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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, May 1, 2002

1540

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.))

Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Portfolio, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1545

The Chair

Mr. John McNee

1550

1555

The Chair

Mr. John Deyell (Regional Director, East Africa and the Horn, Africa and Middle Branch, Canadian International Development Agency)

1600

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott (Saskatoon--Wanuskewin, Canadian Alliance)

1605

Ms. Susan Brown (Chief, Peacebuilding Unit, Multilateral Programmes Branch, Canadian International Development Agency)

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Alan Bones (Acting Director, Eastern and Southern Africa Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

1610

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ)

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

The Chair

1615

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. John McNee

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. John Deyell

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. John Deyell

Ms. Susan Brown

1620

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby--Douglas, NDP)

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Alan Bones

1625

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt--Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

1630

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. Alan Bones

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. John McNee

1635

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

1640

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

The Chair

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke--Lakeshore, Lib.)

Ms. Susan Brown

Ms. Jean Augustine

Ms. Susan Brown

Ms. Jean Augustine

Ms. Susan Brown

Ms. Jean Augustine

Ms. Susan Brown

1645

Ms. Jean Augustine

Mr. John McNee

Ms. Jean Augustine

Mr. Alan Bones

Ms. Jean Augustine

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

1650

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Chair

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

1655

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Susan Brown

1700

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Susan Brown

1705

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. John Deyell

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

1710

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

1715

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Alan Bones

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Alan Bones

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Alan Bones

Ms. Susan Brown

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. John McNee

1720

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Alan Bones

The Chair

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Alan Bones

Mrs. Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

1725

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Maurice Vellacott

Mr. Alan Bones

1730

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Alan Bones

The Chair

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

CANADA

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 024

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, May 1, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1540)

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): I call to order this meeting of the Sub-committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. It's our meeting 24, on Wednesday, May 1.

Sorry I'm late, but I had to deposit a report in the House and had to wait until Minister Bill Graham finished what he was doing.

We're going to begin our study on Sudan. We have a number of witnesses with us today. First, from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, John McNee, Assistant Deputy Minister, portfolio Africa and the Middle East, and Alan Bones, acting director of the eastern and southern Africa division. From CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, John Deyell, regional director, east Africa and the Horn, Africa and middle branch; John Jackson, program manager, Horn of Africa, Africa and middle branch; and Susan Brown, chief, peacebuilding unit, multilateral programs branch.

I think we'll start with whoever is the main speaker from each group, or you may choose to split it. Committee members of course will have questions, so the longer you talk the shorter their question period will be. So if you could say a few words at the beginning...or I guess it's more than a few words. We've already been given some information, but I'm not 100% sure how many people will have looked at it ahead of time. When you're finished your dissertations then we'll have questions from the committee members.

Perhaps we'll start over here with you, John. Do you want to go first?

Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Portfolio, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes, thank you very much, Madam Chair. We are very appreciative of the opportunity to come before the committee today as it undertakes its study on Sudan.

The situation in Sudan is, to state the obvious, extremely complex. It is not a simple north-versus-south or Muslim-versus-Christian conflict. There are no easy answers, and in our view there are no good guys and bad guys. There are problems on all fronts.

Canada has been playing an active role in conjunction with other like-minded countries to promote a political settlement to the military conflict and a durable peace. We do this through a number of channels: diplomatic contact and negotiations; peacebuilding efforts through grassroots measures; and humanitarian assistance, to name but a few.

Right now Canada's trying to take advantage of the window of opportunity that has presented itself. In the past nine months, the international community has witnessed more progress towards peace than in the past twenty years. An example of that is the recent ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, the first ceasefire that has held for any length of time; it calls for international monitors to verify conditions on the ground.

This ceasefire is encouraging, but it is only a step in the right direction. It remains to be seen whether it can serve as a catalyst for the peace process. And I have to say that despite this ceasefire, the conflict is ongoing, and indications from the field are that it is intensifying rather than diminishing.

In fact this conflict is the longest-running civil war in Africa, and its effects on the people of Sudan have been incalculable. Over two million people have died. There are over four million internally displaced. Over half a million Sudanese are now refugees in neighbouring countries. The threat of famine and disease is constant. Human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law seem to be the norm rather than the exception on both sides of the conflict.

What I would like to address briefly today is a little bit of the background, then a word about the peace process, then human rights, and then what Canada is doing in this context, if that sounds okay.

¹ (1545)

The Chair: That sounds okay. I probably made it sound like you had to cut it way down. I realize that you're here to brief us on whatever information you have, so I shouldn't have made it sound like you had to cut off at some point. Just keep going.

Mr. John McNee: Fair enough, and we will be delighted to answer your questions, or to try to.

Since independence from Britain in 1956, except for a brief period of stability in the seventies and early eighties, Sudan has been mired in a civil war that pits the Sudanese army, its militias, and dissident southern rebel factions against the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the SPLA, and a loose alliance of northern and southern factions.

The war cannot be reduced to a north-south war, nor is it true to portray it as a Muslim-Christian split or Arab-versus-black African struggle. The complexity of the situation may be more easily understood using a snapshot of the ethnic and religious makeup of the country. For instance, 70 percent of Sudanese are said to be Muslim, though only 40 percent of them are of Arab descent. So-called black Africans make up over half the population, yet less than 10 percent are said to be Christian.

This brings me to the fundamental question, what is this civil war about? Well, there is no one single issue that is the root cause of this war. On one level it is about religion and race and tribe, but it is also about the dignity of Sudan's communities. It's about the development of a political structure that accommodates the aspirations of those communities, whether a unitary state, a confederation, or self-determination for the south, and it's also about control over natural resources. At the same time, it's about power politics and the lack of democratic accountability of both the government and the SPLM.

On the peace process, over the years there have been several serious efforts to try to resolve this chronic conflict, although the harvest has been meagre. Perhaps the most promising of these was the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 that gave the south a semi-autonomous regional government that shared power with the central government in Khartoum.

The powers of the southern regional government were, however, gradually whittled away, and in 1982 Khartoum introduced shari'ah law, which provoked the latest round of the civil war.

The most prominent of the peace processes of the last decade was under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, known as IGAD. The main goal of IGAD, a grouping of countries of the Horn of Africa, is fostering economic development. This process has been the focal point for the international community, as it is the only process that has developed ground rules, a declaration of principles that has been accepted, albeit grudgingly, by both sides.

¹ (1550)

[Translation]

Recently the efforts of the US peace envoy, former Senator John Danforth, have garnered considerable attention. Appointed in early September of 2001, Danforth was given a mandate to sound out the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army and to gauge their willingness to engage in peace talks.

This US-led initiative generated some measure of enthusiasm and the United States were generally looked upon as the only party with enough weight to get the Sudanese government to take action and with enough influence to rally parties to peace. The Danforth team came up with four conditions.

Only one, namely a ceasefire in the Nuba mountains in Central Sudan, seems to have been met. An agreement to halt the bombings appears to have been broken already by both parties, according to recent reports.

Unfortunately, even though there were high expectations surrounding the Danforth initiative, the proposed measures or conditions were not linked to a formal peace process.

Canada and other like-minded countries are looking for innovative ways to bring the Danforth initiative to fruition within the broad framework of the IGAD peace process.

Despite some small measure of progress, the fact of the matter is that the conflict has intensified in the south. Tangible progress has been made in terms of getting the warring factions to take certain significant steps, but firm pressure needs to be exerted on the two parties so that progress is also achieved in areas beyond the Nuba Mountain region. We are still a long way away from reaching a broad peace agreement.

On the human rights front, the rights of the Sudanese people have been systematically stifled by both sides throughout the country. Security forces arbitrarily detain people without the benefit of a trial, and harassment and intimidation is widespread. They resort to beatings, torture and other similar practices.

Sudan has announced that it will not be a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Women have been the target of discriminatory practices in the name of the charia and homosexuality is considered a crime in the Sudan. The persecution of Christians is officially sanctioned and many groups are victims of widespread discrimination.

At the UN Human Rights Commission, Canada continues to sponsor resolutions condemning human rights violations by both parties. Specifically, the resolutions target the worst human rights violations committed by the Sudanese government, namely the aerial bombings of civilian installations which have killed many and wreaked havoc on the civilian population.

The SPLA has been accused of using hospitals, schools and emergency shelters to shield military targets.

The distribution of humanitarian aid has been seriously impeded by access restrictions imposed by the two warring parties.

[English]

To turn briefly to what Canada is doing, our value added is most evident in the contribution we can make to ensuring that the peace process moves ahead. We undertake this work in several ways, directed towards not only support for the peace process itself but also establishment of a supportive environment in which the peace process can develop.

In terms of the formal peace process, Canada, through CIDA, has funded the IGAD Peace Talks Secretariat, based in Nairobi, and has made available experts to support the work of the secretariat. Canada also works with like-minded partners such as Norway, the United States, and Switzerland to support the peace process.

