SRID Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, May 22, 2002

¹

1545

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.))

Ms. Lois Wilson (Individual Presentation)

¹

1550

¹

1555

º

1600

The Chair

Mr. Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

º

1605

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Vellacott

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ)

º

1610

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Lois Wilson

º

1615

The Chair

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)

Ms. Lois Wilson

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Ms. Lois Wilson

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

The Chair

Mrs. Jennings

Ms. Lois Wilson

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Lois Wilson

Ms. Marlene Jennings

º

1620

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

º

1625

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Ms. Lois Wilson

The Chair

Mr. John Harker (Individual Presentation)

º

1630

º

1635

º

1640

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Mr. John Harker

º

1645

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. John Harker

º

1650

The Chair

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. John Harker

º

1655

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. John Harker

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. John Harker

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. John Harker

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. John Harker

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

»

1700

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

»

1705

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

»

1710

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Irwin Cotler

»

1715

Mr. John Harker

The Chair

Mr. John Harker

»

1720

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

»

1725

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John Harker

The Chair

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CANADA

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 025

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, May 22, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1545)  

[English]

    The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): This is meeting 25 of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. It's Wednesday, May 22.

    We have two witnesses today, the Honourable Lois Wilson, Canada's former special envoy for the Sudan peace process, and John Harker, the African expert and author of the 2000 Harker report on Sudan. Lois Wilson has to catch a plane shortly, so she's going to start, and as long as we have questions, I guess she can stay until she has to leave for her plane. Then we'll ask Mr. Harker to step up.

    Go ahead.

    Ms. Lois Wilson (Individual Presentation): Thank you very much.

    I'm going to be as brief as I can summing up two and a half years, and I'm very glad to be here, since there wasn't any interest from MPs previously while I was on the job. It's interesting to see now that you've suddenly got interested for some reason.

     I was appointed by foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy and the Minister for International Cooperation Maria Minna as special envoy to the Sudan peace process in October 1999. When I cleaned out my office, I came across my mandate, and I thought I would read it to you. He appointed me to:

lead Canada's participation in the International Partners Forum of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. Composed of representatives of governments of the region, IGAD has been mandated by the Organization for African Unity to resolve the conflict in Sudan. The IPF, made up of developed countries and currently chaired by Italy and Norway, focuses international attention on the peace process and provides support.

It was a fairly narrow mandate. It was to personally represent the minister and speak for him at international meetings relating to the support of the Sudan peace process, which meant IPF and IGAD. The other branch was to listen to the representations from Canadian civil society, to academics and NGOs within the country. And that was it. I was not to do anything about Canada's bilateral relationship with Sudan, nor was I was to issue meeting releases. So my role was quite limited.

    Internationally, I provided a Canadian presence for the foreign minister. I visited Sudan twice, met with President Moi, with the Egyptian authorities, with Kenya and Ethiopia. The main thing I think I did was provide access for the Canadian government to the main players, of which Canada was not one, they being the U.S.A., Norway, the EU and the U.K. Because I was a senator, I think I got access that we would otherwise have had trouble getting.

    I attended, in the two and a half years, 13 meetings of the International Partners Forum and Sudan-related ones. During that time the IPF supported financially a Kenyan secretariat, which was supposed to be lean and to try to broker the peace process, which the IPF could not do. President Moi has appointed one recently who was a general, and we are in a bit of a hiatus there. He apparently still has his day job and he's working along, but there is also a Kenyan election coming up, so there is not much happening there.

    Over the years it became obvious that IGAD was somewhat ineffectual, and in September 2001, when the partners forum met in Norway, it was agreed that we all cut loose, that is, that we keep supporting IGAD and keep supporting the forum for what it could do, but not expecting it to carry the whole weight of the peace process, and that countries should feel quite free to work bilaterally with others or in a multilateral framework. At that time too we had the Libya-Egyptian initiative, which people were wanting to roll into IGAD, but that never went very far. Since that time we have had the Danforth proposals, which I will speak about in a minute.

    So that is the international scene. It meant a great deal of travel for me. In Canada I worked with a joint DFAIT and CIDA working group, because both government departments were involved. I addressed a great many civil society meetings and NGOs across the country, and the expectations of the NGOs usually exceeded both my authority and my availability, in my judgment. I tried, usually unsuccessfully, for more statements from foreign ministers Axworthy and Manley; Graham never reappointed me, and I never asked. So this is all historical. I haven't been active really since January of this year.

    The NGOs and the Canadian Sudanese community I found hostile, critical of the government, critical in particular about Talisman Oil and fixated only on the oil issue. Very few parliamentarians were involved or made any requests of me. I reported as regularly as I could to the Senate, to the minister, tried to get an inquiry going in the Senate, and it dropped like a lead balloon. I met most of the Arab diplomats in Canada and the Canadian Arab community, and I was very thankful for that, because I began to understand that they have quite a different perspective from that we're treated to usually in the press here in Canada. I met Jim Buckee of Talisman twice and his community development officer.

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    In all those meetings my own assessment was that there was not much appreciation of the complexity of the issues in Sudan, that it was not just the Christian-Muslim religious conflict, although that was part of it, it was not just south-north, it was not just African-Arab. It was all those things, but it was more. Equally important would be the question of the political future of Sudan. Would there be self-determination? Would there be separation? Equally, there would be the use of resources, very rich oil resources, the waters of the Nile, and the other minerals that are there. My main question was, does either side really seriously want peace? Because my view is that they've really not demonstrated that they want it. They both think they can win militarily, although all their statements say the opposite. So the peace process became stalled and there was a certain abandonment of the declaration of principles, which I assume you know about. It was the basis for a peace agreement, and they have been really sidelined.

    So what role can Canada play and what resources does Canada bring to the table? First, I mentioned that part of the equation is, as you should know, that there was Axworthy, Manley, and now Graham, and a lot depends upon the personal interest and commitment of the minister. There's been a great rotation of public servants in DFAIT who I've dealt with. I won't name them all, but it's like a merry-go-round. In the matter of continuity of policy, that's one of the things you need to be aware of.

    As to Talisman, my own view is that if it had never been in Sudan, we would probably not be sitting at this table, but I'm not sure. There is no other real investment. When Axworthy made his statement about taking action against Talisman, nothing happened. I worked with a number of people on the possibility of amending the Special Economic Measures Act, and I knew the Area Controls Act was in place in Burma, but my own assessment was that it was a lack of political will on the part of the cabinet not to proceed there, because if they proceeded against Talisman, they would have to proceed against all other companies in all other parts of the world.

    I'd like to say that Canada is, in my judgment, a secondary player, that is, on a lower level, a lower tier. One can't equate it with South Africa, where we took such a prominent role. With South Africa, Canada had the advantage of the Commonwealth, we had trade ties, we had cultural ties. We had none of that in Sudan. It's quite a different situation. So I think our more appropriate role is as collaborator, to attempt to support what's going on in the peace process and see whether we can help it further on.

    We're at present involved with Switzerland. Their ambassador came and we had a two-day session in March on wealth sharing. My impression is that they want to do it carefully, they want to do it well. It's not easily done. Whose is the administrative system in the south? Who do you deal with in the south? Who is the government in the south? How do you get a formula that is going to be equitable for the whole country? There has not yet been an agreement on one country-two systems, and how can you move on wealth sharing until that happens? So it's very complicated, but I was impressed with the Swiss take on it, and they're convinced, and Canada is too, I think, that's the way to support sharing of the oil revenues.

