[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, February 4, 1997
.0936 
[English]
The Chair: I call to order the meeting of the Sub-Committee on Business of Supply.
Unfortunately, because Brian was ill, the report got out to all of you a little later then we had planned when we last met in December. I will make no pretensions as to having read it carefully, because I haven't.
We might start, Brian, with your just giving us an overview of the report. Let's see how it goes. I'll leave it up to all of you if you feel you want more time before we actually start getting into approving sections of the report or recommendations.
Mr. Brian O'Neal (Committee Researcher): Yes, good morning, Madam Chair. I also want to apologize to subcommittee members that this report wasn't in your hands sooner than this. I was ill for two weeks, so that slowed down the process considerably. I also want to - if this is necessary - apologize for the length of the report. It's rather large, but on the other hand the subcommittee has covered a fairly broad area of issues.
The first three sections of the report are basically introductory. There is a preface, followed by an introduction. The introduction sets out the principles that guided the subcommittee in its work. There is also, at the suggestion of Dr. Pagtakhan, a section that has a glossary of terms so that readers can understand what the subcommittee is talking about in various parts of the report.
The second section is essentially taken right out of the subcommittee's briefing book, and describes the origin and evolution of the business of supply in the Canadian House of Commons since Confederation.
The third section sets out the reasons why this is a good moment to make changes to some of those procedures. There is a discussion of the criticisms that have been made of the current process, including comments that have been made by previous parliamentary committees, comments from some of our witnesses, and responses from current members of Parliament to a questionnaire that was circulated to them in May and June of last year.
Then there is a discussion of the changes that have been made to the government's expenditure management system, and a note about the Improved Reporting to Parliament Project, which has included pilot performance and plans documents. There is mention of recent changes to the Standing Orders, and then there are a number of comments about the needs and expectations of Canadians in general that Parliament do a better job of controlling expenditure.
The fourth section actually moves into the area of recommendations, and this begins the section where the committee began its previous examination of suggested recommendations back in December.
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It begins with a discussion of the role of standing committees. Then it proposes that there be a single committee created to oversee and review the reporting of the estimates, including a review of crown corporations. Then, because the subcommittee later on suggests that standing committees when they are tabling reports that recommend policy changes take into consideration the potential costs of effecting those changes, there is a section that discusses, in a very summary manner, the potential costs that would be associated with the creation of a new standing committee.
Here I have to suggest to subcommittee members that the kind of information currently available about the costs of operating a standing committee is fairly cursory and doesn't include a lot of the costs that standing committees normally incur.
However, there is a basic estimate there, and on the basis of that estimate - I believe the cost would be somewhere in the neighbourhood of $50,000 to create a new standing committee - there's a further suggestion here that as an alternative to creating an estimates committee, the duties and responsibilities that we have suggested be undertaken by an estimates committee be given instead to an existing standing committee of the House - the government operations committee - and also a suggestion that the government operations committee could, were it given this mandate, establish a subcommittee to undertake the work involved.
Finally, there is a section on committee membership, and here the recommendations have to do with trying to keep committee membership - in terms of the review of the estimates - as stable as possible.
This is followed by a section on new tools, where we talk about the ability to reallocate funds. Sorry, I should say that this section is a combination of suggested new authorities for standing committees and recently created authorities, and also some long-standing authorities that the subcommittee feels standing committees ought to exploit more fully.
So there's a discussion on the ability to consider plans and performance separately, the ability to consider alternative directions, the ability to assess new program proposals, the long-term review of existing programs, reporting deadlines for departmental plans documents, and reporting deadlines for the main estimates.
One of the keys to achieving the goal of better scrutiny of the estimates has to do with putting in place a better system of incentives for members of Parliament so that they receive some encouragement in this aspect of their work. So there is a third section here that outlines what some of those incentives might be. Generally speaking, they have to do with an enhanced profile for committee work on the estimates so that people have an opportunity to see the work that members of Parliament are doing on this very important issue.
Finally, under this main section, there is a series of suggestions regarding new approaches to work on the estimates. So here, really, the subcommittee is encouraging committees to take a number of approaches towards this aspect of their work that ought to, in the subcommittee's point of view, improve the scrutiny of the estimates.
