[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Wednesday, March 12, 1997
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[English]
The Chairman (Mr. John English (Kitchener, Lib.): I'm John English, the chair of this committee. It's my pleasure today to welcome the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights.
I'd like to introduce the witnesses now: Salim Fakirani, Laura Farquharson, and Larry Thacker.
Since we're late beginning, would you begin your presentations right away.
Mr. Salim Fakirani (Member, Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights): Chairperson and committee members, I would like to thank you on behalf of the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights for allowing us an opportunity to discuss with you an important international, legal, and humanitarian issue; that is, the conflict in the Western Sahara.
CLAIHR is a non-profit organization. The objective of CLAIHR's Western Sahara initiative is to ensure, through legal analysis and greater international scrutiny, that a free and fair referendum takes place in the Western Sahara.
The president of CLAIHR, Professor Donald McRae, would have liked to have been here with us, but unfortunately he's in another subcommittee, on the trade disputes.
We are very fortunate to have with us Larry Thacker. Larry is a partner in one of Canada's leading law firms, Davies, Ward & Beck, and he has just recently returned from the refugee camps in Algeria.
Laura is currently working with the Somalia inquiry. She is a former board member of the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights and is a co-project leader of the Western Sahara initiative.
I will begin by highlighting the important events and then pass it over to Laura and Larry. Laura will identify the important legal elements and the key points of disagreement. Larry will describe why the current situation is unstable, why this is an opportune time for Canadian involvement, and CLAIHR's recommendations for Canadian involvement.
As we approach the 21st century, many would be surprised if they were told that there remains a colony in Africa. That colony is the Western Sahara. The major issue in this conflict is the undisputed right of the people of the Western Sahara to a free and fair referendum to choose between independence or integration with Morocco.
The inability of the international community to resolve this crisis threatens our democratic values, our basic human rights, and the rule of law. Further, the credibility of the United Nations is eroded with its inability to resolve this conflict. This is why we ask you as Canadian parliamentarians, entrusted with Canada's relations with the world, to pursue an active Canadian role in resolving this conflict.
The Western Sahara was colonized by Spain in the 19th century, and since 1975 it has been occupied by Morocco despite international condemnation. As early as 1965, the United Nations adopted resolutions reaffirming the right of self-determination.
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In 1973, the people of the Western Sahara created an organization known as the POLISARIO Front to further their cause for the implementation of a free and fair referendum. In 1976, they proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, SADR, a government in exile, based in Algeria.
Morocco and Mauritania both claimed historical ties to the region prior to Spanish colonization. The International Court of Justice was asked by the United Nations to render an opinion on the claim of Morocco and Mauritania. In the following year, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice dismissed the claim of Morocco and Mauritania.
Subsequently, Morocco and Mauritania occupied the territory. Furthermore, an agreement with Spain was concluded to give the northern two-thirds of the territory to Morocco and the southern one-third to Mauritania. This occupation forced thousands of people to flee and set up refugee camps in the neighbouring country of Algeria. Remarkably, an entire generation of those under 20 have been brought up in these refugee camps.
Throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front were engaged in armed conflict. Mauritania had signed a peace agreement with the POLISARIO Front in 1979, so the conflict was between the two. The territory that Mauritania had previously was seized by Morocco when the peace agreement was signed.
Between 1988 and 1990, the United Nations brokered a peace plan, also known as the settlement proposals, between the two parties. The settlement proposals provided that the referendum be conducted under the direction of a special representative of the Secretary-General. It created a military and administrative body to oversee the process, known as the United Nations Mission for a Referendum in the Western Sahara, commonly referred to as MINURSO.
The mandate of MINURSO includes: implementing and maintaining a ceasefire; conducting the voter identification process, based on the 1974 census conducted by Spain; and organizing and conducting the referendum.
MINURSO officially went into operation in May 1991, and it was anticipated that their operations would be complete within a year and that a referendum would be held in January 1992. It is 1997, and yet the long-promised referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara the right to choose between independence or integration with Morocco has never been held.
The major obstacle to the referendum is the voter identification process.
I will pass it on to Laura to describe the legal elements and key disagreements at this time.
Ms Laura Farquharson (Member, Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights): Although we recognize that this dispute involves more than legal issues, CLAIHR believes that international law can play an important role in establishing standards by which the dispute can be resolved.
I'm going to focus on two of the most important legal issues in this case. The first is the right to self-determination, and the second, the standards for a free and fair referendum, and in particular the standards for better registration.
As has been emphasized already, the right to self-determination in the Western Sahara case is clearly established. All legal experts in the international community agree that this is a classic case of self-determination in the de-colonization context. The right has been affirmed in numerous resolutions by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity since 1960. It has been affirmed in an International Court of Justice opinion in 1975, and it's been affirmed in the settlement proposals that were agreed to by the parties in 1990 in which they accepted that the basis of the referendum would be the 1974 Spanish census.
Understanding that the right to self-determination in this case is clearly established and not in question, I want to move to discuss the international standards for a free and fair referendum and focus in particular on the situation in voter registration and voter identification. I'll try to describe the background and efforts to agree on criteria for voter identification and lead you to the point of understanding what the centre of the dispute is right now.
International law experts describe several standards for a free and fair electoral process, and two are briefly discussed in the written submission. They are standards for election management and for voter registration. Although fair and independent electoral management is obviously crucial to the ultimate acceptance of an outcome of a referendum, as I said, I'm going to focus on voter registration, since this is at present the basis of the dispute.
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According to international law, the system for voter registration should be accurate and secure and widely accepted as authoritative and legitimate. The process for voter registration requires clear eligibility criteria and a consistent application by trained officials. Those eligible should be aware of the procedure, electoral lists should be published promptly, clear, effective means should be available for correcting errors, and lastly, given the possibilities for fraud in creating electoral lists, international standards call for transparency in the process.
Again, while in the past there have been problems in all of these areas, I'll focus on the need for clear eligibility criteria.
Both parties, as has been said, agreed in the settlement proposals that the 1974 Spanish census, which comprised 74,000 names, should serve as the basis for the voting list. The disagreement now is over how this list should be updated; who should be added to the list.
