[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Monday, June 17, 1996
.1533 
[English]
The Chairman: Order.
I see a quorum.
We are reviewing the estimates of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and we have today as our witness the director, Mr. Ward Elcock.
Welcome, Mr. Elcock. I understand that you have an opening statement.
Mr. Ward Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service): A very brief one,Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Then why don't you proceed with that.
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, your invitation to appear here today to discuss the CSIS entry in this year's main estimates gives me an opportunity to say a few things that I don't often get the chance to say in public.
[Translation]
The global environment we work in at CSIS is more fragmented and stable than it has been since World War II. When Parliament gave us our mandate 12 years ago, it was a tall order. The world then was a frightening place. But in hindsight is was a more orderly place. Today, in an era of diminishing resources, the order is even taller.
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[English]
As you saw recently in our 1995 Public Report and Program Outlook, the service budget will decrease by 20% between 1993-94 and 1997-98. Between 1992 and 1997, our staff complement will have been reduced by 27%.
While I disagreed with some of what was said about CSIS in this year's edition of How Ottawa Spends, I find their comment that the management of CSIS is obviously facing a significant challenge to be at least accurate.
Nevertheless, we believe we've been largely successful in fulfilling our mandate. Indeed, I think the recent record shows we have been successful. More importantly, I believe our success has come while maintaining the standards and living by the rules that are necessary in a democratic society like ours.
To some extent these reductions have been made possible by paring administrative overhead. Technological conversion and innovation have also helped us to adapt. But when people have left the organization other than by attrition, their departure has also, I believe, been handled with humanity and concern for their well-being. We believe we've been given the means to serve the people of Canada effectively and efficiently. I believe we've managed our resources with the greatest of care, given the fiscal climate all of us are experiencing.
[Translation]
At the end of the day, our success is attributable as well to the professionalism and commitment of the people I work with at CSIS. I have said elsewhere that I have never met a group of canadians who are more professional or more committed to doing their job and to upholding the law of Canada. CSIS has matured in a dozen years into the kind of organization that Parliament envisioned in 1984.
[English]
As it stands now, we have shown we can fulfil our mandate, even in this complex and volatile environment, with the resources we have at hand. But let me be clear. This is risk management in its purest form. We assess the risks to the national security, or threats, as the CSIS Act calls them, and we advise the government accordingly. This requires us to maintain a fine balance. As with any kind of risk management, there are no absolute assurances. There is only the probability that as the resources go down, the risks go up.
We know now the service budget will be reduced by another $1.6 million at least in 1998-99. In these circumstances, while the risk will still be manageable, the level of risk does go up. As managers of the service, my colleagues and I continue to assess those risks, to set priorities, and to report our analysis to the government. The government's role will be to decide when the level of risk itself threatens to become unacceptable.
In the meantime, I can certainly assure members of the subcommittee that the government continues to be, in my view, well served by the organization I head, and the investment of Canadians in CSIS in respect of those aspects of national security for which we are responsible is well placed.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Elcock.
Before we go to our first round of questions, I would just throw out on the table the possibility that members of the subcommittee probably wouldn't reject out of hand an invitation to visit the agency at its new headquarters. It might help some of us get a sense of the broad brush strokes of the spending involved here. We might have difficulty trying to figure out what to bring as a house-warming gift, but that would be our problem. I'll leave that without putting it in the form of a question.
I go to Mr. Langlois for the first round of ten minutes.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): I'm going to start with the issue of bilingualism within CSIS, which must be cleared up once and for all. Mr. Elcock, what is your position on the bilingual bonus? Let's start with the RCMP officers who are transferred to CSIS with a guarantee that their bonus would be respected. For some time that was the case, but then it was abolished. Are you now willing, with the operating budget allocated to you, to reinstate the bonus for the transferred officers who used to be entitled to it as well as for the other members of CSIS who have not been transferred?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: The answer to that question is a relatively lengthy one. There is not, as the hon. member characterizes it, a right on the part of any officers of CSIS to receive the bilingual bonus. It is quite clear, in the opinion of the court, that the right of CSIS officers to receive the bilingual bonus ended as of the decision taken in 1985 to change the course of CSIS and not to have the bilingual bonus in the service any longer.
.1540
We have long pursued a course that in my view has ensured that people coming into the service since that time are indeed bilingual. Since that point in time, it has essentially been a requirement. That is our way of dealing with the issue, if you will.
From my point of view, I was prepared to reconsider the issue if it was clear that there could be additional moneys. Given my responsibilities as the director of CSIS, it is clear that without additional funds we could not afford those costs. But there were considerable demands, as I am sure the hon. member is aware, that we reinstitute the official language bonus. Since we have no additional funds and are living within our existing means, we cannot afford to pay those funds without running down substantially the degree of security we can provide to the country, and we have therefore taken the decision that we will not revisit the policy.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: As a separate employer, if Treasury Board allocated the funds, would you be willing to make an administrative decision to pay bilingual bonuses to the people who have been transferred and the people who would be entitled to it if only because of the application of CSIS separate employer status?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: There is no right on the part of the CSIS employees to receive the bilingual bonus, if that is what the hon. member is asking.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I probably did not formulate my question well or perhaps the witness misunderstood it, or maybe a bit of both. I realize that the employees are probably not entitled to ask for the bonus. If you were to receive additional funds, would you be prepared to make it a priority to pay the bilingual bonus, other wise you are authorized to pay, and to reinstate the status which existed prior to January 1985?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: I said, and I've made it clear to the members of CSIS, that we would be prepared to reconsider the policy were additional funds to be available. Since there are no additional funds, the issue is entirely hypothetical. This is not a time when there are vast amounts of additional funds for every purpose.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: If I understand correctly, in response to political pressure that could be brought to bear on the minister and on the government by asking for additional funding for the bilingual bonus, Treasury Board would have to clearly state that these funds are earmarked for the bilingual bonus, if not you would include them in your overall budget and not make the bonus a priority. Have I clearly understood your position?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: Whether or not there are additional funds for CSIS is a decision for the government to make. I'm not in the business of applying political pressure to anybody, and I'm not going to comment on how the hon. member might want to apply political pressure or might feel he could apply political pressure. As far as I'm concerned, at this point the matter is closed.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I'm going to change the subject, Mr. Elcock. In chapter 8 of his report, the Auditor General of Canada dwelled on your service to some extent. He noted among other things that in his view, you failed to comply with section 34 of the Financial Administration Act by prepaying Public Works fees. Has the situation been remedied? Has action been taken against the people who acted without authorization in the eyes of the Auditor General?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: I haven't got the words of the Auditor General in front of me, but that was part of our contract with Public Works. I think if anybody has a bone to pick or if the Auditor General had a bone to pick, it was with Public Works, not with us.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: The Auditor General's Report also states that consultant fees for the construction of the headquarters' building had been estimated at $8.75 millions and hit$15.5 millions in the end.