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This is followed by a section on improved support for committees and members with regard to the scrutiny of the estimates and supply. This includes a general discussion of enhanced staffing for committees, a discussion of the role of the Office of the Auditor General, and finally better information on the estimates and the supply process.
This is followed by a large section on the scope of parliamentary financial review. Again, this is an area that came under discussion with witnesses, so a lot of these issues are covered, but not covered in any great depth.
Here I should say that if the draft report doesn't suggest this, we may wish to indicate under this section that these issues may require further study. I'd suggest that whichever committee is set up to examine the estimates and the estimates process might also consider taking a look at some of these things, although they might more properly be the purview of the Standing Committee on Finance.
In any case, there is a discussion here of statutory expenditures, tax expenditures, loan guarantees, the voting of net versus gross amounts, and then the vote structure and information on capital and operating budgets.
This is followed by a section on supply days. Again, there is a discussion here, but no recommendations. The feeling of the committee was that it is the right of the opposition - the duty of the opposition, in effect - to make the best use possible of supply days, and we're not prepared at this moment to make any recommended changes to the way this operates.
This is followed by another section on the accountability of ministers and deputy ministers. This section is here because if a number of the changes that have currently been made, together with some of the changes the subcommittee is recommending, are implemented, this will lead to more frequent appearances of senior public servants before standing committees. In this respect, it's important that the rules and guidelines be made absolutely clear so senior public servants are not asked to take responsibility for what are in effect policy decisions.
This is followed by a section on the confidence convention and the business of supply. Then there is another section on parliamentary attitudes toward supply and expenditure and a conclusion.
I should mention that in the final report, when it appears, the subcommittee may wish to take all of the recommendations contained in the report and have them appear separately, either at the beginning of the report or at the end, because quite often what people like to do is read through all of the recommendations in one place.
Secondly, at the chair's request, I intend to develop a chart that will show the supply process, including any of the changes we're recommending, so people can see the process in its entirety. I haven't finished that, but I will finish it when the subcommittee has made its final series of decisions, and it will be included in the report, either at the end or at the beginning.
The Chair: Are there any comments? How do you want to proceed through this?
John.
Mr. Williams (St. Albert): As you may recall, Madam Chair, I was unable to attend the last meeting in December before the parliamentary recess for the Christmas break, and at that particular meeting you were talking about the confidence convention. We have covered off a large number of the issues Brian has raised this morning, but I would like to revisit the confidence convention in detail, because I was unable to speak to it at that particular meeting.
The Chair: So we need to spend a bit of time on that.
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I guess the key question here is how much time you want to spend this morning, since people only got the report on Thursday or Friday. Do you want to start dealing with it in depth now or do you want to leave it for Thursday morning, since we have a meeting scheduled? I confess to not having read this report as I would like to as chair of the committee.
Is there anybody who's read it thoroughly and feels they're ready to adopt it right now? You could do exactly what you wanted in the absence of knowledge by the rest of us.
Mr. Pagtakhan (Winnipeg North): I will agree that we have to give it a very careful study. It's certainly a well-prepared draft report.
On the issue of the matter of confidence, are you prepared to make some preliminary discussions of that today? At least when we meet next we will have taken that into account.
Secondly, are we not making any recommendation in terms of the allotted days?
Mr. O'Neal: No. Prior to the Christmas break the subcommittee determined that it was not appropriate to make changes, although I think I mentioned at the time that Mr. Williams had a number of suggestions he wanted to bring to the subcommittee.
Mr. Pagtakhan: The two may relate, but assuming that you cannot link the two, rather than saying we are not making any recommendation, if our conclusion were in fact not to make any change, then our recommendation ought to be stated that we should maintain the present system. So it is not a case of inaction but a deliberate decision that we ought not to make any change. In other words, maintain the present system to a point that is after our due deliberation on the issue.
Those are the two immediate comments I would have, and I agree that a further reading of this would be helpful so that we can interrelate. On the question of the vote of confidence and separating that, I think any preliminary discussion this morning would be okay.
