes.
:
Thank you very much for that question, Mr. André.
I don't know that what you are proposing is very different from what already exists because, to my knowledge, both in Ottawa and Quebec City, as well as in some of the other provinces, parliamentary committees have been used in the past, and are used regularly, to look at issues relating to international trade negotiations.
As regards consultations with the provinces, there is no requirement to do that at this time. That is one of the things we should be trying to formalize. As I said earlier, this proved impossible in the early 1990s, as well as in the late 1990s. There is only an informal agreement in place.
However, we are talking here about a much broader question. This is really a constitutional matter. The Constitution is clear: the federal government has jurisdiction over all matters relating to international trade. There is no doubt about that. But, in many cases, the issues under negotiation in future will involve areas of shared or exclusively provincial jurisdiction. That is certainly a marked trend that will be even more evident in future.
Without a formal mechanism, Canada runs the risk of being incapable of taking a position that is truly in the national interest, since it will not have had an opportunity to properly analyze all of its interests. It is very difficult to do that when negotiations are ongoing. Once the negotiations have begun, it's a little late to start designing a tool. It is far better to do that between negotiations, when you have an opportunity to look calmly at what has been done in the past and what it would be possible to do in future. That is my suggestion. There are a number of ways of making improvements that do not involve amending the Constitution.
I would urge against tinkering too much with the present situation. I think it works well, and it works on the basis of ad hoc solutions to specific problems.
We ought to bear in mind that in some areas Canada does not have a lot of discretion. Let me give you an example. Based on what I've read in the budget and in some speeches by Mr. Emerson, we are on the verge of entering into or proposing free trade negotiations with a number of countries, in addition to the list that we already have. Whether the government will proceed, I don't know.
Those are clearly voluntary decisions. Consultation is clearly indicated. And my experience as a trade negotiator tells me that you'd better make sure that the business community is really interested in those free trade agreements, or don't waste the resources doing them. If you do them, there won't be a business response and you'll have spent a lot of time.
Multilaterally, where 150 countries agree on the progress or not progress of multilateral trade negotiations, the option for Canada to hold up the process is about zero. The idea that, as a result of consultation with the provinces or with civil society, Canada at that point would say no, we will not participate in multilateral trade negotiations seems to me to be quite unthinkable.
One of the things we've learned over the years—and I sense we now embrace this quite vigorously—is that nothing is to be lost from transparency. Everything is to be gained from transparency. There's very little that's secret out there. The government has far more to gain by opening the doors and letting people come and talk and tell them what their interests are. Trying to do it in one big group with all of civil society, I think, is a mistake because people won't say what they think.
The more time that officials, ministers, and members of Parliament spend listening to people, the greater will be the rewards. But don't formalize it in the sense that the government has to have this consultation before it can do that, where if the consultation were against it, the government would not enter into a multilateral round of trade negotiations or not participate in a big regional agreement. I think that would unnecessarily restrict Canadian flexibility.
My last point is, as Mr. Grenier says, don't do any of this until we know what our interests are. My presentation has argued that our interests are changing and we need to get our minds around how we're going to address that.
Thanks, Mr. Grenier and Mr. Dymond. It's good to see you again. Thank you for sharing some of your wisdom and experiences on the machinery of government.
I know that this committee has been discussing this issue over the last several months and we've been told by several witnesses that our country is falling behind in forging new trade relationships around the world. We continue to examine the different ways government functions, how we're organized and looking at the mechanisms, as we're discussing today, and how effective we are in facilitating Canada's ability to reach trade agreements.
I'd be happy to hear from you in a minute about how you see this fault, whether it lies with the machinery of government, or is it an uphill battle? One of the things we talked about earlier in the meeting was convincing the media and the public, Canadians, about the importance of forging relationships with other countries, that it is critical to trade in the global economy.
