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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, May 29, 2002

1535

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.))

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum (Alternatives Canada)

1540

1545

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny (Researcher/ Policy Advocate for Human Rights - Africa, Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives (KAIROS))

1550

1555

1600

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual (Regional Partnership Coordinator/Africa, KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives)

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

1605

1610

1615

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift (Senior Policy Adviser, World Vision Canada)

1620

1625

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott (Saskatoon—Wanuskewin, Canadian Alliance)

1630

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Manock Lual

Mr. Gary Kenny

1635

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ)

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. Gary Kenny

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Gary Kenny

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

1640

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Chair

1645

Mr. Svend Robinson

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

Mr. Svend Robinson

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Gary Kenny

1650

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

1655

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings

1700

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum

Mr. Manock Lual

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

1705

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

1710

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

1715

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Manock Lual

1720

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Mr. Gary Kenny

The Chair

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

1725

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Mr. Manock Lual

The Chair

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum

The Chair

CANADA

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 026

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, May 29, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): I call to order this 26th meeting of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

We have three groups represented today: from Alternatives Canada, Bashir Abdelgayoum; from KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives, Gary Kenny, researcher and policy advocate for human rights Africa, and I think Manock Lual will make some comments also; and from World Vision Canada, Kathy Vandergrift, senior policy adviser.

I think we'll have you speak in the order in which you appear on the agenda--this is alphabetical order. We'll hear from the three of you and then from the members of the committee.

The members of the committee will be coming in and out. Some of them are at committees where they have clause-by-clause or are finishing off a bill and they have to stay there until that's finished. Some are on two committees. So don't be discouraged if somebody leaves and somebody else comes in; it's just the normal affairs. They will all get copies of whatever you've said today.

Also, we'd like you not to make your answers and your comments too long, because then there's no time for them to question you. In their questioning, you'll probably be able to cover most of what you've left out of your general comments at the beginning, and I'm sure there will be new things coming up.

The Speaker has announced that because we have no air conditioning on the Hill, he's relaxing the dress code today. I'm not sure what the women are supposed to take off, but the men can take their ties off, if you like, or roll up your sleeves, or whatever.

This is the third meeting we've had on Sudan. I'm sure the meetings will probably be going on until next year, as a matter of fact. We hope to be visiting Sudan in November. We've had one session with some of the government people, and Lois Wilson and John Harker have spoken to us.

We'll start with Bashir, if you'd like to go ahead.

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum (Alternatives Canada): Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

This is a brief summary of what Alternatives is doing in Sudan, in northern Sudan in particular. I'm not going to read all this paper, which is about five pages in length, but just quickly summarize the content.

Sudan is one of the poorest countries in Africa, with an average per capita income estimated to be $290 U.S. in 1998. The low per capita income is also consistent with its poor social indicators.

One in ten children die before they reach five years of age, and it is nearer one in five in the south. Only about one in three children go to school in Sudan. More than two million people have died since 1983 because of the war, and more than four million people have been displaced.

According to official figures, economic growth had reached 6% in 1998 and 1999, and it was expected to accelerate to 6.5% in 2000. However, no detailed breakdown by production or consumption was offered, leaving the overall assessment open to doubt. Official figures for both 1999 and 2000 seem overly optimistic and questionable.

A significant increase in the number of social development agencies is a result of increasing needs due to continuing civil war, economic crises, and political instability. Due to deterioration of social services, violation of human rights, and continuation of civil war, the Sudanese NGOs and civil society organizations have expanded their operations.

The role of Sudanese civil society in the search for peace is obvious. This clearly reflects the involvement of local groups in local peace initiatives. The following experiences are among the most impressive examples of scaled-up, sustainable peace efforts.

The first experience is the Netherlands embassy initiative, which emerged in 1998 in response to different fragmented efforts made by Sudanese women's groups and organizations that started to show interest in and commitment to playing a role in the peace process. The concern of women with peace emerged with the fact that women are the most affected by civil strife and the least and last to be consulted. The initiative included nine groups: five groups in the northern sector and four in the southern sector.

The second experience is the people to people peace process, which is initiated by a new council, the New Sudan Council of Churches. The process holds particular potential to involve more communities and local structures. Reports are that more groups are indeed becoming involved and that there are tremendous results from the work to date.

The third initiative is the Peace Initiatives Seminar, held in Khartoum in June 2001 and supported by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, which was a good example of the increasing role played by civil society organizations in peace-building efforts in the country. The aim of the seminar was to support the peace process by offering internal actors the opportunity to examine some of the policy options and proposals conducive to peace. One of the declarations of the seminar stated that there shall be “no military victory by any of the warring parties, and that even if one party succeeded militarily, that will not bring peace”.

The other initiative and experience is that Alternatives and Sudanese organizations, in collaboration with Oxfam Netherlands, NOVIB, organized a two-day round table on poverty in Khartoum in February of this year. The round table was the first of its kind, which involved different groups of civil society organizations. The main aim was to identify the nature and causes of poverty in Sudan and to discuss the role of civil society organizations in the fight against poverty through the adoption of an alternative framework.

¹ (1540)

Another experience was the National Women's Convention, which was a massive campaign for peace organized in March 2002 in Kampala by the Civil Forum for Peace and supported by the CIDA peace-building unit, involving many other sectors of Sudanese civil societies, such as women's groups, NGOs, media, human rights organizations, and political parties. Over 150 participants attended, representing Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, southern Sudan, eastern Sudan, northern Sudan, and Diaspora and Sudanese refugees. The declaration of the convention stated clearly that women should be endowed, entitled, and empowered to be involved in peace processes as active and full partners.

Another experience is the Abyei reconciliation tribal agreement, which is for pastoralist and sedentary communities in war zone areas. Traditionally, informal agreements have been agreed upon between the different groups of southern Sudan and western Sudan to allow the movement of cattle and to avoid cross-zone attacks.

What has been accomplished by Sudanese NGOs represents efforts to tackle the worst of urban and rural underdevelopment, including issues of war and peace. These projects were able to succeed in situations that were not particularly favorable. The factors that make these local initiatives more successful and sustainable lie in their emphasis on addressing community needs and on the process and outcome.

Unlike in the economic and social sectors, there exists no statistical indicator that can be used as an objective measure of the extent to which human rights are respected or violated. But it is evident that the promotion and the protection of human rights are not only required on ethical grounds, but are also imperative for the economy and peace-building initiatives, and must be dealt with as such.

The most serious human rights violations have been committed in the context of civil war, in the form of displacement, bombardment, abduction, and child soldiers, but the current government has resorted to torture, detention, and other such practices outside this framework. The absence from the new constitution of any mention of equal opportunity for all to the right to work, the right to health, and the right to education is implicitly indicative that these rights are not a focus of concern for the government.

I have some conclusions and recommendations. Civil society organizations in the north and south need to be empowered in order to determine their relationship with the state through truly independent structures and organizations that could check the monopoly of power by the government. Poverty will not be eradicated, and of course peace will not be achieved, unless those at the bottom of society have an effective voice, a space with which to organize, and a role in the political decision-making process.

Despite the many obstacles facing the establishment of a genuine democracy in Sudan, democracy as an option seems to be supported by the majority of Sudanese people. Support for peace by Sudanese civil society organizations is genuine and uncompromising. Lasting peace requires a comprehensive political settlement and not a partial and limited solution. There is a need for agreement on an acceptable formula on the relation between religion and politics based on citizenship and the understanding that the state is a political institution and not a religious one, and that freedom of religion is guaranteed for all.

Alternatives, as a member of the international community, and the local Sudanese partners need to consider how best to use their resources and attract resources from credible donors to achieve the greatest and most lasting benefit, and this must be an ongoing process.

Thank you very much.

¹ (1545)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Kenny.

Mr. Gary Kenny (Researcher/ Policy Advocate for Human Rights - Africa, Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives (KAIROS)): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

We very much appreciate having the opportunity to address you today. This is a very propitious time, I think, for hearings to be taking place because of the recent release of the Danforth report and with the G-8 summit coming up. I think it offers opportunities to make some inroads into what has been a very difficult process around achieving peace in Sudan, and hopefully will offer some opportunities to remove the logjam that has been in place for so long.

We in the churches are confident this committee can make a significant contribution to the process in its reflections on the direction of Canadian policy on Sudan. We wish you well and God-speed.

I won't say very much about what KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives is. We did submit a four-page paper. There was some description in there. We've also brought a longer document that members of the committee could have, if they wish to learn more about us.

My brief at KAIROS is primarily human rights monitoring, research, and advocacy. I'm not going to go into an indepth laying out of the litany of human rights violations in Sudan that are currently happening. I would like to refer you to some excellent sources that I would hope the committee will avail itself of as the hearings proceed.

We do have reports on our own website. I'd also want to refer you to Human Rights Watch. It is an excellent source of reporting on human rights violations, both in government- and non-government-controlled areas in Sudan. They have a website and all their reports are available there. I would very much recommend the site to you.

Also, we have brought copies of the Gagnon/Ryle report. I believe you also had copies earlier or perhaps late last year. We would regard this as effectively the standard of truly objective, independent, international human rights reporting, particularly around the oil field situation in Sudan.

The Chair: Maybe I should mention that she will be here next week.