The Chair: Okay. What I might suggest is that we look at section A of chapter 4. I think we had a fairly thorough discussion on it and we might want to go through that. That was on the role of standing committees, and one of our fundamental recommendations is to establish a new standing committee on the estimates. Perhaps we could spend some time going through that and clear that out of the way and then have a look at supply days and the issue of confidence just to prepare for the discussion.
Mr. Pagtakhan: This is starting on page 30, right?
The Chair: Yes. I don't want to push anybody if you feel you're uncomfortable doing that and you'd really just rather have a couple of days with the report. I don't know about the rest of you, but I'm anxious to get this done and get on to other things.
Do you want to start through this now or wait until our Thursday meeting?
Mr. Williams: I'd like to have a discussion on the confidence.
The Chair: Okay. Let's turn to the confidence section, then. Maybe Brian can refresh us on what's in there.
Mr. O'Neal: Yes, Madam Chairman.
Virtually all of our witnesses agreed that the presence of the confidence convention was a complicating factor with regard to the scrutiny of the estimates. However, none of them recommended that the status quo be fundamentally altered.
It seems that the real problem is not the existence of the convention itself. As a matter of fact, this section of the paper argues that there are some very good reasons for the convention to exist and therefore good reasons for maintaining it. The real problem has to do with the exercise of the confidence convention in tandem with the very strict form of party discipline that exists in our political system.
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Unfortunately, at least from my perspective and the perspective of the witnesses, there is nothing that can be done in terms of making a recommendation or changing the Standing Orders that would in any way alter the existence of that fact, the fact of fairly strict party discipline.
So what this section of the paper does, rather than making any recommendations, is to suggest that there are two ways in which the application of the confidence convention with respect to the estimates and the supply process could be relaxed. One of those ways has to do with an earlier recommendation that the subcommittee makes, which is that standing committees be given the ability to reallocate funds.
The second has to do with a government's, any government's, willingness to accept recommendations or changes made to the estimates by standing committees. In effect, if a government were willing to agree to reallocation or if a government were willing to agree to a committee's recommendation that a particular estimate be reduced or an item in the estimate be eliminated, prior to the estimate or the report of the standing committee in question being reported back to the House, it would then in effect be accepting that revised estimate as its own and could present it as such to the House. Therefore, the question of confidence would not arise.
The second suggestion that is made follows very closely on some of the things that were written or suggested by the McGrath committee. That is that there is nothing that should prevent a government from continuing in office should it experience a defeat on an item in the estimates - not the entire estimates, but an item in the estimates. They point out, as others have pointed out, that there have been precedents for this.
In the 1960s, I believe it was Mr. Pearson's government that experienced a defeat on a ways and means item and then returned to the House several days afterward and asked for a formal vote of confidence from the House, which it received. Therefore, the suggestion here is that governments indicate that they're willing to experience a defeat on certain items and that they will commit to asking the House for a formal vote of confidence following such defeats.
Now, none of these things are expressed in the form of recommendations, because I felt it was unwise to do so. I don't think anybody should be bound by these suggestions, but at the same time I think they are a reasonable or a valuable contribution to the debate on this particular issue. Where governments do agree with some of these suggestions it would in effect help make the estimates process a little bit more meaningful for members of Parliament.
In any case, I invite the subcommittee members to read this section carefully. I've already taken the liberty of showing it to someone who is more familiar with parliamentary procedure and parliamentary traditions than I am and have since received tentative approval of this.
The Chair: Another possibility might be what I would call a soft recommendation. What you are suggesting is that the government give consideration to modifying its use of the confidence convention. It might be possible, in fact, to frame a recommendation that says that. That would then require the government to give its views on that at least, if it's a recommendation in the report.
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John.
Mr. Williams: Thank you, Madam Chair. First let's remember that the genesis of this committee was based on my frustration back in 1995 when the estimates went through the House of Commons without change in any way, shape or form.
The Chair: If the chair may be permitted a comment, I think we've expanded your thinking on the issue somewhat since then.
Mr. Williams: That's very true. That's what the committee process is all about, to investigate and to expand one's knowledge on the subject.
The changes we have talked about and the recommendations and the support are an elaboration and a modernization of the system, of the process of the business of supply. The business of supply is still going to run up against the roadblock of the Standing Orders. I am the last one to say that confidence has to be eliminated. I recognize and support the need for confidence in the British parliamentary system based on the fact that if the government does not enjoy the confidence of Parliament it has no right to govern.