Canada continues a dialogue with the Government of Sudan, through our diplomatic office in Khartoum, and with the SPLA, through their offices in Nairobi, and here in Ottawa with their representatives. We are very supportive of such innovations as the ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains. As we speak, Canada is funding the provision of trainers for ceasefire monitors in the Nuba Mountains. This is training undertaken by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

Both CIDA and Foreign Affairs are active in funding peacebuilding projects aimed at fostering a positive environment for peace efforts at the grassroots level in northern and southern Sudan. Canada continues to put pressure on both sides of the conflict in international fora, the most recent example being at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. And on many human rights-related issues, especially concerning the targeting of civilians, Canada continues to press both sides on a bilateral basis. I think my colleagues from CIDA will be able to give you more detail on the sorts of peacebuilding efforts they fund and support.

To conclude, as I mentioned earlier, there has been more progress in the last nine months than there has been in the past twenty years. But the progress so far in absolute terms has been incremental, and important challenges lie ahead. Despite the recent positive signals, such as the Nuba Mountains ceasefire, the war continues to be fought with ferocious intensity, with civilians used as pawns and victims. This has occurred on both sides, and Canada must continue to exert maximum pressure on both to stop this unacceptable behaviour.

There is also a strong need to coordinate all of the activities, whether they be regional or international, launched over the last months so that there is systematic progress towards a negotiated peace settlement. The international community also needs to ensure that the really difficult questions of this conflict, such as resource sharing and the whole federalism, separation, and sovereignty issues, are properly and fully addressed.

Finally, a partnership needs to be developed in which the role of outside parties such as the United States, Canada, regional players such as Kenya and Egypt, and the rest of the international community can be defined and sustained.

To conclude, Madam Chair, we are a long way from peace in Sudan, but we think we may be closer to being able to define a constructive path forward. To paraphrase Churchill, we may be witnessing the end of the beginning of the search for a durable peace.

Thank you very much.

¹ (1555)

The Chair: Alan, do you want to add anything to that? Okay.

Who's the spokesman over here? Go ahead, Mr. Deyell.

Mr. John Deyell (Regional Director, East Africa and the Horn, Africa and Middle Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Madam Chair, thank you.

[Translation]

CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, welcomes the committee's interest in the Sudan. As Mr. McNee pointed out, the situation in the Sudan is remarkably complex. Our policies must be based on a sound knowledge and understanding of the situation.

º (1600)

[English]

Since the foreign policy aspects are so significant, CIDA undertakes its programming for the Sudan in very close and active collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We also collaborate extremely closely with our international partners, mainly through the IGAD partners forum, mentioned by Mr. McNee, of which Canada is a core member. In this regard, I might note that we have worked very closely with Senator Lois Wilson, recently retired as the special envoy for the Sudan, providing her with specialist consultant assistance.

To what end? Well, in a nutshell, CIDA's immediate objectives for the Sudan are to reduce human suffering as well as to promote serious peace negotiations leading to a lasting political settlement. In the longer term, of course, CIDA seeks to strengthen the reconciliation and lay the basis for development, which is our actual focus, as well as to prevent new conflicts. To undertake developmental programming in these circumstances, CIDA uses three different but complementary channels. If you will permit, I will mention them briefly.

In terms of scale of expenditure, first is our humanitarian and emergency assistance, as intimated by my colleague, Mr. McNee. This includes both food aid and non-food aid. This is channelled primarily through multilateral and UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme, as well as through trusted non-governmental organizations, such as CARE and World Vision, to ensure that it reaches beneficiaries. Canada has contributed more than $110 million of this tangible support over the last decade to people living throughout the Sudan, both north and south.

Ms. Brown is prepared to respond to your questions about this type of assistance.

Second, we use our country-to-country or bilateral channel. Those with long memories may be aware that over a decade ago, CIDA had a very significant country-to-country program with the Sudan. This was suspended in 1993 over concerns at that time over the worsening human rights violations associated with south Sudan. However, in 1999 CIDA's minister at that time approved bilateral support for the IGAD process, which you've heard about, notably the official negotiations, the so-called Track 1. We have spent about $570,000 in support of these purposes.

Mr. Jackson, who was recently in the Sudan, is prepared to answer any questions you may have on this front.

Third, CIDA directs funding through its peacebuilding unit to unofficial initiatives in support of this peace process, the so-called Track 2, some of which involve Canadian organizations such as Project Ploughshares. As well, this channel supports community-based projects complementary to the peace processes, involving Track 3. The total investment over the past three years in this work has been $2.3 million, and more projects are currently in the pipeline.

Ms. Brown has assured me that she can respond to your enquiries about this type of programming.

What has been achieved? Well, the humanitarian and emergency aid has certainly contributed to a reduction in the deprivation and suffering of victims of the ongoing conflict. On the official peace negotiation front, as Mr. McNee has indicated, progress has been disappointingly slow, but our work with Sudanese civil society has convinced us that they have a real desire for peace and that a variety of organizations are prepared to help move the peace agenda forward. So on this basis, CIDA retains its commitment, largely because the potential benefits of a lasting peace make a modest and patient investment very worthwhile.

We share with our Foreign Affairs colleagues a cautious optimism about the success to date of the American post-September 11 confidence-building measures. We are also seeking opportunities to support them and to optimize their impact.

We also happen to believe that there are specific areas in which Canada has pre-eminent experience and values that could be helpful in the context of the Sudan peace process. Multiculturalism, multilingualism, freedom of religious expression, federalism, regional development transfer mechanisms--all can inform the eventual political settlement in the Sudan. We attempt to leverage these strengths by financing the programming of Canadian partner organizations for the Sudan.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here. Again, I'll point out that my colleagues, Mr. Jackson and Ms. Brown, are prepared to answer with full information if you have questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, both of you, for your comments.

I think what we'll do, just to try to make it fair, is rounds of five minutes, unless the questions and answers don't last that long.

Mr. Vellacott.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott (Saskatoon--Wanuskewin, Canadian Alliance): Thank you so much for being here today.

I'll direct my initial question to Susan Brown and then others, I guess, as you feel that you have the info to give me a response.

Along with others, I have a keen interest in this area and have followed some of the things that the U.S. has attempted to do, the IGAD process and other things. I guess my specific question comes in respect to the governments of both Canada and the Sudan.

I would ask, Susan, if you have any perception from on the ground there of Canada's involvement in promoting peace, whether that's been hampered by the Talisman involvement. What I mean by that, obviously, is with the Talisman effectively siding with the Government of Sudan by way of partnership there, what trust does Canada have from one side, particularly the opposition forces, in the engagement over there?

º (1605)

I have some follow-up questions, but perhaps you can give me an answer on that.

Ms. Susan Brown (Chief, Peacebuilding Unit, Multilateral Programmes Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): I'm not the right person to talk to about the impact of Talisman on programs, primarily because the peacebuilding unit is working with civil society organizations trying to do confidence-building in support of the official peace processes.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: I understand that, but surely you must have some sense from on the ground, in just talking to ordinary people. I'm not saying there would be official kinds of responses. If Talisman has that kind of partnership in effect with the Government of Sudan, what trust do people have, particularly in the opposition or in the south, toward the Government of Canada by virtue of this Talisman linkage with the Government of Sudan? I mean, you must have some observations or....

Ms. Susan Brown: I know in our annual consultations with Canadian civil society the Sudanese NGOs working in Canada are very concerned about the Canadian company being there. Their questions are addressed to Foreign Affairs. They believe this is a symbol of Canada's lack of concern for their plight.

Our relationship with the civil society organizations is to try to strengthen their capacity regardless of what is happening with commercial investments on the peace process, and I really think we need to pass that over to Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: And that's where I'd like Alan to respond, then. If there is a possibility of peace, but that oil issue represents, or appears to represent, a roadblock coming in the way of an agreement, would Canada change its policies in respect to Talisman if that would help the peace process?

Mr. Alan Bones (Acting Director, Eastern and Southern Africa Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): If I could go back to your earlier question--

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: And then maybe follow up on this one, if you could.

Mr. Alan Bones: By all means.

Last June I was in Sudan with Senator Wilson, our former special envoy, and we had a chance to meet with a lot of the grassroots organizations from the south. There was a major conference going on in northern Kenya at the time. We went up to meet with a number of the NGOs at that meeting.

Yes, there is considerable concern about Talisman as a Canadian company that is operating there; Canada has a good reputation, and isn't there a bit of a dichotomy there? That said, we got a very strong sense that there was a distinction being made between the activities of Talisman as a private Canadian oil company and our activities as the Government of Canada in trying to pursue the peace process.

We found that we were welcomed, that we were listened to. Most of the groups did make very strong representations to us, as they did to all the others who were present. So I think it's fair to say that although there is that concern, and Canada's name has been linked with an oil company, with the south, I don't think there's a sense that Canada as a country or we, as representatives of Canada, whether we be from the government or from the NGOs, are linked with the north.

