FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, October 2, 2003

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1105

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. Karim Karim (Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University)

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1110

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1115

The Chair

Mrs. Ann Thomson (President of the Board, South Asia Partnership Canada)

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1120

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1125

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1130

The Chair

Mr. Michael Bell (Senior Fellow on Diplomacy, University of Toronto, Munk Centre for International Studies)

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1135

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1140

The Chair

Professor Sami Aoun (Professor of Political Science, Université de Sherbrooke)

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1145

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1150

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1155

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)

Â

1200

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

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1205

Mr. Michael Bell

The Chair

Mr. Karim Karim

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Mr. Karim Karim

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1210

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Michael Bell

Â

1215

Mr. Karim Karim

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1220

The Chair

Prof. Sami Aoun

The Chair

Prof. Sami Aoun

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Michael Bell

The Chair

Mr. Michael Bell

Â

1225

The Chair

Mr. Karim Karim

The Chair

Mrs. Ann Thomson

The Chair

Prof. Sami Aoun

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1230

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Michael Bell

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1235

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

Â

1240

Mr. Michael Bell

Â

1245

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Michael Bell

The Chair

Mr. Michael Bell

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Michael Bell

Â

1250

The Chair

Mrs. Ann Thomson

The Chair

Mr. Karim Karim

Â

1255

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mrs. Ann Thomson

The Chair

·

1300

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 049

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, October 2, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1105)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): The order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), is consideration of relations with Muslim countries. We are pleased to have as witnesses this morning, from Carleton University, Mr. Karim Karim, associate professor, school of journalism and communication; de l'Université de Sherbrooke, monsieur Sami Aoun, professeur de sciences politiques; from South Asia Partnership Canada, Ms. Ann Thomson, president of the board; and from the University of Toronto, Munk Centre for International Studies, Mr. Michael Bell, senior fellow on diplomacy and former ambassador to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.

    We'll start with Mr. Karim. We would like you to limit your introduction to ten minutes, because we need to hear from four people and have time for questions and answers at the end.

    Mr. Karim, please.

    Mr. Karim Karim (Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University): I would like to thank the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade for inviting me to make this submission.

[Translation]

    I am very pleased to address the members of this committee.

[English]

    My written submission has attempted to address a number of the central themes and questions outlined in the research brief prepared for the committee. It has dealt primarily with issues of diversity within Muslim communities, looking at questions of whether it is appropriate to speak of a monolithic Muslim world. I draw out the pluralism in contra-ethnicity, national attachments, linguistic traditions, and even religious beliefs among the billion adherents of Islam.

    Muslims hold the ideal of a united ummah, but in reality, one could broadly compare the variations in outlook in this global community to worldwide Christendom. There is, however, a tendency among some Muslim sources to promote the idea that there is only one authentic form of practising Islam. I'm sure the members of this committee will have realized that there are numerous manifestations of the religion, and the respective adherents consider themselves as fully Muslim as anyone else who upholds monotheism and the prophethood of Mohammed.

    Even within the various schools of Sunnism and the sects of Shiism, there is a plurality of outlook and practice. Sufism cuts across these two major branches of Islam and has even informed the religious sensibilities of some people in the west who have not formally converted to Islam, just as forms of meditation and yoga have been adopted from Buddhist and Hindu traditions.

    Terminology can act as a trap and fix our perceptions of people in static and stereotypical manners. Words such as “fundamentalist,” “conservative,” “orthodox,” “liberal,” or “progressive,” when applied to Muslims, tend to conjure up very particular types of persons.

    We know, in the real world, human beings are multidimensional and do not always act the way we expect them to. Perhaps the most misleading books are those that seek to explain to us “the Muslim mind,” “the Arab mind,” or “the Jewish mind.”

    The failings in U.S. policies, whether the inability to foresee events of September 11, 2001, or in the subsequent mistreatment of people, can be attributed in large part to the inflexibility on the part of various agencies in their perceptions about types of Muslims. Tendencies towards viewing them as exotic creatures whose actions are invariably to be seen through the lens of their religious beliefs produces faulty and counterproductive strategies.

    I have traced in my writings the resilience of the core stereotypes of barbarism, greed, lust, and violence in western perceptions of Muslims over the last 1,000 years.

    Observers have often remained so focused on the differences between the Muslim other and the western self that they have frequently overlooked the common human impulses that we find in ourselves. I have pointed out in my written submission the number of fundamental similarities between Muslim and western societies and have also discussed elsewhere the western influences on terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam.

    I would now like to move on to the issue of the presence of Muslims in the west. Diasporas have grown significantly in the west, with extended families and communities settling in separate countries in North America, Europe, and Australasia. Relatively accessible air travel and means of communication such as the Internet, satellite television, and the phone mean they can keep in touch with their global groups on a regular basis. The impact that this and other aspects of globalization have had on the role of national borders is strengthening the place of worldwide diasporas.

    Whereas governments view persons as subjects of specific jurisdictions, members of diasporas--and I would also add to the diasporas members such as those of transnational corporate elites, who are based in various countries for long periods--increasingly view themselves as cosmopolitan citizens. This does not necessarily mean they resist attachment to their countries of settlement, but they maintain a broader notion of the global self.

    Diaspora is especially significant in Muslim contexts due to the concept of the ummah, which has often been translated as “the Muslim world,” but I have critiqued that in my paper.

    Ties cut across national borders in intricate linkages that enable individuals to give and receive spiritual, social, economic, and cultural support. Unfortunately, militants and terrorists also exploit these networks for destructive purposes. It is incumbent upon governments to be able to distinguish between the legitimate and highly beneficial connections that are the characteristics of all diasporas from the criminal activities of the few.

    For example, the participation of Afghans from around the world, including Canada, in the important Loya Jirga assembly in Kabul a few months ago, as well as in various development activities in Afghanistan, is one indication of the many positive aspects of diasporic networking.

    One of the world's largest non-governmental organizations, the Aga Khan Development Network, draws financial, professional, and voluntary support from the worldwide Ismaili diaspora.

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    A number of other Muslim diasporic organizations are enabling the kind of cooperation between governments of western and Muslim majority countries that would be difficult to achieve otherwise.

    Members of diasporas frequently travel back and forth between countries of settlement and origin, as well as to other places where their global communities have settled. Their itineraries also include places of pilgrimage.

    Members of this committee are well aware of the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian engineer of Syrian origin who was deported in September, 2002 to Damascus from New York's John F. Kennedy Airport, where he was in transit while returning from Zurich to Montreal.

    Photojournalist Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian citizen of Iranian origin, was killed earlier this year in Iran after she was caught taking pictures of a notorious prison. The government in Tehran, which considered her an Iranian citizen, refused to return her body despite the request of her son who lives in Montreal.

    The flow of information about the cases of Maher Arar and Zahra Kazemi from the Syrian and Iranian governments respectively to Canadian officials has not been satisfactory. This reflects partially the views of these middle eastern governments about the diasporas. Their concepts of citizenship are based on immutable ties of blood, rather than those of soil, which are operative in Canada.

    Understanding the role of diasporas in the world today is vital for a fuller comprehension of international relations. Various governments, such as those of India and Israel, have developed elaborate policies to engage with their respective global diasporas and have designated cabinet ministers to oversee their implementation. Indeed, the lobbies formed by various diasporic communities have long sought to influence foreign policy in their countries of residence.

    A significant number of diasporic individuals hold dual, and some even multiple, citizenships. According to the work of Aiwha Ong, East Asian and Southeast Asian governments seem to be accommodating Chinese entrepreneurs who conduct business in their diaspora in these regions. The European Union appears to be the site of the emergence of multiple layers of citizenship.

    It is clear that Canada will have to engage sooner rather than later in an international discussion about the implications of transnational diasporas and contemporary cosmopolitanism for foreign policy, immigration, citizenship, and security issues.

    The cases of Maher Arar and Zahra Kazemi have underlined the need for well-defined international protocols for the treatment of diasporic members. This discussion will need to be conducted not only with diaspora-producing states, but also with other governments, especially the United States, given the treatment that some Muslim Canadian visitors have received from its immigration officials.

    Several initiatives of the government have indicated the strong intention to understand Muslim societies better. The ummah has become an inescapable feature of the foreign policies of countries around the world. It is noteworthy that a number of Muslim majority states have rejected Huntington's model of a clash of civilizations and propose instead a dialogue of civilizations.

