OGGO Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, May 6, 2004

¿

0905

The Chair (Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.))

Ms. Nycole Turmel (National President, Public Service Alliance of Canada)

¿

0910

¿

0915

¿

0920

The Chair

Mrs. Lynne Yelich (Blackstrap, CPC)

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo (Legal Officer, Collective Bargaining Branch, Public Service Alliance of Canada)

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

¿

0925

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

The Chair

Ms. Monique Guay (Laurentides, BQ)

¿

0930

Ms. Nycole Turmel

¿

0935

Ms. Monique Guay

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Ms. Monique Guay

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Ms. Monique Guay

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Ms. Monique Guay

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

¿

0940

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

The Chair

Mr. Marcel Proulx

Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo

Mr. Roger Gaudet (Berthier—Montcalm, BQ)

Mr. Marcel Proulx

Mr. Roger Gaudet

The Chair

Mr. Roger Gaudet

The Chair

Mr. Roger Gaudet

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

¿

0945

Mr. Marcel Proulx

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Mark Pacek (Regional Representative, Ottawa Regional Office, Public Service Alliance of Canada)

Mr. Marcel Proulx

¿

0950

Mr. Mark Pacek

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Marcel Proulx

The Chair

Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.)

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

Ms. Nycole Turmel

¿

0955

Mr. Marc Pacek

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

The Chair

Mr. Roger Gaudet

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mr. Roger Gaudet

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Ms. Monique Guay

Ms. Nycole Turmel

The Chair

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

À

1000

Ms. Nycole Turmel

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Ms. Nycole Turmel

The Chair

Ms. Nycole Turmel

À

1005

The Chair

The Chair

Mr. Steve Hindle (President, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada)

The Chair

Mr. Steve Hindle

À

1015

À

1020

À

1025

The Chair

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

À

1030

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

À

1035

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. Steve Hindle

The Chair

Ms. Monique Guay

Mr. Steve Hindle

Ms. Monique Guay

Mr. Steve Hindle

À

1040

Ms. Monique Guay

Mr. Steve Hindle

Ms. Monique Guay

Mr. Steve Hindle

Ms. Monique Guay

Mr. Steve Hindle

The Chair

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.)

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

À

1045

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

À

1050

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

The Chair

Mr. Marcel Proulx

Mr. Steve Hindle

À

1055

Mr. Marcel Proulx

Mr. Steve Hindle

The Chair

Mr. Roger Gaudet

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Roger Gaudet

Mr. Steve Hindle

Mr. Alex Shepherd

Mr. Steve Hindle

The Chair

Á

1100

Mr. Steve Hindle

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates

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NUMBER 013

l

3rd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, May 6, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0905)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.)): Good morning.

    Pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, April 20, 2004, we are considering Bill C-25, an act to establish a procedure for the disclosure of wrongdoings in the public sector, including the protection of persons who disclose the wrongdoings.

    This morning we are pleased to have, from the Public Service Alliance, Nycole Turmel, the national president. Welcome. We were looking forward to your input on Bill C-25.

    Would you please introduce your colleagues who are with you? I understand that you have a statement to make, and I'm sure the members will have some questions, so please begin.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel (National President, Public Service Alliance of Canada): Thanks a lot.

    Yes, I have with me Marc Pacek from our regional office here in Ottawa, as well as Jacquie de Aguayo from the collective bargaining branch.

    I will make part of my presentation in French, including the first part.

[Translation]

    On behalf of the 155,000 members of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, I would like to thank the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates for inviting us to put forward our observations on Bill C-25, the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.

    I want to make it clear, at the outset, that I have no illusions of this Bill passing before an election is called, and sincerely hope that the next government, whether led by the current Prime minister or not, decides to send it back to the drawing board.

    I take this position for three reasons.

    First, as a Union that has fought for legislated whistleblower protection for more than 20 years, we cannot support a Bill that seeks to create an illusion of protection for whistleblowers.

    Second, when it comes to whistleblower protection, the Bill rejects, in surprising form, the advice of public sector workers and their unions, the Public Service Integrity Officer—as articulated in his 2002-2003 Annual Report—and even a report of the special working group established by the President of the Treasury Board to review the recommendations of the Public Service Integrity Officer.

    Third, despite government rhetoric to the contrary, I do not believe that it is serious when it comes to facilitating disclosure and protecting whistleblowers.

    Following the tabling of Bill C-25 on March 22, the PSAC argued that the Bill had no teeth, and was quite simply too little, too late. Worse still, from our perspective, the Bill has the potential to discourage public sector workers from coming forward to report any present or future wrongdoing in their workplaces. That, quite clearly, is the most significant disagreement that we have with the Bill, as presented at first reading, and the issue that I will address first.

    The PSAC and others have advocated for many years that public sector workers should have the right to disclose information to an impartial and independent third party. Bill C-25 fails this test.

    Under Section 11 of the Bill, federal public sector workers must, in most cases, disclose wrongdoing to either their supervisor or a designated senior officer within the department or agency, as a first resort. In essence, this is simply a codification of the age-old practice within the government of Canada. A practice that has not worked in the past, and cannot be expected to work in the future. What we and many others wanted, and what would characterize effective whistleblowers legislation, is the ability of federal workers with knowledge of wrongdoing to have immediate access to an independent and impartial third party. That access to the third party is severely restricted under Section 12, which speaks volumes about the motivations of the government.

    As a result, we would urge your committee to amend Bill C-25 to allow any public sector worker with information on wrongdoing to have immediate, unrestricted and unfettered access to the Public Service Integrity Commissioner.

    A second and very important issue with regard to disclosure is the independence of the Commissioner, and again, Bill C-25 fails the test.

    When someone with knowledge of wrongdoing decides to blow the whistle, he or she must have an assurance that the person or institution that he or she informs is independent and impartial.

    The lack of independence and impartiality was one of the main reasons why the PSAC could not support the establishment, within government, of the Public Service Integrity Officer. I would point out for the record that our position on this issue should not be construed as reflecting badly on the current Public Service Integrity Officer or the President of the Treasury Board who created the Office. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the Public Service Integrity Officer has operated as independently as was possible under the circumstances, and that the President of the Treasury Board facilitated that independence.

¿  (0910)  

    But the problem remains, and it is overriding. That is, that an office that is a part of the government will never be seen by our union or membership as being independent, and will not be fully trusted or relied on.

    I cannot stress this point strongly enough. An independent and impartial office, agency or commission is essential to effective whistleblower protection. This can only be achieved if Bill C-25 is amended to create an independent Commission with its principal appointed as an officer of Parliament.

    A second point with regard to independence relates to the administrative structure contemplated in Bill C-25. The Bill refers to a Commissioner, but not a Commission, and provides under Section 19 that the

“Minister may provide the Commissioner with the officers and employees within the public service of Canada and with the facilities and professional advisors necessary for the proper conduct of the Commissioner's duties”.

    A third and final point with regard to independence is the ability of those responsible for overseeing and investigating complaints filed by whistleblowers to do their job effectively. Again, Bill C-25 fails the test.

    Any entity that has, as its primary responsibility, the investigation of wrongdoing must have the ability to access information, and that can only be achieved if the entity has the power of subpoena.

[English]

    Bill C-25 as currently drafted provides for the “protection of persons making disclosures”, other than a disclosure “that is frivolous or vexatious or in bad faith” or “makes a disclosure other than in the course of a procedure established under this or any other Act”. This section of the bill has generated some concern, especially with regard to the recourse available to whistle-blowers.

    Questions have been raised with regard to the appropriate body to resolve complaints from whistle-blowers who have been subject to reprisal. The government has decided that labour boards, rather than the commissioner, are the appropriate body.

    Given the problems that I've already outlined with regard to the administrative structure that is proposed to deal with complaints of wrongdoing, I simply do not believe that the commissioner will have the resources, authority, or independence necessary to address reprisals. As a result, and in the circumstances, the bill's provision that these issues be addressed by labour boards is appropriate. It's also true that labour boards have experience addressing situations where there is disguised discipline.

    Let me make a comment or two on situations where whistle-blowers will be subject to discipline under the act.

    We have a very serious concern with the potential that our members will face reprisal under paragraphs 9(b) and (c), and that this potential will serve to chill whistle-blowers. Leaving aside bad faith under paragraph 9(b), an individual worker with information to disclose must first decide whether the information will subsequently be determined to be “frivolous” or “vexatious”, in which case he or she will be subject to disciplinary action, “including termination of employment”.

    Our position on this clause is that it will serve to chill potential whistle-blowers, because the average worker will not always be in a position to determine whether the information he or she wants to disclose is appropriate to disclose. I'll go further, and argue that the penalties that are contemplated for disclosure that is made in bad faith should be deleted from the bill as well. I take this position for two reasons. First, disclosure will not normally be in the public domain, so that bad faith disclosure will not cause a problem for the government. And of equal importance, the objective of the bill should surely be to have people come forward, and not to make potential whistle-blowers second-guess their motivation.

