NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

¹

1545

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.))

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter (Chief, Communications Security Establishment, Department of National Defence)

¹

1550

¹

1555

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, CPC)

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1600

Mr. Michael Devaney (Deputy Chief, Information Technology Systems, Department of National Defence)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, CPC)

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1605

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1610

Mr. Michael Devaney

Mr. Murray Calder

Mr. Michael Devaney

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC)

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1615

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1620

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mr. Michael Devaney

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.)

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mr. Janko Peric

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1625

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1630

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Hon. Jane Stewart (Brant, Lib.)

Mr. Keith Coulter

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1635

Ms. Barbara Gibbons (Deputy Chief, Corporate Services, Department of National Defence)

Mr. Keith Coulter

Hon. Jane Stewart

Mr. Keith Coulter

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1640

Hon. Jane Stewart

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

º

1645

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mr. Murray Calder

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

º

1650

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder

The Chair

Hon. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

The Chair

Hon. David Price

Mr. Keith Coulter

Hon. David Price

Mr. Keith Coulter

Hon. David Price

Mr. Keith Coulter

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1655

Hon. David Price

Mr. Keith Coulter

Hon. David Price

Mr. Keith Coulter

Hon. David Price

Mr. Michael Devaney

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Keith Coulter

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

»

1700

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

»

1705

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

»

1710

Hon. Jane Stewart

The Chair

Hon. Jane Stewart

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

Mr. Keith Coulter

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 006

l

3rd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1545)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): We have quorum now. We can call to order the sixth meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. Apologies to our witnesses for the delay. There are quite a few things happening right now. I think maybe some people didn't consult on schedules and so on, but we have to follow those rules.

    I'll make our standard cell phone announcement and ask anybody with cell phones to please turn them off so we're not interrupted during the testimony.

    Before we go to the witnesses, I'd like to acknowledge that Bob Wood, our colleague, has been elected chair of the subcommittee on veterans affairs.

    Mr. Wood, congratulations.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you. It was a popular win.

    The Chair: He's a man with a great interest in veterans. We look forward to that committee's good work.

    With that, let me welcome the witnesses. We have Mr. Keith Coulter, who's chief of the Communications Security Establishment, and I'll ask Mr. Coulter if he'd introduce the people who are with him, as well.

    Welcome.

    Mr. Keith Coulter (Chief, Communications Security Establishment, Department of National Defence): Thank you. Mr. Chair and honourable members.

    Thanks for the invitation to appear before you today. The last time I was here was on October 29, 2001, not long after the terrorist attacks on the United States. I appreciate the opportunity to address you again.

    The members of this committee also visited CSE in early December 2001. You had a series of briefings about my organization's mandate and responsibilities, so I know some of you already have a fair bit of knowledge about the organization.

    I'm joined here today by a couple of members of my senior management team, as I was last time. I will introduce them. Mike Devaney is the deputy chief for information technologies security--that's cyber protection. Barbara Gibbons is the deputy chief for corporate services, and Madeline Finner is the director general of policy and communications. I've brought them here to respond to any of your questions if I don't have the immediate answer. I also have in the room David Akman, our director of legal services. If we want to go down that road, I can call on my head lawyer.

[Translation]

    The CSE is a national cryptologic agency. At one time, we were looked upon as an encoding and decoding agency. This terminology has become somewhat outdated in this age of global information infrastructures, but this description still applies to most of our activities. Our motto sums up our role very nicely: To provide and protect information.

[English]

    The CSE has evolved substantially since 9/11. As you know, those events set in motion many important and far-reaching changes to the Canadian security and intelligence community, in which CSE is a key player.

    I would like to elaborate a bit on how these changes affected CSE, how we have changed since September 11, and what we have done to respond to the security challenges facing Canada today. As you know, within weeks of the attack, the government stepped forward with significant changes to existing laws and with funding to improve Canada's counter-terrorism capability in a number of areas.

[Translation]

    For the very first time, the CSE's mandate has been set out in legislation. In December 2001, the Antiterrorism Act was enacted, amending the National Defence Act and setting out CSE's three-fold mandate.

    Firstly, the CSE has a mandate to acquire and use information from the global information infrastructure in order to provide foreign intelligence, in accordance with the Government of Canada's intelligence priorities.

    Secondly, the CSE has a mandate to provide advice, guidance and services to help ensure the protection of the Canadian government's electronic information and information infrastructures.

    Thirdly, the CSE has a mandate to assist and provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies in the performance of their lawful duties.

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[English]

    At the same time, CSE's legal framework was amended to permit a more robust and vigilant counter-terrorism effort to support the government's overall public safety agenda. This has translated into our focusing resources, investing in new technology, and accelerating our operational output. The Anti-Terrorism Act also enshrined in law the role of the CSE commissioner. The commissioner is charged with reviewing CSE's activities to ensure that they are lawful. He submits classified reports to the Minister of National Defence on a variety of issues and also prepares an annual report to the minister that is tabled in Parliament. CSE's activities are also subject to review by other bodies, including the privacy commissioner and the Auditor General, to ensure compliance with relevant legislation.

    In terms of funding, the 2001 budget provided CSE with a one-time allocation of $37 million to upgrade our infrastructure and to meet increased demands for our services. It also increased CSE's annual budget, which is now approximately $175 million for this fiscal year. Currently CSE has about 1,200 staff, and we are in a growth scenario so we expect this to increase.

    These changes at CSE were similar to those that occurred in one form or another in the rest of the Canadian security and intelligence community.

[Translation]

    Practically speaking, one may wonder what the CSE has done to further its mandate in key areas. Let me describe in four points the progress we have made.

    We continue to expand and improve upon our cooperation agreements with our federal government partners. Our concept of partnership has evolved from the traditional information sharing model to a model of more active cooperation between parties. We now work as a team with our partners on product development.

[English]

    We have been bringing our new authorities into force with internal policies and processes to ensure that our business is conducted effectively while remaining in complete adherence to our legal framework, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Privacy Act. In this respect I should mention that the CSE commissioner's last annual report once again attested to the fact that my agency acts lawfully and respects the privacy of Canadians.

