Arranging the Business of the House / Miscellaneous

February 7, 1990

Debates, pp. 7953-4

On February 6, 1990, the Hon. Doug Lewis (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada) gave notice of the Government’s intention, pursuant to Standing Order 57, to apply closure to the second reading stage of Bill C-62, respecting the Goods and Services Tax. Mr. Nelson Riis (Kamloops) later rose on a point of order to indicate he would be making a submission the following day that not only was closure at that point irresponsible, but unconstitutional.^[1] On February 7, 1990, after the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada had moved the motion of closure, Mr. Riis rose immediately on a point of order to ask the Chair to consider four issues surrounding the closure motion: whether there was a responsibility for the Chair to ensure a reasonable length of debate; whether this particular use of closure was for a purpose never originally intended; whether Standing Order 57 (the closure rule) was consistent with Section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867; and whether the current frequent use of closure was inconsistent with Section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867. insofar as it exceeded those “privileges, immunities, and powers” held by the British House of Commons at this time. Following remarks by Mr. Peter Milliken (Kingston and the Islands) and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Speaker suspended the sitting of the House to consider the argument put forward by Mr. Riis.^[2] He returned shortly thereafter to deliver his ruling.

Decision of the Chair

The Speaker: The honourable Member for Kamloops has raised a point of order in which he says it would be improper to accept the government’s motion for closure. He makes four points in this argument.

First, to paraphrase his own effective use of language and his own eloquence—and I do not mean to do a disservice to him by boiling it down into one point—his first point really is that under all the circumstances it is not fair that debate be curtailed.

He makes reference to comments that I made at another time, pointing out that in this Chamber there are many methods used by both sides in a dispute to make their point. With respect to that ruling, nothing that I say today should be considered to be any detraction from it.

Second, the honourable Member for Kamloops argued that the Government ought not to be moving closure at this time. He also argued that closure was being used for a purpose for which it was never really intended and that the effect of this is to limit freedom of speech in the Chamber.

Third, he argued that closure contravenes the Constitution of the country.

Last, and I think I have it straight, he argued that the use of closure here is inconsistent with the practice in the United Kingdom House. He refers to constitutional sections which indicate that the rights of Members here ought not be any the less than the rights of Members under the Constitution of the United Kingdom. I am going to deal with each of these. Before I do, I want to say that the honourable Member for Kamloops presented his arguments extremely clearly and with a certain compelling significance. I will deal with the first point.

The question of whether it is fair is a very subjective one. I have to point out that the rules of the House make it very clear that what the Government is moving is within the rules of the House. I am bound by the rules of the House and I must make my decision on the question of whether or not the motion by the Government is procedurally acceptable.

With respect to procedure, I have to say that it is acceptable. But the question was a purpose for which it was never intended and to counter Members’ freedom of speech (sic). Even if that were so, I am not going to comment yea or nay on that because that is a philosophic and procedural debate that ought to take place perhaps in some other place. However, I do want to draw to the attention of honourable Members the distinction between freedom of speech and continued debate. There is a distinction.

The rule which binds us with respect to allocation of time and closure does limit debate at certain stages of the process of a Bill through this place, but it is probably going too far to say that it contravenes freedom of speech in the House. I do want to point out that even if the honourable Minister’s motion is accepted by this House then there is an extensive debate later on today and tonight, there is then committee, there are other ways in which this matter can be raised in the House on a daily basis. Then the Bill has to come back again to this House where there is further debate.

The honourable Member makes a very interesting argument. I am not prepared again to rule on it because if I did I would be straying into an area in which I am not allowed to go. He states that our rule in the House contravenes our Constitution. That may or may not be, but the authorities for many, many years back make it quite clear that I cannot rule on a legal or a constitutional issue.

Lastly, I will deal with the argument that it is inconsistent with the United Kingdom, the use of closure here. It may be, but in the United Kingdom, there is a specific rule which attaches to the Speaker a very clear discretion as to whether or not a motion of closure ought to be entertained under all the circumstances. There is no such rule in this House.

Therefore, having listened very carefully to the honourable Member for Kamloops, the honourable Member for Kingston and the Islands, and because no Speaker is immune to what is going on in this Chamber, having listened to representations as to what has been taking place over a number of days and without making any judgment on that, I have taken it into account. I hope the honourable Minister of Justice will not be offended that I felt that it was not necessary to recite all of what had taken place. Looking at all of the circumstances and coming back again to the essential thing that I have to decide, and that is whether or not the motion is procedurally sound, I must rule that it is.

In ruling that it is, I am not in any way taking away from the cogency of arguments the honourable Member for Kamloops put up with respect to constitutional and other matters. They may well be matters which the House may wish to pursue. It may well be that the House would wish to look again at the rules, but that is a matter for another day.

Therefore, my ruling is that the motion is in order.

F0203-e

34-2

1990-02-07