    As a result, we urge the committee to delete paragraph (b) from clause 9.

    We are also concerned with the application of paragraph 9(c), since federal workers who did not disclose information first within their department will open themselves up to disciplinary action, again up to dismissal. Here again, the onus is on the individual to determine under what circumstances he or she can bypass the internal departmental or agency structure and disclose information directly to the commissioner. Again, this will serve to chill potential whistle-blowers, and has no place in effective whistle-blower legislation.

    As a result, we urge the committee to delete paragraph (c) from clause 9.

    One final point is warranted with regard to penalties. A person who commits a wrongdoing is subject to any sanction provided by law as well as internal disciplinary action. From our perspective, initiating a reprisal against a whistle-blower is a very serious wrongdoing, which should include a sanction over and above normal internal disciplinary action. To be clear, reprisals against whistle-blowers can only be implemented by people in authority against people who disclose information that is in the public interest. That being the case, the act of initiating a reprisal should be subject to summary conviction fines.

    Those are my major concerns and comments with regard to the legislative provisions of Bill C-25 per se. Before concluding, however, I would like to make a few general observations that speak to the difference between the government's position, as outlined in Bill C-25, and the position we have taken.

    I'm tabling with the committee two documents that address the issue of whistle-blower protection. The first is a question that Environics Research Group asked Canadians on behalf of the PSAC last September and October, and the poll result showed that 89% of Canadians want the government to enact legislation that protects whistle-blowers from reprisal.

¿  (0915)  

    The second document is a letter that I wrote to the President of the Treasury Board on February 23, 2004. That letter, written in response to a request from the minister for suggestions as to how to protect whistle-blowers in the period before legislation is enacted, recommended that the government agree to a change to collective agreements between the PSAC and Treasury Board to incorporate a whistle-blower clause that we had already tabled with the Treasury Board. The specific clause reads as follows:

No employee shall be disciplined or otherwise penalized, including but not limited to demotion, suspension, dismissal, financial penalty, loss of seniority, advancement or opportunity in the public service, as a result of disclosing any wrongful act or omission, such as an offence against an Act of Parliament, an Act of a legislature of any province or any instrument issued under any such Act; an act or omission likely to cause a significant waste of public money; an act or omission likely to endanger public health or safety or the environment.

    I should underscore the fact that the Treasury Board reply to my letter was not delivered by the President of the Treasury Board, but by government negotiators to one of the PSAC negotiating teams. That response was a clear and unequivocal no, suggesting, once again, that the government's commitment to whistle-blowing legislation is rhetorical at best. In fact, under section 16 of Bill C-25 a whistle-blower who has suffered from a reprisal is explicitly prevented from taking his or her complaint to adjudication or arbitration. This provision would make our proposed contract language unenforceable.

    The government and members of the committee can rest assured that we will be pursuing this demand at the bargaining table, regardless of the status of Bill C-25 or any other whistle-blowing legislation that is introduced or adopted, because we believe it is essential that whistle-blowers have effective recourse.

    I'm ready to answer questions on this.

¿  (0920)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    We're going to begin with Lynne Yelich.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich (Blackstrap, CPC): Thank you.

    I was wondering about incentives. Should there be incentives for whistle-blowers to come forward, and what would you suggest they might be? You certainly have put the fear in the bill, but do you have any suggestions?

    Also, do you think it should be mandatory for employees to come forward if they see wrongdoing? How would you define “wrongdoing”?

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I'll start, and someone else will add to my comments if necessary.

    I believe that at this point the parts we are talking about in paragraphs 9(b) and (c) are not helpful in encouraging people to blow the whistle, so you should be sure to delete that part.

    As well, there should be education and training in the workplace to explain the policy or to explain what is in the best interests of the public. And there should be full protection for the whistle-blowers who come forward. In that, I'll include what we wanted in the collective agreement, to make sure that all the unions have to be involved in the process. That would be my first reaction to this. At the end of the day, if it happened that a person in authority was using his or her role to make reprisals against whistle-blowers, then there should be a penalty, including a fine as well.

    I also believe the commissioner should be able to receive the complaint, as we said, but at the same time to direct. In the past, even if we didn't agree with the full responsibility the commissioners had, because they could not protect the whistle-blowers, at least when they received a lot of complaints that could be related to a grievance or to a labour-management issue, they were able to redirect the person to the right place. The way we see the bill right now, they won't be able to do this.

    That's my first reaction.

    Jacquie, do you want to add something?

    Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo (Legal Officer, Collective Bargaining Branch, Public Service Alliance of Canada): The only thing I would add is to answer the question of whether or not disclosures ought to be mandatory. I think this would be a very difficult thing to apply in force once the legislation is in place. I think, as Madame Turmel just said, the important thing is culture change within the public service. Parts of the bill require the new Public Service Human Resources Management Agency to engage in culture change within the public service through education, training, and dissemination of information on employee rights. That's the way to encourage public service workers to come forward.

    The Chair: This is a question that has come up, and I think it's really important. If an employee is aware of wrongdoing, as defined, is it your position that they not be obligated to report?

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: What we have said in the past is that there is no protection for the person who wants to blow the whistle. So how can they go forward? It's just the opposite. Experience has shown that when they did do that, they were penalized.

    The Chair: Okay, stop there. Let's assume there's full protection. This is about the public interest; it's not just about protection. I think it's very important that you take a position on whether it should be at the discretion of the employee to disclose a wrongdoing.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I believe it should be at the discretion of the employee. But we believe, and Jacquie said this, that through training, through a change of culture, it will happen; they will do it. But it will take a while before they do so, because the environment has not supported it. They have to feel comfortable that they can do it. It will take a while to change that, I agree. But I would say that at the end of the day, yes, they should; they should say it. But as I said, there has to be a change before they feel they can trust the system to be able to do it.

¿  (0925)  

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: We had a witness here who made the suggestion of a mandatory referral mechanism for disclosures falling within the jurisdiction of other agencies, such as the PSC. Do you agree with that or not?

    Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo: I'm not sure I understand what the recommendation was.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: That the whistle-blower should first be referred through the...if it was the Public Service Commission, then they'd go to the Public Service Commission first, before they go to the commissioner.

    I just wanted to know on record what you think of that.

    Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo: If the question is ought the presumption to be that the individual who is making the disclosure go through the management steps within the agency in which they work, or that portion of the public service, I think the position Madame Turmel expressed this morning on behalf of the PSAC is that there ought not to be that presumption.

    There ought to be enough mechanisms whereby the individual employee can make that judgment call themselves and not be penalized for it. So to the extent that there's a commission, or that through this culture change there are individuals within departments who are designated as another mechanism through which individual employees can go in order to make a disclosure, the more places you allow employees to go in order to get these things dealt with, the better. But that it be mandatory that it go internal first is not the appropriate response.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: They're probably thinking of that because it would have to be sifted through to see whether it's really a labour-related issue or an issue of management or other wrongdoings. Until we really define “wrongdoing”, can we make any suggestions on that referral?

    That's my opinion. You can go ahead, or someone else can.

    The Chair: Ms. Yelich is quite right in raising this. The definition of “wrongdoing” in the bill is.... There are a couple of the items--for example, the term “gross mismanagement”. I've always wondered, what's the difference between gross mismanagement and mismanagement? Where is the demarcation? Doesn't that cause you any grief?

    The other one is “serious breach” of the code of conduct. Isn't a breach of the code of conduct just as bad as a serious breach? I'm not sure where that is. It seems a little fuzzy to me. What is a “wrongdoing”?

    I'm almost a little concerned--and I'm not sure if others are--about whether the foundation for your input has to do with the whole range of employee grievances and the history of reprisals, as opposed to these matters that ostensibly occur very rarely but are extremely serious. A Radwanski situation would be an example, I would think. This is very serious stuff.

    That's why I asked the question about whether those things shouldn't be mandatory rather than discretionary to disclose. If you haven't given consideration to whether this definition of “wrongdoing” puts you in a frame of “we're talking about the serious stuff, not about employee grievances”, does that change your opinion on whether or not people should be disclosing in the public interest?

    Anyway, we're going to go on to Madam Guay, and we'll see if we can flesh this out a little bit as we go through.

[Translation]

    Ms. Monique Guay (Laurentides, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Good morning, Ms. Turmel. It's a pleasure to see you again. We have had opportunities to work together in the past.

    There is no doubt that this Bill will encourage workers to make disclosures if they are aware of wrongdoing. But before setting up a system with a commissioner and staff, there also has to be a change in the culture. In the public service, a culture change is not something that happens very easily. There will be a transition period.

