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SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 7, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order.

I'm sorry our guests had to wait. There was some business we had to do in camera.

This is the 15th meeting of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

We have a number of guests today. From Amnesty International Canada, we have Alex Neve, secretary general, English section; and John Jones, coordinator for Colombia.

You may have other people with you, who you want to have speak. If you do, then you can introduce them later, if you bring them up.

Mr. Alex Neve (Secretary General, English Section, Amnesty International (Canada)): We have only two speakers.

The Chair: Okay, go ahead. Just make sure you give us enough time afterwards to ask you questions. I'm sure the committee members will have some.

Mr. Alex Neve: Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, Madame Chair and members of the subcommittee.

As indicated, my names is Alex Neve. I am the secretary general of the English-speaking branch of Amnesty International (Canada).

With me this afternoon is John Jones, who is a long-time Amnesty International member, who coordinates and oversees our work on Colombia.

We certainly welcome the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to share with you an overview of our concerns regarding human rights in Colombia and to outline a number of specific recommendations we have as to the contribution Canada can make towards improving the situation.

I am aware of the fact that you have heard from quite a number of witnesses already in the course of your hearings, and undoubtedly you have heard often from them that Colombia truly does face a human rights crisis at the present time, a crisis that has been getting worse over recent years.

Between October 1999 and March 2000, for example, there were 12 politically motivated killings or disappearances every day in Colombia, but more recently that figure has risen by 67% to an average of 20 per day. Every day 11 Colombians are victim to extrajudicial executions or arbitrary killings, by all sides to the current conflict.

Amnesty International is a global human rights organization, with over one million members on every continent. Our work is likely known to many of you. Here in Canada, over 75,000 Canadians actively support Amnesty's human rights work.

In our work, we have recently given considerable focus to the deepening human rights crisis in Colombia. Among the concerns that we have identified and intend to highlight in our presentation this afternoon are the following:

Firstly, impunity. This is the distressing reality that those responsible for serious human rights abuses in Colombia have rarely been brought to justice for their misdeeds. The resulting prevailing climate of impunity encourages further abuses.

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Secondly, paramilitarism. In recent years, human rights groups have documented a disturbing trend of increased abuses attributable to right wing paramilitary groups, often supported by the military. Efforts to curb their power and activities to date have been inadequate. Numerous international bodies, including the United Nations and the Organization of American States, have spoken out about this concern.

Thirdly, human rights defenders. In our human rights work we have increasingly come to recognize the importance of supporting the individuals and groups who carry out front-line human rights work. This is true worldwide, and it is through their efforts that a culture of human rights protection will truly take root in society. In Colombia, human rights defenders carry out their courageous work in the face of tremendous persecution—death threats, attacks, disappearances, and killings, by both the paramilitary and by guerrilla groups. Many have been forced into exile. Their work must be supported.

Fourthly, trade unionists and other vulnerable sectors in Colombian society. A disturbing number of trade unionists and other vulnerable groups are killed every year in Colombia, often after being labelled guerrilla collaborators by paramilitary groups. At a time when there is a move toward perhaps increased Canadian corporate investment in Colombia, this worrying trend within the labour movement should be of particular concern to Canadian parliamentarians.

Fifthly, guerrilla abuses. While Amnesty International primarily holds governments accountable for complying with international human rights standards—they are, after all, the entities that are bound to international treaties and are actors on the international stage—we also draw attention to abuses carried out by armed opposition groups, such as the FARC and the ELN in Colombia. There are growing reports of serious abuses by both of those organizations. Clearly, Colombia's civilian population is caught in the middle, with good reason to be fearful of both the guerrillas and the paramilitary.

We will provide an overview of concerns with respect to these issues and then close by considering Canada's role. I'd like to begin with the issue of impunity.

International bodies, notably the United Nations and the Organization of American States, as well as numerous Colombian organizations and government officials, have recognized that there is a longstanding tradition of impunity in Colombia and have recommended that the government take decisive steps to turn that around.

Amnesty International and many other organizations and institutions have highlighted that one significant contributing factor to impunity in Colombia is the fact that allegations of abuses by members of the military have generally been handled by military courts. That lack of independence has resulted in an almost complete lack of justice in such cases.

Until recently there had been slow progress towards turning this around. A 1997 court decision, for example, required the government to bring such cases before civilian rather than military courts. Then, in August of last year, reform of the military penal code did in fact exclude cases of genocide, disappearances, and torture from military courts. At the same time, however, other crimes, such as extrajudicial executions, forced displacement, and backing or providing support to paramilitary groups remained with military courts.

Recently there has been further legislative reform in Colombia, which is of serious concern to Amnesty International. This is the Defence and National Security Law, which has been in force since August of this year. We are concerned that this new legislation has set back the struggle against impunity. The act restricts the Procurator General from carrying out disciplinary investigations of military personnel for violations committed during security operations and provides the military with judicial police powers.

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In the past, when the military has enjoyed judicial police powers they have used that power to cover up abuses. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—a human rights arm of the Organization of American States—frequently criticized that arrangement and pressed for reform. It is indeed disturbing to see this retrograde step.

Impunity is not just a theoretical concern, it is a real-life concern. In our brief we highlight the particularly distressing case of General Rodrigo Quiñónes, who had been linked by Colombian government investigations to the murder of at least 57 trade unionists, human rights defenders, and community leaders in 1991 and 1992. Military courts then took over the case and concluded there was insufficient evidence, leading to it being dismissed. He was later transferred to another region of Colombia, where in February of last year paramilitaries massacred local inhabitants over a period of several days while the military stood by. He is reported to now be under investigation for this incident.

Then this year a judicial investigator looked into a January 2001 massacre of 80 farmers leading to the opening of a formal investigation into, again, General Rodrigo Quiñónes in July of this year. But seven weeks later the investigator who began that case was killed by unidentified gunmen.

For a decade the Colombian justice system has failed adequately to investigate and deal with General Quiñónes and hold him accountable for any of the abuses he is alleged to have been involved with. Instead, he has moved from place to place, leaving a legacy of further ongoing abuses in his wake.

My colleague John Jones will now address some of the other issues of concern.

Mr. John Jones (Colombia Coordinator, Amnesty International (Canada)): I'd like to start with paramilitarism. As the Colombia coordinator for Amnesty International Canadian sector English-speaking, I've been doing this since 1978.

Paramilitarism first emerged in 1982 and it emerged as a response to kidnapping. There was kidnapping either by guerrilla groups or by criminal groups. It was called muerte a los sequestradores, death to kidnappers, MAS. Since then paramilitarism has grown, and there is now throughout Colombia a coordinated organization called the AUC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, of which the strongest person who's head of command would be Carlos Castaño. Amnesty states that of the non-combat killings and disappearances in Colombia, of which there are twenty a day of non-combat killings and two disappearances a day, 80% of these are because of the activity of the paramilitary.

