:
Good morning, everyone. It's a delight to see you here in July, the middle of the summer. We are here to do very important business, and I'm certainly looking forward to what we hear at this committee today.
The Standing Committee on International Trade is meeting, of course, to discuss the softwood lumber agreement, which was signed between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States. It was initialled by the Minister of International Trade, David Emerson, and the United States Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, in Geneva on July 1, 2006.
Committees of the House of Commons, as you know, are empowered by Standing Order 108 to review and report to the House of Commons on “matters, relating to the mandate, management, organization or operation of the department, as the committee deems fit”. It is in this context that the committee wishes to look at the softwood lumber agreement today and in the days that have been allocated. The authority of this committee is circumscribed by the mandate given to it by the House of Commons. Should the committee wish, it can report its opinions and observations on the agreement to the House of Commons. Today and again on August 21, we will hear from witnesses and ask questions. Should it wish, after hearing evidence or representations, the committee may report its view to the House of Commons.
The initial agreement between the two governments is not directly before this committee for amendment, approval, or rejection. We are here to examine the actions of government and to report any opinions to the House of Commons.
The Minister of International Trade is here this morning, but before we get to the minister, we do have two items of business to deal with. One is a motion by Mr. Temelkovski to have Ambassador Michael Wilson come to committee.
I just want to say to Mr. Temelkovski and tell the committee that as soon as we received the information that there was a desire to have the Canadian ambassador to the United States, Michael Wilson, come to the committee, we started the process to get him here. So we will commit to get him here as soon as we can, hopefully for the twenty-first. Mr. Wilson, I know, will be a very willing witness. So we certainly look forward to that.
The other motion is by Helena Guergis, and that is dealing with getting to the committee.... Now, isn't this really embarrassing for me; I know who it is.
Ms. Guergis, I'll let you introduce the motion, but of course it's the former Canadian ambassador to the United States, Frank McKenna. Perhaps you could just present your motion and speak to it, and we'll deal with that motion right now.
I would remind the committee that the minister is here for two hours, and we would like to take as little as possible of the minister's time. I know we have a lot of questions for him.
Ms. Guergis, would you go ahead with your motion on having former Canadian ambassador Frank McKenna come to the committee.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to my honourable colleagues, I hope you're all having a good summer. I haven't had a great one yet, but I hope it gets better as it goes forward. Maybe today will be the beginning of a positive new era.
I think it is important today to recognize that we are at a very important fork in the road in terms of the never-ending saga of softwood lumber. I think we all recognize that the strategy of the Government of Canada on softwood lumber has essentially always been, in the previous government and in the new government, to pursue parallel paths of litigation and negotiation as the opportunity arose.
Earlier this year the President and the Prime Minister, at a meeting in Cancun, agreed to make softwood lumber and a negotiated solution of the softwood lumber problem a key priority for both Canada and the United States. Coming out of that meeting, we embarked on a negotiating process, largely involving negotiations through Ambassador Wilson in Washington and his staff, and my staff in the Department of International Trade.
On April 27 of this year, as you know, we announced that we had reached a framework agreement, or a term sheet agreement, on softwood lumber. That agreement involved a number of key features that were attractive to Canada and it was reasonably well received by most in the industry and most provinces.
It included, as you all know, seven to nine years of dispute-free trade; it offered essentially free trade, unrestricted, when lumber markets are in good shape; it offered a choice of a supply restraint mechanism for the different producing provinces in weaker or down markets; it offered a dispute mechanism that would be relatively clean, and timely, and efficient to deal with issues involving the agreement; and it offered what I think was critically important and really beyond what I had expected we would achieve, and that was the potential recovery of something in the order of 80% of the cash deposits that had been paid, which at this time is in the order of about $5.3 billion.
In the period between April 27 and July 1 we embarked on discussions on the detail of the proposed framework agreement and the drafting of a legal text. We had extensive discussions with industry, with provincial governments, again primarily through the U.S. ambassador and his staff, and in that process we identified a number of issues that were of significant concern to industry and/or provincial governments.
One issue of paramount concern was referred to as the anti-circumvention issue. There was great concern in Canada over this clause, which prevents both the U.S. and Canada from taking actions over the life of this agreement that might in fact circumvent the basic thrust of the agreement, because it was thought that it would in fact prevent provinces from putting in place or keeping in place provincial forest management policies.