However, there is a difference between enjoying the confidence of Parliament and setting the rules so that Parliament has no choice but to give the perception that the government enjoys this confidence. There is a difference. Government must always feel that it enjoys the confidence of Parliament, but the rules should not be set insofar as Parliament has no choice but to grant this confidence in the government.
I refer to Standing Order 81(3), which is to me the heart of the matter. Let me read it first for the record.
For the purposes of this Order, the business of supply shall consist of motions to concur in interim supply, main estimates and supplementary or final estimates; motions to restore or reinstate any item in the estimates; motions to introduce or pass at all stages any bill or bills based thereon; and opposition motions that under this order may be considered on allotted days.
That's a complex little section, but basically it says that if we go all the way through the committee, we investigate the estimates, we see that there's a change to be made, we table a report in the House of Commons suggesting a change to be made, and it makes its way onto the order paper on the day that the estimates are to be voted on, Standing Order 81(3) eliminates that entire report, that entire recommendation, and causes the President of the Treasury Board to put a motion on the floor that we concur on the estimates.
You see how we've done a complete flip. Rather than debating about the change, we now have to debate about whether we concur, and the vote will only be on whether or not we concur on the estimates, not whether or not we feel the change is valid.
Therefore, this particular standing order is written to guarantee that confidence is built right into the motion and that government members have little or no option but to vote for the motion as presented. It is worded in such a way as to bring confidence right into the middle of the motion.
Under Standing Order 81(3) we cannot bring an amendment to change or reduce estimates in any way, shape or form, because when we bring that forward it causes the President of the Treasury Board to table a motion of concurrence. These are the only motions that this allows. The business of supply consists of motions to concur, motions to restore or reinstate, and that's it. It does not allow motions to amend.
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Therefore, Standing Order 81(3) has to be changed to allow a motion to amend to be tabled and debated in the House of Commons. Recognizing the need for confidence, I think 81(3) should say that the final vote on the estimate day shall be a vote to concur in the main estimates as amended. There is your confidence right there. We can vote to amend 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 if we so desire, and in the last motion of the day we concur on the estimates as amended.
So confidence is ensured. We now have the opportunity to change while maintaining confidence. That's the stumbling block that over the last 30 years has caused people to turn their backs on the estimates process. They have no way of changing the system because confidence has stopped it in its tracks. Standing Order 81(3) as it's currently written stops everything in its tracks.
The Chair: Are there any comments?
Mr. Pagtakhan: Madam Chair, I would just like to ask for a clarification. When the comment was made on allowing amendments, would it be in the context of changes including a change to increase the total, or would the changes be limited to reallocation within the same total? In the document I could see that some of the discussions revolve around that in terms of analysis. I would like to know from my colleague's submission whether amendments should include all possible changes, including the right to increase the total.
The Chair: Brian, you may want to comment on what Rey is asking.
Mr. Pagtakhan: I would like to know, not so much from the researcher's point of view but from the member's point of view, what he meant by saying that amendments would include the ability to propose an increase in total expenditure.
Mr. Williams: Our parliamentary system does not allow an increase in the global amount approved.
Mr. Pagtakhan: So it's understood that this -
Mr. Williams: It's perfectly understood that we're talking reallocation or reduction. We're not talking here about a fundamental revisit of that magnitude. I'm talking here about when the committee has recommended a reallocation or a reduction. When that report is tabled in the House on the day we consider the estimates, that report to reallocate or reduce under Standing Order 81(3) will then cause the President of the Treasury Board to move a motion of concurrence.
Mr. Pagtakhan: I obtained that. I just wanted to be clarified on your sentiment. Now it's clear to me.
The second point I would like to raise, Madam Chair, is that when we look at votes of confidence during the business of supply during that allotted period, my recollection is that any motion, even from the opposition, during that period of time in the business of Parliament is considered a vote of confidence.
I recall one where it did not even relate to any expenditure. It was a simple motion to me. I was pleasantly surprised at the result from the political point of view, because my motion was that we reaffirm our commitment to medicare. The government of the day took it as a vote of confidence and voted against it. Politically, of course, it was a pleasant surprise for me because it treated it as a vote of confidence, which to a rookie MP was a surprise.