There have been a number of efforts to come to agreement over the criteria for adding people. In 1991, after the settlement proposals were agreed to, it was decided that the list should be updated by, first, removing the names of those who have died, and second, considering applications from those who claim the right to participate on the grounds that they are Western Saharans and were omitted from the 1974 census.
It was under the second of these criteria that Morocco submitted 120,000 names. Of these, 100,000 live in Morocco, and most of them are not members of any tribal group that was represented in the original census. Not surprisingly, the dispute over who should be added to the list centres principally around these applicants.
In 1991, in an apparent effort to advance the process, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar unilaterally suggested compromise criteria that had the effect of expanding eligibility. The parties to this day do not agree on the interpretation of these expanded criteria. Despite this fact, identification was begun in 1994 and carried on for two years on the basis of starting with applicants on whom the parties agreed. But in those two years, only 60,000 of an estimated 230,000 people were identified. In May 1996, the Security Council halted the identification process. At the moment the process is in deadlock, and the disagreement centres over who should be added to this list; how the list should be updated.
Seven years after the parties accepted as the basis of the referendum that it would be the 1974 census, there's still no agreement on how to update the list. The basis for resolution of the dispute over voter eligibility lies in getting the parties together in a forum where any agreement they reach can be verified by observer nations, and subsequent disputes can be resolved by those nations in accordance with international law, in accordance with the settlement proposals and any subsequent agreement they make.
Larry will discuss this idea further in his presentation. He's first going to discuss why the situation right now is unstable, why it's timely for Canada to act now, and CLAIHR's recommendations for how to proceed.
Mr. Larry Thacker (Member, Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights): Mr. Chairperson and committee members, before I get into the three issues, I would like to describe briefly the nature of my visit to the region.
As you've heard, I've recently returned from a six-day fact-finding mission to the Saharan refugee camps. I was in the camps for six days. Those camps are located approximately70 kilometres outside of the Algerian city of Tindouf, in the southwestern region of Algeria. I also spent four days in Algiers, two days at each end of the trip to the camps, interviewing various Algerian government officials and the president of the Algerian Red Crescent, which is the primary provider of humanitarian aid to the Saharan refugees in Algeria.
I was accompanied on the trip by Lord Christopher Winchilsea, a member of the English House of Lords. Lord Winchilsea is a founder of the Saharan Aid Trust that was established in order to provide humanitarian aid to the people of the Western Sahara.
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We were also accompanied by representatives of a charity known as the Friendship Force, which is based in Atlanta, Georgia, and a charity called Action for People in Conflict, a U.K.-based charity designed to provide humanitarian aid to people suffering from military conflict.
Finally, the remaining member of our group was a senator from the island of Jersey. We were also accompanied by the POLISARIO representative to the United Kingdom and Ireland as our guide and translator throughout.
In Algeria we were given access to several government officials who are responsible in various capacities for dealing with the Western Sahara. Those persons that I interviewed included the Secretary of State for the Minister of Foreign Affairs with special responsibility for the Maghreb region; the director general of the African department of their foreign affairs ministry; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the Minister of the Moudjahidine.
We were given extensive security and were allowed to stay at the Algerian government official residence for heads of state and diplomatic visitors. We travelled everywhere with a security motorcade and numerous armed bodyguards and police. The Algerian government was very supportive in allowing us to see whoever we wished to see and were of course very concerned about our safety in view of recent events in Algeria.
We flew to the Algerian city of Tindouf after two days and were met there by representatives of the POLISARIO Front, the liberation movement for the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. We travelled from there by Land Rover to the presidential compound and the refugee camps. We spent most of our time moving from camp to camp. On two nights we stayed in tents that are the homes of refugee families.
During that visit we met many senior officials of the POLISARIO Front, the local administration of the camps, the civil government of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, and particularly the ministries of foreign affairs and defence. A partial list of the persons who I was able to interview myself would include the following: the president of the republic, who is also the secretary general of the POLISARIO; a special political adviser to the president with the rank of minister who had previously been minister of defence and foreign affairs; the current minister of defence and a proposed new minister of defence - we were there in the middle of a cabinet shuffle, and the new appointment has been confirmed - the former and the new coordinator to MINURSO; the president and the vice-president of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic parliament; the minister of foreign affairs; the Saharan ambassador to Algeria; various members of the foreign affairs committee. We also met with the president of the National Union of Saharan Women and the Speaker of the National Council. I won't go on, but we met with various other governors of the camps and officials who were responsible for distributing food and other necessary supplies.
Essentially, we were able to see most of the people we had asked to see, despite great inconvenience. It was very difficult for us to move around the camps, but they did as much as they could to make sure we saw as many people as possible, including those people we had requested.
CLAIHR would like to focus today on two main issues. First, why the present situation is unstable and unjust, and second, how Canada could consider getting involved in moving toward a resolution of the conflict. CLAIHR believes that the present situation is unstable. Although the parties have been under the terms of an agreed ceasefire since 1991, there are several indicators that suggest a continued observance of the ceasefire is now threatened.
First, the status quo would allow an illegal occupation of the Western Saharan territory to continue. Moreover, the party occupying that territory is believed to be extracting significant natural resources, including phosphates, iron, and oil from the land. The party opposing that occupation is understandably very concerned about that continued occupation, based on their observations.
The ceasefire has allowed Morocco to strengthen its defensive and offensive capabilities in the region using troop movements, live-fire exercises, and fixed defensive installations along a long sand barrier that's been created, bisecting the territory. So what we have now is a long defensive wall. On the one side you have the POLISARIO and on the other side you have the Moroccans lined up. That wall extends the entire length of the territory.
POLISARIO has said that in response to the Moroccan movements they've also been forced to strengthen their defensive capabilities and their ability to withstand the tactics they believe Morocco was preparing for. Many of these actions of both sides constitute breaches of the terms of the ceasefire, and the POLISARIO is continuing to be concerned about Morocco's intentions.
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Thirdly, the cost of the current military build-up is causing pressure on Morocco internally. Numerous human rights groups have reported that free speech and other basic human rights have been violated by the Moroccan government in order to avoid domestic dissent and opposition to the costs to Morocco of the lengthy war in the Western Sahara.
