The Legislative Process / Miscellaneous

December 21, 1988

Debates, pp. 539-41

On December 21, 1988, the Hon. Doug Lewis (Minister of State and Minister of State (Treasury Board) and Acting President of the Treasury Board) moved a motion for closure on the Committee of the Whole stage of Bill C-2 respecting the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Mr. Peter Milliken (Kingston and the Islands) immediately rose on a point of order to argue that the motion and its previous notice were not in order since debate on certain parts of the Bill had not begun nor been postponed and therefore could not be “‘further postponed” as stipulated by the Standing Order. After hearing his arguments and those of other Members, the Chair of Committees of the Whole (Mr. Marcel Danis) suspended the sitting.^[1] Later that evening, he rendered his decision which was subsequently appealed to the Speaker. Upon receiving the report from the Chairman, the Speaker briefly suspended the sitting to consider the matter and then returned to the House where he upheld the decision of the Chairman.

The texts of the Chairman’s decision and the subsequent Speaker’s ruling on appeal are reproduced in their entirety below.

Decision of the Chair

The Chair of Committees of the Whole: I am now ready to rule on the point of order raised by a number of Members.

In the point of order raised earlier today, the honourable Member for Kingston and the Islands argued that the honourable Minister of State for the Treasury Board was premature in giving notice of closure in relation to Bill C-2 because debate had not begun on many of the clauses that he referred to in his notice.

This leads easily to the further argument that the Minister’s motion now before the Chair should be rejected. Since this motion must flow from his notice of yesterday, it too, it is argued, is defective.

The honourable Member for Kingston and the Islands and the honourable Member for Kamloops (Mr. Nelson Riis) quoted from the Speaker’s ruling made last week on December 15, 1988 in support of their argument (). I should first address that issue.

Standing Order 57, without a doubt, provides for the giving of notice of closure either in the House or in Committee of the Whole. The Speaker’s ruling of December 15, 1988 clarified what appeared to be an ambiguity as to the timing of the notice, and he ruled that notice can only be given once the debate has commenced on the matter to be closured.

Consideration of Bill C-2 in Committee of the Whole has also without a doubt begun, particularly as the committee is currently on Clause 2 of the Bill. The Minister, during the course of the consideration of Clause 2, gave notice of his intention to close debate on Clause 2 and on all remaining clauses of the said Bill. The timing of the Minister’s action is, in my view, in keeping with the Speaker’s ruling. Unlike the situation referred to last week, the Minister has served notice after debate on the committee stage had begun.

The honourable Member for Kingston and the Islands and the honourable Member for Kamloops further argued that the Minister’s motion is procedurally faulty because it attempts to closure in Committee of the Whole parts of the Bill that have not yet been debated or postponed.

The honourable Member for Kamloops is right in saying that Beauchesne Fifth Edition, page 118, Citation 334, paragraph (8), sheds little light on this matter and that the citation is not quite definitive.

And I quote:

Precedents conflict as to whether closure may be moved on a clause which has not yet been called and postponed in a Committee of the Whole. On four occasions (1913, 1917 (twice) and 1919) all clauses had been postponed before closure was moved. On two occasions (1932 and 1956) closure was used on clauses which had not been called.

The committee will appreciate that since notice of this point of order was given yesterday, I have, in anticipation, reviewed in detail all the precedents mentioned in that citation, and for the benefit of those who may not yet have time to do so, I believe it would be useful to take the time to summarize them.

In 1913, the order in Committee of the Whole was on the Naval Aid Bill [No.] 21. On February 28, 1913, debate commenced in Committee of the Whole on the Bill which contained five clauses. Clause 1 was adopted; Clauses 2 to 5 were all debated and postponed. Prime Minister Borden then proposed a new Clause 6, and it was debated and postponed. On May 8, 1913, notice of closure was given by the Prime Minister. On May 9, 1913, the Prime Minister moved:

That further consideration of the second, third, fourth and fifth [clauses] and the postponed sixth [clause] of this Bill shall be the first business of the committee and shall not be further postponed.^[2]

This motion covered all remaining clauses of the Bill [and] a new proposed Clause 6. The motion was agreed to 71 yeas; 44 nays. No procedural objections were made on the proceedings.

It should be noted that Prime Minister Borden had a very specific purpose in postponing consideration of all the clauses before invoking closure. Under our rules, new clauses are considered only after all clauses have been considered. I refer honourable Members to Beauchesne Fifth Edition, Citation 765.

Therefore, had the Prime Minister proceeded in any different manner, he could not have proposed his new Clause 6 to the Naval Bill since closure could preclude the Committee of the Whole from reaching Clause 5 before the hour provided for interruption.

