Financial Procedures / Miscellaneous

April 26, 1990

Debates, pp. 10719-26

On April3, 1990, the Hon. Harvie Andre (Minister of State and Government House Leader) rose on a point of order to describe his reasons for considering as unacceptable the Senate message tabled March 20, 1990^[1] respecting Bill C-21 on Unemployment Insurance and to seek the Chair's guidance on wording a motion for a return message to the Senate. Mr. Andre argued that amendments 5(a) and (b), 7and 9 in the Senate's message were out of order because they were inconsistent with the conditions expressed in the Bill's Royal Recommendation and infringed on the financial initiative of the Crown. He added that the amendments proposed by the Senate to Bill C-21 would seriously compromise the Budget brought down on April 27, 1989, which the Commons had endorsed. Mr. Jean-Robert Gauthier (Ottawa­ Vanier), on behalf of the Official Opposition, argued that the Minister had not raised his point of order at the first possible opportunity, i.e. on March 12, 1990, when consideration of the first message from the Senate about certain amendments to Bill C-21 had first taken place.^[2] Mr. Gauthier stated that since the House had adopted a motion on March 13, 1990, indicating that it agreed to some of the Senate amendments but rejected others, it was illogical to argue now that the Senate had no right to amend the Bill because it was a Money Bill.^[3] Mr. Gauthier further cast doubt on the need for a Royal Recommendation to accompany the Bill, on the grounds that the amendments were designed to reduce charges already provided for in the Act. Other Members also intervened on the matter.^[4] The Speaker invited the Members to pursue the debate at another time.

On April 4, 1990, Mr. Jean-Robert Gauthier resumed debate on this point of order, as did Mr. Don Boudria (Glengarry—Prescott—Russell), Mr. Peter Milliken (Kingston and the Islands) and other Members on April 5, 1990. Mr. Milliken reiterated Mr. Gauthier's arguments respecting the validity of a point of order not raised at the earliest opportunity. He also argued that a point of order must concern business before the House. In his opinion, that was not the case.^[5] The Speaker reserved his judgement and returned to the House on April 26, 1990 to deliver his decision which is reproduced in extenso below.

Decision of the Chair

Mr. Speaker: On April 3, 1990, the honourable Government House Leader rose to contest the acceptability of certain amendments set out in the Senate message respecting Bill C-21, An Act to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Employment and Immigration Department and Commission Act. He sought "the Chair's guidance in formulating a motion for a return message to the Senate," and asked the Chair "to rule that certain amendments contained in the message from the other place are out of order, because they differ in one way or another with the specific conditions laid out in the Royal Recommendation of Bill C-21, and because they infringe upon the financial initiative of the Crown." In his reasoned and well-documented arguments, the honourable Minister also claimed that the proposed amendments infringed upon the financial privileges of this House in that the Senate amendments "undermine in a significant way the budget of April 27, 1989 in which this House has expressed its confidence." He also claimed that the amendments violated the principle of the Bill, that is to set up the unemployment insurance program as an employer-employee finance program.

Following the honourable Minister's intervention, we had, on April 3 and again on April 5, quite a full airing of this issue.

Perhaps it would be well to summarize briefly at this point the chronology of the proceedings to date on Bill C-21.

On April 27, 1989, the Minister of Finance (Hon. Michael Wilson) tabled a document entitled The Budget Speech which at page 12 reads: at the same time, changes will be made to ensure that the financing of the program is consistent with our efforts to control the debt. Beginning January 1, 1990, unemployment insurance payments will be fully financed by employer and employee premiums." This budget was adopted by the House on May 11, 1989. Subsequently, on June 1, 1989, the Bill entitled An Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Employment and Immigration Department and Commission Act was introduced in this House and read a first time June 1, 1989. The Bill was debated at second reading on June 6, 7 and 21, 1989. The debate at second reading was closured June 21, 1989 and the Bill referred to a legislative commi ttee.

The committee after travelling, hearing witnesses and considering the Bill at length, reported it back to the House with amendments on October 10, 1989. The Bill was considered at report stage on October 16, 1989. The time allocation motion covering both report stage and third reading was debated and agreed to on October 24, 1989. On October 25, the Bill was again considered at report stage and concurred in with further amendments. It was debated at third reading on November 2, and after further debate on November 6, 1989, read a third time and passed.