I should mention that we've now completed phase one of our investigation. We're in the process of arranging a visit to Morocco to hear the other side of this dispute, and we hope to be able to do that as soon as possible. To date we've only been able to speak with the Moroccan ambassador here, but we are taking steps to visit the region on the Moroccan side and to ask those questions of the equivalent representatives.
In any event, the cost of the POLISARIO is forcing precious human and financial resources to be expended in preparing for conflict, instead of providing for the basic needs of the Saharan refugees, who are really at the centre of this conflict.
Finally, the POLISARIO has repeatedly stated that the current ceasefire amounts to a UN-sanctioned, illegal occupation and exploitation of the territory that is in dispute. The POLISARIO has repeatedly stated that the status quo benefits only Morocco and is causing great suffering to the people of the Western Sahara, who are now forced to live in exile in very harsh conditions in arid desert refugee camps.
The POLISARIO has been calling for some signs of progress or some evidence of political will towards reaching a fair and expeditious resolution of the current impasse. Although the POLISARIO has repeatedly stressed publicly and in meetings with me a willingness to preserve the ceasefire and to take any steps necessary to encourage a peaceful resolution, they have expressed the view that they can't allow the present illegal occupation to continue unless they see some signs towards the implementation of a free and fair referendum in accordance with the MINURSO peace plan, which is, of course, the UN peace plan and the plan that has been agreed to between both parties.
CLAIHR believes that several recent events suggest that the time is right for the current involvement of Canada. Several recent events suggest that there are opportunities now to promote a resolution of the current voter registration impasse. First, recently the parties have been engaging in direct talks aimed at resolving the impasse. The talks have been informal. Nonetheless, they are evidence somewhat of a softening of both positions. Morocco has recently softened its approach in certain public statements and has expressed a willingness to implement the MINURSO plan.
Further, we understand that relations between Algeria, which is of course strongly supporting the POLISARIO and the Western Saharan people, and Morocco have also become closer in the past six to eight months. CLAIHR believes that the prospects for direct negotiation are improving and that this movement should be welcomed.
Second, the recent appointment of a new Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, presents an opportunity for the United Nations to now take a stronger role and a more active position in facilitating the implementation of the UN MINURSO plan.
Finally, the former U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker III, was recently appointed as special envoy of the Secretary General to explore a possible resolution of the current voter registration impasse. We believe that is also a positive sign that perhaps the United Nations under the direction of Kofi Annan is considering taking a more active role in implementing its own peace plan.
The third issue we wanted to discuss today is CLAIHR's recommendations for possible Canadian involvement. CLAIHR believes that the present situation is unjust and, further, that it is having a destabilizing effect on the Maghreb region as a whole. The present impasse and the resulting conflict also threaten the credibility of the United Nations and may undermine the United Nations' ability to deal effectively with similar conflicts in the future.
The rights of the Western Saharan people to a free and fair referendum in the exercise of their legal right to self-determination is not in dispute. However, despite the existence of a detailed referendum plan, which has been agreed to between the parties and sanctioned by the United Nations, the exercise of that right to self-determination has been prevented.
CLAIHR believes that greater international scrutiny of the process and engagement by other countries will encourage the parties to hold direct talks in order to resolve the current impasse. This would also ensure transparency of the process, which would help ensure that the parties adhere to their agreed process in accordance with the principles of international law.
CLAIHR recommends that the Sub-Committee on Sustainable Human Development and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade undertake the following actions.
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First, we encourage the formation of a contact group to deal with the Western Sahara impasse. This group of players, key state actors, would encourage the parties to hold direct talks in order to resolve the current impasse on voter registration. Second, it would facilitate and monitor any direct talks. Third, it would remain engaged on the issue and be available as a mediator for any subsequent disputes that might arise. Fourth, it would ensure that the parties adhere to the process that has been set down already in the UN peace plan.
Second, we encourage the formation of parliamentary working groups to work with other government officials in Canada and in other countries in order to resolve the issue. Specifically, we suggest the creation of a parliamentary working group on the Western Sahara in order to foster and monitor progress towards the implementation of a free and fair referendum in accordance with the principles of the plan and in accordance with the principles of international law. Second, the working group would encourage any visits to the region that might be possible, which would allow the people involved to become better informed and would encourage international scrutiny of the process.
Thirdly, we encourage Canada to continue and to increase its support to non-governmental organizations committed to working on this issue. That would of course include CLAIHR, but there are others that are also working in order to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, to ensure that a free and fair referendum takes place, and, equally important in the meantime, to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the 167,000 people living in the desert tent camps are adequately met.
Finally, we encourage monitoring and annual review by the Canadian government of its policy towards the region. That would include an annual review of Canadian policy that would encourage humanitarian assistance to the refugees and ensure that trade and development assistance activities in the Maghreb region support Canada's long-standing position in favour of a free and fair referendum in the Western Sahara.
CLAIHR believes that engagement by the international community is of fundamental importance at the present time, and we believe that Canada is well placed to take an active role in encouraging the involvement of the international community in resolving the current impasse.
We're happy to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Thacker.
Thank you all for the very fine presentations. They were very informative.
[Translation]
Mrs. Debien, would you like to ask a question?
Mrs. Maud Debien (Laval-East, BQ): Yes, please, Mr. English.
Good afternoon. I want to welcome you to our subcommittee. I would like to get some information from you.
We are aware that initially, Canada was part of MINURSO and that when the UN halted the identification process, Canada withdrew. Do you know what prompted Canada to withdraw?
Canada had a minimal number of personnel - I believe it was a contingent of 16, according to the Security Council report - taking part in MINURSO. Can you tell us the exact reasons why Canada decided to withdraw from MINURSO?
I have another question. In the material I read, you state that 74 countries support the self-determination process for the Saharawi people. Are any of the major powers included in those 74? I know that during this whole process, the United States, Germany and another country - I don't remember which - clearly took Morocco's side. Can you tell us how the position of the United States, France, England and Germany, for example, has evolved over the course of this conflict?
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You mentioned a contact group. According to what we've been told, attempts were made to form such a contact group, specifically with South Africa and Norway. Have those attempts led anywhere?
I have another question for you. You say that Mr. James Baker, who has just been appointed by the UN, will be trying to find a solution to the conflict. Do you know the exact nature of his mandate?