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Can you explain why they doubled? No explanation was given, not even to the Auditor General himself.
[English]
Mr. Elcock: Again, Mr. Chairman, you would have to talk to Public Works. We're limited to using Public Works and at the end of the day we pay the price that is charged to us.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: You can give the floor to Ms. Meredith; I will come back in the second round if we still have some time left, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you.
Ms Meredith.
Ms Meredith (Surrey - White Rock - South Langley): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like some clarification on responses to a letter in which I asked you, Mr. Elcock, to clarify which individual added a comment - and when - to the transit slip dated November 10, 1989. I asked specifically whether it was the chief or the director general. In your response to the chair you failed to answer those questions, so I would like to ask you again, who wrote the line ``I suggest'' blank ``govt - unknown person'', and when did they write it?
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, we have been through a considerable discussion on this issue at another time. As I have said clearly from the beginning, there has never been an investigation ofMr. Manning, notwithstanding what is frankly a creative attempt to create a conspiracy. This is a somewhat difficult discussion to have because some of the documents are in fact expurgated, and we cannot have the discussion on the basis of a whole file.
I recognize that may give the hon. member some concern given the theory that she has of events. Needless to say, that is unfortunate. It is, however, as far as I can go. I think I have been as forthcoming as I can be in trying to provide an answer to every question the hon. member has addressed on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, I will finish by simply restating the point that there has never been an investigation of Mr. Manning. The investigation at all times was with respect to the contribution or the suspected contribution of moneys to Mr. Manning's campaign by a foreign government.
Secondly, Mr. Chairman, to reiterate a point that somebody else made at another iteration of this discussion, if we had set out to have a conspiracy, I certainly wouldn't have set out to have a conspiracy with the documents we have released.
We have provided all that we can possibly provide in terms of documentation, and we have provided the original documents as they stand, subject to the expurgations that are made under the Access to Information Act. I really can't assist the hon. member any further.
Ms Meredith: Mr. Chair, I'd like to bring Mr. Elcock's attention to the report that was mentioned on the form 4002. That 4002 is supposedly dated October 17, 1989, and a notation was made on there from a report that was sent out on November 1, 1989. That was two weeks after the 4002 was filled out. You explained that the information was known earlier and that the message number that is cited after this information was also known earlier, and that may well be possible, but I'd like to know how you explain the fact that the November 1 date also showed up on that document two weeks prior to November 1.
Mr. Elcock: Again, Mr. Chairman, I really can't assist the hon. member further since we're talking about documents that are expurgated in a number of places. We have sought to explain it as fully as we can. We have provided a full explanation that I gave you in a letter, and I've answered the hon. member's questions that you had passed on to me from the previous discussion.
There is no conspiracy, and frankly, a discussion on the basis of expurgated documents is not going to satisfy the hon. member. Clearly, she finds the answers I've given you unacceptable. I can't help that, but that's as far as I can go. The committee will have to judge whether indeed it finds the answer credible.
Ms Meredith: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask Mr. Elcock if the file opening request - the people's file - which was also filled in October 17, 1989, is not in fact filled out to obtain a file number. Is that not what that form is for?
.1550
Mr. Elcock: I see no point... I cannot assist the hon. member. Again, we are talking about documents that have been expurgated. They are not complete, and this is a discussion that has no end and on which I cannot really assist the hon. member.
Ms Meredith: Mr. Chair, it was obvious that one of the message numbers had a file number in order to be entered on NSR. Do NSR messages not have to have a file number to be entered?
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I see no point in getting into an endless discussion of these issues. At the very best I'm going to be able to give only partial answers, and that's not going to satisfy the hon. member.
The Chairman: All right. At this point, if Ms Meredith has a question that is in order, I'm sure Mr. Elcock will do his best to answer it.
The questioning is getting into some very precise areas that involve recollecting details of documents produced some time ago and recalled in connection with this subcommittee's review of what we call the Heritage Front matter, and I think I would forgive anyone who mightn't have a clear recollection of every single aspect of every single document that came into play.
However, I would simply ask, Mr. Elcock, if you would make an attempt to answer the questions as put generally by Ms Meredith, realizing of course that you've already gone to fairly great lengths to answer these questions specifically in writing over the last while.
In any event, I give the floor back to Ms Meredith to pursue her round.
Ms Meredith: Mr. Chairman, for clarification I would like to bring up that these questions rise from a letter received from Mr. Elcock this past week. So they are not issues that were dealt with in the distant past. They are issues that we have dealt with fairly recently, and I don't buy the argument that he cannot remember. If he refuses to answer, then that is his choice, but my questions,Mr. Chairman, come specifically from a letter received by you last week.
Because the director is refusing to answer my questions on those issues, I see no point in continuing that line of questioning.
I would like to move on to comments that were made in the House of Commons by the Solicitor General with regard to an individual who was questioned. The Solicitor General was questioned by Mr. Gilles Duceppe, the House leader for the Bloc Québécois, on March 28, 1996. His question was if Pierre Roy was not fired precisely because he had information involving CSIS management in the matter of the alleged Russian spy.
The response from the Solicitor General was as follows:
- Mr. Speaker, I was advised that Mr. Roy was not a regular employee of CSIS, but rather a
contract employee, whose contract was not renewed.
Mr. Elcock: I believe Mr. Roy's contract was terminated. The difference between ``terminated'' and ``not renewed'' is not enormous. In particular, I believe it was only a one-year contract at the best of times.
Ms Meredith: So what you are saying is that Mr. Roy was fired. His contract was not just not renewed.
Mr. Elcock: No. His contract was terminated. You don't fire somebody who's on a contract. You can terminate their contract, for a multitude of reasons.
I'm not at liberty to go into why Mr. Roy's contract was terminated. That would be venturing into an area of privacy, which, frankly, I am unable to do. Although others may feel that they're capable of doing so, it is not an area into which I can venture.
Ms Meredith: Who has the authority in CSIS to fire an individual?
Mr. Elcock: To fire an individual?
Ms Meredith: Yes.
Mr. Elcock: I have the authority to fire an individual.
Ms Meredith: Does anybody lower have the authority to fire an individual?
Mr. Elcock: I don't think so. Off the top of my head, I don't think that has been delegated, but I'd have to check in order to be sure.
Ms Meredith: Who has the authority to terminate a contract?
