[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Thursday, March 6, 1997
[English]
The Chair: Order, please.
Mr. O'Neal wanted to make a correction on the record. I wanted to indicate that he has redrafted our recommendations on reallocation and still wants more time to work on the text.
Mr. Brian O'Neal (Committee Researcher): Madam Chair, to begin with, I just want to make a clarification for the record. At the beginning of the last meeting, when we were talking about reallocation, I mentioned that I had consultations with the clerk's office. That's not entirely accurate. I've been speaking to proceduralists in table research and I just want to make that absolutely clear. I have not been speaking to Mr. Marleau's office.
With regard to the section on reallocation that's been rewritten, it's being formatted and translated at this moment. We may have it by 11 a.m. this morning, but in any case it will be ready by this afternoon. If we reach the point where the subcommittee begins to discuss reallocation, I could read for the record the revised recommendations so at least you will be able to consider those this morning.
What I'd suggest you might want to do is to begin with the section on the estimates committee that was revised and distributed to subcommittee members at the beginning of Tuesday's meeting.
The Chair: Do you want us to deal again with the revisions you've made to the reallocation recommendations, or should we just leave those until we have the text?
Mr. O'Neal: That's at your discretion. You may wish to wait until you've received the text; however, as I say, I could read it for the record and the translators could translate those new recommendations. There are not many of them. I think there are about five in total.
The Chair: My suggestion would be perhaps to wait until next Tuesday, when we have the text in front of us. It's not that much of a change from Tuesday, except the ones we decided on.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin (Joliette): Does this text include the revisions? Do these apply to all paragraphs or only to one?
Mr. O'Neal: I have also made the revisions to the accompanying text.
[English]
The Chair: We'll start with the section on the estimates committee. I will just take a minute or two to summarize where I think we're at.
In large part, Mr. Laurin is urging some changes be made to the proposal for a committee on the estimates. You have actually a whole new draft of that section. What page was it in the original report?
Mr. Laurin: It was the February 28, section 28.
Mr. O'Neal: Yes, Madam Chair. These revisions are meant to replace paragraphs 96 through 122 in the original report. If this revised section is acceptable to the subcommittee, paragraphs 96 through 122 will be removed and these new paragraphs will be substituted.
In the document that has been distributed to you, the paragraphs are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc., but that's for your convenience so you can make reference to them easily during your discussion this morning.
Mr. Williams (St. Albert): I'm not exactly sure I have the document to which Brian has just referred.
On the document dated February 28, are we talking about the entire document? Yes? Okay.
The Chair: Do we have a page summarizing the recommendations? Yes, we do, right at the back. Maybe we could start there.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Isn't it true that the very principle of the existence or non-existence of this committee is being called into question? Madam Chair, I reread the testimony of the experts who appeared before the committee. I'm really not convinced that creating a new supercommittee will address all of the problems that we want to resolve. It is increasingly obvious to me that the new powers awarded to the existing standing committees could do more to resolve the problems that have been identified.
It has even been suggested that the proposed mandate for this supercommittee be assigned instead to either the public accounts or government operations committee. I for one would prefer that more powers be granted to the finance committee or that this mandate be given to the public accounts committee whose work, to all intents and purposes, is confined almost exclusively to examining the Auditor General's report.
In my view, this committee could be given a broader mandate to examine the estimates and supply as we would like them to be examined. It would be unfortunate to create another structure or to burden another committee with these problems. The current lack of interest on the part of members in the business of supply is a problem that will not simply go away. Just because responsibility for the estimates process is turned over to another committee doesn't mean that more members will suddenly develop an interest in the business of supply.
Interest in the estimates process would rise if members had more of a say not only in how the estimates are prepared, but also in how funds are allocated. Our experts have told us that, despite constitutional drawbacks, members could have more of a say, as long as the overall budget was not exceeded. Personally, this is the approach that I favour and I hope that my colleagues on the committee share my view.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams: Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate Mr. Laurin's comments, but the way I envisage this new estimates committee we're talking about is as a forward-looking committee that examines the estimates, which are proposed government spending, and it deals with the four fundamental areas we've been talking about. These are the estimates, the statutory programs, tax expenditures, and crown corporations, within the context of where they are going.