    There is no doubt that this Bill will need to have real teeth if it is to be effective. Otherwise, all of this is for naught. Everyone understands that. This must not be a bill that is introduced simply to make the government look good just before an election campaign. We are also very much aware of that. There has been talk of that for quite some time now.

    You referred earlier to mandatory disclosure. As I see it, no one is in a better position than an employee to know whether he should or should not make a disclosure. This could even endanger his career or his health. Yes, it should be mandatory, to the greatest extent possible. We don't necessarily know what goes on in people's lives. Only an employee can see what is going on and decide when it is appropriate to react. It is not up to us, but rather, to the person directly involved in the situation, to make that determination.

    It is true that the disclosure must be made, but only where that is possible, and under conditions that are as supportive as possible. That is not necessarily something we see in this Bill. But it is something we should look at.

    The matter of the Commissioner's role has been raised a number of times. Most of the witnesses who have appeared before the committee would like the Commissioner to be completely independent—a little like the Auditor General. Yesterday, the minister said to me, in a spirit of good will, and I don't blame him, to have a look at clause 32. Clause 32 reads as follow:

32. The Minister must cause a copy of every annual report, and every special report made under Section 30, to be tabled in each House of Parliament on any of the first ten days on which that House is sitting after the Minister receives the report.

    That means they have ten days to try and change the report or take corrective action. We really don't know. And there is no way we can know. On the other hand, if the Commissioner tables the report directly, he doesn't have to go through that process. Nor does he have to face a minister and tell that minister he will be tabling his report. Everyone knows that the minister will read the report.

    It is quite clear that in that regard, most witnesses want an independent commissioner.

    If you have any amendments to suggest, I would very much appreciate your forwarding as many as possible to us, in order to help the committee make this bill as good as it can be. I would also like you to address the matter of senior officers, which you touched on only very briefly. We have been told that senior officers are often in the best position to receive a complaint because they are working inside the department and are already aware of what is going on.

    However, if someone wants to make a disclosure that may involve a senior officer, then we have a major problem. I would be interested in hearing your views on this.

¿  (0930)  

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I want to begin by addressing the matter of mandatory disclosure. This is, indeed, a personal decision. Except for situations that only occur once—a special expense that is out of the ordinary, for example—very often, the case builds slowly. That person is confronted with the same situation day after day and starts to wonder whether or not he or she should make a disclosure, until it reaches the point where it becomes intolerable.

    At the PSAC, we have not looked specifically at that issue. Our first reaction would be to reject mandatory disclosure in the current context. In subclauses 9(b) and (c) of the bill, it states that someone who misjudges a situation and makes accusations that cannot be proven or that cause a problem can be subject to reprisals, including termination of employment. As long as this kind of provision is in the bill, our reaction will be to say no to mandatory disclosure. Also, you may have noticed that this appears at the beginning of the bill. Very often people don't read a bill right to the end. So, when you see this provision, you really wonder why anyone would be at all inclined to make a disclosure under such conditions.

    Now, in terms of bargaining agents or the role of unions in all of this, we have been given no rights whatsoever, in the sense that an individual cannot file a grievance under the collective agreement, for example. That is certainly not something that will allow us to contribute to culture change or work jointly on education. It is from that perspective that I approach this question.

    Our second point has to do with senior officers. In our opinion, it is essential that persons wanting to make a disclosure be able to go directly to the Commissioner. I believe the current Commissioner has played a very positive role. He himself said that given the lack of protection and the situation that currently prevails inside government, workers simply were not coming to him. As a result, people were submitting labour relations issues to him far more frequently, and he would simply redirect them. That is a role that he could play.

    All the power is being given to one individual. I am happy to hear that you are talking about an independent agency, rather than someone reporting to a minister. That may help, but that person must have the flexibility to do his job.

¿  (0935)  

    Ms. Monique Guay: Thank you.

    Yesterday, we voted on a bill that deals with psychological harassment that was tabled by my colleague from the Bloc Quebecois. Of course, it was defeated. However, this is something we have to discuss.

    Last week, when I rose to comment on the bill, a House of Commons employee came to see me afterwards crying. She told me that tears came to her eyes as she listened to me speak, because she had been harassed herself for two years. There are many such cases. This is a problem that can affect employees here, working with us. I told her I hoped we could have a proper debate on this and that action would be taken.

    There are no provisions in this bill dealing with psychological harassment, and I'm wondering whether you would be in favour of such provisions.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: This actually relates to what I was saying earlier. When an employee decides to put a case together to prove there have been abuses, sometimes the word gets out. Often, the harassment starts even before the person has been able to put a case together or make a disclosure. In that sense, there is in fact a danger of harassment, and harassment is occurring now. Such a person ends up feeling isolated, and we know what the consequences of that can be.

    Now, should this be addressed in this bill?

    Our goal is to ensure that through collective bargaining, we are able to obtain some kind of protection. Psychological harassment is recognized in our collective agreement, and we are seeking to broaden that concept. We are currently in negotiations to address that problem. We want all forms of harassment to be acknowledged.

    That way, there will be protection in place to support the bill.

    Ms. Monique Guay: Would you like this bill to provide for co-operation with the union? Some links have to be established here. You are in a good position to do that, and I am sure that you do receive complaints at the union level. That would require some involvement, and there would have to be some sort of relationship established so that you could work co-operatively with the Commissioner.

    You are saying the Commissioner should be the one to receive all complaints and then direct people to refer their complaint to this or that organization. In some cases, he could recommend that they consult their union. People are not necessarily aware of all the technicalities. There is a lot of good will out there, but a departmental employee may not really know where to go. If he knows that there is a Commissioner who is really neutral, then he could go directly to the Commissioner, who could tell him which organization could most appropriately handle his complaint. That would already be a first step.

    Right now, there is no provision for that in the bill. A public servant has to go through a senior officer. And yet we all know how tightly knit the departments can be. It's not always easy to be faced with that.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I do not disagree with you, but as we mentioned earlier, I do want disclosure cases to remain confidential. That is absolutely clear. However, in terms of prevention, training, and culture change, we have both said and demonstrated that we are prepared to work together with the government to bring about change.

    Ms. Monique Guay: Do you sense there is really a will to change the culture of the public service? You can tell me. Things are changing.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: My view is that it is extremely difficult to bring about change.

    Ms. Monique Guay: It's long term.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: There should be some openness to the idea. I think it is very important that such change occur.

    An honourable member: Marcel!

    Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): She can't say no. It's obvious that the answer is yes. That's obvious.

[English]

    The Chair: I'm curious whether anybody has an estimate of how long it would take to change the culture of the civil service. If you have that answer, you can help us enormously.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I could talk about my own experience. When you want to change something, it takes a long time. But when you want to do it....

    I think at least where there's a show of leadership, a show of wanting to change, putting the right people in place and then working with the unions all together.... That's the difficult part, because I don't think that happens right now. Every time we want to participate jointly on things, it's more for information than to really work together. I'm just thinking about the joint learning program that we wanted to work on. Right now it's not going anywhere. The government has spent millions of dollars on this one.

¿  (0940)  

    The Chair: My concern is that in terms of your definition or picture of what would represent a culture change, when we reach that point, chances are there won't be the need for any unions. It means the world is perfect when there are no unions.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I don't think it would be perfect; it would be perfect control from the employers. I don't think we want that, either.

    The Chair: Everybody would be happy and harmonious.

    Mr. Proulx.

[Translation]

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

    Ms. Turmel and colleagues, good morning and welcome to the committee. It is always a tremendous pleasure to see you and have a chance to work with you. Don't worry, I won't ask you any questions about what the Bloc Quebecois' intentions are here. We will just assume that they're acting in the best interests of public servants.

    Ms. Turmel, as you know, I take a great interest in everything having to do with the public service. There are a couple of questions I would like to put to you in order to better understand your position and determine where changes are required. Indeed, as regard changes or interpretations, you undoubtedly know that Minister Coderre appeared before the committee on April 27. The famous issue of employees being able to make a disclosure directly to the Commissioner was covered in detail by Mr. Coderre. As far as he's concerned, there would be no problem in terms of employees' being able to go directly to the Commissioner. I agree with you, however, that this is not exactly what the bill implies. So, some changes or improvements will be needed.

    The same applies to the subject you touched on earlier, with respect to protection of information. Mr. Coderre informed the committee on that same occasion, April 27, that amendments would be brought forward by the government to make corrections in that area. So far, so good.

    Ms. Turmel, I would like you to explain your position on incentives. We discussed them briefly earlier. There are different levels of incentives. There are what could be called soft incentives, meaning incentives that would prevent reprisals. But there are also far more direct incentives, such as monetary compensation and the like. What is the position of the Public Service Alliance of Canada on incentives, Ms. Turmel?

[English]

    Ms. Jacquie de Aguayo: I think the position is....

[Translation]

    Mr. Roger Gaudet (Berthier—Montcalm, BQ): When you see something is not right, you come forward right away.