A year ago, or say 18 months ago, the paramilitary were particularly active in the north-central part of the region called the Magdelena Medio and they were gradually advancing and getting into the city of Barrancabermeja, which in fact they've basically now gone into.

In the last year there has been a lot of paramilitary advance in the southwestern part of the country, particularly down toward the region of Putumayo, where there's a lot of conflict with guerrilla forces. The paramilitary activity also seems to be related to the forced displacement of right now 2.5 million people, of which in the last year a third of a million people have been displaced.

It seems that the paramilitary will go into an area and then gather the people together—this is in rural areas, not in cities—and then they will very brutally kill some people. Maybe they will cut their heads off—this is what I've heard from Peace Brigades International—and then the rest of the people are terrified. They either leave or they submit to this new sort of regime.

Amnesty identified certain areas of the country where the paramilitary seem to be particularly active. They seem to be particularly active in areas where there are strong economic projects anticipated, or where there are infrastructure developments, for example pipelines, areas where it's expected that there will be later oil development, and also in the north near the frontier of Panama, where it's believed there may eventually be a development and extension of the Pan-American Highway from Panama across...and the belief that land values will subsequently go up. This correlation has been noted, but it needs to be investigated further.

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In respect of this, there's also the question of links with the military. In some areas paramilitaries appear to be fully integrated into the army's battle strategy, linked by intelligence, supplies, radios, weapons, cash, common purposes. They have been designated a sixth division of the Colombian army. In some areas there is sharing of fighters. You'll find militaries turning into paramilitaries and then returning to being militaries. They are observed playing football together.

Quite often the paramilitary headquarters is very close to a military base, but the paramilitaries never close down...and they greet each other as friends. It's sometimes also a question of the paramilitary using military vehicles to get from one place to another.

In militarized areas of Colombia army road blocks have been occurring for some time. If you pass them you get stopped—it's happened to me—but the paramilitary can go straight through.

So there is overwhelming evidence of this level of collusion and cooperation between the paramilitary and the military. It appears to be particularly involving what I'd call middle-level officers, people at the level of captain who simply seem to be disobeying orders. The government tells them they should not in fact cooperate with the paramilitaries, but this is happening.

There have been some arrests of paramilitaries. The fiscalía, the attorney general's department, which to a certain extent has had a level of independence from the main government, has arrested paramilitaries. In 2000 they captured 595 of them. That was 70% of the total. The rest were captured by elements of the army. It appeared that those who were captured were mostly young; some were ex-guerrillas who had changed sides.

There's a phenomenon of guerrillas changing sides, which is a little difficult to understand. Also, we find that when the paramilitaries are detained they frequently escape or somehow are let go.

There's a belief that the Government of Colombia has a lack of real will to confront paramilitarism. The international community—for example, the United Nations office in Bogotá—will tell them they must do something about it. The OAS has given them very clearly defined recommendations, and they comply to an extent, but it's as if the compliance is a very reluctant compliance. It's as if the Colombian government needs pressure from the international community to give it a little more political space, because it's opposed by the army, which certainly doesn't want to go in this direction of accountability.

Another factor here is that in October 2000 it turns out there were 388 army people who were dismissed, reputedly for having collaborated with the paramilitary. Of these, subsequently 50 had just joined the paramilitary. So that is the situation. There is a big link between the military and the paramilitary, particularly in some areas.

Perhaps I can move ahead now to human rights defenders. There are some 250 human rights defenders in Colombia, and it's necessary to give a definition here. Human rights defenders, at least in Amnesty's definition and vocabulary and in the vocabulary of the other organizations that work in the same field, would be those members of independent NGOs in rural areas or city areas or national, regional, or local areas who work on behalf of promoting human rights, on trying to protect witnesses who report. These witnesses are said to be the eyes and ears of the international community. Because they speak out they're exceedingly vulnerable, and basically they have completely inadequate protection.

There is a program of human rights protection whose director is Dr. Rafael Bustamante, and indeed, he's a man who's operating in good faith. Amnesty people have met him. But he doesn't have enough resources.

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Secondly, the main factor that puts the human rights defenders into such danger is simply the impunity. If they get killed, if they get threatened, nothing ever happens to the people who do this.

I've noticed in the last year that human rights defenders are being forced to move from exposed locations in the countryside, and in some cases the organizations are retreating to Bogotá. This is partly because of extreme stress. For example, the OFP, the Organización Feminina Popular, in Barrancabermeja are under extreme stress from constant threats, so they retreat to Bogotá and there they continue their work. They continue to get threatened, but they feel slightly less vulnerable in Bogotá.

We find that the human rights defenders are being very badly pressured at the moment. They're under extreme stress. People are being forced to flee out of extreme fear and extreme threat, and we feel it's very important the international community should support them as much as possible. There's a real need to defend the defenders.

So far this year 125 trade unionists have been killed. It seems that one trade unionist is killed, on average, about once every two days. The majority are killed by army-backed paramilitaries. The trade unionists are frequently labelled as guerrilla collaborators and they seem to be targeted when they're involved in campaigns for socio-economic alternatives. For example, union members in the health professions, for whatever reason, are targeted. In the education section they are targeted.

Amnesty has brought them to Montreal, and they bring with them sufragio. These are invitations to their own funeral. They are very elegantly put together, but they're extremely evil things.

Also, we find that trade unionists in the mining sector, the oil sector, the gas sector, and members of the Colombian trade union congress are targeted. In fact, Colombia has far more trade unionists who are murdered every year than any other country.

I'm sure you must have heard about displaced communities. I've mentioned already that there are 2.5 million displaced persons altogether. They've come from all parts of the countryside, particularly in the north, in the Urabá region, the Choco region. More recently it's occurring in the south, in Futumayo, and also people are crossing the border into Ecuador.

Indigenous communities in the situation of being attacked by both sides.... The case of Kimy Pernia, which you may be familiar with...the Afro-Colombian community and the massacre in Naya River on the border between Cauca and Valle del Cauca. It appears to be connected with land disputes in the area. A lot of the paramilitaries seem to be local, but coordinated nationally with a lot of local government people involved. It's an underground sort of connection.

We have to distinguish between international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The international human rights law is the right to life, not to be killed, not to disappear, not to be tortured.

The guerrilla is by far the biggest infringement of international humanitarian law—for example, kidnapping people, taking people for hostage. Typically, every day in Colombia ten people are kidnapped, and of these, over half are the work of either the FARC guerrilla or the ELN guerrilla. It is a fund-raising device, but it is a gross infraction of international humanitarian law. It's not just a question of kidnapping people; also, the guerrillas do kill people. For example, in the past we've had situations where teenage girls have become friends with the soldiers in areas where the the army is. Subsequently, the guerrillas have come and killed them because they said they were collaborators.