It has always been the role of the public accountants to look backwards and examine problems that have arisen. Most of the time they have relied upon the Auditor General to be their eyes and ears, to identify problems and to investigate these problems. It is a fundamental role of Parliament to hold the government accountable, to hold the work of the government accountable, and to report back to Parliament.
So there's a very definite role for the public accounts committee in a retroactive perspective that is quite different from what I envisage here, which is a looking forward by the committee to see where the government intends to go and to pass comment on that. That's why I think there's a very definite role for the estimates committee and the public accounts committee.
We have discussed in previous meetings the role of this estimates committee as it would relate to other standing committees that have the responsibility of examining public policy. But we all know that efficiency is important, that effectiveness is important, and we need to have a committee that can ensure that the government is doing its best to deliver in these areas of effectiveness and efficiency, in addition to public policy. If the standing committees spend most of the time dealing with legislation - which they do - there is little time, expertise, or incentive for them to leave public policy and try to come to grips with the numbers, which is why I think an estimates committee that can look at the numbers is desirable.
The Chair: What I'm hearing from René and from yourself, John, is an agreement that there are these functions that have been missing. The fact that we've had so many committees and so many reports on the estimates process over the last 30 years is a good indication that there is something that needs to be there on an ongoing basis for Parliament. We've all worried, even in our own committees, about gaps, things that just aren't getting looked at on a government-wide basis because they don't fall under the mandate of any one committee.
It seems to me I'm hearing the need for the function, and there is disagreement technically about how it should be done. I'm inclined to agree that both the public accounts and finance committees have a fairly strong mandate. But if the problem of the estimates were assigned to either of those committees, public accounts is inappropriate and finance isn't interested and doesn't have the time. Neither of them has the time. Both of them are stretched to do what they have to do now.
Brian.
Mr. O'Neal: Madam Chair, I think the report in some ways tries to anticipate the concerns Mr. Laurin has just raised. I think you'll notice that beginning at paragraph 134 in the report, an alternative is proposed to creating an estimates committee, and that is that the mandate and responsibilities that have been listed in the recommendations be instead, again as an alternative, assigned to the government operations committee.
If it's at all helpful, I just want to add to your comment about the finance committee and the public accounts committee being quite busy. My own experience with the public accounts committee over the last three years or so has shown that they're very busy handling the reports coming from the Auditor General. I'm uncertain about whether or not they would be able to take on the kinds of duties you've set forth here. I just don't think they would have the time for it.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Madam Chair, there was a choice to be made: either we go with the public accounts committee or with the government operations committee. The latter has a very broad mandate and its members have a far busier schedule than the members of the public accounts committee.
While it's true that the public accounts committee examines the Auditor General's report, many of the sections in this report do not necessarily require the committee's urgent attention. Not all of the report's chapters are of pressing importance. The review of certain items could be delayed or put off entirely or even referred to a standing committee which looks into the Auditor General's recommendations.
According to paragraph 33 of the revised report, there are no assurances that this committee, equipped with the tools we recommend it be given, will be able to fulfil its basic mandate to support standing committees in their estimates work and to promote further improvement to the supply process. While a new committee is being proposed, there are no assurances that this committee will be able to do the job and fulfil its mandate. One alternative being proposed is that another review be conducted in five years' time to determine whether this committee is meeting its expectations. This would not be very motivating for a member who agrees to sit on this committee and to help other committees carry out their work.
I don't know what kind of reception we would get if we were to confront the members of the finance committee tomorrow morning and say to them: look, we're here to help you because we think you are incapable of doing the job on your own; we're giving you a big brother, a supercommittee that is going to show you how to study the business of supply and how to improve your performance. I don't even think that we have the expertise to accomplish this task.
This would imply that we have a team of experts working for us, as stated in the report, experts who could take it upon themselves to read the documents. As you know, sometime we have a week to read through a stack of documents for one committee or another. We don't even have the time to read through all of them in order to perform our work effectively.
As members of a supercommittee, would we be able to do this? In order to make a reasoned decision, we would have to understand how each committee and each department operates while trying to get an overall picture of the estimates process. To my mind, the task would be far too complex. We will never be able to manage it and we will waste time, unless we have a sizeable team of officials to help us do the job.
The Chair: Or one woman.
