SRID Committee Meeting

SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, May 9, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I will call to order the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

It is Wednesday, May 9, 2001. This is the second meeting of our discussion on Colombia. We have two groups of witnesses here today. Rights and Democracy.... Is it all right to use that? Is that your official title now? Okay. From Rights and Democracy we have Eleanor Douglas, and she will introduce her colleague when she speaks. For the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, we have Judy Meltzer and Gord Schonwalder.

We'll start with Rights and Democracy. Eleanor, you could start and introduce your colleague, please.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas (Consultant, Rights and Democracy): Thank you for the invitation to be here today.

With me is Mary Durran. She is working at Rights and Democracy in the communications department.

The understanding is that we have ten minutes, more or less, and then questions. What I'd like to do is give you a very cursory, quick update of some of the latest developments in the peace process in Colombia, a quick look at the Canadian government's presence in peace-building in the country, and some policy recommendations.

There are perhaps four or five things that are outstanding, I think, about the peace process during the last year. Unfortunately, one is the horrific degradation of the conflict, including the number of massacres by right-wing paramilitary groups, the documented evidence of increasing human rights violations, attacks against human rights workers, trade unionists, journalists, and professors. I won't go into that; it's in the document that you will eventually get.

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There has certainly been a degradation of the conflict over the last 12 months. It's not only the paramilitary. The guerrilla actors have also contributed to this degradation, using arms that are difficult to control, such as cylinders of gas exploding in small towns. There are a number of incidents of this kind. We certainly can't eliminate the guerrilla actors from the fact that the conflict in Colombia is getting much worse.

There is forced internal displacement of unarmed civilians. These are people who are caught, especially in the countryside, and attacked—basically I think by paramilitary groups—and forced to migrate within the country. Perhaps 300,000 people more were added to the total number of displaced people, reaching about two million at this point.

The other fact is perhaps a little more subtle to catch. The worrying thing in Colombia right now is that there's also what the United Nations is calling the de-institutionalization of the democratic state. Public support for the peace process is waning to a certain extent, because people are very, very tired. They're very tired of the war, of the conflict and of so much human suffering. I'm not saying that this is going to happen, but we have to be careful, be aware, and certainly take into our consideration that the peace process is fragile. It's fragile for a number of reasons. One of those reasons is the weariness of people to continue believing that it's possible. This needs to be taken into consideration, especially when you look at recommendations on how to build more support for the peace process.

The positive note that I'll just mention in terms of the last 12 months is the increase in international interest in this conflict. Certainly many more visitors and trips back and forth between Colombia and other countries is a very positive sign. I think that the international community's involvement in the peace process in Colombia is absolutely vital. Canada is one of those countries, obviously.

The other fact is that the guerrilla organizations, especially, in Colombia have been open to this for the first time. For 20 years now Colombia has been negotiating with guerilla organizations. This is not the first time. But this is the first time that the international community has been able to be involved to the extent that it's involved right now.

There are a number of political challenges that we have to think about, and one is, unfortunately, the attitude of the United States to this conflict. We can't avoid this discussion. The U.S. commitment to maintaining dominance over the region and the way it is choosing to intervene in Colombia is difficult. It's problematic whether we want to call it Plan Colombia or, as it's now called, the Andean Initiative. Certainly their intervention through military buildup is not what is required in Colombia if you're talking about building peace. This has added to the conflict. Within the country civil society certainly is not approving of this kind of intervention, and the guerrilla organizations clearly see this as a threat to them, which moves them further away from a negotiating position or the table.

The second problem is the kind of drug policy the United States is insisting on with Colombia. Drugs are an issue in Colombia. They're not the cause of the problem. To only look at the drug problem as a problem of production in the Andean countries I think is a very limited way of looking at it. This is adding to the conflict in Colombia because of the way the United States has chosen to deal with the drug problem by sending in significant amounts of military equipment.

Another political challenge is the possibility of extension of this conflict into other countries. I think it's important for the Canadian government to be very aware of that. As the conflict in Colombia spills over the Ecuadorean, Venezuelan, Panamanian, and Peruvian borders, it could become more of an issue for the international community. There's quite a bit of evidence out there of how this is happening in terms of armed incursions across the borders—not drug trafficking, but actually planting coca in other countries, such as Ecuador. So the possibility of an escalation in this area would be a serious consideration for any government.

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This is obviously related as well to the need to protect certain resources, such as oil. Canada is clearly a part of that, in terms of the number of oil companies we have working in Colombia. The U.S. needs to protect its oil reserves, in Venezuela especially. But Colombia is now the seventh exporter to the United States, so it is also increasingly important in terms of protecting the need to get those oil resources out.

Many people have reached the conclusion over the past 12 months that perhaps the conflict could intensify. It could get worse. It's obviously very bad now, but the possibility of it actually becoming worse is very real, until other things happen and there's actually a further commitment to peace.

One of those things that needs to happen is that the Colombian establishment needs to decide that it's going to pay something for peace. You can't just have a peace process as a technical agreement. There have to be some structural changes in the country. There has to be some kind of agrarian reform. There have to be opportunities for people, or there's not going to be any peace.

It still isn't clear that the Colombian establishment is willing to pay for part of that cost. At Rights and Democracy we think that would also have to happen for there to be any kind of a significant and long-lasting peace process.

The other thing that is important to think about is that when you're designing policies for a country such as Colombia—economic policies, trade policy, or investment policy—it can't just be business as usual or thinking this is the same kind of situation that you might have in Switzerland or Canada. It's a very fragile country at this point. Any intervention, whether it be by civil society, government, or the private sector, needs to have very clear end results in mind. What are you trying to achieve? And you need to make sure that the intervention doesn't undermine what is already quite a fragile process.

The last challenge is thinking about the role of civil society in the middle of this. Because you're negotiating while the conflict rages on, there is a significant role, we think, for organizations and civil society to play. It's not just about negotiations of the table and how many arms are going to be handed in and how many men and women are going to move out of combat uniform, but also what are their proposals, what kind of a world do we want to live in, what kind of a society do we want to build, and what are we willing to pay for it? Civil society, with all its internal contradictions and all its richness, has a significant role to play and needs to be supported. That's not to say that governments don't need to be supported, but certainly, in the case of Colombia, civil society needs to be supported.