And finally, in a cultural connection, to what extent has «moroccanization» of the Sahara occurred? I also have other questions for you, but I'll stop there to give my colleagues a chance to ask some as well.
[English]
Ms Farquharson: The first question was about the reasons for Canada's withdrawal from MINURSO. Our understanding is that Canada had a contingent as part of MINURSO and had actually planned to send over an entire battalion to be part of the MINURSO military force to observe the actual referendum, but ended up withdrawing in June 1994.
The reason we were given was that at the time Somalia was also a big issue and that was where priorities lay. However, in withdrawing, there may have also been concern about the process of MINURSO. There's been quite a bit of criticism about the way MINURSO has been run. At the time Canada withdrew the military force, we did get a response by letter saying that the government was still interested in remaining involved in the issue and seeing it through. So it may be that the government felt that it wasn't the best way to contribute to the process.
The second question, I believe, was about the position of other countries in the dispute now.
[Translation]
Mrs. Maud Debien: Well, particularly the position taken by the major powers.
[English]
Ms Farquharson: I think the United States is perhaps the country that we're most concerned with. It has had an involvement in this issue that goes back and forth. In the past, Ambassador Ruddy was actually on the identification commission when it started in 1994, and he quit the commission because of the problems in the identification process. He felt that MINURSO had relinquished control to Morocco. He made presentations to Congress about it and as a result Congress sent over its own team to see what was happening.
I don't know what their position is now.
Mr. Thacker: We don't know what the position is. We know that Madeleine Albright is very well informed about the situation and that in the past she has been reasonably supportive of the view expressed by the POLISARIO, although she has met on numerous occasions with King Hussein and her view has somewhat moderated. However, she still remains favourable towards the implementation of the MINURSO plan as soon as possible, on the terms that were agreed to.
Her recent appointment may have some implications for U.S. foreign policy on the issue. We do know that she is very well aware of the facts involved about the situation surrounding MINURSO and its operations. We think that is a good thing. We do not know how that will affect U.S. foreign policy in the future.
We do view the appointment of James Baker as an expression of interest, perhaps, on the U.S. side in moving towards a resolution of the conflict. We don't have any hard information on the U.S. position at this point.
The Chairman: The countries you mentioned before, what were the -
[Translation]
Mrs. Maud Debien: France, England, Germany...
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[English]
Ms Farquharson: France remains an ally of Morocco. They haven't taken a particularly active role in moving the process along. The United Kingdom has a parliamentary committee that has been formed in support of the Western Sahara cause. That's what we know about what they are doing there.
Mr. Thacker: They have a committee, but they have not taken active steps to increase their involvement on the issue. They have been relatively hands off on the issue to date.
Ms Farquharson: We have some information on China, another member of the security council. Last June, the Chinese declared their intention to focus on hot spots in Africa, which explicitly included Western Sahara, and China still has military personnel in MINURSO. That's probably the extent of our information on that.
The third question was about the contact group, but can you repeat what you wanted to know about it?
[Translation]
Mrs. Maud Debien: In all the material I've read and in meetings I've had with members of GRILA - the Groupe de recherche et d'initiative pour la libération de l'Afrique - that you have surely heard of, mention was made of the possible formation of a contact group to include, as I recall, South Africa, Norway and England. You also mentioned this last year. That group was to try and find a solution to the conflict in the Western Sahara. Are you aware of any such group or other contact groups having been formed to try and resolve the problem?
[English]
Ms Farquharson: My understanding is that there was an effort to form a contract with those members two years ago, but it never came to pass. I'm not sure what happened, but it didn't end up forming and working. Perhaps because of the points Larry has made, it's time to try that process again. It worked in Namibia.
The concept itself is based on the idea that if you have key players involved, players who are watching what's going on, it lends transparency to the process. It also provides a method for the parties to resolve ongoing disputes. That's the theory.
Your next question was about the mandate of James Baker as special envoy.
[Translation]
Mrs. Maud Debien: Earlier I referred to the «moroccanization» of the Saharawi people. I met some Saharawis through members of GRILA a while back. We were told that Morocco was trying to completely eradicate the culture of the Saharawi people, its traditions and ancestral customs, and that there was a strong movement afoot to «moroccanize» the Saharawi people. How do you view that particular problem?
[English]
Ms Farquharson: I imagine we will have a better sense of that once we've had a chance to do the other half of our fact-finding mission, once we've gone to Western Sahara. Perhaps the next speaker would be able to answer that question more readily than we would be able to.
The Chairman: Are there any comments to be made?
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney (Nepean, Lib.): I was late, unfortunately, and I apologize for that. But, no, I don't have anything.
The Chairman: I have some questions that follow along on the questions that have been asked already.
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You've talked about some of the difficulties involved with the UN's efforts in that respect. I do recognize that there is a new Secretary General, that he has expressed interest, and that there may be a renewed UN involvement here. But are there alternative organizations or groups that might be employed to begin this process of conflict resolution that you're talking about? Aren't there alternative contact groups that need not be from the UN?
Ms Farquharson: Yes, alternatives to... In effect, a contact group can operate in cooperation with the UN, but as a country taking an initiative on its own. In fact, I think that's the way it has to happen.
It would be a matter of figuring out which countries should be involved in order to make this contact group effective. Which countries are needed so that both parties can respect the process? Which ones can the parties live with as the arbiter of any agreement they come to? As a neutral, impartial country without a history of colonizing, Canada is well placed to be part of this group. That has been mentioned in discussions we have had with at least the South African embassy, as well as in some conversations with British representatives.
The Chairman: In your earlier comments, you were talking about contact groups, and you said key players should be involved. When we think of southern Africa or, more recently, the former Yugoslavia, contact groups in the past tended to be from countries that had an interest, that had involvement. In a sense, in both your presentation and in this document, you haven't shown that Canada has had extensive involvement in this area in any direct sense. Is that not a contradiction? You're essentially arguing that Canada is far enough outside that it would have an advantage in a contact group. As you also did before, though, other UN contact groups have stressed the involvement of countries that are more directly involved. I was wondering how you resolve that apparent contradiction.
Ms Farquharson: I think Canada does have connections with this region as part of the Francophonie. It also has strong trade ties with the region. As well, Canada's role in supporting multilateral institutions and its vision of security throughout the world both have a role to play there.
