;

SRID Committee Meeting

Notices of Meeting include information about the subject matter to be examined by the committee and date, time and place of the meeting, as well as a list of any witnesses scheduled to appear. The Evidence is the edited and revised transcript of what is said before a committee. The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of the business conducted by the committee at a sitting.

For an advanced search, use Publication Search tool.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.

Previous day publication Next day publication

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

1540

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.))

Mr. Keith Rimstad (Regional Program Coordinator, Amnesty International (Canada))

The Chair

Mr. Jim MacKinnon (Program Officer, Southern Africa, Oxfam Canada)

The Chair

Mr. Keith Rimstad

The Chair

Mr. Keith Rimstad

1545

1550

The Chair

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

1555

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ)

Mr. Keith Rimstad

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Mr. Dubé

Mr. Keith Rimstad

1600

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

The Chair

Ms. Augustine

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

1605

Mr. Keith Rimstad

1610

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

The Chair

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West--Mississauga, Lib.)

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Mr. Keith Rimstad

1615

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. Keith Rimstad

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

The Chair

Ms. Rieky Stuart (Executive Director, Oxfam Canada)

Rieky Stuart

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.)

1620

Mr. Keith Rimstad

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

1625

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

The Chair

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Mr. Antoine Dubé

1630

Mr. Keith Rimstad

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Keith Rimstad

1635

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

Ms. Augustine

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Ms. Augustine

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

Mrs. Augustine

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Jean Augustine

Mr. Keith Rimstad

1640

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mr. Keith Rimstad

The Chair

Mr. Keith Rimstad

Mr. Jim MacKinnon

The Chair

Rieky Stuart

1645

Ms. Rieky Stuart

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

1655

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Antoine Dubé

The Chair

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Marlene Jennings

1700

Mr. Antoine Dubé

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

1701

The Chair

CANADA

Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 020

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1540)

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): I call to order the twentieth meeting of the Sub-committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are here today to discuss the situation of human rights in Zimbabwe.

Members will recall that two weeks ago, at our last meeting, we met with Minister Denis Paradis on the situation in Zimbabwe. Today we'll be hearing from Amnesty International and Oxfam for the non-governmental perspective.

Keith, you're by yourself from Amnesty International? You're not going to call on anybody else?

Mr. Keith Rimstad (Regional Program Coordinator, Amnesty International (Canada)): I'll be making the entire statement.

The Chair: And Jim?

Mr. Jim MacKinnon (Program Officer, Southern Africa, Oxfam Canada): I'm here with my executive director, and she can help answer any questions.

The Chair: Okay.

I'll start with you, Keith, simply because you're first on the list.

Mr. Keith Rimstad: There's always an advantage in having an organization that starts with the letter “A”. You always tend to be first.

The Chair: Before you start, perhaps I can just explain first that we want to give you a chance to talk, but not too long, because everybody is going to have questions. There will probably be some coming in and going out because of other committee meetings, etc., where there might be votes. So if you both go on for too long, there will be no time for any questions, and probably a lot of what you have to say will come up during questioning. Members will have a limit on their questions and then your answers when it comes to them. Try to understand as well that there will be others who have questions. We should have lots of time, but just be cognizant that there are others who also have questions.

Go ahead, Keith.

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I'll try to be briefer than my paper would suggest; that way we'll move into the questions quickly.

I'd like to thank the subcommittee for the invitation to come here to present Amnesty's views and concerns on the current crisis in Zimbabwe. We're deeply concerned about the escalation of human rights violations leading up to the presidential elections. Our primary concern is that the political violence directed by the Zimbabwean government and carried out primarily by its agents and supporters such as the war veterans and youth militia renders civil society at risk.

We are seriously concerned, then--and there's a real danger--that as we get closer to the election, violence will increase, and the probability of a fair and free election diminishes every day.

In terms of some of the summary concerns, I would like to move right into the issue of the elections. We feel it's very important that the deployment of election monitors remain a key element of the international efforts at this time. We were disappointed that the EU withdrew its delegation. From the perspective of both Amnesty and also the people we are talking with in Zimbabwe, it is clear the international presence is vitally important at this stage to ensure there is no serious escalation of human rights violations. I think in the case of the parliamentary elections in 2000, it was very apparent that in those areas where the international observers were able to be present the violence had diminished. So this is very critically important.

As you probably are aware in the committee, over the past year there's been a serious escalation of killings. Today's report from the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, is a good update. I think Jim will talk a little bit more; he has copies of that report for you.

Torture is also widespread and increasing. We've had reports since the parliamentary elections in 2000 of hundreds of cases of torture. Very troubling is the fact that state structures have been compromised. The police, the military, and the prison service have all been politicized. A recent statement by the head of the army that he would not recognize the results of the election unless President Mugabe won was extremely concerning.

And then of course there's the whole series of laws that were pushed through parliament recently, particularly the Public Order and Security Act, which severely limits the ability of people on the ground to participate in the elections and puts serious risk in place for its civil society.

Of course, another issue we are all aware of is the freedom of expression issue: the fact that international as well as local media have limited access; that the independent press in Zimbabwe is under extreme pressure from authorities; and that many journalists are either being forced into exile or are being beaten up--being forced to be silent.

I would like to end this bit by just stating that I think where the Zimbabwe authorities argue that land is the central issue, we would say that although it may be of concern, particularly in terms of economic and social rights, the real issue behind what's going on is politically motivated violence and a political agenda by the government to ensure they maintain power.

