Parliamentary Privilege / Rights of Members

October 6, 1994

Debates, pp. 6597-8

Following Oral Questions on September 30, 1994, Michel Gauthier (Roberval) rose on a question of privilege claiming that Jean Chrétien (Prime Minister) was in contempt of the House. Mr. Gauthier maintained that, in response to a question posed by Lucien Bouchard (Leader of the Opposition) during Oral Questions on September 28, 1994, the Prime Minister stated that he had found no commitment by the government of former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to reimburse the Government of Quebec for expenses incurred in the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord. Mr. Gauthier claimed that the Prime Minister’s statement was contrary to comments on the same subject made by Jean Charest (Sherbrooke), a former minister in the Mulroney government, as well as a press release from the Office of the President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. Mr. Gauthier argued that the Prime Minister was therefore in contempt of the House and had impeded the work of the Leader of the Opposition and other members, since the nature of his answer changed their line of questioning. He requested that the issue be referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The Speaker agreed to review all matters brought forward and report back to the House, if necessary.^[1]

On October 6, 1994, prior to Routine Proceedings, the Speaker delivered his ruling. The Speaker stated that differences of opinion with respect to fact or detail are not infrequent and do not necessarily constitute a breach of privilege. He quoted Speaker Fraser, who stated that a direct charge against a member may only be made by way of a substantive motion for which the usual notice would be required. The Speaker also referred to the Pallett privilege case and Speaker Michener’s remarks that simple justice requires that no member should have to submit to an investigation of his or her conduct by the House or a committee until that member has been charged with an offence. The Speaker then concluded that the arguments put forward were a dispute as to facts and did not constitute a question of privilege.

Decision of the Chair

The Speaker: I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised by the honourable member for Roberval last Friday, September 30, 1994, concerning comments made by the Right Honourable Prime Minister on September 28, 1994.^[2]

In his presentation, the honourable member for Roberval claimed that the replies made by the Prime Minister during Question Period were contradictory. This, he argued, impeded the opposition in the discharge of their duties, since the nature of the answers given by the Prime Minister changed a particular line of questioning followed by the Leader of the Opposition. Quoting from Erskine May, the honourable member held that such action constituted a contempt of the House.

To support his contention, the honourable member pointed to the exchanges which took place on September 29 between the honourable member for Sherbrooke and the President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and the Deputy Prime Minister during Question Period, as well as the point of order raised by the honourable member for Sherbrooke following Question Period.^[3]

The honourable member for Roberval also submitted that, in his view, as the behaviour of the Prime Minister constituted an obstruction of the House, the matter should be referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, where the answers and the behaviour of the Prime Minister could be reviewed and witnesses summoned.

Joseph Maingot, in his book entitled Parliamentary Privilege in Canada at page 205, notes that if a member of the House has admitted to deliberately misleading the House or through his or her conduct in some other concrete, tangible way has become a subject of a question of privilege, then that member would probably forthwith be the subject of a motion for contempt. Maingot goes on to quote Speaker Michener’s famous ruling in the Pallett privilege case of June 19, 1959. At that time Speaker Michener stated in part:

Simple justice requires that no honourable member should have to submit to investigation of his conduct by the House or a committee until he has been charged with an offence.^[4]

In his May 5, 1987, ruling at page 5766 of the Debates, Speaker Fraser said something which is apt in our current circumstance. He stated:

I would remind the House, however, that a direct charge or accusation against a member may be made only by way of a substantive motion of which the usual notice is required. This is another long-standing practice designed to avoid judgment by innuendo and to prevent the overextended use of our absolute privilege of freedom of speech.

I now want to address the allegation of the honourable member for Roberval that the Prime Minister’s answers misled the House and whether in the specific circumstances a contempt has taken place.

I have carefully examined the exchanges which took place on September 28, 29 and 30, especially during the Question Periods of those days. It is clear to me that there is disagreement among members over the facts surrounding the issue. And furthermore, no evidence has been presented to support the contention that the Prime Minister deliberately misled the House.

The chief government whip quoted from Beauchesne 6th edition, citation 31(1) which states:

A dispute arising between two members, as to allegations of facts, does not fulfil the conditions of parliamentary privilege.

Speaker Fraser noted on December 4, 1986, at Debates page 1792:

Differences of opinion with respect to fact and details are not infrequent in the House and do not necessarily constitute a breach of privilege.

There are numerous other rulings, such as those of Speaker Lamoureux on February 3, 1971,^[5] November 16, 1971^[6] and March 2, 1973,^[7] as well as those of Speaker Fraser on June 1, 1987,^[8] and finally, December 16, 1988,^[9] which amply demonstrate that this is a long-held view of the Chair.

In light of the arguments put forward and the decisions of my predecessors, I must conclude that the matter before us is a dispute as to facts and does not constitute the basis of a question of privilege.

I thank honourable members for their contributions.

P0108-e

35-1

1994-10-06