Also, we have gratuitous killings, such as the recent assassination of Consuelo Araujo Noguera, the Colombian Minister of Culture.

In the event that the Canadian parliamentarians ever interact or speak with representatives of the guerrillas, it's extremely important to impress upon them the importance of respecting international humanitarian law. There should be a humanitarian accord in order to respect the lives of civilians, because civilians are constantly being caught in-between.

There is also the careless use of weapons in attacks against police posts in which lots of people are killed, attacks on pipelines, blowing up pipelines with a lot of fire, and people in the neighbourhood get badly hurt or killed.

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There's general carelessness and lack of respect for human life on the part of the guerrilla forces. So there's a clear need there for a humanitarian accord in Colombia.

I think I've covered the general areas that I wanted to cover. Alex, you have—

Mr. Alex Neve: Maybe as one further point on the concern about guerrilla abuses, another issue we've pointed to recently is the fact that the guerrilla forces do tend to recruit child soldiers into their ranks. With respect to the FARC, for instance, we've received reports that young Colombians, as young as the age of 13, have been pressed into serving with the FARC. It's obviously a serious concern and a clear violation of international law.

To wrap up, I'd like to look at Canada's role and contribution. Before I get to specific recommendations, I would like to begin with a few words regarding the case of the 40 Huey helicopters. I'm sure others who have appeared before you have probably referred to it. These are the helicopters sold by Canada to the United States government, the Department of State, almost two years ago, at least 33 of which have now ended up in Colombia for use in anti-narcotics operations.

Earlier this year Amnesty International and a number of other organizations here in Canada expressed concern about this transfer of military equipment from Canada to Colombia, albeit indirectly through the United States. We urged that the example pointed to the need for a tightening up of Canadian law regulating military exports, particularly so that the export of equipment can anticipate and deal with the final end destination, and that this needs to be covered in the permission allowing the export to go ahead.

At that point we also stressed the fact that Canadian military hardware has now become part of the military component of Plan Colombia, and this gives rise to, at the very least, a strong moral obligation on the part of Canada to take a decisive stand regarding the military aspects of Plan Colombia. Both of those recommendations continue to be very much of current concern.

More generally, we'd like to encourage you to recommend that Canada take important steps to press the Colombian government to adopt an ever more vigorous agenda that tackles the issues we have outlined in our presentation this afternoon and that Canada continue to monitor closely cases and situations of concern in the country. That includes, firstly, pressing the authorities to commit to a timetable for implementing the recommendations that the United Nations has made with respect to tackling impunity; dismantling paramilitary groups; and providing greater security and protection to human rights defenders, trade unionists, and other vulnerable sectors. There are numerous detailed, effective, well-thought-out recommendations that have been made at the UN level. All pressure needs to be brought on the Colombian government to take steps to put that in place.

Secondly, as John highlighted in his presentation, we would certainly urge Canada to seek out and take advantage of any opportunities that may arise to raise concerns with guerrilla forces, or representatives of guerrilla groups, or organizations or governments that may have links with guerrilla groups, about human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law attributable to them.

Thirdly, with respect to impunity, we urge the Canadian government to give particular attention to the continuing failure by the authorities to investigate and hold accountable those responsible for the May 16, 1998, massacre in Barrancabermeja. This is an incident that has received considerable Canadian parliamentary and government attention in the past, and we urge the government to ensure that it remains a matter of utmost concern in Canadian policy.

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Fourthly, also with respect to impunity, we urge the government to be outspoken and insistent that the investigation into the June 2, 2001, disappearance of indigenous leader Kimy Pernia move forward. Kimy Pernia has been in Canada, and I'm sure some of you have met him. He has testified, perhaps, in front of this committee at times when you were involved. He has drawn attention to, among other things, concern about Export Development Corporation funding for the Urra Dam project. His disappearance is a serious human rights concern, and Canada can play a special role in ensuring there is not impunity there.

Fifthly, we urge Canada to continue to monitor the plight of forcibly displaced communities, who have returned to their lands but continue to face serious threats from paramilitary groups. This is a concern throughout Colombia, and it is a concern that the Canadian embassy has taken as being a serious one, and we urge that this continue to be a matter of real ongoing concern.

Finally, we urge that Canada insist on decisive action on the part of the government to guarantee the safety of human rights defenders in Colombia. Key to their safety is effective action against impunity and towards dismantling the paramilitary groups, both of which I've just referred to. But as well, greater attention needs to be paid to the Colombian presidential directive, Directiva Presidencial 007, of 1999, which importantly stated that making false accusations about human rights organizations, which might compromise their security, is not permissible, is illegal in Colombia.

That directive was very much welcomed by the human rights defending community in Colombia and by organizations such as Amnesty International. However, officials continue to make such accusations and do not face discipline for doing so, and we would urge the committee to insist that the Canadian government press the Colombian government to actively enforce Directiva Presidencial 007.

It is appropriate that I end on that point, human rights defenders. Their plight is of grave concern to Amnesty International, and their astounding courage and tenacity, a source of true inspiration.

I'd like to tell you about an upcoming event that should be of interest to a number of you. For the past several months Amnesty International members across the country have been involved in a project meant to convey a strong message of support, solidarity, and protection to 12 human rights organizations in Colombia. Quilts are being prepared, made up of squares and designs by Canadians from every corner of this country. The quilts will be delivered to those 12 human rights groups early next year, and those groups have already indicated that they are eagerly anticipating the arrival of the quilts, which they intend to display in their offices, believing that they will be a message of true international concern and, potentially, a source of some protection.

On December 10 of this year, International Human Rights Day, we will be present here on Parliament Hill, in the Centre Block, hosting an event at which Canadian parliamentarians will be encouraged to contribute a square for the quilts, an opportunity for you to exhibit your design capacities, but we'll certainly have tools that greatly facilitate it. Our hope is to gather enough squares from members of the House of Commons and from senators to possibly even form an entire quilt, or at the very least, the substantial centre or portion of one such quilt. I have information with me today about that event and would be delighted to share it with you, and I would certainly welcome your assistance and support at that time.

Thank you. That concludes our presentation. We've welcomed the opportunity to share our concerns and outline some recommendations, and we would be delighted to respond to any questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Neve.

Do your notes talk about what size you want those squares to be, what kind of material, and things like that?

Mr. Alex Neve: This particular note doesn't, but it tells you where that information can easily be obtained.

The Chair: Good, because if you want us to do it, you have to give us the details—or maybe even help us out.

Mr. Alex Neve: We'll actually have the materials right there at the event.

The Chair: Oh, so we can sit there and show our abilities in front of the world.

Mr. Alex Neve: You can sit there and design in public or take it away to your office and return it later.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): What is the day?