The machinery of government does seem to come to a grinding halt because of the negativity and the partisanship that's played out whenever we talk about concern. Even in the House earlier this week, the Prime Minister alluded to some of the great initiatives within our budget, that we have the strongest economy for over...unemployment close to record low levels in four decades, and the initiatives we've put into the manufacturing sector to try to expand our trade.
But specifically, from the committee's perspective, I'd like to hear from you, Mr. Dymond, on my point that government officials need to do more travelling, get more feet on the ground, and tying that in to the mechanisms of the different departments and how politicians can play a role to effectively enhance our trade, and whether this is hampering our progress in trade, or is it really a fault of the machinery of government? Or is an extremely negative and partisan climate hampering our ability to move forward?
Mr. Chairman, let me draw to the committee's attention a piece of news that I find amazing. It is that earlier this week a deal was reached in the United States Congress to approve four pending free trade agreements that are negotiated with changes—Peru, Panama, and so forth.
The political atmosphere in Washington, as we know, is poisonous. We have a Democrat-controlled Congress. We have a Republican White House with an incumbent who is desperately unpopular, and we are in the middle of presidential politics. We have all the conditions for gridlock, and they reached a deal to approve four of these agreements.
We have two agreements pending, one with four countries of Central America and the other with the countries of EFTA. They have been around for the last four years and they aren't moving. Indeed, the blockage occurred during the days of our previous majority government. These blockages began to appear in 2002-03, when there wasn't the type of political atmosphere that necessarily might apply in the situations we have now, yet there was no movement.
Why was there no movement? It was because very powerful—if small—lobbies, one in the area of textiles and the other in the area of shipbuilding, have blocked this. In my experience, governments and parliaments know how to deal with opposition; what they have difficulty dealing with is the absence of support.
When the government of the day—the successor government of Mr. Martin and the current government—looked to see who would support the government if they took these decisions to say no to the textile industry and no to the shipbuilding and they were not going to protect them, nobody supported them. And they don't support them because the kinds of things that we are able to negotiate in these free trade agreements are of very little positive interest to the business community, to the people who would benefit.
When we negotiated the free trade agreement, we had massive support from the business community and some isolated opposition in corners of the business community. Why? It was because they could see their interest, and we could see what their economic response to it is.
Now, when we have a trade policy that's focused on maximizing export access with a range of countries when our principal interests continue to lie with the United States, you cannot look to the business community to come before the committee and say not to listen to the textile industry or to the shipbuilding industry because they have larger national interests of the type my colleague Mr. Grenier spoke about. The reason for that is that the trade agenda no longer matches the economic interests of the country. It therefore no longer draws those people who are prepared to come before this committee, to go before ministers, or to write letters to Mr. Julian and say they want this agreement and they're prepared to invest political coinage in doing it.
It's not a machinery of government problem; it's an agenda problem, an agenda that is not matching the interests of the country. A machinery of government response, in my opinion, will not provide the route out.
Thank you.
It's interesting; when I began my career in trade policy, which is now almost forty years ago, only two departments of government counted: the Department of Finance, which controlled the tariff, and the Department of Trade and Commerce, which was the export department. They also controlled the Export and Import Permits Act. When agriculture issues were discussed, which was not frequently, the Department of Agriculture was clearly important. The Department of External Affairs had an overall coordinating role, but no authority to do anything.
The last time I looked, at least 24 federal departments and agencies were involved in the trade agenda, whether it's multilateral or bilateral. That's because the scope of trade agreements has grown. The scope of coordination, the task of coordination, has grown more complex. I dare say the task of members of Parliament in assessing these agreements has become more complex. Once you begin to add services and intellectual property and investment issues, it becomes more complex. This complexity is replicated at the level of the provinces because, as Mr. Grenier says, you have an increasing footprint of international trade agreements upon areas of jurisdiction that are either shared or exclusive.
In my experience, does the machinery cope with that? Yes, it does. We know how to do this. Departments of government know they need to talk to each other. They know that bad things will happen to them if they don't. They know that a properly functioning Privy council Office will ensure that this coordination occurs. It operates in an informal, ad hoc way. Most of the practitioners I think would hesitate to introduce formality into the process.