Subsequently, it proceeded through the Senate and was there amended. The Senate sent a message to the House asking this House to agree to amendments it made to the Bill. This first message from the Senate was considered on March 12 and March 13. Debate on the motion of the Minister of State and the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons in relation to the Senate amendments was closured and the motion concurred in on March 13, 1990. Therefore, on March 13, this House sent a message back to the Senate setting out its agreement with some of the amendments and its rejection of others. This occasioned a second message from the Senate which is recorded in our Votes and Proceedings of March 20, 1990.

In this second message the Senate informed the House of Commons of its concurrence in the amendments made by the House to amendments Nos. 1, 4(b) and its insistence upon its amendments 2(a), (b) and (c); 3(a) and (b); 4(c) and (d); S(a) and (b); 6, 7, 8 and 9.

Finally, in the third message on March 21, 1990, the Senate set out the observations-and I underline that word-contained in the fourth report of the Special Committee of the Senate on Bill C-21. That is the position the House was in when the Government House Leader rose on April 3 to ask the Chair "to rule that amendments S(a) and (b), 7 and 9 in the message from the other place are out of order because they differ in one way or another with the specific conditions laid out in the Royal Recommendation of Bill C-21, and because they infringe upon the financial initiative of the Crown."

I want, of course, to thank all honourable Members who assisted the Chair by participating in the discussions of this complex matter on April 3 and April 5. In the interests of both gravity and clarity I will summarize and marshall the several arguments into two categories.

All the arguments advanced dealt either with the substantive question of whether the Senate is entitled to amend Bill C-21 as it did or they questioned the process by which the Senate amendments were being challenged.

I must express my gratitude to the honourable Minister for indicating when he rose on this issue that he did not expect an immediate reply. As the Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary (Mr. Albert Cooper) both pointed out, our relationship to the other House is a most fundamental one which goes back to the beginnings of parliamentary democracy.

I would not want to render a decision touching on such momentous matters in haste. Thus, I reiterate my thanks to all Members for allowing me some time and distance to sort out the threads of argument advanced and to formulate a considered response.

During the course of the argument, the Chair attempted to direct the honourable Member by stating its understanding of the substantive issue and I think that may bear repeating.

What we have here is a Bill based upon the budgetary policy of the Government, as approved by the House of Commons, which amends existing legislation, that being the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Employment and Immigration Department and Commission Act. The Bill proposes in part to eliminate funding from the Treasury of Canada to the unemployment insurance account and to make that account a self-sufficient fund by means of contributions paid directly by the employers and employees. That is a somewhat simplistic explanation of the Bill that was passed by this House. Now the Senate has made amendments to this proposal.

The Senate has returned with the proposal that some of the funding which this House agreed to eliminate should be restored. According to the Government House Leader the Senate amendments would cost the Consolidated Revenue Fund $1.75 billion annually. The question is this: Is it proper for the Senate to restore a charge which this House has taken away? The question arises because of two fundamental principles. These are that, first, Bills for the spending of public moneys must originate in the House of Commons, as stated in Section 53 of the Constitution Act [of] 1867; and, second, such Bills must be recommended by a message from the Governor General which can only be obtained and presented in the House of Commons by a Minister of the Crown. This is called a Royal Recommendation. The foregoing is also a very basic explanation of the substantive matter that has been preoccupying the Chair.

In addressing this substantive issue, the honourable Members for Ottawa­ Vanier, for Glengarry—Prescott—Russell and for(Kingston and the Islands) all questioned the necessity for a Royal Recommendation in respect of Bill C-21, contested the argument that the Senate had no right to amend a Bill of this nature and insisted that since the amendments made to the Bill reduced existing charges provided for in the existing statute, they in no way infringed upon the financial initiative of the Crown. The honourable Member for Saskatoon—Clark's Crossing (Mr. Chris Axworthy) also supported the latter contention.

I should now like to turn to the second group of arguments, those that question the process by which the Senate amendments are being challenged. In doing so at this point, I want to emphasize that in the Chair's view these present a threshold which must be crossed before we can proceed to further consideration of the substantive issues.