Mr. Alex Neve: It's International Human Rights Day, December 10 of this year, from noon to 2 p.m. in Room 256-S of the Centre Block.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

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Ms. Yelich.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich (Blackstrap, Canadian Alliance): I'm really pleased to be here today. I'm not the usual member here; I'm very new to this committee and am really very interested in what I've heard. I found it very interesting, and I'm appalled at what I'm hearing. I did not know this was even going on in Colombia, because all eyes are on other parts of the world right now. I really admire your work. We have a challenge ahead of us—a new challenge to us.

In fact, if I get down to one of my bottom questions, it will be asking.... Perhaps you particularly want to know why helicopters went down there. I think that's a question we should ask our government. However, I think I'd like to hear specifically what we could do. What can Canada do to support the role of civilian courts in Colombia? On the subject of paramilitarism, what can Canada do to support the efforts of the Colombian government to root out the corrupt elements of the military who are allegedly supporting and aiding the paramilitaries? I think we have to get to the root of the problem, obviously, and that's what I'd like to see. Let's get to the bottom.

You mentioned you'd like us to speak to people; you talked about socio-economics; you spoke of what we could do. But I think we have to root out the problem first. Let's see what you can suggest—that's a bigger role than you gave us, I think.

Mr. Alex Neve: I think your question reflects the concern about impunity—the fact that individuals who have been responsible for abuses have not been, as you say, rooted out or brought to justice—and that this is a very critical piece in moving forward with real human rights protection in Colombia.

Ultimately, of course, it means those who commit abuses on all sides of the conflict need to be held accountable. Those who are with the guerrilla groups as well need to be found, arrested, and brought to account—those with the paramilitary groups and those within the military.

I think the framework exists. As I pointed out in my presentation, there are some very helpful and quite extensive recommendations that have been made by the United Nations—which has given this particular issue some careful consideration—as to the steps that need to be taken, whether it be in the area of legal reform, institutional reform, legislative reform, increased training for the judiciary and other government officials, or resources. It's all there.

I think what is necessary is, number one, to bring to bear real, notable, and concerted international pressure on the Colombian government to act on those recommendations. The Colombian government is in a difficult position, in that the military is powerful and is resistant to much of this. It therefore becomes all the more important that there be strong signs of international concern and support about this, to strengthen the hand of the government in being able to move ahead with the reforms that are needed on that front.

Mr. John Jones: I would say there's another factor, too, in terms of the effectiveness of international pressure. Four or five years ago, whenever we had discussions at DFAIT before the UN Human Rights Commission—there would always be hearings in February and March—the pressure was that the Colombian government should accept a UN office in Bogota. For a long time the Colombian government was very resistant, but the pressure continued. At a certain time, they accepted. There is now a UN presence actually in Bogota—there's a UN office there. This office is carrying out intensive investigations all over the country—so far as their resources go—and they're putting forward recommendations.

I think they have to be strongly supported in order to reinforce this situation, because it's probably a key element—simply to support the UN presence in Bogota, to keep it there, and also, whenever Canada has a chance at international fora, to support that initiative.

All the recommendations Amnesty is putting forward are basically being put forward by the UN as well. We basically urge support for the international recommendations there, whenever possible, just to put that sort of moral, political pressure on the Colombian government. All our experience has been that it is susceptible to that pressure—although it has counter-pressures coming from within, so it needs the sort of political space to be able to move.

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Mrs. Lynne Yelich: Before I go on, we need to keep our priorities with regard to CIDA funding and overall Canadian foreign aid, and certainly one can make an argument that one priority is Afghanistan right now. However, with the situation so critical in this country of Colombia, we have to be careful of our present foreign aid resources. Will reprioritization of resources be possible, given the new post-September 11 situation we live in?

When you said you have 75% support for what you're doing in Colombia, I'm wondering whether that same 75% support.... I'm sure they're the ones who are supporting us to help in Afghanistan. Who are these 75% that you have for support as well? I'd like to know, because you know your resources are only so much, and....

Mr. Alex Neve: It might have been a reference to something I said. I might have misspoken; it's 75,000 members, not 75% support—

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: Oh, okay. I actually thought it was public support, because as I said, we have to reprioritize our thinking, and there definitely is a perception that our resources should all be—

Mr. Alex Neve: No, I couldn't agree with you more. It's a challenging time with regard to international human rights work and international development work right now, to ensure that at a number of levels—whether it be the amount of aid, the support that is available, the degree of media and public attention paid to other corners of the world—the support not shrink and diminish.

I think one of the lessons after September 11 is that we need to be attentive to this world as a whole and ensure that concerns about justice, human rights abuses, and violence receive meaningful attention in all corners of the world. If we do so, we do it at our peril, risking that further incidents exactly of the kind we witnessed on September 11 may again erupt from another corner of the world.

I think it's a time when, while there's a great rush for greater priority to be given to aid issues and other concerns in and around Afghanistan, we have to make sure the rest of the world—every corner of the world—continues to receive as much attention as we can possibly give it. It's not a time to shrink the support or aid we provide to other parts of the world, such as Colombia. At the very least it must be maintained, and there should be real, thorough, solid reflection about the possibility of even increasing it in targeted, responsible, effective ways.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Neve.

[Translation]

Mr. Dubé.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would just have a quick comment to make on that. Last week, we discussed that, and I think that we as committee members agree on our position: there should be no reductions. We should perhaps step up what is being done in Afghanistan, but we should not do less elsewhere.

Amnesty International has an excellent reputation. You spoke of your organization in Canada, which has people in each of our ridings. Just recently, I met with young people and a teacher who were studying these issues. This is really a very good thing.

We also know how the United Nations operates. We met with someone, a United Nations special adviser, I believe, in Colombia. I would like you to explain to me in concrete terms how you work in Colombia or in other countries, in order to, for example... You have some specific figures. Are the figures for the numbers of killings and disappearances from the United Nations or are they your figures? I would like you to answer that. Did you identify these cases or are these figures from the United Nations?

[English]

Mr. Alex Neve: Maybe I could respond both to the general question of how we do our work and then specifically to the question about the statistics. I'm glad you see us as an organization with an excellent reputation. We have endeavoured for forty years now—this is our fortieth anniversary—to cultivate and maintain it. If nothing else, our reputation for credibility when it comes to speaking on human rights issues is of paramount concern to us.

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We're therefore very careful in how we carry out our research. Number one, we do not receive any government funding from any corner of the world, even from our own government, so we're sure that we maintain our independence and impartiality in order to do the research in a truly neutral manner.

Then in terms of how we carry out the research, we build a careful network of sources of information, and we check, double-check, and triple-check that information. We rely on sources we ourselves determine to be impartial. We reject much information that comes to us simply because we've either deemed it not to be credible or, unfortunately, have not been able to corroborate it from some other independent source. We always need to have that sense of corroboration before we'll speak out.

We don't maintain a permanent presence in countries where we do our work. We endeavour to visit them as often as we can. We carry out ongoing research missions so we ourselves can go and also do first-hand, on-the-ground work.