Mr. Laurin: Excuse me? I said a team of officials, not...
The Chair: I had to mention that, especially this week.
Mr. Laurin: I have no objections to this team being comprised of an equal number of men and women. I'm worried though that what we are proposing is merely a band-aid solution.
The main problem is highlighted earlier on in the report which states that the goal of the committee is to ensure that requests for funds are answered by certain fixed dates so that it can do its job properly.
The second goal, which creates problems for members, is to put in place a process which would give them an opportunity to examine requests, but by a certain fixed date so as not to hinder government efficiency.
Therefore, if we want to resolve this problem and generate some interest, I don't think we can accomplish this by creating another committee which will operate exactly like the other ones. The problem lies not with the nature of committees as such, but with how they operate. If we create a supercommittee and say that it has to operate more or less like existing committees, we're simply deluding ourselves. We need to change the role of members within these committees and to give them more power and influence over government policies. That's the key to resolving this problem and we must bear this in mind as we search for a solution.
[English]
The Chair: Perhaps I can just throw in my two cents' worth here. I agree, and I think we've tried to do that. The problem is there are things that cannot be accomplished simply within one department's estimates. There are too many government-wide issues. There are too many things that now are slipping through the cracks that Parliament isn't getting a look at because it doesn't fall neatly within the mandate of any one department and therefore it doesn't fall within the mandate of any one committee.
My view is that this committee would start identifying whole areas that aren't getting looked at by anybody. In fact, it would reinforce the ability of the standing committees to do their work. If a committee like this, for instance, were to look at the whole issue of expenditures on technology, which are substantial, $3 billion a year or something like that...let's just assume they said we think we should be spending more to gain all kinds of efficiencies across government. We think it should be better managed; we think we should be spending less. With better management it could be accomplishing more. It could be better integrated across different departments. But then that goes back to the committees. The committees can say, okay, how is this working in our own department when they deal with their own department's estimates?
The second point you made, though, is very important. We might in fact want a recommendation here on the permanent staff for the committee so that they do have the continuity from year to year, the expertise to allow them to do that job and to provide the support to the standing committees. We have that in the body of the report somewhere, but I think it's very important to have it here.
Brian, I think you wanted to add something.
Mr. O'Neal: Madam Chair, it was in relation to your last point about staffing and the point raised by Mr. Laurin. There is a section toward the end of the report that sets out a number of options that could be pursued and recommends that those options be looked into by the liaison committee and another committee.
My suggestion is that if you're interested in going ahead with an estimates committee you do precisely what you've just mentioned. You include a recommendation in the section that calls for the estimates committee to be given, I would suggest, a small, dedicated staff so that they have the expertise they will need to really be of some assistance to them in their work, and perhaps to other standing committees as well in their work.
The Chair: I think we should if we go ahead with this recommendation.
I know I'm repeating myself, but Treasury Board is doing this whole new expenditure management system - performance reviews, plans. They're constantly in evolution. Parliament's been fortunate that this subcommittee has been in existence to at least scrutinize that before they implement it. Otherwise it would just get implemented without Parliament's approval. It wouldn't be evaluated, as we have insisted. They wouldn't have to report back to Parliament, and there are other changes coming. They're going to want to implement the performance reports as the pilot project without any committee of Parliament having looked at that evaluation and decided whether or not it works for Parliament - not for the bureaucracy but for Parliament.
I'm really concerned, if there isn't going to be an ongoing committee that has that responsibility to review the changes being made in the bureaucracy to see whether or not they meet the needs of Parliament....
René, you made another suggestion, that we combine it with government operations. That's a possibility. It was something we had as an option in an earlier draft of the report. My initial inclination was to reject that, because I think that starts taking away from the important profile we want the estimates committee to have within Parliament. But in the interests of coming to some consensus here, maybe we should revisit that issue.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: I agree, Madam Chair. If I had to chose whether to give this mandate to the public accounts committee or to the government operations committee, I would opt for the former because I already think the government operations committee has a very busy schedule, busier still than that of the public accounts committee.
