[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 20, 1997

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[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting to order. This is a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Commons foreign affairs and international trade committees. Senator Stewart will be here shortly, but he's told me to start.

We have with us this morning the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, our minister, to talk to us about NATO enlargement.

Thank you very much for coming, Minister. I know you're only here for an hour, so we should start with your opening statement. I know the members are anxious to speak to you.

On your behalf and on behalf of the other members here, I'd like to welcome the diplomatic corps. We don't usually get quite such a line-up of ambassadors coming to visit us, but you're always welcome. We're glad to see you here.

Minister.

Hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by introducing Mr. Charles Court from Foreign Affairs and Dr. Roman Jacobow from National Defence, who are here to assist me in this meeting with the committee.

[Translation]

I am especially pleased to see you here today at this joint meeting of representatives of the Senate and House of Commons. I find this consultation very important because we will hearing your views on this critical issue.

I think the European trip by the House of Commons committee last November and the Senate committee report on our relations with Europe will generate a great deal of discussion. I appreciated the interest shown by parliamentarians and the answers they gave us on NATO.

[English]

Mr. Chairman, as you recall, we were in front of the Commons committee in November and December to give a briefing at that time, following a major consultation we had undertaken with a number of the interested parties and groups in Europe. I had appointed a special representative on the question of NATO enlargement.

At that time we outlined a basic approach to enlargement along the following lines. When Canada supported a wide enlargement with a view to developing a broad transatlantic community, we sought to encourage the alliance to reach decisions on enlargement on the basis of a transparent and objective process, reflecting the extent to which candidate states can meet the considerations of democracy and good governance, civilian control of the military, sound economic reform, good relations with neighbours, and the ability to contribute to NATO objectives.

We also indicated that any effort at enlargement should keep costs to a minimum; that we should pay particular attention to developing a special agreement with Russia, the Baltic states, and Ukraine and to how their interests can be taken into account throughout the enlargement process; that we should seek the broadest possible effective partnership arrangement with countries that remain outside the alliance; and that we should encourage a thorough reform of NATO command structures with a view to ensuring greater flexibility, generating savings, and providing reassurance to Russia in particular.

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That's the broad outline of the Canadian approach we have followed during a series of subsequent meetings.

As you know, since the turn of the year, the enlargement issue has taken on greater acceleration and greater importance, certainly highlighted by the meetings taking place today in Helsinki with President Clinton and President Yeltsin. They will be followed up by a meeting of foreign ministers in May, at which time basic criteria will be established and the format for an enlargement process will be discussed. Then the leaders of NATO will be meeting in early July in Madrid for a final set of decisions.

So in effect, within three or four months, what will be a very historic decision will be in fact consummated. The process is well under way. I'm very pleased to be able to meet with the committees of both the House and the Senate today to develop a mandate for the continuation of the Canadian participation.

Of course I want to underline that once decisions are made by the leaders as to the direction that will be taken, we will then engage in a thoroughgoing consultation with Parliament again to ratify any decisions that are taking place at that time.

Just to bring you up to date, on the question of the area of enlargement itself, the Prime Minister has made clear in a number of statements that we continue to support the question of a broad enlargement and that consideration should be given to a minimum of about six countries that we think could join the alliance in the first wave.

We need to recognize that decisions on which country to invite will be the result of consensus within the alliance. This is not a majority vote; it will have to be a full agreement. At this point in time there is no final agreement, or I would say even initial consensus, formed as to what numbers or who would be there. This is simply now a matter of major consultations taking place between members of the NATO Council, the Secretary-General of NATO, and various states who have indicated their interest.

I simply want to reiterate and underline the fact that we say there should be no predetermined list, but that if countries meet the criteria, then they should be given consideration. Those criteria, to repeat, are democratic elections; the peaceful transfer of power; the establishing of effective parliamentary and government oversight of defence communities; important steps towards creating a new market or open societies and economies; and, certainly one of the major questions, the ability to settle disputes with neighbours.

We've seen substantial progress in that last area. There have been agreements between Hungary and Romania and between Hungary and Slovakia, and there are ongoing negotiations between Romania and Ukraine.

That is where the situation now rests. We would hope that this process could be as objective as possible and believe sincerely that the decisions taken will be substantially in favour of the notion of a more secure, stable system and will make major contributions to the whole area of the expansion of the entire community.

Of course one of the key questions in this issue of enlargement is the relations with Russia. I don't have to repeat the very public debate that's going on. One of the positions we took at the ministerial meeting at Brussels a few weeks back is that while Russian leaders raise serious, legitimate questions, we also see this as a historic opportunity for NATO and Russia to establish a new relationship and a forum for consultation, cooperation, and co-decision.

When you think about it, who would have foreseen, a few short years ago, the notion of a NATO-Russia council that would be cooperating and coordinating on a number of joint matters dealing with security across the broad range of the Atlantic community?

[Translation]

For example, today's summit between the United States and Russia will further reassure Russia about matters such as strategic arms and the United States' objectives regarding the Alliance.

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[English]

As the debate and discussions have gone on, a number of quite clear commitments have been made by NATO members. Examples are: a commitment not to place any nuclear weapons on the soil of any new members; a statement on the non-stationing of troops; and the question of starting to renegotiate the conventional forces treaty to bring the alignment of forces more into keeping with a balance and equity to assure these areas. As well there are new, innovative proposals in which Russia could work much more closely with NATO to take a greater role in the P-8 process and in playing through the new council, in which joint decisions can be made.

If anybody needs an example of how that's worked, we only have to look at the very intense cooperation that takes place in the present NATO Partners for Peace alliance in Bosnia. Where there is a security threat, there can be a level of cooperation in coming together.

So in a sense this is an opportunity. One of the arguments we make is that if we can shed some of the old Cold War attitudes and conventional wisdoms and thinking that went on during that period, this can be historic in the sense of not only greater security but also greater opportunity for the integration of countries from Vladivostok to Vancouver, to use the old phrase of the OSCE.

Equally, it's very important in this connection that we have a special arrangement negotiated between NATO and Ukraine, which has expressed very specific security concerns. It is important to note that at the same time as the Helsinki summit is taking place, Foreign Minister Udovenko of Ukraine is in Brussels meeting with Secretary-General Solana to discuss the beginnings of a NATO-Ukraine arrangement.

There are, again, basic outlines of principles and obligations for consultation and cooperation. There's a whole range of issues. When Foreign Minister Udovenko visited Canada just about two and a half weeks ago, the Prime Minister was very explicit in saying Canada strongly supports the need for a special arrangement to be made. We feel we've made a major contribution in helping NATO come to that decision to work out this new architecture with Ukraine.

Equally, an important part of this, particularly because of the concerns expressed by the Baltic States and others, is that there has to be a much broader, more efficient, more enhanced partnership. The proposal made by Secretary of State Albright at the last ministerial meeting for a new Atlantic Partnership Council, which would take on broader powers and responsibilities, is one way of providing for a higher level of integration, cooperation, and security.

So in effect the enlargement process is not a unidimensional issue; it is proceeding on a number of fronts. It is proceeding in the specific process of negotiating or looking at the criteria by which countries would be invited to join NATO. It is proceeding very actively on the front of developing new security charters or arrangements with Russia. Similarly it is proceeding with developing new agreements with Ukraine and a much strengthened Atlantic Partnership Council.

A further area that we believe very strongly needs to be addressed is infrastructure reform. That is very important, both from an economic point of view, to reduce the costs, and from the point of view of enhancing security. If we can eliminate the notion that NATO is a string of command bases in a defensive arrangement surrounding one country, we can begin, in a very tangible way, to indicate that NATO is now becoming a broader security organization. We are beginning to make some progress in this area. That, from a Canadian point of view, is a very important element that also has to be put as part of that multidimensional approach we are taking towards the enlargement issue.

Finally, let me deal with the question of costs, because there was some public discussion about that. Recently the United States published a report, which was picked up by Canadian media, that estimated the additional cost to Canada could be in the neighbourhood of about $45 million annually during the period.

I want to reiterate that no decision has been taken on, first, the new members to be admitted, and second, the military posture the alliance will require them to adopt. So in effect, while one can project, it is impossible to tell what those costs will be. Until their actual deal is made and we know what the arrangements are and what the security questions are, any estimate of cost at this point in time is premature.

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For example, we think that enlargement along with additional measures, such as a reform of the NATO command structure, the development of the combined joint task force, which should obviate the need for new headquarters or placements in new command structures, and the revision of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which would affect the overall security environment and the level of forces, would have a very beneficial effect on costs.

So I simply say that at this point in time members and others can't take as gospel that there is a fixed cost, because that simply isn't the case. Those costs cannot be estimated. Now, NATO is working on them, and we will certainly share all the information with Parliament when we receive those studies and get those estimates. But you can't estimate costs until you know what the package is, and the package hasn't been decided. In this case I would want to assure members that we're not looking at the same kinds of cost estimates that were projected in reports of several weeks ago.

As you can see, there will be a high level of acceleration taking place in the next three or four months on about five or six different levels of discussion, negotiation, and consultation. Of course the great trick is whether they will all come together in time for the July meeting. At this point in time, remarkably, I am confident that it will. I think we need to pay some real tribute to the Secretary-General of NATO, his secretariat, and our ambassadors there, who have been working very strenuously.

I do believe that the Secretary-General intends to visit Canada in about three or four weeks, and I hope that he would have the opportunity to meet with members of the committee.

So I think progress is being made. I hope that the kind of support and encouragement we have received from members of Parliament and senators will continue, because this is one of the very crucial international decisions Canada will be making in the year ahead.

Thank you, Chairmen.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much, Minister.

We have quite a few members already on the list. I think if we kept it to five minutes each, we could fit in as many people as possible.