So I don't think that's an impediment to the peace process.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Oh, okay; that was my question, then, if there is a sense that at some point, in terms of a deal breaker, if you will, the oil issue and the revenues that in effect have allowed this to carry on, and probably exacerbated the situation in terms of the extreme amount of dollars that are then provided.... The Government of Sudan has itself said that they're are using it to buy arms and all the other kinds of instruments of war.

So if you sensed along the way--and obviously you're not feeling this way at this point--that this was the deal breaker, and the oil issue represents some significant roadblock to an agreement, would you have any sense that Canada would change its policy in respect to Talisman if that would help the peace process go ahead?

Mr. John McNee: Two things. First, I do think it's hypothetical, but I think the general point is that some kind of arrangement on sharing the revenues from this important natural resource has to be reached for there to be a final settlement. Obviously, both parties have a big stake in that.

So that's what has to be reached. Who pumps it is secondary in that context. It's a political issue that has to be resolved by the two of them.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: The oil reserves are a factor in the bigger picture, though.

º (1610)

The Chair: Mr. Vellacott, you can continue in your second set of questions.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Continuing along the same lines, because I think it's important to define Canada's role and the role of Canadian companies which are 25 per cent shareholders in...In fact, most comments relate to that statistics.

What steps has the Canadian government taken, through DFAIT or CIDA, to examine this aspect of the question?

[English]

Mr. John McNee: Perhaps I could start and Alan could fill in.

As our minister said last week, under Canadian law there is no instrument that would provide for a unilateral Canadian sanction against a company doing business in Sudan. Our approach is, one, to apply sanctions....

[Translation]

I apologize for starting to answer in English, whereas your question was in French.

The Canadian approach involves imposing sanctions on the heels of a resolution either by the United Nations, the Commonwealth or a multilateral organization. That's the approach we've taken here, in the case of Zimbabwe and in other situations. Until now, we haven't had any options.

As Mr. Graham stated last week, we expect Canadian society and others operating abroad to conduct themselves as good citizens. We monitor the situation very closely.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: The committee just wrapped up a study on Colombia. As part of the study, we heard from representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, notably from Ms. Allard. She was asked to describe to us the behaviour of Canadian companies operating in Colombia and she provided us with certain answers.

You're telling me that there are no provisions allowing you to impose sanctions. First, however, have you investigated, as was done in Colombia, to see if certain allegations made were true or false? Do you make any effort to verify these claims? As I see it, there is nothing to prevent you from doing just that. Witness what was done in Colombia. Why can't something similar be done in this case? And if something was done, exactly what measures were taken?

Mr. Alan Bones: With your permission, I'll answer that question in English.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I don't have a problem with that, provided there will be interpretation available.

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: Merci.

The examination of our economic participation in Sudan is fairly limited, in part because we don't have that much commercial activity in Sudan at the moment. Far and away the largest presence we have in Sudan is in the oil sector.

When it comes to the relationship between the oil sector and the peace process, and the impact that the oil sector is having on the unfolding of civil war, I don't think there's any doubt at all. I think there's general agreement that oil has exacerbated the current conflict, but it is certainly not the cause of the current conflict. This conflict was started well before the oil exportation began. The first oil exports out of Sudan were in 1998.

I guess the question we're all wrestling with is, how do we make use of the oil revenues so they are used equitably? Any one company pulling out of Sudan is not going to stop the oil exploitation. I mean, there are other companies there that would fill that vacuum. And I'm not using that as an excuse, it's just a statement of fact. Oil exportation is going to be continuing onwards.

What we've been trying to do is find creative ways, working with other members of the international community--Switzerland, for example, has been doing a lot of groundbreaking work on this--to persuade both sides that it is in their best interests to have an accountability mechanism into which oil revenues can flow, where there is transparency in how they're disbursed.

As I say, Switzerland has done a great deal of work on this. We have been collaborating with them quite closely over the last couple of months, and we'll be consulting with other countries that are part of this process to see how we can move this forward.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Merci.

The Chair: You have about ten seconds left of your five minutes; you can come in on a second round.

Mr. Cotler, do you have a question?

Okay, Ms. Jennings, and then over to Mr. Cotler.

º (1615)

[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.): Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I'd also like to thank the witnesses for their presentations.

First of all, as for the reasons why Canada is not imposing sanctions on Talisman, if I understand correctly, we follow a multilateral policy in terms of our behaviour and actions on the international front. For the sake of policy coherence - and you can correct me if I'm wrong - we have legislation which states that Canada does not impose sanctions if an international organization of which Canada is a member has not taken similar action. That's why in the case of Zimbabwe, for example, Canada did not act unilaterally, but rather waited until after the elections were held and a elections report was produced. Is that correct?

Mr. John McNee: That's correct.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That needs to be stated officially for the record. Thank you very much.

Mr. Deyell, you stated that in some sectors, Canada has a reputation for excellence or for being forward looking and that consequently, we can play a major role not only in the peace process, but also in the rebuilding effort, once peace has truly been restored.

You spoke of multiculturalism, of religious diversity here and of our values of equality and fairness. Can you give us some examples of projects that have been subsidized by CIDA through the peace consolidation initiative which places considerable emphasis on these Canadian values in order to help the peace negotiation process and to work with people facing a humanitarian crisis? I'm talking about projects that focus on these particular issues and problems.

Mr. John Deyell: I have a list of such projects, Ms. Jennings, but I would prefer to let my colleague answer that question.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: By all means.

Mr. John Deyell: Ms. Brown.

[English]

Ms. Susan Brown: The peacebuilding unit is working on the Track 2 initiatives. Those are initiatives where we are trying to ensure that the Sudanese people are able to bring their voices to either the official or unofficial dialogue for peace.

In the early days, we started with Project Ploughshares, working with local communities on small-arms reduction programs. We also worked with the Mennonite Central Committee, which is part of an inter-church action group, multiple denominations working with the southern Sudan Council of Churches, to broker a ceasefire agreement in southern Sudan between the Nuer and the Dinka people.

We have also recently supported, through Alternatives, a peace campaign that brought women from all across Sudan to a meeting in Kenya in order to ensure that women's voices were part of the peace process. These were women from the north, women from the south, women from different ethnic and religious groups who were prepared to work together on peace. The ethnic and religious issues did not seem to get in the way of finding solutions for their programs to move forward.

We're also working with the UNDP in Sudan on natural resource-based conflict in three regions. There are nomadic people competing with pastoralists over scarce resources of land and water. This is another way in which we can use our experience to try to negotiate some agreements between the people and their central governments for peace.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

º (1620)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Robinson, five minutes.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby--Douglas, NDP): Thanks very much.

I too want to welcome the witnesses, and I want to make it very clear that in my comments I fully understand that these witnesses don't make government policy.

I certainly hope we will have the minister appearing before us, Madam Chair, at an early opportunity to explore directly with the minister the policies of the Government of Canada, because frankly, I think the policies of the Government of Canada with respect to Sudan are profoundly immoral and demonstrate the worst moral blindness I can imagine.

Today in the Globe and Mail, as I'm sure the witnesses are aware, there is an article, written by Gary Kenny, headlined “Canada's silence on Sudan is a vote for oppression”. I remember a couple of years ago questioning the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, on the issue of Talisman and the role that Talisman plays in fueling and exacerbating this conflict. Lloyd Axworthy, as minister at that time, said that if there were evidence—and I don't have the exact quote, but I'm sure you have it on file—that Talisman's operations were fueling and exacerbating this conflict, he would be prepared to bring in legislation to respond to that.

We have heard Mr. McNee saying, well, there's nothing we can do because we don't have any law. Frankly, that's an abdication, a complete abdication of responsibility by the government. If the current law is not adequate to respond to this crisis, then quite clearly the government should be bringing in legislation to do so, and they have not done that, despite the promise of Mr. Axworthy.

He also said we'd go to the Security Council and deal with this matter at the Security Council. He was just swatted out of the Security Council. That was one of the sadder episodes at the Security Council.

I have a couple of questions. As Mr. Kenny noted, our representative at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva spoke on Sudan, absolutely silent with respect to the issue of the impact of oil development on the conflict there. And our representative spoke just after the UN special rapporteur on Sudan, Gerhart Baum, had talked about how oil development was fueling the conflict.

First, why did Canada not speak out on this and reaffirm the extent to which oil has seriously exacerbated the conflict while deteriorating the overall situation of human rights? And why is Canada not prepared to bring forward legislation to respond, to give us the tools necessary to respond, to Talisman's appalling corporate conduct in Sudan?

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, perhaps I could try to answer Mr. Robinson's second question and ask Alan to address the first one, about the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.

I would put it a little bit differently, Madam Chair. I would say that we do have legislation, the Special Economic Measures Act. We have simply a different approach, which is based partly on very practical grounds, a belief that the route of multilateral sanctions is the route that is effective, and unilateral sanctions by Canada in a given instance would not necessarily be very effective.

So it's not that we don't have legislation; we have legislation of a different sort and a different approach. I realize that's not what you're asking for, but....