The report cites one example. It says that several departments have programs or measures relating to foreign affairs and that a supercommittee would need a broader, more general view of these problems in order to identify those measures that are the most appropriate. I have to wonder how a supercommittee could determine that a particular departmental measure relating to foreign affairs was not consistent with the general policies of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The people who are in the best position to judge such matters are the people who work for the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Therefore, procedures would have to be in place to ensure that measures relating to foreign affairs examined by other committees be referred back to the foreign affairs committee before they are dealt with by another department, because this committee has the expertise to judge whether other departmental programs relating to foreign affairs programs are adequate.
I don't see how a supercommittee could evaluate these programs or measures any better than the Department of Foreign Affairs which is familiar with the ins and outs of its operations, as well as with its overall policies, objectives and so forth. It seems to me that a supercommittee like this would be unable to do the job properly.
We're proposing to replace the foreign affairs committee with another committee that would examine problems arising from other departments but which relate to foreign affairs. Wouldn't it be better to recommend solutions which would ensure that nothing would happen in other departments without the involvement of Foreign Affairs? This department should be kept abreast of all other departmental programs relating to the same subject. That's what we should be recommending, not the creation of a supercommittee.
We're going to end up with three structures studying the same problems. First, we'll have the Department of Foreign Affairs; second, other departments which administer programs relating to foreign affairs; and third, a supercommittee which would be responsible for examining the operation s of the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as other departmental measures or programs relating to foreign affairs, a supercommittee which would try to get an overall picture of the situation.
Good heavens, we are in the process of building a tower of Babel! Soon, everyone will have the right to examine everything and anything, but no one will have any answers, because no one will have the necessary expertise to come up with effective solutions. That is my main concern and it is shared by many of the witnesses that testified before the committee.
[English]
Mr. O'Neal: If I may, Madam Chair, I would make perhaps three points. First, at the departmental level I'm reasonably certain that departments like the Department of Foreign Affairs are aware of the activities of other departments that relate to their own mandates. I'm sure those things are done after consultation with and cooperation among the departments.
The difficulty lies at the level of standing committees in the House of Commons, where this kind of awareness doesn't always exist. A comment came out in testimony from a number of committee chairs who met with the subcommittee last year. As I recall, one of the chairs said, listen, we don't get the big picture of anything; we're not aware of the things that are happening that may relate to the mandates of the departments we're overseeing.
The other point I wish to make is that the report does try to stress that if an estimates committee were to undertake an examination of estimates or expenditures that relate to more than one department or agency, it must do so - it must do so - with the express consent and cooperation and participation of the standing committees that normally would be responsible for those areas, precisely for the reasons Mr. Laurin has raised; that is, the standing committees are seen to be a repository of expertise on the various departments that are their responsibility, and any estimates committee couldn't hope to by itself duplicate that kind of knowledge. They would have to undertake these studies in cooperation with the standing committees that normally would do the work.
The Chair: What I can see a committee like this having the ability to do, frankly, is to say, look, we really need to have a look at what these four departments are doing in international affairs, and how those programs all mesh. Right now, none of those committees, whether it's agriculture or heritage or foreign affairs, have the mandate to have anything to do with another department.
A committee like this - I don't like to call it a ``supercommittee'', but I think it's just going to be a very hard-working committee like the others - would have the ability, which perhaps we need to specify in the report, to set up a subcommittee that would draw expertise from two or three different committees to work on a specific project for a specific period of time.
I don't know how to move us past this impasse. We all seem to agree there's a function there to be performed; it's just a question of where and how.
John.
Mr. Williams: I appreciate Mr. Laurin's concerns that we don't want to create more bureaucracy on Parliament Hill to try to stand up to the bureaucracy within the government, but if we took a look at what's happened over the last 20 years I think we'd find that the current system of committees has not been able to deal effectively with the estimates. We can think of individual reasons for why that may be so, but the point is, it hasn't been effective.
We are going down a new road here that we feel will have the potential to pull it together. We cannot guarantee results, but we are saying that the existing system is not working, and here is a committee that is not going to be pulled away by a distracting agenda, such as public accounts looking at banks; finance dealing with public policy; and government operations reviewing what government is doing on a daily basis. This committee will have a separate mandate to look at the spending, the efficiency, the management, and the running of government on a government-wide basis.
As well, we're building in the five-year review so that five years from now we can ask if the vision we are seeing today to try to have Parliament seize the initiative of dealing with the estimates in an intelligent and in-depth manner, rather than just glossing over them, as has been the case....
