SRID Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, June 5, 2002

º

1600

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.))

º

1605

º

1610

º

1615

º

1620

º

1625

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

º

1630

º

1635

The Chair

Mr. Vellacott

The Chair

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

º

1640

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

º

1645

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

º

1650

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

º

1655

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

»

1700

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

»

1705

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Gerald Schmitz (Committee Researcher)

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Gerald Schmitz

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Schmitz

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Gerald Schmitz

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Gerald Schmitz

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Gerald Schmitz

The Chair

Mr. Vellacott

»

1710

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

»

1715

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

»

1720

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

Ms. Georgette Gagnon

The Chair

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CANADA

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 027

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, June 5, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

º  (1600)  

[English]

    The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): I'll call the meeting to order. This is the 27th meeting of the Sub-committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Wednesday, June 5, 2002.

    We have one witness today, as we continue our study on Sudan. From International Eminent Persons Group we have Georgette Gagnon, an international human rights lawyer, who is a technical advisor on slavery, abduction, and forced servitude in Sudan.

    For the record, we're very sorry the meeting was late starting. Go right ahead.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon (International Human Rights Lawyer, Technical Advisor, Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan, International Eminent Persons Group): Good afternoon. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address you today.

    I am a lawyer working exclusively in the area of international human rights and humanitarian law. I have been to Sudan three times. The first time was in December 1999 as a member of the Harker mission. The second was in April 2001, when I organized and led a three-person mission that investigated and reported on the human rights situation in the oil development region. This study was commissioned by Canadian and British non-governmental organizations, and we produced a report entitled Report of an Investigation Into Oil Development, Conflict and Displacement in Western Upper Nile, Sudan, which was released in October 2001 and I believe has been tabled with the committee. On May 24 of this year I returned from a two-month trip to Sudan, where I served as a technical legal advisor to a group of eminent persons mandated to find ways to advance peace in Sudan. Our mission was invited to Sudan through an agreement mediated by former U.S. senator John Danforth to examine what have been among the bitterest and most divisive issues of the civil war and an obstacle to peace, the practices of slavery, abduction, and forced servitude.

    I also wish to advise the committee that together with two scholars and with support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Law Commission of Canada, I'm conducting an academic study on the human rights implications of companies operating in conflict zones, looking at the issue of militarized commerce and human rights. We are using Talisman in Sudan as a case study, and we will be proposing a number of policy options for Canada. The full study will be available in September of this year, and I suggest that the committee actually hear from the persons who conducted this study when they resume hearings in the fall.

    My presentation today will cover two areas and will take about 20 or 25 minutes. First, I'll talk about slavery and highlight key findings in the report of the International Eminent Persons Group, which you also have in front of you. I'll also highlight some of the recommendations the Canadian government might consider following up on and supporting. Second, I will discuss oil development and highlight the findings of the investigation we conducted in April of last year.

    At the outset I would note for the committee that my work in Sudan has been as a fact-finder, legal advisor, and advocate for human rights. I'm not an expert on the intricacies of peace process, the political machinations in and around Sudan, or the various aid programs there. I can tell you about what I have witnessed and what the Sudanese people I have met have told me and my colleagues about the situation they live in. In my trips to Sudan I have travelled to the north and the south, in government- and non-government-controlled areas. I've met with representatives from the Sudanese government, from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army, from civil society, and with university students, and most importantly, I've met with civilians who've been displaced, forcibly recruited into armed forces, attacked by gunships, abducted, and enslaved.

º  (1605)  

    To grow up in the war-affected parts of Sudan today is to have little or no chance of an education, legal rights, access to health services, and most critically, physical security. Those Sudanese now becoming adults have never known peace in 19 years of war. Not all areas of Sudan have experienced the direct impact of war, but the entire country is affected by the drain on resources and the allocation of resources to the war effort. With the mass displacement of people, the decayed political institutions, and the resultant political repression in government- and rebel-held areas, the misery of ordinary people across Sudan is immediately and consistently evident.

    My purpose here is to share with you the findings and assessments of the missions I have been involved with, in the expectation that the Canadian government will take a more active and robust role in Sudan. In fact, in my view, the situation demands of Canada a clearer and more decisive policy response. I also believe that as Canadians, we are legally and morally obliged to do more in Sudan.

    On slavery, through Senator Danforth, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A agreed in December 2001 to facilitate the visit to Sudan of a U.S.-led and internationally supported eminent persons group and technical advisory team to investigate on the ground means for preventing abduction, slavery, and forced servitude and to make recommendations on practical measures to end these abuses. Progress on this issue was identified by Senator Danforth as one of the four key indicators of the seriousness of the commitment by the parties to peace. The agreement that permitted the eminent persons into Sudan notes: “The Government of Sudan categorically rejects the allegation that slavery and forced servitude exist within its borders.” The government there has consistently denied the existence of slavery. It has admitted that there is the problem of some tribal militias abducting civilians. However, they say they are not responsible for this and have no or minimal control over the activities of these groups. The Eminent Persons Group believes that until the issues of slavery, abduction, and forced servitude are satisfactorily addressed, peace will prove elusive. The group made a number of findings and recommendations, and the report also contains a series of supporting analyses that expand on them.

    Some of our key findings are as follows. Progress in addressing human rights abuses is a key element in the establishment of a just, endurable peace in Sudan. Violations of human rights are not only a result of conflict, but are causes of conflict and contribute to its continuation. The people of Sudan continue to be subjected to a range of serious and sustained human rights abuses. These have been extensively documented in numerous critical reports of human rights groups and various governments. Particularly serious abuses have occurred in connection with the civil war. To one degree or another, all the warring parties have engaged in such practices as the forced displacement of civilian populations, intentional attacks on civilians, abduction and forced recruitment of children and other civilians as soldiers and forced labourers, hostage taking, rape, looting, destruction of food supplies, and the denial of access to humanitarian assistance. Women and children have suffered especially, both from abduction and sexual violence. All these practices are prohibited by international covenants and conventions. The causes of these abuses are far-reaching and complex and must be understood and addressed as a whole. As I said earlier, many are at the root of the conflict.