    So Canada is not taking a lead role. We have limited human and financial resources. I think our DFAIT resources are understaffed and underfunded, and it has meant a catalyst collaborator role. We have responded to the U.S. request for some help on the Nuba Mountains. We have deployed trainers from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to the Nuba Mountains, and that's been a very good contribution. We've about 40 of them there, and that's come out of the human security budget. However, we were never consulted beforehand. We were brought in after the decision had been made.

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    In the international community Canada has not been the first partner of choice for the U.S., Norway, the U.K., and EU--I think I have said that before. So we work with like-minded countries as supportively and collaboratively as possible.

    You will be aware of the Danforth report that came out on May 14. I went down to Washington--that was one of the trips I had to make--to meet Senator Danforth before he was going to begin. As you may be aware, his mandate was to determine the commitment to peace by the parties to the Sudan conflict, and then to recommend to the President whether the U.S.A. should energetically engage or not. I have read his report. I must give him E for effort in all four areas where he was testing out the credibility of the parties to the conflict--do they really want peace, are they serious? But I found his report quite ambiguous. At the end it doesn't say, we should energetically engage, nor does it say, we should withdraw. He indicated that the most conclusive one was the Nuba Mountains, where it seems to be working. I doubt whether that is translatable to the rest of the country. You can't just take a piece of the country and say, we are going to do that elsewhere. With the day of tranquility, he said there was a lot of confusion there. The bombing of civilians stopped for a while, but it is now, I am afraid, starting up again. The anti-slavery issue they have been working on.

    So I find it ambiguous, and I didn't know whether it was his intention or not to provide an escape hatch, in case the U.S.A. didn't want to do all those things. But certainly, the international community last fall was saying, the U.S. has to take the lead; the rest of us haven't got the clout, so please do something. That is how that happened. I think it was worth doing.

    As to the future role of Canada, we are going to continue the support of IGAD and the International Partners Forum, but look for complementary contributions. That has been our policy since I became involved. We have, I think, potential contributions to make to Sudan at certain points, and that is when I think our collaborative role could roll in. We have some experience in what a pluralistic country can look like, some experience in a secular state and taking a multiplicity of religions into account, and we have quite a bit of experience with federalism, not all helpful, but we have the experience anyway. So we have some good things to contribute, but now is not the time.

    I mentioned the wealth sharing, where there is an attempt to internationalize the question of resource sharing, and the Swiss have taken the lead there. I found that from southerners there was not much respect for Canada, because of Talisman. They feel this does not give Canada a good reputation, because we are complicit in what goes on there.

    I think Canada will continue its rather splendid role, in my view, in humanitarian food and non-food aid, in its people-to-people projects, with Project Ploughshares, with Alternatives, with the NGOs, with women, and that is our strongest contribution. Hardly any Canadians know we are doing that. All they know is about oil, but they don't know there is a very strong infrastructure, where we are trying to strengthen the social fabric, should a peace agreement ever happen.

    I think we need to search for better ways to hold individuals, groups, and companies, as well as governments, accountable for human rights abuses. Canada made a contribution when we headed up the statement to the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in March and April of 2002. I'm sure you have that statement. Canada was central in that, and I think it says a lot about what we are doing and what our policy is.

    But I underline again that we have not sufficient resources in the department to do much more, and it very much depends upon the full engagement with the minister, who I think is up to his ears right now in the Middle East, and until that settles in, I am not sure what will happen.

    I think that is all I want to say. Let's see what your questions are.

º  (1600)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Madam Wilson.

    Mr. Obhrai.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

    It's good to see you, Senator. Did you say your role is now over?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes, it became over when Minister Graham was appointed.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: During this period of time I'm sure you were regularly giving us a report, but I haven't seen any reports. Have you made a final report recommendation as an envoy from Sudan?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: No, I didn't make a final one, I made them as I went along.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: All right.

    Some time back there was a report--and you're an envoy from Canada, so I think I should ask you--of a Canadian involved with the Sudanese government as a security advisor who was wanted in Canada. Do you know anything about that? What happened with that?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: I was aware of that. The RCMP visited me and I knew about it, but that was it.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: That was that. We don't know where it went, where it's going to go.

    As you said, it's a complex issue, it's not that simple. Sometimes I wonder myself about Sudan adopting a federated form of government, like ours, with north and south as the provinces and a central government, constitutionally divided power. Do think that would be the bright future of Sudan? Do you see the current conflict eventually coming to an end and finally getting resolved? What's your gut feeling ?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Likely the only thing that will bring the conflict to a halt is if one side actually does overpower the other, because, as I say, I didn't detect, certainly when I was on the job, any demonstrated commitment to the peace process on either side. That's complicated by the fact that nobody knows who to deal with in the south. The SPLA are there, but they are not the governors, and nobody is quite sure, because the south is badly divided. Certainly, the proposal of a federated state has been made and that was on the table. At the IGAD forums there were several times when they brought the parties together, and that was one of the proposals, but the declaration of principles has in it the right of self-determination of the south, if everything else fails. I think, in the last few years, they're not looking at a federated state so much. Some of them are looking at separation or secession.

º  (1605)  

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: They are?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: I don't know how many dozen proposals I've received over the years for how to get peace in Sudan. Everybody in Canada knew how to get peace in Sudan. It's one thing writing all these things down from a desk in Canada, it's another thing being on the ground over there and seeing the complexities of it. One thing I appreciated about IGAD, although in the end it turned out not to be very effectual, was that the Africans themselves said, we want to broker the peace in Sudan, and would you westerners please support us, but not tell us what to do? That's one reason I fully supported that, even though it turns out they weren't strong enough to do very much.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Is this process still going on?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: It is.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes, and we'll support it, such as it is.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: You made an interesting observation that if Talisman weren't there, we wouldn't be studying the thing here today, we wouldn't be having a role there. Talisman says it's there and it benefits the local people, and others, of course, say it props up the government, not observing human rights. What would you say? When Mr. Harker came and gave his report, I was there. I know what his recommendations are. I'd like to see what you want to say.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: About the role of Talisman?

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: About Canadian investment in Sudan.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: That was not in my mandate, certainly in the beginning, and I left it to the Harker report and the follow-up of that. Mine was the broader peace process, where I found there was very little interest, so I didn't follow Talisman that strongly. However, I think the international code of ethics, by which Talisman is supposed to have abided, they have not abided by. I was one of the people they interviewed in their review of their corporate responsibility, and I sent them quite a critical report. That's what I'm going to say.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Lots of NGOs have said, why don't you or the government get Talisman out of Sudan? And always I came back and said, would you please tell me how? What are you going to do? And then the conversation ceased.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott (Saskatoon—Wanuskewin, Canadian Alliance): Madam Chair, could we have that report, the one she refers to on Talisman?

    The Chair: Do we have that report?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Which one?

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: The one you did on Talisman.

    The Chair: The one she did or the one they--

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: No, she did one in respect to advice.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: That's confidential to Talisman, and in fact, I asked them not to quote me, because I was afraid they might manipulate what I said.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Ms. Wilson, I am a Bloc Québécois MP.

     The Bloc Québécois does not usually talk about the people who work in the Senate, but I have participated in activities organized by you, especially joint committees, and each time I participated, I noted that there was thoroughness, seriousness and great interest. Politicians are often criticized, but personally, I want to praise you and tell you that I have great respect for what you have accomplished.

º  (1610)  

     I also know that you have a great deal of experience and that you are very thorough.