[Translation]

    This is essential to preserving the trust of Canadians.

[English]

    We have also been developing a greater capacity in specific areas such as anti-terrorism and support to Canadian Forces operations abroad. We are moving toward a model that more closely integrates CSE and Canadian Forces operations as they relate to signals intelligence gathering abroad. This committee will recognize that initiatives involving a mix of military and civilian staff are challenging, but ensuring effective SIGINT operations requires this close integration and we are determined to achieve it.

    We are also now providing more focused advice, guidance, and services within the federal government to ensure that our approach to cyber security stays ahead of emerging threats and vulnerabilities. Our five-year strategic vision for information technology security has a risk management orientation and has seen our organization review priorities, shift resources, and focus efforts on protecting the information of greatest importance to the Government of Canada.

    Our vision for the next five years depends, however, on our ability to work effectively with our partners across government, including Public Works and Government Services Canada; the Treasury Board Secretariat, Chief Information Officer Branch; Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada; the Department of National Defence; and others in the security and intelligence community to enhance the government's capacity to protect its critical systems and networks. I am pleased to report to this committee that this is proceeding very well.

    We are also implementing modern management principles and strategies to help the organization function more efficiently and to ensure the effective stewardship of resources.

    Finally, I should note that we are managing all of these challenges concurrently, while also sustaining an extremely high operational tempo. All of this growth, change, and continued pressure to deliver adds up to a dramatic challenge for my organization. I am proud to say that the workforce of CSE is moving ahead with superb energy and dedication to meet these challenges.

    Finally, I know this committee has a particular interest in Canada-U.S. defence relations, so I'll focus on our SIGINT relationship with the U.S. for a moment as I describe our international partnerships.

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[Translation]

    The United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand are strong CSE partners. However, the agency's relationship with its US counterpart, the National Security Agency, or NSA, is key. The partnership between the CSE and the NSA is an excellent example of the effective cooperation between our two countries on security and intelligence matters. For more than 50 years, the CSE has benefited from a close and highly productive partnership with the NSA. Forged during the Cold War, this critically important relationship has evolved over time and provided Canada with invaluable access to technology and intelligence.

[English]

    At all levels, this cooperation is close and productive. CSE and the National Security Agency share intelligence, tackle common problems posed by rapid changes in communications technology, and track threats to our collective security. Although CSE is by far the smaller partner in this relationship, I can tell you with great confidence that both sides derive significant benefit from it, and in fact, both look to bilateral cooperation to help advance national goals. As chief of CSE, I consider my job is to maximize the benefits of this relationship, benefits that accrue to the entire Canadian security and intelligence community and ultimately to Canada itself.

    Honourable members, in closing, I want to state that this is an incredibly important time for CSE. It is a time of increased threat to Canada's security and safety, a time to carefully balance our response to this threat against the rights of citizens to their privacy and their freedoms under the charter, and a time requiring the strictest diligence. I believe my organization is meeting this challenge head-on.

    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Coulter. That concludes your opening comments.

    Let's start with a seven-minute round of questions. We'll start with Mrs. Wayne for the Conservatives.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, CPC): Thank you.

    Thank you very much for being with us today, and thank you very much for your presentation.

    My first question is, how did the Communications Security Establishment respond to the blackout in August of last year?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Well, the first point I'd make is that I'm very pleased to say we have a backup power supply, so we're able to continue as an organization in those blackout conditions.

    What the blackout raised--not directly, but certainly in an indirect way--is the importance to everybody of protecting critical infrastructure here in Canada, as well as the common infrastructure we have with the United States. For our organization, because we are very focused on cyber security, it raised a lot of issues in that zone and, frankly, gave visibility to some of the vulnerabilities that we face as a country, as a government, in that zone. That whole exercise resulted in very serious discussions about what we need and where we need to go on that.

    My voice in those discussions--and I'll let Mike Devaney come in on this, because he was more directly involved in discussions with the National Security Agency as they were playing into the U.S. analysis of that situation--is that we need, as a country, to understand more about our cyber critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and to be more predictive and preventive in our approaches as opposed to just reactive. You'll see that the CSE will move, in the coming months and years, further and further into that zone,because we're the high-end technical expertise in the Government of Canada, and that's where we must go.

    Do you want to add to that at all, Mike?

º  (1600)  

    Mr. Michael Devaney (Deputy Chief, Information Technology Systems, Department of National Defence): Thank you.

    Initially, we had our own requirements to ensure that our critical services were still being maintained on behalf of the Government of Canada and its citizens. We also wanted to ensure that there were no additional threats. I can't go into any details in that regard.

    We participated in the Canada-U.S. working group that was set up under the Department of Natural Resources and in agreement with the minister and the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in the U.S. We worked with the Security Working Group. We assisted in root-cause analysis to determine if there were any cyber linkages that might have been associated with the power outage event and in the development of the observations in the interim report, which was published in the late fall, and in the drafting of the final report, which is due out very shortly.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chairman, through you, does the CSE have liaison officials at any postings abroad?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes, we do. I have a personal representative in both the National Security Agency and Government Communications Headquarters in the U.K. We have what we call intégrés, who are people who work as members of those agencies doing jobs that are defined by those agencies, and those agencies also have intégrés at CSE. It's a very closely knit community. It's very good for career development. People learn an awful lot when they're on those postings abroad, and the members of those other organizations learn a lot at CSE.

    Beyond that, we do regular exchanges with Australia and New Zealand, our other close partners. We did have somebody down at the New Zealand agency. It's called the Government Communications Security Bureau. We're always trying to maximize the career development of our people. We're going for shorter and more frequent exchanges. They are very valuable. A lot of information is shared. We're a highly technical organization, so it's really good to have that interaction, because it makes us technically better. We see different ways of doing things.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm going to share the rest of my time with Rick.

    The Chair: All right. You have a minute and a half, Mr. Casson.

    Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, CPC): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you very much for your presentation.