Mr. Elcock: Off the top of my head, I don't know that I can give the hon. member a specific answer to that. I assume that there are a number of people who have, on a contract basis, the ability to terminate a contract. It's not unusual in an organization.
.1555
Ms Meredith: When the decision was made to terminate the contract, Mr. Roy challenged this, and his response from Mr. Jean-Louis Gagnon was that the termination of the contract was done in a fair and equitable manner.
Would you agree?
Mr. Elcock: It is my understanding this was so, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meredith: Can you explain, then, why CSIS argued the PSSRB did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Roy's appeal, and then once the PSSRB ruled they did have jurisdiction CSIS immediately decided to pay out the balance of Mr. Roy's contract?
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I would have to check the file to determine precisely why the decision was taken. But I suspect I would find, as in many cases and in any legal process where one is involved, at some point it becomes more costly to maintain the action than it does to simply pay a relatively small amount of money - I mean a relatively small amount of money because lawyers' fees and the costs of the process are such that it is cost-effective to do it this way. It is not always our preference, but it is a fact of life.
Ms Meredith: Do you believe CSIS employees are to blindly follow their superiors' orders, or do you encourage them to challenge?
Mr. Elcock: We do, Mr. Chairman. But we also expect them to exercise judgment.
Ms Meredith: Well, when somebody was exercising their judgment, let me quote SIRC's words:
- ...people in CSIS, generally those at a lower level, [believe] he was following something that
could very well have been a great danger to Canada from a national security point of view.
Mr. Elcock: I'm not going to comment on whether it is in fact accurate that he was exercising his best judgment. In those circumstances, if there was an investigation of a mole - I assume this is the reference the hon. member is making - this is not a routine screening investigation. It is a very complex and important investigation and would not have been handled at any time by somebody responsible for a routine screening investigation.
The Chairman: Thank you, Ms Meredith.
We have to move on. We will go to the third chapter of the first round.
Ms Cohen.
Ms Cohen (Windsor - St. Clair): There is a reason why I'm taking the lead here. I think it is only fair to warn you, Mr. Elcock, that I've done a lot of research. As a result of this research I feel more qualified than anyone here to talk about spies, because this past weekend I saw both The Rock and Mission Impossible.
I want to know about these Lamberts. Actually, what I want to know about is people who engage in the kind of foreign intelligence activity covered in the newspaper lately. We were particularly intrigued by people building these - I have all the lingo down, too - legends in Canada.
It seems to me that with the kind of resources we now have in Canada we should be able to keep track of who is dead and who is alive, whether birth certificates or death certificates have been issued, and this sort of thing. I appreciate going back in time to do this is difficult. Is there any role for CSIS in making recommendations on how these records are kept, or is it worth it? Are there that many of these people coming into our country?
Mr. Elcock: As far as I know, Mr. Chairman, there is no province that maintains a link between births and deaths, which means someone seeking to build a legend has a certain amount of latitude.
As to whether or not our voice would be effective in persuading anybody to change the process, I'm not sure. I suspect it would probably have to be a somewhat heavier weight than that. Would it be a good idea? Yes. But at this point, I don't know what the costs would be. The cost may be an inhibiting factor.
Ms Cohen: Are there enough occurrences of this to warrant keeping track? I suppose there would be other reasons for keeping track of births and deaths as a joint record, but is there enough concern by CSIS about this kind of activity to warrant it?
Mr. Elcock: It would certainly be helpful to us, Mr. Chairman. Anything making the job easier is attractive, and this would certainly make it a lot easier.
.1600
As to whether there are vast numbers, I really wouldn't want to comment. I'm not sure at the end of the day I would necessarily have an accurate number anyway.
Ms Cohen: Regarding this particular couple, how long were they in Canada?
Mr. Elcock: I'm afraid for security reasons I would rather not comment on how long they were in Canada -
Ms Cohen: We wouldn't tell a soul.
Mr. Elcock: - or at least our knowledge of it.
Ms Cohen: I should have known this from the movies.
I will just ask another question. In determining their activities, was there an element of luck involved? I feel like I'm on What's My Line? here, but is there an element of luck involved in this, or do you have ways?
Mr. Elcock: We have some ways, but there is always an element of luck in this kind of case.
Ms Cohen: In this particular case, once CSIS had determined that there was reason to be concerned, what steps did CSIS take, in general?
Mr. Elcock: It is not a case, Mr. Chairman, of being able to take immediate steps and knowing right away. The process of knowing can sometimes take a very long time. It doesn't matter who is using illegals as part of tradecraft. Illegals are very sophisticated, very well trained, and in general officers of a foreign intelligence service. An operation against them is one you would have to conduct with great care. Otherwise, you lose the whole basis of your investigation. You lose any information you might get out of it. You lose any opportunities you might have to turn an illegal, or whatever.
So it is a long and slow process to find out what people actually are and what they are here for, etc. It doesn't happen overnight by any means.
Ms Cohen: No. So it might be worth while for CSIS or for Canada to allow them to carry on while you observe what they're doing.
Mr. Elcock: Yes. Because it takes a long time, you're interested in getting as much information as you can about how they operate.
Ms Cohen: Do we know what has happened to them back in Russia?
Mr. Elcock: I suspect they probably don't have jobs for life. But apart from this, I have no reason to believe they're in any danger.
Ms Cohen: Who paid their legal fees?
Mr. Elcock: Not us, Mr. Chairman.
Ms Cohen: Those are all my questions.
The Chairman: Thank you.
That was a ten-minute round that took about five minutes.
Is there any objection to the suggestion that the balance of the round be used by Mr. Discepola? Okay. We will go to Mr. Discepola for five minutes.
Mr. Langlois has acquiesced and he's happy to -
An hon. member: He hasn't acquiesced.
The Chairman: He has not.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Ms. Cohen saw Mission Impossible; it reminds me more of Fiddler on the Roof. We have not had much cooperation from CSIS, and you are aware of that, Mr. Elcock. Although I have no intention to pick up on the discussion, I would like to point out for the record that in the matter we studied regarding the files Ms. Meredith mentioned, I arrived at more or less the same conclusions that she did. Moreover, these events will be made public in the next few days.
Earlier, you quickly passed the buck to Public Works. I'm going to remind you of the Auditor General's comments in paragraph 8.53. He is quite clear when he states:
- 8.53 We also noted that in the years 1989-92, prepayment of Public Works fees at year end was
made to manage cash better and to avoid lapsing of appropriations.
- It takes two to play that game. You are the debtor who pays without being forced to pay. It is rare
to see that in Canada these days: people who pay and who are not required to pay, and especially
people who make prepayments without having to do so. I'd like you to give us an explanation.