Remember that anything that happens, happens under the authority of the cabinet and in accordance with legislation adopted by Parliament.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses.
I would like to begin with you, Mr. Grenier, obviously, regarding softwood and the implementation of our trade policy. We just heard Mr. Cannan say that the Softwood Lumber Agreement has been fantastic for his community. I am from British Columbia, and that is not at all what we are seeing on the ground. We have lost 5 000 jobs since that agreement was implemented. So, this is extremely problematic.
I would like to explore with you the difference between the principles behind our trade policy and the reality of its implementation. With NAFTA, there was a dispute settlement process that was supposed to protect us. Then we had the softwood lumber dispute.
This is my first question: What action should the government have taken when the softwood lumber dispute arose between NAFTA countries?
Second, lumber companies had launched a legal process which resulted, on October 13, in an Act Respecting the Implementation of International Trade Agreements with the United States, a process which Canada effectively won.
Once again, there is a difference between the principle and the implementation. Rather than focussing on the ruling, we focussed on the agreement.
My second question relates to that difference. What could the government have done with respect to that ruling on the agreement?
Third, the Softwood Lumber Agreement was implemented. In British Columbia, it was absolute chaos at the border, where people were not sure what tariffs to apply. It is quite possible that tariffs were doubled.
How could the government have set about implementing this decision to sign the Softwood Lumber Agreement? What could it have done better to avoid job losses?
And, at each of these three stages, what could the government have done to better implement our trade agreement?
With respect to your first question about action the government should have taken at the outset, I have to say that it did exactly what it was supposed to do. In 2001, when the previous 1996 agreement ended, the government immediately stated, with the industry's unanimous agreement, that it would use all legal means and take any and all steps needed to defend the Canadian industry, while continuing to explore the possibility of reaching an agreement through negotiations. This was what is called the two-track approach.
That worked quite well to a certain point. Why? For the first time, in August 2005, the highest level of government in the United States refused to enforce a ruling which should have been final. Obviously, throughout that lengthy period, the monies paid by businesses at the U.S. border were quickly accumulating and becoming more and more considerable. That money, which still belonged to Canadian industry, began to hold enormous potential, and there is no doubt that many companies were suffering.
The softwood lumber file evolved very quickly under the new government. Having virtually rejected the legal approach, Mr. Harper's new government made the decision to put practically all its eggs in the negotiation basket. That sent a very clear signal. Our American adversaries and the U.S. administration understood that immediately. And you saw what happened next. It still took a number of months to negotiate this agreement and, as happens whenever there is a policy change, the government machinery followed but was a little further behind. We know that the final moments of the negotiation were quite highly political, as opposed to bureaucratic. That is just the way it works.
That brings me to your third question. There were obviously a number of hiccups initially, in terms of implementing this agreement. I already mentioned that those provinces that had chosen option B had to wait several months for it to become available. For a while, all provinces and all businesses in Canada were paying the export tax, rather than being subject to a quota and a tax.
The infamous dispute settlement process, which we had secured after a lengthy struggle during negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement, was working. But, like all dispute settlement processes of international scope, it is based on the fact that the parties to the agreement will enforce the decisions. If one party—in this case, the United States—does not enforce the rulings or finds all kinds of loopholes, the process breaks down.
It is unfortunate that we did not carry the process through to its conclusion. Only a few months ago, we had almost reached the end of the process, particularly in front of the American courts. Indeed, you referred to the decision handed down on October 13, where the judges, announcing their ruling one day after the agreement was implemented, clearly signaled to both governments that they did not agree with what had happened.
All of that is behind us now and, unfortunately, we are facing a situation in which industry is more at risk now than it was previously. Why is that? Well, it is because the entire softwood lumber issue has now been taken out of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, to be handled, if a dispute arises, by an arbitration tribunal, the London Court of International Arbitration. That court of arbitration will have to interpret the agreement as it is currently written, without considering rulings we might have been able to secure through NAFTA, the WTO or the American courts. All of that has been set aside and the agreement, as currently drafted, gives a significant advantage to the United States.