    How do you split your time between protecting the government's infrastructure and gathering intelligence? What is your priority? Is there a saw-off there? How do you go about doing that?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: That's a very interesting question. There are always trade-offs to be made in terms of my personal agenda. But in terms of the organization, we are structured with two deputy chiefs in charge of these two different business lines. Mike Devaney here is the deputy chief in charge of information technology security. So he's doing the cyber protection and is very focused on the systems of most importance to the Government of Canada. He has a whole agenda there. We have another deputy chief who is in charge of signals intelligence. His primary focus is on delivering information and filling information gaps for government organizations.

    A lot of common skill sets are needed here. Having the protection and the technical experts within one organization results in some synergies, because one is gathering information and the other is protecting. It's back to our code-making, code-breaking history that those things are fundamentally related. For example, we can pool mathematicians on a code-breaking or code-making kind of problem, and that has huge synergy. So from my perspective it makes sense. But they are two business lines led by different people.

º  (1605)  

    The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Casson. I'll come back to you. We'll have lots of time, I suspect, for questions. We have a few parties not with us today, so we should get lots of questions.

    I'm going to start with Mr. Calder for seven minutes, please.

    Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    With the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the CSE is now permitted to intercept private communications entering and leaving Canada, so I'd like you to expand on that.

    There's something else I'm really interested in. When I was the chair of the national rural caucus, we were pushing very hard--and still are--to have high-speed broadband in rural Canada. You know it's going to be done with a wireless system, so I'm wondering if you will be monitoring that. One of the big issues is keeping high-speed wireless broadband secure. Is that possible?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I'll get a little help on the high-speed broadband from Mike, if that's okay, Mr. Chair.

    On the interception of private communications, a regime was built into our legislation where the minister, under very strict conditions, could authorize us to focus on a foreign entity abroad and follow a communication into Canada.

    That is extremely low-volume business. We're out there in the global information infrastructure trying to get information. On rare occasions there can be a connection to Canada. Then we have to apply very strict rules for how we manage all of that. We have independent review built into both our legislation and our reality. That is looked at to make sure our procedures and policies conform with the charter and everything to minimize that.

    It works in a way that allows us to effectively intercept communications abroad. Getting back to when we did the legislation, we actually had to be able to prove both ends of a communication were foreign. As technologies emerged and dot-com and dot-org became part of them, meeting that standard became extremely difficult. We were slowly winding out of the business.

    The legislation allows us to effectively target foreign entities abroad, and if in doing that we acquire a communication that has a connection with Canada, we have to apply a very stringent test. It must have foreign intelligence value and meet the conditions that are outlined in the legislation. Then we can retain that and use it for foreign intelligence purposes.

    On protecting systems, there is also a provision that we can intercept private communications. That's a very different zone. We only have the capacity to help protect government systems. When we're doing technical things we need to have the authority, because if we stumble across a private communication--if we're working the outside part of a system or something--there's a shield so we're not prosecuted under the Criminal Code. Section 183 of the Criminal Code says you can't intercept a private communication under any circumstances unless you're a service provider, and a couple of others. But this provision allows us to be effective technically.

    We're finding that the volume is extremely low, but I don't have to worry about my people being prosecuted as they do defence or cyber-defence-oriented kinds of work with government departments and agencies. It's as simple as that.

    Mike, do you want to talk about broadband? We don't have a good capacity to get out that far into the infrastructure.

º  (1610)  

    Mr. Michael Devaney: In order to extend the reach, we try to work in partnership with private industry. In that regard, there are international standards evolving around security, in particular the cryptographic security associated with protecting wireless devices. I won't go into what those are, but suffice it to say that if standard X is seen to be most appropriate to provide a level of confidential protection to wireless devices, we in essence accredit Canadian laboratories to then review industry products to effect that certification, that they can provide the level of assurance and security on behalf of those who are acquiring those products.

    We have a number of different industry programs in place, depending on the level of security required. We couldn't do this by ourselves. The work with industry and private sector labs to effect that accreditation--and we oversee that--is a key enabler in trying to secure the broadband, as you mentioned.

    Mr. Murray Calder: Do you have a way of monitoring the wireless system? If somebody was trying to break into the cryptic security, would you be able to trace it back to find that individual?

    Mr. Michael Devaney: We're working with government departments to put in place incident detection and monitoring capability, in much the same way as on our own computers at home. We have a tendency--without putting in a plug for any particular product--to put a firewall or a virus scanner on our systems. You need far more sophisticated systems for critical networks in government.

    We're working with government departments to provide advice on those monitoring and detection systems. We're working with PSEPC on an enterprise sort of approach to reporting incidents, so they can be properly coordinated and responded to by government. That will minimize any disruption or damage that might be caused by a virus or a Trojan. It will also provide advice, through industry programs and a number of other ways, that might assist in reducing that threat and vulnerability right off the bat.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Calder.

    Mrs. Gallant is next for seven minutes.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    What changes, if any, in organizational structure and interaction with other security agencies have occurred as a result of the formation of the new public security ministry?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: First, with respect to organizational changes, we built some pieces. We have basically a new area of activity that deals with terrorism and proliferation. That focus is new, and it built an organization around it because we needed to put people on that. That's what the 9/11 budget was all about, or the December 2001 budget was about. I received money to directly address the security agenda, and that's what we're doing.

    We have now a part of the signals intelligence organization that's directly involved in efforts to fight terrorism and proliferation.

    I think this would be of special interest to this committee. Because the Canadian Forces was deployed to Afghanistan shortly after 9/11 and after a hiatus it was redeployed with twice as many troops for twice as long, we started to work with the military in a different kind of way. The threat to the troops in the field now and the kinds of issues that we're looking at generally in terms of the war on terrorism are becoming related. And the information base that you need if you're a commander in the field now has many overlapping points with the kind of national perspective you want on terrorism and what not.

    We're building in the area of support to military operations too. We want to make the military as successful as we can possibly make it, and that requires focus, and we're building organizational constructs around that too. So those are two areas where within the foreign intelligence organization we built new pieces.