As to what we're asking the Canadian government and the international community to do, I think first we need to take a strong role at the upcoming Commonwealth heads of government meeting as well as at the UN Commission on Human Rights. Although the UN Commission is post-elections and the Commonwealth meeting is just prior to the elections, it's very important now that Canada work hard in taking strong efforts and working with like-minded governments in both institutions to ensure that Zimbabwe hears the international community's concerns loudly and certainly.

The other thing I want to emphasize is that at the commission we must take the lead in working to ensure a strong resolution goes forward before the UN Commission. I would argue that the Canadian government should be working closely now with the African Group to ensure it is on side for that, and that Canada really needs soon to make a statement that it will pursue this.

As I understand it at this time, the government has not decided whether it would pursue a leadership role in terms of a resolution.

¹ (1545)

We should use our influence and good relations with the SADC countries, particularly South Africa and Zambia, to ensure that these countries take a stronger stance in speaking out in support of human rights for all Zimbabweans and fair and free elections in March. We should do the same with regard to other key African states, including Senegal, Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana.

Canada can offer support to the SADC election monitoring group by providing whatever assistance is needed to ensure that the SADC delegation can carry out its mission effectively. In addition, Canada, working with other governments and through the Commonwealth, should do all it can to ensure that the Zimbabwe government allows Zimbabwe civil society organizations to scrutinize the conduct of the elections without state interference.

It's important to note here that there are two categories of observers in this, the monitors and the observer class. We would argue that people should be categorized as monitors, because the Zimbabwean government is recognizing only international observers, not monitors. It's critical here, because if you're an observer you can observe only the actual election process; if you're a monitor you can follow the ballots. After the balloting is closed, you can follow the counting. So that is a critical thing that needs to be noted there.

As part of the Commonwealth monitor group, Canada needs to ensure that the Commonwealth monitors are able to monitor and publicly report on the election in a manner that ensures its independence and an unbiased assessment of the situation leading up to, during, and after the election. We hope that Canada will also ensure that it has the ability to have an independent assessment of the election and will be willing to publicly state its views on the outcome of that election.

We in Amnesty welcome the moratorium on the removal of failed refugee claimants back to Zimbabwe, but we have concerns that visa requirements for Zimbabweans remain in place during this time, hindering travel to Canada by refugees. Before a decision is made regarding the lifting of the moratorium, Immigration Canada should hold an open, transparent, and consultative review.

I think in the longer term Canada needs to look at its strategy and action in the post-election period, particularly if the election is not fair and free. We need to consider what steps we can take and how to deal with the likely results. We have to be doing this with like-minded governments in both Africa and throughout the world.

I will end there, since I've taken a bit of time.

¹ (1550)

The Chair: Fine.

Jim, perhaps you'd like to introduce who you have with you.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: With me is Rieky Stuart, executive director of Oxfam Canada.

First of all, I'd like to thank the subcommittee for inviting Oxfam Canada to testify today.

Oxfam Canada has been working with civil society partners in Zimbabwe for over 20 years. We're deeply concerned about the current situation and its effect on the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe.

Our focus in all countries where we work is on working with poor people on development and social justice. We have seen a steep rise in social injustices in the last few years, and we are encouraged by the increasing levels of awareness within the international community as to what is going on in Zimbabwe right now.

In looking through your past minutes, I can see there's a very high level of understanding of Zimbabwe among members of this subcommittee. However, our greatest concern is with the direct results of the political and economic situation. According to UN figures, at least a half a million Zimbabweans have little or no access to food; most clinics and health care facilities have no drugs or other supplies; schools are without chalk and textbooks; and social assistance programs have ground to a halt.

Add to these numbers the over 300,000 farm workers displaced from commercial farms, people living in huge squatter camps around the major cities, and the increasing number of unemployed as the economy spirals downwards, and we have a humanitarian crisis that probably involves millions of people.

The Zimbabwean government's reluctance to allow the distribution of what little food is arriving from the World Food Programme by knowledgeable local non-governmental organizations--many of whom are Oxfam Canada's partners--the likely rise in violence during the election campaign, and the poor seasonal rains can only mean the situation will get far worse in the coming weeks and months.

The rainy season is just finishing in Zimbabwe. They're supposed to be taking in their crops, but it's been a terrible season. Starvation is looming in Zimbabwe, especially in Matabeleland North and the southern part of the country.

There are plenty of people guessing at possible scenarios should the election results go in favour of the government or the opposition. If ZANU wins, will it result in street riots or a mass out-flux of refugees to neighbouring countries? If the MDC wins, how will the army, the police, and the ZANU militias react? Whichever it is, we know that the hunger and lack of social services will be further exacerbated.

Oxfam Canada is working with other Oxfams in Zimbabwe, including Oxfam Great Britain; Novib, which is Oxfam in the Netherlands; Oxfam America; and Oxfam Australia. They are developing plans for food distribution, supplementary feeding, school feeding, medical supplies, and seeds and tools--planting needs to take place by August of this year--which will be distributed by our extensive network of partners on the ground.

In addition, we are looking at community peace-building programs. Oxfam Canada had recent experience in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, in a peace-building program following the 1994 elections in South Africa. We're also looking at a medium-term relief and rehabilitation program.

Taking this into account, Oxfam Canada would like the Canadian government to do three things.

The first is to exert political and diplomatic pressure through all appropriate channels to allow food and other supplies into Zimbabwe as soon as possible and in a way that allows organizations like Oxfam Canada and their on-the-ground partners to distribute without political interference.