There was a particularly profound issue in northern British Columbia and in the province's interior, where the B.C. government was in the process of introducing a new stumpage system called market-based timber pricing. We were asked to try to negotiate some provision in the agreement ensuring that provincial forest policies, such as the market pricing system, would be protected over the life of the agreement.
We heard concerns about termination. In the framework agreement, we were silent on termination. When this occurs in an international agreement, by international law the default position is a 12-month termination provision.
We were asked to look at the possibility of strengthening the termination provision. Interestingly, there were different views on why we needed a termination provision. Some thought that Canada should have a termination provision in case we wanted to terminate and there would be no mechanism for us to do so.
As discussions unfolded, the focus shifted to the risk of American termination. In other words, the industry in Canada was very concerned that at any point in this agreement the U.S. industry could terminate in a tough market situation, or if the economy got bad and their industry was having problems, we might be faced with a relatively rapid termination of the agreement by the U.S. industry. So we were asked to see if we could negotiate a stronger termination provision than what silence implies, which is a 12-month notice.
There were also some technical issues of a significantly commercial nature, related to the running rules of the agreement. And as has transpired for a couple of years now, there was concern over the timely recovery and return of deposits to our producers.
On July 1, when I was in Geneva at the failing WTO talks, I initialled an agreement that essentially improved on the April 27 agreement in virtually all areas in which we were asked to try to achieve significant agreement. That initialling signalled the termination of negotiations, and we are now faced with a fundamental choice: we can choose the negotiated settlement, recognizing that as with any negotiated out-of-court settlement, there are puts and takes—there are some aspects we like and others we would probably like to improve upon, and I can certainly name several—or we can continue with litigation.
We need to ensure that in making decisions about softwood lumber and about whether we choose to embrace this negotiated agreement, we recognize that the choice is not between the negotiated agreement and some utopian model of clear, unfettered free trade. We need to spend as much time assessing the litigation option—regarding the risks, the consequences, and the timing of how the litigation option will unfold—as we do picking holes in the negotiated compromise. It's clear that all of us can pick holes in the negotiated compromise—there's no problem doing that—but what we have to compare it with is the alternative.
When I look at the negotiated agreement, I see an agreement that provides for a quick return of 82% of the cash deposits. That's a very large percentage of the deposits coming back extremely quickly. It's roughly $4.3 billion, and it comes back with certainty. There is no magic here. If we enter into this agreement, that money comes back, and we will control to a large degree an accelerated flow of that money.
The agreement provides protection from trade actions for seven to nine years. I know there has been speculation or commentary in the media that because there are termination provisions in international agreements like this one, somehow it isn't a seven- to nine-year agreement.
It is a seven- to nine-year agreement. NAFTA has a six-month termination clause; we don't call NAFTA a six-month agreement. All American trade agreements save one—the free trade agreement they have with Israel—have a six-month termination provision in them. We don't call those six-month agreements. Those are trade agreements between states that are terminated only under the most exceptional circumstances, and having a termination provision is standard. We have one in all of our agreements, and the one that is now included in our softwood lumber agreement is a very strong termination provision.
We have very strong protection in this agreement for provincial forest policy regimes. The anti-circumvention clause in this agreement is far stronger than we've ever seen before; for example, in the softwood lumber agreement in the 1990s. This anti-circumvention clause allows market-based pricing. It allows timber prices to rise or fall. Back in the 1990s in the softwood lumber agreement, there was no way you could have any reduction, market-driven or otherwise, in stumpage.
In fact, British Columbia was forced to have a system called stumpage waterbedding at the demand of the United States, so that any reduction that might be contemplated in B.C. stumpage would have to be compensated by a dollar-for-dollar increase in stumpage somewhere else in the system, to hold the overall burden on the industry at the same place. There is no such provision in this agreement.
There is provision to ensure that provinces can take action to mitigate wildfires, to deal with pests such as the pine beetle, to deal with watershed protection, to take environmental measures, to deal with first nations land claims.
So the anti-circumvention provision in this agreement is very strong. And we should never forget that anti-circumvention cuts both ways: it also prevents the American industry and the Americans from pursuing trade actions against Canada for the life of the agreement. They are giving up sovereignty to attack us with trade actions; we are basically agreeing that we will not subvert the spirit and intent of this agreement with our policy changes. But we nevertheless have the flexibility to ensure that provinces can mange their forest management policies in a relatively free manner.