    Canada's pluralistic society has the opportunity to play a leadership role in such a transnational dialogue. The cultural pillar of Canada's foreign policy needs to be extended from its present conceptualization to explore strategies that will enable the use of cultural tools to facilitate engagement with Muslim-majority and other societies.

    The world has been standing at a crossroads since the end of the Cold War. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have only served to underline the need for a new, less confrontational vision of global relationships. Canada's emphasis on global peacekeeping can be enhanced with its strongly held domestic values of cultural pluralism. We have the choice of viewing human relations as manifested only in a series of clashes or making a concerted effort toward multilateral dialogue in order to avert global disaster.

    In a world that seems to be drawn increasingly into a cycle of war and terrorism, Canada has the opportunity--indeed, the duty--to help show the way that leads to mutual understanding and respect among the peoples of the world.

    Thank you very much.

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    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Karim.

    Ms. Thomson.

    Mrs. Ann Thomson (President of the Board, South Asia Partnership Canada): Thank you for inviting South Asia Partnership Canada, SAP Canada, to speak to you today about sharing universal values and building relationships between Canada and South Asia.

    Founded in 1983, SAP Canada is a coalition of 24 Canadian organizations--secular, Muslim, and Christian--that work for human development in South Asia. We empower communities in South Asia to design, implement, and sustain their own solutions to the challenges they face every day.

    SAP's work is focused on governance and democracy, peace and security, and sustainable livelihoods. Gender equality is an important goal for all of our work. We generate support for our partners in South Asia to implement their grassroots development work and to raise issues with other organizations and networks in the region. In Canada, we provide learning and public engagement opportunities for our members and a diverse constituency of organizations.

    SAP Canada is a member of SAP International, which facilitates our development work with national SAP organizations and other partners in five countries: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Some of SAP Canada's members are active on the ground in Afghanistan, and we have organized events in Canada involving the Afghan community in North America. Over the years, CIDA has generously supported our work in the region. We have also worked with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on a number of projects.

    Three of the four largest Muslim populations in the world are found in Bangladesh and Pakistan, which have Muslim majorities, and in India, where they make up 20% of the population. In South Asia, we see that Muslims in both majority and minority communities represent the same broad range of attitudes and practices that we have in Canada and in other parts of the world. Our experience shows that the great majority of people want to live peaceful, productive lives in harmony with others in their communities, regardless of religion and other differences.

    Our partners and colleagues tell us and demonstrate for us that the great mass of Muslims want to be able to practise their own religion, want others to respect it, and are perfectly ready to respect others. Religious differences themselves are not the issue. Poverty, disparities in living standards, unfair treatment before the law, and lack of access to services and opportunity are the issues that give rise to conflict.

    In our experience, we have seen that where there are incidents and conflicts supposedly based on religious differences, they are not spontaneous but are instigated by one or another interest for political purposes. We have also observed that there are certain keystone issues that, without solution, perpetuate a wider sense of injustice and conflict in Muslim communities. The Israeli-Palestinian issue is clearly one for Muslims worldwide. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is another.

    Within the Muslim communities in South Asia there are people and organizations that provide dynamic leadership for what they see as universal values. The freedoms and responsibilities inherent in them lead directly to tolerance; pluralism; gender equality; public dialogue and non-violence to settle disputes; and respect for all people, regardless of differing characteristics--all part of what we think of as Canadian values. Such values are readily embraced and promoted by many local organizations in Muslim countries and communities in South Asia.

    Today, I want to tell you about how the South Asia Partnership network is making a difference in people's lives, the lives of people of all faiths in South Asia. By giving you a snapshot of the lives of ordinary people in South Asia, I would like to reflect the experience and voices of our partners in South Asia and our members in Canada who work with thousands of community organizations.

    One of the most significant women's organizations in northern Bangladesh started with five destitute women. When I say “destitute”, I mean women who have no way to make a living. They are often widows or have lost their homes or land by flood or expropriation.

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    To make ends meet, each woman went from door to door begging. They found that people gave them only one handful of rice--no money. So they had rice but no money to purchase shelter, medicine, clothing, or schooling for their children or themselves. These five women decided to combine their rice and sell it in the market. SAP Bangladesh approached them and offered training and resources to improve their small business. They accepted the help and founded what is today one of the largest women-run non-governmental organizations in northern Bangladesh. They focus on income-generating activities for women like themselves, thus providing not only an income, but the voice and legitimacy for their members that the very poor do not have.

    One of SAP Canada's members, the International Development and Relief Foundation, IDRF, is working in the Jharkand state of India to improve the living conditions of slum residents. In these neighbourhoods, Muslim and Hindu communities live side by side, faced by more or less the same problems. Poverty and its related problems are common to all the poor of the area, so the work must include everyone.

    In three slums, IDRF, with its partners, is providing informal education to the children so that they can continue their study in the formal school systems. Women are organized into self-help groups that are saving on a regular basis to establish a revolving microcredit fund. Girls have access to vocational training and the resulting products are sold. The project is also providing the community with visiting nurses. Over three years, this project has improved girls' access to education, mobilized the communities, generated income, and improved health care. Leaders of this project are now showing interest in educating on a taboo subject in India: HIV and AIDS. By working together, this community has not only improved its living conditions, but has gained recognition and respect within society at large.

    Another of our members, Human Concern International, supported by many Canadian Muslims, has provided support in India in response to two emergencies. One was to help victims of the earthquake in Gujarat and the other was to benefit victims of communal riots, also in Gujarat. The beneficiaries were disadvantaged people of different religions.

    South Asia Partnership Pakistan has trained more than 1,000 community groups and many other larger organizations to address livelihood issues in a context of tolerance and inclusion. The leaders of these groups have become activists for peace, human rights, and gender equality, and while respectful of all religions, are secular in their attitudes. SAP Pakistan campaigns for, among other things, the minority rights of Christians and Hindus.

    The story of Najma is a good example. Najma returned to her village in the northwest frontier of Pakistan, a very conservative area. She began to organize women to have a voice in that community. The village elders swiftly banished her and her family. SAP Pakistan came to her aid by opening a dialogue with the women there. The women decided to stand up for Najma and her family and convinced the village elders to withdraw their banishment. Women now have a collective voice they did not traditionally have in that community. The women in this community are now organizing with women in neighbouring communities to promote basic rights and freedoms.

    During eight years of living and working in Bangladesh and Indonesia, and many more travelling through South Asia, I saw successes like these repeated over and over, even in the midst of conflict. Canadian assistance lies behind each of these stories, and Canada itself has 650,000 Muslim citizens. That number will grow significantly in the future. Like most Canadians, they live in cities and are increasingly becoming involved in the economic, social, cultural, and political life of Canada.

    The September 11 terrorist attacks created a crisis for them as individuals and as a community. They have responded calmly and effectively to the backlash, yet many Muslims in Canada feel less secure than non-Muslim Canadians. Most are reluctant to travel to the United States because of that country's use of arbitrary deportation and detention. Muslims in Canada are offended by the registration of immigrants by U.S. authorities.

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    Furthermore, the use of Canadian immigration laws as a tool in Canada's war on terror, as seen in Toronto recently, has further strained the trust between Muslims and the Government of Canada. The challenge for Canada and Canadians is to guarantee that our citizens are treated equally and with respect at both home and abroad. Canadians are proud of our open multicultural society, and these values have served us well in our domestic, foreign, and international aid policies.

    I would like to conclude with a few recommendations.

    Since the majority of Muslims live in the developing world in conditions of poverty, improving their livelihoods and reducing poverty is critical to building more just and equitable societies. In particular, reducing inequalities between these nations and the affluent western world is an important means of improving relations and limiting the conditions that create support for desperate extremism such as international terrorism.

    Muslims are active participants on all sides in the social, economic, political, and cultural struggles of South Asian countries and in Canada. We should take full advantage of the opportunities to strengthen ties at the people-to-people level. Canada can support the rich fabric of civil society in Canada and in countries of Muslim majorities and minorities to help solve problems and build constructive, long-lasting relationships.

    We should focus in our development cooperation abroad on eliminating poverty, improving livelihoods and social conditions, supporting gender equality, and encouraging democratic practices. Important to all of this is strengthening civil society in other countries and building the capacity of organizations, institutions, community groups, associations, and networks to bring change from within. Active and democratic civil societies serve as the DNA of pluralism, tolerance, and cooperation. Canada needs to support people structure more than infrastructure.