Second, CIDA needs to establish a fast-reaction contingency fund for immediate emergency use, peace-building efforts, and medium-term relief and rehabilitation. The other four Oxfams are also making similar appeals to their respective governments.

Third, with the withdrawal of the European Union observers, it becomes more important that Canada obtain an independent and impartial assessment of the election result. Therefore, Oxfam Canada is recommending that the Canadian government send an observer mission as soon as possible, in addition to their participation on the Commonwealth team.

¹ (1555)

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Madam Chair and I are just back from a mission to Colombia and I must say that, after all the horror stories we heard, it will take quite a bit to surprise us, me anyway.

We looked at the case of Zimbabwe at the last meeting, and we know that the situation there is grave. I have two questions, however, perhaps because I did not understand the translation very well.

Mr. Rimstad, you said that the UN delegation has withdrawn. And you, Mr. MacKinnon, you just said that the EU delegation has withdrawn as well. Is this indeed the case? Perhaps I misunderstood what Mr. Rimstad said. Perhaps he meant the European Union. Please clear that up, and then I will have some other questions.

[English]

Mr. Keith Rimstad: If I said UN, I meant EU. The European Union's monitors have left, and that happened over the last couple of days.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: They were the head of the mission and they left on Saturday. On Monday, the European Union imposed their sanctions--

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Last Saturday?

[English]

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: Oui.

On Monday, they imposed what they called smart sanctions on 20 of the highest officials in Zimbabwe, and on the next five years of development assistance. There was also a military ban, and I think a couple of others.

That happened on Monday afternoon, and by Tuesday the 40 observers who were on the ground in Harare were on a plane back home to Europe.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I understand the situation. However I think this still makes it a bit more difficult for us to recommend that the Canadian government send observers, since the EU people who were already there have surely withdrawn for good reasons. I am trying to find additional arguments in favour of our request.

I would like to know whether it was felt that the situation was too dangerous for them, or whether the EU wanted to apply sanctions. In other words, why would we want to do something the Europeans no longer want to do? I am open to suggestions, but I would need to hear additional arguments.

[English]

Mr. Keith Rimstad: On this issue, from Amnesty's point of view, international monitors particularly are vital to ensure that the escalation of human rights violations does not go to great extremes. There's a real danger here that without an international presence, that will happen.

The Commonwealth monitoring group is a very small mission. The EU group was the largest mission, next to the SADC mission. There were problems with the SADC mission the last time, in 2000. So on the ground in Zimbabwe, I think the reports would indicate there is general support for the sanctions, but there is not a lot of support for the removal of the monitors, simply because without those monitors there's a real risk that an escalation in human rights violations will take place.

In terms of danger, I don't think the EU left because of any particular threat of violence toward them. They left for political reasons related to the failure of the government of Zimbabwe to meet the criteria the EU had set. In particular, I think the removal of the head of the mission, the ambassador from Sweden, was the key reason for their departure. So it wasn't because of violence directed at any of the particular monitors, as far as I know.

º (1600)

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: No, it wasn't the violence. The first condition the Zimbabwe government put on the European Union's mission was that there would be no people from Britain. They said okay and they sent the mission to do preparatory work. Then they put on new conditions, no observers from Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Germany--I think it was six countries altogether--and this was enough for the European Union to say “You're not continually renegotiating this”.

It's very unfortunate, because I think as Keith has said, it's very important. The more international observers there supporting local observers--and supporting should be highlighted--the more international observers support Zimbabwean observers from church organizations, from human rights organizations, the more of them they have, the more it gives them the confidence to be able to undertake their job; but the local observers are key.

In the parliamentary elections in June 2000 there were about 8,000 local Zimbabwean observers and approximately 400 international observers. The largest group of international observers by far was from the European Union. Losing this contingent of 150 is a major blow. Therefore, it has to be made up. A very constructive thing for the Canadians to do is to support additional observers, maybe from Canada, but from other places as well, and push this as quickly as possible, because we're down to 18 days until the election.

The Chair: First on the list was Jean Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke--Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to commend the work of Oxfam and Amnesty International in this regard. At the same time, I think the situation in Zimbabwe and the recent turn of events is very troubling for all of us.

I want to ask a couple of questions. What is the leverage of Canada? When you say Canada should do this, that, and the other and the next, and you laid out three or four things, what leverage do we have to influence the issue of freezing assets, restricting travel, an arms embargo, and all of those things that seem to create...? At this point in time, it seems Canada is not in this ballpark. Therefore, the question is, how can we exert, and what do you see as, leverage?

What is happening, and what do you project might be happening on the issue of food security there? How do we, as Canadians--and you as Oxfam Canada or Amnesty International, in terms of this issue...? How do you see yourselves working to ensure that a food supply gets into the appropriate areas should things go otherwise?

I'll throw my next issue out. You differentiate between election monitoring and election observing, and it seems to me that what you're recommending is that we be observers and not monitors. I was a little bit unclear whether you were asking us to support SADC and the other underground groups. Were you suggesting that we support them in the monitoring and that we send observers? Could you speak to this issue, please?

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: As to Canada's leverage, I think it's very important that we have a number of different avenues. One of the first ones in southern Africa is through the Commonwealth, and I think we can have a very good influence. We are seen as an impartial middle power that can be very influential with other countries, like the United States and Britain. So I think we can be very influential within the Commonwealth.