Talking about Canada's role in Colombia right now, on the one hand I think Canada is playing a very active role on the ground. Our embassy is well recognized for the kinds of activities and the energy we're putting into things that are happening on the ground. The Canadian embassy is active in denouncing human rights violations. We're participating in both of the processes with the two major guerrilla organizations.

Many of my own NGO friends who are working in Colombia know the embassy, because the embassy has come and visited them—staff have come and seen them. So the Canadian embassy on the ground is playing an active role, and I think this role needs to be appreciated. I think at that micro level it's a positive role. Where we run into difficulties is at a more macro-political level. There seem to be some inherent contradictions in the role that Canada is willing to play and able to play on the ground and the role that it's perhaps not willing to play more publicly in the public sphere. I guess we'd have to say that it has to do with the kind of relationship with our neighbour to the south and our commitment to a certain kind of economic model.

One of the things that Colombians, academics around the world, other governments, and the Europeans are calling for is to make a clear commitment to peace and make a clear commitment to not building up military apparatus in Colombia—the armed forces—in the way the U.S. government has chosen to do through Plan Colombia.

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Canada's position publicly is a neutral position. Our position is that you can't be neutral about this kind of involvement. In a fragile peace process in a country with this level of conflict, coming in with this kind of military hardware and sophisticated training is not a clear indication that you're about building a peaceful solution to this conflict. Other governments have clearly stated that, but our government has not.

Civil society in Canada will continue to call on the Canadian government to make clear publicly what our political position is around the U.S. intervention in Colombia at this point. Maybe that will change, and maybe enough pressure can be brought to bear so that the U.S. will think about a different way of intervening in Colombia. For the moment, however, this is a difficult difference, if you wish, between civil society organizations across Canada, and certainly with our colleagues in Colombia.

We don't think Canada would be alone in taking a clear position, because the European Union has taken quite a clear stand on what it means to intervene positively at this moment in Colombia. We would ask the Canadian government to do the same.

In terms of other recommendations, we would like the Canadian government to remain actively involved in the unfolding peace process in Colombia, doing the same kinds of things it's doing on the ground. This is positive, and we would certainly encourage that it be policy, not just the staff or the people who are on the ground in Colombia right now. We don't want it to be an accident. And understand that this is a long-term process. This will go on for years. It's difficult, and we would really urge the government to understand that.

Besides the point I just mentioned about taking a position similar to the one the European Parliament has taken regarding the process, which we think would be positive, the second point is that we would ask Canada to set out a coherent, holistic, multifaceted policy framework for working in Colombia. We would ask that CIDA policy, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and even civil society organizations try to develop an intervention in Colombia that is coherent and that we can discuss together in Canada and with Colombian colleagues in Colombia. It should articulate a coherent kind of intervention in the country. That also includes the kinds of trading agreements we have with Colombia, and it also includes the kinds of investment that we're promoting in Colombia. As you probably all know, there's a significant push for Canadian investment in Colombia, a lot of it in petroleum. The question is, has the homework been done to understand what the conflicts are in those areas where Canadian corporations are going to become involved?

We're not saying the Canadian corporations are causing massacres and all sorts of things like that at this point, but the conflict is complex. It's not so complex that you can't get to the bottom of it, but I think you have to understand what is going on in a particular region before you actually intervene, so that you don't make the conflict worse, so that your actions are not pushing the actors into even worse kinds of armed confrontation, as is already happening.

So we're urging for frank dialogue, like this. We welcome these kinds of discussions, and we would like to continue to be able to have these kinds of discussions with government.

The other area we're concerned about—and this has been mentioned before—comes in terms of Canadian military equipment and services being sold. The recent case of the helicopters is a difficult one to get to the bottom of, but Canadian legislation needs to be tightened up, at least in terms of the sale of military equipment. Until we can see the Colombian military is not involved in or is not colluding with the right-wing paramilitary organizations in human rights violations, we would recommend that Canada not be involved in any kinds of sales of military equipment or services to the Colombian armed forces. Verifying what happens to that equipment on the ground is difficult, but it is absolutely essential before any sales take place.

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And perhaps a final recommendation is for Canada to take a lead in having a very open, frank, informed, and professional debate here and possibly to promote a debate in the hemisphere on drug policy and drug eradication.

Criminalizing the production of coca in Colombia is clearly not solving the problem. For many years the U.S. has been trying to control the production of coca in Colombia, but the arrival of cocaine in the United States has remained the same. It has not been a successful policy. This needs to be looked at in a much broader framework. We understand that Canada has taken the lead at the OAS in looking at some of the verifications, and that's very important.

We think the debate needs to go even further. It needs to be opened up to see what other alternatives are available and not just talk about alternative crop substitution as if it were really easy. It's very difficult. When you're working in an area such as the southern part of Colombia where there are no roads, you can't get crops out anyway. You can't just blithely talk about crop substitution.

We feel that Canada could take a lead in perhaps promoting this debate so that someday an alternative to the U.S. intervention in Colombia on the whole issue of drug trafficking could happen.

The final recommendation to the government, which I've already mentioned, is supporting the civil society organizations that need support. That could happen in many ways, such as providing them with the space they need to be able to do their work in Colombia in the midst of the conflict. Academics who are still studying and writing, indigenous people, and Afro-Colombians who are working at the grassroots level need to be protected, and their work needs to be uplifted. We need to understand that in the middle of the horror, there are people doing very creative and productive things. If we lose the capacity of people on the ground to be able to create, to think, to produce, and even to dream in the midst of the horror, we've lost a great deal.

My final word is just to be there for people. It's going to be a long haul, and we need support from other governments playing a role in the process so that they understand the long-term dynamics and difficulties. We can't reduce the difficulties in Colombia to simple formulas. It's a complex conflict.

The more you can get to know about it, the better. Rights and Democracy would like an official parliamentary delegation to come to Colombia to have a first-hand look and to meet with people in the country in order to get a good understanding of and some of the feeling around what's happening.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Douglas. We know you have some notes we can get copies of, but so far the document is available only in English. Once it has been translated, everybody will be sent a copy. We'll have questions after both groups have spoken.

Next is the Canadian Foundation for the Americas. Who will be speaking?

Ms. Judy Meltzer (Policy Analyst, Canadian Foundation for the Americas): Gord is going to speak for the foundation.

The Chair: Would you please introduce the two of you?