Mr. Svend Robinson: I just want to stop there, Mr. McNee.

Is that a shift in position from the previous government position? Because the previous position of the minister was that SEMA, the Special Economic Measures Act, clearly may not be adequate to respond, and if it were not adequate he would be prepared to bring forward legislation that would be.

So the government's changed its position.

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, with all due respect, I think Mr. Robinson's a little bit putting words into my mouth. I'd like to go back and take a look at what the former minister said. I'm just trying to explain the current approach and current policy in this regard. I'm not aware of any intention on the part of the government to bring in new legislation or revisit this question.

Perhaps I could ask Alan to address the questions about Geneva and the interventions there.

Mr. Alan Bones: Certainly.

The Sudan resolution was drafted by, I believe, Spain on behalf of the European Union, and we co-sponsored it. It was a very complex resolution that covered a lot of hot-button issues, quite frankly, on the part of both the Government of Sudan and the SPLA. We wanted to get a lot of points in there that, quite frankly, many of the other delegations at the committee on human rights didn't want to see in there.

As you are aware, it was a tight vote at the end--it passed by only one vote--and many of the African resolutions fell victim to no action resolutions in the CHR.

Basically what it boiled down to was a calculation that this resolution was probably not the best possible place to bring in the oil issue in light of all the other points we wanted to make on civilian bombardments, on persecution of females, on child soldiers, and on a whole range of other issues. It was a calculation that this probably wasn't the best place to raise that issue, quite frankly.

º (1625)

Mr. Svend Robinson: So when was it raised?

The Chair: We're two minutes over the time, I think, or a little bit over. You can come back.

Keith, did you have a question?

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt--Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Yes, thank you very much.

Mr. McNee and colleagues, thank you very much for being here today.

I think we're losing sight of the real issue here. Talisman, in my view, is not the issue. If you remove Talisman from of the picture, somebody else will go in and take over, and it will be worse, because at least Talisman is doing something, albeit small, in terms of primary health and education on the ground.

That said, I don't believe either side actually has any interest in pursuing peace at this time, which is deeply disappointing for this tragedy.

My question is simply this. I spoke to the Sudanese foreign affairs minister on the phone last year and gave to then Foreign Affairs Minister Manley a proposal that we suggest to both the SPLA and the government in Khartoum a proposal to host a summit where the SPLA reps and the government in Khartoum will sit down and discuss the issue of an unconditional ceasefire. Will you propose that to the minister?

My second question is on the constructive ideas we might have to use. Levers have to be applied. Will you propose that we approach both China and Malaysia to work collectively on the issue of putting these partners to the table to negotiate a ceasefire? The hook would be, perhaps, that their investment on the ground will be protected if they're going to be working in a more safe and secure environment.

The last question is just perhaps an update on the situation of famine. When I was in the Bahr al-Ghazal last year it was really devastating. If you could give us an update on that it would be appreciated.

Thank you.

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, maybe I could start on Dr. Martin's first point.

We'd be delighted to take back the idea of a summit, to take a look at it. I confess, I wasn't in this job at the time, so I would like to learn more about it. But we'll take it back as a representation to Mr. Graham.

Mr. Keith Martin: Please.

Mr. John McNee: Absolutely.

Maybe Alan could address the two other points.

Mr. Alan Bones: Well, just to follow up on this other point, we have been trying to establish a contact, at the level of officials in Foreign Affairs, with both sides of the conflict, especially on the SPLA/SPLM side. There have been some complications within their own political process, especially within the SPLM, which has precluded them from meeting with us to discuss this sort of thing further, but we're still trying.

We're aware of the recommendation that you submitted last year. That is something we have on our radar as something that might be useful to pursue. But it's a slow process, quite frankly, a slow negotiating process even amongst the negotiations within the SPLA/SPLM itself. So we're aware of it, and we're seeing what we can do to develop that.

With regard to leaders with the other countries, that is something else that is certainly worth pursuing. Talisman tells us that they have been doing that with their partners in the consortium to try to press this forward. Essentially the reply they got back--and I don't think I'm telling tales out of school by passing this on--is that the partners are perfectly content to let Talisman run with it, but they weren't going to push the issue very hard. We'll see what we can do on it.

Mr. Keith Martin: People on both sides, the government in Khartoum and the SPLA, at the top levels are making so much money off this conflict; I really have profound doubt that there is a desire on either side to really engage in legitimate peace talks just because of the amount of money that's being made.

Mr. Alan Bones: You're absolutely right that we have to look for creative levers to get them to the negotiating table.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thanks.

The Chair: You didn't use your whole time.

Mr. Keith Martin: The other thing was the update on the famine situation. In the Nuba Mountains it was quite bad at that time, and south of the Bahr al-Ghazal, when I was down there. We saw a lot of evidence of abject famine. A lot of people's lives were at risk at that time.

I don't know if you can update us on the situation.

º (1630)

Ms. Susan Brown: Yes, I can give you a bit of an update. Over the last two years CIDA has provided $14.8 million in food and non-food assistance to Sudan. This includes $8.1 million for non-food items and $6.7 million for food and nutrition support. Access to some of the areas in Sudan still remains a serious problem. The government either denies flights or declares them a red no-go status.

I don't have specific information on the Bahr al-Ghazal area except to say that we do have some indications of flights denied in the last couple of months. This is an ongoing negotiation with Operation Lifeline Sudan and UNICEF, negotiating access on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. Keith Martin: If you could provide those facts to us, it would be appreciated, thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): I'm just wondering whether the Canadian government agrees with the testimony of various witnesses, such as John Harker at the time, that the Talisman's presence has exacerbated the conflict. At the time, the UN special rapporteur with regard to Sudan reported as well that a scorched earth and clearance territory has been created around the oil fields and that the government has been using Talisman's oil field airstrips for attacks against the civilians. In other words, we may have a situation, if that is the case...

Well, let me just put that question, and then I will follow up.

Mr. Alan Bones: I can certainly address the latter part of your question.

The whole issue of the use of the oil field infrastructure is a complex one. Part of the problem from this stems from the fact that the nature of the agreement between the Government of Sudan and the oil consortium, of which Talisman is a member, to develop those oil fields states explicitly that the oil field infrastructure--this includes the airstrips and the roads--are the property of the Government of Sudan. They may be constructed by the oil companies, and their primary use may be for oil extraction, but they are the property of the Government of Sudan, who can use them essentially any way they want.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: No, I understand that. I'm just asking, as a statement of fact, whether the government concurs with witness testimony to the effect that Talisman's oil field airstrips are being used as a base by the Sudanese government for military attacks.

Mr. Alan Bones: They are being used, we are aware—

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I mean, I know the issues of control and ownership. I'm just asking a factual question.

Mr. Alan Bones: We are aware that the Government of Sudan uses them for what they describe as defensive purposes. Now, in the nature of this conflict, I think there has been some doubt raised in the NGO community about the nature of defensive....

We have certainly been conveying to the Government of Sudan that offensive operations should not be undertaken using oil field activities. Defensive actions have been, we know.

The Chair: Does that answer your question?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Well, I'll move on to the next question.

Recently the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, the present UN rapporteur, Mr. Gerhart Baum, said that the whole question of oil-related conflict has gone to the core of what the Sudanese conflict is all about. I know my colleague has mentioned that the Talisman issue may be a marginal issue, but it's not a marginal issue if the whole issue of oil-related conflict has moved to the core of the conflict; if Talisman is part of that which has moved to the core of the conflict; and if witness testimony says not only has the Talisman has been complicit, thereby, in human rights violations, but in fact has profited from that human rights violations and has profited by being able to operate under the protective cover of Canadian law. Is this a situation we want to continue to sanction?

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, I guess we'd say that we have a slightly different analysis. I took a stab at that initially as to what's at the heart of this conflict, and the short answer is, a lot of different and important factors. Oil is one of many natural resources that are important in the country, and of course the revenues accrue to the government and the government benefits.

º (1635)

Mr. Irwin Cotler: And indirectly to us.

Mr. John McNee: And indirectly to the company.

It also becomes then a key objective of the other side...both a share in those revenues and at times these become literally a field of contest and conflict and a military objective for the other side. We would suggest that it's the more recent factor, but this is a conflict that has so many dimensions, I don't think we'd share the analysis that it is the core of the issue.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Well, would you share the analysis that a Canadian corporation may not only be facilitating and exacerbating the conflict but also profiting from related human rights violations?

Mr. John McNee: I think that's a stretch, Madam Chair. I don't think I would go all that far with Professor Cotler on that one. As Mr. Graham said last week, we expect Talisman to comport itself as a good corporate citizen. It has signed the code of corporate social responsibility. We'll leave it to the members of the committee to be their own judges as to their compliance, but I gather they have issued an annual report in that regard, although I haven't seen it. We follow them closely.

So it's the last part of your assertion that I think we differ on.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: The annual meeting is actually taking place today.