[Translation]

Mr. Bergeron, you are first. Could you please try to stay within five minutes.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères, B.Q.): Mr. Chairman, you know that would be breaking one of the rules established by this committee.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We have only 35 minutes.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Minister, welcome to our committee. Thank you for accepting our invitation to meet with us to discuss the enlargement of NATO. I would also like to welcome the members of the diplomatic corps who have come here today. I think that shows how important this matter is, not only for the countries represented here this morning, but also for Canada.

Mr. Minister, you stressed the importance of relations between NATO and Russia. That is indeed a fundamental issue, because if the process were to go ahead without Russia being involved or expressing its consent, we could be faced with a precarious and difficult situation immediately after the enlargement.

A few colleagues from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and I met with some German parliamentarians last November. In their view, the reticence of the Russians on this issue was a negotiating position to obtain as much as possible from NATO.

That may be one explanation, but some members of this committee, as you know, Mr. Minister, were also in Russia the week prior to that. We were able to see that Russia's objection to the enlargement of NATO was not just a bargaining position. I think this feeling among the Russian people has deep-seated psychological causes. There are two reasons for this. First of all, NATO's proposed zone of influence has traditionally been a zone of influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. So the Russians think this is en encroachment on their zone of influence.

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Secondly, there is the question of security. If NATO eventually extends to the Russian borders and stops there, that would be like admitting that Europe still has a common enemy, namely Russia. So would Canada be willing to accept a NATO enlargement that would include Russia?

Mr. Axworthy: Certainly. I share the concern expressed by the member with regard to our position on the Russians. Obviously, the Russian leaders and senior officials are strongly opposed to this. At the same time, however, there are ongoing consultations between NATO and the Russian Department of Foreign Affairs.

There are clearly two facets to this. There is the question of European history and the great divide between Eastern and Western Europe. It is difficult to make changes in that context. It is psychological, as you said.

Canada's position, which is no doubt shared by other NATO members, is that this is an historic opportunity to make changes to the concept of security. It is not a question of East against West, but rather a defence system where all borders...

In my presentation, I spoke about

[English]

joint task force, mobile commands, etc. So I think there's no question that these concerns have to be dealt with. I think the meeting of the two presidents this morning, the ongoing consultations, which have been extremely active.... I want to assure the member it has not been taken lightly.

Secretary-General Solana, who was designated to do these negotiations on behalf of NATO, has been a very busy person over the last several months, and certain outlines of agreement have been reached. Not that they've been concluded, but I think there are already certain basic principles that there could be a series of consultation and cooperation agreements; that there could be a potential of a charter that would set up certain security objectives; that there would be mechanisms at many levels, at the level of the military, at the political level; a potential of a joint Russia-NATO council, which would meet at the ambassadorial level. Plus I think there have been some very clear commitments, quite historic commitments, on behalf of NATO members about changing the nature of the commitment on non-placement of nuclear weapons on the soil, commitment that at this stage there would not be the placement of any troops from other NATO members within the new country. There is also the real effort we're making to get a quite substantial retooling of the command structure.

So I don't treat it lightly, but I think there is an opportunity and my belief is there will be. I could be proven wrong by the results in the next few days, but I do think there are all the grounds available for a rapprochement, and if we do it right it would really be something much broader than the notion of NATO enlargement. It would be, as I say, a brand-new architecture for security that would cover the world that has been racked by wars for centuries. I think there could be a much greater level of security if we do it right.

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[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mister Minister, I must say that your clarifications reassure us that NATO is willing to reach the best agreement possible with Russia. I would, however, like to repeat my original question. Is Canada's position to eventually bring Russia into NATO or to extend NATO as far as Russian's borders, and no further, thereby justifying Russia's very serious concerns about the enlargement of NATO?

[English]

Mr. Axworthy: I can certainly see that as a very historic decision to take, but our attitude has been quite consistent. We say that there should be no policy of exclusion. There are basic criteria. They should be open and transparent. I think I outlined what they were. Countries have a right to apply and make application to join. So far, Russia has not indicated that interest, as many other countries have not. I don't think one should automatically say it's not possible. The way the world is evolving, if you look at the changes that have gone on in the last five years, no one would have predicted the kind of progress we've made. Who knows what the next five years could bring, if we're able to make this initial agreement we just talked about.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Graham): Mr. Martin.

Mr. Martin (Esquimalt - Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for coming to see us today.

Exclusion and secrecy always promote fear among countries and increase the security risk, whereas inclusion into situations always promotes peace. I wonder what assurances you've been promoting with Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Primakov over efforts to increase strategic partnerships between NATO and Moscow. What efforts have been made to include them in future strategic efforts or intentions by NATO?

I also wonder what efforts have been made to increase economic ties between Russia and the European Union in the OSCE. I think if we can improve the economic revitalization of Russia and increase ties between European countries and Russia, then inherent in that is a huge effort towards forging ties of peace and allaying the concerns of Moscow.

Slightly off topic, I wondered also if Canada was making any efforts in the Middle East with respect to what's going on in Jerusalem and whether or not you had spoken to Mr. Netanyahu, or whether there was any intention in the foreign affairs department to deal with King Hussein of Jordan in promoting his efforts in trying to defuse a significant security threat in the Middle East right now.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Graham): That would be an historic enlargement of NATO. Mr. Martin's proposing NATO headquarters in Jerusalen.

Mr. Keith Martin: That's a dangerous proposal.

Mr. Axworthy: God, the way we're going, we may even have Cuba in it by the time the morning is over.

First let me say that I agree, Mr. Martin, with your assertion that I think one of the most important ways in which we can add to the sense of security would be to be more active on the economic and social front. That's not specifically a NATO responsibility, because it's a security organization.

I would remind members, though, that going back to the origin of NATO, we have what we call article II, which is the so-called Pearson clause or Canada clause, which was introduced at the time. It was a clause to promote greater levels of economic, social, and political cooperation. It has been basically inoperative during the Cold War. I think there are opportunities for broadening that level of cooperation. Certainly the European Union has an important role to play. I think that other initiatives, such as the inclusion of Russia in the WTO and other global trade agreements, and perhaps an enhanced role for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, are initiatives that could be indicated.

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I think that in the negotiations under way right now, one of the elements should be how we can better improve the security - and not just with Russia, by the way; I think it's also true with the other new democracies in central and eastern Europe. They need the same kind of economic support - not necessarily in gobs of new aid, but in terms of higher-level integration into the global economy, trading system, and investment system.

I've made several trips into eastern Europe, the Baltic nations, the Ukraine, and came away convinced.... As you know, in the Ukraine we took a major trade delegation there in October of about sixty business people and negotiated $600 million of investments in the Ukraine. It's those kinds of gestures from countries like Canada that will make a big difference.

Another level is simply to do things that are directly related to security. In the case of Russia, for example, we've been holding active discussions about much higher levels of cooperation in the Arctic. We have established the Arctic Council. We had discussions as to how we can improve transportation, trade links, and transfers of technology with Russia, Ukraine, and others in terms of our shared interest in Arctic development. Those are the kinds of added elements, which I think you were talking about, that help create more of a texture to the relationship than simply one of security. I certainly endorse that.

One thing I think we can do as Canadians is perhaps use more influence in other multilateral economic organizations. I think the WTO is a prime example.

On the question of the Middle East, we are actively involved as a chair of the working group on refugees, as part of the overall Madrid process. We've also made representations to all sides about the need for reconciliation. We've taken, I must say, a fairly strong stand against the expansion of the settlements. We think that does not help the peace process. We've made statements of that kind. We voted at the UN General Assembly last week on that matter.

In terms of the present negotiations, we've made our views known, but in this case we are not, I will admit, a major player in that. I think it is very much the parties within the Middle East themselves that are. But we'll do anything we can to support this, both by our development programs and by the support we can give any international organizations.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Graham): Senator Grafstein.

Senator Jerahmiel Grafstein (Metro Toronto): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Minister, I appreciate your last comments. I wonder why this rush to judgment with respect to NATO expansion, keeping in mind that Russia is tremendously vulnerable at this time in terms of its efforts to move towards democratization. I welcome your comments that Canada has already tried to move on the second tier, which is multilateral relations, the Arctic, the WTO - article II by other means.

Let me go back to a fast analysis of the strategic thinking here. I've tried to read the Americans very carefully on this, including Strobe Talbott and others in foreign affairs. There appears to me to be a rush to expansion without taking into account either history or strategic analysis. Let me give you mine for the moment.

NATO started as a direct result of a palpable threat triggered by expansionist, aggressive policies of the communist regime then controlling Russia. It sought to extend its hegemony by means of spheres of influence to its adjacent countries, but it was all based on a palpable threat. Therefore, NATO arose as a direct result to stopping and containing that palpable threat.

In my view, we are, as you say, at a very historic moment in terms of Europe and the growth of stability and democracy. If you look back to Versailles, Versailles was a mistake, because the countries at that time, America and others, took advantage of an unconditional surrender and the weakness of Germany. I think the seeds of the Second World War started at Versailles.

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When you take a look at the second stage of evolution, Yalta, to my mind Yalta divided Europe in a way that was unconscionable. Again, the results of multilateralism, both at Versailles and Yalta, as opposed to bringing the idea of Europe together, fragmented the idea of Europe, the greater Europe, the greater architecture, and ended up in the Cold War and isolation.

Now here we are at the third opportunity in this century to develop, as you put it very well, an overarching architecture to bring Russia and Europe together in some fashion. Yet we seem to be establishing a principle that is driving Russia in a different direction. For example, if Russia is uncomfortable and unhappy with expansion, what does it do? Does it sit still? No, it moves toward China. It moves to developing a different balance of power to sustain its security concerns.

I just conclude by saying we are sensitive to the needs of Poland and the other countries and the trauma they've been through. We have to deal with their security needs, and there's no question about it that we do. At the same time, it strikes me we're driving Russia into an offer or a situation that will provoke national sentiment, provoke them to move in different directions and away from the unity of an overarching European architecture.