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: Mr. Chairman, my question was addressed to the witness. It is the opinion of the Public Service Alliance of Canada that I'm interested in, not that of the Bloc Quebecois. I know they will have an opinion—

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: This isn't a vote, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

    The Chair: No. I have your name on the list and you're going to speak after Mr. Tirabassi.

[Translation]

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: I had a point of order. We are not here to play politics, but rather, to consider this bill. I think you should be able to understand that. I didn't come to this meeting to hear someone talk about politics. If he wants to talk politics, we can do that, Mr. Chairman. Pardon the expression, but a little jerk like that won't get far with me!

[English]

    The Chair: Order, Mr. Gaudet. Order, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: On a point of order. I have never been one to play politics. You have been working with me here long enough to know that I've never done that. And I certainly don't intend to put up with this kind of thing.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Proulx has asked a question of the witness. I understand that you will want to have your say, and you are on the list, but I would rather hear the answer from the witness. We will hear your commentary when you have your full slot of time.

    I understand there may be some disagreements, but we have to respect the differences.

    I'd like to have the answer from the witness, please.

[Translation]

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: Thank you. Our union has never agreed with the idea of providing a reward. I believe that it is through education, by delivering the right message, and by giving public servants a healthy workplace that they will be encouraged to disclosure irregularities when they occur. If we start offering rewards, we may end up having doubts about their true motivation. That's why I don't agree with the idea.

    On the other hand, if a person of authority abuses his or her power and takes reprisals against the individual that disclosed the abuse, and the allegation proves to be true, then the person in a position of authority should be punished, either monetarily or in career terms. That is our position.

    To answer your question, I'd say that we don't agree with the idea of providing rewards, either for making a disclosure or for performing well. Salary increases and good working conditions should be compensation enough.

¿  (0945)  

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: Ms. Turmel, I would just like to talk about your suggestion that subclause 9(b) be deleted from the bill. Nothing in this bill would prevent a public servant from making a disclosure unanimously. That means that an employee could provide documentation or information to the Commissioner or senior officials in what is commonly called a brown envelope, and in such a case, both the senior official and the Commissioner would have to act on it and at least verify whether the allegations are founded or not.

    If we delete subclause 9(b), how can we possibly avoid the possibility of disclosures that are frivolous or made in bad faith? You are aware of some, so am I, and so is my colleague here. As members of Parliament, we receive bits and pieces of information alleging that so and so did this or that, but we discover fairly quickly—sometimes more quickly that others—that their actions are motivated by vengeance or jealousy. This kind of thing occurs for all sorts of reasons; it's human nature. So, what can we do to avoid that sort of situation, or how can we at least try to discourage people from doing that?

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: In our discussions with him, the Public Integrity Commissioner mentioned that very often, such cases were related to labour relations issues. Because people really didn't know where to go, they thought of other ways of dealing with the issue. So, if we improve labour relations, I believe we will resolve part of the problem.

    On the other hand, someone who decides to make a disclosure knows full way that even though the information remains confidential within the committee or working group, there are problems. As a result, that individual will think twice before making a disclosure. That's why we don't think subclause 9(b) could possibly be helpful or assist someone wanting to find out about other forms of recourse or redress. That is my answer.

    There will always be brown envelopes, whether you pass this bill or whether you do not. Will the Commissioner conduct an investigation regarding the content of the brown envelope? That is a decision he will make when the time comes, just as we do when we receive such an envelope. That is what he has to do. At this point, given that culture change and a demonstration of leadership are needed, we do not believe that this will be helpful.

    Mr. Mark Pacek (Regional Representative, Ottawa Regional Office, Public Service Alliance of Canada): Could I add something? Part of the Commissioner's role is to determine that a complaint is unfounded and that no investigation is needed.

    Consequently, where frivolous or bad faith disclosures are involved, well, the employee would have to make his disclosure to the Commissioner, who would then tell him that there is no reason to pursue the matter any further. That being the case, there is no risk for the public service or for its reputation.

    The perverse effect of this provision of the bill is that it will discourage people from making complaints.

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: For fear that their complaint will be deemed—

¿  (0950)  

    Mr. Mark Pacek: For fear of being dismissed if their complaint is deemed to be frivolous or in bad faith.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: If only one individual or office receives the complaint, that may help. However, if an employee has to go through the whole internal bureaucratic structure, there is more of a risk that the information will not remain confidential.

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you kindly.

    Mr. Tirabassi, followed, finally, by Mr. Gaudet.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.): I too would like to welcome the President of the Public Service Alliance and members of her delegation who are appearing before the committee today.

    The President of the Privy Council, when he appeared before the committee, indicated that when the bill was drafted--and he referred to this several times in answer to questions and indeed in his opening statement--there was wide and inclusive consultation and input from a working group. However, I'm not sure what the composition of that group was. First of all, I'd like to ask an indication from yourself as to your involvement, as the head of the largest employees' group in the public service, if any, on that committee. I would take it we can assume you had membership on the committee, the working group.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: Which committee are you talking about?

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: There was a working group in which apparently there was input and help to try to bring together what the ideas should be.

    The Chair: Mr. Keyserlingk and Kernaghan, etc., the task group.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: We were not involved at all.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Was there any consultation?

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: No. We had a few presentations made by Mr. Keyserlingk inside, at PSAC, at one of our boards. And I know he met with the bargaining agents at one point. But there was no input, no.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: So there was no consultation from PSAC on this bill.

    Was there an invitation to participate?

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: Not that I remember, no.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: That's certainly not the answer I was--

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I'd like to clarify that, because I do remember some things, which I talked about in my presentation. At one point we met with Mr. Alcock. We were bargaining, a few of us, the executive of the National Joint Council, and Mr. Alcock raised the issue that he was looking at the bill, and because he said he knew it wouldn't happen right away, meanwhile he wanted input on how we can protect those who blow the whistle. And that's why I wrote him a letter saying that we are ready to discuss right now, even if we don't have a new agreement, with you our demands and to make sure that we protect and we can make that commitment. That's the involvement we had. I received no as an answer.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I'm going to quote from your presentation on page 5 this morning, one sentence, second paragraph:

And, of equal importance, the objective of the bill should surely be to have people come forward, and not to make potential whistleblowers second-guess their motivation.

    I've heard this time and time again, and it's not just in your presentation. Should the priority of the bill not be first and foremost, in its major objective, to in the end have better service for Canadians and certainly improved and realized efficiencies, whether they be in the type of service or that they're done in a much more financially prudent fashion? Could you comment on that, please?

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: If I follow you, I will say, and I have said it many times, that our role as a union is to work with the members we represent. But the role of the government and the workers inside the government is to serve Canadians without conflict of interest. That's clear to us. That's their role, and we want them to have the tools to be able to do that.

    In order for the workers to do that, in order for them to feel comfortable in their environment, they have to feel safe and they have to feel that they receive the advice and they receive the tools to be able to do that. So if they see wrongdoing inside the public sector and they start to be insecure, how can they do that and how can they properly serve the public in general?

¿  (0955)  

    Mr. Marc Pacek: If the objective of the legislation is to have a more efficient and effective public service, then you have to have a mechanism, absolutely, for workers to blow the whistle on waste and mismanagement.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: That's it.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Gaudet.

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Tirabassi asked the question I wanted to put to the witness. Are you telling us that they never asked for your views on this bill? Here I have the names of the working group members who wrote to Mr. Coderre, and no one from the public service was represented.

    I believe they are all people in retirement, such as Mr. Denis Desautels, Hélène Beauchemin, Kenneth Kernaghan, etc. If you would like to have this, Mr. Proulx, I'd be pleased to give it to you.

    I'm happy that you have told us they didn't ask for your views. What would the best organizational structure be for people wanting to make a disclosure?

    When you look at what is happening these days in the Parliamentary system, it's clear that improvements are needed. We all know what has gone on in recent months. Nobody knows anything about anything, from the top levels of government right down to the lowest levels. Nobody knows anything and everything just gets lost in the... As you say, maybe what is needed here is a well-structured organization chart. Even the Auditor General is unable to access all the information she needs, and she is supposed to be independent.

    So, I think we need to be careful here and carefully consider where Bill C-25 could lead us. This bill is supposed to protect public servants making disclosures—not the government. But the way the bill is currently worded, it protects the government. I would be interested in your views on that.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: As far as we are concerned, there is no doubt that an individual wishing to make a disclosure must have the right to go directly to the commissioner. As for the organizational structure, I don't want to venture an opinion on how the commissioner should set up his office or what process should be followed to provide access to people wanting to consult him.

    As we all know, the problem is always one of communication or information. People need to know how information is going to be disseminated and how an individual can access the proper authority, without having to jump through a lot of hoops in order to do so.