Mr. Gord Schonwalder (Deputy Director, Canadian Foundation for the Americas): My name is Gord Schonwalder. I'm the deputy director of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, FOCAL. With me is Judy Meltzer. She's our policy analyst for the Andean region. In particular she has spent some time looking into Colombia, so she probably knows more about Colombia than I do. She will take at least some of the questions at the end.

I would like to tell you a little about the Canadian Foundation for the Americas so that you'll understand a little better where we're coming from and what we actually have to say. FOCAL is an independent, not-for-profit think tank based here in Ottawa. Its main mission is to deepen and strengthen Canada's relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. We do that by encouraging policy discussion and analysis, with the aim to contribute to greater understanding in the hemisphere and to arrive at clearer policy options on issues that concern the hemisphere.

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Among the areas we're looking at are inter-American relations, such as the summit process and the OAS; governance; human security; social policies; and economic integration. We approach these issues by working with experts. We organize workshops and seminars. We monitor the situation in the countries in the hemisphere, and we produce policy papers. The results of our analysis are shared with the public by various means, among them the policy papers I just mentioned and workshops and discussions.

Colombia is emerging as a priority for us, and there are certain reasons for that. The main reason is the seriousness and the degradation of the conflict in the country. Human rights violations are still taking place, and there is the weakening of democratic institutions, along with a number of other problems.

We are currently at an early stage in working on Colombia as an issue. We do not have any specific policy recommendations for the simple reason that we haven't done the exercise I was just talking about, which involves talking with the stakeholders and the experts we know, organizing workshops, etc. We have just begun to do that so we don't have a precise position on that.

What we see as the main element lacking in Canada at this point is that there doesn't seem to be a dialogue that is really going across the board. You have a lot of different organizations and actors that have taken an interest in Colombia, including some government actors, some non-government actors, the media, and academia, but no one has brought them together in order to look at the problem from a holistic perspective and to come up with a few ideas that could then be shared across the board. What we would like to do is to contribute to that process. This is to a great extent the way we see ourselves. We see ourselves as a bridge and as a broker, to some extent, somebody who can bring different actors together and make them talk to one another. We are at the beginning of this process.

Having said that, I don't want to say that we don't have anything to say. We have already published a couple of policy papers on Colombia, which we have brought with us. Unfortunately, one of them is in English only and one of them is in French only. I don't know if that qualifies under the House rules. Otherwise, we will just hand them over, and you can look after the translation. Or you can consult them on the website.

The basic position we have on Colombia is that Canada should become more involved. We think there is a lack of Canadian involvement. I would like to explain that position in more detail. Canada should become more involved in Colombia for the simple reason that the conflict in Colombia is one of the most serious issues in the hemisphere today. This makes it one of the top foreign policy concerns in the hemisphere, not just for Canada but also for other countries. Canada in particular has an interest in becoming involved in Colombia, as one of the main foreign policy priorities, because Canada has a role as an emerging key actor in the hemisphere. That was evidenced by the summit that took place in Quebec last month. Canada has taken a growing interest in the hemisphere in the last 10 years. It joined the OAS, and it has become more active in it. It has a lot going for it at this point. We believe that if it wants to play a role as a key hemispheric actor, it cannot afford to stand aside and not get involved in the Colombia problem.

Obviously, there are also some other good reasons, and they have a lot to do with traditional Canadian foreign policy goals, such as support for democracy. There are other issues at home that are more burning. There are some refugees from that country in Canada, so that is an issue as well. Canada also plays a role as a consumer country in the drug trade. There are a few different aspects that make the argument that Canada should become more involved.

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Now, we think that the kind of conflict we're witnessing and the way it has played out—the degradation of the conflict, the human rights violations, the weakness of state institutions and the fragility of democracy, etc.—point the way to an involvement not just at a bilateral level in terms of providing aid and in terms of providing technical assistance but more at a macro-political level. This means working with other actors, in particular other countries, that are becoming involved in the conflict now. It seems like an opportune moment, with the international community becoming more and more involved in Colombia, for Canada to play a greater role at that level, and it not only can, it should.

The benefits of doing so are quite clear. As I've said before, if Canada it wants to have credibility as a key actor in the hemisphere, it can only gain credibility by playing a role in this conflict. This would also enhance its reputation as one of the main repositories of expertise—if I can put it that way—in areas such as peace-building and peacekeeping. If Canada did otherwise, the costs of remaining on the sidelines would undermine Canada's credibility, and doing so could also be read as a sign that Canada is not really committed enough to hemispheric issues.

There are some other costs involved as well. You have to think about how you are going to get involved. Obviously, if you're getting involved on the wrong side or if you're getting involved in the wrong way, then you're going to pay a price for that. You may associate yourselves with the wrong people.

Our position would be that at this stage Canada probably has most to gain by trying to play a role of mediator or broker—I know these are loaded terms, so I hope I'm not using them in a loaded way. Anyway, Canada could do a lot in trying to make people talk to one another, in trying to get the actors around the table, and in playing a role with other international actors to facilitate a resolution of the conflict. I'm going to say a little more about that later on.

I'm not going to get into any details of the conflict. I think you've had good updates on the situation just now and on previous occasions when government representatives were here and explained the intricacies of the conflict.

I'm just going to focus on some possibilities for a constructive role for Canada. The first one for us, as I said before, would be to play a role at the level of hemispheric institutions and processes. Canada should now operationalize the momentum it generated around hemispheric issues, starting with the 2000 OAS general assembly and the recent summit.

Canada has already become involved at the local level, and it has given a lot of support with respect to issues like war-affected children and aid to displaced populations. At the project level Canada has already done a lot, and it is becoming more involved now in the peace process as such. Just as an example, Canada is the head facilitator of the so-called Group of 10, which is a group of 10 countries outside Colombia that have taken a lead role in facilitating the negotiations between one of the guerrilla groups, the FARC, and the government.

At the same time Canada has also tentatively agreed to play a role in the negotiations with the other guerrilla group, the ELN, which hopefully will start soon.

What we see is a tendency to keep this involvement at a rather informal level. The embassy has been very active in that regard. It has been present in various forums. That's a very good sign, but at the same time we see a lack of official and formal backing for that involvement. We would think that Canada should make it an official priority of its foreign policy to become involved in these processes and institutions. That is basically the main point we would like to raise here.

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I'm going to go through a few other issues that are related to that main orientation we see.

The Chair: If I may interrupt you for a moment, is Judy going to speak also?