    Our subcommittee, called the Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development, hears witnesses and asks them questions about human rights and international development, but this often leads us to deal with political issues. We wonder about what kind of government there should be and things like that.

    You understand that as a politician I would like to talk about that, but I would rather focus on human rights and ask you the following question. When dealing with human rights, normally we should monitor governments, and they should respect human rights. When there is a civil war, there are opposing factions. From your point of view, in these situations, should the same benchmarks or criteria be applied to human rights? Or would that be a mistake?

    I would like to have your opinion about this. I am relying on your vast experience.

[English]

    Ms. Lois Wilson: In a civil war there are bound to be gross violations of human rights. I think countries still need to abide by the Geneva conventions, particularly with prisoners of war and those sorts of things, but you can't hold them to the same standards as when there is not conflict. My experience in Sudan is that atrocities were committed by both the south and the north, and that doesn't get much play in Canada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I know very little about Sudan, but I want to deal with this matter as seriously as I dealt with the Colombia file. Besides, there is an analogy, because there is a government with one or more factions opposing it. And one or more populations are caught between them.

    Up to now, I feel that it is more difficult to see what is happening in certain parts of the country than in others. We can get a fairly clear view of the parts controlled by the government, but whom shall we trust to get the other version? Can we trust all the NGOs with their reports, or might some NGOs have a biased point of view?

[English]

    Ms. Lois Wilson: You're thinking about the south, where we don't get the information, are you?

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: I feel that we are, in fact, getting less information from the south as well as from other sub-regions of the country. I believe you. You followed the situation more closely than we did and thus we are fortunate to hear your testimony. If I need advice from an expert on human rights, whom should I trust? The government? The factions or the mutually opposing groups? The NGOs? Whom can we trust? The representatives of the Catholic church and the missionaries? Representatives of the United Nations? I feel that in some cases, we just have to make do with the information we have.

[English]

    Ms. Lois Wilson: If you're in court, you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I don't think there's anything like the whole truth. You're not going to get the whole truth from one person or from one faction. I think you have to listen to everybody, and then you have to sift it through your own prism and with others. Certainly, there's control information in the north. There are the NGOs, the churches, and so on in the south. There's also the UN special rapporteur, but he hasn't got the whole truth. I think that's the work of this committee, isn't it, sifting through and making your own judgments? That's what we have to do as a Canadian government as well. I went to Sudan twice. I didn't learn anything more than I would have learned had I not gone, because these reports are available, and if you read widely and talk about them, you gradually form some assessment.

    I'm afraid that's a very unsatisfactory answer, but that's my answer. Don't trust one source implicitly.

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    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Colleen.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): One thing that bothers many Canadians is the shariah law, with the crass amputations, the stonings, and so on. I have a letter form the chargé d'affaires from Sudan in which he requested assistance from Canada in drafting their constitution shortly after their election. We refused, and now we condemn them for their shariah law. Do you have any more information on why we refused?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: My guess would be that Canada's policy was to try to play it even-handed with both north and south, but I can't answer that.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: But I was under the impression that Canada accepts and recognizes officially elected governments, no matter how the elections are.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Well, in a conflict situation we were trying very hard to play it even-handed in order to be able to assist the brokers of the peace agreement, and if you take one side or the other, pretty soon you have no credibility. That would be my guess, but it's an educated guess.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Okay.

    The Chair: Ms. Jennings.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you.

    First, I'd like to apologize for missing the first part of your presentation. I was actually assisting with the Paul Gérin-Lajoie Foundation, which does development work in Africa, as well as in Haiti, on education, and they're celebrating their 25th anniversary. I was asked to attend that, and because of the vote, everything sort of got shifted.

    According to what you've just stated, you visited Sudan twice, but you feel you didn't learn anything that you would not have learned by reading the public documents that are already available on the situation and the conflict in Sudan and by discussing it with knowledgeable people.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Not just public documents. For example, we have Nick Coghlan, a Canadian in Khartoum who sends to DFAIT confidential information, and I've learned a great deal from his dispatches. There is a lot of information around. What I learned is that Sudan is a very hot country in June.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: Given that this information normally would be available to this committee, would you have any comments on the fact that this committee does wish to travel to Sudan, since your own personal experience is that it did not add to your knowledge?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: It's up to the committee, but I have grave reservations about its value--I guess that's my bias. When you travel, you see what you want to see, and it depends who you talk with whether they reinforce your biases or whether they take them down. My travel was slightly different from yours. I met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan twice. The second time I really didn't get anywhere, because he began by chewing me out for Canada's not supporting Sudan's entry into Francophonie, and I thought, what has this got to do with the peace process in Sudan? A clear diversionary tactic.

    I'm just saying there are many things like this, if you're going to go, that you should be aware of. I have grave doubts about whether you'll come back other than with your own biases confirmed, but I could be wrong. Nobody has the whole truth.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: No, but I appreciate having your observations on this issue.

    The other question I have concerns Talisman. We've heard a lot from the newspapers here about Talisman. You yourself have said you participated in the internal audit of their corporate social responsibility. You asked that your report remain confidential, and obviously, I'm not going to ask you to violate that. But there has been a great deal made public about Talisman being a socially responsible corporation in Sudan that has invested in schools, local health clinics, things like that. At the same time, there's other information that appears to show that some of those community-based infrastructures that have been put in place are put at the disposal of the government military. Did you, in your trips to Sudan or in the information you had access to, come across information that would tend to a conclusion one way or the other about Talisman's social corporate responsibility?

º  (1620)  

    Ms. Lois Wilson: There are two things I want to say. I think one of the things Canada really has not developed for its businesses in whatever country, Sudan or Colombia or wherever, is guidelines or constraints on business. We have the International Business Code of Ethics. You talk to Professor Mendes at the University of Ottawa, who wrote them, and he says they're very weak.

    I promoted for some time what Norway has on deck, something called KOMpakt, in which they brought together in a consultative way groups from industry, from government, from NGOs, and academics on an ongoing basis. They did this on their Sudan policy too, and that struck me as a very constructive way to go. I first heard the idea from Gerry Barr of CCIC, and the Norwegian ambassador came over with all the material, and I kept spreading it around and promoting it, but nobody picked it up. I mention that because I think it's one of the things we could look at in Canada, not just for the Sudan process, but with what happens to companies in any other country. Do they just get carte blanche there?

    The second thing I'd like to say is, I don't know, but I think Talisman has learned something about development since they started. It's understandable that these people would not understand development theory--and you know development theory, you just came from a meeting. Dropping a hospital and a school is not development. It may be very good headlines and it may be good PR, but it's not development. My understanding is that the hospital particularly attracted so many people to it, because they're so needy, that it created more problems, because suddenly there's a village created and they didn't have the infrastructure. Here we go again.

    So my criticisms of Talisman were along that line: they are a business, but they don't know much about development, and they should not try.

    The Chair: Time's up.

    Canada established an office in Khartoum. Have you been there?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes.

    The Chair: Do we have one person there?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes.

    The Chair: Do you think it would be a good idea if we increased that?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: The debate is that if we increase it, it gives more credibility to the Sudanese government. They have a chargé here, so we're very cautious about raising the level of that office. We're getting very good value, in my view, in terms of information.

    The Chair: From that person?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes.

    But to raise it would give more prestige to the Government of Sudan than Canada wants to give.

    The Chair: Okay.

    If this committee were to take a trip, could you think of things you didn't do on your two trips--it sounds as if maybe you did the same thing on both of them--that you would do if you went again? Can you think of places you might go or things you might do?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: I can't, off the top. I'd like to think about that and be in touch with you.