Why did you make these payments? What steps have you taken to remedy this shortcoming in public administration which seems rather fundamental to me?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: As to the reference in the Auditor General's report to moneys prepaid during the construction of the building, those moneys were paid in accordance with the terms of the contract between us and Public Works.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Let's look at paragraph 8.41. Thanks to cooperation, it won't be long. The paragraph states:
- 8.41 The analysis also determined that the reception/dining room, located next to the corporate
boardroom, could be eliminated. Despite this recommendation, the reception/dining room
space was constructed. Although we did not see a justification of the need for this space as part
of the analysis,...
- That is the Auditor General's conclusion, then he goes on to state:
- ...CSIS has stated that it needed the reception/dining room for entertaining visitors privately.
- What was this need? Could you give us some clarification?
Mr. Elcock: At one point some consideration was given to whether in the early days of the project it was necessary to have a room that could be used as a dining room. It was subsequently decided that it was desirable, and on that basis the building went ahead.
It is effectively a boardroom, but it is fitted out so it can indeed serve as a dining room if necessary. We use that room occasionally to entertain visiting dignitaries. There are some people to whom it is sometimes harder to serve a meal in a restaurant or even a club; security is desirable, and this allows us to do so.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: The original construction plans for your building, as approved by Treasury Board, were not followed. According to the Auditor General, you ended up with an additional 13,000 square metres, without exceeding the estimated costs. Occurrences like that are rare in 1996, or in the 1990s. Were the estimates artificially inflated? Were the people who prepared these estimates incompetent? How can you end up with 13,000 square feet more than what was included in the plans? Who authorized this overrun or the change in the contract's specifications?
[English]
Mr. Elcock: The space initially envisaged was at a very early stage in the process. By the time the contracts were finally done and the design of the building was done, the building had more space, and does have more space, as the Auditor General notes. As you also noted, however, the contract came in at just under budget. It would have been very hard to inflate the cost, and nobody would have had any particular interest in inflating the cost to achieve any benefit.
The Chairman: Thank you.
Mr. Discepola.
Mr. Discepola (Vaudreuil): Thank you.
One of the questions I have, Mr. Elcock - and it was raised - is on economic espionage. I'm wondering whether our country is well prepared in view of the high technology that's evolving, and whether our businesses are well prepared.
What do you view your role as in informing some of these high-tech companies on whether they could be targets, for example? Are we equipped, as a country, to inform businesses transacting overseas or other countries? Is there a security risk? Are they vulnerable, simply left on their own?
Mr. Elcock: It's quite clear, in the world as it stands today, that a number of countries - and I think we've said so in our public annual report - seek to collect that kind of technological information, from which they may seek to have an advantage.
As to our job in respect of that kind of intelligence gathering, clearly, in terms of any attempt by a foreign country, either directly or indirectly, to collect that kind of intelligence, it's an important function for us. It comes easily within the mandate in the CSIS Act.
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We're not in the business of dealing with industrial espionage, however. At the end of the day if one soap company wants to steal another soap company's soap powder, that's not our concern. It's only in those cases where a foreign country is directly or indirectly involved that we would have an interest.
We would of course investigate and we do look for any instances of that kind of activity. We don't provide a corporate service to companies out there. Under the act we are specifically required to provide advice only to the Government of Canada, so we're not in a position to provide specific warnings to specific companies. What we can do, however, is provide them with very generic kinds of briefings as to what the risks are out there, not who is a specific threat, and that's what we've done.
Over the last while we've had something in the order of 1,600 meetings of that kind to provide that background briefing, which I think a lot of companies have found useful. We've also found it useful because they often are able to provide us with information of use to us.
Mr. Discepola: On the question of the excess space that Mr. Langlois pointed out, are you doing anything to maybe sublet that space out to other agencies, for example? Is that conceivable in view of your mandate for national security?
Mr. Elcock: As it turns out, Mr. Chairman, we don't have very much in the way of excess space, although the service has been downsized considerably. We decided to bring the Ottawa region office into headquarters, which took up a large chunk of any space that would have been excess. We have some unfitted-out space that would cost a considerable amount of money to fit out. We have some additional offices that virtually amount to swing space in a large organization. If a relatively small organization were looking for space in the same kind of business that we're in, of course we would be willing to give them house room. But so far nobody has volunteered.
The Chairman: Thank you.
Mr. Hanger, you have five minutes.
Mr. Hanger (Calgary Northeast): Mr. Elcock, I'm curious. In 1994 Minister Gray tabled a report in Parliament and later commented to the press about concerns he had. That obviously had come from the director of CSIS at that time. The report indicated that at that time there were2,366 people employed, and that was a drop from 2,700. The budget had dropped from $229 million to $207 million in that same year.
At that time the minister stated that the CSIS report was sobering and instructive. He went on to reply that the federal government wanted to ensure that recent immigrants to Canada were not victimized or manipulated by homeland governments or extremist groups. He stated further that although the Cold War is over, the global situation does not warrant complacency. As the number of flashpoints grows around the world, so does the potential number of threats.
In your report today you talk about this business of balancing, of risk management, of the probability that as the resources go down the risks go up. I assume by what you're saying there that CSIS, along with so many other departments, is the target of cuts. When you say that the resources go down, that threat to the security of Canada goes up. First of all, is that what you meant by the statement?
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, as I think I said in the statement and I've certainly said elsewhere, at this point in time we believe the risks are manageable.
I think somebody asked the commissioner of the RCMP at one point how many people it would take to ensure that our borders were properly protected or fully protected. He tried to do a multiplication of how many officers you'd have to have if you had one RCMP officer every ten yards. That's an expensive proposition. Absolute security is impossible to achieve. At the end of the day it's always risk management.
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We believe the risks out there now are manageable; we can manage the present targets and we can manage the present problems with the people we have, with the computerized systems we've put in place and with other mechanisms that have allowed us to drop from a high of about 2,700 people and a much bigger budget. That isn't to say you wouldn't like to have more money and more money wouldn't allow you to do different things, but the risk is not unmanageable.
Mr. Hanger: How much of the budget is designated for counter-terrorist activity?
Mr. Elcock: At this juncture, about two-thirds of our operational expenditure would go to counter-terrorist activities.
Mr. Hanger: Every so often - I guess once a year, as it turns out - the immigration minister tables a report in reference to minister's permits. This year it was tabled that somewhere in the neighbourhood of 5,500 people designated inadmissible were admitted into Canada through minister's permits; 394 of those were indicted on criminal offences that would bring a maximum sentence of ten years or more, rape and murder, and ten permits were given to people suspected of terrorism. How does CSIS play its role in such evaluations? Obviously for a person to be designated as a terrorist CSIS would have to have had input into a particular application.