That is not hypothetical: we will end up in arbitration sooner or later, and sooner rather than later. I am extremely concerned that the clauses of the agreement may be interpreted in a way that is not favourable to Canada.
With respect to your last point, unfortunately, even though under NAFTA and in front of U.S. courts, the industry has standing to represent itself and defend its own positions—the same applies to the provinces—that is not the case with the London Court of International Arbitration. Only the two national governments—the United States government and the Canadian government—will have an opportunity to make representations before that court of arbitration.
I do not believe that anyone in Canada would say, had they been closely following these issues, that the industry's contribution to softwood lumber litigation we have been a party to in recent years was not significant. However, we now will have to go through the government. We will have to wait and see how that works, because we really don't know at this time.
The mechanisms I talked about earlier, that have been established for the purposes of negotiating NAFTA, and which were used on occasion in [inaudible], no longer exist.
:
I'm sure it would it be wise of me not to comment on that.
One assignment I had in my professional career was to spend five years in the embassy in Washington, through the days after negotiations of the free trade agreements were announced. It really is a truly remarkable political environment to understand and to function in as a diplomat, quite different from our own.
If you had asked me several weeks ago whether the United States would have a trade policy to speak of until the election of a new administration, I would have said no. Congress now is dominated by Democrats, suspicious of trade agreements and suspicious of trade liberalization. The political authority of the President to do things is weakened for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that he's a lame duck, as is traditionally the case for second-term presidents.
Yet they've cut a deal. These agreements have not been signed, but they've cut a deal on the basis of which the Democrats and the Republicans will agree, with some changes to these agreements, to adopt them according to the procedures of the trade promotion authority. The contrast between the ability to act in those circumstances and our inability to act—
I go back to the days prior to the 2004 election, when there was a very strong majority government. Even then the government felt unable to overcome the opposition of two small sectors. As they say, governments understand opposition; what they don't understand is the absence of support. And that's what we're facing: the absence of support.
:
It's a question of choice, Mr. Chairman.
What happened to the Canadian economy under the impact of multilateral trade agreements, partly, but certainly under the impact of free trade with the United States, is that it was reoriented on a north-south basis and on the basis of integrated production networks. And that is evident not only in the auto sector but also in many others.
The only thing I can tell you on that is to recall a meeting I attended several years ago with Mr. MacLaren, who was the trade minister at the time and present with a number of Canadian business executives. Mr. MacLaren was talking about the Asia-Pacific and other things. And one very senior executive said, “Look, Minister, our interests are in the United States. If you have any time and energy and resources left over, spend them on the United States, as that's where the problems are. Unless you fix those problems, other markets don't matter.”
So is this only for the trade department or the trade committee? No. We're talking about the gamut of public policy issues that we have to manage on a daily basis with the United States. And clearly we have to manage them better, because you're quite right that the border is beginning to thicken and become more difficult and more costly for Canadian companies to penetrate.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. Welcome to the Committee.
Canada has concluded a free trade agreement with its most important trading partner, but is also seeking to diversify its trading partners, in keeping with its international trade policy. In that regard, Canada is seeking to conclude more and more bilateral agreements, either free trade agreements with other countries or other kinds of agreements. The government wants to ensure that these can be dealt with as quickly as possible. As part of these processes, is there any analysis or are any impact studies carried out to determine the potential effect on industry and the provinces?
You have been talking about possible consultations with the provinces. I may have misunderstood what you said, but I had the feeling, at times, that you were saying there was consultation, but at other times, I wasn't quite so sure—perhaps you were trying to say that there was consultation, but that it wasn't particularly helpful. Under these agreements, many partners—be they the provinces, Quebec or affected industries—are seeking to protect their interests. Are they adequately represented to be in a position to defend their interests or positions, before final decisions are made?