    The Chair: Okay, just let us know.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: There were only two or three of us, at the most. How many of you are going? It is quite different to take a tour.

    The Chair: Nine are going.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Well, that's a gaggle. Somebody has got to manage all those people who want to go in different directions, that's my guess.

    The Chair: But sometimes, if there is a force like that, you can do things you might not be able to do on your own. So we may be able to have a bit of force that way.

º  (1625)  

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Conversely, if you are on your own, you can find out a lot of things over coffee that you can't find out as the nine.

    The Chair: Well, maybe we'll go one by one.

    Mr. Vellacott.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: On the matter of suspension of oil production until there is a just peace agreement, would you think there'd be any merit to that? That's often posed as a possibility by some individuals looking to resolve things there. If there was suspension of the oil production, would that help move it along?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Is it possible? How is that going to be accomplished? Is it realistic?

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Theoretically, in a wonderful world where people's dreams could be--

    Ms. Lois Wilson: But politically, no.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: But if it were possible, would you say there would be some merit to it?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: I would be reluctant to.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: You just don't think it's--

    Ms. Lois Wilson: I don't want to deal with a hypothetical question that seems to me politically impossible and not realistic. The development of oil is a good thing in a country, it produces money. The problem is how the money is used. That's why Canada is working on the wealth sharing of the profits, not suspending the operations, but seeing if we can we negotiate a settlement, so that the wealth will be shared

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: The only way you could get that to happen, I would suggest, would be if you had the international community moving in. Then you might eventually achieve something.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: We are working on that, as I mentioned in my presentation. The Swiss are taking the lead and they are working with Canada, the U.K., the U.S., and Norway.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: So you've got to have the big international force there.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: But it's very complicated. The Swiss are doing it carefully. They don't want to make mistakes, because if they do, that will set us back.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Do you get the sense, then, that the SPLA and the U.S. are really playing games. They talk peace, as you said yourself, but is there really any desire on their part?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Certainly, in my view, there's no demonstration of it. Danforth suggested the day of tranquility so they could vaccinate the kids, and they didn't even get that together. There's confusion there. That says to me that there is not a serious commitment. They both still think they can win militarily, but that may not carry on very far, I don't know. Danforth said, I think, three or four times in his report that he also didn't detect a strong commitment to peace on either side. So if you have two parties that will not commit themselves, you are really powerless.

    The Chair: Thank you very much. I know you have to go, and we thank you for coming back. Welcome back to the House. I hope you are enjoying your retirement.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Thank you. It's like being out of school. I love it.

    The Chair: Oh, good.

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Thank you for your questions.

    The Chair: You are going to write us when you've thought about that?

    Ms. Lois Wilson: Yes, I will.

    The Chair: Okay, good. Thank you very much.

    Our next witness today is John Harker, and I have already introduced him. I think most of our MPs here are familiar with his background. He is an African expert and author of the 2000 Harker report on Sudan.

    Go ahead. I am sure we'll have lots of questions.

    Mr. John Harker (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Madam Chair.

    I did submit a couple of weeks ago some written comments. I won't read them out. I covered a number of points there. One that I think really needs to be kept in mind is that Sudan is part and parcel of a very conflict-ridden and unstable region, and I think we must have a regional focus. Regional states have been playing off each other's dissidents for years. All of this has vitiated the IGAD peace process. So I will refer to things that I included in those notes, but not read them.

    Since I wrote them, of course, as Lois has mentioned, Senator Danforth has reported. I wasn't in the country at the time, but I've read various reactions. I was interested that Human Rights Watch--not to pre-empt a question, but that is one very good source of information you should become familiar with--reacted to the Danforth report and said it has to bear in mind that the root cause of the war is broad-based human rights violations. It's worth bearing that in mind, because, in fact, it's very much a simplistic thing to say the conflict in Sudan is caused, for example, by oil. That's a very tempting simplicity, not at all a productive one. It's rather like those people who believe the conflict in Sierra Leone can only be viewed through a diamond lens, which is completely unproductive.

     However, oil is important. I said so in February 2000, when I said Canadian oil investment was exacerbating the civil war, not causing it, but certainly giving a fresh life to it. And I still feel the same today. I noticed that in a previous sitting mention was made to you of the piece in the Globe and Mail by Gary Kenny entitled “Canada's silence on Sudan is a vote for oppression”. What it did was remind me of a similarly catchy headline a couple of years ago, when someone took to task Canada's policy, or lack of it, concerning the war in the DRC. On that occasion the article was entitled “African burns while Canada fiddles”. I recall thinking that an injustice was done to some degree, in that Canada was very busy, and sometimes in very helpful ways, but too little was known about it. It seems to me that one failure of our policy at this time is that for all that we are active, very little about this is known in the public, and it doesn't enable the public to either understand the policy or give it more impetus. I think in areas it does need that.

    I don't say we need to know more in order to feel good. One of the things I learned when studying the Talisman issue was that there are Canadians who rightly feel very offended by the impact, as they see it, of oil activity in Sudan on the human rights of people in the country. Some of them said to me they'd like Talisman out and they're not concerned as to who might replace them, because, after all, they would have clean hands themselves. I've often felt that the point is not for us to feel good or to be moral, but to try to have an impact on the lives of the people. I think that is why we need a much more public policy than we currently have. I think the people in southern Sudan need our policy to be better known and also need it to be more strongly supported.

    So there is this low profile approach, which some people might argue is very helpful, but I recall the origins of the Danforth exercise and the fact that much of it was informed by something in Washington called the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). They had a task force on Sudan. The initial draft report of that task force listed Canada as a problem, rather than a peacemaker such as the U.K. or Norway, a bit ironic, given that the U.K. is every bit as active in the oil industry in Sudan as Canada, and Norway hasn't been supporting oil or the Government of Sudan, but it certainly has, through the Norwegian people's aid, done a lot to sustain the SPLM/A. We looked as if we were, in December of 2000, ready to be seen as a part of the problem, rather than the solution, which I think is very unfortunate.

    I think it comes out of viewing the conflict only through the Talisman lens, a lens that, it appears anyway, we lack the ability to really act on. I think that's not so much bad for Canada, that's really not the issue, but it's been very bad for the prospects of our contributing to a sustainable peace. As to people who feel that peace is more likely now than it was, say, a year ago, I'd be interested in knowing what kind of peace they have in mind, because one could anticipate certain diplomatic arrangements being made when it looks as if there's peace, but a little bit down the road that will evaporate. Sudan is replete with peace agreements and peace initiatives. I, in one encounter with the Sudanese, learned there had been 30 discrete peace initiatives, one after the other, and some come along at the same time.

º  (1630)  

    I mentioned this institute in Washington. Lois talks about the Swiss leadership of the process of looking at wealth sharing. CSIS and another U.S. institution, the Carter Center, are very much looking at oil. They're looking at revenue sharing, and they're applying a great deal of talent and energy to this question. It's ironic that as far as I'm aware, the very first real agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLM was actually signed less than two years ago now, at the conclusion of a Canadian initiated and facilitated session on revenue sharing. We've made initial contributions, and I think it's a poor thing if we take too much of a back seat role and allow others to make the running, without our contribution being recognized for what it has been and could be. I think we should be a bit more assertive, even on this particular issue.