I would include in this category a number of inter-related arguments. The honourable Member for Ottawa—Vanier, the honourable Member for Kamloops (Mr. Nelson Riis) and the honourable Member for Saskatoon—Clark's Crossing, all pointed out that the Chair ought not to rule on legal or constitutional issues. In addition, they argued strenuously, as did the honourable Member for(Kingston and the Islands), that, if the proposed Senate amendments were not in order, they should have been challenged on the first occasion when they were before the House, that is, on March 12 and 13 last, when the House first considered a return message to the other place.

The other place, for the public who is watching, means the Senate. These are words that we use to refer to the Senate; we call it the other place.

Having already made a decision to accept some of the Senate amendments and to reject others, and having so reported to the Senate, this line of argument continues, it is not now open to the House to reopen consideration as to the acceptability of the amendments. Corollary issues as to the purpose of asking the Chair to rule on the Senate amendments and the consequences of the Speaker of the House of Commons ruling a message from the other place out of order were also advanced.

My initial reaction, as a presiding officer, was that, if the acceptability of amendments made to a Bill in this House were in question, then, of course, the Chair must make a determination as to the admissibility of the amendments at issue. That is the customary role for the presiding officer to play. It is the duty of the Chair to rule on amendments at each stage of a Bill's passage through the House. Accordingly, my first reaction was to assess the receivability of the questioned amendments. However, as I explained, the Chair must take into account not only the fact that amendments to the Bill are called into question, but at what stage they are questioned.

In fact, the House has already pronounced itself on the very amendments the Government House Leader invited me to rule on and the honourable Member for Ottawa—Vanier has complained that it is too late for the Chair to now rule on their acceptability. It must be noted that the Senate, in its message of March 20, 1990, has insisted on amendments S(a) and (b), 7, and 9. There is no doubt that the amendments are now, again, before the House for consideration and could be adopted if the House so wished.

It can be argued that the honourable Government House Leader should have raised his points on March 12 or March 13 last, but I see no reason to prevent his raising the matter at this stage, since the Senate message has returned those very amendments for reconsideration by the House. If those Senate amendments can be further amended, adopted or disagreed with, as Beauchesne Fourth Edition, Citation 282 suggests, then logically they would also be subject to procedural challenge.

Therefore, the Chair rules that the intervention of the Minister is valid at this time and I will attempt to reply to the various points raised in that regard.

The honourable Government House Leader said he was encouraged by the decision of the Chair of July 11, 1988 on Bill C-103, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Bill, and I should like to turn for a moment to that decision.

In that instance, the Senate had split a Bill the House had passed and had reported only a portion of it back to the House. It was the unilateral action of the Senate in that matter that I found objectionable and I said, in part:

There is some considerable doubt, at least in my mind, that the Senate can rewrite or redraft Bills originating in the Commons, potentially so as to change their principle as adopted by the House without again first seeking the agreement of the House. That Iview as a matter of privilege and not a matter related to the Constitution.

In the case of Bill C-103, it is my opinion, and with the great respect of course-

I am quoting now from a former judgment.

-that the Senate should have respected the propriety of asking the House of Commons to concur in its action of dividing Bill C-103 and in reporting only part of the Bill back as a fait accompli has infringed the privileges of this place.

I went on to say:

I have ruled that the privileges of the House have been infringed. However, and it is important to understand this, I am without the power to enforce them directly. I cannot rule the message from the Senate out of order for that would leave Bill C-103 in limbo. In other words, it would be nowhere. The cure in this case is for the House to claim its privileges or to forgo them, if it so wishes, by way of message to Their Honours, that is, to the Senate, informing them accordingly.

I hasten to add, however, that I also said at that time that:

The Speaker of the House of Commons by tradition does not rule on constitutional matters. It is not for me to decide whether the Senate has the constitutional power to do what it has done with Bill C-103.^[6]

Later, having noted that Bill C-103 was a financial Bill and that the Senate is somewhat limited in its review of Money Bills, I specifically declined to answer such constitutional questions as whether the Royal Recommendation still applied to the split Bill and whether the financial privileges of the Commons had been breached. In so ruling, I relied heavily on actions of two of my predecessors in the Chair.