Mr. Gary Kenny: Yes. Georgette Gagnon is scheduled to appear before you next week. It is very good news.

This is the only report that contains an ethno-graphic analysis of habitation patterns in the Western Upper Nile, where the oil fields are present. It's very useful information in terms of counteracting what Talisman says about habitation patterns and the fact that there were never any people there, according to Talisman. I would really recommend it to the committee.

In addition, I have my own report. I was in Sudan in February and interviewed numerous Nuer who had been displaced from one of Talisman's concessions on January 27 in an attack on their village of Mankien.

Also, you may be aware of the most recent report for the European campaign on oil in Sudan. It is also a very good report on the current fighting in the Western Upper Nile, oil-field-related fighting, and the various human rights violations that are occurring as a result.

I also want to briefly say, on human rights, as I mentioned, some of the worst fighting in the war to date is occurring in the oil fields region of the Western Upper Nile. There's a massive military buildup. The fighting has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and the killing and wounding of many.

Also, because the Government of Sudan has banned humanitarian access to most airstrips in the region--I believe the number is 45--severing food aid and medical links effectively, the UN estimates there are currently about 1.7 million people facing starvation. This means tens of thousands could die in the next few months if something doesn't change and they don't get assistance. It is a very serious problem. It's starting to look like the famine that occurred in Bahr Al-Ghazal in 1998 that killed an estimated 100,000 people.

I don't know how this committee works in terms of whether you have to wait until all your hearings are finished and your report is in. If there is an opportunity for you to send a letter to the Prime Minister now, in the lead-up to the G-8 on this issue, I think it would be very helpful.

The Chair: Svend can hardly wait.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby--Douglas, NDP): Right on.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I want to make the point that forced displacement is also continuing in the oil field concessions away from the fighting. This was the focus of my report from February.

Many of you will have heard of the rather infamous incident of the attack of Bieh. There was a UN food distribution operation unfolding, and many people were killed by a Government of Sudan helicopter gunships attack.

On May 27, a similar attack occurred in the area of a town called Rier, in the Western Upper Nile. It was a similar situation. Food aid operations were happening, and the area was bombed and strafed by helicopter gunships.

There are similarities, but there is one very distinctive difference that I want to point out. Unlike Bieh, Rier is in Talisman's Kaikang Block 4 concession. I think it's a very significant point that I hope this committee will hold on to.

¹ (1550)

I want to make a point about the peace process and IGAD in particular. The objective of a just and durable peace in Sudan must be the centrepiece of Canada's Sudan policy--with an emphasis on “just”.

There are several root causes of the conflict that must be squarely addressed and resolved if a foundation for peace is to be established. Some of them are: the historical underdevelopment of the south and areas of the north by the colonial administration and successive post-independence governments; a long history of racial, cultural, and religious discrimination against southern Sudanese; and control and exploitation by the north of resources in the south, with little if any benefit accruing to the people of the south.

The emphasis is on durable peace, because a peace that does not take into account the fundamental and long-standing grievances and whose foundation is weak is not well-rooted and will not last. It will quickly deteriorate, causing not only more conflict in Sudan but additional regional instability as well. That's very significant.

The only way a just and durable peace can be achieved is through a robust, unitary, and comprehensive peace process. We believe the potential for such a peace process exists with the IGAD peace process for Sudan, in its framework declaration of principles--a process and set of principles we are very pleased Canada continues to support.

As we all know, however, the fortunes of IGAD have flagged for some time, and it is in urgent need of invigoration. It needs new life injected into it. To be truly robust and therefore more likely to succeed, the IGAD process should have several distinguishing features. There are five of them I have identified.

One is that IGAD member countries must be intensely focused on the task at hand. Over the last couple of years, intra- and inter-state conflicts amongst the IGAD member states and other factors have distracted them from that focus. That must be corrected.

Two, Kenya in particular, as the chair, must provide assertive and sustained leadership. At times it has appeared to lean, causing some drift. This has not been helpful in maintaining the member states' focus on the task at hand.

Three, non-IGAD states that have historical or other ties with Sudan and particular leverage internationally must play a more assertive role. Certainly the U.K. and the U.S. have been mentioned in this regard, and we think that's worthy of more study.

Four, Sudanese civil society must have systematic input into the peace process. I'll come back to that.

Five, a balanced package of incentives and strong pressures--carrots and sticks--must be kept in play to ensure that the main parties to the conflict take the process seriously and cannot walk away from it easily, as they have so many times in the past--in particular the Government of Sudan.

I want to focus on the role of civil society and the need for carrots and sticks. The IGAD process cannot be left to the main parties in IGAD member states. They have too many vested interests and are too easily distracted from the task with which they have been entrusted. Civil society should also have some formal role or access to the committee. I'm not suggesting they should be around the table, but they must have some systematic access to the discussions.

Experience has shown that civil society is a reservoir of energy and ideas to create peace. It is also a source of pressure from the bottom up, on the main parties, to take peace more seriously.

I hope you're familiar with the grassroots people to people peace-building process that has been facilitated by the new Sudan Council of Churches. This process has shown remarkable results in reconciling the divisions amongst ethnic groups in the south. There have been several phases completed and there are more to come. It is an excellent example of how, when you present the conditions and resources for people at the grassroots level to actually do their own peace building, it can have a trickle-up effect and actually galvanize the leadership at the upper echelons who take peace more seriously.

This has very much happened with the people to people process, as witnessed perhaps most dramatically by the coming together of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudan People's Democratic Front in January.

We urge this committee to recommend that Canada work through the IGAD partners forum, and any other useful channels, to ensure that Sudanese civil society has that kind of regular access to the IGAD process and that their views and ideas on the issue of peace are heard and taken seriously.

On the issue of carrots and sticks, currently it seems there are more carrots in play than sticks, especially incentives and favours to the Government of Sudan, which has a long record of making promises in exchange for concessions and then reneging on those promises. We've lost count of how many times that has happened. So the pressures and sticks are missing.

One of those pressures has to be oil. Here we go with the oil theme.

¹ (1555)

In our view, oil is not the main cause of the war. We would state that very categorically. It is clearly now at the centre of military activity, the cause of massive human rights violations, and there is extensive documentation on this fact of an authoritative nature. It is also a source of human insecurity not only in Sudan but also for the entire region.

It has also taken the minds of both the Government of Sudan and the SPLA completely away from any thoughts of peace. They are focused mainly only on war. The GOS wants to maintain and expand its military advantage. The SPLM wants to do the same, perhaps wanting to defend itself against the GOS, which it perceives as using oil revenues to re-arm and enhance its military capacity.

So it is inconceivable that there can be peace as long as the oil is flowing or oil revenues are accruing to the GOS, at least certainly not a just and durable peace that I think is the objective of everybody around this table.

The political will has to be found internationally to, at the very least, constrain oil production in Sudan to create the pressure needed for the IGAD peace process to have a chance. As a country of citizenship of an oil company that very much remains at the centre of oil production and development in Sudan, Canada simply has to take the Talisman bull by the horns. We have to at least be seen to be moving in the direction of imposing constraints on Talisman, and there are three ways we can think of doing this.

A rather simple one is for the Government of Canada to state publicly to Talisman Energy that its operations in Sudan pose risks to more than just Canadian oil personnel working there, to innocent civilians in the oil concession areas. There has yet been any kind of a statement of this nature made by the Government of Canada to Talisman.

In fact, Canada is doing the opposite. It is, according to Sudanese TV, encouraging Talisman to continue operating in Sudan.

I want to read to you a recent report that was broadcast on Sudanese television on the occasion of a Hemisphere International meeting, referring to the successes scored by the Canadian investments in the field of oil and communication in Sudan. It says that Talisman's president and CEO, James Buckee, who “expressed his satisfaction with the investment climate in Sudan, affirmed that the Canadian government encourages all Canadian companies and foundations to involve [themselves] in investment projects” in Sudan.

You can take that with a grain of salt, if you wish, but at least it indicates that the Sudanese government is saying things that I think have been already denied around this table by the Department of Foreign Affairs and other people who have testified. That needs further investigation, in my view.

Secondly, I think this committee hopefully could recommend to the Department of Foreign Affairs to perhaps form a task group with other relevant ministries, the Department of Finance, the Department of Industry, the Department of International Trade, to explore ways that Canadian corporate-sponsored, militarized commerce can be brought under control once and for all. I know it's not an easy task, but we believe with the requisite political will it can be done.

And thirdly, we would hope this committee would recommend to the government that it would begin a process of working internationally to support research that is currently under way through a human rights centre in Geneva. This would apply international human rights standards to non-state actors such as commercial organizations like Talisman so that a regime of international law can be put in place. This is going to take years. It would effectively, on a mandatory basis, prevent corporations from becoming involved in zones of conflict and complicit in facilitating that conflict and also in massive human rights abuses.

In closing, in relation to the upcoming G-8 meetings and their focus on Africa, I think this provides a significant opportunity for Canada as host to take leadership to galvanize support amongst G-8 leaders both for a reinvigorated IGAD and for a plan to convert oil development into a pressure point, an incentive for peace, that it's capable of being.

The success of the NEPAD initiative is dependent on regional peace and security in Africa, on democratic development and respect for human rights. It cannot succeed if conflicts in countries like Sudan are allowed to continue and if just resolutions can't be found for those conflicts.