    Of course, if you go beyond revenue sharing, there is this question of oil. Should it be in or out? Lois has pointed out her direct challenge to people: how we could get Talisman out, or what would happen if they were out? What we perhaps have overlooked, and I've mentioned this in my report, is that maybe we could be doing more, not just by focusing on Talisman, but by looking at the oil industry globally, looking at influencing the Chinese and others, to see if oil can be made into some kind of pressure point to get both parties to think more seriously about peace. I don't myself feel that they are both convinced they can win militarily. I think probably many of them in both camps feel the situation of a low-intensity, grumbling conflict suits many of their purposes anyway. It's not that they are looking for a military solution, there isn't one, but neither are they going to risk peace. That's how I see it anyway.

    I've mentioned oil. It's one of the issues that's now being discussed in other countries, as are such things as self-determination, which Lois mentioned. I feel, like her, that we've got a lot to offer on this. I would differ with her in that I think now is the time for us to focus on this. You can hear in Cairo, for example, there shall never be self-determination, because we don't want the south to separate. And you'll hear in some parts of the south, we're not going to go for a federal system--someone asked that question. They've tried that, but they've never tried it under a determined approach to ensure that governance was for the people, rather for their oppression. And I think we've got a lot to contribute. I don't doubt that there is work going on, it's just that perhaps I, and maybe I alone, am not as well aware of what Canada is doing as I'd like to be, and I think that does apply actually more broadly.

    All of this work that's going on can have its own downside. The International Crisis Group recently argued against a multiplicity of peace processes, and said it allows slipping. In fact, it does, it allows sometimes the parties to, as I say, steal conflict out of the jaws of peace. So there's definitely a need for coordination, but also, I think, for energizing. And I think this really applies to IGAD.

    Just a couple of months ago a group of very major NGOs issued a report on the peace processes in Sudan. I've got it here, if somebody wants the actual reference: The Key to Peace: Unlocking the Human Potential of Sudan. They observe that IGAD really has been 8 years of ineffective negotiations that nobody was really trying to make succeed. I think it's fair to say there was a time when the U.S. was more interested in scapegoating Kenya for its lack of energy on all this than it was in energizing the process. Maybe September 11 has helped them get to the point of wanting to energize it. And now Walter Kansteiner, the leading U.S. official, has said that notwithstanding the Egyptian-Libyan initiative, IGAD has the lead. Well, I recall a year and a half ago the Secretary-General of the UN saying we needed to internationalize, as well as energize, the IGAD process, go beyond the ability of the regional states to determine the pace of progress. I think that's very necessary, but the point I want to make is that if we all energize this process, but leave it as just an inter-elite dialogue, it won't work. I think a lot more has got to be done to root the IGAD process in the local concerns of people throughout Sudan, through awareness of and interaction with a lot of local peace concerns and actions. These are all going on. They sometimes take you by surprise, but they're very appropriate and very worthy of support.

º  (1635)  

    I noted that Lois said it's good to strengthen these for the time when peace comes. I think we should be cognizant of the fact that by strengthening them, we might be accelerating that move towards peace. I think here Canada can play a very strong and publicly understood role, supportive of those people who are more in the lead--and I don't suggest Canada is in the lead on all of this issue. It's got to do those things. I think it will never be able to unless it engages the oil issue more effectively. I'm not sure I have any more of an answer now than I did in February 2000 as to how that might be, but I do want to end by quoting from what I said a couple of weeks ago in my written submission:

We cannot overcome human rights abuses in Sudan without trying hard to end the civil war; the war in Sudan cannot be replaced by sustainable peace without dealing with the regional context. The Horn and East Africa must be seen as a region of great significance to Canada, both with respect to its standing as a peacebuilder and in keeping with its leadership as a major G8 state.

    I do want to say that when he visited Nairobi in November, Prime Minister Blair said he was going to make sure the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis dealt with the Sudan conflict. I think it really behoves us not to be dragged along, willingly or unwillingly, by other people. We ought to be trying to make sure that when there is political will to be directed at a conflict, Sudan is up there. It looks as if there's more of a prospect. Nothing is ever risk-free. People have tried to make peace in Sudan before and failed, but I hope that doesn't hold Canada back from making a more determined effort than, to one, perhaps uninformed, outsider, it seems to be currently doing.

    That's all I want to say. Thank you.

º  (1640)  

    The Chair: First in line is Deepak, for five minutes.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: I have two questions. First, the report on the recommendations you submitted in year 2000, in your opinion, where has that led to? What has happened with that report? Has the government looked at the report? Has it had an impact? What's your assessment?

    Mr. John Harker: Oh, it's changed everything.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: We are now in 2002, so two years have gone by, and it is quite an extensive report. I would be interested in knowing what you feel that report's done.

    My second question is tied to that to some degree. It is our understanding that following the September 11 tragic event, the Government of Sudan has made changes and has actually joined the coalition to fight terrorism, in the hope that the Government of Sudan will not be isolated in international affairs, will become part of the world community, and all those things. Overall, what impact you would like the committee members to know of?

    Mr. John Harker: Those are two challenging questions.

    I did make a number of recommendations, and in fact, I far exceeded my mandate, as Lois would put it, in that I don't think Minister Axworthy expected any recommendations, but just a statement of fact. I did make a number, and some he dwelled on, some he mentioned, some he perhaps ignored. At the time I said I regarded all this as an interim government response, because we had become seized with the issue in such a way that we wouldn't be able to let it go. Yes, if Talisman sold tomorrow, many people would then have nothing further to say or think about Sudan, which I think would be a tragedy and a travesty.

    As to the impact, I know a number of NGOs elsewhere found it useful in focusing their own more determined campaigning. I wasn't a campaigner, by the way, and I'm still not. I was trying to just set out things as I saw them. So I hope it helped them focus on Sudan, and I know they're the kinds of organizations that will, in the end, be the ones who've made a difference in that country. I really can't say much more about the impact.

    As to that second question, I was in Sudan in June of last year discussing, among other things, the talks the Americans were having at that time with the Sudanese on terrorism. I think September 11 has given the Sudanese a window of opportunity, and they are very good at exploiting any such opportunity. What the whole thing has done for me, especially after learning what the Drudge Report revealed about the failure of the Americans to take advantage of earlier offers of cooperation on terrorism, is show that we've got to have certain principles, try to adhere to them, and not get distracted by a wealth of other people's needs or posturings. I've mentioned the ICG. I'm glad it's got the services now of John Prendergast, who you might hear from. I can't help thinking, though, that John Prendergast was part of a government that launched a cruise missile in response to its assumptions about Sudan, and that was a policy that wasn't going to get anyone anywhere.

    So the world has changed a bit. The Sudanese will exploit it. I think we've got to just be sure we keep our eye on the essential problem, which is that this is a very long, bitter conflict, a very complicated one. We can make a contribution, but there's no easy fix.

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you.

    The Chair: Monsieur Dubé.

[Translation]

    Mr. Antoine Dubé: As I read your document, the last paragraph caught my attention. This is more or less the opposite of the question that I just put to Ms. Wilson. You seem to be saying that even though we talk about violations of human rights, we cannot intervene efficiently if we do not have a regular procedure.

    You mentioned self-determination, and I would like to give you an opportunity to clarify this notion, because it can take on different shapes and forms. What are the forms that should be envisaged by those who are responsible for these matters, including the members of this committee?