Mr. Elcock: Our role is to do analyses, to collect information, and then to provide advice to the government. At the end of the day, in any particular case there may be many reasons for the government to take a decision to go ahead and issue a permit. Obviously I can't comment on specific cases, but our role in the process is simply to provide the advice. Government will take the decision. I can't comment on what we would have said in any particular case.
Mr. Hanger: Does CSIS collect information not only on terrorists who come into the country but also on organized criminals?
Mr. Elcock: To the extent that organized crime or, as we have tended to describe it, transnational criminal activity, fits within the mandate of CSIS - and in some cases it will - we certainly would see that as being within our mandate.
Mr. Hanger: If CSIS had information on those who were in the country and who were active in whatever capacity, would it appropriately pass it on to the specific agency or department involved?
Mr. Elcock: We would provide it to the appropriate government department, or indeed, if we had information of criminal wrongdoing, we would provide it to the police jurisdiction.
Mr. Hanger: So the activity of that particular department, whether it would be for removal or arrest, would be strictly up to the department, no matter how long those individuals were in the country.
Mr. Elcock: If what you're saying is it's not our decision to make, yes. I wouldn't want to comment on... They'll take their decisions in accordance with their process and appropriate procedures. Our job is simply to provide the advice.
The Chairman: Mr. Rideout.
Mr. Rideout (Moncton): From a slightly different angle, does CSIS have an information-sharing arrangement with CSE?
Mr. Elcock: Yes, there is a memorandum of understanding between CSIS and CSE.
Mr. Rideout: Can you tell us in what types of circumstances or when information is shared?
Mr. Elcock: There is a continuing flow of information between us and CSE. Beyond that, I'm really not prepared to get into the specific types of information that flow back and forth between us.
Mr. Rideout: Is any of this information that's gathered by either CSIS or CSE provided to other government institutions or institutions outside Canada?
Mr. Elcock: About information collected by CSIS, yes. The ultimate point of our collecting information is not simply to file it, it's to use it as part of an investigation or indeed to provide it to government.
Mr. Rideout: Does CSIS at times receive from CSE information provided by other intelligence agencies in other countries?
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Mr. Elcock: Yes, Mr. Chairman. That would depend upon the nature of arrangements with other countries, but CSE would receive that kind of information.
Mr. Rideout: Does the information sharing between CSIS and CSE go both ways?
Mr. Elcock: Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Your chairman would like to address a question slightly related to an itemMr. Rideout raised. It has to do with foreign intelligence, which CSIS will gather from time to time at the request of a couple of the specified ministers in the statute.
In the SIRC annual report of 1994-95 in a subheading under ``Foreign Intelligence'', page 41 for reference, the second paragraph, there are two sentences I'll ask you about. SIRC says:
- We noted a number of cases where CSIS had received information concerning possible danger
to Canadians. In these cases, officers considered the seriousness of the threat to the individual,
and if necessary, took steps to have the individuals warned.
Mr. Elcock: We would usually, Mr. Chairman, provide that information to the appropriate authority, depending on who the appropriate authority was in any particular case. It would either be a department or a police agency or somebody else who would have the jurisdiction and could either use that information as part of their ability to provide advice to someone outside government or take action on the basis of that advice.
The Chairman: In connection with a police department there would presumably be some element of criminality involved in the espionage going on. Otherwise, why would they care? Is that fair to assume?
Mr. Elcock: I think you may be reading the reference too narrowly. I don't think there was a specific description of information. It could well have been a specific threat to some individual, as I think we discussed before with one of the hon. members of the committee.
The Chairman: They do talk about threats to individuals, but they talk about names of individuals, companies and products frequently having to do with weapons proliferation. It was that area they were dealing with.
If it wasn't a police force, if it wasn't criminality, would you then notify a government department?
Mr. Elcock: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Then that government department would presumably be in a position to convey a warning to the manufacturer. Is that what you imply?
Mr. Elcock: Or to someone. They would have to look for a means to provide that information if it was advisable to provide it. There may be cases where it isn't.
The Chairman: So we have the ability, then, for CSIS to convey a warning, but not directly. It is done by a third party, a police force or a government department.
Mr. Elcock: Yes. As we discussed previously, in the cases of a specific threat to an individual our advice is not provided to the specific individual. It's provided to some other authority with the ability to actually act - in the case of the police forces, to protect somebody; in the case of another government department, to provide advice on the specific issue to a company if that's warranted.
The Chairman: Can I ask you to focus on a hypothetical matter involving weapons technology? CSIS, in relation to its work, becomes specifically aware of an attempt to obtain otherwise unavailable weapons technology from a Canadian manufacturer. The weapons are either to be acquired by the Canadian government or are being manufactured using technology, and the Canadian government is a party to the technology transfer. How would CSIS go about warning the Canadian manufacturer of the specific attempt to steal the weapons technology involved there?
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Mr. Elcock: If you had a case like that, it would be relatively easy, since, as I understand from your hypothetical case, the government is a party to the arrangement. If that is so, then it would be simply a matter of ensuring that the information went to the appropriate people responsible for that arrangement. They could talk to the company.
The Chairman: Does there exist a ministerial directive or a protocol governing the means by which CSIS would be sending out those warnings?
Mr. Elcock: The act is, if you will, the protocol in those circumstances, because the act simply requires us to provide the advice to government. We can't provide the advice directly to somebody outside government.
The Chairman: Ms Meredith.
Ms Meredith: I am curious about where in your budget you find the dollars to look after sources. Do you have an allocation to...?
Mr. Elcock: It's part of our budget.
Ms Meredith: Just the operational budget?
Mr. Elcock: Our budget is broken into essentially three classifications in terms of the public information, but it comes out of our budget.
Ms Meredith: How do you determine to what degree you will protect a source?
Mr. Elcock: I think the act lays upon us a serious obligation to protect a source, and we work very hard at it.
Ms Meredith: Is it consistent for each source? Do you treat them in the same way, or do you have a priority as to your sources?
Mr. Elcock: Each situation is different and each source will need a different set of assistances, if you will.
Ms Meredith: Does any disciplinary action take place if a source is revealed through the actions of staff, actions of IOs?
Mr. Elcock: I wouldn't comment, Mr. Chairman. The act requires us not to identify sources.
Ms Meredith: I didn't realize I was asking for identification. I'm asking if any disciplinary action is taken if somebody reveals the identity of a source or takes actions that allow the identification of a source to occur?