As a collateral to that, minister, what do we really say to the Ukraine? What do we really say to Belarus? What do we really say to the other members of the CIS who are in the same ambivalent position with respect to wanting to be stable, wanting to move to democracy, yet at the same time somehow being put in a third-class category with respect to the champagne of Europe, which is NATO?

It's a complex issue, Minister, and I know you're wrestling with it. But as sensitive as we are to the needs of central Europe, there are these deeper strategic concerns. I wonder if you could give us the benefit of your views before we move.

The Co-Chairman (Senator John Stewart (Antigonish - Guysborough)): Mr. Axworthy, before you do that, may I remind the two committees that the foreign affairs committee of the Senate did prepare a report some months back in which the views that Senator Grafstein has now enunciated were expressed. They were not expressed because they were simply Senator Grafstein's views; they were the unanimous views of the committee.

We said the committee recommends that the Canadian government encourage NATO to continue to implement policies that will help to ensure the enlargement process does contribute to enhanced security and stability in Europe. We emphasized the word ``does''.

We have all the concerns that Senator Grafstein has now mentioned. We understand the sophisticated analysis you have put before us. You've talked about good government-to-government relations as between, for example, the President of the United States and Mr. Yeltsin. But of course even in Russia there is the fact of popular perception. I suspect the perception of NATO in the common Russian mind is that of a military alliance, and it seems to me the expansion of that alliance, as Senator Grafstein has said, could be planting the seeds of future troubles.

There's something else I'm going to mention, so you can shoot it all down at once. It concerned our committee but we did not put it in our report. Now that the communist ogre has disappeared, how long will the taxpayers in North America, confronted as they are with deficits and debts, be willing to pay for what is thought of and advocated as security in central and eastern Europe? I believe we were thinking more of the United States than of Canada.

We can say that it's security for North America, but very often the popular eye doesn't see that far. Are we sure we're not overreaching our electoral support? I say we, meaning the United States and Canada here.

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Mr. Axworthy: Senator Stewart, let me take that first point.

I have a very high regard for the level of sophistication of the Canadian public's awareness of the international commitments and responsibilities of Canada. Certainly historically, to go back to the analysis Senator Grafstein made, Canada has paid very heavily over the last century when there have been instability and insecurity in Europe. Preventative measures are much more effective than reactive measures and far less costly. We certainly learned that lesson the hard way.

As situations have changed dramatically in Europe with a variety of new democracies emerging out of the old Soviet Union, the opportunity to try to restore a system of stability and security is unique. That's why, in a sense, I think there's a certain urgency to it. You don't want to lose the moment. You don't want to lose the window of opportunity.

One of those windows was when the new democracies emerged out of the Soviet Union, very clear commitments were made by western countries. It's important we live up to those commitments and that we not forget them.

The commitments were that they would be helped to be integrated into the larger international community and that we could try to rebuild the historic zone of uncertainty that existed in the central plains of Europe for not just hundreds but thousands of years in a way that would overarch. That is one reason why I think the North American commitment from both the United States and Canada is a very essential and important ingredient. It provides a certain balance wheel.

I don't want to wax eloquent about the New World's contribution to old Europe, but nevertheless I think having North American participation is very crucial in providing a very important element, such as clearly with the United States the sheer size and magnitude of its forces' commitmment. I think Canada provides other kinds of commitments within NATO and other security arrangements that we can make contributions on with our own assets. I think we bring, as I've said in a few speeches, the soft power ingredients to help people negotiate, build bridges, broker and provide support.

I really do feel convinced that the timing is crucial. As we all know, being involved in politics, one can delay forever making decisions, and it's only when you make a commitment to go ahead that you begin to then concentrate the minds. Once that concentration takes place, I think the dynamic of negotiation takes on a higher level of urgency. That's certainly been the case over the last several months.

Let me give you an example of what I mean. In answer to both Senator Grafstein and Senator Stewart, I think there have been some quite interesting spin-offs from these negotiations. It hasn't been exclusively NATO enlargement and how many countries come in. Because we've had to engage the concerns of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltics, a number of new initiatives have been spawned. For example, I think one of the most crucial is the commitment to start renegotiating the conventional forces treaty in Europe, to bring down the numbers to get further parity.

You will all recall back in the good old Cold War days, we used to pick up our news magazines and you'd see these graphic pictures of many tanks and brigades aligned on both sides of the Iron Curtain. I think we can get rid of that now and start working on a more integrated version. If we can pull off a significant renegotiation of the CFE, I think we've made an enormous contribution to European security.

Secondly, a number of new liaisons are taking place. I'll just give you an example of the Canadian relation. We are now responsible for setting up the liaison NATO office in the Ukraine, where our armed forces have a number of military technical assistants. Dr. Jakabow could tell you about this. We're doing joint training with soldiers from Poland, the Ukraine, and from other eastern European countries. They are coming to the Pearson Centre in Nova Scotia. We've got a whole new series of joint exercises on planning. These things weren't happening before.

What we're proposing is that those activities take on even more formal and constructive engagements with Russia in these areas. That's why I come back to the point I made at the outset. The proposals being put on the table do give an opportunity for Russia to have now a much closer cooperative co-sharing decision-making relationship with NATO than we've ever had before.

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All of a sudden those old Cold War conventions that you talked about, the old psychology and the history we're all concerned about, begin to evaporate, because no longer is NATO seen as the demon from the west versus the demon in the east, but instead we begin to see we're sharing these things. We're working together, as we're now doing in Bosnia. That's really the chance we have to seize.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Minister.

I have five more interveners. I think you probably can stay a couple of minutes after 10 o'clock, but I understand you have to go shortly after that.

Mr. Axworthy: Yes, I have to go to another meeting. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have another meeting arranged on another topic.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Do you have to leave right at 10 o'clock?

Mr. Axworthy: Yes.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We've got ten minutes and five people, so people should bear that in mind.

Mr. Axworthy: Chairman, would it help if the questions were cumulative and I take my answers in ten minutes?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That could be, perhaps. Why don't we try that?

Mr. Dupuy, Senator Andreychuk, Mr. Sauvageau, and Senator Prud'homme.

Mr. Michel Dupuy (Laval West, Lib): There is obviously a great deal of momentum behind the enlargement of NATO. Although the final decisions have not been made, one gets the feeling it is past the point of no return and that it will take place regardless of the position of Russia. If that is correct, the challenge is to make sure that the response of Russia will not be so negative as to create a lot of problems, as Senator Grafstein has indicated to us.

Among the things that could be done, I'm surprised that no mention has been made of progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. You made a reference to conventional arms, but it is of course the thought of having nuclear weapons still in western Europe and potentially aimed at Russia that may be the most serious concern by the Russians. One of their likely reactions, if they really wanted to demonstrate that they do not accept NATO enlargement, would be to shift sides on elimination of nuclear weapons. They are now ahead of NATO in their pronouncement and support of various international initiatives.

You mentioned that progress is made on a number of fronts in relation to NATO enlargement, and I share that view, but why not on the elimination of nuclear weapons?

Senator Raynell Andreychuk (Saskatchewan, PC): Just following up on that question, I would also want to know, short of what Russia's request is, that NATO never be used as a tool against it in a military sense. Short of the fact that we should be in a legally binding text, what concessions do you see that we will have to make to Russia that would satisfy, or at least give it some sense of assurance, without hamstringing the operations of NATO?

In that context, also, I note in your text you indicate Canada favours real content to the special relationship in the Ukraine. I tend to agree with you that it's been an agreement in spirit, not content. What content are you going to put into it?

[Translation]

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Sauvageau.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Terrebonne, B.Q.): I have two very short questions for you, Mr. Minister.

The first is on Canadian government policy with regard to disarmament in NATO members countries, given the decision by the International Court of Justice.

The second question is perhaps a little more sensitive. If NATO is enlarged and has new member countries, this increases the potential of conflict between the member countries of NATO. How would the decision be made if there is a conflict between two member countries of NATO, between Greece and Turkey for instance, or between Hungary and Romania, or between other member countries of NATO? What would be the position of the allied countries in that situation?

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The Joint-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you for being so brief.

Mr. Prud'homme.

Senator Marcel Prud'homme (La Salle, Ind.): Thank you.

[English]

Mr. Minister, you said Canada has paid heavily over the years. You're right. We must be careful in the enlargement. There are so many statements, and I don't know if it's politically correct now to encourage almost everybody who asks. Out of respect for some of the countries that have been mentioned, even by the highest authority of Canada, it is almost a sign of encouragement that they may have the support of Canada to be part of this enlargement.

I'll be very polite, but I regret to say that in my view, the stability in Russia at the moment, politically, economically, and even socially, could be a sign of encouragement for these people, to say the least, who may use this enlargement in Russia if we are not doing it with all the necessary signals to Russia that this is not a threat to them. It could only encourage the forces in Russia that may use that to their personal gain.

Finally, if such were the case, aren't we therefore in danger of starting a new arms race that in everybody's opinion could only satisfy the military industrial complex that is crying for a war to take place somewhere because they're dying and suffocating? This is something that I know Canadians will certainly take into account in our final decision.

I follow up very much on what the distinguished ambassador of NATO and Mr. Dupuy said. Nobody talks about the possibility of an arms race. Could it not be possible that all negotiation stops there? That's the concern of many people who reflect on this enlargement. We are talking of course of the cost, because any fantasy as figures has been put forward. As the defendants of the taxpayers' money, I think we must know at least where and what we are entering when we talk about that. It's too late to say now we will do it and then we'll explain how much it costs afterward.

Mr. Axworthy: I hope members will understand if I consolidate some of the answers, because I think questions overlap in some respect.