There are many countries in the world that won't let us in, which of course in itself speaks volumes as to their human rights records. Colombia does allow Amnesty International to come in, and we go frequently and are therefore able to do a lot of on-the-ground research as well.

With respect to specific statistics or details we include in our reports, different statistics may come from different sources. Sometimes they may be the result of our own very careful statistical analysis. Other times, yes, we may at least refer to and possibly even adopt statistics other sources have compiled if we have determined on our own that we think that their basis for arriving at those conclusions is credible and reliable.

John, have you referred to the statistics on disappearance? Do you know if those were from the United Nations?

Mr. John Jones: They come from Colombian human rights organizations, organizations like the Andean Commission of Jurists and CINEP, who do their best to keep track of what is going on. Those are the sorts of numbers we keep getting.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: CINEP?

Mr. John Jones: I see. You didn't understand.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: What is the name? CINEP?

An Hon. Member: What is the name?

Mr. John Jones: CINEP.

[English]

It's a Jesuit human rights organization.

[Translation]

It is a Jesuit human rights organization in Colombia.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: You provided a general answer. Sometimes you do this, sometimes you do that. Mr. Jones is perhaps in a better position to answer. One thing that attracted my attention was your reference to “third parties”. What do you mean by “third parties”? Do you mean that these people are not Colombians, people who are there as observers from foreign countries, or do you mean people who are Colombians, but who are not associated with any of the parties? What are you referring to when you speak of “third parties”?

Mr. John Jones: Do you speak English?

[English]

Do you understand English?

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: We have interpretation. I can speak English, but I do not think that that would improve understanding of the debate.

[English]

Mr. John Jones: You have an interpreter. Fine.

Most of the information comes from Colombian sources. The international secretariat frequently—several times a year, in fact—will send delegations to Colombia.

Sometimes the delegation will be composed of people like Rigoberta Menchu, who went last year, because they wanted to have somebody with a name. She is a Nobel Prize winner. They had the person in the Swedish section who has my position as part of their delegation. They went into Colombia and investigated ASFADDES, for example, the human rights defenders, and then they made public statements about what they had discovered. They were trying to create a sort of physical pressure.

• 1650

I would say that Amnesty always works with Colombian human rights organizations it considers to be credible, and it also talks directly to the Colombian authorities themselves. It would talk to government people, to the vice-president, for example. It would talk to the army people, to the United Nations people, and to the Peace Brigades International people. It would try to get a composite picture of the mosaic in order to understand what is going on.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Okay. Do I still have a minute?

[English]

Mr. Alex Neve: If I could, I'll just add one note to that. Your specific question is where did the numbers with regard to the number of killings and disappearances per day come from. I found it in the Amnesty report, but this particular report—

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: And the killings...

[English]

Mr. Alex Neve: —doesn't identify where we've gotten that information from. That's something I can seek to clarify with our Colombian experts at our international office in London so I can provide further details to you.

The Chair: Maybe you could present that to the committee, then we would know.

Thank you very much, Mr. Dubé.

Madame Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Thank you.

I have three quite specific questions, and the first one is about Amnesty. I know that in Australia there are members of Parliament who have an association with Amnesty International. However, the Canadian branch has chosen not to have one of those because they don't want to have political interference or political connection. I tried to get in touch with you, I think, the first five years I was elected. We received a couple of calls back saying that Amnesty wasn't interested. I was just wondering why the Australian branch would feel differently than the Canadian branch.

Mr. Alex Neve: I must say that's news to me. I've been in the position of secretary general for two years, so perhaps there was some discussion about this previously. I wouldn't have the same initial reaction that it's something we wouldn't want to do. My own first reaction would be that it is something I would very much welcome and encourage.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: That's good to hear.

Mr. Alex Neve: I would be delighted to get in touch with you and any others around this table or elsewhere who have interest in supporting Amnesty in any way, including setting up a parliamentary Amnesty International group.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Well, that's good to hear, because I think a number of us got very discouraged. From 1993 until about 1998 we tried very hard to get some contact, and we were told.... It was no partisan thing. Reg Alcock tried, and we had no response whatsoever, so that's a good thing to hear.

Mr. Alex Neve: Let us make it be so.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Now, the other question I want to ask is, do you know of any Canadian companies that are listed as operating in Colombia that you feel are contributing to the human rights abuses? Do you have a list of such Canadian companies, and if so, could you make that available to us?

Mr. Alex Neve: We have just only recently begun to turn our minds to that very question and have started to identify them, initially looking at the petroleum sector, Canadian petroleum companies, that are present in Colombia. This is very recent, so we've certainly not reached a point where we have anything to say with regard to whether or not they have contributed either directly or indirectly to human rights abuses.

What we are in the process of doing—and this is actually about two weeks from now, when we'll be having a meeting with a number of those companies together in Calgary—is to start to raise human rights issues with them. We will seek information on whether or not they have in place human rights policies, what steps they take to ensure that the human rights policies are effectively implemented and monitored, what steps they take to inform themselves of human rights issues in and around the area where they operate, and all of those things. Depending on what comes of that process, we may start to reach a point where we feel it necessary to speak out on particular concerns.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Would you be willing to send us that information after your meeting?

Mr. Alex Neve: I certainly would, yes.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

I think that's a very interesting area that appears to be opening up. We saw that in Nigeria Shell Oil decided that they would become corporately responsible—or a little, and a little is better than nothing. It's still a beginning, and I think Talisman is making their efforts in Sudan—maybe not enough, but I think that corporate responsibility may very well be a new area that's beginning to open up internationally.

• 1655

Mr. Alex Neve: Absolutely, and I think it's important to note that there are, as you say, two sides to the equation. There is the concern that corporate activity may facilitate or lead to human rights abuses, but there is also the potential and the opportunity for corporate actors to be tremendous agents for change and human rights reform in countries. We need to work in a way that mitigates the first concern, but very much broadens and realizes all possible opportunities of the second.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: My last question is about an umbrella organization. Which organization within Colombia...? The one thing that's unique about Colombia, as opposed to many African states, is the fact that there are so many NGOs within Colombia that have been formed by Colombians. Is there an umbrella organization that you're aware of that would be key to organizing or bringing these people together?

Mr. John Jones: I'm not aware of an umbrella organization. They seem to know each other, and every so often they come together. But this is something we can follow up on and look for the answers to that.

Mr. Alex Neve: There's one group I would recommend to you, with regard to the issue of human rights defenders. I'm not going to get the name completely right but, but it's the ad hoc committee for human rights defenders—something of that ilk. They have very much come together, not necessarily as a formal coalition, but in a loose sense, to serve that kind of role.