So I would like to see this be given a try. I would also like to ask Mr. Laurin to endorse the idea that we should give this new methodology a chance to see if it works.
The Chair: We'll all be back here four years from now doing the evaluation.
Mr. Williams: It's important we do think about it. Why create another bureaucratic committee if it doesn't work?
The Chair: Yes, exactly.
Mr. Williams: Five years from now let's kill it if it doesn't work. But if it is working beyond the very minimal success and examination of the estimates we have today, then perhaps we are going down the right road.
[Translation]
The Chair: Mr. Laurin.
Mr. Laurin: I have no fundamental objections to our devising a different approach, but I'm not certain about the solution that's being proposed. I can give you another example if you like. A number of departments are involved in the affairs of other departments. Again, I use the example of Foreign Affairs. There's also the Department of Industry and Trade and the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. Three or four departments may have various programs that overlap or are almost identical and they may not know what another department is doing in that particular area.
Several standing committee chairmen have said that they have some technical knowledge of the issues brought to their attention, but not really a general picture of the situation. My concern is that while this new committee may have a better overview of the situation, it may be too superficial because it will lack in-depth knowledge of the operation of each standing committee.
Therefore, we would have two extremes: one committee which has no general view whatsoever and another which has only a superficial understanding of the situation. The two would make recommendations that fail to take in account the real problems. That's my concern. I want us to come up with a solution that guarantees such problems will be avoided.
[English]
The Chair: I think we want to see the same thing happening. I see that this is the committee that can work with the other committees, and I think that's a really important fundamental of our recommendation.
I see this here partly to bring the other committees together that can deal with these duplications and overlaps. Right now there is no committee that can do that. Everyone, even though they're there to oversee the work and spending of their department, also has an interest in protecting the territory of their own department. This committee could stand beyond that and say, you guys are spending money doing the same thing. Did you not realize that? Get them to work together on solving those kinds of problems.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Madam Chair, suppose I go along with this idea of a coordination or liaison committee. If we go ahead with this, how will this change the way in which members participate in existing standing committees? They will continue to do exactly what they do now. The existence of a coordination committee or supercommittee won't change how they operate or how they work in committee.
The problem remains. Creating a supercommittee will not resolve the problem of the lack of interest on the part of individual committee members. Will one more committee change the nature of committee work? We've come up with a solution, but it doesn't address the real problem.
[English]
Mr. O'Neal: I think Mr. Laurin is raising some quite genuine concerns; however, I'd point out that the approach being taken in the report is an integrated one and so the problem of raising the interest of individual members in the estimates process has been addressed in other ways later on in the report.
Soon you're going to be talking about, for example, the ability to make reallocations. There are also recommendations in the report that would give the study of the estimates a higher public profile so that those who are actually doing the work would get some credit and some attention from the world outside Parliament for what they're doing.
All of these things are hopefully intended to work together in concert to produce a better process overall. I'm not certain that any one of them just taken in isolation will actually have the effect of bringing about the kinds of changes you'd like to see. So it's necessary in a sense that these things be linked together. Essentially, this is all I have to say about that.
The Chair: The other thing I see is that committee members, as you know, have a lot of frustration: I don't understand this information; it's not in a that I can use. They would have a committee now that can deal with this. We're asking the standing committees to report any concerns about the estimates to this committee so that this committee can deal with them. Right now there's no way for a committee to deal with those problems it can't get at in its own department. This committee then becomes a resource for all of Parliament, including the committees, whereby the committees can say: there's a problem here; we want you to deal with it; we want you to come back with some solutions.
I think the idea of a core permanent staff - two people or something, their own researcher - so they can provide some expertise to the standing committees, which would help them have some greater influence vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, would be...I know I would have found that helpful on committees I've sat on.
I don't know that this is going to improve the situation. I just know that we're making other recommendations. It would be nice not to have Parliament wait another 20 years for this issue to be looked at again. And in five years, if it's not working, or in two years, people can change it, get rid of it, improve it. I just think this committee is going to have a lot to keep it busy with the changes Treasury Board is planning in their expenditure management system, and somebody had better be out there watching out for the interests of Parliament.