    The way we work with others is evolving and it's going in a good direction. I'm one of the impatient people; I want to make it perfect right away, and what I've seen over the last two and a half years, say, is a lot of movement and a lot of relationships and bridges built. We have a much stronger relationship with CSIS. They were focused on terrorism, and we weren't very focused on that issue at all pre-9/11. We're very focused now, and that has resulted in partnerships and collaboration at an analyst-to-analyst, section-to-section, and “parts of organizations to parts of organizations” level.

    We're working much more closely with CSIS. It truly is a much stronger partnership than it was pre-9/11. We're working more closely with the Canadian Forces. As I described, it's not just about organization; it's also about the relationships and the dialogue that we have and the priority that we give things.

    With others, too, I think we've strengthened our relationships, including international ones--with the National Security Agency, with GCHQ in the U.K. We have an agenda. We're trying to maximize what we can do there so we can contribute information to Canadian decision-makers.

    It's a vast agenda and it's moving fast, but we're working it hard.

º  (1615)  

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: You mentioned infrastructure, and I'm trying to distinguish the responsibilities that CSE has with respect to protecting our Internet lines and what OCIPEP's responsibility is. Could you compare and contrast?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes. I think the best way to think about it would be that we are the high-end technical experts. We have no competition in that zone. We have a lot of PhDs in math, computer science, engineering, and what not. It's in the PSEP world now, and it's evolving. I don't hear about OCIPEP any longer.

    The critical infrastructure protection component over there includes cyber security. Their role is more of a coordination of efforts across the government, and coordination of federal government efforts with other levels of government, the private sector, and others.

    We have a very critical stake in their success, because we can be better technical experts if things are well coordinated, both nationally and within the federal government. We're, roughly speaking, their biggest proponents

    Things are evolving. We see it in terms of the new public safety and emergency preparedness department. I talked to senior people there. I know it's moving fast; it's evolving. We're all playing into this national security policy piece. I'm more optimistic now than I was a year ago in terms of our getting our arms around some of these pieces and trying to put the policies in place that we need to face the future.

º  (1620)  

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: There was a joint Canada-U.S. exercise scenario whereby a dirty bomb had been released in, I think, Seattle. I was wondering whether or not the CSE participated in that particular exercise.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Not as fully as we'll participate in the next one, but we did monitor it very closely.

    Mike, do you want to talk about our involvement in that?

    Mr. Michael Devaney: Yes. We had a more limited involvement in that one. I think, as we look to future North American exercises, the context that we'd play in is if there was a cyber dimension that was planned within that exercise, but as you know, the scenario was more focused on the physical, the dirty bomb, etc. Our involvement was less so.

    As Keith says, certainly in the future, if the angles were different, we'd probably play far more heavily.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Mr. Peric, seven minutes.

    Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): The question could be directed to anyone.

    You're gathering classified information. Which departments do you share this information with, besides our allies like the United States and the United Kingdom? Do you share information with any other NATO countries?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: The relationship that we have within the tightest circle is way ahead of all of any other relationships that we would have. The sharing that we do with the United States, the U.K., New Zealand, and Australia is not complete. There are many things.

    We have a classification called “Canadian Eyes Only”. Where our national interests dictate that is the right approach, we definitely slap that on. It's only shared sometimes within tight circles in Canada.

    We do have some other relationships. They spin out of our military involvement in NATO over many years, starting right after the Second World War. They tend to be tactical, and more military to military. I'm part of a group that is largely the most capable in foreign-intelligence NATO countries. There are working groups under that, trying to share information that is more military-to-military stuff, although the Russians aren't the big threat any more.

    There are joint operations. For example, NATO is in Kosovo. There still is a NATO military command structure that needs to be supported in terms of intelligence. That's evolving to a common interest in terrorism, too. I think things like what happened in Spain give extra energy to that dimension of NATO's interest.

    I expect that will continue to evolve, but the level of sharing is a much lower level than what we have in the tight circle with those four other countries.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Last week we heard from the Auditor General that all books are open to her, even some classified information. Do you have any classified equipment? Do you have anything that would be classified even from the Auditor General?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: In my experience--maybe others could talk about it--the Auditor General's folks are shown what they need to fulfill their engagement with us. We have to clear them top secret and we have to make sure they get what they need to know. But curiosity is a wonderful thing, and we do operate on a need-to-know principle. So even within my own organization, we have tight circles around many things. That's the only way you can conduct this kind of business.

    So the short answer is that the Auditor General can engage us on her terms, but we manage this in a way that makes sure she gets, and is satisfied that she's getting, what she needs. But that's not an “open every door of the organization” approach, because you don't need that, for example, to follow the money or whatever. You don't have to get into the most sensitive operation arms, and they know that, and we deal with them very professionally.

    The CSE commissioner has much more latitude because they have to be able to look at everything. It's to everybody's advantage to know that, to know that they look at how we do our business, and then they can publicly state whether we operate within the legal framework or not. So they have a need to know. We can't have a system that closes doors to that office.

º  (1625)  

    Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Peric, all done? Great.

    Mrs. Wayne, then.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Anne McLellan, our Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, spoke to the Canadian Club in Ottawa on March 25 to discuss Canada's state of readiness as it relates to emergencies and acts of terrorism. Anne stated the government is seeking to have better information sharing between national security and public safety entities. An integrated government-wide secret communication system was discussed. It is unclear what this initiative would entail; however, after the blackout in August 2003, there was a great deal of criticism that major departments were not able to coordinate response efforts, nor were they able to report on critical infrastructure to the appropriate authorities.

    What involvement will CSE have in the creation and implementation of such an integrated secret communications network?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Thank you. I'd like to make a comment on the sharing aspect.

    One of the realities about my organization is that we don't act on our own information. We only have value by sharing. In terms of culture, we have a sharing culture. Obviously it has to be done in the right circles, with the right classification level and information, and all of those things. But we're not an action agency in the foreign intelligence area. We absolutely have to provide our product to others.

    Sharing is coming along. There are technical barriers, because you can't put secret information on unclassified networks, for example. The statement of the Deputy Prime Minister points to the development of a more effective technical response to that. We will be the technical experts in that. Work has already started. We will be the technical accreditation authority for whatever is built here.