Mr. Elcock: It depends on the circumstances. I can't answer a hypothetical question.
Ms Meredith: Mr. Chair, I guess what I'm asking - and I'm not really getting an answer - is if the actions of an individual who is employed by CSIS are responsible for the identification of a source, is any disciplinary action taken?
Mr. Elcock: That's not a question to which you can give a yes or no answer. It depends upon the circumstances.
Ms Meredith: So I take it that no disciplinary action is taken when a source is revealed through the actions of an employee of CSIS.
Mr. Elcock: I don't think I said that, Mr. Chairman. I said that it would depend on the circumstances.
Ms Meredith: I guess the reason I'm concerned, Mr. Chair, is that we have indications that there are sources who are treated in a very good manner, whether they are assisted financially...but a source in Toronto was laid off her job because of being exposed by the actions of employees within the department. I'm just curious to know whether there is any procedure when an individual or individuals are responsible for somebody losing their job as a result of their cooperation with your agency - if there is any way in which people are reprimanded, disciplined, or whether it's okay for some people to reveal the source, but not others.
Mr. Elcock: I am not aware of any case. I am not aware at all of the specific case the hon. member is raising.
Certainly if a source was aggrieved - and it has happened - it is possible for a source to go to SIRC with a complaint.
Ms Meredith: So the ramification for an individual who has a complaint against CSIS would be to go to SIRC?
Mr. Elcock: For the individual who has a complaint against CSIS, yes.
Ms Meredith: There's no other recourse for them?
Mr. Elcock: I suppose it is always open, as a first step, for them to try to secure settlement, but there may be any number of reasons, and I don't know anything about the cases that the hon. member purports to have knowledge of. They may or may not be legitimate cases.
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Ms Meredith: So for an individual who has a complaint against CSIS the one place they could take it would be to SIRC. Does SIRC have access to all the information required to bring resolution to the case?
Mr. Elcock: Of course.
The Chairman: Mr. Rideout.
Mr. Rideout: I thought I might ask some questions about the estimates, because we seem to be there. I didn't see either movie, so I don't feel qualified to venture into those areas.
You're talking about budget cuts, and I wondered whether you're going to be consolidating or eliminating certain of your programs and operations. If so, roughly what areas are you impacting?
Mr. Elcock: Over the years we have - and I guess I'm not going to answer your question entirely -
Mr. Rideout: Why are we surprised?
Mr. Elcock: - consolidated a number of areas. We have, for example, reduced the number of foreign postings we have. We have reduced the size of our offices across the country, in some cases to the point where they're basically very tiny, but where we felt it was essential to maintain at least a presence to be able to maintain the liaison with provincial officials in various parts of the country. Those are examples of the kinds of things we've consolidated.
We've also computerized very heavily in attempts to save funds, in essence. We don't have many filing clerks any more, simply because we don't have any documents to file, or we have very few documents to file. It's largely a computerized operation. We've built systems to try to make information flow as quickly as possible and allow decisions on various issues to be taken as quickly as possible. Through those kinds of mechanisms we've been able to save a fair amount of money. There are other places in direct operations where we have either consolidated or shrunk, but I'd rather not comment on some of those.
Mr. Rideout: Are your cuts - obviously they are - totally mandated by program review, and did government give you a target you had to achieve?
Mr. Elcock: The government has certainly set, if you will, an amount it expected departments to reduce by. I think government finds it difficult to deal with us, because just as there are many people outside government who don't know very much about us, there are lots of people in government as well who don't know very much about us, and that's extremely difficult.
We have tried to take as much of the cuts as we've been asked to do and to be as forthcoming with reductions as we can. However, as I tried to say in my opening statement, we have also tried to make the point that the risk does go up as you reduce and that we believe we have come pretty close to the point, if we are not at the point, and perhaps, depending on how you define it, slightly below the point...we believe at this point we're at the point at which we can effectively and efficiently ensure security, to the extent that's humanly possible.
Mr. Rideout: Have you offered your employees any kind of early retirement incentive similar to what's offered to others?
Mr. Elcock: We were a most-affected department for the EDI/ERI initiative. For unionized employees we offered in particular the EDI, or early departure incentive. Most of the people who've taken that up have obviously been unionized employees rather than members on the operational side, intelligence officers.
Mr. Rideout: Finally, those who are taking early retirement: were many of those formerly in the RCMP security service?
Mr. Elcock: No.
The Chairman: Mr. Hanger.
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Mr. Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that you have four particular points in which there will be an examination or a review. One deals with foreign agencies, another deals with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the advice offered by the service to them, and another assesses the domestic exchanges of information, which I gather is the working of CSIS within the country dealing with organized crime. Is that it possibly, or -
Mr. Elcock: I'm not quite sure what the hon. member is referring to.
Mr. Hanger: This is in the Security Intelligence Review Committee 1996-97 estimates, the proposals for 1996-97 that the committee will be pursuing in these areas. I gather that's SIRC.
Mr. Elcock: That's SIRC. That's their agenda for the next year.
Mr. Hanger: They are SIRC's. So they're going to be evaluating the activities of CSIS in the area of domestic operations.
Mr. Elcock: Some of those, Mr. Chairman, would be rather broad expressions of what they intend to do. They tend, on a regular basis, to look at how we're operating in any particular area, province, or whatever. It is something they do on a regular basis, but they would look at a different part of Canada, for example, each year.
Mr. Hanger: I assume that from time to time it would be almost essential to look at Canadian citizens and at some of their actions, too, would it not, if they were associated with anything, whether it be a terrorist group or outside influences?
Mr. Elcock: If we had an investigation going on in a specific area, SIRC would look at it and might well decide in any particular year that was something they specifically wanted to review.
Mr. Hanger: In the past, would the Mohawks have been on that list?
Mr. Elcock: I can't comment, Mr. Chairman, and I don't want to be difficult -
Ms Cohen: Was there a movie about that?
Mr. Elcock: I can't comment on who we would target specifically or which individuals we would target specifically. If they met the provisions of the CSIS Act in terms of a threat to the security of Canada and if we believed that investigation was warranted, we would target whomever was involved.
Mr. Hanger: I had an opportunity overseas to visit with immigration staff, with the RCMP who run security checks on any applicants. One of the complaints I've heard is that they sometimes don't have the cooperation, if you will, with that exchange of information. The information may go, but for some unknown reason it's never dealt with, especially when it comes to those with questionable backgrounds, whether they're organized criminals or terrorists.