At this point all I can ask is if we're prepared to let it go on an experimental basis, and maybe include in the text some of this discussion we've had with regard to the concern about how effective it will be, or the discussion we've had about whether these responsibilities should be allocated to another committee and some of your comments about which committee, I would come to the conclusion that this is a new function for a committee in Parliament. I'd like to see it have this as its core responsibility and see how it's working in a few years.
I don't know if you're prepared to move that far or not.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: I agree with most of the other recommendations, but I have serious reservations about this one because it seems to me that we will be getting this committee to do the work of a subcommittee. When a standing committee has a problem that it wants to examine further, what does it do? It creates a subcommittee. That's what happened in our case. The Board of Internal Economy referred the problem of how committees operate to us. It formed a subcommittee and burdened us with this study. When a standing committee has a particular problem, it creates a subcommittee and asks it to make recommendations.
Madam Chair, I don't think there's any need to belabour this point for three days. I agree with almost all of the other recommendations which do improve the way in which existing committees operate, but this recommendation which calls for a new committee is hard for me to swallow, because there are too many unanswered questions and I wouldn't want us to spend money on something that could prove useless or which has a greater chance of failing than of succeeding. However, this is my personal opinion. You may just as easily be right, Madam Chair, but I'm relying on my instinct. I have worked in the field of public administration for 29 years and I have always felt that there were too many committees.
[English]
The Chair: I'm going to hear from Mr. Pagtakhan in a minute, but the key problem we have here is we all agree on so many other things in this report and the only way we're going to get a report here that the committee will forward to Parliament is if it's by consensus. So I'm looking to see if there's some consensus here.
Mr. Pagtakhan (Winnipeg North): I have been listening to two arguments, and both are possible and persuasive. One, you have a trial of something that we don't know there is an expectation...so it's okay. We can put a flag on in five years. Against that, of course, is the argument that when a realistic expectation of success is not there, why even start the experiment? This is essentially the point the Bloc is raising that I am reading between...one essence of that argument. So why do it?
I think one of the problems is that the proposed new estimates committee is authorized to do something. It has an inherent right to initiate something. One approach to this would be if the House makes the reference to the existing estimates committee, knowing that it may undertake such a study.... In other words, instead of being left to the various standing committees to create a subcommittee to study a program of an interdepartmental nature, if in the wisdom of the leadership of the day they say this is a program - I'll use information technology as an example - that really encompasses the various departments, or a youth apprenticeship program that encompasses many departments, I would like these estimates to be studied by a committee that will look into this. In other words, the authority is only exercised when it is asked for by the House itself, to which the committee ultimately will report.
That could be one way of ensuring that such an estimates committee does not enter into various negotiations or responses to requests by standing committees on a given program and then not go to a trial period. Have an authority, but only when referred to by the House. I would submit, Madam Chair, that it would be one possible approach at reconciliation.
The Chair: Let me see if this might break the logjam. Just to assure Mr. Laurin that Parliament is not going to be stuck with something that's not working, what if we move the review period back to, say, three years? That would ensure that it was not simply carried on. I'm thinking that if this was implemented in the next Parliament, it would ensure that it was not carried on to a second Parliament without a review.
We all know there's a problem here. I don't think any of us feel we've solved it. We feel we made some progress in dealing with it. At a minimum, this would ensure that there is a committee of Parliament prepared to carry on the work we started and to keep looking at ways of improving it on an annual basis.
Would a three-year review help you any? It wouldn't be a major commitment then.
Mr. Laurin: This is very much.... Madam Chair,
[Translation]
all of my colleagues agree, except for me. I would suggest that we examine the other recommendations. I will disagree with this one, unless the Holy Spirit intervenes while we look at the other recommendations and gives me more confidence in this approach...
I'm not asking for guarantees that this is going to work, but I would like some assurances that there is a good chance that it will succeed. However, my understanding of the facts does not lead me to this conclusion. I think there is a greater likelihood that this process will fail. That's my personal opinion. That's why I'm saying that if Mr. Williams, Mr. Pagtakhan and yourself agree that we must move forward, we will dissent.
However, this doesn't prevent us from examining the other recommendations which I feel will truly improve the way committees operate. It will be easier for me to support these recommendations.
The Chair: I can assure you that the Holy Spirit has already talked to me and told me to tell you that the experience will prove worthwhile. I will talk to him again and ask him to speak to you directly. Is that all right with you?