º  (1610)  

    On slavery and abduction, we found evidence of exploitative and abusive relationships between northerners and people from the south that meet the definition of slavery as contained in international conventions, which Sudan has signed. Slavery is evident in a pattern of abuses that occurs in conjunction with attacks by pro-government militias known as murahaleen, from the Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes, collectively known as Baggara, on villages of civilians, mainly Dinka and Nuer, in the SPLA-controlled areas near the boundary between northern and southern Sudan. These abuses are characterized by capture through abduction, generally accompanied by violence, in raids on villages. Most of those abducted are children. This abduction is the first phase in a process of enslavement.

    The victims are then forcibly transferred to another community, household, and geographic area, sometimes in exchange for money or other consideration. They are then subjected to forced labour without remuneration. Children often herd cattle and goats, fetch water, or work as household servants. There are denials of victims' freedom of movement and choice. In many instances the infliction of physical and psychological abuse occurs, and there are frequently assaults on personal identity, such as renaming, forced religious conversion, involuntary circumcision, prohibition on the use of native languages, and the denial of contacts with the victims' families and communities of origin, and for women and girls, forced marriage and sexual relations.

    Many persons who are abducted and enslaved remain with their abductors in areas in the north. Some escape or are returned, and others are sold or transferred to third parties. The group was unable to establish the extent of the onward sale of slaves. It received no information that would confirm the existence of actual slave markets.

    The resurgence of slavery in contemporary Sudan differs from both the historical slave trade of the 19th century and the small-scale, inter-tribal abduction or hostage taking that is endemic among many pastoral peoples in east and northeast Africa. The pattern of slave taking that has developed since the start of the current civil war in 1983--and some say in the late seventies, with the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi--is to a substantial degree the product of a counter-insurgency strategy pursued by successive governments in Khartoum. This strategy involves arming local militias from northern Sudan. These militias attack villages in SPLA-controlled areas, principally along the boundary between northern and southern Sudan. And as I indicated, they burn villages, loot cattle, rape, kill, abduct and enslave.

    The strategy is aimed at limiting support for rebel forces by depopulating rural areas and driving southern populations that are deemed to be actually or potentially sympathetic or supportive of rebel movements into government-garrisoned towns, where they can be controlled, or areas in the north or further south away from strategic areas. Such attacks in northern Bahr-al-Ghazal are frequently carried out by militia members while they are employed by the government to escort the military supply train travelling from the north through SPLA-controlled areas to government garrisons further south.

    What is happening now is not rooted in ancient tribal practices, nor is it the activity of only rogue elements. Slavery and attacks on civilians are not an inevitable by-product of the war. These are often instruments of war and elements of a counter-insurgency strategy. The group did not find a pattern of abuses in south Sudan among the Dinka and Nuer, and among the Nuer and Nuer, or of southern-based militias against civilians from areas in the north that could be defined as slavery under international law. We did hear reports of abduction or hostage-taking among Nuer factions in western Upper Nile, but we concluded that this was not slavery.

º  (1615)  

    The group believed and believes it is important to name these practices for what they are, slavery. Defining certain practices as slavery under international law, rather than, or in addition to, criminal acts or violations of basic constitutional rights under domestic law, has implications for legal accountability. Under international law slavery and related practices are classified as war crimes and universally accepted as crimes against humanity and an act of genocide entailing action by the international community and a consideration, if proven, of the imposition of extraordinary remedies. This status of slavery under international law reflects the consensus among states that the right of all individuals to be free from slavery is one of the most basic and fundamental rights, one all states have an interest, and indeed a duty, to protect.

    As a potential war crime, crime against humanity, and act of genocide under international law, slavery is an offence subject to universal jurisdiction, as are intentional attacks and raids on civilian settlements. This means any state or groups of states, such as the United Nations, can prosecute and, some would argue, are obliged to prosecute and try alleged perpetrators of slavery and their military and political leaders. Perpetrators are subject to individual criminal responsibility under international law and to the possibility of prosecution, conviction, and sanction in both international and national courts and tribunals.

    We recognize that our finding that some cases of slavery exist in Sudan today means bringing the issue of accountability into the international arena, where a number of options could be pursued. This is something, of course, the Sudan government and other governments are concerned about. We recommended, however, that the Government of Sudan should vigorously increase and strengthen prosecution for these offences in state courts, in the acknowledgment that under international law states and national courts have the primary responsibility to prosecute alleged violators of international law, alleged war criminals, and those responsible for crimes against humanity. There has never been in Sudan courts a prosecution for abduction or kidnapping. If the state that has primary responsibility to protect its people is unwilling or unable to halt or avert serious or imminent harm to its people or fails in its duty to protect communities from suffering serious harm, we can argue that the international responsibility to protect kicks in and may necessitate international intervention.

    Our group was not able to establish the number of persons who have been abducted and/or enslaved. There are vast divergences among available estimates, and we point this out in the report. They range from 14,000 people to over 100,000 people. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A have obstructed efforts by independent organizations to investigate thoroughly the problem of contemporary slavery and related issues. There has been no systematic or comprehensive chronicling of abduction or enslavement. However, a figure even the government committee to eradicate slavery has not disputed is that thousands, around 14,000, have been abducted. How many are being held in slavery is unknown at this time.