Beginning with Mr. Dupuy, the one thing I want to change if I might is the vocabulary. It's not regardless of what Russia thinks. As I've tried to emphasize, the whole process has been in very close consultation and engagement with Russia. That's been a premise right from the start.

The larger issue of the alternate use of nuclear weapons, as you know, has been a cornerstone of NATO security positions for many years. You will recognize that I sent a reference to this committee to begin looking at the broader question in light of the international court decisions, the tabling of the report of an NGO group from Canada, and the commission that the Australian government had put forward. I know it's a very broad question and I simply look forward to this committee's recommendation. It's an opportunity for active public participation in a very difficult, but I think very important, issue you've raised.

Certainly we're not going to take any positions until what we know what the public, through this committee, feels about it. I think that would be the initiative we've taken to deal with that larger issue, which partly deals with Senator Prud'homme's question of how to deal with this matter. I take it as under active advisement of the House of Commons committee in this area.

Practical steps are taken, however. I think it's important to note that there has been substantial agreement between Russia and the United States through the START treaty process. It's my understanding that one of the items on the agenda between President Clinton and President Yeltsin will be to try to move the ratification of the START II treaty both through the Duma and through the Congress, which would then set the stage for START III.

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To me that is one of the positive spin-offs of this engagement we're in on enlargement. It is giving us the opportunity to come to grips with these other issues. The fact that it's on the table as part of the summit and it's seen as part of that larger package is a very constructive development, because we all want to see that ratified. Similarly, as I said before on the issue of the reduction of forces through the CFE, it is also a useful spin-off or a side bar to this larger discussion.

To Senator Andreychuk's question, I think you're quite right. Clearly, any new NATO would not have a legally binding commitment, but all the other tangible commitments: we're not placing nuclear weapons on new member territory; we're not putting forces on those territories. There would be a substantial shift in the command structure so it's no longer a bastion of frontier command posts but it's something that would be reorganized into these joint task force commands and so on. They begin to change the nature of the military structure so that it's not an alliance directed against one country, but it is in fact a security alliance and a defensive alliance that brings people together so that they can do joint operations even with Russia, as we're doing in Bosnia.

As we know, the new troubles of security are not so much the classic Cold War confrontations but are so much the product of these internal questions, where competing factions within countries end up in conflict, as we're seeing even today in Albania, because of the instability and the lack of democracy. My view is that one of the assets or advantages of a NATO expansion is that we help consolidate the gains we've made to provide greater stability in those areas and we give a capacity for collective actions on these security matters, if the decisions are made.

In particular, that's one of the purposes of the negotiations starting today between Foreign Minister Udovenko of Ukraine and Secretary-General Solana. I can give you a list, but the proposals on the table are political security, consultations, conflict prevention, crisis of management issues, disarmament arms control, crisis consultation when Ukraine is threatened, exchanges on broad security issues, consultations among armaments directors, arms-related technology and civil emergency planning. Those are the NATO-level discussions. At the secondary level, there's a number of bilateral, trilateral agreements between.... As I said, Canada is undertaking discussions to work on military technical systems with Ukraine, with Poland, with other countries so that we can work together.

This confidence-building activity is one of the important reasons we should get into this. It hooks us up together. We're not separate; we're not divergent. We're actually beginning to share military information, knowledge, connections, cooperation. It seems to me we've made significant progress. I'm hopeful we will have an agreement between NATO and Ukraine at the same time as the expansion decisions are made in July. It's not up to me, but certainly that's what Canada's been pushing for very strenuously in NATO councils.

I partly answered Mr. Sauvageau's question by saying that the committee is now seized with this broader question of the decisions on nuclear disarmament. What are we doing in NATO? As you know, we have taken a very active role in the question of the ban on land mines, which is a very crucial issue for many countries within those areas. I want to report to the committee that we're reaching some success as we proceed down the road. There are now some 50-odd countries that have agreed to join us on a total ban. There are very active discussions now taking place in Africa and other parts of Asia. There's some real momentum for moving towards this. It's one area we can bring to bear to which Canada can make a contribution.

You raise a very important question about what happens if two members of NATO don't get along, as we've seen in some circumstances. Again, I would make the case that by being within NATO, the resolution of those conflicts is helped by simply being around the same table, being part of the same meetings, groups, organizations and discussion. It moderates and reduces the tension and it puts some discipline on the countries themselves to find some rapprochement, some accommodation.

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It's not foolproof. Individual countries have their own interests and their own reasons, but by being part of the same organization, by being within it, you reduce the potential of armed conflict emerging. We're seeing that in the case of Greece and Turkey. They have their very major differences, but the fact that they are still part of NATO means they have to come together to try to work these things out. I'm hopeful in those areas.

Senator Prud'homme, I just want to reiterate on this question of what new members.... What we try to do is not make a priori decisions, Senator Prud'homme, but simply say there are criteria, and I have listed them. There are about five or six basic criteria. If countries meet those criteria, then they have an invitation to the extent that then it's a NATO decision; it's not ours solely. There are some very basic criteria in terms of the contribution scenario, the accountability of civilian control over military, a movement of reform on economic and political grounds, and a resolution of conflicts on boundaries.

If countries start meeting those standards, again, the membership, whether it's an EU, a NATO, or a European Council or whatever.... I will go back to the position that Keith Martin took. That adds, then, to the broader levels of economic and social and political cooperation. Each of these things has its own multiple consequences.

By being part of an international organization like NATO it simply brings you together. I said I met with a group of ambassadors from the Partnership for Peace. The first diplomatic meeting I attended when I became a minister was with the Partnership for Peace. I sat at a table with foreign ministers from some of the new democracies in central and eastern Europe and all of sudden we started talking about things we could do together. Out of that grew a number of new connections and relationships, even on a very personal basis, that otherwise we wouldn't have had. As you know, bringing the prime ministers together with their counterparts in these areas, bringing ministers together, bringing parliamentarians together as part of the NATO Assembly, all these things provide more glue to stick things together, and that's why the integration is so important.

Senator Marcel Prud'homme: Does Parliament have to ratify this enlargement of the...?

Mr. Axworthy: Any decisions that are made will be brought back to Parliament. We would discuss what the best format would be with the chairs of the committees.

Senator Marcel Prud'homme: Is it not an obligation under the treaty that an enlargement must be ratified by the 16 members?

Mr. Axworthy: We'll say that we'll be bringing it back to Parliament.

Senator Marcel Prud'homme: I see some officials saying yes, definitely.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Wait a minute, Senator. You know and I know that ratification is a matter the government can do. We only need some domestic legislation if it has to come before the committee and Parliament, and whether or not it needs it will have to be decided at the time.

Mr. Axworthy: I will work it out under the auspices of the committee, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

Minister, I know you have to go. We really appreciate your being here this morning. I just want to follow up on a couple of points that came out of your observations.

You may recall that our committee did go to Russia, a group of us. We were very impressed when we went to Russia by the potential for a lack of stability in Russia. We were told that there are presently three million people in internal migration in Russia itself, with nowhere to sleep, nowhere to go. The source of potential problems is very serious internally in Russia. So we know you will be bearing this in mind in respect to that.

Our committee will be shortly doing our report on the Arctic. In that report we will be dealing extensively with the very issues you raised - that is to say, trade links, the environment, the sensitive Arctic area, where we can cooperate with Russia. We will work and collaborate with Russia to help them with their development. We hope that report will be helpful to the government in dealing with those issues.

As you suggested, we also have started our hearings on nuclear disarmament or the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. We've held one in camera hearing; we've held one public hearing. We recognize that the political and parliamentary calendar is rather surcharged at this point, so the ability to complete that before the summer would perhaps be difficult, but we certainly intend to treat it very seriously. It will be an ongoing work of great importance for us.

I'd just like to congratulate you personally on your nomination for a Nobel Prize arising out of your work.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): The fact that Senator Leahy recognized your dynamic leadership in that area was important. I was disappointed to see your nomination didn't come from Senator Helms, but perhaps that is understandable, given your recent visit to Cuba.

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Mr. Axworthy: Chairman, I often believe he asked Jesse to second the nomination, but he said he hadn't quite gotten around to that yet.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): As long as Mr. Castro doesn't do it, we'll all be all right.

We're going to have to adjourn, but I just want to tell the members something. We would normally invite the senators to stay. We're going to be continuing this matter with some other witnesses. We would be more than happy to have our senator colleagues stay if they wish to join us.

The morning will be somewhat interrupted by votes. There will be a vote for which I understand there will be a 30-minute bell.

We are now asked to proceed to the House immediately. I'm informed that there will be a vote after a 30-minute bell, and following that there may be a subsequent vote after another 30-minute bell. So we will try to come back here.

Members, please return here immediately after the vote, because if we only have a half hour we can get 20 minutes in. Don't just disappear, please. Thank you very much.

We'll adjourn the meeting while we go to the House.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I would like to call the meeting to order again.

I apologize to our distinguished guests for the confusion resulting from the votes, but I think you are all aware of the exigencies of parliamentary life. I understand that you've had a chance to speak to the clerk and that we've established an order.

We have Colonel Pellerin, who will be speaking first, and then Colonel Fraser and Professor Levesque. No, sorry, the third will be our distinguished Austrian visitor, to whom we're very grateful for coming.

Thank you very much for being here, Mr. Gärtner.

Next will be Professor Braun from the University of Toronto, and finally

[Translation]

Mr. Lévesque from the Université du Québec à Montréal.

Welcome to all of you. I hope you can make your presentations within 10 minutes or less so that we have time left for questions.

Colonel Douglas Fraser (Retired, Executive Director, Canadian Council on Peace and Security): Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

I would first like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to your committee about the enlargement of NATO. With your permission, I would like to say a few words about the Canadian Council on Peace and Security.