Ms. Judy Meltzer: No.

The Chair: No. All right. I'll give you a few more minutes. We want to give the members a chance to ask questions too.

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: Yes, I'll keep it short.

One key issue that needs to be addressed in Colombia, one where we see Canada having a particular advantage and a particular angle it can play, is the weakening of democratic institutions. There is not just an armed conflict going on. That armed conflict together with the drug problem has had a very debilitating effect on democratic institutions. There is a real risk that the democratic state could actually collapse. That would be a very problematic eventuality, especially given the geographic location of Colombia in the Andean region, which is plagued by these kinds of problems to begin with. We believe that given Canada's experience with issues like democratic governance, Canada could play a very useful role in strengthening these institutions.

Canada could also play a stronger role in promoting alternative strategies for development. It has been reluctant to do so because the strategies are sometimes linked with crop eradication, that is, coca eradication. Now, we don't see that as a necessary link. If that link does not exist, then FOCAL thinks that Canada could contribute in this and that maybe CIDA could take another look at its strategies.

Regional politics is another important issue. The countries surrounding Colombia are emerging as actors in the conflict. They have taken a much stronger stance. They have voiced their concerns, and they have also signalled a willingness to play a role in resolving the conflict. Again, Canada could help this process along, building on the relations it has and building on the fact that it is often seen—and rightly so—as an unbiased participant, somebody who can actually play a role in bringing people together.

Beyond the regional level there is the level of actors from outside the hemisphere. Europe was mentioned as one of them. We also believe that Canada could play a role in coordinating its efforts with those of these other actors, collaborating in particular with the European Union, given that the positions seem to be relatively close insofar as they have been voiced.

Obviously, one thing that has to be taken into account is that nobody can impose a solution on Colombia. Nobody can go in there and intervene with a ready-made settlement. This has to be done in cooperation with the Colombians. The Colombians themselves have to agree on a political settlement first. Anything that can be done by others to help must then follow, but the Colombians have to take the lead on this.

Just to conclude, again, the basic view we have here is that Canada needs to increase its involvement in Colombia. It needs to formally commit itself to sustaining engagement during the long road to peace. Canada must move its focus on intervention beyond bilateral projects at the local level and onto participation at the macro-political level in order to become a key actor in strengthening democracy and in negotiating peace.

We also believe Canada has the capacity to make an important contribution to the peace process. Not to do so would result in the loss of Canada's credibility as an important and committed partner in the hemisphere, and this is a credibility Canada is just about to gain and to build on.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you. It's very interesting, what we've heard from both groups.

First we'll have Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair.

[English]

The Chair: I think we'll do ten, ten if you want, and ten, and then we'll go back and forth.

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[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I would like to start by thanking our witnesses for appearing before us today.

I have two questions for Ms. Douglas. I would like more information on the following two points. First, you mentioned that in your reading of events, you feared a possible extension of the conflict to neighbouring countries, you feared that the situation would degenerate and the neighbouring countries would also be involved, if I understood you correctly. Could you explain that further?

Second, you spoke about a type of contradiction in Canada's attitude, between its behaviour in the field and its friendly relations with the United States, I believe. There too, I would like you to provide me with more details.

[English]

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: As to the possibility of expansion of the conflict into neighbouring countries, those neighbouring countries would be Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador principally, and possibly Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. The extension is taking place in different ways.

First, there are people being displaced across borders because of the eradication of crops in the south of Colombia, but also people fleeing from the conflict. So we need to pay attention to those borders to make sure that displaced peoples—they're not displaced people any longer either, they're actually refugees crossing borders—have their rights protected. This has been an issue in Panama and Venezuela and Ecuador.

The second issue in respect of extending the conflict is that, as you know, cocaine and drugs are an illegal undertaking, and as long as there is a way to make money, it seems there will be a way found to actually grow the raw material. So where there are extensive eradication programs, as we're finding in the south of Colombia, there is a tendency to displace that production to other parts of Colombia first, but there's also some indication, especially on the Ecuadorian border, that there are now crops and laboratories in Ecuador.

The third thing is that other countries are frightened of this conflict, and so they have been watching the borders very carefully, and if a military kind of protection were needed, they would be ready to do that. So there's the possibility of escalation in that sense.

The fourth thing, I think, is that because of the fear of extension of the conflict, these countries are also now asking for increased military support, from the United States government especially. So now we have what is called the Andean initiative. It's still mostly about drug trafficking and crop eradication, but it has a significant military component.

These are tendencies, this is not a crisis yet, but the possibility of this kind of activity continuing and growing on the borders of Colombia is a concern. So there is the migration of peoples across borders and the displacement of the conflict itself across borders. There's indication in the north of Ecuador right now that the FARC, for example, is actually recruiting Ecuadorians. There have been incursions in the north of Ecuador as well between the FARC and the paramilitary. These borders are quite difficult to discern in the midst of jungles and mountainous terrain, and it's not always clear that the people are crossing borders. But it has happened. The Ecuadorians are talking about Colombians buying up land on their side, they feel, to have land to grow coca. So these are some of the ways we see the possibility of the conflict spreading.

The second point is the...I don't know, maybe contradiction isn't the precise word. My sense is that Canada's role in Colombia—and I agree with what has just been said—the way Canada is playing a role in the peace processes in Colombia, is positive. It needs to be clearly stated that it's not just because of a particular government in Colombia or a particular regime in the embassy, but this is actually Canadian policy.

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I think it's also that we're wanting Canada to become more involved, and to be able to talk about some of those other issues that are affecting the peace process. Basically, for many, many civil society organizations, the application of the military buildup by the United States in Colombia as a way of participating in the process is just not helpful. Other governments have said that, and we're asking the Canadian government to say it also, as a complement to the way they are supporting a peace process in Colombia. So we would ask Canada to be more clear about that.

An academic in Canada the other day at a conference said Canada had an “agnostic” policy toward Colombia. I guess what we're saying is we don't want an agnostic policy. We would like a very clear policy.

We also realize what the limitations are, but I think it's that ethical voice we want to hear—that moral voice. To build on some of the things you were saying in terms of the attitude of others toward Canada, you have the space to play this role.

Canada's seen differently in the south. It's seen differently in Colombia. They would expect Canada to be saying more than they're saying. The contradiction I see is there because of our very close and very necessary...well, the close relationship with the United States and what that means in economic terms for Canada. That probably inhibits some of the things we would like to see happen.