    The Government of Sudan has acknowledged, as I said, that abduction of civilians occurs. Its 1999 decision to create the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children, or CEAWC, was a significant step in the recognition of the problem. The government, however, has not given CEAWC the resources it needs to adequately deal with abduction, and since 1999 CEAWC has retrieved and returned only 1,000 persons from the 14,000 it accepts have been abducted.

    We found also that the Government of Sudan has failed to acknowledge its own responsibility for acts committed by militias and other forces under its authority. The lack of judicial control and appropriate structures of military accountability in Sudan means militia members are able to act with impunity. We found that the challenges of dealing with the issues of slavery, abduction, and forced servitude are made much greater by an absence of democratic institutions and practices across Sudan.

º  (1620)  

    The group also noted increased fighting in areas of oil development in western Upper Nile. While we were not able to visit this area this time, we did interview persons displaced in 2002 from western Upper Nile. They reported a pattern of abuses similar to those that have occurred in northern Bahr-al-Ghazal, which includes the use of militias, attacks on civilians, forced displacement of local populations, and abduction. We are very concerned that the process of enslavement in western Upper Nile may be occurring and that there will be a new round of abduction and slavery with increased fighting there. This, we think, requires urgent further investigation.

    Finally, we found that bringing about an end to the practices of slavery, abduction, and forced servitude will require Sudan's national and political leaders to speak out forcefully and act vigorously against these practices. Denials of the existence of slavery and rationalizations for its existence may be interpreted by some as indifference, or worse, licence to continue these abuses.

    Now I would like to highlight several of the recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group the Canadian government might consider looking at and supporting and this committee might look at further.

    Our group urged General el-Bashir, the President of Sudan, to take the lead in launching a campaign to make clear to all in Sudan his government's firm opposition to these practices in all their forms. This should include statements calling on people to immediately release people, victims, they may be holding. This should be done in order to prevent new abductions. A campaign of this kind, backed by effective action, could help greatly to move the peace process forward and restore international confidence in Sudan. We also urged Dr. Garang, commander-in-chief of the SPLA, to take more vigorous action to end abduction by SPLM/A forces, particularly in western Upper Nile, among newer factions there.

    We also recommend that international support for CEAWC must be contingent on the government's taking verifiable action in a number of areas that are clearly outlined in our report. The international community should provide appropriate support to recent local peace agreements between Dinka and Baggara communities that have demonstrated an indigenous capacity for conflict resolution. However, these local peace efforts should also be linked into the greater peace processes that are going on through IGAD and other mechanisms.

    We also recommended that enhancing economic and social development in the affected areas can contribute to addressing human rights abuses. Abduction and enslavement and related practices should be more adequately and comprehensively researched, and the parties should facilitate this research.

    In addition, a monitoring group drawn from both international and indigenous organizations should be established with a mandate to monitor any new occurrence of abduction and slave taking and to prevent new abductions. This monitoring mechanism should be designed in consultation with human rights monitoring efforts in Sudan, including the agreement to prevent attacks on civilians mediated by Senator Danforth. Such a monitoring group might be established under the auspices of an international organization, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, of a donor government, or of a group of governments--and I would include Canada here--active in supporting efforts towards peace in Sudan.

    The group also recommended that the military train that travels from the north through northern Bahr-al-Ghazal into the south should be suspended pending the establishment of peace.

º  (1625)  

    We also felt that organizations and individuals who can contribute to the prevention and redress of human rights abuses should be provided with resources and encouraged. But the improvement of the human rights situation in Sudan requires a long-term perspective, a sustained commitment, and a continual presence in the area by implementing organizations with free access, and also requires rigorous monitoring and auditing by donors.

    We recommended that oil companies operating in Sudan must ensure that their operations do not cause or contribute to human rights violations. The Government of Sudan, governments of countries whose nationals or companies are engaged in oil development--and here, again, I include Canada--the companies themselves, and international organizations operating in Sudan should support independent and impartial human rights impact assessments in those areas and should act on the recommendations made. Talisman is exploring for oil in Sudan now. It has recently made a new discovery in the Kaikang area, and Canada should be calling on the company to do a human rights impact assessment in any area it is considering for oil development.

    Finally, we recommended that the U.S. and concerned European governments, together with other concerned parties and states, including Canada, particularly those with direct interests or involvement, should establish a permanent mechanism to monitor the efforts of the Sudanese parties to address the issues of slavery, abduction, and forced servitude.

    The response to date to the report of the Eminent Persons Group has been minimal. Neither President el-Bashir nor any of his top advisors have yet responded to the report. CEAWC, which is the committee to eradicate slavery, has responded, indicating that while it finds some positive things in the report, it is not in need of international observers to monitor its activities. There has been no formal response from the SPLM/A. The U.S. government has received the report and accepted the finding that slavery exists and said the report sets out ways to end it. The U.S. has also called on the Government of Sudan to control militias and armed forces that are involved in any slave raids and to eliminate this military supply train. I have been advised by the State Department that the proposals are moving forward and are under review.

    Now I'd like to move to the area of oil.

    The Chair: We want to leave time for everybody to ask questions. We're only supposed to be going until 5 o'clock. We were late starting.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: It's only about five minutes more.

    The Chair: Fine.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: In front of you you have our report of October 2001. It documents and places into context an intensification of armed attacks on civilians in areas of Sudan's contested oil region in western Upper Nile in 2001 and 2000. We noted that these attacks were carried out by Government of Sudan armed forces, local pro-government militias, and rebel forces of or aligned with the SPLA and the SPDF. These two groups merged in early 2002.