[English]

The Canadian Council on International Peace and Security is an independent, non-governmental organization, with a mandate to develop and advance innovative Canadian policies on issues of international peace and security, in keeping with Canada's international tradition.

Our council promotes public debate and dialogue by providing independent views and sources of information to the Canadian government and the public, on topical matters ranging from nuclear disarmament to post-conflict peacebuilding.

In the view of the council, to date there has been very little public debate or dialogue on the question of NATO expansion. Today's hearing is a beginning, and there are a number of papers and programs being prepared by various scholars and institutes in the next few months. We welcome this surge of activity, but very much wish it had taken place before the government adopted its position.

Our council is currently undertaking a major study on NATO enlargement, and we will be publishing a report in our Aurora Papers series in June. For reasons that I have just mesntioned, this paper will not deal with the question of whether NATO should or should not make an offer of membership to a number of central and east European states. We believe it is a given that offers will be made.

We want to focus on what happens in the months ahead, before and after the Madrid summit in July, and are concentrating on the following outstanding issues: the Russian reaction to enlargement; the security concerns of the central and east European states not invited to join; the cost; ratification; and the Mediterranean security concerns of some NATO member-states.

As part of the preparation of the paper, the council is sponsoring a small round table today, centring but not exclusively on the question of ratification, and we are very pleased that a number at the table and in the room will be attending this round table. Next month, specifically on April 24, the council will bring together in a major seminar here in Ottawa an eminent group of four from Russia, Hungary, the United States, and Canada to discuss the other outstanding issues resulting from the enlargement of NATO.

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We hope that these two events and our ongoing research will result in a policy paper that is both current and relevant to some of the problems that Canada will be confronting in the next few months and years.

With me today is the council's project officer for the NATO enlargement issue, Colonel Alain Pellerin, who will brief you on our position today. Professor Heinz Gärtner, from the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, will be the council's guest at our round table today. He will speak here from the perspective of a citizen of a neutral European state.

[Translation]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Colonel.

[Translation]

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Retired, Project Director, CIIPS NATO Enlargment Project, Canadian Council on Peace and Security): Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

[English]

before I go into the gist of the matter, which is the outstanding issues Colonel Fraser has mentioned, I think it's important to look at the security context in Europe of the NATO enlargement. We've heard a lot of historical analogies that sometimes do not add up to the current situation. We've heard about the security vacuum in central Europe. We heard from Dr. Kissinger about the no-man's land. I think the context is very different. It might have applied between the two world wars, but the situation is quite different. This is for four reasons, in my view.

One reason is Russia. Russia's border is where it was three centuries ago. Russia's military is therefore not in the position it was in at the end of the Second World War to be the arbiter of what Europe or central Europe should look like.

Second, Germany, which was the cause of a lot of concern in central Europe, is in my view no longer a military threat. It is also firmly anchored in NATO and the European Union and has been a firm ally for the last 40 years.

I think another key element is the involvement of North America, and the U.S.A. in particular, in European security. I think that's a very positive element. North America to a certain extent, or the U.S.A., is probably the most important European power now.

Finally, the last issue is that ideology has disappeared as a key factor in central European security. The communist ideology no longer plays the role that it did.

I think these are important issues, which will come up again when the treaty is to be ratified.

What I'd like to do now is address some of the outstanding issues. To start with, I think the decision to hold a NATO summit in July firmly commits the alliance to enlargement. Therefore, in my view, to reverse that decision at this eleventh hour would be disastrous for the alliance.

Hence, for those who believe in NATO - and I'm a firm believer in NATO - the first priority must be the successful management of the enlargement process in the months ahead and, as Colonel Fraser said, before and after the summit. The outstanding issues we address will be with us years ahead.

Therefore, it's not my intention to reopen the pros and cons of enlargement but to address some of the unresolved issues and if I have time at the end propose some recommendations.

Obviously, the key outstanding issue is Russia. This we see from the Clinton-Yeltsin summit today. I must say I fully agreed with Senator Grafstein when he raised the analogy of Versailles. I think we should be driven in our negotiations with Russia as an equal partner and not as a defeated nation, but I think the issue here is to establish what is the role of Russia in the future security architecture of Europe. There is obvious difficulty in reaching that agreement, in NATO and the countries that want to join NATO and those that will not be invited. I think that's a key issue we need to address.

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In my view, what needs to be resolved is that Russia has to be firmly anchored into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, in the same way Germany was at the end of the Second World War, and we must avoid repeating the mistakes of the post-Versailles era.

Now Russia's goal as a European power is to avoid isolation. On the other hand, NATO's goal is to enhance security and stability in Europe, but in order to achieve that goal for NATO, I think it is very important, and essential I would suggest, that we treat Russia as a respected and valued partner, treat Russia with dignity in line with the Versailles analogy, which didn't happen in the case of Germany. If the enlargement issue is not handled properly, it will poison the relationship with Russia for years to come. Obviously, the danger is re-creating the spheres of influence in the immediate...what we could call the ``near abroad'' of Russia, if you want, and their effect particularly on key nations such as the Ukraine, but also on the smaller nations of the Baltic states. I think that's very important, and hopefully the summit today will bring out some key result.

There, I must give a warning, or place a caveat on these discussions. Contentious concessions must be made to Russia to satisfy its legitimate concerns. On the other hand, as an alliance we must ensure that the concessions will not come to haunt us in the future, in particular to undermine article V of the treaty. I think that's very important. The alliance is not just an alliance for good weather, but particularly for bad weather, and I think we need to preserve that.

The arms control dossier is another issue in our relationship with Russia, and I know that was raised this morning.

I'm more optimistic than some reports. I think START II will be ratified in the near future, if only because it's in the interests of the Russian military to maintain a credible force. The 10,000 warheads they have now are not easily maintainable with the reduced budget they have. So I think it is in their interests to ratify START II and go on to START III, with a much lower ceiling.

With respect to the chemical warfare convention, I think America has to take the lead to ratify that treaty. In the case of Russia, even if they ratify the treaty, I think they will have serious difficulty for a number of reasons, mainly economic but also environmental, to destroy the very large stocks of chemical warfare. But it should be pursued. I'm more optimistic, I think, than the press is on this.

The other outstanding issue is the countries that will not be invited. The debate recently has been more on enlargement, on the countries that will be invited, and for obvious reasons Russia. I think those that will not be invited need to be reassured, notwithstanding the official line we hear that the enlargement of NATO will not bring new dividing lines to Europe. It will.

We have to be realistic, if only because institutional lines will created by the enlargement of NATO, by those that will be members of NATO, both new and old. Under article V security guarantees are provided to those who are members, but those who will not be invited will not get the security guarantee. So there will be dividing lines. That's not Cold War thinking; it's a reality, I believe.

The main issue of those nations that will not be invited, and this was raised by Minister Axworthy this morning...are Ukraine and the Baltic states, but there are other countries that need to be addressed. We're likely inviting those countries that are the most stable in Europe - the central Visigrad or at least the three Visigrad countries - but we need to address those countries that will not be invited and are very unstable, whether it's Bulgaria or Albania.

Next is the cost issue. Costs will be as little or as much as the alliance wants to pay, and I think the message from this morning is that the alliance doesn't want to pay too much for enlargement.

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The issue of the cost for the enlargement is not purely a financial calculation. I think it's also a political and strategic one, because it has to do with how article V of the Washington Treaty is implemented. If we do not want troops or if we want no infrastructure in the new countries, then obviously the costs will be very low. In my view, the costs will in fact be very low, much lower than the speculation of $25 billion to $110 billion that we've seen in various studies.

I think it's going to be a very low-cost affair, especially since it's unlikely that there will be any conventional NATO troops stationed in these countries and therefore the infrastructure will be much less. It's unlikely that there'll be more than one or two regional headquarters, and that's minimal cost. But again, the costs shouldn't be looked at in isolation. It has to be looked at with the credibility of the security guarantees we will give to these new nations under article V.

The other outstanding issue is ratification. This is a decisive phase, the final phase, and we need to get it right. It's not a foregone conclusion that it's going to be a cakewalk in some countries.

The question was posed this morning by Senator Prud'homme on what is the procedure. Article X of the Washington Treaty talks about unanimous ratification by all nations and also the tradition as such. As it stands now, 13 of 16 nations will go to Parliament for ratification. Three of those - probably Canada, the U.K., and Norway - will likely do it through an Order in Council, but my strong recommendation is that if there is an Order in Council in Canada, there should be a debate in the House because I think people are interested in the issue.

In the year ahead, what will likely happen in 1997 will be the consultation with the invited countries. Then the instrument of ratification will be sent to nations in 1998, and that can take up to a year in some nations, although some nations will be very rapid. So that brings us to the end of 1998, with the new members invited probably in April 1999.

I have one caution again. We have heard our Prime Minister talk about inviting five or six members and a wide membership, but NATO remains a military alliance and to be credible I think we have to realize that to invite new members involves providing them security guarantees under article V. NATO is not the Rotary Club. There are security implications.

I must say that new members in central Europe, because of their history, want to join NATO because in their view NATO will provide them these security guarantees and they will hold NATO to these security guarantees. We talk about the new NATO and the old NATO, but I think they prefer the old NATO rather than NATO being involved in cooperative security and non-article V.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): They prefer the old NATO, but with new members.

Col Pellerin: I think the ratification will be a major issue in the United States, in the Senate. What will likely happen is that a lot of the questions which have not been debated will come up, like the security guarantees I mentioned. Why NATO first? Why not the EU? Why aren't the Europeans doing more about their own security? It will be difficult also to sell an abstract concept like stability and security in Europe without a clear and present danger, as we had before in NATO.

If you'll give me two minutes, I just want to say -

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm sorry, you've taken 11 already, and if you go to 13 there's going to be no time for questions. I'm sorry to rush you this way, but can you just wrap up quickly?