:
I have in fact noted Canada's desire to negotiate a certain number of bilateral agreements with countries that are much smaller and less important to Canada in terms of trade. I believe that is related to the fact that our neighbour and main partner began to do that before we did. I believe that people have appeared before you to provide testimony on that. If the United States signs a free trade agreement with Costa Rica which favours their exporters over our own, our exporters will be at a disadvantage if we don't do the same thing. There is no doubt about that.
However, I do not see these agreements as the culmination of an in-depth analysis of our real needs. In my opinion, Canada's view is that if the United States are doing this, then it has no choice but to do the same. There in something inevitable about all of this, and that is unfortunate. Indeed, I believe, and others also believe, that it would be far better to turn our energies towards ensuring a successful conclusion to the Doha Round at the WTO. That would be far more advantageous for everyone. But, as you can see, things are somewhat different in the real world.
Having said that, I believe our international exports to the United States, which rose considerably following the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement, are now going down. There have been a number of articles in the newspapers about that, but the fact is that few people have even noticed. Our international exports to the United States had risen to almost 86 or 87%. It is difficult to imagine their going much further than that. Now the rate has dropped to about 81 or 82%. It is also worth noting that prior to the Free Trade Agreement, they were at 78 or 79%. So, this is really a kind of realignment.
I think that is most certainly due in part to what my colleague mentioned—in other words, the fact that the border is becoming thicker, primarily for security reasons. However, that is not the only reason. I believe there are other factors at play, including the fact that Asia is a rising power. That reality is causing a realignment everywhere, and in many different ways.
As for consultations with the provinces, I believe they are occurring. But there again—and this goes back to the point made earlier by Mr. Dymond, that I fully agree with—the real issue is not the fact that some groups are opposed, but rather, that there is a lack of support from the business community at large, which is preventing these agreements from going forward, even though they are probably advisable in the real world of which we are a part.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to ask some questions about consultation. It's something I've been dwelling on for quite some time, not just on this committee but on other committees, because I take to heart the comments you made, Mr. Dymond, about consultation and how the government consults. I think there certainly is an opportunity for misunderstanding, just from the way it's carried out.
Some of my thoughts on this are that there is definitely consultation going on at all sorts of different levels. For example, as an MP, I have formal and informal consultations with businesses in my riding. But also, as MPs, we get national groups coming to see us to explain their points of view on something or the concerns they might have.
There is the departmental level. We had officials here, and I asked them this question about consultation and about what sorts of consultative mechanisms they have in place. They confirmed that they do consultations at different levels—some formal, some informal, some at conferences, and some here in the government. There are all sorts of different mechanisms and different levels.
Of course, there is the ministerial level. The minister himself or herself is either lobbied or in fact reaches out to industry or accepts meetings from industry.
There is the committee here. We call in witnesses. We study a particular topic. And of course, we have to pick and choose who comes, and we do the best we can.
And of course, there are still reports and position papers. Oftentimes companies or organizations and associations that represent a particular sector publish reports.
Where I think some of the confusion sometimes comes in is that industries at certain levels don't realize that all this consultation is going on. So in other words, if they're not part of this picture, even though this consultative process is taking place, they feel that it's not taking place, because they don't know about it. So I think there's a communication issue that might hinder this.
The second thing is, for example, if they're not invited, because everyone has to pick and choose. Not everybody can participate in everything. So if they're not invited or they don't actively plug into the consultative process through these different mechanisms I spoke about, it can leave them with the feeling that the process that's in place isn't working. Or they may feel, actually, that they have limited time and resources and they can't plug in, because as you know, it takes time and effort to prepare your position and present your position and participate in a larger setting to communicate it. They may just feel that the payback isn't worth it for a company of that size or in that sector, or whatever.
I notice that you both have experience within our government. You have experience internationally. I wanted to ask both of you how other countries deal with this idea of consultation. I would start by asking if you agree with what I've said here. And do you have recommendations as to how this might be improved?
