Committees / Committee Chairman Exceeding His Authority

Committee proceedings; systematic obstruction; limiting of debate; time allocation; Standing Order 78(3); powers of committee chairs; applicability of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons to the proceedings of House Committees; withdrawal of a motion; lack of consultation; rights of the minority; rights of the majority; appealing a committee chair's decision; Committees master of their own proceedings; non-interference by the Speaker in committee proceedings; conduct of the committee chair

March 26, 1990

Debates, pp. 9756-8

On March 21, 1990, the Hon. Roger Simmons (Burin- St. George's) rose on a question of privilege to protest the decision made the previous evening by the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Finance, Mr. Don Blenkarn (Mississauga South). Since March 19, 1990, the Committee had been debating a motion by Mr. Rene Soetens (Ontario) regarding the Committee's consideration of Bill C-62, An Act to implement the Goods and Services Tax. Mr. Simmons argued that the Chairman had exceeded his authority by interrupting the proceedings, declaring the motion moved by Mr. Soetens deemed withdrawn and tabling a draft time allocation motion. Mr. Simmons further criticized the Chairman for announcing that his order was a "ruling": and that there could be no points of order or debate on it. The "ruling" was appealed by several members of the Committee, but the Chairman's decision was sustained by majority vote. The Chairman then declared, without putting the matter to a vote, that the meeting was adjourned.

Several Members spoke in the course of the lengthy debate which followed. Some raised the issue of whether a committee chair may move a motion; whether time allocation may be invoked by a committee chair; whether a chair may adjourn a meeting arbitrarily; and whether the rights of the majority and minority had been fairly balanced. The Speaker took the matter under advisement^[1] and handed down his decision on March 26, 1990. It is reproduced in extenso below.

Decision of the Chair

Mr. Speaker: On March 21, 1990, the Chair received several notices of questions of privilege relating to an action of the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Finance on March 20, 1990.

The honourable Members complained that the Chairman of the Committee, the honourable Member for Mississauga South, had exceeded his authority by putting an end to a debate on a motion, declaring the said motion withdrawn and introducing a new order for allocation of time for the consideration in Committee of the Goods and Services Tax Bill. The Chairman also declared that this action on his part was in essence a ruling that there was to be no debate or points of order. The action of the Chairman was formally challenged by a Member and the Chairman was subsequently sustained on a recorded vote of 7 yeas and 4 nays. The Chairman then declared the meeting adjourned without question put until March 26, 1990 at 3:30 p.m.

The Speaker has often informed the House that matters and procedural issues that arise in committee ought to be settled in committee unless the committee reports them first to the House. I have, however, said to the House that this practice was not an absolute one and that in very serious and special circumstances the Speaker may have to pronounce on a committee matter without the committee having reported to the House.

The matter that has been raised with the Chair is a serious one. Evidence of that is that eight honourable Members filed notices of questions of privilege and the Chair heard submissions for almost two hours on Wednesday last.

Because the matter is serious the Chair will respond in some detail. For clarity's sake, I will begin by listing the points that I will cover.

First, there are the points raised by the honourable Member for Burin—St. George's who was supported in argument by the honourable Member for Ottawa—Vanier (Mr. Jean-Robert Gauthier), the honourable Member for Yorkton-Melville (Mr. Lorne Nystrom), and the honourable Member for Edmonton East (Mr. Ross Harvey):

Did the Chairman exceed his authority in (a) declaring a motion withdrawn, (b) disallowing points of order, or (c) adjourning the committee arbitrarily?

Second, there is the point raised by the honourable Member for Yorkton-Melville which relates to a similar case that occurred on June 6, 1984 in the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. Is that a valid precedent which should be followed?

Third, the honourable Member for Nickel Belt (Mr. John Rodriguez) invoked the principle of English parliamentary law that the minority must be protected from the tyranny of the majority. He asked that I review Standing Order 1 and seek guidance from other jurisdictions. The question is therefore: Should the Speaker overrule a majority decision made in committee?

Fourth, finally the honourable Member for Burnaby—Kingsway (Mr. Svend Robinson) referred the Chair to Standing Order 78(3) relating to time allocation. The question is: Does this Standing Order apply in Committees?

Let me now address each point.

First, did the Chairman of the Finance Committee exceed his authority? A committee chairman is elected by the committee. Like the Speaker, he is the servant of the body that elected him or her. The chairman is accountable to the committee, and that committee should be the usual venue where his or her conduct is pronounced upon, unless and until the committee chooses to report to the House, which this Committee has not yet opted to do.

That is the tradition of the Canadian House of Commons. If I am to respect that tradition, I should therefore avoid comment on the conduct of the honourable Member for Mississauga South and let the Committee deal further with the matter if it so desires. There are also other means by which the Members may bring such an issue forward for debate on the floor of the House. In this case, as Speaker, I have decided to resist both the urgings of Members and my own temptation to comment at this time on the conduct of the Chairman.

Next, does the 1984 incident in the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs constitute a valid precedent?

Let me summarize that particular event. The bill was before the Committee and no progress was being made. The Chairman took it upon himself to break the impasse. The Committee, by majority vote, supported his decision with the opposition voting against it. The Chairman acknowledged the parliamentary significance of his action by resigning immediately after the bill was reported back to the House. The matter was raised in the House on June 8, 1984,  and Madam Speaker Sauvé^[2] refused to hear a question of privilege citing Citation 76 of Beauchesne Fifth Edition. Let me summarize that particular event. The bill was before the Committee and no progress was being made. The Chairman took it upon himself to break the impasse. The Committee, by majority vote, supported his decision with the opposition voting against it. The Chairman acknowledged the parliamentary significance of his action by resigning immediately after the bill was reported back to the House. The matter was raised in the House on June 8, 1984,  and Madam Speaker Sauvé^[2] refused to hear a question of privilege citing Citation 76 of Beauchesne Fifth Edition.