Col Pellerin: One issue that I think has not been addressed is Mediterranean security. We talk about the whole of Europe being stable and secure, and I think five nations of the alliance have a Mediterranean dimension. We see Algeria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey. The Cyprus issue comes up again. And if we talk about a multifaceted approach to enlargement, NATO has to take into account the security priority of the southern tier of nations.

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I'm sorry, I've been going too long.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): No, it's all right. Thanks. I'm sorry to rush, but you can see the problem, the time we lost - an hour - with the voting.

I will turn to our visitor, Professor Gärtner.

Mr. Heinz Gärtner (Research Fellow, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Laxenburg, Austria): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, I start with a general remark on NATO, and then I'll move on to the debate on NATO enlargement within a nuclear state, which to some extent reflects the debate in Europe, as such.

After the end of the Cold War, with the main threat having faded away, many thought NATO would not survive. But six years after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO shows no signs of demise.

I would argue that the reason NATO survived is that NATO is focusing on new areas and takes on new tasks. On their agenda we now see crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, but also peace enforcement.

Nevertheless, those who argue that an alliance can hardly survive without a sufficient threat have a point. I would say the core of the Cold War - NATO, the collective defence - is getting less and less important, and the new tasks are becoming more and more significant.

Part of the new NATO is that some countries will be invited to start accession negotiations. The official position of the Austrian government is that the Austrian government supports enlargement of NATO if it is handled carefully, if there's an agreement with Russia and a solution for the Baltic states and the Ukraine. If there are no dividing lines, it could enhance stability in Europe. As you can see, there are lots of ``ifs''.

NATO enlargement will have an impact on Austria itself in two ways. First, Austria's neighbouring states are among the first countries that might become the new members of NATO. This will create a new security situation for Austria. Second, the enlargement debate has initiated a discussion within Austria on its attitude towards NATO itself.

Based on the observation that NATO is changing, I'll distinguish two tendencies to explain Austria's view on enlargement. I call them the traditional and the new security concepts.

The traditional concept focuses primarily on NATO's old role as a military alliance. Even though NATO reform is recognized, this viewpoint is based on threat perceptions. NATO's role as a defence organization, with its core of collective and territorial defence, as enshrined in article V of the Washington Treaty, is important for this perspective.

In this concept, enlargement is mainly seen as a window of opportunity before Russia becomes a superpower again. Austria, as a full-fledged member in NATO and also in the WEU, is in the realm of possibility. Supporters of this concept put forward three arguments. First, NATO needs a territorial link to the new east-central European NATO members. Apart from Slovenia, this would be Austria. Second, as a full-fledged member, Austria would have an impact on decision-making policies within NATO and the WEU. Third, Austria is vulnerable because of the instability in the former communist neighbouring states.

So far, international lawyers have argued that membership in an alliance is not compatible with the existing Austrian neutrality law. As you probably know, this law prohibits Austria from joining a military alliance and deploying foreign troops on Austrian soil permanently.

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Politicians are careful to address this issue of neutrality and NATO membership openly, because 75% of the Austrian population still supports Austrian neutrality. In order to solve this problem, the Austrian foreign minister stated this week that NATO membership could be compatible with neutrality if article V commitments of the treaty would be called ``solidarity.'' So you see how the debate moves in some problematic directions.

Some argue that Austria could even be in the first wave of NATO membership, if there's an agreement with Russia. And Austria could use its advantage of being an EU member.

Concerning European security, this view supports the position that the European Union and the WEU should merge. The WEU treaty also has an article V, with more binding security guarantees. This article should be incorporated into the EU. And WEU membership eventually would lead to NATO membership anyway. Austria at present has observer status in the WEU.

The second concept reflects a different view. It is based on the idea that the security system in Europe is changing dramatically. The challenges are becoming flexible, so the responses have to be flexible.

Membership in an alliance is only one answer. Among others, security has become not only a military but a comprehensive issue. Alliances are changing, and so is the concept of neutrality.

Future membership of Austria's neighbouring states in NATO does not mean that Austria would have to join NATO as well. And this concept of collective and territorial defence is considered to be an instrument of the Cold War.

For the new missions of NATO, this concept argues that no territorial link is necessary any more, but NATO needs rapid deployment forces. Territorial bridges were a requirement in 1914. In this concept, Austria could participate in crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and even peace enforcement operations, in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. And the new Atlantic Partnership Council concept will provide the opportunity for non-members to take part in consultative and decision-making processes. So the rights of allies and non-allies would be blurred.

Austria already participates in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. Currently there are 1,200 Austrian troops active in about 13 peacekeeping operations. So this demonstrates that Austria is not a free rider.

According to this viewpoint, Austria does not need security guarantees, because there's no threat to Austria. Therefore, membership in a collective defence system is not necessary.

Even so, the concept of neutrality is changing. For example, participation in peace enforcement operations that are authorized by the UN does not necessarily entail formal membership in NATO or the WEU.

Concerning European security, this option is similar to a Swedish-Finnish proposal. According to this proposal, the European Union should focus on the so-called ``Petersberg tasks'' of the WEU, which include crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian action. It's not entirely clear whether peacemaking also means peace enforcement.

All European Union members, including the four neutral states - Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland - would have the equal right to decide, and take part in these operations.

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The EU and the WEU should not merge, as in the first concept. The EU can request the WEU to carry out peacekeeping crisis-management operations, but whether Austria should take part in certain operations or not should be on the basis of an Austrian decision. So Austria should not commit itself to military operations beforehand.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not know which of the tendencies will prevail, and I do not know when the final decision on Austria's attitude towards the WEU and NATO will be made. Some argue it should be done already this year, at least before the Austrian presidency of the EU in the second half of 1998. Others argue that there is no rush, because there is no threat to Austrian security.

Let me conclude by saying that NATO enlargement, in general and in principle, should be based on the second concept. The extension of NATO should be based on crisis management, rather than on collective defence. If NATO enlargement only meets the interests of those new members that are based on the traditional concept of collective defence, it might well be that these new members could block NATO reform towards crisis management.

Many times new members want an old NATO. NATO should demonstrate that it has left the Cold War behind, and that it is willing to continue its reform process, as was argued recently by Secretary General Solana. Enlargement should not take place until it is clear to everyone who wants to join NATO that NATO doesn't look backwards.

Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

Professor Braun.

Professor Aurel Braun (Department of Political Science, University of Toronto): Thank you. I'm going to speak about the dilemmas of enlargement, lowering expectations, and clarifying the risks.

In general, I am a supporter of enlargement, but with an agnostic variation.

I'm going to focus on four areas: first, east-central European aspirations and expectations; second, Russian fears and opposition; third, preserving NATO; and fourth, Canada as a balancer of opinion.

In the first part - that is, ECE aspirations and expectations - there are several interconnected goals I want to touch on, and I hope to be able to get back to these in the question period. These goals of the ECE states are interconnected.

The first goal is enhanced security. For that to be achieved there would have to be a fundamental alteration of the entire framework of the national security in these prospective members. This will range from radically changing civil-military relations, all the way to changes in industrial military procurement and the production system. Perhaps NATO can help here.

Second, there is a desire to create a new security architecture in Europe, with the alliance playing a role.

Third, they wish to seek reassurance - so they proclaim - rather than deterrence. I think it is important to make a distinction between deterrence and reassurance. Reassurance involves policies and measures that instil confidence in allies so that they can conduct their domestic affairs and form policies without feeling intimidated.

Fourth, the ECE states claim that they wish to ensure that enlargement is part of a process of integration, which is also political and economic; that is, NATO enlargement is to create a synergy for European Union enlargement as well.

Fifth, there is a hope to entrench democratic institutions and processes.

Clearly, NATO has a role to play in all of these. The larger goal of reconnecting the ECE with western Europe is a worthy one; dividing the continent is something else.

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The ECE states speak of enlargement often as an insurance policy. It is an ingenious but unfortunately an inadequate explanation. The costs of it - and I disagree with one of the previous speakers - will be substantial. They may be worth it, but they are going to be large. These kinds of premiums are not going to be expended unless there is a fear of some threat. It is obvious that the threat these countries fear is Russia, and there's no way of getting around that, certainly not in the Russian perception.

Further, there is a confusion of reassurance and deterrence. There may be some overlap, but there is a kind of muddling of it that is rather dangerous.

In terms of creating a new security architecture, there has to be an assumption of the indivisibility of security. The need is to build walls, not bridges. In the case of the ECE states, however, what ultimately they appear to be seeking is a qualitatively different relationship with the alliance from that which Russia can or will have.

Further, the process of integration that is to operate at the political and economic levels, through the European Union, is far from certain. There is no evidence of that synergy. On the contrary, it may be that it will be made more difficult.

I'd just like to point to a statement by the German defence minister, one of the most avid advocates of enlargement - and this should give the east-central European states pause. He said yes, membership in it is important, but the European Union enlargement will be something else entirely. After all, you can join NATO with rusty tanks. You cannot join the European Union with rusty tractors.

The assumption nevertheless is widely held in east-central Europe, and in some parts of the west as well, that this is a propitious time to enlarge. You have a Russia that is economically and politically prostrate, and it may be irritated and unreasonable, but it cannot resist that enlargement. Historically, unfortunately, in this kind of operation, the kinds of treaties that result in these situations - uneven treaties - are not likely to create long-term, sustainable, stable relations.

Ultimately there is this dichotomy in approaches between what many of the West see and try to pursue as reassurance and what the east-central European states are doing, and that is fundamentally deterrence.

Second, let me touch on the area of Russian fears and opposition. There are three areas here: the problem that may arise with Russian readiness to ratify treaties such as START II; the pressures that Russia might bring on the ``near abroad'' states and the Baltic states in case things do not go as they hope; and the danger to democracy in Russia.