Again, this agreement provides for free trade in strong markets. Markets today are not strong. Markets in the next little while may not be strong. In fact, there is a serious risk of a down market in front of us, which is a further complication that members of the committee, members of the industry, and other governments are going to have to contemplate, because it has implications for the continued litigation scenario, which I'll come back to.
The agreement provides the choice for provinces of a supply restraint mechanism for down markets. It gives some flexibility, depending on the circumstances in different provinces, to deal with down markets in alternative ways.
There is an opportunity written into the agreement and a committee to explore further exemptions to the agreement. We know there are some areas we would like to have seen included to broaden the exemptions of the agreement. There is now a committee that would be struck government to government to deal with and review possible changes and exemptions to this agreement, and to do so in a timely manner.
I mentioned the termination provisions. There is complete assurance of at least three years of dispute-free operation of this agreement.
We have also negotiated into it what's called a standstill of 12 months over the life of the agreement, so that if the United States were to terminate the agreement, they could not bring a trade action within 12 months. That was a big request of the industry in Canada, and it was a big concession by the United States that provides significant comfort to Canadian industry.
We don't hear much about the third-country mechanism in this agreement and we hope we never have to use it, but there is a mechanism in the agreement that would protect Canada in some circumstances against third countries coming in and taking market share at the expense of Canada.
Let's look at the second alternative, continued litigation. There is no doubt that we've been successful in litigation to date, so you would have to say there is a high probability that we will win the critical remaining cases in this dispute. Let's be generous and give it a 90% probability. I don't think it's as high as 90%, but let's say it is 90% probable that we will win the remaining cases of this agreement. Let's assume further that we get the cash deposits back after winning our cases in two to three years. Again, depending on the appeals, the length of the legal processes, and the time it takes to unwind thousands of duty entries to get the cash flowing back to Canadian companies, it could be another three years or more. We may never see the money, but let's say we do.
In that scenario, the expected present value of a successful litigation strategy of that sort is under $4.3 billion, right off the top. There's time value of the money that is tied up with the U.S. Treasury. That money could be invested in treasuries or in capital and equipment in the industry, and nobody in the industry makes capital investments these days for a return on capital employed of less than 15% to 30%. So there is a huge forgone opportunity cost on having the money tied up for a significant period of time. So add that into the mix, and add the fact that duties would continue for a certain period of time--we don't know how long. We know there's been another administrative review conducted, so duty rates would rise from approximately 10.8% today to 14% as of December 1. So there's another cost. There are litigation costs and the cost of lawyers. There are costs in terms of the management resources in companies that are unproductively dedicated to dealing with the intense administration of dumping and countervailing duty investigations.
But let's look at the bigger cost, the bigger risk, and that is the risk of Lumber V. Anybody who says that we're one win away from free trade has simply not followed the softwood lumber industry and the trade issues around it in Canada for the past several decades. There is no doubt that if we walk away from this agreement, the industry in the United States would launch another action against Canada. Think of launching an action now where we have won the case of threat of injury, we've largely won the allegations of subsidy, and we've been doing okay on the dumping cases, but that's a mug's game. Think of a world where the markets are going into the ditch, which is what we're experiencing today. There's tremendous fear out there in the industry. In every company that's dependent on the housing market and the lumber business, their stocks are falling, prices are falling, and confidence is plummeting.
If you think that the U.S. industry is not going to take this opportunity to come at Canada again with another trade action, think again. They will. There is no doubt about that. We will see dumping again as a primary method of attack. Remember that dumping is not that hard a game to play, because it simply requires that you establish one of two things: that you're selling into the U.S. market at lower than you're selling into Canada--not likely; and that you're losing money on products you're selling into the U.S. market.
Anybody who knows the dumping file and who has seen how the Department of Commerce in the United States calculates dumping margins will know that they will have no problem establishing a substantial dumping margin. It will be spurious and fictional, but it will be sufficient to allow them, once again, to bring interim duties. And once again, we will be into the litigation cycle that has characterized this industry for a couple of decades.