Mr. John McNee: Yes.

The Chair: We'll read the report with interest.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: We could go on for quite some time, but I sense that your actions are somewhat restricted, not because you lack the will to act, but because of circumstance.

I have a more general question for you. I'm curious as to the perspective of DFAIT on the prevailing situation in so far as democracy is concerned. Where do matters stand? Have elections been held? Can you summarize for us the democratic criteria that are widely applied?

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: Certainly. I'll divide my answer into Government of Sudan and the rebel-held areas.

As for the formal structures of the Government of Sudan, the democratic situation is not very good, frankly. There has been a renewed state of emergency in place for a couple of years now, which essentially has suspended most of the democratic trappings of the country. Many of the key opposition figures are either under house arrest or in exile.

There is a small opposition movement that is not completely unitary, not completely one party. There is a small opposition party that is allowed a certain amount of political latitude. There is an assembly in Sudan but its scope of action is very highly circumscribed.

There is a considerable expatriate, exiled community of opposition members that runs the political spectrum, from quasi-democratic to hard, extreme fundamentalist. In the south, for rebel movements to conduct themselves in a democratic manner is virtually unheard of. It's very difficult to do so in a war situation.

There have been questions raised about how representative the SPLM is of the south, the rebel areas as a group. That is hard to get a fix on. But in a situation of a civil war it's hard for them to actually conduct an election or anything like that. So the representative of the SPLM is something that has been raised in the past.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Is there a constitution in place? You claim that this is no longer a North-South issue or a matter of religion. You also say that Talisman is not the problem. What is the problem in that case?

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: Boy, where do you start on that one?

The problem with Sudan is that there a huge number of problems that intersect, and don't intersect neatly. They break up into small fragments. It's hard to boil down, which in part addresses Professor Cotler's observation. It's hard to narrow this down to any one single cause.

Historically, in the days of the colonial administration and even before, the two areas of Sudan, north and south, were not treated equally. They weren't treated as a unit under the British colonial administration. They were essentially treated as two separate areas that were united only at the top through a bureaucratic structure.

There is the kernel of a racial conflict between the Arab-descended population, that is largely in the north, and the black African-descended population, largely in the south. But that is beginning to mix as well. Geographically, it used to be north and south, but now, because of the mixing and matching, you can't draw a line and say below this is the south, above that is the north, above this is the government, and below that are the rebels.

On top of this, you have the whole issue of resource exploitation. It's not just limited to oil; a number of other resources are subject to controversy. Teakwood in the south, for example, is one of the ways the SPLA/SPLM raises their funding.

So there's a huge number of problems, and they overlap, which is why it's so hard to find a solution. It's one of these situations where you pull one thread and three sweaters unravel.

º (1640)

The Chair: You have 30 seconds left for a question and answer.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I read in your documents and elsewhere that the South did not support independence. This implies that it does not accept the borders as drawn with other countries. In fact, you're talking about separation. I don't like that word, but in any event...Since the South has never recognized this country, the whole issue of recognizing borders needs to be addressed. Where do things stand exactly? How does the UN feel about the lack of...? I'm going back to 1956.

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: The international borders are reasonably well defined, actually. There is very little controversy about the borders between Sudan, as it is on the map, and neighbouring countries--Chad, Central African Republic, Kenya, and the others. There is very little dispute over its external borders.

The whole issue of where you would draw a hypothetical division between north and south of course is one of the big controversies of this conflict, because there has been migration and because there are so many internally displaced people. For example, there are a couple of million internally displaced refugees around the city of Khartoum itself who come from the south. There has been so much movement of the population, because of the conflict, that it is very difficult to draw a line. And this is where one of the difficulties in negotiation is coming from.

The Chair: Ms. Augustine

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke--Lakeshore, Lib.): Madam Chair, I want to apologize for coming in after the presentations.

To the witnesses, you may have been very explicit and answered some of the questions I might ask, so I won't be offended if you say, “We answered that.”

I just want to ask a very basic question. Who are CIDA's partners in humanitarian activities? What organizations, NGOs, groups, international and otherwise, on the ground and otherwise, are the partners with us in humanitarian activities?

Ms. Susan Brown: On the humanitarian assistance side, we've been working with the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the OCHA, the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs. We've been working with the International Organization for Migration, which looks at internally displaced people and migration of people, Médecins sans frontières, Alternatives, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Red Cross again, World Vision, and CARE.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Can I ask, then, for one practical “how”?

Ms. Susan Brown: On the humanitarian assistance side?

Ms. Jean Augustine: Yes. Take one organization and give us a how.

Ms. Susan Brown: I've brought a list of the projects we have supported, with the titles. For instance--

Ms. Jean Augustine: Is it just monetary?

Ms. Susan Brown: No. In fact these organizations come to CIDA for specific humanitarian activities. In some cases, if it's the Food and Agriculture Organization, they're looking at food security issues for the most vulnerable groups. In the case of UNICEF, it's emergency relief items to people who have been displaced by the conflict and who have no shelter and who have basic human needs.

Alternatives has been working with street kids in Khartoum who have been displaced from their communities.

On the peacebuilding side we've been working with Partners in Rural Development, which is doing capacity-building activities in the district of Wau in the implementation of education, health, and agriculture, trying to get those communities working again. There's also CARE Canada, Project Ploughshares, and Mennonite Central Committee.

º (1645)

Ms. Jean Augustine: My other question has to do with the Canadian position. If we say that there is an American or U.S. position, how would we put in words the Canadian position? And how does the Canadian position sit vis-à-vis the U.S. position?

You may have answered that, but is there some way we could clarify what is the U.S. position and what is our position, and how the two positions differ?

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, just to make sure I understand Ms. Augustine's question, is that a reference to the position on the conflict in Sudan?

Ms. Jean Augustine: On the conflict, yes. Whether it's the analysis of the conflict... There are things that you can identify--religion, the place of religion in state affairs, the degree of autonomy, the power sharing. Is there general agreement as to what, really...?

Mr. Alan Bones: In a nutshell, yes. There is a fair degree of concordance between not only Canada and the United States but many of the other countries that we deal with on a regular basis on this issue of the complexity of the causes of the conflict and therefore the difficulty in trying to get the parties to sit down at the table to negotiate.

For example, one of the biggest problems that has been faced over the last decade in trying to get the parties to the table is to agree on a common vocabulary. What does a term like “self-determination” mean? It means very different things to somebody from the SPLA than it does to somebody from one of the harder fundamentalist groups allied with the government in Khartoum, for example.

So there is indeed a fairly general sense of the factors that contribute to the complexity of trying to find a solution.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Mr. McNee.

Mr. John McNee: I was just thinking, Madam Chair, just to try to boil it down in a slightly different way in terms of Canada's position, we're trying to find ways to promote a political settlement to the military conflict and ways to reach a durable peace. We are very concerned and very active on the human rights front and, through CIDA, the humanitarian assistance front in a very considerable way. I think the figure is over $110 million over the last decade.

Very telegraphically, then, that is what our policy is and what we're trying to do.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Robinson, your turn again.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

I just wanted to get clarification, I guess. Mr. Bones indicated that the Government of Canada didn't feel it was the appropriate place to raise the issue of the impact of oil exploration on human rights, on exacerbating the conflict, during a debate on a resolution on Sudan. I find that a little surprising. I wonder if Mr. Bones could perhaps indicate when Canada has raised those concerns publicly.

Mr. Alan Bones: It's not that we don't raise the concerns. It's an issue of what is attainable in a negotiated document like a resolution that—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm not talking about the resolution.

A voice: But that's what he was talking about, Madam Chair.

º (1650)

Mr. Alan Bones: Yes.

So where do we—

Mr. Svend Robinson: When has Canada spoken out with respect to the concerns raised by the UN special rapporteur for Sudan, Gerhart Baum, and by many other respected interlocutors, such as Georgette Gagnon and others? When has Canada spoken out publicly with respect to similar concerns on the impact of oil exploration in terms of exacerbating the conflict and deteriorating the human rights situation?

Mr. Alan Bones: I think I would clarify the grounds on which we would be making our representations, that oil is indeed a factor that has been identified as exacerbating the controversy. Where we make our interventions in that kind of public forum as opposed to bilateral interventions is more aimed towards trying to find a constructive solution than it is about pointing fingers. This is why we have been working, for example, as I mentioned, with the Swiss to find some way—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I am not talking about pointing fingers. I'm just asking a simple question: Has Canada spoken out in any public forum, any international public forum, on this particular issue?

Mr. Alan Bones: We do, but we do it from a different direction from what you were indicating in your question, sir.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So you don't agree with the special rapporteur's criticism.

Mr. Alan Bones: I don't think I would phrase it like that. I would say that we have a different take on it.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I won't ask you to do it now, but perhaps you could table with the committee what the Government of Canada's take is on this issue. Can you do that?

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, we would be pleased to do that. I think we've been trying to do that this afternoon.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Well, it hasn't been terribly clear.