In the case of the first fear, I am not as concerned as some, since I take a rather pessimistic view of what is likely to happen with ratification of START II in Russia. On the other hand, I am not as concerned about the effects of not ratifying it, because Russia is not presenting and is not likely to present a military threat in the immediate future. The long term will be something else entirely.

The second element involves pressures on the ``near abroad'' and the Baltic states, and that is very likely to happen.

The third element is absolutely crucial, and this is where we need some proper conceptualization of it. It's not a simple, linear, causal relationship. If we expect that NATO enlargement would immediately endanger democracy.... That is not going to happen. But there is very much a cumulative, long-term danger of Russia being excluded, or having a sense of being excluded, that can help prejudice the prospects for democracy and can give rise to authoritarianism or reinforce authoritarian tendencies, which presents a long-term threat.

It is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that Russia is a threat, and this would present enormous dangers. If Russian reaction is not, immediately upon enlargement, that of a sabre-rattling stance, there may be a collective sigh of relief. That's premature. The danger is far more long-term.

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The third element is preserving NATO. I mentioned that in the West much of the thrust is to create reassurance rather than deterrence. In a sense this tallies in with what Primakov is demanding, and Primakov basically wants to neuter NATO.

He wants either NATO to offer the EC states much less than they are asking - that is, the NATO military structure would not move eastward and there basically would be a second-class status for the EC states - or, if this cannot be achieved, he wants NATO to be transformed in such a way that it would not really be an effective organization, with the role of the United States greatly diminished or ended. Third, his fall-back position is that whatever he gets he's likely to pocket, and if he doesn't get the first two - which he's not likely to, completely - he will try to alienate Russia further from the West to ensure that Russia does not become part of the western system.

Yet this is what is crucial: ultimately we have to think of a broader approach to security. It is important in terms of preserving NATO that we don't wind up with a watered down NATO. You cannot just dispense with article V. NATO must maintain its options, and the main goal of the alliance - a combination of reassurance and deterrence - needs to be preserved.

The fourth area is Canada as a balancer of opinion. Canada is not a superpower. In some respects it cannot even act as a great power. But it is an important power. It is a respected country. It has influence. Canada can play a role in the balancing of opinions. Canada can moderate ECE state expectations. It can diminish Russian fears. Canada could slow down the enlargement process so that development of democracy in Russia could allow the Russians, eventually, to hope to join this integrative process.

We need to think in terms of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok, which means that eventually all pluralistic states in this ark should have an opportunity, once they have met rigorous standards, to join the alliance. For this we must be credible and the alliance must be credible.

If I can have one and a half minutes, I'll conclude.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm sorry to rush everybody like this, but we now have 12 minutes until we have to adjourn the hearing, and we'd like to hear what Professor Levesque has to say as well.

Prof. Braun: Absolutely. If I could finish two sentences....

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Two sentences, great.

Prof. Braun: It is foolish to have Canada advocate at this stage that more than three countries are ready to enter, because that weakens both our credibility and that of that alliance. So we need to maintain that.

I would conclude by saying we have not really worked out the costs, dangers, and risks of the enlargement. There is a very real danger that the EC states are getting much less than they want, and ultimately less than they deserve, from NATO, or that NATO is becoming much less than what it should be and what it could be. The EC states want to get into NATO in the worst possible way. Sadly, the real danger is that is precisely how the alliance might be enlarged.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Professor Braun.

Professor Levesque.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacques Lévesque (Professor, Political Science Department, Université du Québec à Montréal): As a specialist on Russian foreign policy, I am obviously going to talk to you today about the implications of Russia's objections to the enlargement of NATO.

As you may already know, the enlargement of NATO is the international policy issue on which there is the greatest consensus in Russia right now; not only is there the greatest consensus, but there may even be total consensus. Every Russian political force, regardless of the stripe, is opposed to the enlargement of NATO. There is no such consensus on any other similar issue.

There are obviously various reasons for this, but they can be summarized in two major categories. The first are easy to understand. They are the traditional geopolitical and military reasons, in other words, the Conservatives and Communists think the enlargement of NATO is merely an attempt to consolidate the western world's victory in the Cold War, an attempt to further encircle Russia, to isolate it from a military perspective and to stop it from ever becoming a great power again.

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The other line of argument, which is the one I will focus on because it should concern us more as a democratic country, is the argument put forward by the so called Russian liberals or democrats. They object to the enlargement of NATO because they think it is being done while sidelining Russia from what is becoming the main collective security structure in Europe.

Russian democrats feel that the Soviet Union, during its last phase under Gorbachev, just like Russia today, made significant, unprecedented efforts to show the western world that it could be accepted as full partner in ensuring the security and future of Europe.

I will give you a few examples of the pledges the Russians feel they made and the bitterness they feel about the enlargement of NATO. First of all, in 1989 when Gorbachev accepted the emancipation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe without using force to oppose them, it was first and foremost because he wanted to build a new structure for European security within which Russia would be a full partner, and also to offer a pledge of good behaviour. It is essentially for that reason, and for many others as well, that the USSR did not intervene militarily.

Secondly, the Russian democrats feel they were ready to give up on the Soviet federation, to let the Soviet Union break apart so that Russia could become a truly democratic state and be accepted as full partner by the Western states.

Those are unprecedented events: a major power such as the USSR lost its empire without resorting to military force; a major power such as the Soviet federation, with its massive stock of weapons, dismantled itself with very little violence. The Russian democrats consider that was how they wanted it to happen so that they could provide pledges good behaviour with a view toward a future integration into the western world.

In the final days of the USSR, the situation was very similar to that of Yugoslavia, in that there are 25 million Russians outside Russia's borders, very artificial borders for Russia, and with a Russian majority in various locations on the territory of former soviet republics.

Any nationalist or irresponsible government could have encouraged the Russian minorities in other soviet republics, where they were in the majority, to claim sovereignty, and the scenario would have been similar to that of Yugoslavia. The current Russian leaders did not do so precisely in order to show that they accepted the rules of good behaviour of what they themselves called at the time the civilized world.

So that is why the Russian democrats see the enlargement of NATO as a rejection of Russia, of Europe's founding institutions, and they feel they have proven they are worthy of integration.

As for Russia's counter-proposals, you know what they are. Given this perspective, I will talk about the counter-proposals that worry the democrats. As Gorbachev did when Germany united, they have constantly suggested that instead of enlarging NATO, a new structure for collective security in Europe should be built by strengthening and institutionalizing the CSCE, by eventually creating a new subsystem of the United Nations for Europe, which would involve Russia. Building such new structures is difficult and risky. The Russians know that and advocate such solutions for the long term.

Given the difficulty and progress achieved in enlarging NATO, the Russians have indicated... The Russians are quite ambivalent on that. Yeltsin said: "We would not object to a NATO enlargement if Russia were included". Obviously, under those circumstances, NATO would become the structure for pan-European collective security, of which Russia would be a full member.

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The Russian position on that is fairly ambivalent. On the one hand, Yeltsin said very clearly what I just quoted. On the other hand, at the same time, because of its status as a major power, Russia does not want to appear as though it is begging to become a member of NATO. It does not want to look like the smaller countries, such as Poland and Hungary, who come knocking on NATO's door, especially since they know full well they will not be admitted. The Russian leaders know very well that if they make an official request to become members of NATO, it will be denied. So they would be doubly humiliated. That is why the Russians are quite ambivalent about the integration of Russia.

That would solve the problem of Russian advocates of westernization if Russia could be included, but obviously NATO would no longer be what it is now if it suddenly integrated a huge country the size of Russia.

Now let me go back to what Aurel Braun was saying about the consequences of enlargement despite Russia's objections. The Russians have made a number of threats. A number of those threats are just bluff and should not be taken too seriously. However, I agree with Aurel that we have to expect Russia to take a harder line with regard to its immediate neighbours, those who would not be integrated into NATO during the first phase, the Baltic countries and Ukraine.

Secondly, and this again is for the longer term, there would be a negative impact on the balance of political power within Russia. For the past three years now, there has been a trend toward an anti-western policy, a more nationalistic one, etc. This is obviously due to all sorts of factors, to the difficulties involved in changing over to a market economy, but it is also due to the poor relations with the western world.

Why? Because in the case of Yugoslavia or on a number of other issues, the Russians feel they have been treated like junior partners and not as full partners, and all that has progressively weakened the policy of the Russian democrats. The nationalists and communists emphasize that they have sacrificed everything for the western world, in the interests of the western world in order to be accepted by them, and they haven't been accepted.

So, if the enlargement of NATO did occur without any major concession to Russia in terms of getting it on board, with a charter of some sort, or through some organization that played a key role, and not just a symbolic one in terms of European security, it is clear that the democrats, who have already lost some legitimacy, would lose more and be accused with even more justification of having sacrificed everything and got nothing in return from the western countries, just as they are being accused of that now.

I will stop there, Mr. Chairman, to leave time for one or two questions.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much, Mr. Lévesque.

Can members of the committee stay for 10 minutes after 12 o'clock? I myself have to leave around 12:10.

Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, I especially appreciate the comments Mr. Lévesque just made. The way Russia should be treated has been one of my concerns since the beginning of the discussions on NATO enlargement.

In fact, I asked a question about that to the Minister of Foreign Affairs earlier on. Along with the Chairman and other committee colleagues, I met with Mr. Lukin, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee of the Douma, if I'm not mistaken. He stressed that if we wanted Russia to become a member of NATO, we had to invite it to do so. We answered that no one was ever invited; countries had to apply. He just repeated the same thing, that Russia had to be invited. That eloquently illustrates what was stated earlier.

Given your reservations, this committee must eventually make recommendations to the government. We have all had contacts with diplomats from Central and Western Europe, who would have certainly liked to appear before the committee to justify their admission to NATO, but since we have so little time and since there are so many countries who have wanted to appear, we decided not to invite anyone.