    In our relations with Muslim countries and communities overseas, we should draw on the knowledge and expertise of Canadian Muslim organizations. The Canadian government can work closely with progressive Muslim social justice organizations and support building of strong practical partnerships between them and organizations in Muslim majority and minority countries.

    I understand you're visiting South Asia soon. We'd like to recommend that you visit the SAP International board chair in Pakistan and our other partners in the countries you visit. They will be pleased to introduce you to grassroots organizations and people working daily to improve their communities and their lives.

    Canada will enhance its relations with Muslims across the globe by supporting their efforts to address fundamental concerns: clean water; health services; good education; women's equality; safe jobs; peace and security; and so many more. By being a helpful partner to Muslims across the world, by providing a voice to those who would not otherwise be heard, and by building a relationship of respect rather than suspicion, Canada will improve dialogue, build trust, and alleviate the poverty that is a major barrier to sustainable and tolerant societies.

    Thank you.

Á  (1130)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Thomson.

    Mr. Bell, please.

    Mr. Michael Bell (Senior Fellow on Diplomacy, University of Toronto, Munk Centre for International Studies): What I'd like to talk to you about today is the question of democratization in the Middle East. I'd like to use as my starting point the Bush doctrine, the policies articulated by the current administration in terms of its world view, and most specifically its view that it has a moral duty to convert, if you like, others to its values.

    I call this is a kind of coercive, or at best forced, democratization, and I think it's very dangerous. In my experience, it goes against the culture, the traditions, and the history, and, we could say, Islam as many interpret it today. If we were to see this kind of forced democratization, we would then be faced with the imposition of values that might be very different from those held by the people of the region, which certainly would run counter to the view that people should develop their own societies.

    Now, I think the threat of forced democratization has receded considerably in the wake of what's happened in Iraq, because what's happened in Iraq is much more of a challenge to the Americans than they ever thought possible. So the agenda has changed in the Middle East, number one. Number two and number three, Iraq cannot be a failure, so the amount of time and effort being put in to try to force Syria, force the Saudis, and force the Egyptians into a process of democratization, as seen through this American administration's eyes, is less pregnant, if you like, than it had been prior to the Iraq invasion.

    Nevertheless, there will be much effort to make Iraq a democracy. Anybody who doubts that just has to look at the web page of the so-called coalition, or really the American administration in Iraq, where they are quite specific about what those institutions should be and how they should be run. Given the differences between American values and, perhaps more importantly, American methodology--in other words, how they're going to impose, if you like, those values--I think we would run some really high risks if that were to happen. I'm talking about civil war, destabilization, radicalism--a very, very dangerous thing--and a reinforcement of the view that the U.S. is an imperial power, a hegemon that obviously is going to impose its values.

    Now, looking at societies that have strong authoritarian traditions, as I've said, there are different types. Egypt or Jordan appear to us to be liberal or progressive, relatively speaking. Iraq and Syria appear to be much more repressive. What I'm going to argue here today is that these differences are not unimportant, as they do affect people's lives, but they're nuanced.

    I want to use the case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an Egyptian intellectual imprisoned by the legal authorities of the Mubarak regime because he accepted money from the United States to run his NGO. Now, the difference between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Mubarak's Egypt is that in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Saad Eddin would have been killed. In Egypt he was brought to trial and found guilty. He was held in prison, he appealed, and then he appealed again. Finally he was released, found not guilty. But the effect was very similar. What did Mubarak want to do? To draw a red line and say that these civil society reformers cannot go beyond a certain point, and if they do go beyond a certain point in fostering pluralism, they will pay a price. The example is Saad Eddin Ibrahim. And I don't mean to focus on Egypt alone. I'm using that as a characteristic of many societies in the region.

Á  (1135)  

    In terms of what is done to foster democratization and pluralism, which I think is a good thing, it has to be much more nuanced. In fact, I don't think we should use the term “democratization”, because then we get into a question of Islamic radical groups saying “We're all for democracy”, and governments saying “Well, we're all for democracy, but we're faced with these threats to overthrow the regime and its values, and therefore we can't tolerate them.”

    Frankly, I doubt that many of those who seek to replace existing regimes by revolutionary force would end up being very different from the present regimes. Of course they would have fervour and they would bring hope to some, as the revolution in Iran proved, but at the end of the day, in terms of rights and a rights-based agenda, I don't think there would be much of an improvement. Perhaps I'm overly cynical, but that's the way I see it.

    The Egyptian model, if you like, has been that there should be no independent institutions, little pluralism. There's a parliament, there are elections, but those elections are largely controlled. A small number of opposition members are elected, and the press has some elements of freedom so you can say here's a criticism of the government for this or that policy, but it's very strictly curtailed.

    So what do you do in practical terms to make the changes that are going to improve lives? What the Islamic movements have done--the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, in Egypt--is offer welfare services, education, health care, and what have you more effectively and in a more timely way than the government can. So it's gaining adherents by its effectiveness. It doesn't suffer from sclerosis. That effectiveness is very important in getting people's loyalties.

    Middle East regimes would be happy to be rid of the Muslim Brotherhood if they could, even if they're tolerated now. Why would they be happy to get rid of them? They'd be happy to get rid of them because they object to those organizations as much as they do to Saad Eddin Ibrahim or so-called leftists or reformists of a secular type. However, the Brotherhood has religion on its side. No government in the Middle East can move radically against a movement that identifies itself with Islam. The irony is that you then have radical movements that want to replace the regime--of course, they may alter their language, saying they're only for democracy, etc.--and a government that's afraid to crack down on them because of their religious affiliation.

    So the only legitimate means of opposition is through these movements. If you join a secular movement, if you form an organization to protect the trees in your neighbourhood, you'll be shut down. Islamic organizations cannot be shut down in the same way because of their resonance, because of their identification with Muslims.

    Now, what do you do about this kind of thing? I think, by and large, the Canadian government has done a pretty good job. The way we've done it, at least in my experience, is through trying to create a feeling of pluralism of institutions that are independent of the executive. Right now all these regimes are executive-driven. Other institutions are almost incidental. They're window-dressing, if one wants to be cynical enough. What we have to do is give those institutions help, and assist them in gaining real power. What we have to do is empower people.

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We had a few projects in Egypt, and I can give you a few examples. One was called the women's initiative fund. It was a process in upper Egypt of giving small loans to women to start their own businesses. Why was that so important? It gave the women who were affected some control over their own lives. It's interesting to note that a number of the women who participated in the project, in order to register, for the first time became legal entities. In other words, there was no record of their existence, citizenship, or what have you before they had to register.

    We had another project that we called the girl child education project. It was for girls who weren't getting any education and lived in small villages. Built into the curriculum was an attempt to inculcate in these students the fact that they were individuals, and as individuals they had rights. In other words, it was to create space in the mind between those individuals or NGOs, many of which we aided, and the government--space to develop, to realize yourself, or to realize the goals of your organization.

    The surprising thing was that to a large degree, a lot of this was negotiated with the Government of Egypt, the Government of Jordan, or whatever government where we had aid programs. I think there were two different agendas, but it happened that our proposal was subtle enough to not raise all these demons before the authorities. We did have problems where we got a little too close to the fire, but generally I think we were pretty successful in testing the limits of the possible. That's what I'd like to see more of.

    In my view, if Canadian assistance doesn't touch people's lives in the near term, it's probably not worth doing. In other words, if we have to make a choice between changing the way people think about themselves and the government that rules them, in building a lab or a drainage system in a country like Egypt or Jordan, both of which have been receiving funds for many years to support these objectives, there's no choice. When you change the way people think and give them space, that creates initiative and allows them to fulfill themselves.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    We have now Mr. Sami Aoun, who is professor of Political Science at the Université de Sherbrooke.

    I'm going to do some advertising for him by saying that he published this year at the Éditions Boréal a book entitled La civilisation de l'Islam.

    Go ahead, please, Professor Aoun.

    Professor Sami Aoun (Professor of Political Science, Université de Sherbrooke): Good morning, Mr. Chair. I am very honoured to be called as a witness for the second time.

    I would like first to apologize; I who am used to the galleries of Quebec universities, I got lost in those of the Parliament. I had received contradictory directions.

    Being the fourth one to speak, there will be some redundancy, at least as far as some points which have already been dealt with here, incidentally in a very appropriate and wise way, are concerned.