It appears that it's not just held up there, if you will, but maybe... Would that information not fall into the hands of CSIS next, after the RCMP and those looking after security on that end as far as individuals coming into the country put their sources together and report?
Mr. Elcock: I'm not quite sure where the hon. member thinks the problem is. There may well be problems from time to time in specific posts. I'm certainly not aware of any specific ones at this time. We do work very closely with the RCMP and with immigration in terms of making sure there is an information flow that ultimately allows immigration to make the decision, or in some cases, if it's a police enforcement issue, that ultimately allows the police to make a decision.
Mr. Hanger: I'll be a little more specific. An application can come into one post. The information can be compiled and sent to the appropriate sources, and the applicant can go to another region of the world and make application and it will not be... There's no widespread dissemination of the original sources of information. It just seems like it falls into the hands of one particular person or gets to one particular point and is not spread from there.
Mr. Elcock: It would be unfair of me to comment, Mr. Chairman. I really don't know enough about the immigration department system, and I assume that's what you're referring to.
Mr. Hanger: I'm referring to immigration and security checks.
Mr. Elcock: If the information came to our attention it would certainly be accessible in our database to any of our officers, so I would be surprised if that was a problem we had.
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Frankly I'm not even aware that Immigration has a problem, so it would be unfair of me to comment. There is a vast amount of information and there are a lot of applicants. It's not impossible that on occasion they do slip by, but certainly I know we all make a considerable effort to ensure that we are coordinated and that we're passing the information on.
The Chairman: Ms Cohen.
Ms Cohen: Following up on what Mr. Hanger was saying, I put questions like this to SIRC. Often we in our constituency offices here do work on behalf of refugees who are applying for landed immigrant status or immigrants who are coming to the country. We frequently run into that while there's a CSIS check going on, and it seems to take forever. This is not a criticism at all; I'm just wondering if this is a result of your downsizing and if there's something we can do to assist in speeding it up.
Another question is whether there isn't someone else who could be doing it so that CSIS could be busying itself with other things. Is it so important that CSIS do a check on all of these people, or could someone else be doing it?
Mr. Elcock: Our involvement is in the area of security screening. We're not looking for information on criminal issues, although if we do find it, we'll pass it on. The checks we're making are within our area of business, and in fact we probably have better contacts to do that than anybody else would have, to the extent that it's required.
To give you an idea of the numbers, in 1994-95 we checked about 52,000 applications, and 43,994 of them were done within 90 days. About 7,000, which is about 14%, took about a year, and 569 took over a year. In 1995-96, 51% of the applications were completed within 62 days, 49% of the applications were completed within 110 days and 0.7% of the applications took over one year to complete.
Sometimes the reasons they take a long time are not because there's anything intrinsically serious or important about the application. It may simply be that in point of fact it takes a long time to get the request to the appropriate place in that specific country to find out some information that allows you to come back with a recommendation one way or the other.
Ms Cohen: Are there any particular countries that are more of a problem, where you do experience more delays? Is there a pattern?
Mr. Elcock: The pattern has as much to do with the size of the country, the sophistication of its bureaucracy and whether or not indeed in some cases the communications exist that allow you to make those checks in anything other than very slow time.
Ms Cohen: When there is a delay in processing someone, is there someone we can call, not to find out what's going on, but to be satisfied that someone knows there's a delay on this file?
Let's face it: sometimes files can fall between the cracks. I'm not suggesting that any have, and certainly in my experience that's not been the case, but when you see a long delay and you're an MP sitting in Windsor and you have this family in your office, you want to be able to take a step at least to reassure them or to reassure yourself that the system is working and that ultimately a yes or no answer will be coming up.
They may have concerns. They may have all had their medicals and not be able to afford to go back and do them again, and the deadline may be coming. Is there someone we can contact in CSIS? Other departments have a specific person for us to contact. Do you want to name him? Give us a source.
Mr. Elcock: In some cases we're not even the source of the delay; we're just part of the process. At the end of the day we don't make the decision. We just collect the information and provide a recommendation, and that's taken somewhere else by somebody else in a different time period.
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To the extent that there is in fact still a security issue to be dealt with and we're dealing with it, I get lots of letters - sometimes telephone calls, but more often letters - asking if we would look into this file. We don't provide an answer, but we do at least check.
The Chairman: Mr. Elcock, I have a couple of questions. On May 30 the Deputy Minister of Justice appeared before the main committee, and there was a discussion about an interdepartmental working group looking at the possible use of data collected by CSIS in connection with criminal prosecutions. They're looking at the field. Can you tell me if CSIS is participating in the working group on that study?
Mr. Elcock: Yes, Mr. Chairman. If we weren't, I would be somewhat worried.
The Chairman: So would we. Are you able to frame for us the objective of the working group study, or have I already framed it?
Mr. Elcock: I really couldn't offer a comment. The Deputy Minister of Justice has gone as far as he has. At the end of the day any recommendation the group would make would be for ministers in terms of any possible action. I wouldn't want to prejudge where ministers might want to come out on those issues or the views they might have.
The Chairman: That's a fair comment.
This may or may not be connected with the need to overhaul the Official Secrets Act.
Mr. Elcock: It could be.
The Chairman: Do you take the view as director of CSIS that this statute requires a reasonably urgent updating?
Mr. Elcock: A large number of people have indicated that it's perhaps not the best statute in the modern world. It probably merits some looking at, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: We've talked about the current initiative of doing some downsizing and having a more efficient budget. As your personnel resources diminish to whatever target level you're aiming at, as you look into the future there is always the possibility of an uptake in the need for resources in investigative activity. Does the service have a contingency plan to bolster its investigative resources in the event that something happens requiring a material uptake in those resources?
Mr. Elcock: Do you mean, Mr. Chairman, if there was a sudden emergency, where would we find the people?
The Chairman: That's right. The work involved needs a bit of training.
Mr. Elcock: Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, it needs a long period of training. I would have to say that one would not be able to respond instantaneously by bringing in a whole lot of new people to do the job. One would have to cope by reassigning and rejigging priorities until one could bring people on-stream, assuming that one was able to get the necessary authority to expend additional sums of money. We think we'll be able to manage, but one never plans for two or three crises at once so one never knows for sure.
The Chairman: Connected to that is a very short question. Is the agency doing any hiring now, given that there's a lead time in bringing people on-stream?
Mr. Elcock: Yes, we have continued to hire all through the last x number of years of restraint. We have to do that. As people leave us we have to bring new people in, particularly on the operational side but also in any other jobs in the service. We need to bring in people who understand operations and can do operations. That means bringing a continuous flow of people into the organization. We hire somewhere between twenty and forty people a year on the strict operational side.