[English]
Mr. Williams: Before we leave this subject and move on - and I guess we'll come back at the end to revisit this and hope that Mr. Laurin can see it as a real possibility - I would just like to draw his attention to the work of the standing committees today. In this session of Parliament, being just a little more than a year old, we've had 70 or 80 bills tabled by the government that were all referred to committees. Some have had to travel around the countryside for a significant amount of time. Some of these bills have been complex and required a significant amount of time and effort to be studied.
It is this obligation of committees to study these bills in depth and to pass judgment on them that has taken their attention away from the ongoing management of their departments. I think we all realize there is a potential for a great deal of improvement in the way the departments are managed and the way they're run and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the departments. But the standing committees have this other role that takes their focus away from the departments and their management.
We see this standing committee on the estimates as working all year, not just for the few weeks at the time the estimates are being processed through Parliament. It will look at the broader financial management of the departments with regard to their efficiency and effectiveness - standing statutory programs that we don't vote upon at this point in time but as you know expend 70% of all the money the government spends.
We feel there is a definite need for a committee such as this that has as its number one priority and focus to look at the management and effectiveness of the departments as they implement the policies that have been reviewed and commented upon by the standing committees. That's why we'd like to see this committee have a real solid influence, rather than just being an ad hoc subcommittee of a standing committee being created when they see a problem arising. We don't want to wait until the problems have arisen before we create a subcommittee to look at a departmental problem. We want this estimates committee to be examining government, and right across government, to ensure it is being as effective as possible on an ongoing basis.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: The committees have never complained; they have never blamed their lack of interest on lack of time. The large number of bills examined by committees doesn't explain the fact that committee members have lost interest in the business of supply. What emerged from the testimony and from the report is that committee members have lost interest in the estimates process because they feel that they cannot change anything, that decisions are made in advance and that everything is carved in stone.
That is the reason given by most witnesses to explain the lack of interest on the part of members. In my opinion, the other measures proposed in the report could leave individual members with the impression that they can make a difference. If these other measures help to resolve the problem of the lack of interest and as a result, committee members become more interested in the business of supply and in the estimates process, then the problem may perhaps be resolved without the need for a coordination committee.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. O'Neal might have some comments on this, and then we'll go to Mr. Pagtakhan on what our witnesses did say.
Mr. O'Neal: I have a couple of comments. First of all, if a committee doesn't report back its estimates and then is deemed to have tabled anyway, and if committees aren't required to make a justification for doing that, I don't think we know the real reasons why they don't.
The other thing - and I don't think this appears in the report - is that when we had a meeting with committee chairs, one committee chair argued that the reporting date for the estimates should be set ahead. That is, he figured more time was required. So that point was made.
Second, just as was raised in paragraph 2 of this particular revised report, the witnesses who were arguing in favour of creating one single committee to review all of the estimates said - and this is in their testimony - that the estimates have to compete with a variety of pressing issues for committee attention and thus do not get the thorough consideration they deserve.
I agree with Mr. Laurin that one of the reasons this happens is that they're deemed to have reported anyway.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: That was stated by only one individual.
[English]
The Chair: Let me put it this way. We've all compromised. Some of us really wanted an estimates supercommittee to get the estimates totally out of the hands of the standing committees. Others wanted no estimates committee.
We're now in the middle position. Let's see if we can't find some way of getting us all there.
Dr. Pagtakhan is next.
Mr. Pagtakhan: The more I see this, the more I really have reservations, and for these reasons. To know the process of the estimates is already in the preceding recommendation, under paragraph 11. So that is taken care of.
But insofar as serving as a supercommittee - page 5, item 13 - when you examine it closely, before it can even do what we think it will be able to do, there are so many conditions.
Paragraph 14 says:
- There are two areas in which the committee we propose could play a direct role.... The first
involves instances in which a standing committee were unable, for whatever reason, to conduct
a review of the Estimates referred to it. A combination of better information and incentives
should make this unlikely.
Paragraph 14 continues:
- However, in the event that such cases do occur, the Estimates Committee should be able to take
steps to ensure that the Estimates in question are given adequate scrutiny.