    I shall make a rather critical, even self-critical analysis of the approaches of the Muslim world. However, I shall not make a critique of the foundations of Canadian foreign policy; I shall leave aside that critique of the policy as it is viewed or implemented, to focus on the fact that there are some accomplishments in this area. My remarks will be threefold: preliminary remarks on the present Muslim world; Muslim world issues in the face of Canadian foreign policy; and finally, possible avenues for recommendations, which are rather brief.

    Generally speaking, we can say we have reached the moment of truth in what is called the Muslim space which is very diverse, pluralistic, plural, multiethnic and multilinguistic. As a matter of fact, Islam is a civilization which is superposed on different orders, whether societies, tribes, clans, languages or other things.

    As far as my thoughts are concerned, I would say first that in the Muslim imagination, what we call the geo-cultural Muslim space, has been there for a long time. Now, even if this golden age had some periods of unification, the idea of a unified nation under a single power is rather a product of the imagination than historic reality.

    Then, if Canadian diplomacy should reorganize or question itself, there are four moments with which it should come to terms.

    The first one is unquestionably the terrorism of September 11 and its distinctly Islamic cultural or sociological colour. Even with a manipulation of that Islamic colour, we can question whether September 11 is either partly or completely a product of that geo-cultural space.

    The second point that Canadian diplomacy cannot avoid to consider is this consummate break between the U.S. strategy and a conservative and radical Islam it has always manipulated either for the purposes of its empire or to advance its interests, western interests in general or American interests in particular, at the expense of the Soviet empire, in other words of communism. As Canadians, we are experiencing today some kind of mourning: it is a transition which has the colour of a break-up with radical and conservative Islam.

    Thirdly, there is the war against terrorism. Canadian diplomacy cannot go back to square one. The war against terrorism is ongoing and it already had some success, namely the overthrow of the puritanical and obscurantist Taliban regime which was not a credit for Muslims, and the overthrow of a hollow and empty nationalist Arab dictatorship which, while being full of fascist rhetoric, guided its very people in the wrong direction, whether the Kurd minority or the Shiite majority. So we are talking about two overthrows which are beneficial, first of all in the Muslim world and then on the international scene. We now have to try to understand why these regimes created so many mass graves instead of trying to identify the lies and the excuses of war. It is a problem of the democratic sphere rather than a problem of the Iraqi people as such.

    Except for the fourth point, these are positive effects of war.

Á  (1145)  

    However, Canadian diplomacy should not consider these successes as solid or everlasting. In fact, successes are almost always temporary and ephemeral. The U.S. war machine had obviously a swift victory but it still does not have the capacity to establish a stable peaceful order which is in the interest of the Muslim, and particularly the Arab people, and which is a step to a more equitable and human international system. At the present time, the pax americana may be at the embryonic stage. The military U.S. strike force is not counterbalanced or accompanied by a world vision which is less unilateral, more multilateral and most of all, which is able to help Muslim entities, not necessarily to experience again their golden age but to be a partner which cannot be ignored in the context of globalization and of the shaping of an international system. As you know, this Muslim world in general—if I can use this sometimes empty shell—has a very deep narcissistic wound because the Muslim caliphate was dismantled in 1924. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Muslims are orphans politically and their traditional institutions have been destabilized by colonialism or by something else.

    Now, what are the reading avenues for Canadian diplomacy? I believe that Canadian diplomacy will have to deal with dialectics of civilization which leave their grip on these geo-political spaces that, through generalization, we call today's Muslim world.

    The first dialectic is that this Muslim world is in a cultural , political and civilization dead end, because of its incapacity to recover the tradition, the Shari'a, the law and the glorious history of its past. This Muslim tradition does not have the ingenuity and the energy to seek technical processes in order to solve social, political, economic and military problems. Tradition is out of breath but at the same time this western model called modernity is itself out of breath, in the western space, anyway. So we are speaking of a Muslim world yearning for modernity, which tries to apply this modernity and does not succeed in recovering its tradition, whereas western modernity itself is ill, as you may know if you look at our societies and our life models with a somewhat critical eye. So western proselytism should be rather limited.

    The second element which has a grip on the Muslim world in general and which Canadian diplomacy should take into account is this opposition between liberation and liberalism. Unfortunately or fortunately—it all depends on the approach—, the Muslim world is rather engaged in wars of liberation, whether in Chechnya, in Kashmir, in Cyprus, in Greece or elsewhere. Even recently, Parsley island was an issue between Morocco and Spain. An islet with two goats makes a casus belli between two large nations. Practically, this liberation which drains the energy of the Muslim world here and elsewhere makes it lose sight of its domestic situation. I would not say that there are not a few historic rights at issue but this liberation engages the Muslim world in the path of confrontation and war.

Á  (1150)  

    Meanwhile, the primary cause which is the liberal cause, the cause of internal democracy, of internal responsibility or that of creating powers which are tuned to civil societies, is relegated to a position of secondary importance. Unfortunately—and I think this was underlined—these liberators, the liberals of Islam are perceived as being westernized and are rejected as puppets of the West. It is said that they are the carriers of a foreign agenda. What harms democracy is that the forces of change are weaker than the demand for change in the Muslim world. I think that Canadian diplomacy should come to their rescue.

    Let us have a quick look at the realities of the Muslim world. As to political change, choices are not particularly interesting. In Pakistan, they resorted to military putsch for a political change. In Palestine, to torpedo the peace process, we have Arafat's authoritarianism. In Tunisia, to advance secularism, we have the grip of the army and of the security services. It is the same in Turkey. In Syria, there is only one dynasty in the republic, which is a mental aberration: the son takes over from the father. This problem is not only seen in Syria. We are told that it is also the case in Egypt, in Yemen and in Libya. All these presidents are going to transfer the power automatically to their sons, which is unfortunate as far as political change is concerned.

    The third important element in the Muslim world and which Canadian diplomacy should watch—I am going to be brief, since this was mentioned by my colleagues—is the monstrous state which the Arab and generally speaking the Muslim bureaucratic state is, a state which is eroding but which still has its claws on civil society and chokes it. It is a state which is too big for the small problems and too small for the big problems. The present Muslim state is unable to confront the enemy, whether in the case of the project of U.S. hegemony or in another case, and is unable to solve charitable or social problems.

    I would like to make briefly a couple of recommendations for Canadian diplomacy. First, we should not wish easily a U.S. failure in Iraq because it would amounts to wish an Iraqi failure and ipso facto a failure of the Muslims and of the Arabs in a democratic management of the cultural mosaic which characterizes all their societies.

    Today there are fortunately trends towards reform. Today, 403 Saudi prominent people signed a petition for reform. Elections were held in Bahrain. In Syria, a Syrian opponent who is back told us for the first time that it was not the people but governments which were scared. If Canadian diplomacy wanted to help the Muslim world, it could draw inspiration from this Muslim thinker, Malek Bennani, who said that the problem is not in the aggressiveness of external hegemony but the issue of why the Muslim world is so vulnerable to these hegemony plans.

    Thank you.

Á  (1155)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Aoun.

[English]

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. Information has come, I'm sure, to most members that two of our Canadian soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan and three have been very seriously injured. I'm wondering if we could adjourn, out of respect for our fallen soldiers, to the House to hear the statement.

    I hesitate to do this, because the message we're hearing is so absolutely connected to the very question of what it means to support genuine democratic development and to what our role should be that I would hope we could come back to continue. But I think, out of respect, that I would like to suggest we adjourn to the House to hear the minister's statement, respond, and come back, if that's possible.

    The Chair: I'm going to ask Ms. Carroll and Mr. Martin.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): I'll just say that I very much agree. The chair knows I came up and spoke to him about it. It's very difficult when such excellent people have come from some distance, but I completely agree with Ms. McDonough. I think that's where our place is, in the House.

    The Chair: Mr. Martin.

    Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): While I have a lot of respect for what Ms. McDonough is saying, I think out of respect for the people who've fallen to build a more secure world, it would be in their honour if we continued to do what we're doing right now in trying to listen to the people who've come here from a long way to provide solutions, to build a stronger future, and to try to avoid the violence they have become victims of.

    The Chair: It's quite difficult, Ms. McDonough, because if we adjourn, the problem I am going to face.... There has been a statement from the defence minister, Mr. McCallum, and all the five leaders are going to talk. This means that if we come back, we're going to come back for something like 15 minutes at the maximum.

    It's up to the committee. Some members, like Mr. Day, who sent me a note, have left for that reason. I also want to respect my witnesses, who have come from all across the country. I think it's quite important.

    Mr. Harvard.

    Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): I think I would want to support Alexa's motion.

    I agree with Keith that the fallen soldiers would want us to continue our work, but at the same time, I think it behoves us to set aside a short period of remembrance for them. We do it every year for two minutes on November 11, and I think on this particular occasion if we set aside just a few minutes out of respect for the fallen it's the right thing to do.

  (1200)  

    The Chair: Mrs. Redman.

    Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Are the witnesses available if we do come back to continue?

    The Chair: The problem is a technical problem: we're closing at one o'clock.

    Mr. Obhrai.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: Can't we stay any longer than that? Could you stay until 1:30?

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): I agree with the importance of giving respect to the fallen soldiers. There's no question about it. But I think we will do that in the House; I do not think we will not do it. I'm sure we will do it at question period, and we will recognize their sacrifice appropriately.

    But I would like to agree with Keith and say that the witnesses have come forward, have presented a point of view, and have come a long way. I think we should go ahead with them.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Lalonde.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I share, of course, the grief and the sorrows of the families but I think that this committee should continue. There are some members of the committee who can go to the House. If my colleague goes, it is not because he disagrees on us sitting but because we shared the responsibilities between ourselves.

    I would like to add that when Canada decided to send 1,900 troops in Afghanistan in a situation which, as we know, is difficult, everybody knew that is was dangerous. I think that we, all the honourable members together, are going to honour them in the House.

    So I would rather have us stay here.

[English]

    The Chair: So there will be one minute of silence concerning the death of our two soldiers. The members who wish to go will be excused. I understand this. We're going to just keep going after the one minute of silence.

    Ms. Carroll.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: This is just to say that I am assuming the decision of the committee is to do what you suggested, that those of us who wish to go to the House can do so. But I would also ask that if there are any housekeeping matters, they be left until the conclusion of our witnesses and until those of us who have elected to go to the House return to the committee.

    The Chair: We will do our best.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: Is that acceptable?

    The Chair: Yes, that's acceptable for sure.

    We will have a minute of silence.

  (1203)  

---

  (1204)  

    The Chair: We're going to start questions and answers with Mr. Obhrai.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It's indeed the case that our soldiers have lost their lives in Afghanistan for precisely what we're discussing here—democracy in that part of the world and the rule of law, which you have articulated, Mr. Bell and Mr. Aoun.

    I will ask a question, but I also want to move to another bigger question. I'll ask Mr. Karim and Ann Thomson. It's just a point. During our visit down to New York, we met the former Jordanian prime minister who was responsible for the first report written by the UN on democracy and the critical situation in the Middle East with many of the social and democratic indicators. She mentioned to us that their second report was due in September. I wonder if that report has actually come up or not, because she mentioned the follow-up report to that original report. Do you know about it and whether it's come up or not?

    Then I want to go to Karim and Ann. You made a very interesting observation about the impact of the diaspora community that has grown in the western world, which you have articulated here. I would agree with you that over the next five to ten years, as this diaspora increases, its impact is going to be very dramatic. Right now, you articulated only two countries...but I would say that down the road, more and more countries will tap into that.

    The concern I have, being one of a diaspora myself, and to allude to the cases of Maher Arar and Mrs. Kazemi, who are both Canadian citizens overseas, is that after September 11 there is a growing feeling, which I'm sure you can tap into, among Muslim communities of being second class citizens in Canada. I do not wish to discuss what's going on in the U.S.A.; that's a different country. I'm interested in Canada.

    Many of these feelings are coming out. We just had a multicultural report that deals with that point as well. In the end, there is a feeling that the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Government of Canada sometimes are not really proactive at all in that issue to make this diaspora feel they are part of or, as you mentioned, equal citizens in this country. That feeling is still hanging very strongly out there.

    So I want to hear your thoughts about what steps the Government of Canada could take to ensure that among the Muslim community and the others, they feel they are fully represented by selected officials. What would be your point of view?

  (1205)  

    Mr. Michael Bell: On the report, I don't know.

    The Chair: On the UNDP report, the answer we got is that it is scheduled for October 14.

    Mr. Karim.

    Mr. Karim Karim: This is a very important question, in that it addresses perceptions....

    Would you like me to address the issue of the government as a whole, or just foreign affairs?

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: The government as a whole.

    Mr. Karim Karim: There was concern.... In fact, I was asked by the Department of Justice to carry out a quantitative analysis of Muslim media and how the anti-terrorism law was viewed by it. There was a lot of alarm and concern about victimization, about unfairly targeting Muslims, and so on. That issue has almost disappeared from the radar, and I don't see it mentioned so much.

    I think the concerns are primarily for a better understanding of what Muslims are in this country, their diversity, and their abhorrence for the most part.... I'm generalizing, but I would say that the large part of Muslims abhor the kinds of terrorist events that took place, and so on. So that kind of understanding....

    The training of officials is very important, especially frontline officials, such as immigration officials, about the diversity within Canada generally among Muslims, as well as in the religions, and about who they are, and so on. There seems to be a perception that this is lacking among the frontline people who engage with Muslims. Whenever terrorist incidents or crises occur, there is a generalization that all Muslims are that way. That is a primary concern, that perhaps the government should be doing more so that people understand the nuances and different characteristics among Muslims.

    We know that some people have been caught trying to get across the border. I forget the name now, but on the eve of the millennium, someone from Montreal was caught. So that does exist, as we have found—but in a very minute part of the community. The rest of the people seem to be quite aghast at those things, and they want this to be recognized.

    My last point is about the reaction people have towards traditional Muslim dress, which is also of concern, and especially how people react to women wearing the hijab, and occasionally to some men wearing traditional clothes. So there is also a plea among Muslims that officials and Canadians in general understand that better.

  (1210)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Ms. Lalonde, go ahead.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you very much.

    I thank all of you. We would like to have more time to torture you a little.

    We have already heard a lot of experts, a lot of views and I want to tell you that, in this very moment, I am trying to understand where those societies, those Muslim countries are going. This very democracy we treasure did not come like a flower which grew slowly with a little water.

    Where are the societies of Muslim countries going? It is interesting but at the same time we live in a time of modernity which may be a little obsolete. We live in this time while another part of the world seems to live in another. How can we help? In my view, by developing human rights. We should open up and help people become free in their minds.

    I leave the question open.

[English]

    Mr. Michael Bell: It's a good question, a challenging question. I don't know what the future holds, and I confine myself here to the Arab countries, because they're the countries with which I have experience. There are very serious questions, as the UN report made specific, in terms of growth, the ability to succeed, freedom of choice, and what have you.

    I really think that at the end of the day our best chance is to do more of the kinds of things we have been doing as Canadians; in other words, try to create pluralistic societies through cooperation with governments where we can, NGOs and individuals. It seems to me that liberating people within themselves encourages initiative.

    There is very little initiative taken in corporations because the structure is so authoritarian. We had, for instance, an oil and gas project of almost $50 million in Jordan when I was there. There was a strong disagreement between the project manager and his Jordanian counterpart. These guys could not sort that out. I went to the minister and said, “Minister, help me. What do we do here?” Within 24 hours that problem was straightened out. If we were doing it here we'd say “We don't want to go to the minister. That shows we can't resolve it ourselves.”

    There is such an authoritarian tradition that the automatic tendency is to pass things up, not to seek solutions and try to resolve differences, but to use the cultural code, and if that doesn't work, to push it up the system. I think the more we can do to give people their own space to determine their future, organize, and what have you, the more we create the conditions for the kind of dynamism that's going to be necessary for not only political growth, but economic growth.

  (1215)  

    Mr. Karim Karim: Merci, Madam Lalonde.

    Again, I think the diversity of different countries needs to be studied. Unfortunately, the Arab countries seem to be sort of at the bottom of the scale, in terms of certain kinds of progress. If you look at the kinds of things happening in Indonesia and Malaysia, perhaps there is more hope, but they're not completely out of the woods.

    We need to review what we mean by democracy. Is our model or are western models--and of course there are several--of democracy the only kinds that are practical and can be implemented abroad? We know that is not the case. We need to address the indigenous values, cultures, histories, etc.

    Over the weekend I was at a conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists in the United States, and we discussed the issue of democracy in Muslim countries. There were several papers that addressed the importance of civil society, and the historical role that civil society has played, even in making law. There has been this notion that has existed in Muslim societies--and is accepted in Canadian and western societies--that even the leader of the country is subject to the law of the land. Of course, in the present day you will be very hard put to find a leader who constantly subjects himself or herself to the law. Things have regressed in that way.