We would encourage Canada, though, to think about the positive things, as you said, that would come from playing a more active role, and the fact that you can easily join up with European governments.

The Chair: Judy, do you have something to add?

Ms. Judy Meltzer: Yes. I just wanted to follow up on what Eleanor said, which was a really great summary of what the region, the neighbouring countries, are facing. I think what's important for Canada also is that when we start talking about regional approaches, there's a real tendency to homogenize problems.

A regional approach from a U.S. perspective may mean militarization, for example. I think it's important to recognize the countries in the region are feeling the impacts differently and have very different relationships with Colombia.

Brazil, for example, has had a real wait-and-see attitude up to this point. They've been the loudest critics of Plan Colombia and U.S. policy in the region. They've more recently become a bit more engaged with this. They've made an alliance with the European aerospace to do surveillance. They're very concerned about their thousands of kilometres of Amazonian border. Brazil's coming from a very particular take.

Venezuela and Colombia have had a very cold relationship. At least recently, there is sort of a superficial rapprochement between the two. An interesting point there is that the rapprochement in some ways is being facilitated by Mexico. This is maybe Fox looking to exert a little autonomy under the U.S. But the G-3, which is the link between Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico, a lot of it based in trade, is being reactivated. Venezuela and Colombia have recently agreed to do some border security together. So Venezuela has an interesting role in it, and of course has had past links...not links, but has been inclined to be supportive of the guerrilla groups.

There's been a lot of tension between Colombia and Venezuela, so the nature of their relationship is quite distinct from that of Ecuador, which has been very close to U.S. policies, looking to get on board the counter-narcotics strategy. They've opened a U.S. air base in one of their coastal towns, Manta. There's a lot of investment going in there.

So as much as they're all feeling similar problems—as you say, refugees, the ballooning of the drug industry—the actual amount of drugs coming out of the region hasn't changed; it's sort of just dispersed itself.

I think a regional approach shouldn't be a homogeneous approach. I think it has to take into account that each of these countries has distinct relationships. But it's important that the region be approached. I just wanted to add that on, as a macro-political perspective.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Schonwalder: I would just like to add a few words. Speaking personally, I think that if Canada had a clear position on Columbia, it would probably be very similar to the European position. The European position is not the only position. We must realize that the European Parliament is always much stronger in its resolutions than the European Community or the European Council, which is comprised of the member states of the European Union.

• 1625

We must distinguish between the two. However, I do think that Canada's basic position would probably be a little closer to the European position.

At the same time, and this is something we should think about, the United States is the country that is still present in Columbia. I don't think we can imagine a situation in which the United States would no longer be involved in the conflict in Columbia. Thus, the question is who will speak to the United States, and whether any party can do so in order to ensure a compromise between the different positions?

If any country could play that role, it is Canada. It is much easier for Canada than the Europeans to do so. So perhaps we should be looking at the problem from this point of view as well. That does not mean that we should not be criticizing certain aspects of the Columbia Plan, aspects that are not working. However, at the same time it is also important to have a country that can talk to the Americans.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you.

I want to thank the witnesses for their evidence and the work they've been doing over many years. I'm particularly familiar with Eleanor's tireless efforts, both here in Canada and in Colombia.

I wanted to just follow up on a couple of points that have been made.

On Plan Colombia, I certainly share the view that Rights and Democracy has expressed that it's important that our government make a clear statement and take a clear stand with respect to the military component of Plan Colombia. I've certainly raised that issue in the House and in committee, and will continue to do so. I find it particularly sad that Canadian helicopters are participating in the military component of Plan Colombia, helicopters that we sold to the United States, and then, because there were no end-use requirements, went right into the U.S. military involvement in the south of Colombia.

Just before I ask a couple questions, has FOCAL taken a specific position with respect to Canada speaking out on Plan Colombia and its military component?

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: Can I answer directly? No, we haven't. We haven't taken a position on Plan Colombia for the simple reason that we haven't come to the end of our analysis of the problem. At the same time, we are not an advocacy organization. We see our main role as bringing people together and then arriving at policy recommendations. So taking a very strong stance on any policy issue is not usually something we do. We try to act more as a bridge.

Basically, I can say we're simply not at the point where we can say yes or no, black or white, on any major issue here. I would go as far as to say that certainly some elements of Plan Colombia give reason for concern. I think that's pretty clear. But no, we haven't taken an institutional stand on that, and as I said, it is not really something we usually do.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So FOCAL doesn't take stands on issues in the hemisphere?

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: We try to arrive at policy recommendations, and then we would leave it up to the policy-makers and the policy community to take them up and implement them, turn them into policy.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I guess I'm a little confused about the difference between a policy recommendation and a stand. If, for example, following your analysis of Plan Colombia—which is not new, it's been around for a long time—you came to the conclusion that Canada should be taking a strong position on the military component, as many others have done, are you saying you wouldn't be in a position to make that policy recommendation to the government?

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: No, it would be a possibility. It would be a possibility to make a policy recommendation on an element of Plan Colombia. We simply haven't arrived at the point where we can make that at this stage. There is a possibility there.

At the same time, I can only repeat myself, we see our added value as an institution, an organization, in Canada as one of the few organizations that can actually manage to bring people from different sides of the political spectrum around the table. As such, we would be maybe a little bit more reluctant than an advocacy organization to come out and take very strong positions. That doesn't diminish our capacity to make policy recommendations, and certainly it doesn't diminish our capacity to encourage dialogue and debate.

• 1630

Mr. Svend Robinson: We'll certainly await with interest the outcome of your deliberations on Plan Colombia.

I'm wondering if perhaps Ms. Douglas could share with us her perspective on the UN Commission on Human Rights and what took place in Geneva around Colombia.

When I was in Colombia in January, I met with the UN representative there, Anders Kompass, who in his previous report to the UN was very critical of the position taken by the Colombian government, particularly on the issue of collaboration between paramilitaries and the military and the culture of virtually total impunity in Colombia. He indicated to me that in fact his report this year would be even more critical and that there was a deterioration in the situation in Colombia. He was very critical of the role the Colombian government was playing in a number of respects.