They oversee general issues of concern to the numerous human rights defending organizations in the country. They serve as a central lobbying point for them, with regard to national and international concerns they may be seeking to advance. They have been doing some really good work. I know they received some financial assistance from Canadian church groups, in order to be able to carry out that work. I can certainly get you the details. If you travel to Colombia, I'm sure you would definitely benefit from meeting them.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

The Chair: We will be going. We have a full agenda, but we would be interested in hearing if you have any suggestions on who we should meet with.

Mr. Proctor is next, for eight minutes.

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I am also a bit of an interloper on this committee. I don't normally appear, but I'm interested in the subject. I used to work for the Canadian Labour Congress in Latin America in the mid-1980s. I knew some of the desaparecidos among the trade union leaders in Colombia. It's a very important topic.

There's passing reference in your document this afternoon to Plan Colombia. I just wonder if you would share with us what effects Amnesty International perceive that Plan Colombia has on the situation in that country at the moment.

Mr. Alex Neve: We have expressed serious concern about Plan Colombia because of its highly militarized nature. There are said to be different dimensions to Plan Colombia—the military side and the non-military side. But the military side is clearly an area of major concern. There's a huge amount of investment from abroad in providing resources for greatly increased military spending. We have therefore campaigned actively worldwide against the military side of Plan Colombia. We've raised that with the government here. We've pressed the Canadian government to speak out publicly in opposition to the military side of the plan.

In our view, in the current conflict military assistance of that kind to Colombia will only inevitably lead to further human rights abuses. We need to pursue a strategy right now that does everything possible to ensure that lethal weapons are kept out of the hands of the paramilitary—the military and the guerrillas. There needs to be attention to that at all levels, and Plan Colombia doesn't help us get there.

The Chair: Could I just interrupt for a minute? We just passed out a document on the American government's opinion on Plan Colombia. It appears to be changing, so if you have time maybe you can glance at it. On page 2, the fifth paragraph down, it talks about the new chair of the committee and what he feels. It goes on to suggest—

A voice: U.S. Senate.

The Chair: Yes, it's the U.S. Senate, I'm sorry, not the Congress. But they're interesting comments. It looks like they're softening their role.

We won't take my comments out of your time. Sorry. Go ahead.

• 1700

Mr. Dick Proctor: Thanks, I appreciate that.

You say you're pushing the Canadian government. Have we had a favourable response, or what's the reaction been to the lobbying efforts?

Mr. Alex Neve: While they have on a number of occasions made it clear that our own government's policy intention is to not be involved with the military side of Plan Colombia, they are not prepared to criticize the U.S. military side. So although we won't go there, we won't criticize the American government for making that choice.

Mr. Dick Proctor: I'm advised that when the Colombian ambassador to Canada was before this committee six weeks ago, she sought Canadian support in securing export permits to companies selling military equipment in Colombia. You expressed concern about what has happened heretofore, but what's your reaction to the ambassador's request?

Mr. Alex Neve: We are opposed to military transfers to Colombia of any goods that would be considered either lethal or dual-use—in other words, goods that can be either lethal or non-lethal, depending on how they're used. That's not necessarily saying nothing should go to Colombia, even under the military rubric, but there needs to be real concern about lethal and dual use. So we wouldn't support that.

Our concern is that the Canadian export regulation system, when it comes to military equipment, continues to be very inadequate, in terms of the openness and transparency that would make a real review of decisions around military exports possible.

For instance, the last annual report on military exports from Canada that was made public was from 1999. This report wasn't just on Colombia, but was a worldwide one, of course. We know nothing about military transfers since that time, unless people have been able to seek the information using Access to Information requests, which is a highly inadequate way of ensuring ongoing openness and transparency, with respect to decisions of that nature.

I know Project Ploughshares and other organizations—and we support this—have called on the government to instead adopt a system whereby that information is disclosed as it arises. When a military export is approved, that information would be made public, so there could be an immediate response to it if there were concerns. It's completely inadequate to have the information two or three years later, by which time the damage has already been done.

Mr. John Jones: I would like to comment on one thing, with respect to that. I was at an Amnesty International meeting in Stockholm in May of last year for several days, and Plan Colombia was just coming onto the agenda; we were becoming conscious of it. There was very great concern that this would lead to much increased militarization, there would be far greater numbers of human rights abuses, and it would really sort of militarize an already bad conflict and make it much worse.

Subsequently, there were international meetings on Plan Colombia in London, which Amnesty International did its best to sort of influence, and subsequently in Madrid and Costa Rica at the end of last year. At the present time AI U.S.A., for example, from within the United States, is actively opposing the negative impact of Plan Colombia as far as it possibly can. Amnesty has a very negative take on Plan Colombia. It's criticizing and basically exercising what influence it can to negate the negative impact of that.

Mr. Dick Proctor: So Amnesty International, both here and in the United States, is highly critical.

Mr. John Jones: Absolutely. It's basically critical worldwide. Certainly in the United States it's very critical, obviously.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Finally, there was reference made to the 40 helicopters, 33 of which ended up in Colombia. This was news to me. I was unaware of that. I apologize. But I just wonder if somebody might elaborate a little bit for my edification, if not for other members of the committee.

Mr. Alex Neve: These helicopters once upon a time originated in the United States and were bought by the Canadian military. They were then declared surplus stock, decommissioned, or whatever the terminology is. Then, lo and behold, they were sold back, not to the U.S. military, interestingly, but to the State Department , which in itself raises questions. Why does the State Department need combat helicopters? I assume post-September 11 there might be cases for why it's necessary in Washington, but certainly not at the time.

• 1705

So even then it raised questions as to whether there was some intention for the helicopters to go further. And they did in fact: 33 of them have ended up in Colombia and are being used actively by anti-narcotics battalions. The reason it was possible is that the export regulations dealing with military exports in Canada only look at the immediate country of transfer. So the only country that was being considered was the United States.

There's nothing in the system that allows for or requires a further analysis as to whether or not that's only a transit point and what the likely end destination is. Obviously, if this is all about ensuring that Canadian military transfers don't lead to civilian casualties and human rights violations, we need to have a system that is looking toward the end destination.

So we've used that example to point to why it is so necessary for Canadian law to be reformed and that particular loophole tightened up.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Neve.

Ms. Yelich.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: With the ongoing election, what do you think of democracy in Colombia? Will this improve or decrease human rights? Do you have any hope there with the ongoing election?

Mr. Alex Neve: Democracy always gives hope. The ironic thing is that amidst this great turmoil and ongoing civil war there has continued to be democracy in Colombia. And many within government, at the presidential and other levels, have sought to take important steps toward human rights reform, have made strong statements, have adopted things. I talked in my remarks, for instance, about presidential directive 007, which is a very welcome, strong statement of presidential protection for human rights defenders.

The problem, of course, is the degree to which the military continues to be a very powerful institution in the country and therefore able to counter and block, ignore, overlook many of the initiatives the government may seek to bring forward. It is of such power that sometimes the government is even tentative and cautious in the degree to which it may try to push reform.