    Mike has a thousand ideas in this zone. It's risk management. You can buy the Cadillac or you can by the Chevrolet. What we're able to do, as a very technical agency, is to help provide the information into the discussions in a way that allows us to do something that's affordable and will work in this zone. But it is an important area that I'm encouraged we're going in this direction on, because I think we need it.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: The government presently is preparing a national security policy to be released in just a few weeks from now. The Minister of Public Safety stated that the department has set out the groundwork but that Canadians, and specifically parliamentarians, must be consulted. What role does CSE have in the information of this national security policy?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: We're very interested, too. The principles that the Deputy Prime Minister laid out on March 25 included intelligence as a major category. I'm involved in discussions about how to make that as strong as we can. As I understand it and as she laid it out, it will be a component of the national security policy. Therefore, it's a matter of operationalizing it, and we'll be very involved in that.

    There's also another issue under emergency management in that framework she laid out. We are a voice for strong cyber security approaches. Our voice is that we need to place this component within that strategy in a powerful way, because the way we see the world, the need for sound cyber security approaches is going to increase, not decrease.

    My short answer would be that we're a voice in these discussions. We are encouraged that a policy will be developed, because I think we need it.

º  (1630)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Does the CSE have liaison officials at the RCMP, and CSIS, and the Office of Critical InfrastructureProtection and Emergency Preparedness?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You do.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: We do.

    With respect to OCIPEP, we have former employees who understand us, but I don't believe we have right now employees--

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No one other than the former.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes.

    With respect to CSIS and the RCMP, we have regular back and forth of people to deal with issues and what not. I hope we'll have the capacity and the strength to put people on assignments there, as we have in the past, more and more.

    I look at that from a career development, educational point of view. The interaction between our organizations, analyst to analyst, solving problems on a daily basis is where the action is, where the most value can be gained.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Does anyone on this side wish to speak on this? Mrs. Stewart, please.

    Hon. Jane Stewart (Brant, Lib.): I'd like to build on the comments that you're making about analyst to analyst and an earlier comment, Mr. Coulter, about the level and the quality of personnel who work for CSE, PhDs. With regard to the long-term human resources planning strategies for your organization, what do you see as being the greatest challenges?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I'll let Barb help me out here, because one of her responsibilities is human resources.

    What we're finding is that there is a very, very enthusiastic response to our recruitment campaign, which is really encouraging. When 9/11 happened and I needed more really educated people, I didn't know what would be out there, and what we found almost overwhelmed us--the response of people who would like to work for us and everything.

    I worry about the longer term. You can bring them in, but how do you keep them over the longer term when the private sector high-tech industry takes off fully again and all of those things. I think what we need more than anything is to develop careers in a way that is exciting for these people, so that they're not just hired off the street and plugged into somewhere, solving a problem. That's all fine and good, but I think we're evolving in a way that we need to care, right up front when they walk in, about how they're going to advance in our organization.

    Another aspect of this is that as we've evolved since 9/11 in terms of our interactions with other security and intelligence organizations and more broadly with the government, we've seen some advantages to letting our people get out to other organizations and bringing people into our organizations and becoming more normal. We traditionally have been off to the side, kind of in the shadows. The way we've evolved over the last few years now has been to bring in people from other government departments and agencies, and in turn, we placed people there to help other government departments and agencies. Some of our people see excitement in that, and they've moved on and what not.

    I think all of this will add up really well if we care about the people who are out there and if we care about people from the moment we bring them in. We have a thing that Barb has just launched, our own version of HR reform, that's going to modernize some of our HR practices. I think that will really help us here.

    Barb, do you want to add to that?

º  (1635)  

    Ms. Barbara Gibbons (Deputy Chief, Corporate Services, Department of National Defence): I can just add a couple of things, Jane.

    First of all, finding these specialized skills is probably one of the biggest challenges. We're in competition with other government departments and with private industry for some of the high-tech skills, the engineers and the computer scientists. But in addition, as you can imagine, some of the analytic and linguistic skills we need are not easy to find, particularly when we have security clearance requirements for them.

    The other thing, as Keith mentioned, is learning and development. Retaining those people is key, and we're starting to focus on how we retain those key people once we get them in the workforce. It wasn't as much of an issue for us in years past. Once somebody came into the organization, they were--or for most of the federal government ,in fact--kind of there for life. However, that's changed completely, and we're having to manage a whole different program on that front.

    One of the key challenges we've got right now, frankly, is where to put them. Accommodation is a big problem for us right now. We've been in a growth scenario. We don't have space for them. We have a shortage of space for 300 people right now, where we are currently. So this is a big challenge. We're squeezing more and more.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: We do have a long-term solution to that, but it's a very slow thing to get space, so we are very cramped.

    Hon. Jane Stewart: Thank you.

    It's interesting today, some have made reference, perhaps--I apologize for being late--to the Auditor General's comments about investment in our security strategy and planning. You've made a number of references to your integrated approach with other departments, the new money you received, and how you have utilized it within the agency. Is it your sense that the integration required for a comprehensive public security structure and system in Canada has been lacking? Is it your sense that there is a growing period or an experiential period that is going to strengthen the effective linkages and liaisons? Or is it your sense that we have been in pretty decent shape and that when new moneys are allocated to this very important priority, it could be overlaid quickly into an organization and infrastructure that is capable of utilizing it effectively and not duplicating or creating other openings in what obviously needs to be a closed and coordinated system?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I guess the bottom line for me is that we are moving in a good direction on all of this stuff. I wish we could accelerate in terms of...some of it is just flat out cultural change, in terms of the way we operated pre-9/11.

    I started as chief of CSE five weeks before 9/11. What I saw in those initial five weeks going around and what I see now are very different in terms of the energy levels, the networks, the desire to fill gaps in information--they're the best possible gaps, and you haven't taken the second choice in terms of what you're doing and what not.

    There are histories and cultures around the different disciplines in the intelligence business. I think we're breaking down barriers. I spend a lot of time with my colleague at CSIS, Ward Elcock, and we talk though an awful lot of issues and try to line up our organizations the right way, yet there's a learning factor here in terms of how you can best do it and how interactions can be managed the right way, how you can make it as efficient as possible.