There are just a couple of other areas I would like to follow up on. You say that, unfortunately, under SEMA, there is nothing we can do, because the multilateral approach is the only approach. In Burma that wasn't the position that the Government of Canada took. What's the difference?

The Chair: Mr. Robinson, can you elaborate on that?

Mr. Svend Robinson: The Government of Canada actively discouraged Canadian businesses from investing in Burma.

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, two points. One is that I neglected to mention, and Mr. Robinson reminds me, that in terms of some of the policies the Government of Canada has undertaken--and my colleague from CIDA noted that the bilateral cooperation program was suspended some ten years ago--we do have a ban on military sales and we don't engage in the normal trade and investment promotion activities that the government provides to Canadian businesses around--

Mr. Svend Robinson: In the case of Burma, Canada actively discouraged corporate involvement.

Mr. John McNee: But I just wanted to get a backdrop, which I neglected to do earlier on, to our approach to Sudan. If you allow me, since Burma isn't in our area of responsibility, perhaps we can get back to the committee on that one.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Sure. You could explain what the difference is.

As well, I would note that our government has acknowledged that the civil war in Sierra Leone was fuelled by diamonds, and we've taken steps to try to reduce the trade in what are called “blood diamonds”. The Harker report made it very clear that oil development is fuelling the civil war in Sudan, but we've taken apparently no steps whatsoever to reduce the trade in blood oil.

I want to come back then to the question that Mr. Cotler raised as well. Just what is Canada's position with respect to the role that Talisman is playing in Sudan at this point?

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, forgive me if I repeat myself, but we have not encouraged Talisman or any other Canadian company to invest or do business in Sudan. We don't have a legal framework to impose sanctions on Talisman. Therefore, as Mr. Graham said in a meeting with NGOs last week, we expect them, within their own operations in that country and elsewhere, to behave as good corporate citizens. And we follow closely--

Mr. Svend Robinson: But are they behaving as good corporate citizens, according to the government?

The Chair: Mr. Robinson, your time's up now.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Perhaps I can just get an answer on that.

Mr. John McNee: As I say, I invite the committee to make its own judgment. We haven't seen their own report, which I think is out now, on their compliance with the code. And as other members have mentioned, there are certain things they do in terms of primary health care and education in their own areas that are commendable.

Just one small point. Mr. Robinson mentioned the case of Sierra Leone. There is a fundamental difference between the international trade in oil, which is perfectly legal and legitimate, and the illicit trade in conflict diamonds. They are fundamentally different situations.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. McNee.

Mr. Vellacott.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: I guess to Mr. McNee and Mr. Bones, from time to time I've puzzled over the name of this department--the Department of “Foreign Affairs and International Trade”. It occurs to me that at times, especially in a situation like this--and this is not the only one--it's a fairly sterile kind of hybrid, almost working at cross purposes with itself. And I think that is something that could be alleged in the case of Sudan.

For example, the minister, John Manley, used to stand in the House of Commons during question period and talk about Canada's interest there overriding...that the dominating interest there for Canada was to make sure that Talisman's employees were protected, completely abandoning the human rights component of the portfolio. I would remind you, as you appear here today, that this a subcommittee in respect of the human rights aspect. It's not international trade.

So I guess my question to you would be simply this. When the minister makes a statement like that, it just occurs to me that this is your kind of cross-purposes mandate here, a sterile mandate in respect to a situation like this. How could you possibly ever resolve the situation when the human rights component is so completely submerged in terms of--quote-- “international trade” and protecting Talisman or any other workers there? That seems to be the dominant, overriding concern.

º (1655)

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, I'd like to try to clarify a couple of things.

First off, protecting Talisman; I wouldn't agree with that as an analysis of our policy, of the government's policy.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: No, this is what the minister said in the house, protecting those Talisman workers, their employees.

Mr. John McNee: Ah, that's a rather different issue. We have a concern for Canadian citizens working abroad wherever they are. The Government of Canada's advice to those workers, our best advice, is leave, because it's a war zone and it's not safe. They, or most of them, have chosen not to accept that advice. That's their right. But the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which has an important responsibility in the consular domain to give advice to Canadian travellers or workers abroad, has given that advice.

I'm sure that's what Mr. Manley was getting at when he was addressing the situation of Canadians working in Sudan. And I can't remember the number, but it's not huge. Caring for their safety and giving them the best advice and whatever consular assistance we can is certainly extremely important.

To your broader question...

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Do our interests go beyond that when in fact the primary emphasis in a response to a question put in the House like that is that it's about our Canadian employees working for Talisman and submerging the human rights, the other folk there?

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, I disagree. I think Canada has several different important interests in this country. I wouldn't agree that the human rights consideration is submerged at all. We have a concern for those individual Canadians who are working there in a legal capacity, but I don't —

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Let me go to another line of questioning with Ms. Brown, then.

This is my concern. I think it's been raised by some other colleagues here as well. To what extent are oil revenues and the Government of Sudan's interest in oil part of the problem in aid moving to its intended recipients? You inferred something of an issue there before--can't get in, Government of Sudan doesn't allow that aid to get in the south, I think predominantly in the south. So then the Khartoum government....

I kind of have a problem here. And I know we don't want to make this too simplistic and then, on the other side of this, too complicated. But saying that there's no bad guys and good guys, well, I think we all know that. It's all relative; you know, nobody's perfect. That's pretty plain, I guess, in any theology or book of reference and so on. But the other question is--and I might come back to this after, Mr. McNee--are there some people who are badder than others in the conflict here?

I guess my question would simply be to what degree are the oil revenues, and the GOS interest in oil, part of the problem in aid moving to its intended recipients?

Ms. Susan Brown: Most of the conflicts that are taking place in Sudan are not on a grand national scale. They are small rebel incursions between different ethnic groups, the Nuer and the Dinka people. They are rebels against communities. I don't think the oil issue is the key issue for access to some of these communities.

The Government of Sudan denies access when they feel that they have a security interest to protect.

» (1700)

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: A security interest as in oil fields?

Ms. Susan Brown: No, they don't just deny flights in the oil-producing areas. They will deny them in many cases for their own reasons.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Do they tell you the reasons?

Ms. Susan Brown: No. The flight will be denied. The flight will be cancelled.

They do have a different status attached to the security situation. They usually refer to the security situation, the rebel activities going on in the area. They may or may not have military activities going on. The areas where they deny flights may have rebel activities going on with the Government of Sudan forces not being present.

So it's a whole range of issues. It's not primarily about oil. It's mostly about disputes. In some cases, I think, the Government of Sudan is using access to food and humanitarian assistance for political reasons and not for commercial or oil reasons. They're simply denying access because they don't particularly want that area of the country to have the assistance.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: The oil fields, yes.

Okay.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I believe there are four million displaced persons in total. I would imagine that there are a number of refugee camps. Can you show me on the map where most of the refugees can be found? Where are they now?

[English]

Ms. Susan Brown: There are a number of displaced person camps and refugee camps throughout the country. There are some even in the north, outside of Khartoum. I could give you more details and provide you with a report after this on where the camps are located and how many people are in the camps.

The difficulty of dealing with internally displaced people is that they are generally not subject to the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, because they are, in fact, not refugees; they are still within their country.

But there are a number of organizations that have camps, and I'd undertake to provide that information to you later.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I suggest you share this information with all committee members and that you table...

Most likely Amnesty International is involved. What other major NGOs are working in that area? I suppose you'll mention the ones that we will be inviting here to testify. Who are the major NGOS with whom Canada is involved and with whom we should be talking first, if it were up to you to make some recommendations?

[English]

Ms. Susan Brown: I think there are two areas for your inquiry. If you are interested in getting a status report on the humanitarian situation, Canadian NGOs would include Médecins sans frontières, Alternatives, World Vision, and CARE.

On the peacebuilding and conflict side, those Canadian NGOs that are working with the civil society groups to try to reinforce the official peace process and to also negotiate local ceasefire agreements would include Project Ploughshares, the Mennonite Central Committee as part of the inter-church action group, which is that multi-denominational church group, Partners in Rural Development, Alternatives, and CARE Canada.

» (1705)

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: That's fine.

Mr. John Deyell: Madam Chair, we'll send you a detailed list of these organizations.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: For my final question, the committee travelled to Colombia to view the situation there first hand. The Colombian government agreed to cooperate up to a certain point. As I understand it, the government is not very open to the idea of our going to the Sudan to meet with the people.

Mr. John McNee: Are you talking about the Sudanese government?

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Yes.

Mr. John McNee: That's a good question. I'll ask my colleague to round out my answer.

A while back, the government allowed a delegation of British parliamentarians into the country. I don't think it's beyond the realm of possibility, but in order for a committee to visit a country embroiled in a war, both parties would need to vouch for your safety.

Right now, we get the impression that the answer would be: “No, thank you”, but as for the future, who knows?