[English]

    Mr. John Harker: You've introduced two things there. One is the question of human rights. Human Rights Watch has documented very ably the human rights situation in Sudan, north and south, and has suggested many good, strong ways in which things can be improved. My only point is, I think, that as long as there is a war, it is difficult to get full respect for human rights, partly because people will use it as an excuse for not being able to improve the situation, and in reality, it does get very hard to guarantee rights while this this conflict is raging. But the Government of Sudan has violated the rights of northern women, displaced, living in Khartoum, who, to survive, sell illicit booze. They can't blame that on the war, let's be serious.

    As to your point about self-determination and ways of accomplishing it, I do believe there are ways. The trouble is that in Sudan it has become etched now that self-determination must mean carving out a new south Sudan state. Frankly, I cannot see anyone supporting that ambition. I am not sure the ambition is so clearly held, but it just will not work, it will not fly. It would be more productive, in my view, to try to find ways of ensuring that governance is for the people, of the people. That is not to be trite; it's a difficult thing.

    I spoke at the standing committee in Halifax in February and someone, I think from your party, asked me if there was a need for new architecture for overall world intervention, and I had to say, if governments, in Africa particularly, because that is where I spend my time, let's say Sudan, viewed sovereignty as a responsibility to the people instead of the delineation of borders, we wouldn't have the need for all the interventions we currently witness.

    So to go back, yes, there are ways. I don't think it's productive, frankly, for those ways to be thought of as including how we break out a south Sudan state. It's just not on. But short of that, we can't just say, you must accept a federal system, because actually it works quite well here. Our culture and history and public perception are so different. In south Sudan--and the problem for Sudan is not just the south by the way, there are people in the far west and the northeast who similarly have real problems--there can be no part of their history recently that suggests that they should trust one another, and that is the great obstacle to get over. So if we find a way to discuss self-determination as real governance, maybe it can be. My point is that we are well placed to help them explore all these things.

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Ms. Beaumier.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Mr. Harker, I was one of the MPs who travelled to Sudan and came back with the somewhat, I guess, controversial.... However, the one thing I did notice when I was there, and we dealt with the Talisman issue, because everyone.... We have had so much lobbying on it. You have got to demand Talisman get out, get out, get out, get out. So keeping in mind that Talisman is not a social worker, the bottom line is what is important. They are a multinational corporation in Canada, they are not social workers.

    I would like to tell you a few of the observations. When we were in Khartoum, U.S. involvement was very apparent. The American government at that time was looking for land. They were looking to eventually open an embassy there and to get back involved in the oil business. For all those who've condemned Talisman, I would like to ask them how many other companies they know who are operating there. They have gone after Talisman because they can. At this time there is no U.S. oil involvement there.

    When we were there, we met with a number of NGOs. A couple of them told us that if we were to repeat what they had told us and attribute it to them, they would deny it, because they were afraid of their parent organizations and losing their jobs. One thing we did ask a group of NGOs, some of whom have since denied it, but there were eight or nine of us there and we heard it, was whether the people of Sudan would be better off if Talisman pulled out, and the answer was, no, they wouldn't be better off, the environmental concerns would be dropped. As much as there were many weaknesses in what Talisman was doing, at least it was a beginning. The other question we asked was about the government. Was it a bad government? Had they seen an improvement? The answer was, five years ago--two years ago we were there--it was a bad government, today it's a government with some bad people. Would you agree with those statements?

    Mr. John Harker: I will deal with the last one first. I don't think it's very often possible to think of the whole government or regime as being good or bad. Certainly, the human rights violations Humans Rights Watch recorded were more numerous not long after the coup that brought the NIF to power. That isn't to say, however, that the government meets its commitments or does so willingly. It isn't to say it is believable on many points. I know this from absolute experience revealing that the military was using airfields in Sudan that were around the oil concessions. Seven of their cabinet ministers held a press conference with Canadian press to denounce me as not knowing what I am talking about. Very often I'm in that position, but on this one I know very well. It was quite incontrovertible--that's the term I use--and I have absolute proof from a variety of sources. So they're not particularly honest or reliable or trustworthy. It's a government, though, with all sorts of splits, always having to look over its shoulder. I left there the day Bashir had Turabi arrested. So what can you say? I wouldn't ever say it was a good government. A bad government? Well, it hasn't done enough to be a good government. That's all I'd say.

º  (1655)  

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I don't think anyone said it was a good government.

    Mr. John Harker: Okay.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: There have been improvements. Basically, it is now a government with some bad people.

    Mr. John Harker: Yes, but those bad people are very often the ones who control the way in which the security apparatus operates.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So you say there've been no improvements?

    Mr. John Harker: There have been a number of improvements in a number of areas, but when the security apparatus deems it appropriate, it seems to have the power to hold back a bit of progress or cause a destabilization.

    On the first question, I don't want to repeat all my observations about a hospital or a school. All of these things are very good, but has oil made a big improvement? We've met many southerners who felt the presence of Talisman was a good thing, and what they wanted was to be able to benefit more directly. I'm not talking necessarily about NGOs or civilians. The fact is that military commanders now associated with the SPLA were before associated with the Government of Sudan. They were against oil when it appeared to them that the relationship wasn't going to be as great as they thought. The fact is that the benefits of oil do not accrue to very much of southern Sudan. That's again a statement of fact. Will that be the case in the future? Let's hope not. Some people would argue that if there were no oil activity being undertaken, the war would not be so fierce. It would probably rage up and down the railway line in Bahr Al Ghazal . It would be different, but it would still probably be going on.

    So it's hard to say. What does it matter? The fact is that oil is being produced there, the clock will not be turned back, the taps will not be turned off. We've got to do more, though, to try to end the war and to ensure that the product of oil helps the people. And it is wrong-headed to believe--the history of Angola supports this--that oil necessarily means the people are going to benefit.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Yes. I think I wasn't very good at posing my question. If, in fact, the government has improved, what I'm asking is whether this is a government you think we can be successful working with?

    Mr. John Harker: As far as I know, the Government of Canada and the Government of Sudan have diplomatic relations. What we expect out of the relationship is something beyond my information. I think very few Canadian officials who manage the relationship automatically trust what they are likely to be told by their Sudanese counterparts. That's probably the case with other governments too. It's not treated by Canada as a kind of pariah, as far as I know. We have relations, we've just got to do more to try to make sure our dealings with them reflect our values and interests as strongly as possible.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Okay. Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Vellacott.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Thank you for being here, Mr. Harker.

    To get the context there, at a point you were commissioned by the federal government to write the report, which you did, over that period of time.

    Mr. John Harker: Yes.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: So what is your relationship with the government at present?

    Mr. John Harker: I pay taxes.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Thank you. Well, there's a kinship then, sir.

    Prior to writing your reports you served as a consultant? That would be your bread and butter, if you will.

»  (1700)  

    Mr. John Harker: Yes. Basically, I survive by writing, teaching, analysing.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: You make a point about using oil as a pressure point. So I take it you're not of the view that the suspension of oil is going to solve something. What do you mean by using it as a pressure point to bring about something of a resolution?

    Mr. John Harker: I echo what Lois Wilson told you. It might be ideally a very nice thing to able to say, let's suspend oil production, but that's just not going to fly.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: So how would you use it as a pressure point? How would one go into a situation using oil as that leverage or pressure point?

    Mr. John Harker: Two things I think would be worth trying to explore. I don't know how far Talisman's share price has been depressed by oil. Some people suggest it's an incubus, but it seems to be a huge cash cow, if you ask me. I don't see them rushing to get out of it. When I presented my report, I was asked to go to Calgary and meet the executive committee of Talisman. There's a map here on this table, and when I appeared before their executive, there was also a map and they wanted me to look and tell them where it was I had been in Sudan, but before long they were touching parts on this map I'd never been to, down by the border between Upper Nile and Equatoria. They were saying to me, this is where the big oil is, this is where the real money is going to be made.