The litigation cycle is this: you have a flimsy case of injury or threat of injury, as we had with Lumber IV, where we proved in all the appeals and the legal processes that there was no injury or threat of injury. We won those cases, but we've been through five years of duties that started at a combined rate of 27% and have now dropped to 10%. If anybody in this room, or in the Canadian industry, thinks we're going to avoid another litigation cycle, then I say, all right, make your decision, be accountable for it, but I'm here to tell you that I think a litigation cycle will be coming our way and it will be ugly. There will be job losses, there will be company failures, and communities will be in very difficult situations.
And that's not all. Don't think for a second that we can walk away from this agreement and, when we feel like it, negotiate another one. That is not going to happen, I can assure you. If anyone thinks the President is going to come back and negotiate softwood lumber after the Prime Minister and the President have put so much capital on the table to deal with this issue, I suggest that you give your head a shake. It is not going to happen. We're going to have a Congress that will be as protectionist or more protectionist than ever. I assure you that negotiations, as an option, will be gone for a minimum of three years.
In wrapping up, I would like to say, let's make a decision. I will respect the decision that everybody involved in this file has to make, but let's make a decision that's based on objective fact, analysis, and what we think the consequences are. Recognize the uncertainties, recognize the two choices we have, and stop playing games about there being some utopian free trade option that we will all benefit from in a few short months if we just have one more legal victory. That is not on the table.
What is on the table is continued litigation and a negotiated agreement that I think is the best softwood lumber settlement we've ever seen in this country. Let's make a decision. Let's take responsibility for our decisions. Let's make sure the companies take responsibility for their decisions with their shareholders, with their employees. Let's ensure that governments make a decision. Stand up, be counted, and let's accept the consequences. I will clearly respect those who are prepared to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Minister. In the middle of Parliament's summer recess, thank you for coming back to Ottawa. Thank you, colleagues. As Helena mentioned, thank you for taking time to study this important issue.
Minister, in my questions I wanted to touch on three issues. My colleagues in subsequent rounds are going to talk about some of the concerns we have--for example, money ending up in the hands of the U.S. industry and the treatment of the Canadian industry--but my colleagues will come to that.
Minister, I wanted to touch on three issues. The first one is that as an Atlantic Canadian--and I see my colleagues Mr. Casey and Mr. Eyking are here as well--I think we need to recognize that the Atlantic industry, the Maritime Lumber Bureau, and the provincial governments in my region of Canada have endorsed the agreement because the historic exemption of Atlantic Canada has in fact been preserved. I say that candidly and without reservation; for Atlantic Canada, this was an important moment. There have never been allegations of subsidy made against the Atlantic industry, for reasons that you understand very well, in terms of stumpage rates and private land holdings, so as an Atlantic Canadian, I'm certainly pleased that this agreement protects the rights we have fought hard to ensure are protected.
As an official opposition, we're concerned that other regions of the country--like yours, Minister--don't seem to have the same level of confidence in this agreement. I'm sure that as a member of Parliament from British Columbia, you're concerned with the reaction of your region.
Specifically with respect to the Atlantic exemption, I think that in previous comments you have resisted a separate agreement for the Maritimes similar to the 1996 exchange of letters that became known as the maritime accord. Now that the Maritimes are included in the main agreement, if, as you said in your closing comments, decisions are made by industry or by Parliament and this agreement does not go ahead, would you be prepared to look at a mechanism separate and apart from this issue that would preserve and protect the Maritimes exemption? That is certainly a question people in the industry in my part of Canada are asking.
Another issue, Minister, is with respect to the termination clause. You touched on it in your comments. Many industry spokespersons, and you've seen them as well as we have....
[Translation]
As regards Quebec, I heard the comments made by Mr. Chevrette and the industry in that province with respect to the need for more than a 23-month agreement. In Quebec and other regions of the country, the termination clause is causing a great deal of concern.
[English]
You have said that other free trade agreements have six-month cancellation provisions, for example, but there has never been such a litigious set of circumstances as those that apply to softwood lumber. Surely in all the different trade and sector agreements, for reasons you've identified, softwood lumber has been a very contentious and litigious moment.
Don't you worry, as do other representatives of the industry, that this termination clause in fact guts the argument of the Prime Minister and your own argument that it brings seven to nine years of stability? From our perspective, the termination clause renders moot the idea that there is a sustained and long period of stability and predictability, so that remains something we hope to improve.