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Madam Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I apologize for my absence; I received an urgent call. You may have answered this question, but if you have, I'm going to beg your indulgence and ask you to answer it again.

All of these warring factions, including the government, are armed. Do we know where their principal suppliers of arms are, and who they are, for each one, for the Sudanese government, for the factions in the north, for the factions in the south, wherever the southern limit is? Which countries are actually supplying them with either the arms or the money to get the arms? And are any of those countries involved in the so-called peace negotiation?

The reason I'm asking is that after September 11, one of the facts of life that a lot of countries seemed to suddenly wake up to is that we had partners who were turning a blind eye to illegal activities to fund terrorist groups and activities, either within their own country or in other countries.

So I'd like to know--we must have a good idea--where they're getting their arms from, which countries, and what, if anything, Canada has done internationally to speak to that issue and to attempt to get those routes cut off.

Mr. Alan Bones: Most of the sourcing of the arms on both sides of this conflict seems to be essentially grey market acquisitions, not official arms sales from any one country or another. A great deal of it seems to originate from eastern and central Europe, but there's not much documentary evidence on this, given the nature of the trade.

To the best of our knowledge, certainly none of the partners in the peace process, or certainly none that we've been dealing with, are engaged in that trade.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And you include Libya and Egypt? As I understand it, they've come up with a peace initiative. Because it doesn't include self-determination for the south, it doesn't seem to have as much support, but there seems to be, at least in one of the documents here, an acknowledgment that they have to be integrated into the processus IGAD.

Mr. Alan Bones: There's certainly a sense that Egypt should be included in the process, in the political process, given their considerable influence over the Government of Sudan. I personally am not aware of major arms sales by Egypt to the Government of Sudan. I stand to be corrected on that, but I'm not aware of anything.

As I say, most of this tends to be quasi-open, grey market arms sales.

» (1710)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Including the Government of Sudan--

Mr. Alan Bones: To the best of my knowledge.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: --arming itself--

Mr. Alan Bones: To the best of my knowledge.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: --also from grey market.

Mr. Alan Bones: To the best of my knowledge.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And do we know where the funding to buy those arms for the various factions comes from? I presume for the Government of Sudan, it comes from its revenues, but the other factions?

Mr. Alan Bones: From its consolidated revenues.

For the rebel groups, a lot of it seems to be coming from their own exploitation of their own natural resources, in particular teakwood.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Well, exploitation of their natural resources; if I take the situation in Colombia, they've created a natural resource in terms of the drug trade. FARC is using that, and it's a whole black market.

What natural resources are they...

Mr. Alan Bones: Teakwood is the way they do it.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay, and where is their market?

Mr. Alan Bones: As near as we can figure, most of it is exported to third countries, and it gets re-exported from those countries as a product of that country.

Probably much of it is going to go out through Uganda. Whether it goes out from Uganda subsequently under Ugandan label, we're not sure, because there's a lot of teakwood exploitation in the countries in the region.

It's a bit like the problem we faced in blood diamonds, for example; once you separate it from the pack, it's hard to tell exactly where it came from.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Except that Uganda is part of the process, right? Isn't Uganda one of the countries that are part of, in French, L'autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement?

Mr. Alan Bones: First of all, they're not an active player in the process, and two, there is no legal prohibition against international trade in teak.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Chair: Do you have another question, Marlene?

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Oh, yes; small arms.

Ms. Susan Brown: I'd like to reply to the question on small arms. The peacebuilding unit has been working with Project Ploughshares on a small arms reduction initiative in Sudan. Of course, this is a cross-border issue, because as the arms are flowing across the border, children are also being abducted across the border from neighbouring states.

There is an international initiative on small arms reduction in all of its forms--it has quite a long title--and the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA are very actively engaged in implementing some initiatives in specific geographic regions to reduce small arms production activities.

One of the issues that becomes problematic is that 80 percent of the arms that are produced in the world are produced by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The small arms that are being produced in local areas are really a very small percentage of the arms flow. But we do have some activities ongoing there.

We've been doing small arms reduction programs in Mozambique and also El Salvador that have been quite successful. We've retained small arms reduction as a priority activity for the peacebuilding unit and we've retained Sudan as a priority country of interest for our peacebuilding activities.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay.

The Chair: Svend Robinson, five minutes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: After the release of the Harker report... [Editor's Note: Technical difficulty] ...engage with human rights NGOs and attempt to work with them and to establish an independent monitoring process. Is it still the position of the Government of Canada that this a desirable objective, and if so, what steps has the government taken to reinforce that concern with Talisman, since the previous attempt was a complete failure?

Mr. Alan Bones: Yes, it is still an objective of ours. We meet with Talisman at fairly regular intervals, at their request. We have been renewing these requests to Talisman every time we see them regarding an integration of the human rights monitoring mechanism, which they describe in their corporate and social responsibility report, into something that has an outside verifiable element to it so that it has greater credibility. They are considering it, but we raise it with them each time we--

» (1715)

Mr. Svend Robinson: So far they've ignored those requests, have they?

Mr. Alan Bones: Let's put it this way; they haven't yet moved to have independent monitors.

Mr. Svend Robinson: They've ignored the requests so far.

On the issue of refugees, Sudanese refugees outside Sudan, I wonder if we could get some clarification, perhaps from Mr. McNee, on what Canada is doing to help Sudanese refugees who are outside Sudan.

To conclude my questioning, I understand there's been concern that the Sudanese may have been involved in bombing a refugee camp in northern Kenya. I don't have the details on this, but the Friends of Sudan group was in touch with my office and raised concerns about this.

Mr. Alan Bones: Recently?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Apparently, yes. Again, I don't have the details, but if you could look into it....

Mr. Alan Bones: If you could share with us any information you have on that, we'll certainly follow up on that.

Mr. Svend Robinson: It's the Friends of Sudan, which I'm sure you're familiar with, that has raised the issue. Perhaps you can follow up on that.

Mr. Alan Bones: We have not come across those reports yet, but we'll certainly follow up on that point.

The Chair: Was that within the last couple of days or couple of weeks?

Mr. Svend Robinson: I believe it was within just the last few days.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

You still have--

Mr. Svend Robinson: The refugee issue.

Mr. Alan Bones: Do you have anything you want to...

Ms. Susan Brown: I think the question is, what does Canada do to support refugees who come out of Sudan? And that's not where the humanitarian-assisted...

You were talking about refugees in Canada, I think.

Mr. Alan Bones: No, I can address that.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Sudanese refugees who are in Egypt, for example, or other countries, who have managed to flee; what steps is Canada providing to assist these people?

Mr. Alan Bones: Most of our assistance in that respect goes through multilateral channels. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is the coordinating body for dealing with refugees outside of their borders.

Ms. Susan Brown: We'll get some information for you.

Mr. Alan Bones: Yes.

To the best of my knowledge, most of them are south rather than north.

Ms. Susan Brown: Is it just Egypt or the surrounding area?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Egypt is certainly one of the countries, but surrounding areas, that's right.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

Keith Martin, five minutes.

Mr. Keith Martin: When I was in the Sudan I saw a lot of evidence of Chinese small arms as well as a Hind helicopter gunship in the Lundin concession, just for your information.

Personally, I don't think the IGAD process is going to work, just because of the notion of self-determination, and the Egyptians would never go for that. So I ask you this. For 400 years peace existed in the Sudan under the Funj kings, when the south had self-determination. And maybe that's a better way to go in terms of the negotiations, because the issue of having autonomy in the south under the Funj kings and the issue of self-determination to the IGAD kills it. It's a dog that will not run.

First, if Talisman left, would that stop the flow of oil?

Second, choking off the sale of weapons...and also teak and gold are essential to choke off the money supply in this conflict. Will you get the government, our government, to propose this at the G-8 so that we can get a multilateral effort in trying to choke off that money supply that's fuelling this conflict?

The last question deals with the Lord's Resistance Army and that bloody conflict in northern Uganda. Perhaps you can let us know whether the government in Khartoum is still supporting the LRA and whether Mr. Museveni is still supporting the SPLA.

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, I think on the first point Dr. Martin raises, to our minds it's not altogether certain what the fundamental objective of the south is. Is it really self-determination or is it a form of autonomy within a federated state? I think we would share your view that this sounds like a more constructive way to go.

Our analysis is that there is a stalemate in the sense that the Government of Sudan will not be able to achieve, or it's unlikely to achieve, its objective of a unitary Islamic state in Sudan, and neither is self-determination and secession by the south realistic either. So getting them both to realize that is number one, and then from there, where do you go to work out some kind of a compromise? So I think we share your analysis on that front.

On the second question, if Talisman left, I think we share the view that you or one of the other members expressed earlier on, that if they left, in all likelihood they would sell their stake and another company would take their place. So the answer to that is no.

On the question of teak and gold, I guess we see this as a question of what is a fair distribution of the money flowing from the natural resources of the country, all of them, from cotton to teak to gum arabic, I think it's called--it goes to Coca-Cola--to oil to gold.