The story does not end there however and what subsequently occurred is very interesting. At the next meeting of the Committee the same individual was re-elected to the Chair of the Committee on a motion made by a Member of the Official Opposition, seconded by a New Democrat. All this can be found in the Minutes of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs of June 6 and June 19, 1984. The outcome of that particular case was determined by the Committee, as it should be, and not by the Speaker. I would caution Members, however, in referring to this as a precedent. What occurred was merely a series of events and decisions made by the majority in a committee. Neither this House nor the Speaker gave the incidents any value whatsoever in procedural terms. One must exercise caution in attaching guiding procedural flags to such incidents and happenings.

Let me next deal with the points of the honourable Member for Burnaby­ Kingsway relating to time allocation. Standing Order 78(3) reads as follows:

A Minister of the Crown who from his or her place in the House, at a previous sitting, has stated that an agreement could not be reached under the provisions of sections (1) or (2) of this Standing Order in respect of proceedings at the stage at which a public bill was then under consideration either in the House or in any committee, and has given notice of his or her intention so to do, may propose a motion during proceedings under Government Orders, for the purpose of allotting a specified number of days or hours for the consideration and disposal of proceedings at that stage; provided that the time allotted for any stage is not to be less than one sitting day and provided that for the purposes of this section of this Standing Order an allocation may be proposed in one motion to cover the proceedings at both the report and the third reading stages on a bill if that motion is consistent with the provisions of Standing Order 76(10). During the consideration of any such mot ion, no Member may speak more than once or longer than ten minutes. Not more than two hours after the commencement of proceedings thereon, the Speaker shall put every question necessary to dispose of the said motion. Any proceedings interrupted pursuant to this section of this Standing Order shall be deemed adjourned.

That standing order can be made to apply to the committee stage, but is must be moved in the House by a Minister. Once such a motion is adopted, it becomes a mandatory instruction to a committee considering a bill to deal with the legislation according to the wish expressed by the whole House.

Finally, the point raised by the honourable Member for Nickel Belt is the one that gives the Chair the most concern for it is an extremely valid one. The question is: When does the Speaker step in and judge that there has been an abuse by the majority?

I should like to remind honourable Members of comments I made in the House on April 14, 1987, at page 5119 of Hansard. I said:

It is essential to our democratic system [that] controversial issues should be debated at reasonable length so that every reasonable opportunity shall be available to hear the arguments pro and con and [that] reasonable delaying tactics should be permissible to enable opponents of a measure to enlist public support for their point of view. Sooner or later every issue must be decided and the decision will be taken by [a] majority. Rules of procedure protect both the minority and the majority. They are designed to allow the full expression of views on both sides of an issue. They provide the Opposition with a means to delay a decision. They also provide the majority with a means of limiting debate in order to arrive at a decision. This is the kind of balance essential to the procedure of a democratic assembly. Our rules were certainly never designed to permit the total frustration of one side or the other, the total stagnation of debate, or the total paralysis of the system.

The honourable Member for Nickel Belt suggested I look to other jurisdictions but I have found a comment of Speaker Lamoureux which is on point. On July 24, 1969, he said:

What honourable Members would like the Chair to do under the provisions of Standing Order 51 is to substitute his judgment for the judgment of certain honourable Members. Can I do this in accordance with the traditions of Canada, of Britain, and in all parliamentary systems where the Speaker is not the master of the House, in spite of what Standing Order 51 says? The Speaker is a servant of the House. Honourable Members may want me to be the master of the House today but tomorrow, when, perhaps in other circumstances I might claim this privilege, they might have a different opinion. It would make me a hero, I suppose, if I were to adopt the attitude that I could judge political situations such as this and substitute my judgment for that of certain honourable Members, either a majority or, perhaps, sometimes a minority. [But] I do not believe that this is the role of a Speaker under our system. I am not prepared at this time to take this responsibility on my shoulders. I think it is my duty to rule on such matters in accordance with the rules, regulations and standing orders which honourable Members themselves have turned over to the Speaker to administer.^[3]

That is the end of Speaker Lamoureux's quote.

In the light of our long-standing practice and the wisdom of Speaker Lamoureux's, I have chosen not to substitute my judgment for that expressed by a majority on the Finance Committee, unless that majority decides to report its dilemma to the House.

The Chair has been unable to find the basis upon which to act at this time. That is not to say that under different circumstances the Speaker would not intervene. If l am cautious in not acting now it is simply because the Chair does not supervise the standing committee chairmen. That function belongs to the members of each committee and they have obvious avenues to pursue other than invoking privilege in the House.

At the same time, chairmen ought to be mindful of their responsibilities and make their decisions and rulings within the bounds of the fine balance provided by our rules.

I am grateful for the patience of the House and grateful to Members for their submissions.

I would urge all chairmen and members of Committees to try and strive mightily to ensure that the general rules of this place are followed as far as is sensible and helpful in those Committees. I remind honourable Members that endless points of privilege on what goes on in committee, when they fall short of that extreme situation where a Speaker might have to intervene, take up a great deal of time in this House. I would ask all honourable Members to consider carefully what I have said in this ruling and also, perhaps, some of the things I have not said.

On April 30, 1990, the Standing Committee on Finance tabled its Fourth Report, in which it recommended that the "question of Committees' rules and procedures as they relate to the limiting of debate in cases where a Committee has reached an impasse" be referred to the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections. The Report was concurred in the same day^[4] and, accordingly, the Privileges and Elections Committee studied the matter. The Twenty-Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections entitled "Procedure relating to the limiting of debate in Committees" was tabled in the House on March 20, 1991, but was never concurred in.^[5]

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