    There are various things--what was called at the conference “critical Islam”. Critical social scientists, Muslim social scientists, are trying to review the traditions in Muslim societies, in Muslim civilization, that allowed civil society--associations, guilds, etc.--apart from the power of the state, to play a critical role in shaping the society and maintaining a balance. You will find that the independence of scholars who are critiquing society, or those who maintain it, does not exist today in most Muslim majority states.

    I just want to give you an example of one of the things that happened recently in Egypt, where a law was being considered to give greater rights to women for divorce. There was a lot of opposition from the traditional religious establishment; however, a coalition was formed of secular lawyers, other civil society members, as well as members of the religious establishment, and individuals who were not tied to dogmatic kinds of thinking. This was an example of how people can work together, even in contemporary times, with the government justice department to produce ways in which progress can be carried out.

    The task for governments like ours is to identify within those societies the people and organizations willing to carry forward certain agendas from their own indigenous and cultural sorts of timetables. We have here in our own country certain initiatives--I mentioned a couple--and others, like the Progressive Muslims of Canada, have initiatives in Afghanistan, for example. They're putting together multi-faith initiatives among Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and other organizations.

    So what we need to do, in general terms, is first of all identify within our society, within Muslim societies, those who can be our partners. Secondly, we need to identify the specific projects that can be carried out. Also, as was mentioned earlier, perhaps by Professor Aoun, there is the importance of not seeming to be thrusting our values--western or Canadian values--on them.

  (1220)  

    I think Mr. Bell pointed out the kind of experience he has had where there was some perception in certain projects that there was too much interference. We need to find the right balance of partners who can carry the day. They have to identify and shape those agendas and projects. We have to see if these work before us.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Now we'll go to Mr. Calder, please.

[Translation]

    Prof. Sami Aoun: I would like to answer, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: You have 30 seconds because we are already past our time.

    Prof. Sami Aoun: Where is the history of the Muslim world going? There are three scenarios: either the clash of civilizations, or the coming anarchy, the anarchy which is going to return, or the acceptance of the fact that democracy is a cross-cultural value. Canadian diplomacy has no other choice than the third option. Democracy is not unique to the West, nor to the East. It is a human heritage at the individual and collective levels. We have to encourage Muslims to engage in a debate which both rejects terrorism as a shortcut, the proof of its failure being that the Palestinian case is regressing, and dictatorship as a means of resistance against U.S. hegemony, the proof of its failure being that Iraq is occupied.

    We have to encourage them to see that, through a liberal democracy, they will we able to manage themselves properly internally and to face hegemony plans externally.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Calder.

[English]

    Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I'm going to focus on what you said about us imposing our values, because I think that is very key and crucial. If you've read the position paper, the United States “Project for the New American Century”, it gives you a general direction on where they were originally heading, but I think they've now switched to plan B.

    Time is of the essence for them in Iraq right now, because they're very quickly moving from liberator to occupier. So my first question is, what type of successful government do you see being implemented within Iraq, given the anomaly, for instance, of the Shiite, Kurd, and Sunni percentages of the population that exist within Iraq?

    Second, the issue of Israel and Palestine is definitely the irritant within the Middle East that has a ripple effect through the Arab nations. What is the best solution to that situation?

    Those are my two questions.

    The Chair: Mr. Bell.

    Mr. Michael Bell: Only two minutes, not two hours?

    The Chair: You have a very short preamble, that's it.

    Mr. Michael Bell: On democratization in Iraq, I'm not sure if these efforts are going to be successful. It seems to me that there are forces at work, in terms of the different religious and ethnic groups in that society, that are pulling it apart, especially when you have a history of domination by the Sunni group--a minority of the population--over others. I have deep doubts about what's going to happen there. I won't take any more time to say that.

    On taking our values and forcing them, that is very much the Bush administration's approach. We have these values; they are good for all people at all times. In fact, I've heard spokesmen from the administration say that. I like our approach much better. In other words, we're going to give people the freedom to make their own decisions. We're going to do it slowly so we influence groups and individuals in society to work in their own directions to gain their own freedom, rather than this top-down approach that will not work.

    On the Palestinian-Israeli issue, there's no doubt in my mind that the persistence of this issue causes alienation in the Arab world. It's viewed as a kind of humiliation, not so much because it's Israel, but because Israel represents a western presence, an alien presence taking land from those, in their eyes, who rightfully own it.

    I think the Oslo process and the Barak negotiations that ultimately broke down at Camp David were very much going in the right direction. In other words, a solution has to be found, if one can be found. We have to work toward a solution that assures both Palestinians and Israelis dignity and security. Once there is a solution that can do that and the Palestinians themselves feel they have their dignity back, this will never disappear, but it can be much less dramatic in its impact on the situation.

  (1225)  

    The Chair: Mr. Karim.

    Mr. Karim Karim: I'm a little bit more optimistic about Iraq. Yes, there's a lot of diversity, and there are not only the Shiites, the Kurds, and the Sunnis; there are other peoples as well. Now, they lived together before Saddam Hussein, and the notion of the Iraqi nation-state, which in a way was imposed by the British during colonial times, has come to be accepted by and large. I think they want to stay together.

    The trick is how to share power, and that's going to be very important. Given the limitations of time, if we are to give a helping hand, our example of pluralism is a very commendable one. We have learnt from our mistakes and continue to learn. We can share this knowledge about forming institutions in nation-states that constitute our various peoples, and hopefully that can be received well.

    About the Israel-Palestinian issue, I would agree, and I would briefly add that the notion that the west is dealing justly and in a genuinely even-handed manner with both sides is very important. I think it is very important that justice, which we value so much in our societies, be seen internationally, that there be the perception of it.

    The Chair: Ms. Thomson, as a specialist in South Asia, can you add anything to their remarks?

    Mrs. Ann Thomson: I'm not sure I can comment on Iraq or on the Palestinian situation. There are lessons that can be learned from the South Asian situation, where you have had pluralistic societies and differing religious groups living together for centuries with ongoing conflict that exists even today, but they have managed in most cases to move towards democratic societies.

    What we need to look at perhaps is what the dynamics are in countries like India, like Bangladesh, which has a majority Muslim population, or indeed like Indonesia, where conflict continues to exist between various religious groups but where the striving is towards democracy and some means of tolerance and pluralism.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Aoun, do you have a comment?

    Prof. Sami Aoun: Yes. I would like to share a few ideas with the chair.

    I am also optimistic about the Iraqi experience. Perhaps it's wishful thinking, because first of all, I feel that if we rush into a disaster in Iraq, it will be very gloomy for the whole Arab and Muslim world. Second, look at this aggressivity coming from neighbouring states in an effort to dismantle any experience of democracy in Iraq. It's coming from Iran, which does not want to see pluralism with the Sunni or the ethnic Kurds. Look at the Syrians, who are not very keen to see the dismantling of a Baathist regime. They share the same values. Look at the Saudis, who as Wahhabi perhaps feel their ideology is at risk.

    Yesterday, I guess, one of their best thinkers, Turki al-Hamad, appealed for them to disassociate Wahhabism from the Saudi state as a foundation of ideology. My guess is that in Iraq we are now drawing the future of this area in particular, and the people have a keen interest in proving that a cultural mosaic is capable of being administered through democracy and not by very heavy-handed regimes.

  (1230)  

    The Chair: Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I just want to say, I intended no disrespect whatsoever for our visitors, but I felt compelled to return to the House briefly to pay tribute.

    I'd like to deal with the general proposition that I think really represents a common thread in the presentation, that it's so important for Canada to be very much focused on contributing to genuine democracy, building through strengthening civil society, through helping to give people a sense of their own ability to shape the future, and so on. Then I'd like to focus specifically on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    It seems in some ways so evident that the general proposition you advance is the one that fits best with Canadian values and is the one that is the most likely to have success, as opposed to imposed, enforced, coerced democracy. Interestingly, that was very much the message last night from the secretary general of the Arab Federation in his speech to the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations. I suppose it was quite a bold message, really, although maybe understated about strengthening the struggle for equality for women and fuller participation for women, ensuring that there is indeed genuine democracy and so on.