My research indicates several occasions since Confederation when the Senate amended Commons Bills with financial implications. For example, messages were received by the House on May 23, 1873, May 23, 1874, September 15, 1917, May 23, 1918, June 11, 1941, and July, 14, 1959.^[7] A close examination of these six cases reveals that the House agreed with the Senate amendments in all but two of these instances. In 1873, the House disagreed with all the amendments and, in 1959, it agreed to one and disagreed with another. What is interesting to note from a procedural point of view is that the Speaker was only required to comment on two of the occasions, namely in the 1917 and 1959 cases.

In the first instance on September 15, 1917 the Speaker replied to two points of order, one regarding the authority of the Senate to amend a Money Bill and another regarding the obligation of the House to insist on its privileges and reject the amendment. On the first issue, the Speaker stated, and I quote:

-the question whether the Senate can make such amendments as has been made in the Bill now under consideration is a point of constitutional law in respect to which it would, I think, be improper for me to undertake to give an official decision. Matters of such high constitutional import are for the House and not for your Speaker to determine.

On the second issue, he stated:

-there is nothing contained in—our rules which prevents this House from adopting as its own, amendments such as this now under consideration—in my judgment the principle involved as to the authority of this House to waive under stated conditions its rights and privileges is the same.^[8]

In short, my predecessors many years ago refused to become involved in a constitutional issue which should be settled by negotiation between the House and the Senate, and further ruled that nothing should prevent the House from waiving its financial rights and adopting the Senate amendment as though it were its own. I say that is an option open to the House.

The second case further clarifies the situation and emphasizes the fine line between the constitutional and procedural issues. After the government moved concurrence on certain Senate amendments on July 14, 1959, the Speaker drew the attention of the House to the procedural difficulties with a motion before the House to concur in a Senate amendment and to waive the House's rights, that is, the House of Commons' rights. The Speaker, in 1959, ruled, and I quote:

—if the house in its wisdom feels that-it should waive its asserted privileges in this particular case, by doing so it in effect suspends Standing Order 80(1). Therefore the view which I take is that unless the motion properly suspends Standing Order 80(1), it would require the unanimous consent of the House at this time to pass the amendments which are proposed-I have come to the conclusion that the motion-would require notice. That is why I said Standing Orders can only be suspended by an Order of the House made on proper notice or by unanimous consent.^[9]

In the 1959 case, unanimous consent was withheld and four days later the Government introduced another motion, with notice to concur in some amendments while rejecting others. This motion made reference to "the sole and undoubted right of the Commons to impose taxation" and was agreed to by the House.^[10]

The 1917 and 1959 cases clearly illustrate the longstanding principle that the Speaker should not become involved in constitutional issues regarding the authority of the Senate to amend money Bills, but may only bring procedural irregularities affecting Standing Order 80(1) to the attention of the House in order that it can safeguard its own constitutional financial prerogatives.

I would now tum to the specifics of the case before us. In looking closely at the amendments of the Senate to Bill C-21, I must admit that on the question of the principle of the Bill, the honourable Minister has raised an extremely valid issue. There is no doubt in my mind that the Senate by way of amendment is modifying the principle of the Bill, something which would certainly not be allowed at committee stage in this House. If the Senate amendments were adopted, the Government will clearly continue to support financially the unemployment insurance account as was stated by the Minister. That would run contrary to the approved budgetary policy of the Government and contrary to the principle of the Bill as adopted by the House of Commons.

However, for the same reasons referred to earlier in my ruling of July, 1988, the Speaker of the House of Commons cannot unilaterally rule out of order amendments from the other place. I can comment, as I am doing, but the House as a whole must ultimately make the decision to accept or reject amendments from the Senate, whether they be in order according to our rules or not.

As I have said, it is also clear from the review of the amendments of the Senate, which can be found in the Votes and Proceedings of March 21, 1990,^[11] that there will be continuing charges to the Consolidated Revenue Fund if Bill C-21 is so amended. It is perhaps less clear that there will be an increased charge over and above that which is presently lawfully provided for in the Unemployment Insurance Act itself.

I point out that the Unemployment Insurance Act was passed many, many years ago and has been amended many, many times. So, Bill C-21 is an amendment to that Act.