I haven't had a chance to review that report yet, but I'm wondering if you could perhaps indicate what did happen on Colombia at the UN Commission on Human Rights and what role Canada played there. I know there was a strong resolution on human rights violations in Cuba, but I haven't heard of a lot of massacres or disappearances in Cuba recently. I wonder whether there was a resolution or a chairperson's statement on Colombia.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: The first thing is just to say that the United Nations human rights office in Colombia is very important. It's one of the only ones in the world. Canada is supporting that office, and certainly that work in terms of monitoring the human rights situation and trying to assist the Colombian government to do better on this front is a vital support to the country.

I did not follow the actual sessions in Geneva. I have read the high commission's report, which is certainly even more critical than last year's report in terms of the things you have just mentioned—the degradation of the conflict, the increasing number of massacres by the paramilitary, the increasing number of kidnappings, more of them attributable to the guerrilla organizations and the paramilitary, but sharing both, and the inability and unwillingness of the Colombian government to break the ties between the military and the paramilitary. This is absolutely crucial to the Colombian situation. If this doesn't happen, there's not going to be a peace process. You can't establish any kind of confidence in the country among the civilian population and among those who are negotiating for the guerrillas unless the paramilitary are reined in and some effort is made to contain the kinds of actions they are undertaking.

I don't think we need to go on the evidence, the documentation showing the links between members, institutions, and parts of the armed forces and the paramilitary. It's clear.

At Rights and Democracy we have not said that the paramilitary are an institution of government. There's not a department in the Pastrana government called Paramilitary Operations; we're not saying that. However, the links between the armed forces and the paramilitary are clear. The State Department documents it all the time. Until that is broken, there isn't going to be a peace process in Colombia. The United Nations human rights report is really clear about it. It's right up front. It's one of the first considerations.

There are other strong recommendations, as usual—and Canada has also supported this strongly—that there must be an international accord on behaviour during the war, during the conflict, for the protection of the civilian population.

The second major thing that needs to happen to build some confidence among the population in terms of them believing in this peace process is protection of people who are not involved in the conflict, who are not armed, and who are the victims—massively.

I actually didn't follow the vote. I can't say anything about what actually happened in those discussions. I don't know whether Mary followed it either.

Ms. Mary Durran (Communications Officer, Rights and Democracy): Not in detail, no.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Or the other witnesses?

• 1635

Ms. Judy Meltzer: No, I didn't follow it in detail, but of those 21 recommendations that she made, I remember they did sort of.... Some are really coming strong. She's saying yes, some gains have been made, and human rights violations by the armed forces have diminished, but there's a long way to go. You can't have trade unions, journalists, academics.... They're targeting the civilian population. There are some real strong points that came out of it.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thanks.

As one last point, I just wanted to reinforce the point that was made about the role the Canadian embassy is playing with respect to human rights. I personally travelled with the ambassador, Guillermo Rishchynski, into Barrancabermeja in the immediate aftermath of a terrible attack by paramilitaries, and was with him when we met with representatives of the police and military. I know that human rights defenders in that area greatly respect the role the Canadian ambassador and the staff at the embassy are playing in following up on concerns that have been raised and so on.

I want to be very clear on that. Certainly as a Canadian I'm very pleased that we have that kind of respect in the Colombia in terms of that human rights protection and the role Canada is playing.

The Chair: Svend, you're time is almost up.

Mr. Svend Robinson: My final brief question then is—

The Chair: Can we get a question and answer in 30 seconds?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Okay.

The negotiations with the ELN for another demilitarized zone—where are they at?

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: At this point they're suspended. The ELN has suspended these negotiations. The government and the ELN agreed to an area of the country where they have what they call the national convention. It will be an area for nine months of discussions with the government, the civil society, and the ELN about what kind of a country they want to build, what kind of a Colombia they want.

The sad thing is that the area that has been chosen and agreed to by the government is under paramilitary control. Unfortunately, at this point the demonstrations against having this convention in this particular area have been so strong that the ELN said they're suspending conversations for the moment. So the question that has to be raised is who's in control. This is an area where the government agreed to sit down with a guerrilla organization and now can't because the paramilitary have taken control of the area.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Bellemare.

[Translation]

Mr. Eugène Bellemare (Ottawa—Orléans, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to thank you for the compliments you paid to Canada. In particular, I would like to thank you for the work you do in observing and analyzing the human rights problems being caused by the conflict in Columbia at the moment.

[English]

I was pleased to hear that you're recognizing that Canada has done a great deal, is doing a great deal. Obviously as the parliamentary secretary of CIDA I know that we're intent on doing more and more in a stable manner. It's a question of having a large pie and breaking it up in pieces to help the situation throughout the world where there's a need for civil society and human rights. You're aware that we spend millions of dollars in Colombia alone.

Comments were made that CIDA should have a more coherent intervention. I would like to know exactly what you meant by that. I would throw some questions and then you could answer them, so that we don't go all over.

You say that Canada should intervene directly. Of course in my mind I'm not sure exactly what that would really mean. Someone said that Europe does intervene directly. I'd like you to make comments on the positive role of Canada at the Quebec summit and what impact it may have on the happenings or the conflicts in Colombia.

• 1640

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: I terms of CIDA and a more coherent intervention, I think CIDA itself is clearly revamping its program for Colombia. They're beginning the discussion of a new five-year program, and the public statements, as you will see in what I've written, are talking about support to displaced people, humanitarian support, peace-building.

What I was trying to say.... I was saying that CIDA and the organizations that want to work in Colombia all need to sit down and be more coherent, not just CIDA. So rather than having bits and pieces of a program, it would be great if all of us could sit down, talk to each other, and think it through: “We intervene in this way, you intervene in another way”.

I think CIDA is on the right track now. They don't have a policy framework; it will be ready in the fall. But certainly from public statements they've made verbally and from what ministers have said, we agree with the kinds of themes they want to work on. My issue was more that we should all get together and talk about being coherent—all of us.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: It's my understanding that NGOs are rather nervous of becoming direct interveners in Colombia. Did you notice this?

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: Historically, Canadian NGOs have not been as significantly involved in Colombia as perhaps in Peru or Bolivia or other countries. We don't intervene; we support groups on the ground that are working on reconciliation, alternative justice, alternative development, peace-building. But most Canadian NGOs would not go down and set up a program of intervention. We would support partner organizations who are doing these kinds of work.