We are not ignoring their concerns or claims, but in a very imperfect way I must admit, we decided to invite experts who could shed some light on this very delicate matter of choice of countries that, in a first phase, could become members of NATO.

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NATO itself has drawn up a list of criteria countries have to meet if they apply for NATO membership. You also raised a number of concerns about Russia, which should be kept in mind with dealing with the first group of countries that join NATO.

My question is very simple. Which countries do you think should be admitted into NATO in the first phase and for what reasons?

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Can you give a collective response? I think there may be room for some difference of opinion, but go ahead, Colonel, let's have you start. It'll come on by itself.

[Translation]

Col Pellerin: In answer to your question, I would first say that there are not any set criteria. The Minister used the term "criteria", but the September 1995 study on NATO enlargement uses the term "parameter". NATO wanted to make sure it has some flexibility when making the final choice.

Obviously, democracy and control of the armed forces are included in the parameters, which are the same as those the Minister mentioned earlier, but they are not very specific criteria. There will be some flexibility when making the choice. For example, besides the three commonly mentioned countries, Romania is being backed by France. Some may wonder whether Romania is really democratic, whether its armed forces are really controlled by civilians, etc.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Based on these parameters, which countries do you think should be admitted into NATO and for what reasons?

Col Pellerin: No doubt, the first three in line are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, for the reasons mentioned by the Alliance. I do not, however, want to associate myself with the position of be put in the same category as the Alliance, because I have some reservations about enlargement.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: So describe your position to us.

Col Pellerin: It is what I described earlier. I think the discussions are now too far along to present differing views from those of the Alliance. The Alliance has expressed its opinion, will hold a summit in July and will invite some countries to begin consultations. If you have faith in the Alliance, you have to try to limit the damage, so to speak. It is really a question of managing the issue, which is already too far for advanced for us to quit. The train has started moving and it can't really be stopped.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Should we go further than those three suggestions?

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That's it. I think all committee members who have studied this matter for long enough should agree on the three you just mentioned. It is the others that interest us as well as the parameters they would have to meet.

Col Pellerin: The only point I would like add concerning criteria is that if countries are invited, that would have security implications. In accordance with article 5 of the Washington Treaty, those countries would be given guarantees of security.

I think you have to be very selective and very honest with your people. They must be told you are inviting those countries and that you believe in security in those countries. You are ready to defend them if the need arises. I think we have to be very selective.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Which countries do you think they should be?

Col Pellerin: I think we should limit ourselves to a very small number of countries. I mentioned the three of them.

Mr. Lévesque: I will be a little more blunt with you: I would say none. I think that the enlargement of NATO has generally created more problems than it has solved, and I disagree with selective enlargement. There should be a global framework, as the Russian democrats have suggested, a new structure for European security that should be carefully thought out and developed.

I would like to talk about a very important point. We always say that the enlargement of NATO is not being done against Russia. Indeed, as far as Canada or the United States are concerned, it is not directed against Russia. But be careful! As far as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are concerned, this is very explicitly directed against Russia.

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You just have to read the speeches by politicians in those countries to understand that the purpose of NATO enlargement, in their view, is to protect themselves against Russia and is directed against Russia.

That is why our Austrian colleague pointed out earlier that once those countries are included in NATO, this would stop NATO from changing from what it was during the Cold War.

As for Russia, you could say it could eventually become a member, but it is quite clear, and the Russian leaders are very much aware of this, that if they were to become members, it would be now or never. Why? Because of the veto. To my mind, it goes without saying that in the future, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will automatically use their veto to stop Russia from ever becoming a member of NATO. So for them, it is now or never.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Professor, we totally respect your answer and the Cartesian spirit in which it was made.

Mr. Lévesque: Thank you.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Braun, apart from the original three mentioned, do you believe there are any candidates who are?

Prof. Braun: Yes, I'll answer the question.

The standards for election have to be rigorous and non-exclusionary. They haven't quite met the standards, but three countries come the closest to meeting the first part - that is, rigorous standards. They are the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. None of them has fully met them yet. They still have work to do. None of the others does.

The problem with the process is the second part, that it should not be exclusionary. That has not been fully answered. It is an exclusionary process in the sense that it effectively excludes Russia. You can't have a fair process and talk about security from Vancouver to Vladivostok if it is exclusionary.

You mentioned Vladimir Lukin, with whom I spent a great deal of time in Berlin two years ago. He's making a great mistake. The Russians, in a sense, are their own worst enemies in explaining their position. They wait to be invited. They should ask and they should ask specifically. They should put the dilemma in front of the world and then one could say these are the standards, this is what has to be met, and those countries that meet them will get in. It is a fair process.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Are you suggesting that if Russia came, either the U.S. Senate or the members of this House of Commons would agree to moving article V, protection to the Russian and Chinese border, and if a conflict erupted between Russia and China that we, as Canadians, would be involved in a nuclear war on the Asian front? Is that what you're recommending to us?

Prof. Braun: Try to understand me. Let me put it to you this way.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That's where you're going to take us.

We only have about a minute left. I'm sorry, instead of nuclear weapons, you have to finish it in two minutes. I know it isn't fair.

Prof. Braun: You'd like a yes or no answer and there isn't one. In fact the answer is really a question. The question is that it's going to be very difficult to try to integrate Russia. Put yourself in the position of what happens if we have a hostile authoritarian Russia outside NATO. What is that alternative?

I think when you look at that alternative, perhaps we have to very seriously consider the kind of mechanism we can create for an enlargement that is inclusive, not exclusionary. And you have to deal with Russia. You cannot dismiss Russia. You cannot get totally around Russia. We have to deal with it. One of the ways to deal with it would be for Russia to put its cards on the table and say they would like to apply for membership. The fact that it would be excluded right now does not mean they would be excluded in the future. It is the same as if Romania is excluded now; it does not mean they would be excluded in the future. And I'm not saying Russia is Romania.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It would be like Turkey's admission to the European Union. We've heard this story before.

Madam Bakopanos.

Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos (Saint-Denis, Lib.): I have too many questions for us to do them in one minute, but I'll stick to two things.

I think the Mediterranean security issue is an important issue to look at the enlargement, because our focus is to the north rather than to the south. Two NATO members of course are involved in -

Col Pellerin: There are five nations.

Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: There are five, but two in particular with a long-standing feud.

Without getting into Mediterranean security, which I would include in our recommendations when we get to our resolution, you talked about standards. One of the interesting things I found, being a member and a VP of the Canadian North Atlantic Assembly, was that certain countries that are members and do not in fact fit the high standard we set for the new countries are the first to say they won't let those people in because they don't have either their military under control or they don't respect the democratic rights of their elected officials. We can go on and on.

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I don't want to say it's bigotry, but I find such dialogue, in terms of talking on one hand about including them but saying on the other hand they can't right now because they don't meet certain standards, is an issue we haven't really faced up front.

Anyway, as I said, we only have a minute. I don't want to expand on it. Do you have any comments?

Col Pellerin: Could I just make a very short comment on that? I think it's an important point.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes, please.

Col Pellerin: When NATO prepared their enlargement study of 1995, they addressed that specific issue because it had been anticipated. If there's a second wave, no new members could block the entry of members of the second wave who would want to enter. For instance, in the future maybe Hungary as a new member might want to block the entry of Romania.

Senator Jerahmiel Grafstein: That's not in the articles. Is that a prohibition?

Col Pellerin: It's in the enlargement study.

Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: It's in the enlargement study. It's not part of the articles.

Col Pellerin: No, but it's NATO's position.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm afraid I have to draw to a close. We really have to adjourn now because members have their obligations and we have to clear up two quick things.

I want to thank very much the panellists for coming. I once again apologize to you that we had such a short period of time. You've enriched our understanding of the issues very much and we appreciate your contribution.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, could we possibly continue this committee meeting at 3:30, even if it is in a somewhat impromptu manner?

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I...

[English]

Mrs. Beryl Gaffney (Nepean, Lib.): The human rights subcommittee is meeting at 3:30.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): The human rights subcommittee is meeting at 3:30 and I'm leaving for Toronto at 3:30. The clerk will poll the members, but then we'd have to see whether our guests are likely to be here.

[Translation]

It is somewhat doubtful for Mr. Lévesque.

[English]

We've heard from German Slovenia. We've heard about these and we really would like to hear something about the other countries. But we'll have to move that to another time.

I have just two items of business, members. The first is that we've distributed to you this resolution from the steering committee. I'd appreciate it if everyone assumed that unless I hear an objection we're adopting that in full committee. It's a ratification of what we accepted in the steering committee. It's important that we get number two through because we're replacing somebody. We want to get this other report printed.

Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: Is it the report of the subcommittee?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes, we're talking about this report of the subcommittee. Unless I hear an objection, I'll assume that's been adopted.

Finally, I distributed a draft to you.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, on the fifth point, unless I'm mistaken, I thought we had agreed to also invite the Minister of International Trade.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That's to the estimates, yes.

[Translation]

That was a draft I sent you. I wanted to give it to you now rather than wait until the last minute. Since Mr. Francis LeBlanc is not here with us, I took the initiative to discuss this with Gerry. We prepared something, but it is subject to discussion. Everyone can glance at it. During the break, we might be able to improve it, to change it, etc., so that we can have a proper resolution when we have finished our discussions.

[English]

I don't think we have time for all five, but I think we have time for those three. Obviously we have to have Mr. Boudria because of CIDA. Members, if you'd agree to that, we would hear Mr. Eggleton in connection with the estimates for the international trade ministry.

Finally, I distributed to you a draft resolution. It is very much a draft.

[Translation]

We apologize again for the somewhat abrupt way you are being treated. Thank you very much. We will try to reconvene here at 3:30. Our clerk will tell you whether that is possible or not. Thank you very much.

[English]

Thank you all very much for coming.

The meeting is adjourned.

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