    In the bill as currently worded, the minister may... The wording is clear: it doesn't say the minister “shall”, but that he “may”, at the request of the commissioner, provide him with officers and employees and the organizational structure he wants.

    I understand that there have to be certain limits and a proper framework for establishing a budget, but in this case, it says the minister will be making the decision and that he will be the one providing the resources. We could end up with an office staffed by only one person. I don't think that would be very effective.

    So, I don't want to venture an opinion as to how many staff, the structure that is needed, and so one, but at least—

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: You have focussed more on the question of the Commissioner's independence.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: Yes, he has to be completely independent.

    Ms. Monique Guay: But he can't choose his own staff.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: No, he can't choose his staff, but I imagine that, as would be the case for any manager, he will have his say as to how the staffing process is carried out. It has to be open and transparent, according to the usual practice.

[English]

    The Chair: Madam Yelich.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: One of the thoughts I have is trying to separate a labour grievance from a wrongdoing. I think until we define those two items....

    Also, yesterday we did have a witness here, also a victim, a whistle-blower, and she also said the same, that she also was not asked to speak to the working committee. So I almost think we should start all over again and throw out the legislation and meet with the unions and the real whistle-blowers. But that's a question for the minister, I suppose.

    Psychological harassment, how would you define that? We're talking about human nature. Wouldn't that be more labour-related? I think perhaps after a wrongdoing is revealed, as it was in the Radwanski case, then we have some harassment. But if we're just talking about putting harassment under the purview of this bill, I would have some concerns, because it's indefinable. Some of this is so indefinable. We can't even define “wrongdoing” right now; how would you define “psychological harassment”?

    I wondered if that's really where we're going. Will it mitigate our work? Because what we're really looking for are some real serious management problems. Does this become labour? That's what I worry about. I think a lot of the things you say are very important and very good, but what we really are after is getting at the gross mismanagement and all the other--the Radwanski cases.

    I'm going to ask you, how many public servants are in your purview, and how many cases could you see coming forward in a year? How would you handle them? Let's pretend you're the integrity officer. What would you suspect would come?

À  (1000)  

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I would talk about what I have heard from other people, so it wouldn't really be my experience on that.

    I should talk about our own experience. At one point--I cannot remember what year it was--we had a 1-800 line exactly for that. We told members, “If you don't want to blow the whistle, and we understand you don't want to do that, call our office”. We had a line that went all over Canada.

    In the beginning there were a lot of phone calls to talk about labour-management issues, where to go for grievances, and things like that, but within a year we didn't get that many cases. For the integrity officer, it will probably be the same. By the time you get the change, the information, and everything, if it is well publicized it will be quite busy. After that there will be a change, but I hope by then that it will have changed to the point that there won't be many cases.

    I cannot answer your question on how many cases. I hope Mr. Radwanski's case will be the only one the government will have. It's not good for anybody. But I know there might be other cases.

    On the number of public workers, we represent 155,000, which includes crown corporations as well as agencies. So it will impact on more than just those in government. We fully agree that it should be expanded outside of Treasury Board employees.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: That's fine. I'm not going to say anything more, except I am going to reiterate that yesterday's witness, Joanna Gaultieri, said she was not asked. She wrote to the working group, and had no response or input. I'd like that to be on the record. She was not sought out, despite her extensive legal knowledge of the issue. I think it's people like that who should help us draw up the legislation.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: You asked a question about harassment. As I said in my presentation, this bill won't be adopted before the election. If there is consultation afterwards in the real process, we can talk about those debates and whether it should be mandatory or not. We have a first reaction to that. It might stay the same. Should harassment be included? What should be included in the legislation? How can we work together to change the culture and everything? That's the best approach we can suggest.

    The Chair: I think that's a good place to stop.

    I share the committee's concern that maybe the consultation process does not appear to have been as exhaustive as it should have been.

    If you require copies of the task force report, or Mr. Keyserlingk's report, I'm sure the clerk could get you copies so you have the benefit of that. I know you're following the transcripts that are available of this. But we want you to have the benefit of the thinking of others who may have a slightly different view of the model that should be applied here. UIltimately, this will have to be substantively negotiated to the best fit to meet the public interest but at the same time provide proper protection for all stakeholders.

    Ms. Nycole Turmel: I appreciate your comments, and I understand and agree that we should be consulted. But if you make recommendations, I suggest you make sure there is a timeline. We don't want a delay in whistle-blowing legislation. We want to make sure that workers are protected. We appreciate it.

À  (1005)  

    The Chair: Understood.

    Thank you very kindly, all of you.

    We're going to suspend to set up our next witnesses.

À  (1005)  

---

À  (1012)  

    The Chair: We are resuming consideration of Bill C-25.

    We're pleased to have with us, from the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, Mr. Steve Hindle, president.

    Welcome, Mr. Hindle. Please introduce your colleague to us. We understand you have a presentation to make. I'm very sure the members will have some questions for you, so please begin.

    Mr. Steve Hindle (President, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Bob McIntosh is with me. He works as the policy adviser to the institute's president, and has more than 30 years of experience in labour relations in federal as well as some provincial jurisdictions.

    Before I begin my presentation, for those who want to follow in our brief I will be starting on page 6. You will notice that the brief contains suggested wording for amendments that we think will achieve the recommendations we want.

    Mr. Chair, I'm at your disposal as to whether or not you want me to read the amendments themselves, or if it's sufficient to just speak to what's in the brief.

    The Chair: Let's speak to it. It will be a more productive use of our time.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: I think so. It might even be a little bit clearer.

    The Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada welcomes the opportunity to speak to the committee today concerning this important legislation. The institute has made presentations to parliamentary committees before on this issue, and we sincerely hope that this will be the moment we see the realization of legislative protection for public sector employees who come forward to disclose wrongdoing in the public sector.

    Since 1920 the institute has been advocating on behalf of professionals in the Public Service of Canada. We know that many of our 49,000 members are the scientists and professionals who, through the course of their work, discover wrongdoing. It is this reality and our experience representing our members who have come forward to blow the whistle on wrongdoing and mismanagement that gives us the insight to make these recommendations.

    The institute has described and documented in detail stories of discipline and job loss that have taken a toll on the lives and careers of our members. This has occurred although they acted ethically and in keeping with their duty to the public interest by disclosing wrongdoing.

    Nothing that has been initiated to date has done much to correct that. Indeed, the report of the working group on the disclosure of wrongdoing submitted to the President of the Privy Council this past January recognized a deep cynicism and profound lack of confidence in the policies and directives currently in place to facilitate the disclosure of wrongdoing and the protection of whistle-blowers. Recent events have proved that these measures are not sufficient to create the ethical environment that the government has announced it is striving to achieve.

    On March 11, 2004, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts heard the testimony of Allan Cutler, a member of the institute and a 29-year veteran of the public service. It is not necessary to tell Mr. Cutler's story in detail again, but given the facts that a veteran employee with an exemplary record was subjected to a horrible eight-year ordeal for doing his job well and protecting the public interest, it is clear that the status quo is not acceptable and that relying on policies that focus on internal departmental mechanisms does not protect anyone but those involved in wrongdoing.

    The working group on the disclosure of wrongdoing's report included 34 recommendations to reinforce the principles of integrity and accountability in government management and a call to codify these principles in law.

    On February 24 the institute submitted a briefing note to this committee supporting the work and recommendations of the working group. It was our hope that this report would serve as a starting point for legislation.

    Given the public demand for a new standard of public accountability, the government could use the opportunity to build a legislative framework that could serve as a model to other parliamentary democracies. This would send a clear and unequivocal statement to Canadians that their government was serious about the integrity of the public service and deserving of the trust of Canadians.

    However, Bill C-25 has taken the opposite approach. Instead of opening the door to disclosures of wrongdoing, by omitting the most important elements of effective legislation it creates a cumbersome and onerous structure that controls and stifles disclosure of government wrongdoing. Only the leadership of Parliament will create a renewed environment of ethics in the public service. Unfortunately, this legislation does not exemplify that leadership.

    The institute hopes that these recommendations point the way to correcting the problem and help restore the faith of Canadians in the integrity of their government.

    The first recommendation deals with clause 2, under the heading “Interpretation”. It is to broaden the interpretation and the definition of “public sector”. In order to protect the public interest and the members of the institute who work throughout government departments, agencies, and crown corporations, it is vital that this legislation have the broadest possible application.

    Recent examples of wrongdoing involving departments and crown corporations prove that any organization established to perform a function or duty for or on behalf of the Government of Canada should be covered by this act. In keeping with the intent of the legislation, exclusions should be limited to only those individuals whose positions clearly demonstrate the necessity of exclusion for reasons such as those under subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act, as mentioned in clause 14 of this bill.

    In each case, the decision to exclude a position from the application of this legislation must be balanced against the right to protection from reprisal and the public right to government accountability.