Part of the problem is that many NGOs that work in other parts of the world have not historically been involved in Colombia. But it's increasing. It's growing, and certainly there's more interest in talking to people working with children. So I think there's definitely a growing interest—not to go down and actually implement, but to support.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: You're aware of our human rights and civil society activities. One statement you made raised my eyebrows. You seem to be accusatory—maybe it's in the interpretation I got, English to French—that Canada was selling military equipment. I feel you may have made allusion to helicopters to Colombia, which are used in turn to attack citizens.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: It's the same point Mr. Robinson just brought up—that a number of—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: I'm aware of this, but he has an angle to make it look like we're selling. The helicopters—

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: What legally happened was that between 1998 and 2000 Canada sold some refurbished helicopters to the United States. These helicopters have ended up in Colombia. The official position, of course, is that Plan Colombia hadn't been approved when these helicopters were sold.

I'm just trying to make the point—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: But we cannot be faulted for that—

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: —that we had to be aware—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: —no more than if you sell your car to a car dealer and then he sells it to a gangster. You are not helping gangsters by selling your car to a car dealer.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: No, I totally agree with you. It's simply the point—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: There's an imposition of ideas there that made me sort of raise my eyebrows.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: Okay. The point is that there are loopholes in the export of military equipment. Organizations in Canada are just looking at that. That's the point.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: I think you make a good point there: that when we do sell equipment, there could be in any contract an item that would state that this is not to be misused or mal-used. Do you agree with that?

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: Yes, absolutely.

The Chair: Mr. Schonwalder, would you like to speak?

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: Thank you.

I just wanted to make a brief comment on the Summit of the Americas in Quebec, since you raised that point.

• 1645

As you know, there was a declaration adopted on Colombia. I think it's fair to say that the declaration is rather weak and it's a little bit less than could have been expected. I think we at FOCAL and some of our partners we expected a much stronger statement emanating from the summit that would maybe point out some concrete roads to follow, some concrete option as to how to deal with the conflict. What this summit did was basically only reaffirm—“only” in quotation marks—support for the peace process in Colombia, which of course is important, but what one would have expected maybe is some more specifics, a stronger initiative, something more concrete as to what to do with this commitment and what to do with the support for the peace process.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Who would be to blame for that?

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: I wouldn't want to blame anybody for it.

The Chair: Maybe they're waiting for our advice after our meetings.

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: I wasn't privy to the discussions at the summit, so I don't know how these discussions went.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: You don't need to be privy. With 34 countries sitting down and discussing a hot topic, it is obviously impossible to get an idealistic decision on any item.

Mr. Gord Schonwalder: Well, if you look at the declaration on Haiti, that was much stronger, and there was some meat there, something that the Haitians now have to deal with. I think one could have expected something a little bit stronger on Colombia as well.

The Chair: Ms. Durran would like to speak.

Ms. Mary Durran: I want to add to that point on the Quebec summit that we were very encouraged by the fact that support for democracy and human rights was so strongly stated, and it was very clearly stated that respect for human rights has to be part of a democracy.

But I would just second what Gord said. We found that Aristide of Haiti was rightly condemned for a violation of electoral procedures. Yet coming back to the point that Eleanor made about the Colombian government's inability to break the ties between the military and the paramilitary, we would have hoped that would have warranted just as strong a chastisement. I would consider it something equally serious, if not more serious.

The Chair: Okay.

[Translation]

Mr. Rocheleau, five minutes please.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I will be very brief. There are two groups involved in the conflict: the paramilitary group on one side, and the guerillas on the other. Is either party benefiting from foreign aid? That is my first question.

My second question is whether it is realistic, when we think about drug trafficking, to consider that someone is profiting from this crime? I am thinking of the Americans, in particular. Ultimately, are there not some individuals for whom it is advantageous to have this type of conflict continue?

[English]

Ms. Judy Meltzer: I'll make a brief comment on your second question, and then if other people want to add to it....

I presume you are asking if there are people in Colombia who are profiting from drugs. It's a huge question, and it depends on how you'd want to think about profiting. Certainly the money that comes out of drugs is preventing exhaustion of the conflict; it's fueling it. The guerrillas intake a profit from taxing drugs of about $250 million a year, or something to that effect. The paramilitary equally use it to fuel their war.

It's too easy to look at drugs, though, as more than just one of those influencing factors, exacerbating factors, hugely exacerbating—it's a huge issue—but underlying that are all the structural issues of agrarian reform, unemployment, and social and economic inequity. Those often get lost because of the focus on the drug element.

I want to make those two points about drugs.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: In terms of profit from trafficking, 90% of it is profit that stays outside of Colombia. So that is the big question for Colombians too. Who is profiting? Not them. The real profit is actually staying in other parts of the world.

The percentage that goes back to Colombia is what Judy is talking about. The guerrillas are profiting, the paramilitaries are profiting, and it's corrupting the political system. So there's clearly an economic agenda related to extension of the conflict and drug trafficking. But Colombians will also say to you, then let's look at the whole profit circuit and see where most of the money is actually staying. It's not an easy question to answer, but the vast majority of it doesn't go back to Colombia.

• 1650

In terms of the paramilitary and the guerrillas and foreign support, it's not a huge issue. I don't know a hundred percent that there's no other support from some other guerrilla organizations, but basically it's a Colombian phenomenon right now. The paramilitary is supported inside the country, from their money from drug trafficking, by certain sectors of the big cattle ranchers, and by other sectors of society. The guerrilla support is coming from the money they get from ransoms in kidnapping, and also from the drug trade.

They're recruiting in the country quite easily, not because people believe in their struggle, but if you're a young man living in the rural areas of Colombia today, you have no choice: you leave, or you join something; otherwise you're a target. This is fueling the conflict, in a sense, because young men, especially in the countryside, don't have choices because of this territorial struggle. But it's an internal struggle; it's not an external struggle.

There are areas where foreign investment comes in, because there are important resources. Our position is that the companies don't come in and cause conflict and massacres, but because there's a struggle between contending armies inside the area where those resources are, their presence may fuel the conflict. This is what I was trying to point out, to make the effort to really understand the area that any company or corporation is going to be involved in.

If you have oil in an area and there is already a guerrilla presence, and a company comes in to exploit that oil, you can bet your bottom dollar that the paramilitary is also going to move in. The conflict is going to increase, and the civilian population is the one that suffers. It's intricate, but it's not support for the conflict; it just makes the conflict more difficult.

I don't think there are huge amounts of money coming in from external sources. There is a free flow of arms up and down the continent through Panama and through Central America and Mexico. That's clear. But mostly those arms are being paid for.