    All of that is going in a good direction, I think. The piece that I think may have been missing initially from 9/11 for the first while was having the coordination of all of this done in a little more heavy-duty way, if I could put it that way.

    The way this has evolved now, particularly with Rob Wright, who is the national security advisor to the Prime Minister as well as the security intelligence coordinator, is that he can speak with more authority. He can insist on things in a powerful way.

    My biggest worry a year ago was that we were going to lose momentum, and I'm seeing now that we're getting organized with a national security policy, a national security advisory committee, and as I understand it, we're soon going to get a committee of parliamentarians who are focused on national security issues. In my mind, all of that is going to help.

º  (1640)  

    Hon. Jane Stewart: I have just one more, somewhat unrelated but of interest.

    Is there much call on your services from the point of view of economic espionage? Are your links with the government and within your mandate very focused on that?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: You know, I can't be very specific here, but I have to say that our highest priority now is security, and that's affected the amount of attention we can pay to other things.

    When we talk about our mandate, it's to gather information from the global information infrastructure that's consistent with Government of Canada priorities. Government of Canada priorities changed after 9/11, and that's had an enormous impact on CSE. We are very determined.

    In many respects it was a return to our past. During the Cold War, what we did was the then Soviet Union had almost everything; that was the big focus during the Cold War for agencies like mine. Now the highest order is the security agenda, and it's the long-range one. Terrorism is something that can happen any day, but there's a proliferation piece out there, which we have to build capacity to understand and make sure that terrorism doesn't go nuclear, if I can put it that way.

    The Chair: Great, thank you.

    We'll have a five-minute round, and we'll start with Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm trying to figure out how the pathways of communication work. If you were to intercept something or a sharing of information revealed that there was an imminent threat to Canadian security, that there was event anticipated, what channels, what pathways, both politically and militarily, would this information filter through?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I hope we're thinking about the same kind of incident, but if there was a terrorism threat, for example, the information we have can be put in real time in front of key decision-makers. I would suggest the highest end of CSIS, the highest end of the Privy Council Office, and the highest end, depending on what it was--for example, of railway transportation--would have that in real time. Depending on assessments, meetings would be called and this would be a trigger to start a government process. It could be very specific or it could be a worry, depending on the nature of the information.

    But we have a way.... I think maybe what you're looking for here is that we have customer relations officers placed in key departments and agencies, and they can take our information, wherever it is needed, in real time. We have electronic delivery as well. Senior people need something flagged for them and they need to know it's important, and then they look at products.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay.

    Now, if there had been action taken--I just want to understand the oversight now--as a result of information that came from CSE, if there had been actions taken by the government, the military, that resulted in serious consequences, and if in the end it turned out that the information was not correct, what would be the protocol in terms of finding out what went wrong and how it could be prevented in the future--if somebody had a complaint, if it became a national issue, an inquiry?

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Well, I'm happy to say I'm not aware of any of these incidents in our case, but you're seeing things unfold in the U.K. and the United States that involve, in the case of the United States, independent inquiries, congressional investigations, all kinds of things around the type of information that was available and the actions that were taken.

    We're not an action agency. We provide information. We provide analysis. People act on that. We also don't do assessment in the way that the Privy Council Office intelligence assessment secretariat does, where they take all that information and then they look at information from a whole bunch of different sources, everything they have available, and they make an assessment about what the reality is. That's not our business. Traditionally, our kinds of agencies provide direct information to those assessors as part of what they look at when they do assessments.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: You're providing the raw data, then.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I'm not sure what you mean by “raw”, but yes, we provide direct products rather than assessed intelligence, which means an assessment can be made on how that adds up with other things.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay.

    We were talking earlier about the limitations. Now, with the passage of the anti-terrorist legislation, you're able to monitor communication if one end is Canadian, if it passes this stringent test.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: “Monitor” is probably not a great.... When we're targeting a foreign entity abroad, my legislation says that this has to be consistent with Government of Canada priorities, as set out by the government. So if we're targeting a foreign entity abroad that's consistent with government priorities and there is a communication that comes into Canada, then we can legally acquire it, but we'd then have to meet very stringent tests before we could use that for foreign intelligence purposes.

    So upon recognition, we have to put it through tests, and it's only in very rare circumstances that we would do anything with that but delete it.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Mr. Calder, please, for five minutes.

    Mr. Murray Calder: Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

    Going back to my question along the lines of security, obviously ministers and parliamentary secretaries all have secure coded lines that would be transferring information back and forth.

    I guess my question would be, are you able to monitor those? And if in fact you're able to monitor them, can the bad guys monitor them?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: You're talking about monitoring government systems?

    Mr. Murray Calder: Yes.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: If authorized by the minister, we can monitor systems for a specific purpose.

    You've got to understand what we're trying to do; we're trying to drive vigilance and good technical practices in the Government of Canada. So we don't have the capacity or the desire to sit on networks and do monitoring. Individual departments and agencies need to build what they need to protect their systems. What we can do, under very specific authorizations, if it's required for them to understand what they're vulnerable to or to understand the vulnerabilities they face, or what not, we could go in under an authorization for a specific period of time and do a very limited thing that we define and get authorized to do.

    They have to ask us. So we're not Big Brother here. We have to be specifically requested in writing. We can do an MOU with the organization, and then we can do stuff.

    What we're finding, as we've gone down this road since this legislation was passed and 9/11, is that this is a driver. By our putting our high-end technical people on it, people are learning more about what it takes to do effective protection. Of course, this is a moving piece, because hackers are getting better all the time, and so the program has to keep up. But we're finding that we're really helping people, everybody that we've engaged. In fact, our demand far exceeds our capacity right now, and we're trying to think through how we can share best practices and stuff without doing technical exercises. It's a highly technical thing, and the best thing to do is to work with the technical people in departments and agencies.

    I just wanted to come back to your question, if I may, about.... When you're talking about one end being Canadian, Madeleine here, my policy guider, reminded me that I should have mentioned this, because I sometimes assume that people understand. We have to be specifically authorized by our minister in what's called a ministerial authorization to do any of that. So whatever we do is very specifically authorized in terms of an activity or a class of activities, if we're ever going to intercept the communications of a Canadian. It is circumscribed in authorizations by the minister.