But also, the point we were trying to make is that the Commonwealth is one good avenue and we should continue to push that. We have three Canadians on the 50-member delegation, and I think that's very good.

In addition, we need an independent voice, because sometimes with these types of missions you can be compromised at a certain level because you have a lot of different interests to try to please. We just think it would be a good idea for Canada to have an independent voice.

Around food security, there are specific cases coming out now from our partners. A very high level of children in Matabeleland, as well as Masvingo and parts of Manicaland, are not going to school now. They are too weak. They are not able to go.

People knew they were going to run out of food. There were alarm bells from the UN agencies and from independent assessments as far back as a year ago that there was going to be a food shortage by October or November of last year, and it came true. As for food right now on the shelves in the cities, there's no mealy meal; there's no oil. There are a whole bunch of shortages, and if it's short in the cities, you know the rural areas are far worse off.

The problem is, as we all know, food becomes very politicized, especially in delivery, and moving in outside of any urban centres right now is extremely dangerous. These youth brigades have set up roadblocks. Church organizations trying to get out, a number of different agencies trying to get out on the ground are having a very big problem. That's one of our recommendations, that people--organizations, both international and local--must be able to have access, because people are starving.

I will now pass it on to Keith, who I think can speak more about the first two points, as well as about the observers and monitors.

º (1605)

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I want to talk a little bit about Canada's leverage. Certainly directly on the Zimbabwean government, our leverage is relatively limited. We could go the route of looking at the path the Europeans have taken, and possibly the U.S.

In terms of Amnesty International, we don't take a position on sanctions per se. We're neither for or against, so I can't comment on that.

Where I think we do have leverage, though, is in terms of our good relations with SADC states that have greater leverage on the Government of Zimbabwe. Certainly President Mugabe has made it very clear he does not respect interference from outside unless it's from African states. He also made a comment earlier this year where he stated, “Who are these people to tell us what to do? The UN hasn't brought it up.” So that's why it's important to bring Zimbabwe before the UN and have a debate there about Zimbabwe's track record with regard to human rights. A very good opportunity to do that will be at the commission. That's why we're arguing that Canada should take the lead on that. It's very important to do so.

I think President Mugabe has been very effective at dividing opposition to his policies, not so much inside the country, but certainly outside in terms of the divisions and the tendencies of countries to downplay in public their concerns. So I think Canada does have leverage, but it should be within the context of the region, talking to the countries I mentioned and to other like-minded countries to maximize the pressure on the government.

On the issue of observers and monitors, under the current electoral laws, which have just recently been changed, there is a distinction between who is a monitor and who is an observer. That distinction is related to what you can do or say.

The monitors follow the ballots from the point that they go in the box to the point that they get counted. Those people who are monitors are only people who were officially appointed by the Government of Zimbabwe from the public service and various ministries. There is no independent monitoring taking place in Zimbabwe during these elections. That is a grave concern.

The observers--the international observers, as well as the local observers--don't have the right to follow the ballots. What we would argue is that pressure has to be placed on the Government of Zimbabwe to change that to allow for observers to follow the ballots to ensure that there is an independent oversight over the counting.

In the 2000 elections, it was that very fact, that they were the on-the-ground local observers who followed the ballots--who reported on the fact that there were attempts at stuffing the ballot boxes--that ensured the election turned out as well as it did, and even then there were problems. So that's where I think the issue is.

Jim, did you want to say more about that?

º (1610)

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: With respect to those two moments in February 2000--when they had the referendum and also the June parliamentary elections--Keith is right; the major component of why those both were free and fair, or as free and fair as possible, was the fact that local monitors were able to follow. It was in the last legislation, around electoral laws, that the Zimbabwean government made the distinction between monitors and observers. People were using them interchangeably, but now part of the electoral law in the country defines this, as Keith has said.

I think that is key. Very often their focus is on what internationals are allowed to do, but from everything we're hearing from our local partners, it's what the non-government civil society and local NGOs are allowed to do. They are the ones being barred right now, and that is very worrying.

The Chair: Ms. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West--Mississauga, Lib.): Why was the Swedish ambassador removed? His visa expired, I know, but what reason did they give for removing him?

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: The reason given by the Zimbabwean government was political arrogance. He was the head of the European Union delegation for the June 2000 elections. I don't think the Zimbabwean government was pleased with him at that time, and when the European Union named him as the head of the mission this time, it raised eyebrows among both Europeans and Zimbabweans, I think.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I can identify with that kind of response.

I have two questions. One, how many EU observers will we be missing now, 150? And two, where do you expect that those can be picked up?

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: I don't think they will be. At this late date, trying to organize that amount and that major a contingent is impossible.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I'm jumping way ahead of the gun here, and making some assumptions, but I would think that when this election is over, to rule it fair and democratic is going to be highly unlikely, just as with Sudan. What, then, will be the western world's reaction to this? Should we be boycotting them and treating them the way we have treated the Sudanese government, or...?

I know there are answers there, and you know better than anyone the need for answers there. Let's talk about after.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: I think the main answer is to be prepared. Look at the two or three major scenarios that are likely, be prepared as a government, and don't be surprised by a certain scenario that comes out. Do your homework and be prepared. If he announces, yes, he won, and everyone is saying no, what is Canada's response going to be? If the opposition wins and the army is out on the street, what is Canada's reaction going to be?

So I think you have to go through those various scenarios and be prepared, and not be taken by surprise.