À  (1015)  

    For those so excluded, each must have access to similar and comprehensive protections and disclosure structures. There should be no organization-wide blanket exclusions.

    The institute goes on to recommend that the public sector integrity commissioner be an agent of Parliament, responsible and reporting to Parliament in the same manner as the Auditor General or the commissioner of official languages, with the authority to direct chief executives to correct wrongdoing. In addition, the legislation should clearly provide for the establishment of a public sector integrity commission in the same manner as the acts establishing other offices of Parliament, such as the privacy commissioner, etc.

    If this system is intended to truly make ethical practice a priority throughout the public serviceand restore Canadians’ confidence in their government, then its agent must be an instrumentof the Canadian Parliament with the authority to ensure its ethics are enforced throughout the public service. Anything less will send a message to Canadians that despite the recent andprevious wrongdoings that have caused millions of their dollars to be misspent, dollars thatcould have been spent on important public programs, the government is still not willing tobring its management under full scrutiny.

    The institute recommends that the act be amended to allow public sector employees to bring a complaint of suspected wrongdoing directly to the public sector integrity commissioner at any time, and that the act specify that bringing an issue to the commissioner in good faith cannot be grounds for discipline.

    The report of the working group specified that there is little confidence in internal disclosure mechanisms within the public service. The experiences of Allan Cutler and others have justified and exacerbated these attitudes and fears. If this legislation is to support a change in this atmosphere of distrust, and rehabilitate ethics as a driving force in government administration, public service employees must be given the option of disclosing wrongdoing outside their internal mechanisms, without the fear of reprisal or discipline for doing so.

    The institute recommends that the act be amended to specify that public sector employees have full rights of representation by the bargaining agents at all stages of the disclosure process. As currently written, the only role for the bargaining agent is to represent members after they have suffered reprisals for disclosures. It is extremely important to the integrity of the disclosure process to minimize the number of incorrect complaints or complaints that are directed to the wrong process. Without the assistance, advice, and protection of the bargaining agent, public service employees will be less likely to come forward to disclose wrongdoing. This will undermine the government's stated intention of creating a culture that supports disclosures and ethical behaviour within government. This amendment is vital to the success of this initiative.

    The institute recommends that subclause 16(4) be removed and clause 16 be amended, so complaints concerning reprisals against those who disclose wrongdoing may proceed through the grievance process to arbitration or adjudication. Furthermore, subclause 16(7) should be amended so there is an expected role for the public sector integrity commissioner, as his or her office has knowledge and investigative expertise to best aid in the determination and fair resolution of the complaint.

    The mechanism of the complaint process is unclear, and would be simplified if the ban on adjudication and arbitration were removed. As currently written, it seems complaints concerning reprisals may be made directly to the Public Service Staff Relations Board or the Canada Industrial Relations Board. The issue may also, according to clause 44, be carried through the grievance process. However, once at the board, the complaint may be mediated or ruled on by the board, or both. The role of the bargaining agent in the resolution of the issue is unclear, as is the process by which the board would be able to make its ruling. Amending the act to allow the grievance procedure to take its normal course to arbitration or adjudication would resolve many of these issues and would also place the complaint within a legitimate framework of jurisprudence.

    The role of the commissioner must be fully incorporated into the determination of the complaint, as his or her office has expertise on the issue of reprisals for wrongdoing. Also, having carried out the investigation of wrongdoing, the commissioner has the depth and breadth of knowledge of the events to better aid in the determination of the complaint.

À  (1020)  

    The institute recommends that clause 16 be amended to include a stipulation that, for a period of five years following a disclosure, any negative action taken or threatened against an employee who has acted to disclose wrongdoing shall be presumed to be a reprisal unless the employer is able to prove otherwise.

    As is the case in other jurisdictions, it is reasonable to place a reverse burden of proof on the employer in the instance of complaints of reprisal. This means that any adverse action taken against an employee who has acted to disclose wrongdoing within government should be assumed to be a reprisal. The employer then bears the onus to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse action was not a reprisal. These measures recognize the difficulty employees can have in proving that an employer, with all the power and authority at its disposal, has acted punitively in exercising its management discretion.

    Bill S-13, tabled in the last Parliament, and the current American whistle-blower legislation have incorporated this provision. American legislators have also included this concept into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Pipeline Safety Act in 2000. It is currently incorporated into a new mutual fund bill before the United States legislature.

    The institute recommends that education and communications material to inform employees of their rights and obligations under the act be jointly developed by the employer and the bargaining agents. The institute believes that information to advise employees of their rights, particularly given the atmosphere of mistrust and apprehension that exists within the public sector with respect to disclosure of wrongdoing, is best produced in consultation with the bargaining agents. Doing so will lend credibility to the process and signal that the government intends to be inclusive and transparent in its efforts to support a culture of ethics and openness within the public service.

    The Professional Institute has been pressing for legislation for protection for whistle-blowers for many years. If the critical weaknesses in this act remain unchanged, they will effectively kill any chance of a renaissance of public institutions in this country. It will be worse than business as usual; it will gag every employee, those who are best positioned within the mechanisms of government to protect the public interest. It will also fail the expectations of the citizens of Canada that government accountability and transparency will be dealt with in a serious and effective manner.

    In light of the sponsorship scandal and its impact on the institute's members and the faith of Canadians in their government, the test for this act must be whether it would stop this type of wrongdoing from happening again. Unfortunately, in its current form it would not. Anything less than a fully independent investigative regime, with uncompromising protections for those who risk their careers, their futures, and their families to protect the public interest, will not provide the commitment Canadians expect. Without these changes, Canadians will be left waiting for the next scandal, with diminished faith in those who promise to protect their interests.

    This legislation will be either the harbinger of a revival of ethics in government or the demise of Canadians' remaining faith in public institutions and services. It is absolutely justified that Canadians expect to be protected from government wrongdoing and that public service employees expect to be protected from those who commit it.

    We've been clear about our concerns and we've tried to be clear about our recommendations on amendments. I'm pleased to have read the minister's comments from last week, that he is open to having a discussion and to having amendments of this legislation and is actually intending to propose some of his own.

    I think we are now dealing with a bill that was drafted quickly. We're also in a bit of a testing ground in terms of the fact that we're sitting here talking about it between first reading and second reading, which is not what we have been used to.

À  (1025)  

    I think we all have to get used to how this is going to work and how the input into making amendments and how they'll be dealt with are going to work under this new process. I'm very pleased to hear that the minister is open to the concept and has actually suggested some amendments that are, we believe, in line with what we have put forward. We're looking forward to dealing with him and his office on what those amendments will look like.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm open to questions.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Hindle.

    We're going to start with Ms. Yelich, please.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: I'm going to ask you: were you around the round table that helped draw up the legislation mentioned by the previous witness, to which she wasn't invited? There was a round table, a consultation, and there were invitations extended to different groups. Were you invited?

    Mr. Steve Hindle: I was not a member of the working group that reported, but I was involved in conversations with government officials prior to its being set up. I made some suggestions about people who had some experience and had the views of public service employees who would be useful to the working group.

    I'm pleased to note that one of the public service union presidents, Mr. Merdon Hosking, from the Association of Public Service Financial Administrators, was on that working committee.

    In dealing with senior officials, I quite clearly recommended that I, as the president of the institute, not be included. I've been very vocal about whistle-blowing, and I did not want any indications that this was going to taint the process and that the minister would get anything other than a different set of advice from what the institute had been providing over the years.

    So we weren't involved in the working group, but I did have some discussions before it was set up and I made some recommendations.

À  (1030)  

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: And did any of them show up in the—

    Mr. Steve Hindle: As I indicated, there was a union president on the working group.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: Yes, that's one, but was there anything else? You said “suggestions”; you pluralized it.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: I have a lot of faith in the people who were actually selected: Dr. Keyserlingk, with his experience before even becoming the public service integrity officer; Denis Desautels, with his ten years of service as the Auditor General. I know Madame Beauchemin from her work inside the public service and have a great deal of respect for her knowledge and experience, as well as her own integrity. And while I had never met Dr. Kernaghan, I understand and have seen some of his work through his involvement with IPAC, the Institute of Public Administration of Canada.

    I have a great deal of confidence that they picked a very good group of people to work on making recommendations. It's just unfortunate that the drafters of the legislation were not, I think, given adequate time to incorporate all the recommendations in the legislation that's currently before this committee.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: That's fine. I have lots of confidence in the participants. I think they are absolutely excellent and I liked what they said and did. But I would have thought other groups—including the witness yesterday, who was a victim, a whistle-blower, and was not invited—would be included. Perhaps I don't know whose purview that would have been under.

    Can you give me any thoughts on compensating whistle-blowers—what kind of compensation, or what kind of incentive could be given? Someone had suggested there should be perhaps some monetary compensation for the endurance, maybe for people who have to relocate. Do you have any suggestions on compensation? I don't think you touched on compensation, did you?