So we hope the committee can urge Prime Minister Chrétien to provide vigorous leadership at the G-8 summit on this issue. Again, my hope would be that perhaps some kind of letter could be forthcoming from this committee to the Prime Minister for that purpose.

Thank you very much.

º (1600)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Kenny.

Do you want to speak now before we take questions?

Mr. Manock Lual (Regional Partnership Coordinator/Africa, KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives): Sure I want to speak, because what I will say complements what Gary has said.

The Chair: Go ahead. I'm sorry.

Mr. Manock Lual: I'm also with KAIROS, and we came together as a KAIROS group. Actually, we divided up our work, and I am supposed to be speaking on the right to self-determination. So greetings, Madame Chair, honourable members, and guests in the room.

What I have to say about self-determination, actually, I would have said anyway, independently, but it's even more compelling now that I have heard and read people saying that what self-determination means--for example, in the Danforth report--is unrealistic, and southerners should be convinced to go for what they call “protection of human rights and religious freedoms”. Also, I have heard some people from this room who testified before us who dismiss it as being “no fly” or unrealistic. I think they are wrong.

First, I want to talk about what self-determination is. I don't want to be patronizing; I just want to remind you, members, that the right of self-determination is a universal human right that has been enshrined in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. What the UN declaration means is that the right of self-determination is a right that is given to a people to determine their own destiny, and therefore, in this case, it should not be different from what the southern Sudanese people want. In other words, southern Sudanese people should be given a right to have a say in their future and they should have a decision about whatever political constraints may be put on it.

The second point I want to make is that the right to self-determination is one of the principles in the IGAD DOP--the declaration of principles--whereby the IGAD partners, who analysed the problem in Sudan and put out a paper and wrote or drew up the seven principles that are now famously known as the DOP, said that in the event that the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA--the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement--fail to reach an agreement on separation of religion from state and on decentralization of the country, among other matters, then the people of southern Sudan should be given a right to choose whether they should remain in Sudan or become independent, in an internationally supervised referendum that's going to be held and will give them a right to exercise the freedom to choose whether they want to be in Sudan or be an independent country.

Therefore, if we say, as has been the case also with Danforth's report and others, that IGAD is the way to go, then you don't pick and choose from what IGAD said. The declaration of principles includes self-determination as one of the things that should be done, albeit as a last resort in case of lack of agreement on secularization of the country and decentralization of the country, among other things.

Therefore, I find it difficult to understand people saying that it is unrealistic and that it's no-fly. Who has the right to say it's not realistic, and who has the right to say it doesn't fly? It is a democratic right that is sanctioned by the United Nations and by the regional partners; therefore, we should not go around and start defining it to mean guarantee of freedoms, and religious freedoms, and human rights, and whatever--or to mean “good governance”, as I have heard some people say.

We have nothing against--the southern Sudanese have nothing against good governance.... I must apologize here; I have to also say that I happen to be a southern Sudanese. I'm speaking for KAIROS, but you will find that some positions I'm making will be personal. Excuse me for that.

It's a democratic right that is given to every people to determine their future. I think it's arrogant, and it's doing a disservice to the peace process, when you say, let's take out self-determination and let's deal with IGAD as a basis for peace. There will be no peace--that is, just in Sudan--if the people of southern Sudan are not given the right to choose whether they want to remain in a united Sudan or whether they want to declare an independent state in an internationally supervised referendum.

º (1605)

The reasons for this are, first, southern and northern Sudan were ruled as two entities from 1898 to 1947. People from northern Sudan needed passports to go to southern Sudan before 1947. All of a sudden, because of the pressure of Egypt--and I'll talk about Egypt a little bit later--the British, who ruled the Sudan.... I've heard some people say that Canada has nothing in common with Sudan, but Sudan was a British colony, and I must say there are still people in Sudan who have high regard and respect for what the British say, because they were seen as principled, albeit colonialists--unlike the experience the people in southern Sudan have had with our northern brothers.

Since 1947, when the British changed their mind and decided to make southern and northern Sudan one country, there has been a series of broken promises. In 1947 they said, okay, you become part. The representative from the south on the first day--it was a two-day conference--refused to be part of Sudan. But the British, under pressure from Egypt, made up their minds to lump the two parts together. On the second day, the representatives of the south reluctantly agreed to be part of Sudan on the promise that they would be treated fairly in an independent Sudan.

What happened after that, nine years later, when the British were vacating, is that there were 800 civil service seats that had to be filled with Sudanese, and 796 of them went to the north. The south got only four of these seats. So you can see their promise of fairness was broken right there.

Just shortly before 1956, when the Sudanese Parliament was getting ready to declare the independence of Sudan from Britain, the south had to go along. They were reluctant, but they were promised that by the time independence came, if they went with it, there would be a federal constitution to rule the country. They said, okay, let's go, let's see what will happen.

Immediately on January 1, 1956, independence was declared, and they went back on the promise. The Government of Sudan, or the elite who were ruling in Sudan, went back on the promise. So what they did, in 1958, because the demands from southern Sudan were loud and clear and really becoming a nuisance to the elite in northern Sudan, was decide to hand over the power to the military in order to silence the demands for a federal constitution in the country.

When the military came in on November 17, 1958, under General Abud, the first military ruler of Sudan, repression started. Some of the politicians who were in Parliament and who did not run away were imprisoned. Student activists and civil servant activists who were agitating for a federal constitution were arrested. Some of them had to flee.

That was the beginning of the first civil war, and it lasted until 1972. In 1972 there was an agreement that was arrived at by southern Sudanese politicians and the President of Sudan at that time, General Nimeri, who was very powerful. The agreement gave the south self-governing status with a government and a parliament.

But in 1983, the very president who brought about that agreement decided to throw it out the window, dissolve the south, and divide it into three. People asked him why he did that. This was a political agreement that was enshrined in the constitution of the country. He said, “The agreement is not a Bible and it's not a Koran. I can violate it”.

So that's another reason I think the south should be given the right to decide: the northern elite don't keep their promises.

That was the beginning of the SPLA war, which started in 1983, exactly after Nimeri tore up the agreement and threw it out the window.

What it has done to the south is cost us...two and a half million people died as a result of the civil war, as a result of the violation of agreements and betrayal by the northern elite. It's been costly.

º (1610)

I find--and I would be supported by the facts--that the elite in northern Sudan will say one thing and do another. The present government agreed not more than two months ago not to attack civilians. Only last week the same thing happened, as was referred to by Gary. If they can fool even the United States, what are the weak southern Sudanese going to do if they agree to unite with this government? They will end up being killed again, agreements will be broken, and, as a result, war will start.

Because it is a democratic human right and one of the principles of IGAD, nobody should try to define it to mean something other than what is in the human rights declaration and the principles of IGAD, which are very clear. I would say that as Canada supports IGAD, Canada must take IGAD with its principles intact. Don't even attempt to try to define what self-determination means. It is already defined. There's no reason to look for words to say it's this or that. Let's go by what it says. The IGAD principles are clear. They say it's going to be the last resort if the parties to the war don't agree on the contentious issues. Therefore, the people of southern Sudan must be given the right to determine their future. It says to vote between being in a united Sudan or an independent Sudan.

I brought along a statement by the churches of southern Sudan, which speaks about self-determination.

One other point I want to make is that the Sudanese government agrees to self-determination, and it is in the constitution as one of the rights that the people of southern Sudan can exercise. I haven't read the constitution so I don't know what it says. They have agreed that it is something the southern Sudanese people have a right to, and nobody should have the right to say that should not be given to them.

It is true that all political parties within Sudan, starting with the Umma Party of former Prime Minister Sadiq Almahadi in Chukudum, which is the largest party, agreed with the SPLM that the southern Sudanese should have the right to self-determination.

The Asmera agreement between the NDA, the National Democratic Alliance, and the SPLA also has a provision that when the government that is now ruling in Sudan goes, unity will be tried. If it fails, then the people of southern Sudan should be given the right to exercise self-determination.

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The Chair: Perhaps you can wrap this up so that Kathy can speak.

Mr. Manock Lual: Sure I will. I'm almost there.

I'm guilty of guessing here, but it seems that people are trying to appease Egypt. Egypt is a colonial power. Egypt ruled Sudan together with Britain as a colonial power, and it has always wanted to absorb the Sudan, even at independence. But they failed, because there was opposition to that. As a result, they opted to say that Sudan must remain one. People say, let's expand IGAD. IGAD cannot be expanded to include the Egyptian initiative because it is contradictory to the IGAD process. You cannot merge them without sacrificing the self-determination, because they don't include it.

There were times when Egyptian soldiers fought alongside the Government of Sudan against the south, and being a party to the war, they cannot be neutral to broker a peace. So I don't think there is a reason to appease them. These people are colonialists. They have a design on Sudan, and whatever that design is, it has been detrimental to the interests of the south and has killed 2.5 million people. My point has been stressed.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Now we'll hear from Kathy Vandergrift.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift (Senior Policy Adviser, World Vision Canada): Thank you.

Having worked in Sudan for more than 20 years, World Vision appreciates this opportunity to contribute to this committee's study. I mention the number of years to dispel the perception--which I heard around the meetings of the last few weeks--that NGOs are only interested in this because of the oil issue. Many of us were engaged in Sudan long before the oil issue arose.