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I think on this, certainly no matter what the results, we can expect the situation to get very dangerous in the post-election period.

In terms of an election won by the opposition, the military has already made it clear they won't accept that. So we can assume they will act. If the government wins, which they're doing their best to ensure they do, then I think we can expect there will be repercussions for any of the perceived opponents, be it those who are running for election or be it those who voted for them. We can assume that the human rights situation on the ground is not going to improve, because this is not just about the election; this is about maintaining power. We can also assume that if the population believes very clearly that it was not fair and free and that the government stole the election, there will be public demonstrations that will result in a severe and harsh response by the police and the military, and then probably an increase in the violence by the paramilitary forces, the war veterans, and the youth militia groups.

So if we're going to do something now, it is to be talking to the front-line states. In the worst-case scenario, the outcome of this is there's going to be a massive flow of refugees across the border to Zimbabwe into the front-line states around Zimbabwe: South Africa, Malawi, Botswana. These states don't want to deal with that.

So there is a self-interest here to ensure that the elections are fair and free, even though they are rather tentative in their criticisms right now. And I think it's now that we should be talking to them and pushing hard to ensure that we're there for them. If the worst-case scenario happens, they're going to need assistance. They're not going to be able to handle the refugee flow. And it would be a disaster if people who are crossing the borders or attempting to cross the border to Zimbabwe into other states are being turned back because those states can't deal with those numbers. We should be promising to provide support.

º (1615)

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So what you're saying is we should be gearing up for the almost-inevitable?

Mr. Keith Rimstad: Well, we should be ready for anything.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: Oxfam Canada is doing that. We have set up an Oxfam International Crisis Committee--five Oxfams that are working in the country. Oxfam Canada is chair of that. We are setting out contingency plans around the refugees Keith is talking about--dealing with the South African government, about what they are doing. They're already establishing a camp on the Zimbabwean border. What's the Botswana government going to do with refugees?

So we are planning now for some of the worst-case scenarios that could happen. And we are asking the Canadian government to work with your fellow parliamentarians in South Africa, in Malawi, in the Commonwealth countries. Every country in southern Africa is a Commonwealth country and it is one way that Canada can be very influential.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

The Chair: Did you want to say something? Sorry, Ms. Stuart.

Ms. Rieky Stuart (Executive Director, Oxfam Canada): Yes, I was just going to say this. To go back to Jean's question about what can the Government of Canada do and what is our leverage, I want to reinforce what both Jim and Keith have said. Our direct influence on this is probably fairly slight, but because of the way it's being constructed as an African versus non-African issue, at least by some of the parties, then one of the things Canada can do is use its good offices, both through the Commonwealth and through other parties, to try to frame it differently. From what we are seeing, this is not an “African versus the rest of the world” issue. And the more we can be working behind the scenes and in the Commonwealth fora, in SADC, in the UN, to try to reframe it as an issue of free and fair elections and as an issue of not punishing the civilian populations, the stronger we will be.

The Chair: Ms. Jennings.

[Translation]

[English]

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to thank my colleague

[Translation]

Mr. Dubé for letting me go ahead of his second turn.

[English]

I really appreciate what you had to say, Ms. Stuart, about the importance of not allowing Zimbabwe to continue to push that it's an African versus non-African issue. As we know, it's not. The fact that all three of you are suggesting that while Canada does not have a great deal of leverage directly with Zimbabwe, Canada's good reputation as a middle power and an impartial state on many fronts could provide leverage with the Commonwealth countries.

My question is on the issue of the SADC, the South African development communities. You've said they're not equipped to handle, quite possibly, what's going to happen with a massive outflow of refugees. At the same time, if I'm not mistaken, they have not been particularly vocal with their neighbour, Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwean government and officials about what is going on there.

How is Canada going to use its good offices within the Commonwealth? I really do think Canada should take a lead within the Commonwealth, or attempt to, depending on the outcome of the elections and an independent report as to whether there were fair and impartial elections.

The countries that are immediately surrounded within the region, who are directly concerned with what is going to happen in Zimbabwe, are not taking a lead. Does Canada have any leverage directly with those countries? They can be a major player. Do we have any leverage directly with them, and if so, what is it?

Secondly, I think Canada should also take a lead in terms of the United Nations Commission and look at the possibility, as you suggest here, that there should be an independent investigation that takes place, because it hasn't happened. You propose that CIDA should establish a fast-reaction contingency fund. Could you give me more information about what you see that kind of fund doing? Do you already have an idea as to how money should be dedicated to the fund?

It's Canada's leverage with the development communities that surround Zimbabwe, or immediately neighbouring Zimbabwe. What kind of influence and leverage do we have directly with them to encourage them to take a stronger lead? The second question is on CIDA and the suggestion for the fast-reaction contingency fund.

º (1620)

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I think we're both going to answer the first question regarding the leverage. Then I think Jim is going to follow up with the CIDA issue.

In terms of the issue of leverage, I would argue that it's very important for Canada to be talking directly right now with the states in and around Zimbabwe in SADC--specifically Zambia and South Africa, I think, are critical. The problem with the SADC approach has been the quiet diplomacy, and the hope that by taking forward the quiet diplomacy approach, it would result in some efforts by the President of Zimbabwe to agree to at least allow for a relatively free and fair election.

