Parliamentary Privilege / Rights of the House

Contempt of the House: Minister and Parliamentary Secretary alleged to have deliberately misled the House

April 4, 2019

Debates, p. 26694

On March 18, 2019, Peter Julian (New Westminster—Burnaby) rose on a question of privilege regarding allegedly misleading statements made by David Lametti (Minister of Justice and Attorney General) and Arif Virani (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General) during Oral Questions on February 7 and 8, 2019. Mr. Julian noted that these statements, about a possible deferred prosecution agreement with SNC-Lavalin, contradicted the statements made by Jody Wilson-Raybould (Vancouver Granville), the former minister of justice and attorney general of Canada,^[1] and Gerald Butts, the former principal secretary to the Prime Minister, before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and by Justin Trudeau (Prime Minister) to the media.^[2] He accused the minister and the parliamentary secretary of having misled the House. In Mr. Julian’s opinion, the statements made by the minister and the parliamentary secretary constituted a contempt and a violation of the privileges of the House. After hearing from other members, the Speaker took the matter under advisement.^[3]

Resolution

On April 4, 2019, the Speaker delivered his ruling. He stated that such charges could be very serious, because a member’s integrity was being called into question. That is why the burden of proof required to conclude that a member deliberately misled the House was very high. The Speaker reminded members of the three conditions that must be met and explained that he must base his decision on the information available to him: statements made in the House. The Speaker’s authority to pass judgment on the content of responses to oral questions was limited. As a result, he could not find that this matter constituted a prima facie case of privilege.

Decision of the Chair

The Speaker: Order, please. I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on March 18, 2019, by the hon. member for New Westminster—Burnaby, regarding allegedly misleading statements by the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and his parliamentary secretary.

In his intervention, the member for New Westminster—Burnaby accused the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and his parliamentary secretary of deliberately misleading the House by repeatedly denying accusations of political interference by the Prime Minister’s Office in the work of the former minister of justice and attorney general.

As proof, the member cited certain answers provided by the minister during question period on February 7 and by the parliamentary secretary on February 8, where it was argued that at no point was either the current or former justice minister pressured or directed by the Prime Minister or anyone in the Prime Minister’s Office to make a decision on this or any other matter.

These answers, he contended, are contradictory to the testimonies given before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on February 27 by the former minister of justice and attorney general, the member for Vancouver Granville, and on March 6 by Gerald Butts, as well as a statement made to the media by the Prime Minister on March 7.

He concluded that:

All parties involved, specifically the former attorney general, the current Attorney General, the Prime Minister’s former principal secretary and, especially, the Prime Minister himself admit that there was pressure placed on the hon. member for Vancouver Granville in her former role.

While he acknowledged that accusations of misleading the House are usually found to be disagreements as to the facts, he argued that the two versions of events presented amount to a breach of the privileges of the House.

As I mentioned in my ruling on January 29, 2019, which can be found at page 24980 of Debates:

The charge of misleading the House is always regarded by the Chair as a most serious one for it touches not only on the technical aspects of the charge but also the integrity of the member.

This, in large part, explains the rigorous burden of proof required to reach the conclusion of a member misleading the House. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 85, describes this proof as threefold, stating:

… one, it must be proven that the statement was misleading; two, it must be established that the Member making the statement knew at the time that the statement was incorrect; and three, that in making the statement, the Member intended to mislead the House.

When questions of privilege are raised which involve a charge of a member having deliberately misled the House, essentially the Speaker is being asked to pass judgment on statements made; in this particular case, it is the answers of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and his parliamentary secretary to oral questions.

Members, of course, are well versed in the limited authority of the Chair in this respect. The Speaker is not responsible for the quality or content of replies to questions.

However, as has been suggested, it is also true that exceptional circumstances could exist whereby, with proper evidence, a determination could be made that certain statements made to the House breached its privileges.

After thorough study, the Chair cannot find that the statements in question were misleading, made with the knowledge that they were incorrect and made with the intent of misleading the House. Accordingly, the Chair is unable to conclude that this matter constitutes a prima facie case of privilege.

I want to thank all hon. members for their attention.