We have been working with Switzerland and others to try to work out what kind of wealth-sharing regimes would be fair and sensible as part of a settlement, to try to look ahead to what would be a reasonable solution rather than concentrating efforts, at least to my knowledge--Alan, correct me where I go wrong--on choking off trade in one commodity or another. We're trying to put that on its head and to look at it in a positive sense, at what would be a fair resource-sharing mechanism or arrangement.

» (1720)

Mr. Keith Martin: I just think both sides right now—I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. McNee—are making so much money off this conflict, and there is absolutely no distribution to the people who need this. Choking off the oil supply, the oil sales as well as teak and gold, might be an option, although it may not be feasible at all.

Mr. John McNee: The final point, on the LRA, Alan, please.

Mr. Alan Bones: There have been some developments on the LRA front. As you are probably aware, the Government of Uganda and the Government of Sudan have reached an understanding with each other regarding the LRA. Basically, the Government of Sudan has undertaken not to lend refuge and comfort to the LRA and the Government of Uganda has agreed to cut back significantly, to just drop its support of the SPLA.

To the best of our understanding at the moment, both sides seem satisfied with the moves of the other on that front. Uganda seems to be satisfied that Sudan is indeed cooperating in trying to deal with the LRA, and Sudan is satisfied that Uganda is doing as much as it can to throttle back on its support of the SPLA.

Mr. Keith Martin: Has it dampened down the LRA's gross brutalization of the civilian population?

Mr. Alan Bones: No, it hasn't, and that's the nub of the question now: How do you deal with the LRA when you can't talk to them?

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you.

The Chair: Incredible problem in that country, isn't it.

Marlene Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: My documents are in French. LRA stands for what?

A voice: The Lord's Resistance Army.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And SPLM?

Mr. Alan Bones: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement, which is the political arm of the army.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay. That's what I figured.

SPLM revenue or financial support comes from where?

Mr. Alan Bones: Most of their revenue support comes from exploitation of teakwood and gold as well as remittances from expatriates.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: From expatriates. And you're able to actually show that?

Mr. Alan Bones: Let's put it this way; this is what they tell us.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Finished? That was fast.

Mr. Vellacott and then Mr. Dubé.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: You had made a point earlier, Mr. McNee, about the “no bad guy, no good guy” kind of thing. I guess I shrink back when I hear that, and it's used in a lot of contexts. I want to let you have an opportunity to clarify that a little bit. Surely we can all quote Holy Writ and other places in terms of there being no perfect person, but on a scale of things, would you not agree that, when you think about the reserves and the revenues and so on that the Government of Sudan has as compared with the SPLA in the south, even if you only want to look at it on a very relative and comparative basis like that, the “badder” guys--excuse my grammatically bad language--would be the Government of Sudan, when you compare with the SPLA, in terms of the scale of things if nothing else?

I'm looking for just a short answer, if you can give me one.

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, I've been thinking about Mr. Vellacott's question, which he also posed a few minutes ago. I guess my response is that, first off, there aren't just two actors. There's the Government of Sudan, and it has allies and factions. Some of them switch sides in the same. We talk about the north and the south, but there are groups allied with the SPLA. So it's a confused and confusing picture, to some extent.

I guess Canada's concerns about the behaviour of the two principal actors are somewhat different, depending on what they do. So the hard nub of it is that they both abuse the human rights of ordinary Sudanese in ways that we find objectionable. They both have targeted civilians. They both have hindered the delivery of humanitarian supplies and humanitarian access. So I'm not sure we really can give you that judgment.

Now, maybe in terms of resources, clearly the Government of Sudan has certain hardware at its disposal, military hardware, that the rebel group, or the southern group, may not have. But in terms of behaviour, I think we find an awful lot of fault on both sides.

I mean, Médecins sans frontières just issued a report on the nature of the conflict in the western upper Nile region, and really, one of the conclusions was “a plague on both their houses”, based on behaviour, not....

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Yes. Maybe it is difficult for us to draw... and maybe that's not within your purview. I mean, if two people are in a physical confrontation and have fisticuffs anywhere in our country, I'm not sure... we get to making those distinctions. If one is pushing away and using their fists a bit, and the other has an axe or a bazooka or whatever, I think we would come to a determination pretty quickly as one being worse than the other.

But I'll go to my next question. This may not require a very long response. In implementing SEMA, if I understand you, then, we're not prepared to do anything—and I don't understand why, because there's no law preventing it—or to move on something like SEMA or some similar legislation until an international body acts first. We're not prepared to get the ball started rolling with SEMA.

Do I understand you correctly on that?

» (1725)

Mr. John McNee: Madam Chair, I guess what it says is that the underlying premise of our policy approach and of that legislation is that for international sanctions to be effective, they're effective when they're applied in a collective fashion. That's how pressure is brought to bear, and that's the approach Canada has followed. I think in this case, our view is that it would be very unlikely, extremely unlikely; the relevant multilateral organizations in this case would be the United Nations or the African union, and we think it is impossible that either one at this stage would go for a sanctions approach.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: I have one last quick question, then. Our office has had some contact, as I'm sure other members have had, over quite a number of months with people on the ground there. Some of our sources say that the bloodshed and the brutality--and I would give you my bias here--perpetrated mostly by the Government of Sudan against the people in the south of Sudan has worsened considerably in the last number of weeks. I think you're probably aware of that. As well, all of this is perhaps seen as a prelude to maybe the U.S., the Brits, and other countries moving in there aggressively to impose peace and move some kind of resolution to the conflict. But by moving the lines down to the south a little more, possession being nine-tenths of the law, you're in a better negotiating position.

Do you have any information to corroborate that from what we've been hearing from direct sources on the ground out there--one, that it's intensified, and two, that it might be a harbinger of a peace down the road once the intensity is mitigated somewhat by the international community moving in?

Mr. Alan Bones: To the first half of your question, is the conflict intensifying in the south, yes, it appears to be, just in the last few weeks. This frequently happens just before the beginning of the rainy season, when both sides struggle for military advantage. By the standards of the conflict, it appears to be somewhat more intense than usual this time around.

Mr. Maurice Vellacott: Do you have any sense that the international community is going to move in at a point...

Mr. Alan Bones: No, to answer the second part of your question, we haven't heard anything along those lines.

» (1730)

Mr. John McNee: I would add two things. First, at the same time as there is an intensification in the south, you do have this ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, which is an optimistic signal.

In terms of the international community imposing solutions, we think that unlikely, but it's clear that the Americans are taking the problem more seriously. The British are putting a lot more resources, a new sort of...and a sustained effort to try to do something. In the Nuba Mountains, as I mentioned, there's Canada's participation. Norway is there. The Swiss are active. But that's different from imposing a solution on the parties. I think we would be misleading you if we suggested that was in the cards.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

The last question is to Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Truthfully, this is our first meeting. We know that bin Laden was once in the Sudan. I haven't checked, but Canadian law recognizes the existence of certain terrorist organizations. Are some of these groups based in the Sudan? Is the Sudanese government still suspected of collaborating with certain terrorist organizations?

What is the nature of the relations between the Sudanese government and other Arab or Muslim countries?

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: It's true that Sudan has clearly had a history of support for state-sponsored terrorism up until the mid- to late nineties or thereabouts. Osama bin Laden was indeed resident in Sudan up until about 1998, I believe, when he left. There appears to be since 1998 somewhat less engagement on the part of Sudan in state-sponsored terrorism. They are still officially on the U.S. list, but I think what you'll find is that there has been a change in the political dynamic in Khartoum stemming from the fact that their oil has now become on-flow--starting in 1998, coincidentally, which was the year of the pharmaceutical bombing of what was alleged to be one of Osama bin Laden's installations.

The Sudanese government has an interest in keeping its oil on the market. In order to do so it needs to ensure that there is a minimal amount of obstruction to access to that market, and that means no sanctions against their oil, either bilaterally from the United States or multilaterally. To that effect, it appears as though they have moderated their position towards terrorism and to the harder extreme elements of Islamic fundamentalism quite a bit, but at least when it comes to their international behaviour—

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Has Canada singled out any one terrorist organization?

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: I don't think so, no.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I see.

Mr. Alan Bones: I don't believe so.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: And what of its relations with other Muslim countries?

[English]

Mr. Alan Bones: The Khartoum government, of course, has a fairly close relationship with most of their Muslim neighbours, including Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in particular.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I have just one question. Has the government appointed a replacement for Senator Wilson?

Mr. John McNee: The short answer is, no, not yet, although this is under active consideration by the minister. Senator Wilson, of course, did a terrific job on behalf of Canada.

The Chair: I'd like to thank our witnesses for coming today. We had wondered if it would take the full two hours, but I suppose it could have taken another two hours.

We have several meetings before our June break, but we'll be starting up again in the fall. I wouldn't be surprised if we asked you to come back at some point, or maybe two points.

Again, thank you very much for coming.

The meeting is adjourned to the call of the chair.