Clearly, the quiet approach isn't working. I think it's fairly obvious that the Government of Zimbabwe's intent is to win the election no matter what the circumstances. It counters any real possibility of a fair and free election. The fact of the matter is that the government is placing all these things into law, in terms of the set-up of the militia and the kinds of actions and repression taking place. It's clear they don't believe they could win it through the normal process. I think really it's talking with those states, South Africa and Zambia, working together to find the solution. We need some very vocal pressure now.

I think Jim can go into more detail on the other issues.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: On your first point, I think SADC are in a difficult position, and I think President Mugabe, for years, has played the nationalist card very well, the poor colonial country. He continually goes after Britain and plays the race card on an ongoing basis. That plays well with some other countries.

Within that strategy, I think Canada can work with certain countries that have influence and have tried a bit more than quiet diplomacy. There has been movement at certain times with South Africa. They seem to take one or two steps forward and then step back and then a step forward and a step back. At certain times they're trying, and I think we can try to support that.

In a country like Mozambique as well, President Chissano has been very helpful. I think this applies to Botswana as well. Right now you can't count on much support from Zambia because politically they're in quite a mess themselves. Malawi has been very disappointing and so has Namibia. But I think if you focus on Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa, not take SADC as a whole but look at individual members, I think that's the way to go.

On the CIDA fast-track contingency fund, there have been mechanisms. I think what we're proposing here is mechanisms that are fast and very responsive in a very quick fashion, both in the short term around medical supplies and food, so that quick decisions can be made within the Canadian government, and then also quick decisions made for the medium term around seeds and tools, restocking vaccines and things necessary for the health care system.

As I said, what we're mostly pushing for is mechanisms under which good programs can go into a certain mechanism where people can make very fast decisions. We have set that up ourselves, as Oxfam, because various.... The Netherlands have had negotiations with their government, and Britain as well. So I think that's what we need to be able to turn around.... If things do change, we are ready; the Canadian government is ready.

º (1625)

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Ready to move in.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: Very quickly.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Have you had discussions with officials from CIDA?

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: Yes, we had meetings on Monday morning. My understanding is that they've had meetings with other departments within CIDA. So yes, it has moved forward.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: You're welcome.

The Chair: Thank you very much. I have two short questions, and then we'll go on to Mr. Dubé.

Apart from the removal of the EU observers, would you support the EU sanctions? And if the sanctions are imposed, how would this affect your ability to get food in or to deliver assistance of any kind?

Maybe Jim first.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: Support the sanctions or not support.... The key is if this was a year ago, I might support them. But now I think it's too late. The EU sanctions will not affect food aid into the country. They are very targeted sanctions toward.... The actual sanctions have targeted 20 individuals and frozen bank accounts of 20 individuals. Actually, in the sanctions they've named those individuals, and they're not all parliamentarians. There's a whole wide range of people in that.

In the short term, it's too close, and it's unfortunate that the observers on the ground were tied to this. So for many reasons, I don't feel sanctions at this moment are right. It's just because it's too late.

The intent of it was very good. I think trying to hold the President and the country accountable to what they have said before, what they have signed.... Zimbabwe signed the protocol around elections, the SADC protocol around elections, and they are not following it. There are a variety of things they have stated, and I think that's what they have to be held to.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I am not an expert on Africa. My questions may be off the mark because of a lack of knowledge. We heard you speak about the positions taken by the European Union, about the importance of working with SADC countries, but you did mention what the United Nations is doing vis-à-vis these different organizations.

Both of you represent NGOs and must maintain a certain neutrality in your dealings with any government in order to be able to intervene in any situation. But what is the UN doing right now? Does it have a delegation? You spoke about the withdrawal of the European Union observers from the process. Have any other observers been sent by the UN? Has a mission been organized, or is one planned, or is there nothing in the offing? What are people saying right now?

º (1630)

[English]

Mr. Keith Rimstad: The UN isn't participating in election observing, at least in this case. Certainly from Amnesty's point of view the next opportunity for the UN to take a strong position would be at the UN Commission on Human Rights.

There was some debate in the general assembly but it wasn't very extensive. In terms of the institutions within the election monitoring process, these have been regional institutions such as SADC, the EU structures, and the Commonwealth. Those types of institutions have taken on this role.

As for the UN itself, I'm not sure what the very specific UN programs have been doing, such as the UNDP. I'm certain that the UN within the region is concerned about both the issue of impending famine as well as refugee movements. Jim might have more details on this; I don't.

Certainly from Amnesty's point of view, we really need to push at the commission, which is really the one opportunity now to speak strongly and to push hard for a very strong resolution that addresses the human rights concerns on the ground.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: The UNDP is there. It has a pretty strong presence. They attempt to do a coordination role. They do things round elections.

The World Food Programme is another body there. There were very long, difficult negotiations between the World Food Programme and the Zimbabwean government around the distribution of food by the WFP. The WFP thought it had a deal, and it took another six weeks before it had actually signed a deal. The Zimbabwean government was putting serious restrictions on who the World Food Programme could work with. It didn't want the WFP to work with this organization or that organization, saying they were too political. So it was a very long process.

Both the UNDP and the World Food Programme have had a lot of difficulties with the Zimbabwean government.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé I will try another question. The UN has maintained a certain presence with respect to food aid and so on. If the UN is completely absent from the electoral observation process, are you not afraid of the possibility of—I will say it—massacre. If my understanding is correct, regardless of the outcome of the elections, there could be violence during or after.

I am going to ask you two or three questions in a row.