    The Chair: You are referring to “the minister”. Are you talking about the Minister of National Defence?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I am. He is my minister.

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Is it solely the Minister of National Defence? Is that the only person who can authorize you to—

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes, it is. That's in the National Defence Act, and that's the way it was passed.

    The Chair: Right, okay.

    Mr. Calder.

    Mr. Murray Calder: You're in my time!

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: No, I'll give you more time.

    Mr. Murray Calder: Mr. Chair, if I could, I'd like to share my time with David Price.

    The Chair: Mr. Price.

    Hon. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): I'm sorry, Mr. Chair. I was directing my question to Mr. Calder to try to keep out of it.

    The Chair: No problem. We're glad to have you here.

    Hon. David Price: I guess what I was getting at is that we do have secure systems in-house here, but obviously if we have them, the bad guys have systems out there too. What I'm wondering is, are you able to pick up the back and forth on those types of systems coming in and out of the country? In other words, how is your R and D going on that?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I know what the question is, but I don't think I can answer it.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Hon. David Price: Next question.

    When we were there in 2001, you had one of the best computer systems, actually, in the world at that point, and you were going away from that and into another system of daisy-chaining computers all together. You were in the process of expanding that on a rather large scale. Of the extra funds you got for post-9/11, would part of that money have gone into that type of equipment?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes.

    Hon. David Price: Simple answer.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: High-powered computing is part of our business. You have to have state-of-the-art computing capacity to do what we do. We're always trying to increase it and looking for money opportunities to do that, because it's expensive equipment.

    Regarding the chained-together computers, it's all about the total computing capacity, in many respects. Some of the smaller systems can be flexible and they can do the job, but in the end, those big high-powered computers are where it's at. That's why we can bring the best PhDs in computer science in, because they know those are the most challenging and exciting computers.

º  (1655)  

    Hon. David Price: We are still one of the top ones, though, in the world with the system that we do have.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Yes. Top in the world? We're definitely one of the top in the country. The National Security Agency has more computing power than any organization in the world.

    Hon. David Price: Are you still in the business of making tapes? We were shown, at the time, these tapes you were making for NATO, the coding tapes.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Do you want to answer?

    Hon. David Price: That wasn't classified at the time.

    Mr. Michael Devaney: We certainly still contribute our share to ensuring that the secure communications with our allies stay that way.

    Just to give some assurance with respect to your question on the devices that are in use, those classified devices that ministers use, certain assurance is there. We have two sides to our business. On the code-making, the challenge is that with all the best computers in the world, we want to maintain the secrecy that's associated with the communications if those devices are used, for a very long time, considering Moore's Law and the development of computers, and everything else.

    When you're talking about the various levels of security, from top secret down to the systems that we've assisted in architecting for the Government On-Line project, a secure channel, the PKI that protects the transactions there at a protected B-level for privacy purposes, and so on, that's again part of the assurance that we try to provide through our algorithm specialists in knowledge of how systems work, that those levels of protection will be there.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Mrs. Wayne, please. You have five minutes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I only have one question.

    Does the Department of National Defence contribute additional resources, personnel, or other support, to the CSE's signal intelligence activities that you have?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: We have a fairly close relationship with DND. We are funded separately, but because we're part of the DND portfolio, they can help us cash manage, for example. They have a bigger sum of money. They have invested in us in very specific things over the years, and I'd like them to continue to invest in us.

    We have a close relationship with a group called the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group, which does signals intelligence, and we're actually moving towards an integrated model of operations with them. The defence department has to invest in them for them to be successful, and that's the first stop when they're thinking about signals intelligence: investing in their own organization in terms of its capability. But because we work so closely together, there are frequently common interests, and so it's an ongoing dialogue, and sometimes it has given us quick hits in terms of funding for specific things.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: How many full-time equivalents are currently employed by CSE?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: The last number I saw was 1,227. We're over 1,200 now. With the budget money we got in 2001, we can go to about 1,300. Dealing with space problems and getting the right people and the right approaches take time, but we're on course to do that. In addition to that, in the current budget, for example, there is a reserve for security, for which I have business cases. We can do more if we get more money. I give visibility to that so that people can make wise decisions about what is a limited amount of money for different things.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Wayne.

    I don't see any other colleagues wishing to question right now. I have three or four questions I'd like to ask.

    The new whistle-blower legislation apparently does not apply to your organization. Do I understand correctly that organizations like yours, which are exempted from the legislation, will have to come up with some alternate plan? If that's correct, are you working on that? What would the timeline be to produce that?

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Keith Coulter: In terms of that legislation, I was aware in advance that we would be exempted, but not by much. So we're beginning our work on it. The word “exempt”, in my mind, is the wrong word. The legislation requires that we put in place an equivalent regime. The reasons for that are obvious. If somebody wishes to report something in our organization, that could get tangled up with very sensitive information. I've talked to my counterpart at CSIS. Both of us are required by this legislation to put that regime in place. We have to sort through the best way to do that. Both of us have started very preliminary conversations with our review bodies to see if there's a piece there that might fit with this. But we're going to work through it. If you could tell me the timeline on the legislation, that would be helpful. My understanding is that whatever we do will have to be approved by Treasury Board ministers. Therefore, we're going to have to work with Treasury Board officials to make sure we meet the requirements as seen by the government.

    My concern before this was tabled was my internal audience of a little over 1,200 people and how they would feel about being exempt. It's self-evident to people at this table that national security agencies may need a different approach. I have rank-and file employees who feel that they should have the same rights and privileges as other public servants unless it's explained to them why not. So I was a little worried in terms of how it would be presented. We did assure our own employees that we will work toward something equivalent, and I intend to do that.

    The Chair: That's great. Who would approve your alternate proposal?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: My understanding is that it will be Treasury Board ministers.

    The Chair: Does the Minister of National Defence have any involvement in that?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: I wouldn't take things to ministers without his agreeing that it would be the appropriate thing to take.