Of course, you need players who are particularly involved in the region, and you also need particularly powerful players as part of any contact group. But you also need players who are seen as neutral and whom both the parties can respect. I think that's the role Canada can play.
The Chairman: In the case of this issue, there hasn't been very much attention paid in the press, nor has there been very much public discussion of it in Canada to this point. What do you think can be done to enhance the profile? Being a member of a contact group is an obvious answer, but perhaps before we could do that, we would have to - what's the word? - raise the consciousness of the Canadian people. How might that be done? Obviously, what you're doing today is part of it, but what else is there?
Mr. Thacker: I think there are really two things that have gone against public awareness of the plight of Western Saharan people. The first is that the POLISARIO has expressly forbidden any terrorist activity - in fact, it's part of the Saharan constitution - or any violent activity that might raise the consciousness of the plight. Other liberation movements have quite often resorted to such a tactic in order to increase public awareness, but here it is constitutionally forbidden, so they have repeatedly stressed that they will never engage in that sort of activity. It is therefore one avenue that they have not been able to use.
The second thing, of course, is that they've adapted remarkably well to life in the camps. Although they're reliant almost exclusively on foreign aid, the efficiency with which they have set up the camps and food distribution networks is quite remarkable - and we will provide a more detailed report on that, of course. Generally, they are coping quite well, so it's hard to gather the same sort of sympathy that you can for certain other conflicts in which the need is more obviously important.
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To increase public awareness, however, I think we will engage in education campaigns and lectures. We would like to see more visits in order to increase public awareness, and the POLISARIO is willing to host anyone who would like to see for themselves the operation of the camps.
When I was there, there were about 250 Spaniards there. They had come on a mission to increase international cooperation and international awareness of the plight, and the POLISARIO is happy to host visitors from foreign countries. There are contact groups of that nature in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain, and they regularly will visit the camps and encourage international cooperation.
In terms of helping out, one other issue that we could look towards is the education of Saharan nationals. Western Sahara currently sends its high school students either abroad or to Algeria for high school and for university education. They are essentially sent to any country that is willing to accept them unconditionally - in other words, countries that will not place conditions on the education they receive. If there were opportunities for Canada to participate in international exchanges of that nature, we believe it would foster international and Canadian awareness of the plight. To the extent that we could participate in those programs, it would help as well.
The Chairman: You mentioned the Francophonie before. Can it play any role in mediation and conciliation in this case? You said that France is an ally of Morocco. Is the position of France a barrier with respect to mediation? What happens at Francophonie meetings at which this has come up? Or has it even come up?
Ms Farquharson: I actually don't know. We haven't thought about it from that angle before, about how it could be worked through the Francophonie. My understanding is that the Francophonie tends to be more of a cultural trade organization. It's not as much of a political organization as, say, the Commonwealth of Nations.
The Chairman: I would just remind you that this committee has worked on Nigeria several times in the past, and there would seem to be a little bit of a parallel there. In that case, of course, Canada has been active as a member of the Commonwealth. I made comments before about the distances, etc., that apply in the case of Nigeria. In the Francophonie, we haven't been active in this way at all; we haven't raised the issue in any way that you are aware of?
Ms Farquharson: No, not that I'm aware of.
The Chairman: I only had one other question. What countries would you envisage as being part of this contact group? What types of people should be the representatives in that contact group?
Ms Farquharson: I don't think I'm going to answer that question right now. I think the first thing is probably to get acceptance of the idea that there should be a transparent process. There should be direct talks between the parties, and those talks should be watched - ``supervised'' is too strong a word - by outside people. Whatever agreement is reached can then be the standard to which the parties are held.
So I think it's an important question, but I just don't have an answer right now.
Mr. Thacker: In order to get over the current impasse, I think the parties need countries that can act as trust facilitators. There is a sense that there may be some resolve now, or at least a softening of the hard positions. But what they do need is someone to sit down with them in direct talks, and someone who is trusted by both sides. That might require the participation of both Morocco and Algeria, given Morocco's interest as a party and given Algeria's practical interest vis-à-vis its location, its long-standing support of the Saharan people, and its history as a country that suffered for a long time under a war for its own independence. However, I do think there's a role for countries like Canada, which has a long-standing and valued reputation as impartial and trusted peace facilitators. To that extent, I think Canada is a prime candidate for involvement in that process.
The Chairman: Are there any further questions?
Mrs. Gaffney.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: One comes to mind. Does Canada have any trade with Western Sahara at all?
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Mr. Thacker: No. Although last fall the Western Saharan people adopted a currency, the peseta Sahrawi, they do not use the currency. At this point it has not been used. They don't have access to hard currency, except to the extent that people living in the camps may have family who recently or in more distant years left the region and settled in other neighbouring countries, such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania. So some of the people have access to some currency.
But there really is no trade in the camps at all. Food and shelter is a basic human right. Everyone in the camps is entitled to an equal amount of food and the shelter they need and the things that go along with it, such as blankets and such. Everyone does work, but there's no requirement that they do work in order to obtain those basic necessities, and there is no money in the camps at this point.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: I apologize for being late. I've missed most of your presentation.
Is there another example somewhere else in the world that is similar to the Western Saharan situation where Canada has been involved? Can you think of something that is very similar?
Mrs. Maud Debien: East Timor and Tibet are similar situations.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: Thank you. That's helpful to me.
Mr. Thacker: So far we've tried to stress that there is a peace plan that has been agreed to between the parties and set down. There is an impasse over one small aspect of it that has forced the parties into a stalemate. But the steps along the way towards the exercising of a right, which is uncontested, are well defined. There is a present impasse, but once that impasse is reached, the process is relatively clear. It then becomes a matter of ensuring transparency, and that's a matter of international supervision. There have been other instances of involvement in that issue.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: Morocco has moved in, and the situation in Indonesia and East Timor is the same as that of Morocco and the Western Sahara. Is that correct?
Mr. Thacker: Yes. After the ICJ released its advisory opinion, Morocco began to move people into the territory, both civilians and military personnel.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: How many years has it been since this took place?
Mr. Thacker: Since 1975.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: It has been quite some time, then.