It would certainly be permissible in this House to restore in an amending Bill charges already provided for in existing legislation. For guidance on that point, I refer honourable Members to Erskine May Parliamentary Practice, 21st Edition, page 716, and I quote:

The same principle applies in the case of amendments moved to a Bill which abolishes or reduces a charge authorized by existing law. Amendments to such a Bill, which are designed to restore a portion or the whole of the charge which the Bill proposes to reduce or abolish, are in order without the need of a preliminary financial resolution.

As the honourable Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader stated, that citation applies to the British House of Commons. But Erskine May is silent on what the Lords may do. Again, I have to say that it is not within my power to rule on whether the Canadian Senate should have the constitutional right to restore charges when the Commons have decided otherwise. As the honourable Minister said on page 10144 of Hansard of April 5, 1990: "It is up to the House of Commons to defend our responsibilities and our authorities."

Having addressed the amount and limits of the charges, the Chair has however some concern in the area of conditions and qualifications, objects and purposes.

I should remind honourable Members that Citation 540 of Beauchesne Fifth Edition states:

In relation to the standard thereby fixed, an amendment infringes the financial initiative of the Crown not only if it increases the amount but also if it extends the objects and purposes, or relaxes the conditions and qualifications expressed in the communication by which the Crown has demanded or recommended a charge. And this standard is binding not only on private Members but also on Ministers whose only advantage is that, as advisors of the Crown, they can present new or supplementary estimates or secure the Royal Recommendation to new or supplementary resolutions.

If reviewed against this citation, the Senate amendments seem to have some impact on the Royal Recommendation, the extent of which is difficult to determine. Thus, for greater certainty the House might want to draw this to the attention of the Senate, even if the House were to choose to waive its financial prerogatives, pursuant to Beauchesne Fifth Edition, Citation 115, which reads:

It is the function of the Speaker to direct the attention of the House, when the occasion arises, to a breach of its privileges in Bills or amendments brought from the Senate, and to direct the special entries to be made in the Journals by which the House, in respect of particular amendments, signifies its willingness to waive its privileges without thereby establishing a general precedent.

The honourable Government House Leader further claimed that the Senate has interfered with the budgetary process of the Government, as approved by the House of Commons. He said: "To tamper with that, or to reverse that somehow in another place, is to tamper with the very fundamental purposes and powers of this body," meaning the House of Commons.

The honourable Government House Leader has found support at page 340 of a book entitled The Modem Senate of Canada, which was published in 1965. The author's name is Mr. F.A. Kunz. He says:

On the contrary, the Senate has acted in full understanding of the meaning and the implications of responsible government and accepted as binding upon itself the proposition that it should not unduly disturb what has come to be called the "balance of ways and means"; or, as Hopkins says, "that it would be inadmissible to tamper with the overall financial program submitted by the Government in its budgetary proposals in such a way as to effect a material change in the budgetary surplus or deficit envisaged therein."

I repeat: "in its budgetary proposals in such a way as to effect a material change in the budgetary surplus or deficit envisaged therein." As I have already noted, the honourable Government House Leader has said that the amount involved is $1.75 billion annually.

That comment by Kunz is based on an article by an author named E. Russell Hopkins, who is a former law clerk and parliamentary counsel to the Senate of Canada.

At pages 321 and 322 of the Canadian Tax Journal, Volume 6, September/October 1958, Hopkins comments on Section 53 of the Canadian Constitution. He says:

Section 53 of the Act provides that "Bills for appropriating any part of the Public Revenue, or for imposing any tax or impost, shall originate in the Commons." This clearly means that all taxation or appropriation Bills must originate in the House of Commons. It is universally understood that it would be a violation of the principle embodied in this provision for the Senate to propose amendments which would increase a tax or appropriation proposed by the House of Commons.

I have a duty to comment, but I can only ask: What would the learned author say if the words that I just read "increase a tax or appropriation” were substituted or added to by the words "an increase in the budgetary deficit"? I bring this query to the attention of the House, and to the public who ultimately pay all the bills.

Hopkins went on to say:

The question whether the Senate should or should not amend a Money Bill in such a way as to disturb the balance of ways and means in any fiscal year is one of policy rather than of law: that is, it is a question for the Senate itself to determine in all the circumstances. The Senate may of course reject a Money Bill absolutely, and, in its view, may reduce a tax or appropriation.

He went on to say:

In either of these events the balance of the ways and means would be upset.