    Mr. Steve Hindle: We didn't, and there was probably a good reason.

    We believe people who blow the whistle—people who disclose wrongdoing, people who identify things that are going wrong in order to get them fixed—should be acknowledged and should be understood to be valued employees and should be treated as such. But going beyond that to provide compensation we think is sending the wrong message and has the potential—whether it came to pass or not would remain to be seen—to encourage people to “disclose wrongdoing” that wasn't actually wrongdoing in order to try to achieve a financial benefit.

    We think that's the wrong incentive to put into legislation. We believe most public sector employees act ethically and do not look for reward beyond their normal compensation for doing the right thing. I think doing the right thing is what we should really be concentrating on. That's what this legislation should be trying to deal with: ensuring that people in the public service continue to do the right thing and do it for the right reasons. I think putting financial encouragement in the legislation is doing it for the wrong reasons.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: That brings the question: would it be incumbent upon that person to come forward—actually mandatory, not just voluntary?

    And just in case I don't have time, I really want us to define “wrongdoing” somehow—it's going to be my mission—so I also want you to think about that.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: We think proper conduct in the public service should be an expectation government has of its employees and employees have of their colleagues. As to making it mandatory, requiring it and putting in stiff penalties for not doing it, I don't know if that's going to work to get people to do it. People need to understand it's the right thing to do, that it's part of the public trust.

    But along with that there needs to be an understanding that they'll be treated properly when they do it. Right now people do not feel they will be treated properly when they do it. We have far too many examples of cases where people have disclosed wrongdoing, have tried to get things fixed, and have paid a price in order to do it. Until you can change that management culture, that attitude towards people who blow the whistle, then putting in mandatory requirements is not going to achieve what you want it to achieve.

    In the end, we want to get to a point where it's just considered a normal part of doing the job and being a public service employee that you do not engage in wrongdoing to start with. We think the vast majority of public service employees already act with ethics and integrity and do not need protection from what's going on because there isn't a whole lot of it going on.

    But as for making it mandatory, again, what are you going to make mandatory in terms of how managers are actually able to manage in the public service?

    What are you doing, quite frankly and with all due respect, to ensure that ethics and integrity in actions are mandatory for members of Parliament?

À  (1035)  

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: What's the definition of wrongdoing? We have to make sure it doesn't end up as labour grievances; that can be a concern.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: It's quite clear there are some things that more correctly belong somewhere else. If an employee, a member of a union, has a grievance, there is a process to file a grievance.

    Wrongdoing would generally be those things that don't fall under a collective agreement. Mismanagement of government funds would be an example; that's clearly not covered under the collective agreement.

    Generally, it would be considered that if somebody is disclosing wrongdoing, it's something that doesn't affect them directly. It's not, for example, that a manager is harassing me and I'm going to use this legislation to correct it. There is a more appropriate mechanism, one using people experienced in the processes, they should be using for that.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: When you talked about the compensation, I couldn't help thinking that if I couldn't get compensated for all my legal fees, for example, what would be the incentive to ever come forward besides all of this integrity and these strong ethics I have? What happens if you do come forward and you go through a legal battle? I just wonder about that as an example.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: That's not my understanding of the word “compensation”. What you're describing is covering the legitimate and reasonable expenses of an employee, and I think that should be there. I wouldn't confuse that with the concept of compensation. Compensation, as I understood your question, is something over and above a reasonable expense or over and above what they're normally paid to do their job.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Madam Guay.

[Translation]

    Ms. Monique Guay: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Good morning, gentlemen. I would like to know how many members you have.

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: There are 49,000.

[Translation]

    Ms. Monique Guay: The reason why we asked you earlier whether you had played a part in drafting this bill is that the Public Service Alliance mentioned to us that it had not participated in any way in that process. That's why we asked whether you had. I see that one of your members was represented. So, that's a good sign.

    You have made seven good recommendations. I have looked at them, and they are along the lines as those made by most of the witnesses who have come before the committee. We will see the extent to which the minister is willing to amend the bill.

    There is one recommendation that keeps coming back, and it has to do with the Commissioner's independence. People want the Commissioner to be fully accountable for the House and that he be able to chose his own staff—and not, as clause 19 suggests, that the minister make officers and employees available to him for the purposes of staffing his organization. The idea is that the Commissioner has to have a fully independent team. I would like your views on that. I'm referring here to clause 19.

    Also, as a union, how do you perceive the role of senior officers?

    Over to you.

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: My understanding of the mechanisms in place is that the commissioner would be provided with staff from the public service requested through the minister. Our view is that this does not provide the commissioner with adequate independence of operation. We think that making the commissioner dependent on a minister of the crown for the resources to investigate alleged issues of wrongdoing by the crown does present a problem--or definitely a potential. That's why our recommendation is that the commissioner be an agent of Parliament similar to the Auditor General, with the resources provided directly by Parliament in order to run the commission and to make sure they can adequately investigate allegations of wrongdoing.

À  (1040)  

[Translation]

    Ms. Monique Guay: And what about senior officers?

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: If the commissioner became an agent of Parliament, I would suspect that the senior employees would be treated the same way as senior employees of the Auditor General's office.

[Translation]

    Ms. Monique Guay: No, that's not what I'm referring to. The problem is that the bill states that complaints should be made to senior officers before being referred to the Commissioner. A number of witnesses have told us that they would prefer that people wanting to make a complaint be able to go directly to the Commissioner. The Commissioner could then decide if he wants to handle the complaint himself or whether it should be handled at another level, and at the same time work closely with the unions.

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: Our recommendation and our amendment would make it clear that the public service employees get to choose. They can use the internal mechanism if they're comfortable with it, but they should have the opportunity to go directly to the commissioner at their own discretion in order to have an investigation or to suggest that an investigation is warranted. Then it should be up to the commissioner to deal with it.

    I'm not sure I'd recommend against the commissioner being able to send it back to the department. However, I think just the fact that an employee would go directly to the commissioner would indicate some trepidation with the process inside the department, and I think the commissioner should be seized of it if it's an issue worthy of investigation. Either it's something that should be investigated or it isn't, and if an employee goes directly to the commissioner, the commissioner should have to do it.

[Translation]

    Ms. Monique Guay: I have one last comment to make, Mr. Chairman. We will look carefully at your amendments. Indeed, they will be very helpful.

    The ultimate goal of this bill is to allow people to make disclosures, to open doors and to change the culture inside the public service. I do hope that goal can be attained.

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: Thank you.

    I believe the minister's objective is the same. I have had some positive dealings with his office since the legislation was put in front of the committee, and I believe they are open to sitting down with us to talk about the amendments we're recommending. It's not just the committee that will be looking at it, but we'll be dealing directly with the minister's office as well.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Shepherd.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): Thank you.

    I was fascinated by your discussion in your recommendation 6. It says “...that Section 16 be amended to include a stipulation that for aperiod of five years following a disclosure, any negative actions taken or threatened againstan employee who has acted to disclose”--I presume “disclose” doesn't necessarily mean it was a successful disclosure--“wrongdoing shall be presumed to be a reprisal...”.

    To me, when I read this I think, as an employee, why wouldn't I take out a wrongful dismissal action? It would give me some kind of guarantee for the next five years that I won't get demoted, I won't get fired, and I won't get shifted off to some part of the country I don't want to go to. It seems an unusual tool.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: It is unusual, but keep in mind that disclosing wrongdoing inside the public service is also unusual and that all the authority and all the power rest on the side of the employer. I think the unusual nature of it and the insidious nature of reprisals are such that the onus should be on the employer to prove their actions are legitimate and are not reprisal.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: But if you see people being remunerated for whistle-blowing as abuse and as sending the wrong signal, why isn't this thing sending the wrong signal as well, because these people have some kind of protection for five years? Presumably, an employer has to prove the person deserved to be terminated or something; this is sometimes difficult to prove in fact.

    The reality is that the onus is put on the employer to deal with this employee who may or may not have brought a successful wrongful disclosure. It seems an inordinate provision that you'd--

À  (1045)  

    Mr. Steve Hindle: I'm curious as to why you would think the employer shouldn't have to prove that. Take the case of Mr. Cutler. He came forward and used internal processes to try to deal with what he saw as going wrong inside his department, and he paid the price for it.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: Well, he was there, but you're assuming that once he does.... And maybe he's a bad example, but—

    Mr. Steve Hindle: I'm not sure why he's become a bad example.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay, okay, once he blows the whistle....

    Now, three years later, I don't know, but say that Mr. Cutler walks off with some money or he does something in an inordinate.... But he says “Gee, you guys can't fire me, because two years ago I brought a wrongdoing complaint; therefore, I have some protection here.”