The Chair: Thank you. I'd like to ask a question to comment on something you said.

You've mentioned what happens when these industries go in. What are you suggesting, that they not go in? What is your feeling about how we should handle that?

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: I would just repeat what I've said, that certainly investment in Colombia should be handled with a great deal of information and care. It should not exacerbate the conflict.

We don't have a position that there should be no foreign investment, that trade should stop. That's impossible. It can't happen. But take the time to really know the area and find out who the actors are, who the potential victims might be, and act accordingly. Make sure your bottom line of investing in a region is not going to make things worse. I think that's about as far as I could go right now.

The Chair: But for a company deciding to go in, that's a very difficult judgment to make.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: There are lots of resources inside the country, however, to find the information you need. You can't just say you don't know.

You don't have to go in and do your own investigation. There is a lot of research that has been done in Colombia in every single area. They know the areas of conflict. People have developed maps. You know who's fighting who. So no, you can find out, and our wish is that you would.

Ms. Judy Meltzer: The onus is on the company to find out, if they're socially responsible.

The Chair: Even if they do find out, as you've said, it's still going to exacerbate the situation if they're there. That's what you mentioned, by them being there. They know what position they're in, but how can they do something about it so they don't make the situation worse by being there? Is that possible?

• 1655

Ms. Judy Meltzer: I have a quick comment to echo what Eleanor has been saying. I think there's no perfect way to go in, even if it's Colombia or Ecuador, which also have huge Canadian mining interests or oil interests. Going into these often environmentally sensitive regions, with indigenous communities, is always hard. Knowledge is a tool to mitigate some of those negative impacts.

In Colombia, with the conflict and the human rights situation, it's even more important to be informed going in. I think it's also important that local communities are equally informed and empowered to negotiate, and to know what impact those companies may have on their local communities.

Knowledge is a tool. It's instrumental in mitigating some of the repercussions. I think this is the point Eleanor is also making.

The Chair: Thank you.

We have Colleen. Ms. Beaumier, do you want to ask a question? We have about five minutes left.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Actually there are a couple of things. I want to expand a little bit on what Beth said.

How many Canadian companies are there? Do you have a list of them?

I know the Canadian embassy was conducting meetings for corporate responsibility in those countries. It would seem to me that you have a situation here.

You're talking about engaging local government from local communities and empowering them. How can you empower a local community or a local government if they've been taken over by a rebel group or a paramilitary group?

Without the foreign investors, you're going to have the poverty that is causing unrest and unhappiness in the beginning. This is one heck of a mess and certainly isn't unique to Colombia.

If the Canadian government were to be more forceful in discussing the situation, our policy, and our attitudes toward the Colombian government, does the Colombian government know the way to do this? They may not have the will right now. I guess the will is something for which we'd be pushing. Do they have the means to put an end to this?

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: In terms of your comment about how to empower local communities and local government, in Colombia there are no black and white answers.

There are areas, for example, where a local government in the Department of Cauca has elected an indigenous governor, like the premier of a province here, for the very first time in the history of the country, based on wide support. They're not taken over by anybody. This is based on real local people, indigenous people, trades people, and small-business people. Those kinds of spaces are really important to preserve. They do cite that you can make a difference. There is another way to do politics in the country.

This is happening more and more. You're finding more coalitions running candidates. It's not just the liberals and conservatives. They are truly independent. I can say that. They're not in the pockets of anyone, sometimes. You have to look at each case. There are examples. You can support and engage with local government.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: How do we support that?

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: For example, in Cauca they're developing their own development plan. It's a five-year development plan for a particular area of the country. They've joined together with the four governors of the other departments nearby. They're asking and pleading for resources and political support to surround them, or to be provided with political support in terms of the conflict.

I think there are concrete ways. Colombian central governments aren't going to oppose it. They're not going to be angry with Canadians for doing something like that.

If the Canadian government were more forceful today, would the Colombia government get everything together? No. It's not going to happen that quickly.

There are some institutions of government that work. The constitutional court has been quite effective. There are many functionaries within different departments of government who are effective. There are huge problems. The whole issue of institutional strengthening, which has been talked about here today, is a really important piece of the puzzle for different departments and institutions of government to do their jobs.

• 1700

Behind all that, of course, is a political elite—a political establishment—and this makes things very difficult. It's not just the functionaries of government; it's not even just the elected officials of government who are making this process difficult, making it not work. It's also the behind-the-scenes powers, the real power.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: The overall will just isn't there.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: They're the real people who are impeding the process.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Gee, I can't imagine there being a behind-the-scenes, overall power.

The Chair: Does anyone else want to say something?

Ms. Judy Meltzer: On your first comment about a number of Canadian companies, I don't have exact numbers, the dynamic number. We're obviously big in oil and gas, mining, and we're the largest foreign investor in telecommunications—Bell and Nortel. We have a large presence there. All the big names in Canada, in mining, oil and gas....

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Are they training Canadians? Employing locals?

Ms. Judy Meltzer: I don't know.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: That would be something worth....

Ms. Judy Meltzer: You asked what corporations do to mitigate impacts. They start their own foundations. There are interesting strategies...Canadian Occidental, Alberta Energy, Talisman, Enbridge—big names like these come to mind.

Ms. Eleanor Douglas: I again emphasize that the Canadian embassy in Colombia is very open to any of us going down to talk to these companies. It's not a closed shop. We can debate with them. This is really important. Hopefully, it's policy, not a mere accident.

I'm going down soon with a group of people. We have a meeting with the oil companies. We can talk to them, ask them questions on the information they have. This is the kind of dialogue we want, not to say that everything is wrong.

Ms. Judy Meltzer: May I take one second to add something?

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Judy Meltzer: This brings up the point about the need for a real cross-sector dialogue. It is not only that we need talk between civil society and government, but it's also with private sector, government, civil society—all stakeholders have to be at the table. This is currently missing in Canada.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

You've noticed some of the people have left, but they all have other committees or things they have to go to—though the researcher is here, which is very important. We don't yet know, but there's some chance we'll be meeting into the fall, and we may have some reason to call you back.

Your suggestion regarding CIDA is useful. We may call them back before they officially change their policy. We may look at the policy again and see what they're going to do with it, before they make it official.

Thank you again very much for coming.

The meeting is adjourned.