Mr. Thacker: Yes. They did it based on their interpretation of the ICJ opinion, which suggested that there were some ties, although that's a tenuous interpretation. They moved about 350,000 people into the territory. A year later there was an agreement reached among Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco to divide the territory, giving the bottom one-third to Mauritania and the top two-thirds, which happened to be the richest part in natural resources, to Morocco. In 1979 Mauritania gave up its claim to that territory after struggles with the POLISARIO and relinquished its claim to title. At that time Morocco then moved its border further south in order to regain part of that territory, and they have now erected a sand barrier, which is essentially a defensive wall splitting the territory.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: Is it on the agenda or is anybody speaking to the issue at the UN conference in Geneva that's starting right about now?
Ms Farquharson: Yes. In fact it is today that they are passing the resolution that's passed every year on the Western Sahara calling for a free and fair referendum.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: So every year it has come before the convention.
Ms Farquharson: Yes, and Canada supports that resolution.
Mr. Thacker: The resolution has become pro forma. Unfortunately, it hasn't addressed the real issue, which is how to get past the voter registration impasse towards implementing the process towards a free and fair referendum, which has been supported by each resolution.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: I'm sorry. For someone who had no questions, I'm just going on and on.
Does the Western Sahara have a strong non-governmental organization such as East Timor has, for instance, fighting on their behalf, apart from you?
Mr. Thacker: No, I don't really think they do, not on a political level. They have various groups, such as the Friends of the Saharwi People, in other countries, such as Italy and Spain, where they have strong support; organizations in Italy, France, Germany, and Switzerland; and there are several chapters in England. I don't think there's an organization like ours that is dedicated to independent legal analysis of the problem. The other groups are mainly encouraging humanitarian aid, international cooperation, and international awareness of the problem.
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Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: Interesting.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs. Gaffney.
If there are no further questions, I'd like to thank you very much for, as Mrs. Gaffney said, this very interesting presentation, and I want to congratulate you on your work. We've listened to the advice you've given us today and we'll consider that. I look forward to the work you're going to be doing in the future.
We have a member of the POLISARIO Front, Sayed Mustapha, who will be speaking to us as well and will clarify some other questions, I'm sure.
Thank you, Mr. Fakirani, Ms Farquharson, and Mr. Thacker.
Our next speaker, as I said, is Sayed Mustapha from the POLISARIO Front.
[Translation]
Mr. Sayed Mustapha (Representative, POLISARIO Front): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for this invitation to appear. Through you, I would also like to express my appreciation to the members of the subcommittee, for giving me this opportunity to explain what is going on.
It is important that Canada and its people or peoples not remain indifferent to what the previous witnesses have described as a denial of justice and complete disregard for a right - the right of a people, the people of the Western Sahara, who have for some 25 years now been enduring the difficult conditions the delegation that preceded me has so eloquently described.
I guess you could say the members of CLAIHR, the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights, pretty well stole my thunder by providing you with details that I hope will allow you to gain a fair and real appreciation for the situation that currently prevails in the Western Sahara.
However, I would like to begin by focussing on two or three points and, before that, posing a question. Why is there currently a war in the Western Sahara? Why is that war still going on? Why is it continuing when practically as far back as 1965, the United Nations, with the support of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, just to mention those few, passed a resolution, the first one dealing with the Sahara - after determining it to be a classic decolonization problem, as we have just heard - that focusses on the need to achieve decolonization by holding a fair and equitable referendum that will allow the Saharawi people to freely choose their destiny?
Perhaps it is an irony of history that the United Nations Commission of Inquiry that visited the territory in 1974 and which was chaired at the time by the Ambassador of the Shah of Iran, should have decided, upon arriving in Morocco, to accept the almost ongoing, perennial request on the part of the Moroccan authorities, which was based on three conditions.
The first condition for holding a referendum was that the Spanish authorities withdraw their army, as it was considered to represent a crippling obstacle to holding a referendum; the second condition was the withdrawal of the Spanish settlement; and the third condition was the dismantling of the Spanish administration, which was also considered to be a major issue and one which had to be solved before serious thought could be given to holding a referendum.
So, why is it we are facing this problem today? Before answering that question, I would like to focus on a particular point that, if it can be borne in mind, will help us to gain a clear understanding of certain issues.
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Why did Morocco, which had consistently supported Algeria, Mauritania and others with respect to the UN resolution - I say consistently, because it reasserted that position year after year - suddenly do an about-face? Well, there is only one possible answer.
If the Kingdom of Morocco has managed to survive in its present form for practically 14 centuries, it is thanks to an alliance between the King, who is the supreme leader, and the Moroccan army; between the King and what is called the makhzen, which includes the army, the security forces, the police, and so forth.
Between 1974 and 1975, two attempted coups d'État practically resulted in the dissolution of this alliance and paved the way for the modern Morocco, hence the urgent need for the King to find a way to rid himself of an army that had become a constant and serious threat to the state's finances. But where could it be sent? The Western Sahara, Mr. Chairman, was without a doubt the most logical choice for the monarchy, hence its sudden about-face and this consistent pressure to see the Sahara, not as it had previously been viewed, but as a territory to decolonize, a territory forming an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco - in other words, nothing more than a province to be handed over to Morocco with no conditions attached.
It is certainly true that the particular circumstances that prevailed at the time of Spanish domination strengthened Morocco's hand. Franco was dying. Two trends within the Spanish power structure made it possible for the tripartite Madrid Accords to be signed. A crime that could pretty well be described as unique in the annals of decolonization, three powers got together, in the absence of the party principally involved, and divided up the booty as one would a herd of sheep, with no consideration whatsoever for the needs of that party and especially for the recommendations and resolutions passed by the United Nations, which should normally have been uppermost in their mind and informed their vision.
So, the tripartite Madrid Accords were signed, giving the southern part of the Sahara to Mauritania, and the northern part to Morocco, while of course guaranteeing Spain a certain interest in phosphate mining operations.
Talking about the Madrid Accords reminds me of that just king- -not the one I referred to a moment ago, but another one who, in order to settle a dispute between two mothers, proposed to cut the child in two. Well, the real mother, who had the appropriate reaction, was very different from this mother who would swallow us up and who had no qualms about splitting us in two.