A final point, Minister, is that you have said negotiations effectively ended with the initialling of your agreement in Geneva. We're very much hoping that's not the case. We, the official opposition, think you can still make improvements. We're not opposed to any agreement; we're opposed to an agreement that we believe is bad for the industry and bad for Canadian workers. We're hoping you can confirm for us today that some discussions are taking place, either among industry groups with the U.S. coalition or perhaps among provincial governments and the American government; that we may see mechanisms that could improve this agreement; and that perhaps that might be why the Prime Minister and the President didn't sign the agreement earlier in July--because you too are hopeful that we can bring some improvements to this agreement.
:
Thank you very much, honourable colleague.
I am really pleased with the exemption for Atlantic Canada. I think it's a very important part of this agreement and it does uphold a traditional exemption for Atlantic Canada.
As far as I am concerned and the government is concerned, the way to deal with the Atlantic Canada exemption is to get on with concluding this agreement. In the event that the agreement is not concluded, we're all going to have to contemplate how to pick up the pieces, and provincial governments and industry are going to have to get together. Certainly the federal government is here. We'll continue to pursue our trade litigation, as we would normally do, as a national government, but it would require some recontemplation that right now is hypothetical, and I'm not prepared to speculate on what we would or would not do in the event that this agreement is not concluded.
You did mention some issues with respect to concerns from B.C. In the last few months, B.C. had indicated several concerns that were vital. When it came right down to what the really critical hill-to-die-on concerns were, the anti-circumvention clause was absolutely their number one issue. There were a few other issues, and we have worked with them to deal with those.
There is another outstanding issue in B.C., and to be candid with you, it's a very controversial one. It's the request that lumber produced from logs from private lands in B.C. be exempt from the agreement. We can talk about that part of it, but it also includes a liberalization of whole log exports.
My honourable colleague on my right will know that liberalizing log exports is a very controversial issue in British Columbia. There has been a very substantial increase, even without liberalization, of raw log exports. It is causing serious concern in coastal communities that see these logs going to the U.S. for processing. So while we have been responsive to the province's wishes on that issue, that is not something we have succeeded in getting into the agreement.
What I think is critically important for B.C. and other provinces is the provision for a binational softwood lumber committee of the parties, of the governments, to look at these issues in a very timely way and see if we can create the basis for more exemptions and the basis for more improvements. So I think this agreement does, in a very constructive way, deal with some of the areas where we would have liked to make more progress but didn't.
With respect to negotiations being over, negotiations are over. Ambassador Wilson has had some discussions with provinces and industry in the last few weeks. The purpose of those discussions was around identifying further administrative issues that were still of concern to governments and industry, but the negotiation is over.
Mr. Emerson, in your opening statements you talked about the risk of Lumber V. You said you thought the American industry would launch other actions against the Canadian industry, which is exactly the point, and why so many in the industry oppose this proposed agreement: essentially, it gives $500 million to the coalition to launch further actions against the Canadian industry, and it starts us back from square one, because it erases four years of legal victories.
We have heard from the industry in the past that 20% of Canadian mills might close as a result of this agreement. What we have is a very badly flawed agreement and botched negotiations. As one industry representative told me, Canada has capitulated on everything. Essentially, over the course of negotiations from April 27 to July 1, we saw continued concessions to the United States. It's no surprise that the industry feels betrayed. Earlier that week, prior to July 1, the industry was very clear that they saw this as fundamentally flawed. They raised very serious objections, and yet on July 1 you initialled the agreement just the same.
I have three questions.
The first is, why did you initial an agreement when you knew the vast majority of the industry was opposed?
Secondly, the Conservative Party in opposition, when you were with the Liberal Party, supported loan guarantees to the industry. Why is the government not moving to provide loan guarantees to the industry, and why the strong-arm tactics trying to force the industry to accept an agreement that is unacceptable?
Thirdly, you raised these issues around litigation and about there being potentially two or three years before funds come back. The Prime Minister spoke, I thought, very irresponsibly. He talked about seven years of litigation. We know that currently—on July 21, with the Tembec case—we won and won quite easily, and that the industry is now looking into providing remedies to the court. The court will address the issue of remedies. They will most assuredly be applying for a preliminary injunction, which would mean the tariffs would be taken off in that case. That case and the ECC judgment on subsidy, which Canada has suspended, are the two cases that are in their last throes.