What Hopkins has concluded is that interventions by the Senate in Money Bills inevitably will change the budgetary and spending plans of the Government.

I may say to honourable Members and to the public that is listening, there are many Canadians across this country who may or may not have been well educated and some who think that they were well educated, who have no idea whatsoever of the awesome powers which the Senate claims to itself over the elected lower House. That is one of the reasons why it is important that honourable Members listen carefully to this judgment because there is information here which many Canadians are just absolutely unaware of.

In attempting to shed light on this situation, I have looked at the British practice and I have found the following at pages 518 and 519 of Erskine May Twelfth Edition. I am going to quote quite a bit of it because it is time this country got a history lesson. I am quoting from Erskine May. This is in Great Britain.

In 1909 the Finance Bill which gave effect to the budget of the year was met on its second reading in the House of Lords by an amendment declaring-

And I quote the amendment. This is the amendment by the House of Lords, which is their upper House.

-"That this House is not justified in giving its consent to this Bill, until it has been submitted to the judgment of the count ry." The rejection of the Bill by the Lords was condemned in the House of Commons by a resolution declaring "that the action of the House of Lords in refusing to pass into law the provision made by the House of Commons for the finances of the year is a breach of the Constitution, and an usurpation of the privileges of the House of Commons."

Note that that statement was made by the House, not by the Speaker, but by the House of Commons of Great Britain.

A dissolution of Parliament followed,-

Which is a polite way of saying that an election followed.

-and in the new Parliament a Finance Bill to take the place of that rejected by the Lords was passed by both houses.

Now there are a lot of historical and very interesting things that happened that led to the House of Lords finally passing that.

The House of Commons also agreed to three resolutions in a committee of the whole house dealing with relations between the two houses and the duration of Parliament, as follows:-

First of all, on Money Bills-that is what we are talking about here-that British House of Commons resolution said this:

"That it is expedient that the House of Lords be disabled by Law from rejecting or amending a Money Bill, but that any such limitation by Law shall not be taken to diminish or qualify the existing rights and privileges of the House of Commons.

"For the purpose of this resolution a Bill shall be considered a Money Bill if, in the opinion of the Speaker, it contains only provisions dealing with all or any of the following subjects, namely, the imposition, repeal, remission, alteration, or regulation of taxation; charges on the Consolidated Fund or the provision of money by Parliament; supply; the appropriation, control, or regulation  of  public  money;  the  raising or  guarantee  of  any  loan  or the repayment  thereof; or matters incidental  to those subjects or  any of them."

The House of Commons resolution went on to deal with Bills other than Money Bills.

"That it is expedient that the powers of the House of Lords, as respects Bills other than Money Bills, be restricted by Law, so that any such Bill which has passed the House of Commons in three successive Sessions and, having been sent up to the House of Lords at least one month before the end of the Session, has been rejected by that House in each of those Sessions, shall become Law without the consent of the House of Lords on the Royal Assent being declared: Provided that at least two years shall have elapsed between the date of the first introduction of the Bill in the House of Commons and the date on which it passes the House of Commons for the third time."

"For the purposes of this Resolution a Bill shall be treated as rejected by the House of Lords if it has not been passed by the House of Lords either without

Amendment or with such Amendments only as may be agreed upon by both Houses."

It went on to say other things with respect to the duration of Parliament.

"That it is expedient to limit the duration of Parliament to five years."

Upon these resolutions when agreed to by the House a Bill was brought in but further progress was not made with it. In the first session of the new Parliament which met in the following year the Bill was again introduced, was passed by both houses, and received the royal assent as the Parliament Act, 1911.

It is important for every Canadian who cares about who decides how we spend our money to know that in Great Britain they settled this 80 years ago.

The British Parliament apparently resolved their problem some 80years ago with the House of Lords recognizing in law the claim of the House of Commons as the final authority on Money Bills. Such is not the case in Canada. The Senate has consistently refused to concede the power to amend Money Bills. I would refer honourable Members to the Ross report which was tabled in the Senate of Canada on May 15, 1918 and subsequently adopted by the Upper House, rejecting the House of Commons' position on the Constitution. At page 199 of the Senate Votes and Proceedings for May 15, 1918, the Ross report states:

When the House of Commons of Canada claims that it can drag the Senate beneath it as the Commons did the House of Lords in England and through the "swamping power"-

Meaning there the addition of lords to the Upper House.