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When we look at the vote of confidence in this context, if we cannot reach a consensus - and I cannot prejudge our final sentiment - we separate those two issues to the extent that we can. That means that during the business of supply, when a motion does not involve within the limits of our imagination any specific allocation or expenditure, certainly I would propose that during that period of time it not be considered a vote of confidence. Then we will lose a real reasoned debate on a given issue from the opposition side in this instance that we feel all of us could unite and support. I would say they were expecting unanimous support on that, and I was pleasantly surprised.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Monsieur Laurin.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin (Joliette): It is surely not necessary to go back over the entire debate we had before Christmas. That is not what I want either. However, it seems to me that one aspect is not covered in the report we have here.
In my view, confidence is interpreted by the government. Governments pass many bills in accordance with the principle of confidence, and when the time comes to implement them, the government often backs down on certain aspects of the legislation.
Currently, there are two examples. Consider the tobacco bill. The government introduced the bill, and it is now very likely that because of opposition from the public, it will back down on some aspects of the legislation.
However, the government has made this bill a matter of confidence. If the government decides to back down on advertising, for example, it will back down on an aspect of its own bill and not consider it a vote of non-confidence in the government.
The same is true for the GST. The government made certain announcements during the election campaign. It passed a bill that dealt with the Maritime provinces, and the Minister of Finance announced yesterday that there would perhaps be a change regarding tax-included pricing.
If the government had made this a matter of confidence, it would not be able to back down on its own bill. It could not go back and say that it is amending this aspect of the bill since public pressure does not seem to correspond to what the government was seeking.
Whether it makes this a matter of confidence or not, it is really up to the government. Why would this not be allowed in the House, in Parliament? The government assumes a privilege by saying at some point that it considers something a matter of confidence. In another case, it can say that it is not a matter of confidence.
If the government considers that adopting a measure calls its confidence into question, it should say so openly. When the government feels that an issue is so important that it wants to hold a vote of confidence on it, well, it should say so and enforce party discipline.
If the government cannot obtain a majority on its own bills, the matter of confidence remains, even if theoretically it is not raised publicly.
If the members of the government party do not support a bill, it is because there is true opposition to it.
So in my view, there should be a recommendation on that. The issue of confidence does not necessarily always jeopardize a government, unless the government wants to enact all pieces of legislation blindly, without amendment or any constraints. In that case, it would no longer be a matter of confidence. It would be closer to a dictatorship than a democracy with flexibility.
It seems to me that it is possible, with a new approach to government management, to amend the notion of a vote of confidence without preventing a government from acting and without its existence being continually jeopardized.
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We should make a recommendation along those lines for certain policies. Even the ones the government considers essential could be amended by the House without the government itself being jeopardized.
[English]
The Chair: I think that's essentially what the report says. It says that it is not a matter of the Standing Orders; it's a matter of the attitude of the government. That's why I proposed that in fact we might want to put suggestions in the form of a recommendation for the government to consider so that there has to be a response to that.
In terms of Standing Order 81(3), while it's true that it talks about the motions for concurrence, John, there's nothing that prevents an amendment being put forward if it was developed by a committee.
Mr. Williams: I beg to differ.
The Chair: What we might want to do is suggest that where a committee has made a reasoned report - and I don't mean just take $20,000 out of tsetse fly research - recommending a reallocation of funds, we might want to find a way of proposing that it should also be brought forward for debate in the context of that vote for concurrence. You may have a single vote and in fact you might have two or three recommendations for amendments to that vote. There's nothing in Standing Order 81(3) that prohibits or prevents those reports being debated in the House. It's just a question of how they get moved and whether there should be some....
That's why I wanted to hear Brian's comments, because I think he recommends something about committees reporting and having the freedom to recommend reallocation of funds.
Mr. O'Neal: We do. We also recommend that when they do so, they provide the reasons for wanting to make those reallocations.
I'm not a procedural expert and I don't intend to present myself as such, but I will make a number of comments based on my discussions with people in table research and elsewhere.