That's the challenge to human rights, and that's the challenge to democracy. That's why issues such as impunity, issues such as dismantling the paramilitary groups, and issues around weapons transfers to the country need very strong concerted international pressure to make sure the international community is doing everything it can to diminish that sense of power and hold that the military has in Colombia and strengthen the ability of democratic institutions to do the work, which many of them very much want to do, to promote and improve human rights.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: Also, if you were to prioritize what you were going to ask of this committee, besides having the presence of the UN there, which was your number one wish from this committee, what would be your next thing? I don't know the mandate of CIDA exactly, but I have to hear this again. You said that you don't get paid at Amnesty International?

Mr. Alex Neve: He doesn't, but I do. No, we don't take government funding; we're totally reliant on individual donations. So it's Canadians across the country who give us $10, $20, $70 a month, you name it—bake sales and other fundraising events; that's where our funding comes from, and that's what makes it possible for us to do the kind of research work we do.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: So what are you asking CIDA today? I'm going to ask the most simple question. I just wondered, besides noting all the humanitarian issues and to recognize...are you asking for something else? There's the military—I understand you don't want the military presence. So who do you want to intervene, or what exactly do you want?

Mr. Alex Neve: Do we each get a number one?

Ms. Lynne Yelich: I just want to hear it.

Mr. Alex Neve: My number one would have to be the recommendations we've made with respect to human rights defenders. I'd like it to become absolute priority number one. And I have to say the Canadian government, through the embassy presence in Bogota, has done a lot to try to support the work of human rights defenders. It's something already well under way, but it needs to be strengthened and improved. The situation is dire. It is, to me, so obviously a situation that could benefit from strong international support. When there's a strong sense of the international community standing with and behind and around these individuals and groups as they do their work, the degree of protection they enjoy increases dramatically.

• 1710

The Chair: Thank you.

We're going to go to the four-minute round now. Mr. Casey missed his eight-minute round. Would you like a four-minute round now?

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC/DR): I'd love a four-minute round. Thanks very much.

You seemed to indicate that you have some faith in the government. That's the impression I got, that you believe they will work towards justice and human rights if given the opportunity. Is that right?

Mr. Alex Neve: I don't know that I would state it in quite so absolute terms, but I think there are those within government who are deserving of that characterization. There have been, unquestionably, initiatives taken by the government on pretty well all of the issues we've outlined today to seek to improve the situation. I don't think it has gone far enough on any of those fronts. Part of that is, again, because of the power of the military and the influence they continue to hold in the country. Part of it is that perhaps not always has there been as much good will and good faith and determination as necessary. I think I would give a mixed review on that front.

Mr. Bill Casey: At least it isn't all negative.

Mr. Alex Neve: No, I don't think so.

Mr. Bill Casey: Explain something to me. We were talking about this paramilitary. Are there a number of paramilitary organizations, or is there one paramilitary organization?

Mr. John Jones: There are a number of them.

Mr. Bill Casey: How many?

Mr. John Jones: We don't know. They appear to be locally based, but they come under an umbrella, and they form this national paramilitary coordination. They're under an umbrella known as the AUC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, if you wish. On the other hand, their actions appear to be locally based. They seem to be recruited locally.

PBI people have said they have noticed in areas where there are paramilitaries that they see people wearing the peasant costumes of other areas, so there could be a certain amount of movement of paramilitaries from one region to another. They appear to be mostly from the local region, but we're not absolutely certain because this is very hard to investigate, obviously. But there is a network of paramilitary organizations.

Mr. Bill Casey: What do they see as their purpose?

Mr. John Jones: I think they feel that the army is not doing a good enough job to defeat the guerrillas. In a sense they've become shock troops of the counter-insurgency. That's one way it's been put. I would say they want to defeat the guerrillas, basically. That's one of their goals. They seem to have a side goal that is simply to get control of territory for whatever reason. Maybe in the future they can benefit from the increased value of it. Local groups may be doing this, but the national goal is probably to defeat the guerrillas, I would say.

Mr. Bill Casey: What percentage of the population would you estimate the guerrillas represent?

Mr. John Jones: That's hard to say. There are about 18,000 guerrillas. What proportion of the general population would support them? I understand that in the cities people are strongly in favour of what is called the peace process. They're against the guerrillas, but they're also against the paramilitary.

In the countryside, where there may be a lot of very marginalized, very poor people, because that seems to be where they're getting their support, most of their support, I don't know. It's hard to know. I don't know the answer to that. It's a good question.

Mr. Bill Casey: The relationship between the paramilitary and the military I gather is quite close and they support each other.

Mr. John Jones: Yes, in certain areas it seems to be very close. Human Rights Watch, an American organization, did an investigation into this. They interviewed as well the Colombian fiscalia, the attorney general's department. It appears that in certain areas there's telecommunication, there's exchange of information, there's cellphone communication, radio communication, and also coordination.

• 1715

For example, if you take the paramilitary attack on Barrancabermeja, which was in May 1998, the army was there, but before the attack they sort of withdrew, which they didn't normally do, and then the paramilitary came. Then the paramilitary went away, after they had done what they did, and the army went back.

This is a pattern that has been observed, the army retreating and letting other people come, and then the army moving back again. Or, alternatively, the army is simply told that the paramilitaries are coming, and they don't do anything; they just let them come, and then they sort of stand by.

So all the evidence is of collusion. Human Rights Watch is the organization that has done the most research on this.

The Chair: Thank you very much. We'll come back. You can have a third round.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: I do not want to take too much time, but I have a question regarding something I read on the next-to-last page of your brief, where you mention the connection with the Kimy Pernia affair. We read:

    Kimy Pernia participated in Canadian Parliament meetings, and during these sessions information was revealed that indicates that the Urrà Dam scheme received some EDC funding.

Each word means something, but there are some missing. What do you mean by “received some EDC funding”? Are you implying that there is something wrong with this? Why did you include this there?

[English]

Mr. Alex Neve: The Urra Dam was not wholly funded by EDC money, by any means, but there was EDC support for some of that work.

As you are likely aware, the dam itself was of grave concern to Kimy Pernia's people, the Embera-Katío indigenous people who lived in that area, who essentially felt that their entire lives—livelihood, environment, way of living—had been destroyed by the dam project. He sought to raise that issue in any way he could with the Colombian government, and he came to Canada on numerous occasions and spoke about it to government and to non-government groups in Canada.

There was concern that they were going on to build Urra II, and at the very least he didn't want the misery that had accompanied Urra I repeated. But secondly, he wanted to press the case for there to be compensation for the various harms that had flown from the first dam project.

There is perhaps some need for serious Canadian attention there to whether the EDC funding gives rise to any obligation, moral or legal, on Canada's part to provide compensation of that sort, or at the very least to be pushing the Colombian government to ensure that there's full and meaningful compensation for what happened.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Thank you for saying that, because I will be looking at it during the committee's upcoming work. In any event, I would like to have EDC people invited to appear before this committee so that they can give their version.