    If you look at the future, there's a lot more oil going to be produced in Sudan than we see at this time. My thinking is that right now strong governments should be talking to strong industrial concerns about the future of oil in Sudan as a way of dealing with the present oil in Sudan. That is the area--I can't be more specific than that--where there might be some way of pressuring both sides to see that there's a lot in it for them if they can get something resolved, so that there would be exploitation of greater reserves than currently is the case.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Is that not what the Government of Sudan is trying to do by its scorched earth policy, moving people out of certain areas because there are greater oil reserves there. Would that not be what they, in their own way, are attempting to do?

    Mr. John Harker: That may be. They haven't shared with me their innermost motivation. But that doesn't really relate to what I'm raising. You're not suggesting, I hope, that we leave them to get on with scorching and displacing.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: No, certainly not. You're suggesting that you go to them and you say, look, this could benefit your country wonderfully in services and all kinds of things good for Sudan, because of all the oil revenues that are there, instead of having this horrific war that's going on. Is that what you're saying, convince them both, you've got to draw a picture of the benefit to all the people involved there?

    Mr. John Harker: It's got to be at one element only. There's no point in going to that government or any other trying to paint a picture and asking them to see that it's in their interest. Right now there is a prospect of the United States and other G-8 countries getting their act together to apply pressure, whether it's incentive or diplomatic pressures of one kind or another, even perhaps sanctions, but I think that door has probably escaped us. So a blended mix of as much leverage as we can muster might just move the dynamic towards peace. That's as much as I could possibly claim.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: You make a point here about the fact that we need to have a zero tolerance attitude towards ethnicism, racism, and any other forms of exclusion. Some of my sources indicate that only a few weeks ago the Government of Sudan sponsored an anti-American, anti-Israeli demonstration in which they were calling for training camps to be set up to help the Palestinian jihad liberate Jerusalem from the Zionist filth and so on. Then they were pressed about that and they said it was really more playing to their own people. But my impression would be that the ordinary man on the street in Sudan, if you will, is not particularly anti-American and militantly pro-jihad, so I would then have to believe it's the government that is using this, whipping up the fervour. You've heard about some of this?

    Mr. John Harker: Of course, yes.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: So what's your take on that? There's obviously fairly strong religious jihad sentiment there, and the government is playing on that to keep the conflict whipped up.

    Mr. John Harker: I think that incident probably relates more to very localized power struggles as to who has the influence in Khartoum than to any other concern. There is ongoing conflict between different elements around Bashir, and I'm sure that was not unrelated.

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    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Some have suggested that this so-called isolating of Turabi is a hoax, a fairly elaborate one at that. Would you care to offer an opinion on that? A number of former government officials that have defected from the government also believe that. The Bashir junta is pretty committed to an Islamic jihad, I understand, for the cause of Sudan and Africa, as Turabi was. Is there any merit to this deal that's put out there by some?

    Mr. John Harker: I am not sure why Turabi and his family would go along with some sort of elaborate charade that has lasted for the last couple of years. Turabi himself is a very complicated guy, who talks all sorts of good values when he wants to and behaves in very tough-minded ways when he doesn't. He said to me the south could have a referendum tomorrow, he would be glad to organize it, and they would all vote for his government.

    In a sense, it's wrong-headed to think there is some sort of great game going on there. He has, or had, a lot more influence among young professionals, especially in the non-lethal arms of the armed forces, and it's taken Bashir a long time to find ways of trying to very gently winkle some people out because they might constitute a threat to this power. I think the two are not following some sort of a master plan to promote Islamic jihad. Actually, Bashir is trying to run a government and remain in charge of it one way or another. I don't think they are to be seen as following that path these days particularly. That is why, if they are pushed and prodded, maybe they would be more open to seeing peace. But I think his problem is, without this war, with a new political constellation around him, why would he remain in power? Why wouldn't one of the big, well-established party leaders from the modern history of Sudan return to be powerful, and he be on his way out? I think that is his prime motivation at this point.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Cotler.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): I would like to welcome you. I'm sorry that I had a prior commitment that didn't allow me to come and hear the whole of your presentation, but I had read your written testimony prior to coming here.

    I just wanted to ask you about what appears to be a convergence of factors in the last several weeks, for many human rights NGOs and others a sounding of the alarm on this situation, and they're as follows. First, Talisman has made a new oil discovery in the western Upper Nile. Second, NGOs such as Action contre la femme have issued what they call an urgent alarm about food prices and starvation in Sudan. Third, the government is preventing humanitarian relief assistance, according to the testimony of these human rights groups, in order to secure the area for Talisman and other corporations, resulting in displacements of people and the like, which has led one scholar even to call the situation now genocide by attrition. Professor Kathleen Mahoney, the chair of Rights and Democracy, issued what she called a public notice to the Talisman and other corporations that they could be put on trial before the ICC for aiding, abetting, and facilitating these international crimes. In summary, they claim that in sounding the alarm, we may have reached the point where humanitarian intervention is necessary not only to save the people from starvation, not only those who are being displaced, but to stop the massive killing that may be resulting in genocide by attrition.

    I would share all the recommendations you made with respect to energizing the IGAD process, about supporting those who are in the lead on the ground, NGOs and the like, that Sudan should be the centre piece of the G-8, and so on. Do you believe, however, we have to consider the option of humanitarian intervention, something we were prepared to do in Kosovo, for example, or in East Timor? The situation in Sudan may cry out for the same kind of intervention, and the G-8 may be a framework or opportunity for that kind of recommendation, if not before.

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    Mr. John Harker: These alarms are never without some foundation in Sudan, regrettably. We've seen before policies implemented by government to use food and security as a weapon of war. I have seen evidence that the government was, in fact, moving people violently out of particular areas. I have attested to that, and I see no reason why they would ever have abandoned that as a policy.

    When it comes to a response, I think it's fair to remind ourselves that since 1983 the west has spent over $2 billion U.S. on humanitarian assistance in Sudan. In a way, we are keeping people barely alive, while not dealing with what it is that's bringing them to the point of death, whether it's starvation assisted by government or military action. Canada took the lead in helping establish and funded this international commission on intervention to come up with a framework for why and how that could be attempted in the future. It was all about protecting people. So I mentioned to your colleague the need for a blend of incentives, the carrot and stick, and various things. I think there ought to be a lot of contingency thinking going on as to how there could be some kind of intervention.

    But I will say to you, I appeared before the task force on Sudan of the CSIS in Washington, and at the time there were Americans who are now close to the administration saying, what will it take for us to have ground troops in Sudan and so forth? I just don't see much evidence that the west is prepared to do that kind of thing for the Sudanese, so it may be that we've got to look hard at all the possible ways of bringing pressure to bear. You mentioned the courts. Why not try that also? It seems to me you've got to prepare for any eventuality, knowing there'll be strong pressures to do nothing.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler: Do you think the meeting in Kananaskis offers an opportunity for the G-8 to commit themselves to seeking, let's say, humanitarian intervention under chapter 7 of the United Nations similar to what was done with respect to Kosovo?