The first is to remind subcommittee members that the Standing Orders, as currently drafted, reflect the fact that the general debate on supply and the estimates was moved out of the House and into the forum of standing committee examination. Therefore, it was reasoned that opportunities to reduce or eliminate estimates were to be had within the context of the standing committees so that by the time an estimate had moved out of standing committee and back to the House, most of the work, if not all of the work, is considered to have been done.
I did bring up in my discussions with these people the question of what that means if there's a majority government in office. This would mean that a standing committee's chances of making a change are highly unlikely. That doesn't figure into their thinking on this. In fact, the committees are the ones that have the opportunity to make the changes.
The second point I want to make is that according to the Standing Orders there is a procedure available on the last allotted day, and that procedure consists of an ability of individual members of Parliament to submit notices of objection to items in the estimates. They have a certain number of days in which to do this. When they do this, the items in the estimates that they have objected to are separated and are debated and voted on individually. They trigger a motion of concurrence in the entire estimate, the entire item, from the President of Treasury Board. There's a debate and that's followed by a vote.
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As I understand it, nothing prevents someone in the House from proposing an amendment to the motion tabled by the President of the Treasury Board. An amendment would consist of arguing that the vote ought to be reduced or eliminated. Then, as I understand it, there would be a debate on that amendment.
The Chair: Therefore we get silly amendments such as eliminating the entire budget of the Senate.
Was that yours, John?
Mr. Williams: No, that was not mine.
Madam Chair, if I may say -
The Chair: I think Rey has a comment.
Mr. Pagtakhan: In fairness to our colleague, I think the point he was raising is that he accepts the same point - that is, it would trigger the concurrence motion. If I heard him correctly, it is still a vote of confidence. The opportunity to put any idea or motion or anything exists, but from his point of view - and I'm trying to reflect on this to be sure that I have understood you correctly - because it remains a vote of confidence, a convention he feels that the government members would vote all or none...and of course it would be all for the government. Hence, it felt there is no reasoned debate on the specific items.
Did I hear you correctly?
Mr. Williams: I think you're starting to see the picture.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Starting to see.
Mr. Williams: The point I'm trying to make is that we can go through the entire process of debate in committee and spot something that we may feel, for one reason or another, potentially should be changed. But when it gets to the final analysis, on that one day's debate in the House of Commons it is impossible to get a debate on that amendment to reduce or to reallocate where one can bypass a blanket motion to concur in the estimates as tabled. Because there is this blanket motion to concur in the estimates as tabled, dictated by Standing Order 81(3), it is impossible to make a change without triggering that blanket concurrence. That is a stone wall that has held everything up.
I understand the chair's concern for frivolous motions. I am a reasonable person. I was suggesting, when I had a discussion with the researcher to pass the information on, that I would propose something like this. As you know, the House of Commons accepts amendments and subamendments. A subamendment must always, of course, amend the main amendment. Therefore...the Standing Orders be changed to, in essence, introduce a standard amendment to reallocate or reduce a standard main amendment without being too descriptive. This would then allow a subamendment to be introduced by committees that have discussed the issue or opposition parties or whomever. Then, during the day we can have debate on several issues, several subamendments, and they can be voted on one by one, followed by a vote on the main motion to amend, followed by, at the end of the day, a motion to concur as amended.
A motion to concur as amended at the end of the day would validate the confidence motion. Parliament is saying it has confidence in the government and has allocated this amount of funds for the government to spend. That way, Parliament has been given its historic right to express its opinion, freely and collectively, without the government dictating to Parliament that if you change one single penny, confidence is then triggered with the attendant complications.
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Standing Order 81(3) is a stone wall that can be changed to allow some modification and to ensure that confidence is protected at the same time. It will allow sanity to prevail. It will allow free debate, yet the government can be protected.
You may talk about the fact that we can debate the issues. Of course we can debate. We're allowed a great deal of latitude in our debates in the House of Commons, but Standing Order 81(3) says that the only motions that we can vote on are motions of concurrence, to restore or to reinstate. We are not allowed any motion to reallocate or to reduce. It's absolutely forbidden.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Excuse me, may I interject? Do you meaning including the amendment to that?