I have one last question. As you no doubt know, there was a new mandate... there is a law that clarifies the mandate of the EDC, and unfortunately... Since you are independent of the government, you will surely be able to answer my question. Do you think it is right that the EDC is not required to follow the rules applying to human rights in its activities?

[English]

Mr. Alex Neve: Yes. Much like the question about Canadian businesses operating in Colombia, this is an area of increasing and fairly recent concern for us. The degree to which economics, business issues, intercept with human rights concerns should and must be a source of real concern for organizations such as ours.

• 1720

We have just begun to review the changes to EDC policy and practice with regard to human rights issues. We have not yet prepared anything in writing and haven't submitted anything, but we're certainly concerned that it's not particularly fulsome, detailed, hardhitting, or effective. We're not convinced that approach will ensure that decisions taken by the EDC adequately guard against the possibility of things such as the Urra Dam project, where EDC funding is involved and human rights violations occur. So I expect that we will be making—

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: When do you think you will be able to complete this evaluation?

[English]

Mr. Alex Neve: I would be unwilling to commit to a timeline, but certainly we hope to get something in to the government fairly soon, shall I say, with some recommendations as to how we think that could be improved.

The Chair: Before the end of February?

Mr. Alex Neve: Before the end of February? That's when you would be—

The Chair: No, I'm just asking.

Mr. Alex Neve: That's within the realm of the possible.

The Chair: Okay, thank you. Maybe you can let us know what your comments are.

Mr. Casey, would you like another go?

Mr. Bill Casey: I have a couple of questions.

As just a little about Amnesty International, you were talking about where you get your resources. How many people do you have on staff in Canada?

Mr. Alex Neve: In Canada there's a staff of 40 bodies, full-time and part-time. In full-time equivalents, that would probably be about 30 people.

Mr. Bill Casey: Are they all in Ottawa?

Mr. Alex Neve: No. To further complicate things, there are two branches of Amnesty International in Canada. There's a francophone branch based in Montreal, which has a staff of about eight or ten persons. The Ottawa office is the English-speaking branch. We also have a medium-sized office in Toronto and a very small office in Vancouver.

Mr. Bill Casey: How do you choose the subjects to study?

Mr. Alex Neve: We work at two levels. We do country-specific work, and in that regard we endeavour, as a global movement, to provide global coverage. So our professional research staff, which is based at our international office in London, is at all times paying attention to, monitoring, and following human rights developments in every country in the world, including Canada. There's someone there—not Canadian, because you can't research your own country—who is even following what's going on here.

We also have a program of work that identifies themes of concern: torture; business and human rights; women's rights. That changes from time to time. It's based on our own understanding of evolving human rights challenges around the world. We seek to identify patterns, and if we can see that something has some real international significance, we'll endeavour to give it some profile in our work, make it a priority.

At the current time, for instance, we're in the midst of a very serious global campaign against torture, which we've certainly made a priority here in Canada, but Amnesty sections around the world are doing so. For two years, that will be one of the biggest pieces of work we're involved with, trying to push governments to adopt a number of recommendations that we ultimately think could actually lead to the eradication of torture, but certainly, at the very least, to seeing it dramatically diminish.

Mr. Bill Casey: You said you've been at this for two years?

Mr. Alex Neve: I've been at my current position of secretary general of the English-speaking branch of Amnesty International Canada for—

Mr. Bill Casey: And before that?

Mr. Alex Neve: I'm a lawyer by training, and over the last decade I've worked previously for Amnesty, both internationally and nationally. I've practised law, and I've taught law at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. In my last incarnation, before taking on this job, I was a member of the Immigration and Refugee Board, hearing and deciding refugee claims.

Mr. Bill Casey: I have one last little question. How many people work in London?

Mr. Alex Neve: The London staff is about 400 now, about half of whom would be the research staff. Obviously you can appreciate that if we do have that aim of global coverage, we need a considerable number of bodies to do so, and it is at that level where we really do develop very impressive country expertise, the people who have that responsibility.

Some people have only one country to think about—for instance, our China researcher. You can imagine the challenge. Others may cover four or five countries. But they really develop impressive expertise.

They are then backed up by a team of legal experts, international law experts who can help ensure that our work always takes account of and is situated within international legal frameworks, because that's what we use as our basis. What we are essentially doing at all times is pushing governments to comply with international legal standards, and that's what we make the basis of our work, and others.

• 1725

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Proctor, you'll have the last question, unless somebody has a very pressing one.

Mr. Dick Proctor: All right. Thank you very much.

You had some kind words to say about Dr. Bustamante, who is the human rights protection program person. But the sentence that describes goes on to say “...is a program of solely practical measures on protection.” I wonder whether you could elaborate on that and what is missing from that position.

Mr. John Jones: First of all, within the practical measures, it's simply resources. They don't have enough money. Also, they have a backlog. It has taken a long time to get into place.

Amnesty people have met Dr. Bustamante, and they have said that he is a man in good faith; he's doing the best he can. But what they say is that you can provide all the practical protection you wish, but that is not going to be absolute protection. Ultimately, you have to get at the culture of impunity, that if people who are human rights defenders or trade unionists are murdered, somebody has to be accountable.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Right, and nobody is, at the moment.

Mr. John Jones: At the present time, nobody is accountable.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Right.

Mr. John Jones: And the new security law that has been passed will make it much easier to allay the culpability.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Just by the nature of the law itself?

Mr. John Jones: Yes, because the army is given police powers, and they say if the fiscalía cannot accompany us, we'll have to deal with this ourselves. In fact, practically, the fiscalía cannot accompany them. Impunity is sort of being strengthened by this new law. Amnesty and the other organizations have always been saying that impunity is the key. You can put all the protection in place you like, but that's not going to be protection.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Right.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Ms. Yelich.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: What kinds of tax breaks, if any, do citizens receive for their donations to Amnesty International? You are a charitable organization.

Mr. Alex Neve: We are a charitable organization. We have charitable status in Canada, so a donation to Amnesty International can be claimed on an individual's tax return.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: I would also like to mention that I'm very impressed with you both. I'm on the immigration committee, and I'd love to talk to you about that next, on that committee.

Mr. Alex Neve: Certainly.

Mrs. Lynne Yelich: I think you are doing a very good job of representing your case. I would definitely help you, if I could.

Mr. Alex Neve: We're of course going to have the new parliamentary amnesty group for you to join.

The Chair: Thank you very much to both of you for coming today and to your assistants who came with you. We appreciate it very much. We'll make sure that you get a copy of our report, and we'd like to have anything you feel we could use for our report. Thank you.

This meeting is adjourned to the call of the chair, which will probably be November 21.

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