I would encourage this committee to make a very careful study of the human rights dimension. Not only is the international context right, but Canada is also promoting the report called, The Responsibility to Protect. I would suggest to you that Sudan is an ideal case study to advance the principles of that report, which Canada endorsed. So I would recommend you frame your report in that context as well.

Human security and human rights should be viewed as the top priority for Canadian policy. In the last few weeks, I heard statements to the effect that the conflict creates human rights abuses, and if we solve the conflict, then the human rights abuses will disappear. Sudan is one case where the human rights abuses are contributing to the conflict. Solving them has to be part of creating the peace. It's not just a residue.

So I would like to speak to human rights and the peace process, human rights and development, and highlight the issue of the LRA and the children. I won't go through all of what I've submitted in the written document.

World Vision has advocated support for the declaration of principles and the IGAD peace process from the very beginning. Again, I highlight this to remind you that NGOs are not single-focused, as has been stated here. We are looking at all aspects of the issue. We have also given active support to the people to people process.

As you've already heard, IGAD has derailed. In this context, violations of human rights, and accusations about violations of human rights, have become weapons in the war. Instead of human rights and humanitarian law setting limits to this conflict, a culture of impunity has developed. I think that's an important issue for this committee to come to grips with.

I will mention some specific dimensions. First of all, I would like to highlight the urgency of the situation, as Gary has also said. I distributed to you a press release, from May 23, by nine humanitarian agencies operating out of Nairobi. I have with me the text of a letter they are sending to the Secretary General of the United Nations today, asking for urgent attention--even before the G-8. The situation is reaching a crisis state because we're at the point of planting. If people don't plant now, then we're dealing with long-term hunger. The most recent surveys already show a 20% malnutrition rate among children; 15% is a crisis. We're at the beginning of the hunger cycle.

So they are asking the United Nations to intervene immediately. Mr. Vraalsen, the special representative of the Secretary General, is trying to negotiate in Khartoum. I would suggest Canada come out very strongly, right now, at the highest level, to deal with the issue of access to humanitarian assistance.

Secondly, the protection of civilians from arbitrary bombing attacks has been discussed by a number of people. So I won't go through it. But I will highlight one dimension, based on listening to the discussions in recent weeks. It is with regard to the second point that the nine NGOs make in the letter they are filing with the Secretary General: that is, to ensure immediate deployment of the verification mission. The department spoke to you about the fact that the agreement to protect civilians will be verified, but they didn't say how long it's going to take to get that in place. We have been advised it may be up to a year. This is totally unsatisfactory, because both sides are using the interim for military advantage.

The NGOs out of Nairobi are advocating that there be an immediate deployment of at least a team that can investigate allegations of abuses. The fact that World Vision was forced out of an area about a week and a half ago, which was relatively safe up until then, demonstrates the urgency of this. By the time we get back in, we will be facing serious malnutrition of the children. It's planting time. If they don't plant now, we're into long-term problems.

Again, I highlight the importance of immediate verification of this agreement to stop bombing civilians. It can't wait for a year.

As for civilian participation in the peace process, this committee has heard about proposals for wealth and power sharing as part of the peace process. The people who are most affected by these haven't heard about them yet.

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I would suggest to you that Canada should focus on the links between the many civil society peace initiatives that are out there and the official process. You cannot impose a solution. The people most affected need to know what those proposals are, and I would submit there are creative ways to create the opportunities for them to discuss them as well.

Human rights and development: World Vision's main business in Sudan was agriculture, food security. It is sad because Sudan could export food under the right conditions, and we would like to get back to that kind of development. Sustainable development requires that all actors, including foreign investors, respect and promote the human rights of the people directly affected by their projects. Oil development, under the right conditions, could make a significant contribution to Sudan. It's the conditions, not the oil development itself, that have been our focus of concern, including early, direct engagement with Talisman Energy to discuss ways to prevent their project from contributing to the conflict.

I think this committee should know two things about those discussions. First is the fact that Talisman left the discussions as soon as it became clear that the Government of Canada was not going to do anything about the Harker report. I think that demonstrates the importance of having a policy framework in place that has a range of options for the government to use, not relying on doing nothing or total sanctions.

The second thing I would highlight is that the issues the NGOs put on the table in those discussions two years ago are now acknowledged by Talisman itself in this year's corporate social responsibility report. They were denied then, but they're now acknowledged, two years later. We've lost that time, and we've lost thousands of lives in the meantime.

I'll highlight two. Forced displacement has been talked about a lot, so I won't speak about that one. A second one is the method of securing the oil operations. We have presented this government with documented evidence that the Government of Sudan is recruiting underage youth from south Sudan and forcing them to guard the oil field and shoot at their own people. Nothing has been done with that report, which we gave to the government some time ago.

Canada claims to be leading on children and armed conflict, and I happen to lead the group of NGOs that appreciates Canada's leadership. Security Council resolution 1379 on children and armed conflict, adopted November 20, 2001, urges member states to take action to discourage corporate actors under their jurisdiction from maintaining commercial relations with parties to armed conflict who abuse children's rights. Canada has not done anything to implement this resolution. I would draw to your attention that Canada acted very quickly to implement resolutions on terrorism. I think we should implement this resolution with the same urgency, because the lives of children are at stake.

I would also draw to your attention the recent poll that documents that 75% of Canadians want the government to set standards for corporate social responsibility and hold companies accountable, even if other countries do not do that.

Finally, I would like to speak just briefly to the question of the rights of children held captive by the Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan. We're drawing this to the committee's attention because of its seriousness and because it demonstrates how ignoring human rights violations in fact contributes to more armed conflict, with loss of even more lives and civilian security.

Over the last decade, more than 12,000 children have been abducted from northern Uganda, taken into south Sudan, and forced to commit atrocities as part of the Lord's Resistance Army, which was supported and used by the Government of Sudan in its military campaigns against the SPLA. As a result of these threats, over 400,000 people in northern Uganda have been forced to live for years in woefully inadequate protective camps. We ourselves have assisted 5,000 children who escaped, but there are at least 5,000 unaccounted for.

We have been raising this issue for years, but little has been done by authorities with the power to take action. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy brokered an agreement at the Winnipeg conference that made the headlines in the Globe and Mail, but implementation of that agreement was sabotaged by delay and political foot-dragging, and the Canadian government would not use public reporting to hold the Government of Sudan accountable.

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I think a lesson to be learned is the importance of public exposure and public accountability on matters of human rights. I would also highlight on this question of access that even due to the fact that the nine NGOs have raised this question, the Government of Sudan is now allowing a few more flights. So public pressure does help.

Now a military solution is being imposed. The Government of Uganda has been allowed into the country by the Government of Sudan to dismantle these camps, but meanwhile the LRA have fled into the hills, taking the children with them.

When the Ugandan army entered the camps, by the way, they found huge amounts of weapons, which document the extent to which the Government of Sudan was supporting this operation and lead to serious questions also about their support to actually resolve the situation. This is certainly something this committee might want to explore further.

I highlight this situation because now they are creating instability in another area of south Sudan and have killed over 600 south Sudanese people. The regional and humanitarian impact of this situation would justify it becoming a legitimate matter of international peace and security, but its low strategic priority makes it one of Africa's forgotten wars.

As well as a matter or urgency, this situation is a good example of how the failure of the international community to take serious action to stop violations of the security and rights of children contributes to new conflict and the culture of immunity. I would suggest that Canada needs to publicly state that the Winnipeg agreement was broken and take a leadership role in forming an international mission to determine what has happened to those children during the military assault. I can tell you not one child has returned home, although supposedly this was supposed to release the children.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Thank you to all of you for coming today and taking the time to make us better informed.

We'll make it five minutes for each person, and then come back. The five minutes includes their question and your answers, so please try to make your answers very concise. They might have a second question or a third question and we have to go on to somebody else after five minutes, so please make your answers quite concise.

Mr. Vellacott.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott (Saskatoon—Wanuskewin, Canadian Alliance): I'd like Kathy and Gary to respond to my first question, and I have another question for which I would like to get a response from the other witnesses here today.

Gary, in your report to us you note that the Canadian churches commend Foreign Affairs and CIDA for establishing a joint policy committee to ensure coherence in Canada's Sudan policy, and you seem encouraging of that. But how confident should we be, Gary--and, Kathy, please respond as well--that the perspective of Foreign Affairs won't swallow up that of CIDA?

In the past, Foreign Affairs has, on occasion, expressed concern only for the safety of Talisman employees--it was stated in the House by Minister Manley at the time--clearly putting the human security of the southern Sudanese on the back burner. So the primary concern, at least from some of the comments that were made, seemed to be that Talisman employees' safety was the big priority.

So my question is simply, will CIDA be drowned out by Foreign Affairs or will it be used to give the appearance of a “balanced” approach here?

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The Chair: Mr. Kenny.

Mr. Gary Kenny: It's a very good question. I think probably Kathy is better placed to answer it.

We had a meeting of the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group here in Ottawa. I think it was the second last one we had, and this was when I think it was first announced that CIDA and Foreign Affairs had formed this joint committee and they had outlined the broad objectives of it. I think we felt rather heartened and encouraged by its existence and hoped that it would lead to the establishment at long last of an integrated and coherent policy between the two departments, because as NGOs we have certainly been getting signals of some--how can I say it diplomatically--discord and some disconnectedness on a number of issues.