Mr. Williams: Well, you can have an amendment to the motion to concur, but I said earlier that you cannot have a motion to amend without a subsequent motion to concur. When you get this motion to concur in the estimates, you're then automatically finding that you cannot amend a motion to concur without triggering consequences. That's why this standard motion to concur automatically triggers confidence by the way in which it is written, and that is a stone wall. Rather than having it automatically built into the motion, what I'm suggesting is that you can have your confidence in a subsequent motion on the same day. You can debate the changes, decide on the changes, follow it with a subsequent motion to concur. But if you build a concurrence into the motion to change, you can't have your cake and eat it too. You can't have concurrence and change at the same time.
Mr. Pagtakhan: I see your point. In essence, it's to separate it.
[Translation]
The Chair: Mr. Laurin, do you have something to add?
Mr. Laurin: I said most of what I wanted to say earlier, except that I agree to some extent with my Reform Party colleague in saying that there could be a possibility of holding a vote to make certain amendments without it necessarily being a vote of confidence. Recommendations from a committee or the opposition could be allowed to be studied in the House without necessarily raising the matter of confidence and the government...
If an opposition motion or a motion from a committee were carried on division by Parliament in a case like the Budget, nothing would prevent the government from saying that it has amended one aspect or another of its Budget or its votes. In the end, in view of the amendments, it could hold a vote of confidence on its budget as amended: even if an amendment was made, does the government have the confidence of Parliament?
That could be done quite easily without risking the existence of a Parliament, and without the risk of an election being held each year. It seems to me that would be a reasonable amendment that would place a lot more importance on members, because otherwise, voters are left with the impression that if they want legislation to be adopted in the House, the only way for them to be heard is to be represented by a government member. If that is the case, there is no longer any opposition. For voters to be well represented, and well served, they need to have an MP who is a member of government.
In some cases, it takes a long time. There are some ridings that have been held by opposition members for 20 years. I do not think that those people deserve to be left with the impression that they are poorly represented, that they have no voice or that they are unable to influence government policies.
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That attitude has led us to this state of affairs. I think that democracy would come out ahead. Governments could still fulfil their political programs, while accepting that particular points could be amended.
In my view, this is not a problem for government. It is not a vote of confidence in the government. If withdrawing a bill that seems to be disputed is not a vote of confidence, why should a partial amendment to a bill be considered a vote of confidence? The only difference is that in one case, the government itself decides to withdraw a bill, whereas in the other, a committee or the opposition uses a motion to ask the government to amend an aspect of its legislation.
I think that is possible. Significant progress would be made if such a recommendation were accepted by the government.
[English]
The Chair: Can I make a few comments? I've wrestled with this quite a bit, based on a couple of things.
Dr. Pagtakhan and I have both sat in opposition and in government. I'm always very aware that changes that we want to make around here should be appropriate. They should not depend on whether you're sitting in government or in opposition. They should be appropriate to the good functioning of democratic and responsible government. That's something I always bear in mind.
Second, I think the issue of accountability in Parliament is extremely important. If we can enhance the level of accountability of the government for its estimates through some of our recommendations, that would be a constructive thing.
Third, I think we have to look at it from both sides: the responsibility of the government and the responsibility of the opposition. As all of you know, I've been extremely concerned about the use of supply. They say ``are specifically to debate and hold the government accountable on the estimates''. They're not used in that way. I don't want to revisit the whole discussion that we had about supply days, but that's the other side of this issue. If the opposition isn't going to use the tools available to it to hold the government accountable on the estimates, I think it's failing in its responsibilities - perhaps as the government is if it overuses the confidence motion.
I don't debate the idea of opposition days. I think it's important that the opposition has opportunities to raise any issue it wants for discussion. But I think it also should have supply days on which the appropriate issues for it to raise are supply issues, and only supply issues. However, as I said, I'm not going to reopen that debate. Those two are different sides of exactly the same coin.
On Standing Order 81(3), that section does absolutely nothing whatsoever to prevent the introduction of amendments. What the Standing Orders do not do, though, is require, as they would for legislation, that a report and recommendation of a committee be debated in the context of that concurrence motion. Maybe we can work on something that places some onus on the introduction of those reports and recommendations in the debate, and I don't mean on the last day. You see, that's where I think we have to do something.