Second, are there models in other countries that you've experienced? Are there good things we could pick from those other countries?
I want to come back to the elephant in the corner—and thank you for answering my questions on softwood. The elephant in the corner is the difference or the disconnect between the principles of our trading policy and the implementation of our trading policy, in terms of economic betterment.
We went through the Canada-U.S. free trade debate. We went through NAFTA. We're now going through the SPP debate—at least sometimes, when we actually hold committee meetings. In each of those cases, when we've had representatives of the ministry coming forward, they've always started with Canada's seeing unparalleled prosperity. Mr. Cannan referred to that now. In his part of the world everything's fine. He actually comes from the province that has the highest rate of child poverty in Canada.
We know that most jobs that are being created now and that have been created over the past few years are temporary and part-time in nature. Statistics Canada tells us—and another report came out last week—that most Canadian families are earning less in real terms than they were in 1989. It's the elephant in that corner. You don't see it in the business press. The National Post won't report on it. The Globe and Mail won't report on it. You don't see it on any of the television networks. But it's the reality. Most Canadians are poorer now than they were in 1989, and that has to be the bottom line if we're talking about implementation of trade policy. I think we would all agree that if most Canadian families are poorer, there's a serious problem.
My question is to both of you. If we're failing on that bottom line, if most Canadian families are earning less now than they were in 1989, do you not agree with me that we have to look at the basic fundamentals of our trading policy to see what we're doing wrong if we're reaching a situation where this huge prosperity gap—indeed, prosperity gulf--is actually engulfing most Canadian families?
:
One of the dangers in dealing with trade policy or any other area of public policy is if you consider it to be the be-all and end-all. Trade and trade policy is not an objective in itself; what we're trying to achieve is economic performance. The IMF tells us that since we got the fiscal books right, the economy, cycle over cycle, is performing more or less at capacity.
In fact, I read The Globe and Mail, so I saw that report, so it's doing its job in reporting. It indicates that yes, there are some serious problems out there that the government might want to address, but they are not problems of trade policy. You don't solve child poverty or any of these things by flipping trade policy on its head and saying no more imports. You don't, on the other side of it, solve some trade problems that you may have by fixing your trade problems without addressing, for example, the social policy mix, the education mix, infrastructure, and the macroeconomic policy framework that you have.
Trade policy and trade is a necessary but not sufficient answer to the problems that Mr. Julian mentioned or that others may wish to bring up. But to pin the responsibility for increasing child poverty rates and the bad news on this upon trade policies that we have been conducting since 1948 is, I think, a complete distortion of history.
:
Mr. Julian, you're out of time.
I want to thank both of the witnesses very much, but I do have a couple of things to say to the committee too, so don't leave.
Thank you very much, Mr. Dymond and Mr. Grenier, for your presentations and for answering the questions.
The first thing I'd like to bring to the committee is this. I do want to say that from now on when motions are brought to the committee, before we debate them I will ensure that we know clearly what the motion is.
Today, what happened when Mr. Cannan brought his motion is that I heard the motion one way, and my thought was that it wasn't in order and would require a 48-hour notice. I discussed this with the clerk, who is very knowledgeable and I respect his opinion; he does a great job for us. But he'd heard the motion differently. So we were ruling on two different motions, in fact.
From now on, to avoid 15 minutes of unnecessary debate, I will insist on having the motions read clearly, or actually written and given to us, so that we can make sure we're all on the same page. It's a mistake of a chair, I think, not to do that. We will do that in the future to avoid confusion like this.
The other thing—and Mr. Cardin, I will give you a minute as we have a couple of minutes left—I do want to remind members that we will have our briefings on May 29 for the Middle East trip and May 31 for the South Asia trip. That's the week we get back. I encourage all members to come to both briefings. I think they'll be very beneficial.
Mr. Cardin, if you have something very quickly, we have about a minute left.