    Mr. Steve Hindle: Presumably, if the person does something that requires an appropriate level of discipline, the employer will be able to prove that, and they should not allow to hang over the whole situation the fact that the person blew the whistle a little while ago and is now paying the price. So I think you need to separate it.

    It does not provide immunity from future action by the employer when that action is legitimate. It just gives the person further protection from those insidious things that go on inside office places—and it's not just in the public sector, but it happens in the private sector—such as being put away in a corner; not being given meaningful work; not being invited to the meetings; and not being allowed to go to the conferences that the person needs to continue their career, etc. It's those little things that are so hard to prove are a result of a previous action, and that's why the onus should be on the employer to prove that the discipline that comes afterwards isn't a result of what the person did before.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: So we don't want Mr. Cutler to come to a couple of meetings and get upset, and therefore say that he's being abused because two years ago he brought forward one of those actions. Is that what you're saying?

    Mr. Steve Hindle: And maybe he is.

    I think the presumption that he is is a reasonable presumption.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: I'm assuming that some of the people who were bringing wrongdoing actions against are also members of your group. Is that...?

    Mr. Steve Hindle: It's possible, yes.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: There seems to be little protection for those people.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: Well, presumably, if they're acting on behalf of the employer, the employer is ensuring that they're acting responsibly and is providing them with protection. As well, the institute, as a union, does provide representation to any member who requires representation. And we have instances—and some are probably going on right now—where we are representing both sides in a case, because they are both members of the institute and both have an entitlement to representation. We have a duty to provide that representation to both sides; we do that right now.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: Once again, in your recommendation 3, you are saying that for anyone who brings forward evidence of wrongdoing “in good faith”—whatever that means—there should be no reprisals, and that person should not be terminated, and so forth. So we have all kinds of strengths and ways for people who bring forward wrongdoing issues, but those people who are alleged to...or are attacked by it don't seem to have any particular protections under this act.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: Presumably they have the protection of due process and an employer will not act precipitously based on an allegation from an individual. It's the same way the legal system operates. You can make an allegation against your neighbour that they've committed a criminal act; that doesn't put them in jail, but it might start an investigation.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: I don't know what the words “good faith” mean, because how do we get from good faith to “vexatious”, which is talked about in the legislation? Where are the demarcation lines?

    Mr. Steve Hindle: I believe you're pointing out the need for the commissioner in the first place. That's going to be up to the commissioner to determine.

    “Good faith” is just that: it's acting in good faith or without malice towards another individual, without seeking personal reward, and truly believing that the person is committing a wrongdoing or is grossly mismanaging public funds, for example. There's an intrinsic nature to acting in good faith; the person actually believes they're not doing it for their own gain or, quite frankly, their own silly reasons, such as “I don't particularly like you, so I'm going to make your life a living hell”.

    That's not what this is about. And I think that the commissioner will be able to determine, through the investigative process, whether or not the individual was acting in good faith.

À  (1050)  

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: The members of your organization are presumably professionals. They have professional reputations that possibly transcend the public service. It seems to me that their professional integrity could well be attacked by a member they're working with and so forth, yet for the person who has lost their professional credibility or had their professional ability attacked there seems to be little or no concern. All the exemptions are on the side of those who bring wrongdoing disclosures, whether they're appropriate or vexatious. It seems there is a big hole there. You're not concerned about that person's rights, that's what surprises me, because you're supposed to be representing them as well.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: You're making an incorrect assumption if you are going to sit there and say I'm not concerned about the rights of the other individuals. We have a great deal of concern about appropriate processes to protect people who make allegations and that those against whom the allegations are made have access to due process.

    We have addressed the issues as we see them on behalf of our members, and by and large our members are those who will be disclosing the wrongdoing, not those who will be committing the wrongdoing. I say that based on the experience we've had with disclosures that have been made in the past. Those disclosures, by and large, have been made against managers in the public service, people who supervise our members, people who are excluded from the union, people who act on behalf of the employer. That's why the focus of the presentation has been on those who disclose wrongdoing.

    However, I think it's absolutely essential that those who are accused have a process they can rely on to ensure that they are not dragged through the mud in a way that damages their reputation beyond what they may have done that's wrong, if they actually did something wrong. It is not that dissimilar from what people have to go through in a court of law if they are faced with criminal charges. Not everybody who is charged criminally is guilty, but they all have access to a process to try to clear their name if they actually haven't done anything wrong. I think that's what we're trying to deal with here. We represent the people who generally make the disclosures, not those who do wrong things.

    The Chair: Mr. Proulx.

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Good morning, Mr. Hindle, Mr. McIntosh. It's nice to see you here this morning. It's always very pleasant to discuss these matters with you.

    I need your help in understanding two points. When you talk about public sector employees having full rights of representation by their bargaining agent at all stages of the disclosure process, I want to understand why. When I look down to your explanations, you're talking of possibly a filter, but you're also saying that without this, public service employees will be less likely to come forward to disclose wrongdoing. Help me understand what you're telling us here.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: We believe some employees who might otherwise disclose wrongdoing don't have a lot of faith in the system or in the people with whom the'll be dealing if they're on their own. The recommendation is to give that person the choice to go to their union to help them, because the person may not know whether to file a grievance or a complaint or whether this is something they should disclose as wrongdoing. The representatives in the union have experience on which that member can draw. They can also provide some support for that person in helping them through the process, if that's what the member actually wants.

    It's very similar to having a complaint about one of your neighbours and talking to a lawyer or somebody else. It's getting help with something in an area where you don't have much experience yourself or where the issue itself is somewhat ambiguous. A person may not be sure if their manager actually is committing wrongdoing. Perhaps the union member doesn't know exactly what authority the manager has in that case, and the union may well be able to explain that it's just a misunderstanding.

À  (1055)  

    Mr. Marcel Proulx: But for the employee to inquire and find out if his fellow employee is doing right or wrong, he doesn't have to be represented in the process. He can go to your union and ask for advice without necessarily being accompanied in the disclosure process by a representative.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: That is possible, but the member should have the choice. If, for example, you have a member who is going to go through the process and by their very nature is a timid person, that member is not going to get very far or is going to be easily pushed aside, if that's what somebody wants to do. But if they recognize that and are able to bring somebody with them who's going to be perhaps a little more assertive and more understanding of what the process is and what the rules are, that will help get the member through the process.

    But it should be the choice of the member. We don't want to impose ourselves on our members and say they can't take an issue without union representation. The legislation isn't written that way, and we're not suggesting that it is. There are some instances where a member cannot take a grievance forward without the permission of the union, but that's restricted to the application and interpretation of a collective agreement; it's there because of the protection required for the other members covered by the collective agreement. But in this case it should just be the union member's choice whether or not they have their union along with them.

    The Chair: Unfortunately, we only have a couple of minutes. I would like to give Mr. Gaudet an opportunity to ask a brief question.

[Translation]

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very quick question.

    Would someone who makes a disclosure out of jealousy or a desire for revenge be affected by your sixth recommendation?

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: This legislation does cover that, and it would be considered wrongdoing in itself, a complaint that's not in good faith, vexatious, or frivolous. I think there is adequate provision in the way the legislation is written to protect a manager or another employee from such an action. In this case it would be the person blowing the whistle, the one seeking vengeance, who would actually be facing the discipline.

[Translation]

    Mr. Roger Gaudet: Are we protecting the employee or the employer? We have to be careful here. Supposing an employee makes a disclosure against his employer out of jealousy or a desire for revenge. I want the law to be the same for everyone. Someone who is the subject of a disclosure motivated by vengeance or jealousy needs to be protected and have an opportunity to take action against the person who made the disclosure. That's what I'm wondering about. Your recommendation 6 scares me a little. What it means is that if I were to make a disclosure against you out of jealousy or a desire for revenge, I would be protected for five years. That doesn't make much sense.

[English]

    Mr. Steve Hindle: You'll find that there is a balance in the legislation, in clause 9, that protects people from that sort of complaint. Somebody making a disclosure that is frivolous or vexatious or in bad faith is subject to discipline themselves. So I believe there is protection in that situation.

    Mr. Alex Shepherd: But then they wouldn't be protected for five years.

    Mr. Steve Hindle: No. I would expect them to face discipline right away.

    The Chair: I think your assessment is correct, Mr. Hindle. It's a wrongdoing in itself.

    I want to thank you very kindly. Your presentation is excellent; it gives us specifics we can consider. As you mentioned, the whole aspect of this bill coming to us before second reading gives us a lot more latitude. It probably means that should there be amendments proposed, we would want to see people again to vet the new and improved product. So I suspect we will want to hear from you again, or at least have your reaction to some of the proposed changes from the minister or members. We thank you kindly for the attention, for the work, and for the interventions today. It's been very helpful.

Á  (1100)  

    Mr. Steve Hindle: You're welcome, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time. We will endeavour to make ourselves available when next you need us.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We're adjourned.