Going by past experiences in neighbouring countries on this continent, is anyone, anywhere, planning action to prevent massacres? Perhaps I am prejudging, but is there a possibility of massacres? If so—we know how long this takes—we should perhaps even anticipate the worst-case scenario. Have you heard of any such preparations? Finally, are the Americans, who are usually concerned about everything going on in the world, concerned about Zimbabwe?

[English]

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I'll try to answer some of the questions.

I really don't know. You'd have to speak to the specific governments, including our own, as to what the detailed plans are in a worst-case scenario. Amnesty would urge governments to be ready for the worst-case scenario, but we wouldn't be in a position to specify all the detailed actions they must take. We would recommend certain specific things that are needed to protect human rights.

We are arguing at this point that, regardless of how one wants to look at the election, we have to see it in the broader context of what's going to happen now at the election, and more importantly, in the post-election. This problem isn't just because of the presidential election happening in March. It's important for governments to think in the longer term of how to deal with it and with all the possible consequences, and to work with other like-minded governments on a strong strategy to ensure that, regardless of the outcome of the elections on March 10, there is not an escalation of human rights violations.

º (1635)

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: I'll answer that.

I agree, it's very hard to...you have to be prepared, but this scenario is very difficult.

Surprisingly, the Americans have been very good in Zimbabwe. They were the first ones to draft....The European sanctions were basically modelled after the Americans'. The Americans passed the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill before Christmas, they just had not enacted it yet. The President has signed it. So they were at the forefront.

On the ground, around development and initiatives, the transition fund out of the USAID has actually been very good, very progressive, and has done some remarkable things over the last two or three years. So as I said, surprisingly, the Americans have been very positive in Zimbabwe.

The Chair: Is there anyone else?

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Madam Chair, I am a little surprised. Two weeks ago, there was a motion concerning this country. The individual who put it forward is not here today, and the opposition ranks are a bit sparse. I think that we may speak about a proposal made publicly. May we ask their opinion of it, or is that not permitted?

[English]

The Chair: Does anyone want to comment on this?

Ms. Jean Augustine: Madam Chair, again, it's asking a question so it can help us to make some decisions from the answers we hear. For example, if we were to say to you, should we at this point in time call for the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, what would be your reaction to that?

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: I think there is an unfortunate timetable over the next couple of weeks, with the Commonwealth heads of state meeting happening three days before the Zimbabwean elections.

Ms. Jean Augustine: That's not the kind of issue we should be looking at.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: Well, I'm not saying you shouldn't look at it. You should look at it as a possible scenario after and be prepared. The timing of this could not be worse.

Ms. Jean Augustine: What other questions can we ask? These are some things we're grappling with as a committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: In his resolution, Mr. Martin moved that Zimbabwe be suspended from the Commonwealth, that all international travel by Mr. Mugabe and members of his government be banned, that the personal assets of Mr. Mugabe and his close collaborators be frozen, and that an arms embargo be imposed on Zimbabwe. What do you think of this proposal?

[English]

Ms. Jean Augustine: That was done by the EU.

Mr. Keith Rimstad: Amnesty has no position on boycotts or sanctions. We don't take a position either for or against. There is the issue, though, of arms transfers. In the context of any arms sale Canada makes to another country, we are obligated to ensure those arms do not get into the hands of individuals who then commit human rights abuses. We've raised this with the government before--the tightening up of arms legislation to ensure this--but in this context I'm not sure if we currently have any trade in arms with Zimbabwe.

But in this case it's likely Amnesty would be supportive of arms control, certainly with regard to Zimbabwe, to ensure that no arms get into the hands of individuals who then use those arms to commit human rights abuses.

º (1640)

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Here is a related question. We are talking about European Union monitors who have had to return home. In one case, Zimbabwe sent home a head of mission.

Is anyone suggesting that we recall our high commissioner to Zimbabwe and send Zimbabwe's high commissioner back home? What is your opinion?

[English]

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I think the government would have to evaluate the decision in terms of what would be most effective. From our point of view, it's very important to maintain a presence of international observers in Zimbabwe at this critical moment in time. Certainly the embassy does provide that presence for the government. I would think therefore that would have to be a factor to consider before any decision is made with regard to withdrawal.

The Chair: Can I just see if I can get him to clarify that?

If we were in a position of trying to make a decision about whether we would ask our government to make a stronger statement than has been made up until now, if we did do it, could or would this affect our ability to be effective afterwards, after the election, no matter what happens? Is it better to do nothing or to do something like the EU has suggested or has done? Can you give us a feel of whether you think it might be better to make no statement, for us not to suggest this? Is that vague enough?

Mr. Keith Rimstad: I would say that in any case where there are human rights abuses taking place that people are aware of or that the government becomes aware of, we should condemn those.

In the context of the election, I think it's very important to keep in mind why we are making the statement. Is it because we feel we have to make a statement? What are we trying to do? Both Jim and I have made recommendations as to what the government can do and should do, and I will reiterate those if you wish. But if you're looking for a more dramatic statement, such as whether or not to withdraw the high commissioner, I think really it has to be evaluated against what your intended objective is. A concern would be simply that the embassy does provide us with an on-the-ground presence that can report on this, and I would hope the ambassador will be able to do so.

The Chair: Jim.

Mr. Jim MacKinnon: It should be noted that even in the long, dark days of the relationship between Zimbabwe and the British, there has never been talk of withdrawing their high commissioner. Even after this, I've heard no talk of any of the European nations withdrawing their high commissioners or ambassadors.