So there were fairly strong pledges made at that meeting by the CIDA and Foreign Affairs folks present, which we found quite buoying. I have to confess, I'm really not sure how much progress has been made since then. I've talked to a couple of the departmental staff about that, but I have to say that my understanding of whether much progress has been made is rather vague. There may have been delays experienced by one or other departments that were legitimate, but since Kathy is in Ottawa and I'm in Toronto, she's able to keep a little bit closer in touch with those, so I'll call on her to answer.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Do you think that will be swallowed up by the Foreign Affairs perspective, or maybe even International Trade, in relation to CIDA?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: We have been given indications they will be presenting some kind of draft coherent policy. We have not yet seen that. I think there's merit in both working together.

But I think you've put your finger on a key question for this committee to explore. I made a statement in the paper that I think this committee should consider. Canadian policy should not give the right to secure an oil field priority over the security rights of the Sudanese people.

In our discussions, particularly with Foreign Affairs, that is not clear. The committee should perhaps bring Foreign Affairs back to explore the question of the limits of the right to defend an oil field, and how it relates to the rights of the Sudanese people. If that shapes foreign policy, then we could have a coherent policy by both agencies.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Maybe it has been cleared up, and public comments that have been the concern of the Talisman employees have kind of trumped things here and been the driving thing.

I want to get to my next question because I know time passes quickly in five-minute rounds here. I would be interested in Manock responding directly on this one. How does Canada's position on Talisman and oil hurt our credibility as a nation supposedly encouraging the peace process? How are we perceived as a nation in southern Sudan?

Mr. Manock Lual: I'll give you my impression of the southern Sudanese. Canada is suffering as a result of Talisman. The reputation Canada has built over its long history of supporting human rights and arguing for fairness and justice in the world is suffering at this time. The impression amongst the southern Sudanese is not positive.

I will let Gary finish that because he has some experience. He has been to the field.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I want to just briefly tell you a story. Last fall, there was a youth delegation of the United Church of Canada, 12 people, who were led on a visit to refugee camps and displaced persons camps of Sudanese in northern Kenya and southern Sudan respectively.

I'm not sure whether it was in the refugee camp in northern Kenya or the internally displaced persons camps in southern Sudan, but they encountered a large group of southern Sudanese youth, many of whom had been displaced from the oil fields. These youths were so angry that they were Canadians, because they associated Canada with Talisman, that the delegation felt worried for their physical safety and had to withdraw. That's the first time I've ever encountered anything like that.

I have encountered that personally, but I go to Sudan roughly twice a year. Each time, over the last couple of years, I've been asked increasingly pointed questions that have left me feeling rather uncomfortable, especially in my last trip. I've had to do a lot of explaining that this is the way it is and here's what the NGOs are trying to do.

It's washing less and less with people. As they learn more about this issue, they become more disgusted, frankly, and deeply disappointed with Canada, who they've always held up as a defender of human rights internationally.

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The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): I would like to tell you that today, because I am a diabetic, I am not feeling very well; I will therefore probably skip my turn. I wanted to be here today to show my interest and to assure you that I will read the documents that you have tabled over the next few days. People are aware that I am diabetic, and today, I am not in my usual state. I have taken some medication and it has made me drowsy. Rather than ask poor questions, I prefer to skip my turn.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much. We will make sure you get all the documents.

Ms. Jennings.

[Translation]

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

[English]

Thank you very much for your presentations. I found them very informative. Some of the recommendations are really interesting, and something this committee should look at more closely.

Mr. Kenny, you wrote an article that was published by the Globe and Mail May 1, 2002. I have the French version, but in the second-to-last paragraph, you say the Canadian government is profiting from Talisman's activities. One way is through the taxes that are paid, which I think we all knew about, but you also mention that the Canada Pension Plan holds more than $50 million in Talisman stock.

Mr. Gary Kenny: That's true.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: I'm not questioning it; I'm just speechless.

Mr. Svend Robinson: It's been in the public.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: That's fine, but we're inundated with so much information here on the Hill that it's easy, even when someone has a particular interest in a particular subject, for certain facts to get by us.

So I'm even more pleased you're here before us, because it brought this article and this particular fact to my attention.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I would just say in response, in the NGO community our research capacity is limited. I think there's probably a lot more of this kind of certainly scintillating, if not incriminating, evidence that we could probably dig up if we had the resources.

I've also gotten wind of some other kinds of ways in which Talisman is benefiting in Canada, which needs more research.

But you're quite right, and we've found in our church constituencies across Canada that this has really struck a chord. We're getting many letters--and I hope letters are going to MPs and meetings of MPs--in which people are very disturbed about these issues.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Well, I'm appreciative that this has come to my attention.

There are a couple of issues that I want to explore with you. I'll find these very quickly, because I know we only have five minutes and I've probably used up a minute of my time--okay, two and a half minutes.

One is some of the initiatives that the Canadian government, through its foreign policy, could in fact undertake, some of which are not short term--for instance, the issue of the role the private sector has to play in areas where there's a civil war going on and substantiated human rights abuses, because theoretically, hypothetically, you could have a civil war but there are no human rights...where both sides respect the international covenants and treaties--well, if we pull the elastic really taut, really hard.

One is the issue of some kind of international mechanism. I'd like all parties here to discuss that a little bit more, if you have enough time. If you don't, maybe you can answer it with someone else's time after they've asked you a question.

The Chair: We have only three people here, so it won't take long.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Okay.

The Chair: Gary, do you want to start?

Mr. Gary Kenny: Excuse me, this is the international mechanism that I referred to earlier?

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Ms. Marlene Jennings: Yes.

Mr. Gary Kenny: Well, there is currently a body of research that has been completed in Geneva. I think it's called the International Council on Human Rights Policy.

Basically it's recognizing the fact that these kinds of militarized commerce issues are happening, that corporations around the world are more and more getting involved, particularly in the extractive sector in developing countries, where governments have become weak in terms of their sovereignty. They're desperate for foreign direct investment. They lower their regulations, and it makes it much easier for these foreign companies to come in en masse. I think Talisman, to some extent, fits that bill.

This research is basically designed to lay out a number of options as to how the international community could develop an international regime of law that would be mandatory in nature, that would regulate and penalize, if necessary, corporations that were engaged in what we generally term as “militarized commerce”.

It's many years away from actually reaching fruition. When you're working through the UN system in particular, which is what this body of research is aimed at, it takes a long time.

I think the researchers are now looking at NGOs like us to begin to put our shoulders behind some of this work and give it some life, but it's a very exciting and promising area of work. It will take some time to achieve, but I think it's very worthwhile, and I hope this committee will strongly recommend to the Government of Canada that it too needs to find a way to support this kind of legislation.

The Chair: Kathy.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: I would just add that there are a number of initiatives. The U.K. is looking at some of them. There is research being done by an NGO in Norway that has helped define some of the definitions more closely. You might want to look at it. It's FAFO, for short. I don't know what the long name is. I'll get it to you. And of course the move with the diamonds sets a bit of a precedent. So we're moving forward.

The other thing I would highlight--and that's why I named it--is resolution 1379. Here you have it in a UN Security Council resolution, and many of us are going to start looking at how to implement that. It's there; it's the first recognition at that level, and we will keep working at that.

There are various options worth pursuing.

The Chair: Thank you. We'll come back to that question if anybody else wants to make a comment.

Svend.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I will try to be brief and just ask questions in a couple of areas.

First of all, I want to thank the witnesses for their ongoing commitment and dedication to the people of Sudan and say that, as I hope they're aware, certainly I and my federal New Democrat colleagues strongly support the recommendations you have made over the years to the government.

I have questions in two areas. One is on the issue of Talisman. Obviously this one is particularly salient for us because of the Canadian connection and the extent to which, for many Sudanese, this is the face of Canada in Sudan. It's the only face they know, and it's a face that has led to terror, repression, and death for too many people. That's the face of my country there, and that's why I'm very concerned about this.

I'm concerned about the fact that the Canada Pension Plan continues to hold shares, and frankly, I'm concerned about the fact that the Government of Canada refuses to take the legislative steps that are necessary to respond to what they suggest is a vacuum in the law. They say they don't have the power to act under the existing Special Economic Measures Act. Of course, the response to that, as many of you have stated over and over again--Gary and Kathy and others--is that if you don't have the power under the existing legislation, you're in government, you have a majority, do something about it. Change the law to give you the power to do that. Right?

So I want to just ask if you could perhaps elaborate a little bit. If you were sitting in Ms. Jennings' position as a parliamentary secretary--a powerful parliamentary secretary--or as a cabinet minister, what would you do?

You've talked about some options, but what would you do to deal with the Talisman issue? Would you say to Talisman--as I would--get out of Sudan?

My second question is whether, if I could ask, Madam Chair, the witnesses could communicate directly with our researcher with respect to the suggestion that there be a letter--or an interim report--from this committee on the urgent humanitarian issues that they've addressed. I can't speak for the committee, but I think if they were to communicate with our researcher and we asked our researcher to draft up a letter based on the concerns they've raised and circulate that as soon as possible in the context of the upcoming G-8 meetings and so on, we could get agreement around the table to support sending that.