Two, if it fails to make that request, nothing can be done. This says only ``at the request''. The weakness too is that if the request is made, the estimates committee can refuse to act on that request. So we are back to that same process now, of, oh, we requested you to do this but you said no, so we are not doing this. A problem presumably has been identified by a standing committee and the estimates committee refuses to act on it, which is the final determining authority on whether to act or not.
The Chair: The estimates committee is the master of its own business.
Mr. Pagtakhan: I know. But then it says here, in paragraph 15, that: ``In such instances'' - using the example of information technology - ``an Estimates Committee could, with the agreement'' - condition one - ``and the co-operation'' - condition two; you can agree, but if you do not cooperate it will not happen - ``of the appropriate standing committees, or at their request'' - the third condition.
That is why I have come to the conclusion, to reconcile this, that we should make the determination to let the committee exist for the other functions that I think we have consensus on. Let it exist. Use this as a reserve obligation. It could do such an undertaking only if referred by the House.
In other words, if a standing committee feels strongly that such a study ought to be done by this supercommittee, let it be the report of that committee to the House, and the House, in its wisdom, then refer it back to this new estimates committee.
Mr. Williams: Madam Chair, I think we are moving into new territory again.
First of all, I think we were all agreed that this is not a supercommittee. I understand, again, Mr. Laurin's concerns that up until now members of Parliament have felt little capacity to bring about change. It was through that frustration that this committee has found its creation.
I'd like to draw his attention to the fact that the estimates, as they are currently tabled, represent only 30% of government spending. We have only three months - March, April, and May - to deal with them. During that time there's Easter break for two weeks; committees are seized with legislation they have to examine; some are travelling; and others have other issues on their agenda.
While we're calling this the estimates committee, I see it as a committee that deals with more than just the estimates but within the financial management and effectiveness of government, and works on a year-round, 12-month basis. It deals with 100% of government spending. It has the opportunity to look at statutory program spending, tax expenditures, as we have said, and the effectiveness of crown corporations - the four fundamental areas in which a government spends its supply.
So we want to have a mechanism by which Parliament can comment on and look at wide areas of expenditure that, as the chair has pointed out, can cross way over departmental boundaries. Standing committees as they currently exist have only this three-month period in which to deal with the estimates. Because there's other legislation, when are they going to get the time? That's why we see the need for this committee.
This is not a supercommittee but a committee with a mandate to look at the effectiveness and efficiency of government all year round. That's what we're trying to achieve here.
The Chair: Another committee is meeting here at 11 a.m. We have to wrap up in the next couple of minutes.
I think Brian had some comments to make.
Mr. Williams: I'd like to hear Mr. Laurin's response to what I just said to see if he is in agreement with that philosophy.
Mr. Pagtakhan: I'd like to respond to that too, Madam Chair.
Mr. O'Neal: Madam Chair, I wanted to respond quickly to some of the points originally raised by Dr. Pagtakhan about paragraphs 14 and 15.
First of all, he asks who would determine who has the primary responsibility. I think that's already clear in the fact that certain estimates are automatically referred to certain committees. So that sets out who's responsible.
Second, it was mentioned that if no request comes through to the estimates committee to do this kind of work then nothing will happen. Well, there was a very strong concern on the part of subcommittee members that this estimates committee not be, in effect, a supercommittee and tell the others what they may or may not do.
The last point was whether or not the estimates committee makes a final determination as to how to respond to a request. Again, there was a concern at our last meeting that committees not doing the work on the estimates could just dump the work onto the lap of the estimates committee. This would give the estimates committee an opportunity to say, no, we don't think it's possible for us to do your work for you; you go and do it yourselves.
The Chair: Or don't do it, as you wish, but we don't have the time and we don't have the resources.
Look, I'm going to have to adjourn the meeting so that we don't keep the next committee waiting. You're going to have to keep your response comments for our next meeting.
I'm going to talk to Dr. Pagtakhan about the possibility of lengthier meetings on Tuesday. We'll be meeting all Tuesday morning, at a minimum.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Some members of the other committee have not arrived yet. Can we go on here, and then stop as soon as they come? Because we're in the midst of a -
The Chair: But then somebody else is going to be in the middle of what they want to say and feel equally frustrated. I think it's neater to adjourn the meeting right now and come back to this fresh on Tuesday.
The meeting is adjourned.