The Chair: Did I get an answer about what effect a stronger suggestion on our part would have or could have after the election?

º (1645)

Ms. Rieky Stuart: No one knows--

The Chair: Will it do more harm than good?

Ms. Rieky Stuart: --what will happen after the elections and what the state of unrest, violence, or human rights violations will be. We know there will continue to be food shortages. I think you have to weigh your decision again, in terms of impact. This is not something that if you don't do it today you can't do next week, or in two or three weeks.

From where we sit, our obligation is to support ordinary civilians who are being affected by poverty and human rights violations in Zimbabwe. If the best way to achieve that is by withdrawing, then that is the decision. If there are other ways to do that, you will know far better than I what the possibility is of trying to work with your counterparts in other SADC governments, other African governments, or in the UN, to bring some pressure for moderation to bear in Zimbabwe. So you are in a better position to judge than we are.

Our concern is around violence and poverty in Zimbabwe. In my history of this work, in terms of Canada's position in general, even where Canada has not kept open formal relations, they've kept some capacity for informal discussions, through either NGOs or neighbouring states. They've left the door open a crack. As to when and how, you would know that far better than I, from your colleagues in Foreign Affairs and elsewhere.

The Chair: Thank you very much. I think you've given us a very good overview and helped us decide what we're going to do about some decisions we have to make.

There are no more questions now. We thank you very much for coming here today. We may be in touch with you again, if we have to get some more information. Thank you very much.

We'll take a break.

º (1652)

The Chair: We'll resume the public meeting.

We have heard the witnesses we planned to hear for our study on Zimbabwe. We have one motion on the floor that we ask the government to make a statement. Mr. Dubé would like to say something. We just have to decide if this is where we're going, or if we're going to say something or not.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: There are two things. First, I thank people for having allowed me to raise the issue. Mr. Martin's motion may be well-intentioned, but I would like to see it disposed of neatly, perhaps by tabling it— I move that this motion be tabled, and I will have another to suggest to you. Even if the 48 hours' notice is not respected, I feel that it is urgent that action be taken in this matter. I do not know whether you would be prepared to agree. I have written something that I could read out to you.

[English]

The Chair: If we do, we'd have to have unanimous consent. Would you like to read it? We have quorum.

I suggest we hear the motion and then make comments on whether we should stop now or accept his motion.

Monsieur Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I could have put lots of “whereas's”, but I hereby move as follows:

That the Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development call on the Government of Canada, through the Foreign Affairs Committee:

1. to denounce immediately the human rights violations in Zimbabwe and to present or support a resolution to that effect at the next session of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva;

2. to consider the possibility of sending observers during the next elections in Zimbabwe, if an international mission is organized for this purpose;

to consider allocating part of the $500 million fund for Africa for special humanitarian aid for the people of Zimbabwe, who are already facing famine.

I realize that I have not given 48 hours' notice, but that is basically my position. I have understood very well what they said, about taking action encouraging more communication, more dialogue, much as was done in the case of Colombia. With a government like this, that is not the way to go.

So we must keep talking and remain prepared to help—There you have it.

º (1655)

[English]

The Chair: Comments, anybody?

Ms. Jennings.

[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I appreciate your good intentions, but I have a few problems. First, there is the issue of the $500 million Fund for Africa. This money is intended for the new African initiative the government decided upon.

If you don't mind, I prefer that we take the time to examine your motion more closely.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: You know that the Sub-Committee on Human Rights is not the place for partisan politics. My objective was simply to say that I would agree to that, and not to burn bridges with—

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Personally, I would like to have the time to study it, and I think that a much more detailed debate next week would be useful. With everyone's ideas, we could come up with a resolution that would be sure not to pose any problem. We could reach a consensus and perhaps even unanimity on a resolution.

I think that we are going to work well together because everyone is on the same wavelength. We want the Government of Canada to do something, but we want what we propose to be feasible and potentially beneficial.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: You will have my co-operation.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Very good. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Really, the next meeting would be to study the Colombia report, but we will allow half an hour to discuss this. Mr. Dubé will send it to the clerk so that we do have 48 hours' notice and it can be translated, if that's okay with everybody.

Are there any comments?

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I do not have to have the credit for it. Mrs. Jennings, we could perhaps get together. However, I think you are not the best person for this, being a parliamentary secretary. It would perhaps be better if I worked with— In any event, I will suggest something and show it to you informally.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I could get back to you with something and we would try to—

Mr. Antoine Dubé: But something needs to be done next week, because after that there is a one week break. I think that a message needs to be sent by someone—

[English]

The Chair: There is another matter before us, so perhaps we could have a motion to remove this motion from the table. Mr. Martin's motion is already on the table, but we have a quorum here that...or we could deal with both next week.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: No, that is absolutely—

[English]

Ms. Marlene Jennings: It's not a good motion. As Mr. Dubé said, I think he and everyone else around the table understands Dr. Martin's intentions, which are the best of intentions. However, I don't think this resolution is one that I can support, and my sense is that no one else around here can support it.

» (1700)

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé [Editor's note: inaudible].

[English]

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Why don't I move the question, and let's simply vote?

The Chair: We'll have to vote on his motion.

All those in favour of Mr. Martin's motion?

(Motion negatived)

» (1701)

The Chair: That one has gone now. At the next meeting we will look for half an hour at what, if anything, we are going to say; at whether we're going to accept your motion or not.

If there are no further comments, the meeting is adjourned until next week.