The Chair: I was going to suggest we all think about it during the weekend and at the beginning of our next meeting maybe take a few minutes to do it. We'll have a draft.

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Mr. Svend Robinson: If we had a draft to work with, that would be helpful.

So that's a suggestion, but I wonder if you could respond specifically on the issue of what we should do about it.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: Obviously, developing legislation and doing it carefully does take a bit of time, so we have been advocating that the government take that first step and start that process. In the meantime, I think there is merit in a very clear statement by the government. We haven't seen that, and it's easy to do.

One of the reasons it's important is that there have been three ministers in a row, starting with Axworthy, then Manley and Graham, and senior officials who have said to us that they think it's a good thing the NGOs are raising the issues directly with Talisman, because it helps to raise awareness about the importance of corporate social responsibility. But when we go into the meetings with Talisman, they diffuse our criticism by saying the federal government likes what they're doing.

Until that is clear and we can table something very clearly, there is confusion for the investors and the Canadian public on that point.

Mr. Svend Robinson: We tried to pin them down when they appeared before the committee, as you probably know.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: So a clear statement of policy would go some way to setting some other things in motion in this country.

Then, I think, we need to start the work of developing legislation. It could be a committee of Parliament that looks at it. It is not going to be the easiest legislation, but start the process. And once you send that signal out there, you're going to see behaviour improve.

I'd just remind you, they walked the minute the government said they weren't going to do anything about Harker. That's exactly when they walked away from the table talking with us.

The Chair: Are you finished?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Yes.

The Chair: That has to be some kind of record.

Maurice.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Gary, in your brief to the committee you recommended the subcommittee hear the testimony of some, what you call, non-partisan northern Sudanese Muslims who can offer a sophisticated critical analysis of political Islam in Sudan, and you offered to suggest some qualified candidates.

What would these witnesses say? Can you summarize? It almost seems as if in your offer it assumes you already know something of what they would be saying to us. You've probably had conversations or been in contact somehow with them. If we were to have some of those people here or in some other way have that testimony, what would they be saying to us, some of those northern Sudanese Muslims who have a more sophisticated political analysis of political Islam in Sudan?

Mr. Gary Kenny: My sense is that the National Islamic Front of Sudan is a government of a very particular ilk. The conflict is often seen in a rather conventional way as being between two warring parties, and the human rights abuses they commit seem to be put on a level of moral equivalence. Of course, we would dispute that. I don't think it is a conventional struggle. I think there are idiosyncratic elements on both sides that make it a different kind of struggle than we encounter elsewhere.

On the government side, as I understand it, the current regime is a peculiar mixture of people whose main purpose is just to hold on to raw power. There are others who bring a kind of political-religious orientation to their presence and their work in the government, and all these things form an admixture. It creates a very peculiar kind of dynamic, and this committee needs to understood that and have a real, clear sense of what the core issues are at the base of the conflict before you can really establish a policy base.

On the SPLA side, the SPLA carries the name of liberation in its title, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. It would be nice to think that they were truly concerned about liberating the people of Sudan, but I have some questions about that, partly in terms of the way the organization is led.

More importantly, unlike the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela in South Africa, which we're all quite familiar with and which started as a political organization and later adopted an armed struggle once its political objectives could not be achieved, the SPLA did it in reverse. They started as a military organization and have now--and I would say not very well--tried to sophisticate themselves politically, and they have not done a very good job at it. So they're two very different kinds of organizations.

But my point is, you have the government and you have the SPLA, the two main parties in the conflict, who are of a particular nature that's not well understood by policy-makers. Policy-makers tend to look at the relationship in rather conventional terms, comparing it to other kinds of conflicts.

That would be my reason for recommending that you hear testimony primarily from academics, but perhaps from others, from northern Sudanese Muslims, who are well qualified to give you some critical analysis on what orients and motivates the parties and how the NIF regime evolved.

Manock, do you want to add something to that?

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Mr. Manock Lual: Yes. I'll just briefly add to what Gary said about political Islam.

The point is, the group that is ruling in Sudan is using Islam as a means to hold power rather than trying to convince all Sudanese to become Muslims. In testimony to this there are a lot of Sudanese in the north who are Muslims who have been killed by this government. In fact, I call them equal opportunity killers. The kind of Islam they are preaching is not necessarily the faith. It's used as a vehicle. They use it to get power.

And by the way, in the last elections they got about 10% of the votes. Even their leader, Turabi, who's now in jail, lost his seat.

They are using Islam as a means to get power and to retain power. They appeal to the emotion of the people in northern Sudan who are Muslims, and they thought they would get the votes from them by appealing to Islam.

The kind of Islam they are preaching even goes against what other Muslims believe in Sudan or anywhere in the world. It's very fanatical and it is almost adulterated. It's being used only for power purposes. That's what I would say about political Islam in Sudan.

The Chair: Did you want to speak now, Bashir?

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum: Yes. I would just like to comment quickly on political Islam, which is what we have been observing since 1989, and point out the damage to the name of Islam that has been created by this regime. These people use Islam to control and oppress the people.

We think that the real Muslim has to be given more opportunity to contribute to the dialogue in terms of the concepts and the principles of Islam. I believe that Islam is more than what these people are doing. It is something that is really genuine in terms of peace, in terms of dialogue, in terms of respect, and in terms of human rights. What the current regime has done to its own people is in contradiction with the main principles of Islam.

The Chair: Thank you. I'm going to sneak a question here if that's okay.

I'd like to ask Kathy something. Somebody, I think Gary, mentioned that 54 of the airports--most of them--were closed and that the NGOs are asking the United Nations to get food in because it's an emergency.

How are you going to get the food in even if you get the food? Are there other ways to transport it?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: What's being referred to here is flight bans of humanitarian assistance.

The Chair: I see.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: So when they close these airports, they deny flights and they use safety as a reason. But in some cases it isn't safety--that's been documented as well--it's manipulation of access to humanitarian assistance.

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The Chair: Yes, I understand that, but with that going on, will you be able to get the food in?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: Just to give you an example, they banned all these flights, and then after the NGOs raised the issues, in fact now they've allowed some and some are going in.

So it isn't always that it is so unsafe, but the other factor that many have been talking about is protecting the air space to make that safe. It's the Government of Sudan that has the bombing missions. That's why some of the NGOs are also asking for days of tranquility when there is agreement to stop the fighting, to get the food in. And that's so crucial now because we're heading into the rainy season, and if people don't have food and plant, we can't get in by road and other ways.

Most of the humanitarian assistance in Sudan is delivered by air, so these flight bans are a really important factor, and they're rather arbitrarily used by the government. Does that clarify it? It's flight bans.

The Chair: Yes. I was going to go into whether the Danforth report, the United States policy, is helping. That's one of the things he recommended, isn't it? Weren't the days of tranquility recommended by Danforth?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: He refers to that, yes.

The Chair: Gary, did you want to say something? And then Manock.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I want to follow up on Kathy's point. Kathy is referring of course to the context of official UN humanitarian assistance.

There are also other small relief operations that fly outside of the OLS umbrella, very trepidatious organizations that take great risks to fly into these areas and take small amounts of aid to people who cannot receive it otherwise.

So there is that aspect of it too.

The Chair: Manock.

Mr. Manock Lual: I'd like to add to the statements that Kathy and Gary made in response to your question about whether it is safe. Who makes it unsafe? It's the government. When they ban flights, it's precisely because they don't want any other neutral persons to see what they are doing in terms of killing the civilians.

So what can be done is to hold them accountable, hold them to honour the agreements they made. They just signed an agreement with Danforth, which said they will not bomb civilians, and yet that's what is happening. Wherever the ban has been made it's because there is going to be a military activity there, and, shortly after that you hear that civilians are killed.

Yes, food can get in if we hold the Government of Sudan accountable and make them respect the agreements they enter into. Airfields are all over the southern Sudan, and therefore if there is peace and tranquility then food will go in. But the peace and tranquility has to be heavily on the government side because they're the ones bombing relief centres and UN planes, and so forth. So what can be done is to make sure they don't violate their own agreements.

The Chair: I'm trying to be realistic. If, say, next Tuesday you get so many tonnes of potatoes, how are you going to get them in next Tuesday? All these other things that we hope for won't have been done, so are they going to get in next Tuesday? That's what I was getting at. I'm just wondering if it can happen that this food can get in.

But it's okay, I understand the answer.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: I might add one more. In response to the joint appeal by the NGOs, the World Food Programme is actually trying to position food for a flight in right now. So in fact if they can get the UN to move on this, there is food positioned to move in.

The Chair: Ms. Jennings.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: The second point I wanted to discuss was the issue of empowering civil society within Sudan, both in the north and in the south.

One of the papers here--I've gone through it diagonally--talked about some specific projects that have actually happened, whether it was conflict resolution.... One of the projects was about two groups, about fishing. One had begun fishing before the official fishing ceremony, so the other group stole some livestock. As a result of a civil society conflict resolution, the women of the two groups got together and decided they didn't want any more killing because there had been some killing and things like that. They went to their respective elders and said they weren't going to milk the cows any more. That was an example of how civil society was actually able to have an impact on a local, but very real, conflict situation.