In 1917, there were two occurrences of closure in Committee of the Whole. All four clauses of Bill [No. 125, The Canadian Northern Railway Act, 1913], and all five clauses and the schedule of Bill [No. 133, The War-Time Elections Act], were first postponed before closure was invoked. The Debates or the Journals offer no explanation of why this procedure was followed and there was no objection or procedural discussion.^[3]

The 1919 case is more analogous to the 1913 case. The Committee of the Whole was debating Bill [No. 70, The Canadian National Railway Company Act]. The Committee had adopted some clauses and postponed others in what was a 30-clause Bill. As in 1913, the Prime Minister was required to seek the postponement of all the clauses because he, too, wished to move two new clauses numbered 31 and 32. Like Prime Minister Borden in 1913, if he had proceeded any differently and had invoked closure any earlier, he would probably have been precluded from moving any amendments.^[4]

The next instance of closure in Committee of the Whole was on April 1, 1932. Prime Minister Bennett moved:

…that further consideration of the title and Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of The Unemployment and Farm Relief Continuance Act, 1932, shall be the first business of the committee and shall not be further postponed.^[5]

This motion covered all clauses of the Bill, although only Clause 1 had been formally called and debated. The motion was put and carried and there was no procedural challenge to the fact that some clauses had not been called or postponed. This precedent is virtually identical to the situation the committee now faces.

The most recent example of closure in Committee of the Whole took place on May 24, 1956, when debate commenced in Committee of the Whole on Bill C-298, the Northern Ontario Pipe Line [Crown] Corporation. Clauses 1 to 3 were postponed, Clause 4 was being debated, and Clauses 5 to 7 were never called. On May 30, 1956, notice of closure was given by Prime Minister St.-Laurent. On May 31, 1956, Prime Minister St.-Laurent moved:

That at this sitting of the [Committee of the] Whole House on Bill No. 298, An Act to establish the Northern Ontario Pipe Line Corporation, the further consideration of Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, the title of the said bill, and any amendments proposed thereto, shall be the first business of this Committee and shall not be further postponed.^[6]

The closure motion covered all clauses of the Bill, although Clauses 5 to 7 were never called or debated. A point of order was raised, and the Chairman of the Committee[s] of the Whole ruled the motion in order, referring to the 1932 precedent. His decision was appealed to the Speaker, who confirmed the ruling. The Speaker, whose rulings were at that time subject to an appeal of the House, [was] also challenged.

The question was put to the House for decision, and the ruling that the Minister could closure clauses not yet called was sustained by a vote of 143 yeas to 50 nays.^[7]

To address the matter raised by the honourable Member for York South—Weston [Mr. John Nunziata], I should point out to the committee that the language used by the Minister today is the same as in every case heretofore mentioned.

As I said earlier, Beauchesne Fifth Edition, Citation 344, offers little direction, but an analysis of the cases seems to provide some indication.

In two cases, 1913 and 1919, it would appear that the clauses were postponed for procedurally strategic reasons. In two other cases, both in 1917, all clauses were simply postponed, and the debates shed no light on why. On the last two occasions when closure was invoked, in 1932 and 1956, some of the clauses in the Bills concerned had not been reached, and in the latter case rulings were made by the Chairman of the Committee[s] of the Whole and the Speaker, which were subsequently confirmed by the House itself, that the closure motion was in order.

The 1958 Fourth Edition of Beauchesne gives us a little more to consider. The committee will remember that prior to 1968 most Bills of Supply and of Ways and Means destined for a Committee of the Whole were preceded by a resolution first considered by the Committee of the Whole.

Citation 167 of the Fourth Edition of Beauchesne says, in part:

If, under this Standing Order, the notice applies to several proposed resolutions, the whole of the sittings allowed for discussion may be engaged in only a part of them and the remainder has to be voted on without the House having debated them at all. The right of free debate is thereby abolished in so far as those proposed resolutions are concerned.

It is obvious from that citation that Beauchesne 1958. Fourth Edition at least envisaged the possibility of closure being applied in Committee of the Whole to parts of a Bill not yet debated.

The honourable Minister of State for the Treasury Board made a strong point in underlining that the 1956 precedent which confirms the 1932 precedent carries the authority of sustained Chairman’s decision, a Speaker’s ruling, and a recorded decision by the House itself.

The honourable member for Peace River accurately pointed out that in all the recent discussions of procedural reforms, closure has remained untouched.

Therefore, in light of the 1958 Beauchesne citation, the precedents of 1932 and 1956, and the lack of further direction by the House since 1956, I must rule that the Minister’s notice given yesterday is valid and that his proposed motion is in order.

And Members having appealed the Chairman’s ruling to the House:

The Speaker: I have been following the proceedings carefully. I listened to the Chairman’s ruling, and I have considered the arguments from both sides of the House. During the recess just concluded I read the Chairman’s ruling, and I am satisfied that the two precedents mentioned, that of 1932 and that of 1956, are persuasive precedents. I rule that the Chairman has properly applied them to the issue before us. Therefore, I confirm the ruling of the Chair.

Following the appeal to the Speaker, the closure motion was put to the House and agreed to.

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1988-12-21