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The Chairman: So there is still room for a career for some young people out there who think this is their career.
Mr. Elcock: Very much so. We hire very bright young people, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Mr. Hanger.
Mr. Hanger: I'm curious how CSIS would place its resources in this particular area where organized criminals are much more active. I'll speak specifically of the triads, given they're so widespread throughout the world and the cause of so much concern even amongst the police departments, not to discuss how they victimize their own groups, their own people. With the resources it takes to put any investigation through such a mobile group of people, is it CSIS's effort too to commit more resources in this area?
Mr. Elcock: There are growing concerns in the area of transnational criminal activity in comparison with what people might have been concerned about several years ago. It's an area that will require some more resources, but how big and serious a problem it will be for us... At the end of the day we're not a law enforcement agency, we're an intelligence agency. There are a number of ways in which we can operate and provide advice to government and also provide information to the police from time to time.
So it may be we will be able to cope with that without straining our other resources. Managing our resources and allocating those resources is something we have to do on a continuous basis. It depends very much on the nature of the issues that confront us at any particular time. We have, certainly in our intelligence officers, what we think of as a very flexible workforce, a very flexible group of people, who can indeed move to different problems over time.
Mr. Hanger: When you look at some of the people who have come into this country and are now accepted even as citizens, one has to ask the question, where does all the information go, not only in the area of the triads but also in that of the Russian mafia, who are as about as active on the east coast as the triads are across Canada and specifically on the west coast.
I guess it all boils down to this. I know a situation occurred here back in 1993, when this Abdirahman, a Somalian defence minister, was allowed to come into Canada and had clearance of some kind. No one really knows how he came through. Yet here he sat with such a high profile as that of a defence minister in Somalia. He certainly got through all the cracks the right way. What efforts have been made since then to give Canadians more assurance there isn't going to be a repeat - not to say there hasn't been since then, but...
Mr. Elcock: There is no absolute assurance. There is no absolute way of ensuring somebody with a record will not enter the country, whether it's because they've entered and destroyed all their documents and therefore it takes you months and sometimes years even to identify who they are or because they've arrived here on false identification or whatever. We do our absolute best, as do the RCMP and Immigration, in trying to ensure that doesn't happen, but there is no absolute protection. There is no absolute way of ensuring everybody who comes in is who they say they are and indeed even has an identity.
Once they're here we can also, if a problem is identified, begin to collect the information that will ultimately allow the government to act to expel somebody. That happens, as I'm sure you'll be aware from some of the cases that are reported in the press.
Mr. Hanger: The appalling side of it all, when it comes to even high-profile people like this, or even those who are just common thugs or murderers or whatever the case may be, is the fact that it seems the government can't act to remove them once they do have the information.
Mr. Elcock: At the end of the day, that's not a problem I can resolve.
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Mr. Hanger: I agree.
Mr. Elcock: I work with the system of ``Dance with the one that brung you'', as somebody famous used to say. Actually, I think a number of people have used it.
There's no question that one would like to have a system that works very effectively and efficiently, but of course that's a tradeoff to democratic rights and freedoms and so on. It's not for me, at the end of the day, to make a judgment about where the tradeoff should take place. Indeed, that's for you ladies and gentlemen to do more than I.
I guess I'd only make one other point. At the end of the day, as I said, we don't always have all the information. I think there's a perception that intelligence services have unlimited abilities to collect information and have endless piles of information. We think we do have pretty good contacts and we think we do have pretty good information systems in place that allow us to make judgments, but we're not omniscient; we don't have everything.
In many cases, the accusations against people may well be unprovable and may in fact not be borne out when one does the checking. So frankly, it's a lot more complicated in the doing than it is in just looking at the issue and saying this is how we should resolve it.
The Chairman: Ms Meredith, do you have a question?
Ms Meredith: I want to deal with the issue of your discretion. There were two instances in Canada where you had employees with undisclosed contact with targets. You had two individuals working for your outfit as translators, one in Vancouver and one in Montreal. Why did the organization respond so severely in the Kwan case in Vancouver with a Chinese translator and respond completely differently with a Russian translator in Montreal?
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I find the suggestion of racism more than just offensive. Having said that, let me say quite clearly that those cases were very different and the judgments were made on that very different basis. They were not similar situations whatsoever, and to suggest that they were is absolutely incorrect.
Ms Meredith: You're quite right, Mr. Elcock. The one in Vancouver was strictly an individual having unreported contact. In the one in Montreal, not only did the individual have unreported contact, he failed polygraph exams. They weren't the same and yet one, which would appear to the outsider as being more minor, was treated in a very severe way. Your operation refused to hire him even when a federal court suggested that you should and even when SIRC suggested that you should. With the other, which as an outsider I would suggest to you appears to be far more serious, nothing was done. Can you explain the discrepancy between these two?
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I am unable to explain in sufficient detail the circumstances, not only because the information in some cases would relate to security issues but also because the privacy of both individuals would not permit me to do so. Let me assure the committee that those cases were utterly different and that the judgments made were appropriate in the circumstances of those individual cases, regardless of how it may appear to the outsider.
Ms Meredith: I have one final question, Mr. Chair. I'm interested to know why an individual who was given a commendation on his file in the same year for outstanding, excellent work was fired months later because he didn't do as he was told and drop an investigation.
Mr. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I haven't a clue what case we're talking about and I can't possibly comment.
Ms Meredith: The case we're talking about is Mr. Pierre Roy of the Montreal region.
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Mr. Elcock: As I've already said, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Roy was not fired. He was not an employee of the service. He was simply a contractor who was carrying out routine security screening investigations.
Ms Meredith: Is it not true that Mr. Roy had had his contract renewed prior to his last contract, that it wasn't only a one-year contract?
Mr. Elcock: I'm not aware of his previous time in CSIS. I believe it was relatively short, however.
Ms Meredith: I believe he had had more than one contract and his contract was terminated. He was fired. Can you explain how an individual who was given a commendation for excellent work could be fired in the same year?
Mr. Elcock: In this case, Mr. Chairman, I'm not in a position to explain the details of the case beyond what is already available. Again, both for security reasons and for the privacy of the individual, it is not inconceivable, even in a hypothetical case, to imagine those kinds of events happening. Frankly, I don't find it passing strange even as a hypothetical that this could happen.
The Chairman: Thank you.
I think there's a consensus. We've reached 5 p.m. and we've dealt successfully with most of the issues.
Just before I close, with reference to my opening remarks, Mr. Elcock, committee members will be organizing our fall agenda over the summer, and I want to thank you for coming.
This meeting is now adjourned.