As you know, part of one of CIDA's social development objectives is the issue of good governance. It is the issue of strengthening civil society, particularly women, for example. Are there areas where you feel CIDA could have more of a local impact in terms of enabling and empowering civil society to be able to take more of a concrete role in bringing peace, either locally or within this so-called international process that's been trying to bring peace to Sudan for decades now?

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Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum: The recommendation to empower civil society organizations in Sudan included women's organizations, particularly the local peace process initiatives, which have been going on for years and years in Sudan and which have a very grassroots basis rather than any formal and official ground. I think this is something that has to be strengthened, has to be supported, and has to be encouraged. We know very little about it. There is very little documentation on it, no lessons learned. This is an area where we are trying to communicate with CIDA to strengthen this part of local peace initiatives.

We believe local peace initiatives, as lessons learned, are really strengthening the capacity of the local groups on one side, but on the other side also will be very useful in terms of peace negotiation, in terms even of the IGAD process. This is very important, a very educational and important tool, for the educational curriculum and for the students and the children in the schools, just to build on something that was already inherited in Sudanese cultural life. This is something we are trying to.... We know there are some research activities going on. I can say that at a very official level, but we are talking about a grassroots level. This is our point.

Mr. Manock Lual: I might add to that, or at least say something else about what is happening in the New Sudan Council of Churches, your question being specific to women.

The New Sudan Council of Churches established a youth and women desk last year. I received a proposal from them whereby what they want to do in southern Sudan, in areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Army, is to empower women to be able to participate not only in peace-building but also in economic activity, local community development. They are going to be establishing what they call ecumenical and inter-church centres in areas in southern Sudan, where training would be going on to train women not only to be able to articulate their concerns in the peace process, but to be self-supporting in terms of economic development.

I have the proposal. I can share it with you if you want. That's one way CIDA can support the civil society development.

Another thing I want to add is that USAID, the United States Agency for International Development, has been involved in moving from relief to rehabilitation and development in the last few years. They have a project called Sudan transition assistance and rehabilitation, STAR for short. I just talked to a colleague who came from Yambio in southern Sudan not too long ago. They held a meeting there, where they are involving the community to see what can be done in order to support community development and civil society development.

I think CIDA can very well do the same thing, or something similar. They have also participated in renovation and rehabilitation of hospitals, clinics, and roads, and in agricultural development. I think these are things that will give the civil society some power and some independence to be able to get their ideas heard in the larger scene.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much. I just wanted to comment that we have a few CIDA representatives here, I believe, so they'll be listening to this.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: Most NGOs appreciate the support CIDA has given to the people to people process, and there have been proposals tabled with CIDA to expand that. Most of us think that's very well worth doing. We have had continuing dialogue between the NGOs and CIDA about moving beyond humanitarian assistance into some kinds of appropriate developmental activities, even though there is a conflict going on.

It is important that there be capacity for a civic administration if we are going to move to peace. I think the real trick is to link that with the official process, and I would highlight what happened in Sierra Leone, where NGOs were also involved. There was a lot of stuff going on among civil society and there were a lot of ways--not formal ones--that those linked, and that is eventually what caused it. I think our concern here is one of them. There's very little awareness of the official one among the people in the other level.

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Ms. Marlene Jennings: Obviously one of the concerns any government has when it's providing assistance or contributions, particularly to NGOs from its own country, for instance, Canadian NGOs,which then go and do work, is the safety. I'm assuming that if we don't.... Off the top of my head... I may have been briefed on it, but if I have, as I said, there's so much information that can get crammed into one's head that some of it comes out the other ear at one point in order to make room. I may have been briefed that perhaps some kind of policy exists in terms of providing contributions or investments or financial support to NGOs at the civil society level to work on capacity-building in a conflict area. I'll have to recheck that, but if one exists, that may be something of a barrier or an obstacle in areas where that kind of security cannot be guaranteed.

I remember that in Afghanistan, for instance, when things were really raging, the Canadian NGOs and even the international NGOs weren't actually operating in Afghanistan. They were operating on the border countries because within Afghanistan they couldn't assure the safety of their own workers.

I think it's probably a balancing act, but that's something that I personally will examine. I take good note of the point you make in using Sierra Leone. When there is a local initiative with civil society capacity-building and the official international or government bilateral or multilateral policy to move towards peace, when you have that dialogue, it does help move the process forward. When peace actually happens, you have some capacity to set up institutions and actually start to run government.

I take good note of that. Thank you.

The Chair: Do any of you want to comment on what she said, or is it okay?

Manock.

Mr. Manock Lual: I would like to say there are areas in southern Sudan that have been free of a government presence for a long time and are quite secure.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Yes, I know.

Mr. Manock Lual: The Western Equatoria region, the border of Uganda and Congo, is one where it can be done. We can start to limit our activity there.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much. I have a couple of questions.

Gary, I think you mentioned constraining oil production in Sudan as something that's the goal. One thing Senator Wilson mentioned was that work was under way in Switzerland, I believe, on the idea of sharing wealth from oil.

Would you like to comment on it?

Mr. Gary Kenny: It's unclear to me how it's going to work. I've yet to see any kind of a mechanism sketched out. I understand Foreign Affairs is doing some work on this, I think, with the Swiss and others.

I meant to call Alan Bones of Foreign Affairs this week to see if I could get some more information on it, but I never got around to it.

I think it's problematic to develop any kind of a revenue mechanism sharing system that is outside of a unitary, comprehensive peace process. I think it has to be in the process. Then it can be used as an incentive or a dividend for peace, as you will, to force both parties to take the talks more seriously.

I have problems with locating it outside of the peace process. I have fears it's what's being done now. I may be wrong, but it is a concern of mine. If it's in the process itself, then I think it could be a very useful kind of thing.

The Chair: We'll check up on it and see.

Manock.

Mr. Manock Lual: Maybe I'm paranoid, I don't know. The fact is, when you talk about revenue sharing, you are already presuming there is peace in the country. As a result, you jump the gun.

As Gary said, what you need to do is concentrate on efforts to bring about a just peace that will be sustainable. Then the idea of revenue sharing is attractive. It is a good idea to help the Sudanese on how we will share the wealth of the country. First concentrate on peace. It presupposes there is peace in the country, and therefore let's share revenue. You cannot use it as a way to peace in that sense. If you have revenue sharing, they'll give it to the SPLA and the government: this is good for you and now you can agree on peace. No. It wouldn't work. Go the other way around.

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The Chair: Okay.

I have another question. You mentioned the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group.

Could you tell us a little bit about it? What do you do? Is there any way the government can help you out in the process?

Mr. Gary Kenny: It has been around for four or five years now. I think it currently has at least about 25 members on paper. It is not a coalition in the formal sense. It's a loose-based forum of agencies, a wide diversity of agencies, doing human rights research and monitoring, development, relief, capacity-building, track two diplomacy, and a whole range of issues. It's quite a broad spectrum of organizations.

We try to facilitate opportunities for members to collaborate on certain initiatives and to make a common cause on certain initiatives. We don't issue policy in the name of the reference group. We sometimes will draft a letter to Foreign Affairs or to a minister. We'll sometimes develop a set of policy options that we try to get as many members as possible to endorse.

It is loosely how it works. We have found it to be a very useful entity over the last few years. It continues to exist. We hope it will continue to yield some positive results in the future.

Kathy, do you have anything to add?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: Sharing information is a first basis. Together we did sponsor one two-day dialogue at which several people from Sudan came here. I think it was a useful experience. It's a loose group. It's not always easy to do that kind of thing, but it's very useful.

Could we consider other initiatives like it?

I think we certainly want to look at, particularly with the peace process, if it starts to move forward, how we collectively work with our colleagues in Sudan to maximize whatever opportunity there is.

The Chair: Marlene, do you have any more questions?

I have another one. You mentioned both soft and hard power are needed. What would you include in the latter, the hard power?

I think it's for Gary.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I think I mentioned three.

The Chair: Are they for the hard power?

Mr. Gary Kenny: On the oil, particularly, there needs to be a way to constrain the flow of oil, or to somehow make the oil revenues less available to the Sudanese government.

It's one of the things I meant by hard power. There may be other hard power incentives that one could consider.

The Chair: Kathy.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: A number of the NGOs have put forward the idea of a no-fly zone in terms of preventing the bombing attacks. There's a precedent in Iraq. How successful it's been is debatable, as is who would do it, but the possibility of preventing those bombing attacks would also create some more political space for peace.

Mr. Gary Kenny: If I could, I'll just add something. The bombing of civilians has been one of the two or three critical military strategies of the Sudanese government. If that were taken away, it would have an enormous impact on their capacity to fight the war in the way they have. It would be very significant.

The problem is, when we put some of these ideas forward--a no-fly zone, somehow cutting off the flow of oil, suspending oil, putting the revenues in an escrow account--the typical response we get from Foreign Affairs and other officials is, can't do, unrealistic, no go.

We're not saying that it isn't difficult. We're not saying that there aren't obstacles to overcome, but it just amazes us that in other conflicts in the world, the international community can sometimes galvanize around an issue, muster the political will, and do phenomenal things. The question is, why not with Sudan? We've never been able to really come to a clear answer on that question. We speculate, but--

The Chair: Are you taking it so far as to suggest using military force ourselves, or are you saying to try to do this in public opinion without the military?