    But when one looks at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict--and here is my question to all the panellists, but particularly to Dr. Bell, because he's had such a distinguished diplomatic career in the Middle East--I think we are to a large extent pursuing that formula, supporting that approach in Palestine, of addressing dire poverty, the desperate need for health services, emergency services, and so on. The difficulty that seems to come into it is that because Israel is not facing the same serious underdevelopment problems of economic infrastructure, educational infrastructure, health infrastructure, and so on, but in fact is very advanced relative to that, it seems we find ourselves in a dilemma. It's very difficult to figure out how to not get caught as being seen taking the side of the Palestinians when there needs to be some way to contribute from a Canadian perspective to the strengthening of dialogue between Israel and Palestine and finding a way to participate in that constructively.

    Very specifically, my question would be, how can Canada do that in the instance of Israel when our ability to direct funds seems very much tied to international aid that only goes to developing countries, as opposed to a more economically secure country like Israel?

    The Chair: Mr. Bell.

    Mr. Michael Bell: It's going to be very difficult and time-consuming to raise the confidence of both the Israelis and Palestinians to a point where they're able to re-engage productively in terms of diplomatic negotiations to find a satisfactory outcome to this 100-year war, if you like.

    The downfall of the Oslo process came, I guess, from trying to stretch the envelope too far and forcing people--I think Arafat, in particular--to make decisions they simply were not prepared to make. As a result, we had a breakdown in law and order, and we're in the midst of a major crisis that has undermined many of the positive aspects of Oslo and the confidence building that went on for seven years.

    What can you do about it? Well, every American attempt--the Mitchell plan, the Tenet plan, the road map--seems to run up to a dead end. It's very complicated. It's complicated in Palestinian terms because Hamas and Islamic jihad have significant popular support on the streets. It's complicated because on the Palestinian side, there is no overriding authority that can present and deliver on commitments. Now, it may be that Arafat doesn't want to deliver on commitments; I'm not arguing that point. I'm just saying that very often he can't--let's assume he wants to--because there are people there undermining him. Let's assume it's Mahmoud Abbas, or Ahmed Qureia; there are people there who are trying to undermine whatever they do, to radicalize further the process.

    On the Israeli side there are people who are very disappointed. In fact, they feel betrayed by the Oslo process and betrayed by Prime Minister Barak for his failure. I personally think it was a noble failure, but others are less sympathetic.

    It's going to take time, and it's going to take a certain amount of fatigue until people get to the point where they say there has to be a better way. Everything goes in cycles. In the Arab world, you had secular nationalism, then you had the opening to the west in terms of capitalism. Now you have Islam as the major driving force in terms of finding solutions.

    Right now in Israel, the belief is that force is going to lead to solutions. Personally, I don't think it is, and I think we're going to wake up one day with perhaps two exhausted peoples who say “We have to re-engage”. I think it's our job to try to help them reach that point, even if all we can do is act modestly.

    We do have programs of dialogue and networking, some of which are very good, very advanced, particularly the third-party presence or the case for peace building or a peace-enforcement force in the West Bank and Gaza in terms of an eventual settlement--as a guarantor, if you like, of that settlement.

    On the other hand, I must say that while the human security fund in the Department of Foreign Affairs has been very effective, I do feel that in CIDA there has been too much emphasis on--as you point out--aid to the poorest of the poor, the wretched of the earth, and what have you. But when it comes to facilitating dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis, there's a conceptual problem, so the dialogue fund was inactive during my entire term in Tel Aviv--four years.

    Through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the human security fund, we got people talking about different issues. We have, for instance, one project where the producer of the Cold War series is producing a series on final-status issues--Jerusalem, borders, refugees--so that people on both sides can tell their story. Hopefully there will be a cross-fertilization, a belief that the others have some kind of legitimate claim, a better understanding.

  (1235)  

    There's a Sesame Street series that the Canadian government is also, in part, funding--78 programs of these puppets demonstrating conciliation, the ability to solve problems and work together. We could multiply this hundreds of times.

    Also, I think CIDA's work in the West Bank and Gaza is very critical. It's going to be increasingly focused, as I understand it, on institution building, on putting in place the basic institutions we need to ensure a pluralistic society.

    I think there are very positive things being done. I think more could be done. I think we need a sharper focus and we need to speak out more about what we're doing.

    The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Cotler.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): First, I want to commend Professor Sami Aoun for his remarks about the importance of the democratic experiment, if you will, in Iraq succeeding, or if I put it the other way, the danger of it failing, given, as you say, the various neighbouring interests in having it fail. I think it was a very important statement, and I just wanted to reassert it.

    My question goes to Ambassador Bell. I think you represent a unique resource here, having been ambassador to Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, and also having a relationship with the Palestinian Authority. I have two questions in that regard.

    First, we've talked about democracy, but as some have put it--such as my colleague Per Ahlnark, in her recent book--it's almost an empirical law of international relations that democracies don't wage war on each other. Therefore, the best guarantee of an Israeli-Palestinian peace would be the existence of democracies on both sides, or as my Palestinian colleague Bassem Eid put it, it would not only be a guarantee of peace, but it would be the best guarantee of authentic self-determination for the Palestinian people.

    How do we bring about that kind of democratization in a situation where the Palestinian Authority is itself authoritarian, where many of the NGOs are themselves GONGOs, or government-organized NGOs, and where, regrettably, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and others enjoy a measure of popular support even though their charters publicly call for the destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews? How does one operate in that kind of very difficult morass to help contribute to a democratization process?

    I have a second very brief question. Given your expertise, what would you suggest we ought to look for, those of us who are going on that Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Palestine track, where we're going to be just a day and a half in each place, to maximize our appreciation and contribution?

  (1240)  

    Mr. Michael Bell: Well, I agree with you on democracy as a guarantee of peace. If there were truly democratic regimes in the region, I think the process of peacemaking could be much easier. But we are given a certain set of circumstances, and those don't hold any prospect of immediate democratization. That's why I even have reservations about the use of the word. I think the U.S model or the Bush model, if you like, will be a failed model. I think it takes time, effort, and commitment, and that commitment has to come.

    In terms of our government's activity, I agree there are many humanitarian things we should be concerned about--there's water, there's health, and what have you--but there are a surfeit of governments in Europe, the United States and USAID, that are involved. What we can do is to focus on affecting the mindsets of people, the way they think, expanding pluralism, and building institutions. I guarantee you that others will be there to look after other things. That's what we can do: fostering dialogue, creating pluralism, and fostering debate.

    As to the possibility of peace with non-democratic regimes, I think it can be rockier, but in the case of Egypt and Jordan there are peace treaties with Israel. Let's just use the case of Egypt. There are certain hard facts; the government has invested mightily in the Sinai as a major revenue earner for tourism. The government has invested a lot in getting foreign funds and investors to come into the country, to feel at home there. Now, if there is a breakdown of that peace treaty, if it appears that there's another war, or what have you, the Egyptian economy will not be able to withstand it. So there are very important domestic requirements. Whatever role Egypt may or may not play diplomatically, whether it be positive or less positive, or what have you—though I think it has often been positive—there are critical factors that mean they are going to maintain the peace treaty, unless the worst happens and there's some kind of radical takeover.

    As far as support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad are concerned, it was interesting to me that during this period of the Hudna, or six-week ceasefire, life started to return to normal in the West Bank and Gaza. There were marriages and celebrations, and what have you. It occurred to me at that time that if a way could be found of slowly, slowly bringing about some kind of disengagement, to eliminate the terrorism, which I admit is a very, very difficult task, and that if the Palestinian people could lead more normal lives, there might be a falling off in support for the solutions of Hamas and Jihad. It will never go away; it will always be there.

    The important thing, though, is that the Palestinian Authority and its leaders, whoever they might be, have credibility, support, and the loyalty of their populations. That's what we should be concerned about.

    As for what to look for on the trip, I'd try to look past what people say and look at what they mean. I'd try to identify areas where Canada can be active and actually do something. At the end of the day, it's only what you do that counts; the input is great, but the output is what counts.

    If you came back with an agenda you could engage the government with, and engage each other on, as to what we should be doing, that's the only way, even if it's going to take years. In my view, we just have to take those years and work hard at it, and not be discouraged.

  (1245)  

    The Chair: Mr. Martin.

    Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you all for being here today. I feel we're trying to square a circle here, and perhaps you could help us.

    Ms. Thomson, I don't think there will be any disagreement on what you said about what needs to happen, in terms of education, political emancipation, economic emancipation for individuals, and as Professor Cotler said, democratization and freedom, but how do we do that in the context of...?

    Ambassador Bell, you said that “civil society reformers...in fostering pluralism...will pay a price”. So how do we do what Ms. Thomson wants, and what in essence all of you have agreed to, in the context of the wall we are going to be confronted with?