It is also true that since 1975, the war has continued, with its procession of dead and wounded and wasted fortunes - something that is seriously mortgaging the future development of the entire region. Based on that evidence, one can only conclude that the war has consistently proven that the Saharan issue cannot be resolved through military means and that it has injected some common sense into the approach of the main parties involved.
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And, of course, one must take into account the assistance provided by the United Nations, which began to find new strength and international influence in the early 1990s, particularly after the Gulf War, during which the countries of the world mobilized to defend the rights of a small group of people, the Kuwaiti people.
So, the Accord was based on three conditions. They are the basic components, minus a few details, of the Accord proposed by the United Nations in 1974 to end the war and especially to prevent further conflict.
First of all, the problem in the Western Sahara is not a problem of colonization and, as a result, a solution can only be achieved through fair and equitable consultations and freedom for the Saharawi people. Both parties have clearly stated and accepted that only an electorate identified strictly on the basis of the Spanish census has the right to take part in the vote, and thus in the consultations.
After that, the UN was to be the body to organize, monitor and guarantee the results of the reform. That is why right from the outset, and despite military pressure, the POLISARIO Front agreed to the ceasefire. That is also why people began to hope against hope and look to a future without war.
Unfortunately, it is again important to point out that Morocco did not maintain the cooperative position it should have. The Assistant Representative, Mr. Ruddy, clearly said so in a report submitted to both the United Nations and the American Administration.
Thus far, Morocco has not even allowed the UN to fly its flag on the building that houses its force, not to mention the plethora of other problems and irritants that they must endure. No UN member is allowed to travel without the prior authorization of a representative of the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, which has an office on site.
The UN does not have the right, as it should, to inspect troops and barracks whenever it wants to. It cannot do it at all on the Moroccan side.
Even worse, Morocco has reneged on one of the primary components, if not the main one, namely the formation of an electorate. After initially accepting the electorate established in 1974, Moroccan authorities now claim that between two and three million Saharawis have moved into Morocco over the centuries and that they must also be registered. I would remind you that the 1994 census established a population of approximately 74 000.
It is clear that a way out of the impasse must be found since, in the absence of an immediate solution, the current situation could well continue for quite some time, with all the problems that entails for the people's development. You know as well as I do that a region subject to pressures of all kinds - such as the rise of the extremists - could see its stability seriously threatened if a problem such as the one in the Western Sahara is not resolved.
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I believe the United Nations was on the right track when it approved the Accord via a resolution. It should also be pointed out - I forgot to mention this earlier - that the Accord was unanimously approved by Security Council members. The UN cannot now allow a problem of this nature to persist and its authority, indeed its philosophy, to be defied in this way.
Thus it is our fervent hope that Canada can become involved through non-governmental organizations such as CLAIHR that fulfil their missions courageously and often in very arduous conditions, and that I see as noble organizations.
So, by encouraging non-governmental organizations to travel overseas to visit these sites and see what the people are going through, Canada is also helping to raise awareness and especially to provide information which will, I hope, make it possible for the people of Canada and Canadian authorities to maintain a consistently clear position on the issue.
But Canada cannot remain indifferent to the distress of 165 000 refugees living in extremely precarious and inhumane conditions in Southern Algeria. Canada has no choice but to provide humanitarian assistance.
One of the speakers who preceded me referred earlier to the fact that a generation will have grown up in exile, living in these harsh conditions. These people need to learn, and want to learn. Canada, along with other countries, can give them an opportunity to no longer suffer the punishments of a war of which they are the casualties.
Canada could also take full advantage of its authority and its international standing to remain vigilant throughout this process and help it reach a successful conclusion. From that standpoint, I can only sincerely regret that the Canadian contingent of MINURSO was withdrawn, while the representation of other extremely important UN members, such as France, the United States, China, the USSR and others, was maintained.
I would like to close with a message of hope. With the election of the new Secretary General of the United Nations and the appointment of his Special Representative, perhaps we can now look forward to a future of peace and new-found stability, and especially to the triumph of international law on this earth, so that a people will never again be sacrificed based on a logic that is beyond our comprehension.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Mustapha, for your presentation. Madame Debien.
Mrs. Maud Debien: Good afternoon, Mr. Mustapha. I'm very pleased to be able to talk to you in our mother tongue.
You have explained the complete reversal in the attitude of Moroccan authorities following the peace plan, and I must admit I'm rather perplexed by this. You told us that Morocco has been able to survive through its alliance with the army and that following a couple of revolts in the army, the government decided that the way to get rid of those army members would be to send them to the Western Sahara.
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That may be one possible explanation, but I also see a far more important one. I would be interested in your reaction. The Western Sahara has rich phosphate and petroleum deposits, as well as iron ore, phosphate, vanadium and deposits of other very rare precious metals that were never exploited by Spain when it occupied the territory. Could that not be the most important reason for Morocco's current attitude towards self-determination for the Western Sahara?
M. Mustapha: I don't know if that could be one of the reasons, Mrs. Debien. However, having been part of delegations that met with Moroccan authorities on a number of occasions and noted their insistence on the presence of 200 000 fully armed Moroccans, I know that this problem is a real concern.
I should also say that before the war, we took care to make contact with all parties in the region. Just as we contacted the then Algerian officials, we also made a point of getting in touch with Mauritanian and other officials to make them aware of what we intended to do if the peace plan - the UN resolution - were not implemented and if Morocco persisted in its determination to continue the war, because at the time, we had taken these actions against Spain, in defence of the Saharawi people's right to self- determination. We could not change course simply because Morocco had decided to take Spain's place and perpetuate the same logic of occupation and colonization, which is what it is currently doing.
I should also add that before the two coups d'État, Moroccan authorities had a completely different attitude. After the two attempted coups, the security issue became an obsession for the monarchy. But as is always the case, that cannot be its sole motivation. It may well be the main reason, but it certainly is not the only one. There are definitely other reasons behind this about- face, such as the rich deposits... [Inaudible - Editor].
And yet, even today, we continue to make proposals to the Moroccan authorities and we rule out no opportunity for cooperation as far as the Maghreb union is concerned. The Saharawi people are every bit capable of contributing not only their intelligence, but their material or other goods to the process. So, I must say I'm somewhat sceptical that natural resources are the only reason for this reversal. But they're certainly one of the reasons.