    A significant new development in this period was a higher number of direct attacks by the armed forces of the government on civilians living in oil areas. Our report documented a number of other things, including coordinated attacks on civilians, in which aerial bombardment and raids by gunships were followed by ground attacks from government-backed militias and government troops. Defecting government soldiers and civilian victims of the attacks reported that some of these gunships operate from facilities built, maintained, and used by the oil consortium, which includes Talisman. If you'll note, Talisman has conceded in its recent corporate social responsibility report that it is unable to control or monitor the use of oil infrastructure for military purposes.

    We also documented forcible recruitment of young teenagers into the Government of Sudan's armed forces and their use to provide security in areas of oil development and to attack their own people. We reported an increase in military expenditures by the government, correlating with an increase in oil revenues.

    Finally, we documented an absence of independently verified evidence that economic or other benefits of oil development have accrued to indigenous communities in the oil areas, in spite of claims by the government that it uses oil revenues to assist the civilian population and Talisman's announced sponsorship of assisted projects in oil areas. We concluded that oil development in the present circumstances has exacerbated the conflict and assisted the war aims of the government. It is damaging to the inhabitants of the oil areas. We also concluded that Talisman's claims that it is a force for good in Sudan have not been borne out. The company has failed at constructive engagement and proved unable to exert a positive influence on the government through its partnership with Khartoum.

    We had one recommendation. Foreign commercial enterprises should remain in Sudan only if they support a regime of long-term, independent, expert human rights monitoring in the oil areas. Such monitoring is necessary to permit oil companies and government agencies to mitigate the damaging impacts of oil development, and to support international efforts to negotiate with the warring parties and mediate peace in Sudan.

    The situation today in the oil region is worse than it was a year ago and worse than it was two years ago. There's been continued bombing of civilian targets and aid centres, continued targeting of oil installations by the SPLA, and continued forced displacement. The government has just cut off humanitarian access into western Upper Nile. There have been reports that spending on the war has increased and that future revenues have actually been committed to the war effort, leaving little or no oil revenue to share at this point.

º  (1630)  

    I would like to address two interrelated arguments that frequently come up regarding Talisman's operations in Sudan. The first is that if Talisman left, another company would come in and oil production would continue. The second is that the situation would be worse if Talisman were not there: at least they're doing something, building clinics, hospitals, and schools.

    The situation could not be much worse in the western Upper Nile or for the persons displaced from their land and on the run. The situation is bad and getting worse. The harm done in existing circumstances by companies developing oil is as great with Talisman as with any other company. Talisman's presence does not minimize overall harm and the negative impact of oil development. For the majority of inhabitants, Talisman's presence is no better or worse than any other company's. It has had no impact on how the government secures oil development through forced displacement and attacks on civilians. In my view, it doesn't improve the situation much to say, if someone came in, they might do something worse. That is not a meaningful response. If what you're doing is wrong, it's wrong. If someone is going to sell somebody arms or illegal drugs, it is not a meaningful response to say, it may as well be us.

    In addition, any benefits from development and aid programs Talisman is involved in have not been independently assessed. They're likely exaggerated. Some would argue that in fact, these programs are complicit in the government's agenda to control, assimilate, or drive out southerners. Development is in government-controlled areas, and its access is restricted. Certainly, all the persons displaced from the western Upper Nile have no access to any of these development programs. In addition, we found that Bentiu, which is a town in the concession, has one of the highest levels of malnutrition in the western Upper Nile. This is where the oil companies operate. These smaller aid projects do not mitigate or balance out the much greater harm and damage currently being done by Talisman and the other oil companies there.

    We have argued that if Talisman left Sudan, it would have a serious impact on oil production. It would fall by 30%. It would affect government revenues and the money the government is spending on war. As we know and have argued, oil revenues permit the government to believe it can win the war. Without foreign investment, or limited foreign investment, oil revenues will be reduced, and the government may be forced to compromise and negotiate seriously for peace.

    In addition, Talisman's expertise, technology, and leadership in the oil consortium is crucial to plans for further expansion and additional capacity. Talisman's withdrawal would send a message to companies with U.S. capital market exposure or susceptibility to divestment pressures that investing in Sudan's oil fields at this time means you're going to face pressure and be targeted. Any new company that comes in to replace Talisman or any other company can expect to have a lot of pressure put on it from a number of sources.

    I think I should stop here. I would simply say that Canada needs a new policy on Sudan. I hope this committee comes up with it. I think we've given you some ideas on what this policy should contain. It should put human rights at the centre and deal with the human rights implications of corporations operating in conflict zones. There are some very specific things that can be done in this area.

    Thank you.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    We have one bit of business to do at the end, if we're going to end at 5 o'clock. We have to get quorum regarding a letter we want to send. We will have permission to count you for a quorum. Can you stay five minutes after the meeting if we each get five minutes for questions?

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott (Saskatoon—Wanuskewin, Canadian Alliance): I guess people have to go on to other things. For my part, I'm certainly prepared to be around after 5 o'clock, even for questioning of the witness.

    The Chair: Mr. Dubé, can you stay later than 5 o'clock?

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Until 5.15.

[English]

    The Chair: All right, we'll do five minutes each, and then see if we have another turn.

    Mr. Dubé.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): You didn't ask me if I could stay.

    The Chair: Excuse me.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): I'm already here from another meeting, which I have to return to. So I'll try to--

    The Chair: If it's okay with Madam Gagnon, when we get a quorum, which will be in a few minutes, we'll just stop for two minutes and see if we can get the letter okayed.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Yes, fine.

    The Chair: If we don't get it okayed today, it doesn't go out until the fall.

    Mr. Dubé.

º  (1640)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I read your report several times and I listened to your presentation. I will focus my remarks on the recommendations it contains. Looking at these, and without being critical, I note that most of them are targeted at the Sudan Government. However, we are not the Government of Sudan and I would like you to tell us in a more specific way what you expect from Canada. You talked about Talisman and the military train. What do you think the Canadian government can do? Our parliamentary committee may meet the Canadian Government officials and we intend to go to Sudan. In the meantime, what would you like us to recommend to the Canadian government?