     My second question ties into my original question. Scholars often say that the essential failure of Islamic states is their failure to embrace modernization, globalization, and secularism. If that is so, then how do we engage predominantly Islamic states to follow that path, particularly countries like Saudi Arabia, which is ruled, as you know, by a relatively small group of people who benefit at the expense of many?

    Thank you.

    Mr. Michael Bell: Well, I think I was quoted out of context.

    The Chair: We'll check the blues.

    Mr. Michael Bell: If you take the example of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, he paid a price for his reformist tendencies. He crossed a line, which the regime was not willing to tolerate. These are very brave people who undertake what to us in our society are activities that would seem minor or normal, not even noteworthy.

    I think we have to find ways--and I think we have--through our program through cooperation with Canadian NGOs. So often it's not the Government of Canada that's in there, it's a Canadian NGO in there working with people. That's very important.

    We have to test the limits, not in a harsh way or a confrontational way, because we'll never win, but we have to focus our attention on empowering people. There are a million ways these guys in CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs should be able to come up with many projects that will give people the power to control their lives, and this will begin to make a change. It's an evolutionary process, and it's going to take a long time.

    Mr. Keith Martin: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but how do we do that, given the wall that exists there in some countries where an authoritarian leadership perceives that as a threat to their leadership, which it is?

    Mr. Michael Bell: Well, it's a rough road. I can tell you that in Egypt we had a case where we had worked with the UNDP on an education program where the UNDP had published a textbook. The NGO they were working with wanted to publish this book and have a meeting to publicize it, but they couldn't book a room. They couldn't book a room in a hotel to do that, so we were asked, the Canadian embassy, to book the room because we wouldn't have the reservation cancelled on us. It's all very subtle.

    On the other hand, we had a project that assisted the families of victims of torture, and nobody interfered with that or criticized us. It's about having a team that is sensitive, not sensitive just to the needs of the people we might want to identify with most but sensitive to the government and its preoccupations. These governments do have legitimate preoccupations and they work within a certain cultural framework.

    All I can say is, it's a long, hard road. Success is going to be measured, but there's no alternative other than to do that, as I think everyone here at this table agrees.

  (1250)  

    The Chair: Ms. Thomson.

    Mrs. Ann Thomson: Thank you.

    I think there are a couple of issues here, and one is that we have attempted to use aid as a catch-all remedy for a whole range of problems. I would disagree with my colleague. I believe that aid is in fact intended to reduce poverty and to address those issues that are key to reducing poverty, one of which is governance and a strong civil society.

    You talk about how we do this in the face of the walls that are there, but you can do it. What we must do, though, is develop some new instruments for addressing the problems we're seeing in the Middle East in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. We can't do it all with aid, but a strong, articulate civil society is probably their best defence and our best defence. It can be done through empowering women, and it can be done through working at the community level while you're working with central governments as well.

    But I think the most effective and probably most sustainable forms of democratization and maybe the most appropriate forms that come out of developing countries are those that start from the bottom up. Canada has been particularly strong in supporting those; I think we can do it, but not only through aid.

    The Chair: Mr. Karim, please.

    Mr. Karim Karim: I'd like to address the second question, that Muslim states have supposedly failed to modernize, secularize, and globalize. I would suggest to you that the terrorists of September 11 were engineers and were not quite familiar with Muslim norms. I think a couple of them had been caught the night before in bars and so on, and they were fairly globalized; they had travelled around the world and so on, so there are various indicators. I think it would be a mistake for us to use fixed notions of modernization, secularization, globalization, and democracy.

    I'll just deal with one of the arguments my colleague, Ms. Thomson, made about democracy in South Asia. The kind of exploitation by political parties in Gujarat, for example, of the differences between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians is abhorrent. But this is what, unfortunately, democratic systems lead to from time to time. What is happening at the national level with the BJP is not completely admirable either.

    If we try to lump everything under democracy and think that democracy is the panacea, the answer, I think we will have some very rude surprises. We need to understand the pluralism of society and try to build that up. We need to work with children and teenagers, and I quite agree with you both about a dialogue.

    We need to create safe spaces among the Palestinians, Israelis, Jews, their diasporas, the Arab diasporas, to come together and to understand them. What is happening right now is that they're slipping very clearly into racist notions of each other, which really needs to be stopped. I did mention this in my oral report about the problem with terms and terminology, where we tend to fix those ideas, and I think this is a trap.

  (1255)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Ms. Carroll.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Well, there are a million things you'd like to ask about, but the time runs out.

    Mr. Bell, I've been listening very carefully to what you've been saying about enforced democratization. It provided a very good theme. And while I have a certain empathy for your thoughts, I think of Woodrow Wilson making the world safe for democracy. At the time I studied, I remember, we considered that relatively naive, because we did that old revisionist thing of looking back. But in many ways I think maybe he was smarter than we all thought and understood that first of all you had to create security. After that, you could see this evolutionary process you're holding out as the objective. At the same time, we have the example of enforced democratization on Japan with General MacArthur, which seems to have taken root. That's sort of an exception, maybe, to what we're saying, but I wouldn't mind hearing from you on that.

    I also want to shift very quickly to Ms. Thomson, because it's important that this group is sending a large contingent--well, as large as any of our contingents are--to South Asia and Indonesia, and you bring expertise, very much so, from that area. If you could, keep us from focusing on the Middle East all the time and comment a bit, if you would, on these general themes from your experience base.

    I note you were 12 years with WUSC. You have two WUSC grads here, Mr. Cotler, from the seminar in Poland a number of years ago--he won't say how many--and me from the seminar in Algeria...and I'm not going to say how many. Anyway, I don't want to digress, but it's for you to apply what you did in the sixties, the good days. Tell us a bit about what we're talking about and what you could share with us.

    Mrs. Ann Thomson: Probably the internecine violence in Indonesia, for example, which started while I was there after the removal of President Suharto, is well known. What we're seeing is in fact a clumsy and undirected move towards a more representational form of government in Indonesia.

    But people who are going to South Asia are going to be coming bang up against what is in South Asia one of the most difficult conflicts, and that is Kashmir. I would imagine that as Canadian parliamentarians, you would be expected to comment and would perhaps even be put into positions where you might have to take sides. You certainly need to be thinking, for instance, about what role Canada can and might play in Kashmir, given the close historical relationships we have had with India and to a certain extent with Pakistan.

    I think Kashmir is an area where Canada really could do something. There is a willingness there to see Canada in its honest broker role. I think both sides would be willing to see Canada in a position where it was promoting dialogue. The parliamentarians going to the area need to be thinking about whether or not self-determination is realistic for Kashmir and what, if any, role Canada might want to play.

    While it certainly has not had the same attention as the countries of the Middle East have, we're dealing with two nuclear powers and a great deal of national pride. That is one particular area I would think this group would want to look at very carefully, and there are many well-informed, educated people in Ottawa who can talk about that.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    This concludes our discussion this morning.

[English]

    I just want to thank all the witnesses. It was very interesting. It is always very interesting to have you, Mr. Bell, Madam Thomson, Mr. Karim, and Mr. Aoun.

[Translation]

    I thank you all once again.

[English]

    I just want to tell my colleagues that next Tuesday we are scheduled again from eleven to one o'clock, but I will try to have a room available for us to start at 10:30--I've asked the clerk about this--to discuss all the motions beforehand, because we're never going to get a quorum. It's at the end by one o'clock. I'm going to try to start maybe half an hour earlier.

[Translation]

    Ms. Lalonde, very briefly because I am concluding.

·  (1300)  

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Are we going to have the Solicitor General on Tuesday?

    The Chair: Yes, the Solicitor General and the people of CIDA.

    Ms. McDonough.

[English]

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: I just wanted to ask if there is any progress to report on the foreign affairs minister--

    The Chair: The Solicitor General is coming next Tuesday, but Mr. Graham is away all week next week. He just cannot do it next week; it's impossible.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: He flies all night to get back in, he's here a brief time, and then he heads back out. I have spoken, as the chair has reflected, to the Solicitor General, and Mr. Graham, the foreign affairs minister, will meet with us upon our return.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Yes.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Then, if we want to see him, it will have to be during the week off.

    The Chair: See who?

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Graham.

    The Chair: During the week off, you will be in Montreal. You can only make an appointment with him.

    Thank you.

    The meeting is adjourned.