    The Chair: I've heard NATO mentioned a couple of times today, but I didn't hear NORAD mentioned, unless I missed it. What's your involvement, if any, with NORAD that you can tell us about?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: As you know, there's a binational planning group looking at various dimensions, including maritime security, in terms of the future of our arrangements with the United States in military-to-military terms. We're watching that very closely. I was at a meeting down there a couple of months ago. I went with my U.S. counterpart, Lieutenant-General Mike Hayden, the director of the National Security Agency. We're both monitoring that. Because it's a Canada-U.S. thing, we have to make sure that our two agencies are in sync in terms of providing intelligence in the right way to whatever emerges out of those discussions and government decisions. So we are following it closely. We will do what's required to make sure that the Canadians involved in that are well served with our kind of intelligence. But because it's binational, we'll also work with the National Security Agency and make sure we have the right partnership in this.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    I wonder if you could clarify for the committee the reporting structure with you and the minister. Can you go directly to the minister? What is your involvement, if any, with the CBS, let's say? How much direct access do you have to the minister?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: My reporting relationship, under legislation, is to the minister, but he has options to have me report in any way, under him, that he sees fit.

    I have an accountability directive from the minister that has me reporting on policy and operations through Rob Wright, the national security adviser, and on administration and finance through the Deputy Minister of National Defence. That can sound complicated to a lot of people, but administratively and finance-wise, it does fit with the Department of National Defence. It has since the 1970s, and I'm not a voice for changing that one.

    In terms of policy and operations, CSE's activities need to be looked at through a government prism. That fits well, too. I'm comfortable with the arrangement.

    People wonder why two deputies get involved in this, but it's collegial. I go to both of them on a lot of issues that they both understand. The three of us visit the minister regularly, together.

    I do written things to the minister, too. There is a regular ebb and flow of stuff that has to be taken care of. Sometimes I take advantage of the fact that the Deputy Minister of National Defence has file clearings with the minister, on a regular basis, to get business done.

    On the important things, the three of us have to be together in terms of our advice to the minister. We spend some time together to make sure we are on the same page, and then we go to the minister.

»  (1705)  

    The Chair: Great.

    I have two last questions. The RCMP is mentioned. First of all, what reporting goes on with your activities with them? I know you've provided a lot more support to them over the last period of time.

    Secondly, do other law enforcement agencies, say the OPP or even the Ottawa City Police, or whoever, have any opportunity to get assistance from your organization?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: If I could take the second one first, the short answer is not directly. That would require indirect assistance from the government. As you know, since 9/11, we've been working on this set of issues in terms of what information needs to be provided on national security issues to other levels of government, other levels of police, and even to Canadians generally. We don't have a direct relationship with any police force but the federal one.

    In terms of reporting, I'm not sure exactly what you're getting at. Were you talking about the foreign intelligence that we would provide the RCMP?

    The Chair: No, I'm talking about the RCMP. You have been providing more assistance to them, I understand. How is the reporting of those kinds of efforts done? In fact, is it keeping pace, I suppose, with your increased level of support?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: With respect to what we do, we provide the RCMP with some foreign intelligence that's relevant to their issues. If you're referring to increased assistance, was that in the Auditor General's report?

    The Chair: Yes.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: It is increasing and it's very technical. I can't get into a lot of detail in an open forum like this, but for example, the RCMP may not be able to decrypt something. In the way that it works, it's all done under their authority and we provide simple technical assistance. It's complicated technically, but it's a simple provision of a service. For example, if they couldn't decrypt something, we would work on it with our computers and our talent. We would give them back something that's decrypted, and everything would be done under their authority.

    In the way that it works, they would have to show us a warrant or something, and show us there is a legal authority in play. Then we would act in technical and operational assistance to them to do whatever had to be done. We don't have actions around it; that would go back to them.

    The assistance that's increasing in that zone is increasing because things are getting technically more complicated. We are the high end of technical expertise. I expect the demand here will increase.

»  (1710)  

    Hon. Jane Stewart: Who pays for this?

    The Chair: Yes, exactly. Who pays for all this?

    Hon. Jane Stewart: They do or you do?

    The Chair: It's highly technical.

    As we all know, you have to be running very hard to try to keep up with the high tech that the bad guys have.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: In terms of our strategic plan, we allocate resources to this. The amount of effort we put in isn't just between the RCMP and us. For example, I would talk to the national security adviser on this one. Treasury Board also monitors expenditures around this too and it does some reporting, I believe, in terms of what's spent in different categories, under different arrangements. But for me, it's a very practical problem of trying to meet their highest-priority demands.

    In terms of the way I've played it on some of these issues in recent times, I'm trying to ensure that it is the commissioner of the RCMP who is comfortable with the priorities of what we're doing and not doing, and not my analysts trying to figure out what the most logical demand is from the RCMP analysts. It has to get up to that top level and all the way to ministers in terms of making sure we're on target with a limited capacity to make a difference.

    The Chair: Something you said brings this question to mind. I guess we would all like to see a coordination of intelligence in this country as much as possible. I think the Auditor General is certainly speaking to that in her latest report. You're talking about the Minister of National Defence, but what about the new minister, Anne McLellan, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness? Would you not have some logical involvement with that particular minister? Or what's your view of how the interaction will be between the two ministers?

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Our minister is responsible for delivery and for CSE generally, but other ministers are client-ministers. And as I want to make sure that Margaret Bloodworth is getting what she needs over in the new Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, my minister wants to make sure that the Deputy Prime Minister gets what she needs from CSE. So this is resulting in serious discussions about how much of what we do...and I keep ending the discussions by saying, “If you give me more money, I can do more.” Sorting all of that out is key, but one of the advantages of having Rob Wright as the deputy minister responsible for policy and operations is that he's also a deputy minister reporting to the Deputy Prime Minister. So if she were unhappy, she would have a very easy way to make sure that Rob had me with the program.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Coulter, and to your staff. It was very interesting, and we appreciate it. We hope to have you here again in the future when the need arises.

    Mr. Keith Coulter: Thank you.

    The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.