My question is very simple. We're hearing seven years and three years. We know the Tembec case can only be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and that the ECC judgment is non-appealable. So very specifically, how do you come up with these figures—three years or, in the Prime Minister's case, seven years of litigation—when we know they're not the case?
Thank you, Mr. Minister, for appearing today. I think all the parties are in agreement at least on that much, that we appreciate your appearance here today and your trying to clarify this agreement.
I have a number of things I want to get through and a few questions, and perhaps you could just jot them down. On the first one, perhaps you'd just want to comment. I find it more than a little bit puzzling and contradictory for the opposition to be so focused on the termination clause and so upset about the agreement. You'd think they'd be asking for an even shorter termination clause, given their opposition to the agreement and the fact that if it's that bad, wouldn't the Government of Canada perhaps somewhere down the road want to try to get out of it--if we were to buy into their arguments, which of course I don't and we don't?
I want to express, on behalf of the lumber companies in northern and central British Columbia, specifically in the riding of Prince George--Peace River, which I represent, that certainly they're very pleased with that part of the agreement that would see an accelerated repayment of the deposit. Some of these companies of course are hurting, and if the projected problems arise in the future with the market, that money is going to be incredibly important not only to those companies but to the workers they employ and the communities they reside in.
I want to ask a question specifically about the mountain pine beetle, which has devastated the pine forests of central and northern British Columbia and is now encroaching into northern Alberta. Is the anti-circumvention clause sufficient to allow for the increased harvesting of the mountain pine beetle-killed wood? That's a big concern to the companies and the people in central and northern British Columbia.
My last question, Mr. Minister--and I apologize for trying to cram so much into my five-minute slot here--is in particular for one of my colleagues, Randy Kamp, the MP for Pitt Meadows--Maple Ridge--Mission, who has a large number of lumber remanufacturers, or remanners, as they're sometimes called, in his riding. My understanding is that this agreement is certainly superior to what is in place currently for those remanufacturers. Could you comment, perhaps, on that issue? That, in addition to the other issues you have mentioned, was of concern to British Columbia in particular.
Also, could you potentially clarify the future litigation, as much as possible at least? We seem to get the concerns that the opposition are raising, that somehow this might go on for another three years; the Prime Minister said potentially seven years. I would actually submit, Mr. Minister, that we have no idea how long litigation could go on. It's a best guess type of scenario, because we have no control over what the Americans may or may not do. We have no crystal ball--you don't and I don't--as to what laws the Americans might pass if this agreement doesn't go ahead and tie their hands to some extent. Could you comment on that as well?
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Minister, I have followed developments as regards this agreement from the standpoint of Quebec's interests and I see that the various Canadian realities have been taken into account. You also took into account the various court rulings in our favour in recent years, with a view to strengthening the Canadian position as part of interest-based negotiations. And with this agreement, you will also be able to avoid further litigation or, as you say, “Lumber V”. As well, Quebec will be entitled to its fair share of exports.
When you worked with Mr. Peterson, the expectation was that we would recover half of the money paid to the United States, whereas under this agreement, $4.3 billion will be repaid.
The fact is that the agreement has been improved. It includes an accelerated refund mechanism, which makes loan guarantees of little use, cumbersome in fact, since they would force people to go more into debt. Under this agreement, they will be getting back their own money. As a Member of Parliament, I represent a riding where there are a lot of border mills. And you did in fact take into account the historic exemption enjoyed not only by mills in the Maritimes, but our border mills as well.
For all these reasons, Minister, I want to commend you on an excellent job. This is a comprehensive agreement. However, I do have one question with respect to the termination clause. You said yourself that the clause is nothing more than a red herring; that it is a non-issue. And if you had kept the April 28 agreement as is, with no termination clause, under international law, there would have been a unilateral one-year termination clause under the Vienna Convention.
However, at the request of Canadian industry, you made improvements to that 23-month clause and also negotiated a one-year standstill provision. That is unusual and provides extraordinary protection for our Canadian industry. Indeed, the Chief Negotiator for Quebec, Pierre-Marc Johnson, who is an expert on international law, made that very point.
So, I would be interested in hearing your comments with a view to clarifying that point because, unfortunately, we hear far too often that Canada gave in to the U.S., when in actual fact, it made very significant gains.
Thank you.