-the answer is that it-

That is the House of Commons of Canada.

-has not got this power and is as much bound by the British North America Act as the Senate. We have a Constitution that can only be altered by the Imperial Parliament. The House of Commons cannot by passing rules add to its powers or diminish those of the Senate.

That was the last Senate report of a Senate committee in 1918.

Therein lies the Canadian constitutional dilemma! Should the Senate choose to further insist on its amendments, the two Houses may well be unable to resolve their differences and be faced with a serious constitutional crisis. The strength of our parliamentary system lies in all three constituent parts that is: the Crown, the Senate and the House of Commons respecting their constitutional roles.

The events in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 20th century do not provide the Speaker of this House with any procedural solution to this particular conflict. Because of the Canadian parliamentary practice, the Speaker of the House of Commons is powerless when an impasse develops around this long unresolved constitutional issue which is now exacerbated by a deep difference of opinion on matters of public policy.

I want to refer honourable Members to two matters. I do this as lawyers say, obiter dictum. That perhaps is part of the substandard ruling. But there is an interesting, curious book called A Student's Manual of English Constitutional History by a master of arts named Dudley Julius Medley, tutor of Keble College, Oxford, and examiner in the honour school of modern history. It was published in 1898. He was talking, of course, before the British-if! could be permitted to say this-came to their senses.

This vast increase in membership [of the House of Lords] has almost of necessity resulted in a weakening of the sense of political responsibility in individual members of the House of Lords, while the completion of the representative character of the House of Commons has made the body of the electorate increasingly impatient of any check by the hereditary House. Those who do not believe in constitutional cataclysms cling to the necessity of a second chamber.

I also draw to the attention of my colleagues-I know they will be very interested-on both sides of the House to hear the comments by Sir Wilfrid Laurier on September 7, 1917. As I say, this is not put in as the substance of the ruling. It is just brought to Members' attention, and I hope the attention of every Canadian who has a chance to listen to or read this judgment.  This is what Sir Wilfrid Laurier said on September 7, 1917.

This was his view. He was a great House of Commons man: "Under Rule 78 the Senate has no right to amend or alter in anyway a Money Bill sent to them from this House." Rule 78 is the same as our Rule 80 paragraph 1.

He said: "This House alone has the privilege of dealing with Money Bills. The only right the Senate has is that of rejecting or assenting to such Money Bills. That rule has been confirmed over and over again in England."^[12]

Now, I point those two interesting comments out to honourable Members because there is a long history in this. There have been strong views on both sides of this Chamber over the years as to what the Constitution does say, and what the Constitution ought to say in terms of our country, and the powers of our House of Commons of Canada.

I want to thank the House for its indulgence and its patience in listening so carefully to this lengthy explanation. This ruling has not been an easy one for we are here dealing with a fundamental issue which goes to the very heart of the Canadian parliamentary process. May I close by saying I am extremely grateful to the Members who made such useful contributions to assist the Chair in its consideration of this issue.

To say anything further, despite the fact that I am the Speaker of the House of Commons, would be trespassing upon what I am called upon to do, and that is to rule on procedural matters.

What I may think about the constitutional impasse which we have in this country, is not for me to say. If any of my colleagues or the public want to speculate on what I think, of course, that is their free and democratic privilege.

On May 7 and 8, 1990,^[13] the House debated a motion by the Minister of Employment and Immigration (Hon. Barbara McDougall) in relation to the Senate amendments in dispute. The motion, which was concurred in on May 9, 1990, indicated in part that the House continued to disagree with certain amendments made by the Senate, in that they "infringed the financial initiative of the Crown in a manner at variance with parliamentary practice respecting the Royal Recommendation." The motion claimed that two amendments, in particular, violated "the principle embodied in Sections 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and constitutional practice. " The House then reaffirmed its "sole and undoubted democratic right, which will not in this matter be waived, not only to grant aids and supplies to the Sovereign but to direct, limit, and appoint for all such grants their ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations and qualifications, none of which are alterable by the Senate."^[14] On October 23, 1990, the Senate sent a message back to the House indicating, in part, that it did not insist on the amendments in dispute. The Bill was given Royal Assent later that day.^[15]

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