[English]

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: In my presentation I said there are a number of recommendations made by the Eminent Persons Group that Canada could certainly support and take on itself. For example, it could call on President el-Bashir to end the practice of slavery now. The other area is to look very carefully at the activities of companies operating in conflict zones. As I said, there are a whole number of policy options here that can be explored. Certainly, I and the two other researchers I am working with will be bringing forward these options. I can discuss them with you, either now or after the presentation. We do have some very specific recommendations.

    Right now I think the Government of Canada could denounce much more actively and vigorously the violations of human rights that are occurring, such as the bombing of civilian targets, including last week. The Government of Sudan has also restricted humanitarian access into the western Upper Nile. The Government of Canada could denounce this and say it should not happen, because populations need access there. I understand that the letter that you may be looking at will address this. As well, there are a number of areas in the peace process that could be explored further. As I said, I'm not an expert on the peace process, but I do think the Government of Canada could put forward much clearer benchmarks and timelines. I know they are doing some work in the area of wealth sharing, but right now I don't know where this is going, because the government has clearly said already they are not going to share oil revenues with the rebel groups.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: That's what you want for Canada, fine, but when you say that the government or the president should recognize... It says in the documents that the government has accepted to look at the slavery issue, which is maybe more specific. We went to Columbia and we know that there are displaced people in several regions of the world. But this is here a more specific report on slavery. Hasn't the government decried slavery since 1926? Is it fair to say that this slavery is rather practiced by third parties, i.e. non-government controlled militia?

[English]

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: No, that's not the case. The report clearly says the government is arming these militias and does control elements of the militias. In fact, when the militias head south and attack civilian villages, they are, to a certain extent, doing so as part of a government counter-insurgency strategy. In any case, it's very clear that the militias are under government control and are, therefore, the responsibility of the government. It is a basic principle of international law that a government is accountable for the actions of forces under its control.

    The government has acknowledged abduction, but it has not acknowledged that slavery exists. It doesn't matter whether it was abolished in 1924, it's happening today, and they are not dealing with it.

º  (1645)  

    The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler: I have been particularly concerned, as I've indicated on previous witness testimony, with the intensification of human rights violations in the western Upper Nile, as you've described, including the prevention of humanitarian relief that has accompanied the intensification of attacks, civilian bombing, and the like. This has been coincident with increased oil finds and extraction. In particular, this brings me to something time may not have permitted you to do, giving some specific recommendations with respect to what the Canadian government might be able to do regarding the situation in the western Upper Nile. I think this challenges some of the wisdom that things have been progressing in Sudan. This is a kind of looking glass into the actual escalation of human rights violations in Sudan. I'm particularly concerned with Talisman's presence, and thereby its imputed acquiescence, if not complicity, in these human rights violations. What might be some of those specific recommendations with respect to Talisman, apart from a human rights impact statement?

    I note that the chair of rights and democracy of the International Centre for Rights and Democracy, Kathleen Mahoney, on the occasion of the annual meeting of Talisman put them on notice that they could find themselves liable for prosecution in the International Criminal Court as of July 1. At that time a provision comes into effect for war crimes and crimes against humanity that were committed with a party's knowledge, in the sense that these were violations they could have prevented or took place under their authority and control.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: The academic study I'm involved in is looking particularly at the governance gap that exists in Canada right now regarding corporations operating in conflict zones. What we have found is that there is in fact no rule of international law that requires states to regulate the extraterritorial activities of their corporate nationals, but states clearly have jurisdiction to restrict the extraterritorial actions of these corporations. We are also finding that there may be an emerging duty to regulate on behalf of states, this based on the fact that human rights are no longer solely a matter of international concern and that there is this emerging responsibility for states to protect vulnerable populations.

    Of course, in Canada we also have to think about implementing the principle of human security. Our recommendations to date--and again, these are preliminary--include expanding the strategies already recommended by the Broadbent commission and some others. These strategies aim to expand the notion of fiduciary duty to cover obligations to ensure respect for human rights in foreign-based operations using government incentives for overseas investment, such as export development credits and tax credits, to the advantage of corporate social responsibility.

    Also, we recommend formalizing or putting into actual law a code of conduct for Canadian corporations that operate in conflict zones. This would be narrowly focused on human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations arising from the conflict. You would have to look at the relationship of the corporation to the host state and to public and private security forces. It might also include a list of conflict zones where this code would be applicable. The main focus of such a regulation would be on a monitoring program, which would include a human rights impact assessment and a common trust fund sponsored by business and government, with a tripartite board that would look at early warning, conflict prevention, and also independent monitoring by an international NGO.

º  (1650)  

     Other areas that would need to be looked at in a regulation are cases of non-compliance. What are the array of options there, from the least strict to the most strict? What about criminal sanctions? What about amending SIMA as a sanction? What are the incentives for the corporations to sign on to this code? There aren't many, as we know. What is the exact meaning of complicity? What kinds of evidence will be sufficient to show complicity? What should the standard of liability be? Should it be a liability proven beyond a reasonable doubt or strict liability, with the corporation required to show due diligence? There are a whole number of outstanding questions here. That's why we think, at the end of the day, state regulation is needed. I can talk to you about this after if you'd like. I have a handout on it.

    The Chair: Ms. Jennings.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you very much for your presentation.