Mr. Gary Kenny: I'm not personally saying that, but I do think it's worthwhile looking at the possibility of some kind of humanitarian interventions, especially if there's no way to mitigate this current, developing famine. There are things we can do in that regard, and they've certainly been done in other parts of the world.

The Chair: Manock.

Mr. Manock Lual: I'd like to speak on the subject, and I'm speaking as a Sudanese now, not as a KAIROS employee. I think the war will end sooner if the capacity of the government and the SPLA to wage war is denied. One way of doing it is that first, Canada has Talisman--Canada says they don't have means to stop Talisman, but Talisman should be stopped.

Then look for multilaterally supported action to block oil exports and imports from and into Sudan. Sudan has only 400 miles of coastline, and the oil from Sudan is exported from only one port. If you block that port, there will be no oil going in or coming in. That can be done easily if you can persuade your friends the Americans to block the port, or it can be internationally done.

Why don't you blackmail Britain and say, look, this was your problem, you left us with this mess, come on, block the sea for us and let's solve the problem? I'm being a little bit facetious here, but I think that's the only thing that will bring the war to an end quickly.

If you stop Talisman from working there and ask for help from the world to block the port, the government will not receive the money they are getting and they will make peace. When they didn't have the oil revenues, there were times they were defeated militarily in the field and they negotiated seriously. But since 1999 that has gone.

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The Chair: Could we just get it on the record? There's not just one oil company over there, is there?

Mr. Manock Lual: That's why I'm saying have a blockade. If you take action against Talisman and there is no outflow or inflow of oil because of a blockade, no company will be interested in going in because they won't be able to export it. There will be no way the Chinese or the Malaysians can export the oil they may be developing. It's not only about an action against Talisman; the world should act against all the people who are there.

The Chair: But are there other oil companies there?

Mr. Gary Kenny: Yes.

The Chair: And if Talisman pulled out, would somebody else just buy the company?

Mr. Manock Lual: That's why I'm not stopping there.

The Chair: I just wanted to get it on the record. You made it sound as if it were the only oil company there.

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: Could I add one point? I was itching to add this last week as I was listening to the conversation.

Lundin has ceased its operations temporarily, and so has Petronas. It is said that it isn't possible for Talisman to suspend operations until peace, yet two companies have in fact suspended operations.

The Chair: Why only temporarily?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: Well, if there's peace, obviously Lundin is going to go back in. It hasn't given up its rights to the area it has rights to explore, but it has temporarily ceased operating in Sudan. And Petronas has, so there is a precedent--

The Chair: How many are left?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: There are the Malaysians and Chinese, I think.

Mr. Gary Kenny: Russia is now exploring for oil in the north.

The Chair: Ms. Jennings.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: You actually answered my question, because it was about whether there was a possibility of shutting off the oil revenues that are being produced.

I'm not sure I would be in favour of pushing Talisman out. I would be in favour of simply getting a blockade going, and therefore, for those companies that invested their moneys and there have been human rights abuses taking place in the areas in which they're actually operating, well, too bad, they suffer the consequences.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I agree with you.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: The issue, before I turn the microphone over to you, Gary....

I'm a talker, so I'm using up the fact that there's just myself and the chair here. Usually I get cut off.

I think it was you, Mr. Lual, who talked about the Brits being principled colonialists, if there was such a thing. It's kind of an oxymoron, isn't it?

Mr. Manock Lual: I was reporting the fact of the situation in Sudan. I wouldn't have that much faith in them, being colonialist and having sold us out in 1947. But it was in relation to something I heard in this committee--I wasn't here, but I got it somehow--that Canada has no cultural ties with Sudan and therefore a reason not to do anything. So I brought up the British connection there in order to remind some people who might have forgotten that Sudan was a British colony.

There are some values that the British imparted in Sudan that are still appreciated, one of which is the fact that our people back home believed when the British said something they meant it. Our experience with our northern elites is that they say something and do something else; therefore the fact that the British said something and did it, whether it was good or bad, is admired. That's what I was trying to say.

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Ms. Marlene Jennings: Okay, I appreciate the explanation.

The Chair: Gary.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I had anticipated Colleen Beaumier and Keith Martin being here today and asking the question that if it was not Talisman it would be somebody else. I did have a response prepared for that. I'd hate to leave here without being able to get it on the record, so could I do that?

Ms. Marlene Jennings: If Talisman wasn't there, wouldn't someone else just move in?

Mr. Gary Kenny: These are five compelling reasons, and I'll have to read them because they are a bit complicated, but I'll go through them quickly.

The first is that--and you've heard this before--Talisman has given critical moral cover to oil operations in Sudan and has been used relentlessly by Khartoum to this effect. There is good reason to believe neither the Austrians nor the Swedes would be in block 5A if Talisman hadn't led the way in blocks 1, 2, and 4.

The second one is contained in the Gagnon-Ryle report. This report estimates that production could fall by 30% if Talisman withdrew. This is very serious revenue for a regime spending over $1 million U.S. a day on the war, and probably much more. The regime is one of the most indebted in the world, at over $20 billion U.S. They are spending for the war, military hardware, at a rate that exceeds income from present oil revenues. They will find it extremely difficult to deal with a decline in oil income and will thus feel additional pressure to make peace.

Third, Talisman is critical to the plans for expansion and additional production capacity in blocks 1, 2, and 4 where they are operating. They are far superior to their Malaysian and Chinese counterparts on this score. There really is no comparison. North American oil exploration technology and engineering are far superior to anything else that might replace Talisman.

Fourth, Talisman's exit would send a message to any and all with U.S. capital market exposure, or even susceptibility to investment pressures, that if you go into Sudan, you will be targeted. Here it's useful to remember--and this is important--that the China National Petroleum Corporation tried to bring a huge $10 billion U.S. initial public offering to the New York Stock Exchange in the fall of 1999. When it finally limped to market the following April, renamed and restructured as PetroChina, it netted less than $3 billion, a $7 billion capital market hit. Even then, the IPO would have failed outright but for the intervention of BP Amoco with a guarantee of $1 billion in investment.

Finally, Canada is now deeply complicit in what is finally--this is somebody else's term, although I have some sympathy with it--genocidal destruction in southern Sudan. Talisman's exit will not stop the war or the destruction, though it will bring very significant pressure to bear on Khartoum--why the regime has worked so hard to make it difficult for Talisman to exit. This fact is not widely known, but it is the case. Talisman president and CEO complained about it to senior U.S. State Department officials. It will certainly end Canadian complicity, and that should be reason enough for people who have prided themselves on a commitment to human rights and human security issues.

The Chair: Thank you very much for reading that into the record. You mentioned in your report, Gary, from KAIROS that you support our making the trip. I just wonder if any of you have any comments or suggestions, further than what's in your reports, about our trip to Sudan.

Mr. Gary Kenny: I'm sure many of us have many, but I think you should go to government- and non-government-controlled areas. You should do the gamut, as much as you can. You have 10 days, which is not much time. Please do not short-sell the south in favour of the north. I think you need to create a balance.

It's critical that you talk to the victims--ordinary southern Sudanese who have been displaced from the oil fields, or who have been living in fairly liberated areas for years, but have experienced all kinds of horrors over the years as a result of the war. It's critical you talk to those people and get a perspective from them. You should also talk to ordinary Sudanese in the north.

The Chair: Do you have any comments, Kathy?

Ms. Kathy Vandergrift: As you plan your trip, the NGOs that have offices in Nairobi would be happy to facilitate some of that. I want to leave it to them to suggest what would be best, but they would be happy to help.

The Chair: Manock.

Mr. Manock Lual: I'll just endorse what Gary just said. In addition, I agree that 10 days is not nearly enough time. Sudan is one million square miles in area, or 2.5 million square kilometres. You couldn't cover it in 10 days, and I know that's not your ambition. It would be lovely if you had more time, but if you go, do seek out some southern Sudanese who are there, especially in Khartoum.

Some students from southern Sudan were just arrested last week. Look for students and the Union of Sudan African Parties. There are other private citizens who are not involved in the government. You can also listen to the southern Sudanese who are in the government, so you can have a balance. But I don't think they represent anybody.

I'm just saying to make sure you get a broad view of what is going on. Gary and Kathy have covered the southern part, and in Khartoum you will have a chance to see the government people, but seek out the other people who are there.

I support the mission; you should go. I don't agree with people who say it's useless. You will get something very valuable.

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The Chair: What about going to Talisman's area?

Mr. Manock Lual: Precisely. That's where the displacement is.

The Chair: It's the only way, as far as I can see. There were recommendations that we not go.

Mr. Manock Lual: But make sure you go to both sides. Don't take the organized red ribbon or blue ribbon type of tours they will give you at Talisman. After you finish, go through the other door.

The Chair: Thank you.

Bashir.

Mr. Bashir Abdelgayoum: I would also like to suggest that when you go to the north you meet with Sudanese civil society organizations that are working not only on peace, but human rights and poverty issues. These include people from the south, people from the north, and people from the Nuba Mountains. Some of them are working together in different networking activities, and you'll find a lot of information about things we don't know a lot about.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Bells will be going off any minute now for a vote. If you have more questions, Marlene, maybe you can ask them afterwards.

Thank you very much for coming. If you have suggestions, names, etc., for our visit, please let the clerks know. We're going to see as much as we can, and we'll try to be as balanced as we can. That's all we can say for now.

The meeting is adjourned.