Private Members’ Business / Miscellaneous

November 2, 1989

Debates, pp. 5474-5

On October 20, 1989, Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough West) obtained leave to introduce a Private Members' Public Bill. Ms. Dawn Black (New Westminster—Burnaby) rose on a point of order to argue that the bill was substantially the same as two bills already on the Order Paver and that as a result, consideration of this bill would give rise to the same debate and its passage would have the same effect as the two bills already introduced and given first reading. Ms. Black therefore asked whether the Chair ought to have exercised its discretionary power under Standing Order 86(5) dealing with "similar items".^[1] The Chair took the matter under consideration. On October 26, 1989, Ms. Black raised the same objection when Mr. Don Boudria (Glengany-Prescott-Russell) introduced a Private Members' Public Bill that she felt was substantially the same as other bills already on the Order Paper.^[2] The Speaker noted the Member's observations and indicated he would rule on both matters later. His decision on November 2, 1989 is reproduced in extenso below.

Decision of the Chair

Mr. Speaker: Before I call orders of the day, I have an important point of order to respond to raised by the honourable Member for New Westminster—Burnaby on October 20 and again on October 26.

The Member questioned the inclusion on the Notice Paper of two items which she argued appeared to be substantially the same as two other Private Members' Bills now on the Order Paper, namely Bill C-261, standing in the name of the honourable Member for York South—Weston (Mr. John Nunziata), and Bill C-266, standing in the name of the honourable Member for Lambton—Middlesex (Hon. Ralph Ferguson). These two bills were introduced and read a first time on September 27, 1989 and October 10, 1989 respectively.

The first of these [items] is a bill introduced by the Member for Scarborough West on October 20. It is an Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Human Being). The second was introduced last Thursday, October 26, by the Member for Glengarry—Prescott—Russell; it is an Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Destruction of Foetus).

Standing Order 86(5) states:

The Speaker shall be responsible for determining whether two or more items are so similar as to be substantially the same, in which case he or she shall so inform the Member or Members whose items were received last and the same shall be returned to the Member or Members without having appeared on the Notice Paper.

The honourable Member is invoking this standing order to ask the Chair to use its discretionary power to keep these items from appearing on the Notice Paper.

When I say "to keep these items from appearing on the Notice Paper", I should point out that the honourable Member has put the application forward on a perfectly logical and proper procedural motion and that is, of course, the only basis upon which I can respond. I want Members and the public to know that the honourable Member for New Westminster—Burnaby is raising a procedural point and she certainly has every right to raise it and to have it argued

I have carefully considered the argument presented by the honourable Member and have reviewed the items in question with equal care. I should say that in the view of the Chair, two or more items are substantially the same if, first, they have the same purpose and, second, they obtain their purpose by the same means.

Accordingly, there could be several bills addressing the same subject, but if they took a different approach to the issue the Chair would judge them to be sufficiently different so as not to be substantially the same.

In my view, that is exactly the case we have here.

It is clear that the two bills which have already been given first reading, and the other two bills introduced and now awaiting first reading treat the same subject matter. Honourable Members will know, and the public should know, that the subject matter is the question of the unborn child and what the law ought to be with respect to that. On these grounds, they meet the first criteria for being substantially the same. However, on examination of their contents, the Chair has concluded that there are sufficient differences as to how they sought to accomplish their purpose so that they could not be judged to be substantially the same.

This approach accords with the practice both before and after the introduction of this standing order in 1986. The intent of the new rule was to give Members an opportunity to put before the House items of concern to them, but to prevent a multiplicity of identical bills being submitted in the draw for Private Members' Business. However, Standing Order 86(3) provides that any Member prevented from submitting a bill because of a decision of the Chair can add his or her name as seconder to a Bill already on notice on the Order Paper.

In the present case, the Chair has carefully examined the Bills in question and finds that there are sufficient differences in their content to allow them to proceed. I would, therefore, allow the honourable Member for Scarborough West and the honourable Member for Glengarry—Prescott—Russell to move first reading of their respective bills.

I thank the honourable Member for New Westminster—Burnaby for giving me the opportunity to clarify the position of the Chair with regard to Standing Order 86. Again, I stress that the point raised by the honourable Member was a procedural one and one to which she was completely entitled to argue. I also want to say to the honourable Member that because of the nature of the bills, the Chair most carefully examined the references to various sections of the Criminal Code, and I do want to say to her that those various references did help to persuade the Chair that the bill should go forward. I assure the honourable Member that very considerable attention was given to the legitimate point of procedure which she has raised.

Following the ruling, Mr. Wappel moved first reading of his bill on November 7, 1989; Mr. Boudria moved first reading of his bill on November 9, 1989.^[3]

F1004-e

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1989-11-02