    I'm particularly interested in continuing the response you were giving to my colleague's questions on the legislative framework that doesn't exist yet, which the Eminent Persons Group report and some of the research you're doing as a follow-up will be recommending or have recommended. It reminds me, to a extent, of when, for instance, Canada signs or agrees to an international covenant or treaty, and as a result, has to change domestic legislation to fall into place. The drug patents issue is an example. I sat on the industry committee, and last year about this time we actually had to study and review Bill S-17, which was amending our Patent Act in order to bring it in line with an international treaty we had signed or a trade agreement we're a party to, to ensure that it was the 20-year patent and we actually had a deadline.

    So my question is, with international law on the issue of the abolition of slavery, for instance, and the fact that it is now considered a crime against humanity, is there anything in those international covenants or treaties or agreements that requires state nations, if they do not already have domestic law to cover it, to change their domestic law to bring it into conformity with that international law?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Perhaps Mr. Cotler knows more about this than I, but all international treaties signed by various governments are supposed to be implemented. Nations are required to bring their domestic law into compliance with the treaty. Slavery, as a crime against humanity and an act of genocide, is subject to universal jurisdiction and customary international law.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Except that international law has the primary jurisdiction.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Yes, but even with universal jurisdiction, the national state has the primary responsibility. If it fails, then it is up to the international community to do something, but universal jurisdiction means any state can go ahead and prosecute. The national government doesn't necessarily have to, any state can. These are the most serious crimes, and as I said, it is seen to be in the interest of the international community as a whole to protect these rights and prosecute those who violate them.

    I don't know if that answers the questions.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Yes, it's sufficient.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I can also expand on that.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: This brings me to my second point. Given that some of the recommendations suggest Canada needs to look at its legal policy, our actual legislative responses to some of our international obligations regarding slavery, for instance, about Canadian companies doing business in conflict zones, how would you propose that this committee proceed? We can say in a report to the government it should do this, but a process actually needs to be engaged in to arrive at that. If there were unanimity or consensus within the committee that this is something we should be recommending to the government, what would you recommend as a process that would allow the government to get to this?

    It's a serious question, because if we're going to be legislating the conduct and the rights of the private sector, and not just the private sector, but the private not-for-profit sector, because it's not just the for-profit sector that are in conflict zones, and not all private not-for-profit organizations are necessarily doing great things, then we need to engage all of this in some kind of process here in Canada to develop the consensus to bring along legislation.

º  (1655)  

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I can really only talk about the activities of corporations in conflict zones. As I said, there's a governance gap, and that's the first thing you would need to correct: there is no law in this. Then you would have to identify why this should be done, and the testimony from all the people who appear before this committee will certainly say that. There has also been polling done, as you know, that shows that Canadians are concerned about corporations of which they are shareholders being involved in human rights abuses.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: One of the reasons I'm asking you is that you have raised an issue. Is it strict liability? Those are issues that need to be discussed. In order for the government to make a decision, they also need to have a discussion that goes down into the grassroots, so Canadians understand, when a decision is made and if we decide to go that route, which kind of liability we will choose and why.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: My understanding is that generally a draft bill, a white paper, or a discussion paper would be drafted by somebody in the government. Then there would be public consultations on that, a precursor to legislation. I don't see why that couldn't happen in this case.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Before we go to Mr. Vellacott, I don't know how many of you have read the report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade for the 2002 G-8 summit, Securing Progress for Africa and the World. I believe it was just tabled on Monday. I'm not going to read this whole thing, but it says that they have to discuss “promotion of an enforceable code of commercial conduct, especially in zones of conflict.” This is not open for discussion; it's not my turn. I just want to let people know.

    Mr. Vellacott.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: I appreciate what my colleagues have said here, because I think, where there is a will, there is a way. If you really want to do something, it doesn't take rocket science to adjust SIMA or do other types of things like that.

    I wonder if you could make a point of tabling--and I'm sure we'd all like individual copies--your report with the committee when it's completed in September. Is that a possibility, Georgette?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Yes. In fact, what I think should happen is that the researchers should appear before this committee and discuss the study in depth, because it is, I think, going to be the most comprehensive one yet in Canada. As I said, it's actually being sponsored by the Law Commission of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. It is a serious study.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Before I go on to my questions, I'd like to direct that back to the chair and the clerk. If there's a possibility, could we get that in hand and have those researchers as witnesses at a point in September or October?

    The Chair: We can look into that.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I won't be here, but I can certainly give you the names.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: That would be great, because I think you've had some good suggestions in the preliminary concepts you mentioned today as to how one could write a law and so on.

    You didn't seem to mince any words at all in saying that oil is exacerbating the conflict there. Others say, well, it's part of it, but it's not really a big issue. How big an issue would you say it is? Is it a major contributing factor? There are always other things.

»  (1700)  

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I'm sorry, are you asking me whether it's a major issue in the war as a whole?

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: As a contributing, exacerbating factor, yes.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Now oil development is occurring and revenues are coming in, it has become a major issue in the war. Some would argue that the war has been about control over resources, water, land, and now oil, for a long time--