    Mr. John Harker: I think the most you could expect from them is their saying, this is a possibility we're not ruling out, and we'll have people seriously look at how to do it, should it become necessary, but I don't think they'd go beyond that, because it's still seen by many people to be in its infancy, this new engagement of the U.S., the U.K., and Norway to pursue peace. The Kananaskis summit is only three weeks away. They're not going to commit themselves to the kind of action you've sketched out.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler: But if the evidence is clear that not only is Talisman exacerbating the conflict through its oil extraction, as you yourself reported, but at this point it may be facilitating the displacement of people and prevention of humanitarian relief, and thus is complicit in starvation, which are statements being made by a multiple set of NGOs who've examined this, with on-site witness testimony, should Canada at least be doing something with respect to a corporation over which it, at least, has legal authority, in the sense that it acts under our legal cover and through our legal extension?

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    Mr. John Harker: I spoke of the role of Talisman as I saw it a year and a half ago. I am not in a position to say that I believe it has been one thing or another at this point. I went to a lot of trouble to be able to say I can seriously attest to what I saw. I'm not in that position now. I am not casting doubt on what other people have seen, but that is the context within which I will make this remark. I saw, for example, that a legal process has been instituted against Talisman in a New York court. The case of that law firm on behalf of southern Sudanese seems, in part, to revolve around, for example, a memorandum they claim shows Talisman's complicity in May 1999. I don't know about that, but I do know that in May 1999 I satisfied myself that there was, at that time, the launch of a military attack aimed at displacement. You used the term facilitating. Whether it can be established or not that this company or any other is facilitating displacement today, I think it would probably be appropriate for the Canadian state--I'm not a lawyer, so I don't know what kind of legal standing it needs--to look hard to see if there is legal evidence of what you have referred to, and if so, take appropriate action. It is the case that in southern Sudan, when I was there in 1999, people weren't prepared to listen to arguments that this is a private company. For them, this was Canada in action, and I think we all pay a price for consequently doing nothing.

    So I think we ought to be very careful to ensure that when people are operating abroad, whether it's without our permission.... DFAIT will rightly tell you that they never gave permission to Talisman, they never encouraged Talisman. In fact, they tried to discourage them. The fact is that companies abroad are very often seen as Canadian, and that perception is one that should be of real concern to Canada, so we should find a way of dealing with it. But what that way is, at this juncture I don't know.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    I'm going allow one other question, but I'm going to ask a couple of questions here. I just want to make sure I get them, in. I asked them of the previous witness. Do you think we should put more people into our office in Khartoum? And if we do go as a committee, what do you think we should do, where should we go, and do you think there is any point in going?

    Mr. John Harker: I will answer the one about the Khartoum office first. At the time I was somewhat fearful, in that if we were doing nothing other than setting up this office, what does that look like? Our NGOs have wanted an increased monitoring presence in the south. That is not enabled. Some of them have called for action to improve the legislative capacity of Canada to deal with Talisman. That is not brought to fruition. So if the establishment of an office becomes almost the only thing on the table, is that seen just as a consular operation for Talisman employees or a listening post? I am not against listening posts, they are very valuable, but it seemed to me that it made more sense as part of a full, integrated package of activity. If that package gets rolling now in support of the window of peace that has been referred to, it may be necessary to have more than one person there. In due course, if it looked as if having a bigger operation or maybe a full embassy would be very effective in helping really get a sustainable peace rolling, I would be very much in favour. But at this time I don't know enough about the demands on its time to argue whether there should be more than there is currently or not.

    With respect to travel, I was interested in what Lois was saying, because I actually took a team of seven people to Sudan and had to manage what was a quite challenging process. People were only there because they had strong capacities to see and think and talk about what they had seen. It wasn't as if we were automatons or anything. I think it's difficult, but on the other hand, what we accomplished and what I set out in the report could not have been done other than on the basis of going. In fact, we went to places the UN special rapporteur had written about, but had never been. We went to places where one of the parties made every effort to prevent us going--and that, by the way, wasn't the Government of Sudan. We had to try to be sure we saw everybody we could elicit information about. It wasn't easy. I think we didn't do too bad a job, but before we went, we were in touch with all sorts of people, sometimes at our instigation, but often at theirs, who wanted to suggest who we should speak to. There must be many people we failed to contact, but on the other hand, we did contact enough to have a broad and detailed picture.

    So I think there is no reason why you shouldn't contemplate going, and hopefully, everyone would be serious and want to do a good job. I don't think it's a matter of a trip like that just reinforcing your own biases. I said in my report that I went into this with an open mind, but not an empty one, and I think that should be expected of you as our legislators.

    So by all means do it, but I would make the point that you have to consider going by Khartoum for part of your trip and by Nairobi for another. I made the point earlier to your researcher that although Lokichokio, the OLS base in northern Kenya, is not now what it was a couple of years ago--it has been downgraded somewhat--I would certainly go there. I would have your people mix with all the young, energetic people who work out of Lokichokio, go in and out of Sudan, and pick up all sorts of information and perspectives that will otherwise be not shared with you. So I would even go there and spend a couple of days.

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    The Chair: Thank you very much. I'm sure we'll be contacting you to get some more specific ideas. Maybe those of you here on the committee would like to know that we did get approval to go on our trip this morning.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler: Is there a timeframe for it?

    The Chair: Yes, November 12 to 22.

    Mr. Vellacott.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: With the Talisman issue again, some have commented that there is a “charm offensive” that goes on when you have an oil company from Canada or Lundin Petroleum from a Scandinavian country. Do you place any stock in that, or do you say, hey, there is such a thing? You can have other oil companies from China or other parts of the world, where human rights are not high in their order, but if you have Canada's good name involved there, is that not a rather different thing? Is there not something about Canada's good name being dragged through the mud, so to speak, by having Talisman or Lundin? The Sudanese government, it would seem, benefits by being able to say to them, come in, we have good countries like Canada's Talisman or Lundin from a Scandinavian country. Is there not something to be said for that as a strategy by the Government of Sudan?

    Mr. John Harker: I've seen that they have made, when they've needed to, very much of the fact they were able to attract investment from Canada, but bear in mind, they're attracting much greater investments from France, Italy, Germany, all over Europe in both the oil industry and general development.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: It's like a domino effect. If you have Canada and you draw others in, it continues to snowball from there.

    Mr. John Harker: Maybe so, but if Talisman left tomorrow, and they would if it suited their bottom line, you're not imagining that the French corporations would say, ooh, we're not going to invest any more. That isn't the case. Things have gone beyond that point.

    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Okay, if you had one or two pull out, would it begin to have a downgrade effect possibly?

    Mr. John Harker: I can't see it happening. If Talisman sold, its share in Gempot would be presumably bought by people. They may be less attractive in some ways than the glossy corporate social responsiblity folks at Talisman, but they would be in there. That Gempot consortium is seen by many people as a valuable commodity.

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    Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Could it be any worse?

    Mr. John Harker: The only thing I said at the time was, while Talisman is there, it behooves us all to use the fact that they are generating all sorts of interest to hammer home the need for transparency, respect for rights, and all these issues, which may not be quite open to Canadian NGOs and others if China National Petroleum Corporation increases its stake to replace Talisman. But that's another issue. It does get down to the fact that whilst they're there, it is very encouraging that our civil society is trying to ensure that as much light is shed on the situation as possible. That's maybe an insufficient comment to you, but that's the only thing I can think has any particular validity right now.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Harker. As I say, we'll probably be in touch with you and get some ideas from you.

    Thank you, all, for participating today. I think it was a very worthwhile meeting.

    I'll adjourn the meeting to the call of the chair.