[English]
The Chairman: We've heard quite a bit about the Western Sahara today.
The previous presentation, from CLAIHR did not call for any sanctions against Morocco. Would you support sanctions against Morocco?
[Translation]
Mr. Mustapha: I want you to know that our intention has never been to penalize Morocco or the Moroccan people - far from it. Indeed, as one of the witnesses who preceded me so aptly pointed out, we have always based our action on the logic and requirements of international law. We have never departed from that logic, despite the pressure we have come under at times, despite tremendous difficulties, and despite the ever-present temptation one feels when subject to such pressure.
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We have always, whatever the cost and whatever the circumstances, continued to focus on the standards of international law. I believe the international community has clearly understood that message, given that all countries, without exception, have refused to recognize Morocco's authority over the Sahara. The Saharawi Republic is a full-fledged member of the Organization for African Unity. It is recognized by 74 countries around the world with whom we carry on diplomatic relations.
The previous speakers emphasized the importance of the networks and linkages that the Saharawi people have established and nurtured with all Western countries, either through NGOs, parliaments or associations, something that is extremely important and has also allowed us to put up a resistance.
I'm smiling because I think we're at a point in history where the victim may not even be able to imagine his fate without his torturer. Let me explain. I think we're at a point where we realize that Morocco is experiencing serious problems - serious problems of all kinds. The Saharawis, as Morocco's neighbours - through the fault of geography - dearly hope that this Morocco can be preserved. We would not want a neighbour... [Inaudible - Editor]. Nor do we feel vindictive towards the Moroccan people, to whom we wish every possible opportunity for development and stability.
However, what we would like would be for others to help us to try and get across to the Moroccans - to those who hold real power in Morocco - that in their own interest, they should stop ignoring the reality that's clear for all to see, namely that the Saharawi people are not about to disappear. Whatever military means they may employ, they will not make the Saharawi people disappear. If that were possible, they could have done it 25 years ago. And it is not in their interest to push the Saharawi people too far.
Our expectation was that others would join with us to get the message across to the Moroccans that as we enter the 21st century, hate, rancour and war are not the only way, indeed not any way for intelligent men with a conscience to be solving their problems. It is this message of peace and responsibility that we would like to pass on to the Moroccan authorities - nothing else. We had agreed to all kinds of concessions and accommodations in the peace plan which, right from the start, was approved and accepted by the Moroccan authorities. We were extremely flexible. We agreed to make a lot of concessions in order not to sever that fragile connection with the giant who happens to be our neighbour.
But at the same time, if we continue to be ignored and if the Moroccan authorities, contrary to reason and common sense, continue to base their actions on logic that is a throwback to the Middle Ages, then there is nothing we can do about it.
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So, what we're asking you to do, Mr. Chairman, and through you the Canadian authorities, is to help us convey that message of peace and responsibility to the Moroccan authorities. I believe Canada is in a good position to help us get that message across.
Others are not in your position, because at one point or another, they have been part of the genocide of which we are victims. They supported the war in one way or another. But you can't be both judge and judged. That is why Canada has an important role to play in that part of the world, one that it can play fully, to foster peace and stability and development in all the countries of the Maghreb, which will certainly be very grateful for that assistance.
Mrs. Maud Debien: I have one last question that I put earlier to Mrs. Farquharson, who answered by saying you would probably be the best person to ask.
Before I get to my question, though, I would like to say this by way of a brief preamble. You have just spoken of the constant struggle of the Saharawis to ensure their survival as a people. You surely realize that your situation is remarkably similar to that of Quebeckers, who have historically struggled to preserve their language and culture, and that some of our fellow citizens in the rest of Canada are now experiencing first-hand the tragedy of acculturation.
I asked to what extent there had been acculturation of the Saharawi people by Morocco. Is this really a problem? Is it an illusion? Is it nothing more than a myth, or is Morocco really determined to «moroccanize» the Saharawi people?
Mr. Mustapha: You're absolutely right to raise that question, which is fundamental to the current situation. Indeed, it's one of the reasons that prompted the First Special UN Representative to leave the job and hand over his responsibilities to the Special Representative.
Just after the Security Council passed the 1991 resolution, Morocco organized what Mr. Manz, the current Swiss Ambassador to the United Nations, called the Green March - the second Green March. Hundreds of thousands of people were transferred from Morocco to the Western Sahara - and remain there even today - as a means of completely overpowering the Saharawi presence through this human tide of Moroccan nationals.
At the same time, another process was set in motion, which involved taking young Saharawis and establishing them in different towns in Northern Morocco. More than 5 000 young people found themselves completely cut off from their origins and their social and family environment, not to mention the hundred of Saharawis that no one talks about that have vanished since 1975, and about whom we have absolutely no information. We don't know whether they're alive or dead. They have never been brought before a court or sentenced. We know absolutely nothing about the charges against them.
I have to tell you, Madame Debien, that all across Europe collectives have formed that encompass the vast majority of human rights and legal organizations. In France, for instance, there is a collective that represents practically 27 separate organizations. Those organizations have all followed the same process: they have asked to visit Morocco after visiting the Sahara, to see exactly what is going on. But I can tell you that thus far, we have received absolutely no reply from the Moroccan authorities. No non- governmental organization has been allowed to visit the Western Sahara up until now, with the exception of one which was then served with a departure notice.
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All the others are, for all intents and purposes, subject to a ban. I'm sure you recall the events that occurred when Amnesty International sent a delegation to Morocco. It was absolutely unbelievable. If we continue to sound the alarm bells and send out these distress calls, it is because we want to save the many innocent people who may well die without anyone ever knowing what happened to them. Their families have a right to know whether they are alive or dead. You can imagine what it's like for the hundreds of women and families whose main breadwinner vanished back in 1975, and what they are going through.
So, this is one of a variety of problems that really calls for a concerted effort on the part of all those that believe human rights to be an exacting responsibility, and that the preservation of human life throughout the world is important.
[English]
The Chairman: Are there any other questions?
If not, I'd like to thank you, Mr. Mustapha, and the other witnesses for their comments today. It has been very useful. We have learned a great deal about the situation in the Western Sahara, and we will consider your recommendations. Thank you very much.
I declare the meeting adjourned.