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Most wars are.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: --particularly since 1983, with the new round of fighting.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: What do you propose, then, especially in respect to that? You have Talisman and a 30% drop, as you said, in oil revenues. What about this notion of a trust fund, an escrow account? In fact, as recently as yesterday I talked to Sudanese representatives in our country and suggested that I would be quite willing to head to the bank as soon as they give me a call and set up a trust fund or an escrow account. They'll get back to me, I'm sure, at some point about that. Is that something that has been talked about? But as has been said to me, what government would do that with resources like this? What government has ever, in the history of the world, done such a thing?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: The trust fund is an old recommendation. It has been around for a while. Most groups now, if I'm not mistaken, are not really supportive of it. They don't see it as a solution to the issue of sharing of oil revenues and wealth sharing.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Why not?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I think it's really the mechanics of it. How are you going to get both parties to agree to that, who is going to control it, and how is whatever revenue that is going to go in going to be distributed? Frankly, I'm not as up to speed on that as I should be. I used to know more about it. Others in this room might know more about that option than I do. But I can say it has been thoroughly analysed by a number of parties.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: With UN food aid, you mentioned some denial of access into the western Upper Nile and so on. Some would suggest that the Government of Sudan is doing that to protect the UN planes, aid workers, etc., and that's why it's going to endanger the lives of these individuals. Are you buying that?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Of course not. It's the government that is bombing aid centres.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Not the SPLA.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Not the SPLA. That is really not borne out by the facts. As you know, the government is the only warring party with helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: The no-fly zones, then, are not for the protection of the United Nations aid workers, planes, etc., in your view.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I frankly don't understand that argument.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Do the SPLA or others use the aid?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Yes, there have been reports that the SPLA has diverted food aid.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: That's not a big concern?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I think it has been a concern.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We're going to take a couple of minutes now to look at the letter we were asked to do last week. The researcher has worked on the letter. If we get an approval today, we can send it in. Otherwise, we may have to wait until the fall to do this. Could you just read it quickly.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Our researcher isn't here.

    The Chair: I know that. The researcher is not here, so we do it either now or in the fall. If you approve of the letter, I'd like a motion that we approve it and send it to the Prime Minister.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: Could we have 2 minutes to read it?

[English]

    The Chair: Yes, read it.

    It has been moved by Marlene Jennings, seconded by Irwin Cotler.

    He wrote this letter in consultation with the NGOs that were here last week at the meeting. They suggested this.

    How often have you seen four or five MPs this quiet?

»  (1705)  

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: You're the only one talking.

    The Chair: I had the chance to read it before.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I have a question.

    At the end, one reads: “Finally, the international community should approve a more robust peace process...”. What do we mean by that? Does that mean the Armed Forces intervention?

    Mr. Gerald Schmitz (Committee Researcher): No. In English, it says “more robust”. We can say then, “more robust”.

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I would rather suggest “more intensive”.

    Mr. Gerald Schmitz: O.K. That's better.

[English]

    The Chair: “...support a more intensive...”. Okay.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: Yes.

[English]

    The Chair: Okay, that's a good suggestion.

    Maurice.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Are we asking them to take it up on their agenda, or are we being a little more gentle and subtle than that, Marlene? In a sense, you're the mover. I would have said, stick it on your agenda, and filled it out thereafter.

    The Chair: We just did.

    Mr. Gerald Schmitz: We just tabled a huge report to the main committee on the G-8 agenda, but not specific to that. Because it could be Zimbabwe, it could be--

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: I would have said in a letter like this, please place the Sudan issue as a top priority or place it on the agenda. Are we figuring that corners them too much? Then they could respond, brush it aside, and say, no, we won't. I guess there has to be some strategy in this whole thing. You've been around the block inside government issues for a long time probably.

    Mr. Gerald Schmitz: The agenda is already set.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Then why are we even attempting the fit?

    Mr. Gerald Schmitz: It's an opportunity to raise certain concerns when the African leaders are present. It's not necessarily that you're going to have an entirely new agenda.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: In what form? So it won't be at the main meetings?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: May I answer? The program is set, but I think the aim of the letter is that in the discussions flowing from the set agenda, there will definitely be opportunities where the Prime Minister, his sherpas, and other Canadian officials and ministers can raise the issue of Sudan. They can use some of what we've put in the letter. During the official discussions under the set program at the G-8 summit at Kananaskis they should use every opportunity to raise the issue of Sudan and the pressing humanitarian issue there.

    The Chair: Yes.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Sudan doesn't need to be formally on the agenda. When they're talking about Africa, they can use Sudan as an example.

    The Chair: Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I would like to point out that we've just started our review and that we've only heard a few witnesses. I do not dispute their sincerity and the relevance of their testimony. But we're only starting and I think we cannot go any further at this point. I understand the concerns, but for the time being, we have to have good arguments.

[English]

    Mr. Gerald Schmitz: If you look at previous agendas of G-8 summits, you find that things that were not on the agenda ended up being on the agenda, simply because the nature of the conflict area required it to be on the agenda. For example, you very often don't find the Middle East on the agenda, yet it ends up being on almost every G-8 summit agenda. In this instance Africa is already on the agenda, so it's a very small stretch to address within the subject matter already on the agenda, Africa, the urgency of the humanitarian situation in Sudan and the human rights violations there. So I frankly think this is a very modest request.

    The Chair: We're just pointing out that the Prime Minister makes some--

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: That's all I want to know. I know what happens all the time. Somebody has a bathroom conversation with some ambassador from God knows where, and all of a sudden, they've had great diplomatic discussions on some pressing issue of state. I don't want it to get into that kind of thing. But we've got wiser heads here, who are more experienced than I. I mean that, especially if my colleagues across the way are of the view that this is strong enough to say we're going to take it up, we're serious about it, and if it's also worded in such a way that they will get back to us. I don't want it to be totally loose. How do you anticipate they'll respond?

»  (1710)  

    The Chair: It's their action. We anticipate that they will bring it up.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: But when I write a letter as an MP, I ask for a specific action. The more precise one can be, the better. It's almost a courtesy to them. They then know what to respond to as well.

    The Chair: This is telling him how strongly we feel that this should be brought up; we know he is looking at all of Africa, but we're asking him to bring this up in particular and to talk about this. I think that's all we have to do.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Normally, after the summit has ended, we would get some kind of response, either from the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, saying they followed up on the suggestion or didn't.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: We have a pressing, dire humanitarian need. That's all I'm saying here. I don't think this needs to be super-controversial, political, or anything like that.

    The Chair: That's all we want, that they bring it up and talk about it at the meeting.

    Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: In terms of follow up, I am satisfied with the letter and the correction that was made. However, I know that the G-8 is a meeting of State leaders, but are there going to be other people? The issue may have been discussed at the Foreign Affairs Committee. Could the parliamentary secretary answer that question? Will you be there? Will someone from the Foreign Affairs Committee be there?

[English]

    The Chair: The G-8 is a leaders' conference, it's not--

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I know, but sometimes... Nothing is planned?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: To date, I heard nothing. I know the Committee's report made a recommendation to that effect...

    Désolée.

[English]

    The Chair: Could you read your motion, Ms. Jennings?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I move that the letter concerning Sudan and the G-8 summit addressed to the Prime Minister be approved and sent prior to the beginning of the summit in Kananaskis in June 2002.

    The Chair: With the amendment.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: With the amendment that in the French version, on the second page, the second-to-last sentence that begins “Finally there is a need”, on the first line, where in English it says, “to support a more robust peace process” and in French it says,

[Translation]

“to support”.

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: Not “robust”, but “intensive”.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Right.

[English]

    It's to change.

[Translation]

    “robust” by “intensive”.

[English]

    The Chair: Is everybody in agreement? Are there any objections?

    (Motion agreed to)

    The Chair: Okay. It will be done.

    We understand if people can't stay. So if you can, stay, and if you can't, go.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: Madam Chair, I'd like to tell our witness that this report is substantial still and that it obviously required a lot of work. In fact, it contains testimonies and estimates--even if there are some gaps between them--that will be very useful to us. You can be sure that as an MP, and I think my colleagues will do the same, I will read this report. Thank you.

»  (1715)  

[English]

    The Chair: I'll verify that. He reads everything we get.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Could I just respond, though, to what Monsieur Dubé asked me earlier? He asked me for more specific recommendations that Canada might look at. I would say Canada, even this committee, could put forward a very strong policy statement on Sudan, a much clearer and more decisive policy response. It's not there right now, in my view.

    Second, they could recommend, or even start to move forward, the process of legislation on corporate complicity in conflict zones. I think you'll certainly get enough information from the hearings, the people before you, that you could get this process going. That I think would be a very good start on the issues involved.

    I would also suggest that Canada--and I know CIDA has looked at this to some extent--support vigorously and pursue the implementation of an international human rights monitoring regime there. This was a recommendation made in both the reports I have been involved in, and it is urgently needed. It's really not a controversial recommendation. The problem is doing it properly and getting the consent of the parties to have monitoring on the ground there.

    May I respond briefly to Mr. Vellacott?

    The Chair: Okay.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: With regard to the trust fund issue, the Swiss are apparently looking at this issue in the whole analysis of wealth sharing and whether this sort of process could go forward with vigorous international monitoring. So it is being looked at, and if you want more information on it, there are certainly people who could provide it to you. It is a legitimate effort.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: It's not totally out of vogue, then?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: No, I don't think it's totally out of vogue. There has been a lot of discussion about it. There may be some new life in it.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Is the détente or “ceasefire” in the Nuba Mountains working in a small, modest way, from your understanding of things?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: It depends on who you speak with. The government troops who were in the area have now been moved into western Upper Nile and are doing their business there. There hasn't been, I think, any major fighting in the area, although I did hear reports of some small incidents, and I do understand that after several months there have been some deliveries of humanitarian relief into the area.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Would it be an example for the whole of southern Sudan, or the whole of the country?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I think it's something that can be looked at. I don't think whether it's successful has been fully analysed yet and is fully known.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: If the Government of Sudan could tolerate war for some 18 years, but now, after 19 years, they've suddenly realized it isn't in their interest to continue, what has happened? People on both sides say we want peace, they tell you that to your face when you're before them and so on, but I guess it's the walk, not just the talk, as we say. So what has happened, if in fact there is some new desire for peace, at least in what's said on the part of the Government of Sudan? What is it? Is it Danforth's pressure? Is it that engagement, that push?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I think it's partly that engagement and the government's concern about U.S. efforts in its war on terror. That certainly has had some impact on the government there. Many say neither side is actually interested in peace at this time. Some argue that with oil revenues, the government thinks it can win the war now, others disagree with that. Senator Danforth disagreed with it, others disagree with him on it. There are many competing opinions out there.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Some say you can't win a guerilla war, so maybe the government says, we have the revenues, we have the gunships, but we can't....

»  (1720)  

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: But there are bigger oil concessions even further south, there are bigger prizes to be had, and there are certainly some out there who think the government wants them.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: So there may be interest on the part of the players on both sides for there to be peace?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I think there certainly are some players who are open about discussing the problems that exist among the various parties.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: But there's not enough momentum at the current time?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: As I said at the beginning, I'm not an expert on the peace process, but in my two months there recently there certainly wasn't a lot of momentum.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: In conclusion, then, Talisman, from your point of view, should be out of there, they should be gone?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: As we said in our report, unless they radically change the way they're operating and unless they support a very extensive human rights monitoring regime, they should be out.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Not their own?

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: Not their own. Their own is totally ineffective. They may even admit that, I don't know.

    The Chair: Okay, I'm going to close the meeting now, but I'm going to ask you a question that may seem a little odd. Could you tell us how to dress if we're over there in November? We're planning to go, and it might be helpful to people.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: If you don't want to get malaria, which is prevalent there, you need to wear long pants and long-sleeved shirts. It's going to be fairly hot, but not really hot. In the north women, to show respect, should wear long sleeves and long skirts.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Ms. Georgette Gagnon: I'd also be very prepared to assist you with planning a trip, since I've been on several, and discuss with you some of the people you might like to meet with.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Thank you very much for coming today. I'm sorry we had some problems there and delays, but that happens in the House.

    The meeting's adjourned to the call of the chair, which may be next October.