These supply days are there so that it's not a last-day debate, it's a 21-day debate in opposition to the estimates. They're not being used that way. We're sitting here talking as if there's only one day on which to put forward amendments. That's not true. Maybe it would be very helpful if we had a specified number of days in the supply period - no matter how few there are to start with - on which that's what happens: there's a motion to amend the estimates.
From the point of view that we have recommended that committees look at the whole cycle of supply, I would be very interested in seeing them more involved in influencing the next year's estimates. If they want to make changes to the estimates based on their knowledge of their field and their department, they should come forward with reallocation. And if we're going to encourage them to do that, I think it's only going to be effective if there is in fact some automatic way to ensure that those recommendations, and the reasons they've given for those recommendations, are debated in the House.
I don't know how we might best do that. We might in fact have a recommendation that when a committee has done that - when it has prepared a report and provided justification for its recommendation for reallocation - the recommendation should be deemed to have been moved and seconded, or that the chair and vice-chair of the committee or their designate shall move and second that report to the House in the context of the concurrence motion. That would accomplish what you want to see accomplished, but would start the discussion from the basis that these are the estimates and these are the amendments or changes that are proposed.
I don't think you can start treating the estimates like any other piece of legislation that might come before the House. In fact, they're more than what's happening in this department. With all respect, a committee that's focused on one department is not necessarily going to see things in the broader context. It may want to change something in its own department, but that may in fact have ramification in two or three other departments.
Anyway, that's my suggestion for one way in which we might accomplish this. It's also a lecture to the opposition parties, and to ourselves when we're back in that position.
An hon. member: That's a long way off.
The Chair: Rey's next, I think.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Madam Chair, you indicated that the opposition fails to use the business of supply as they ought to use it. In light of the discussions we have had so far, it could potentially be argued that the opposition really has not failed to use it, but because of the sense of anticipated frustration - using the argument that it can trigger the concurrence motion -
The Chair: No, not when it's done as part of an opposition day.
Mr. Pagtakhan: No, I'm saying that to move a motion or bring into the debate a reallocation, if the recommendation were in fact to be that it is separated from the concept of a vote of confidence, I think we will have achieved at least some of the sentiments being raised on having it separated while not triggering a concurrence motion, a vote of confidence. In other words, it would just be pro forma. There would be no ability to vote, because what we would be voting on would be the concurrence motion itself - all or none.
What I'm saying is that to argue that the opposition has not used the business of supply for supply and could not think of any other kind of idea may in part be a consequence, not of the opposition doing it but of a sense of frustration that it could not achieve a change on the estimates anyway, so it will therefore introduce this motion that there is nothing to do.
I am saying that because, when I introduced the motion on medicare, I didn't know anything about the business of supply, confidence motions or anything like that. I really had an idea that we should reaffirm our commitment to medicare. Perhaps it was an idealistic motion.
So when we look at this issue, I would like us to revisit the point of separating it. Let us make a decision on that, because whether we agree or not, it is a very critical question before the committee.
Second, if we look at that and cannot reach a consensus to make a change on it at this point, let us at least separate it so that when the motion or the business within the business of supply days has nothing to do with the supply itself or with the estimates themselves, obviously it ought not to be treated as a vote of confidence at the very least. That's my point of view. Let it stand up on its own.
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That's my submission at this time.
The Chair: Okay. John.
Mr. Williams: In response to your statements regarding supply days, etc., I would like to record my disagreement with your perception of the issue. The supply days have become a stylized way of responding to the historical right of Parliament to bring its grievances before the monarch prior to consideration of the request for funds. That was how the parliamentary system evolved in days of yore, when the king brought his request to Parliament for money. They said, before we even talk about what you want, you will listen to what we have to say...and how they represented their constituents.
As I said, that way of dealing with granting the business of supply - grievances before dealing with the business of supply - has ended up in a stylized format of certain days being allocated for the business of opposition motions. These are under the broad heading of the business of supply, but recognize that they are not necessary to deal with the granting of supply but the grievances prior to debating supply - a significant difference.
The Chair: This is blackmail, is it? If you want your money you have to listen to me for a few days first?
Mr. Williams: Well, that's very true. Very true. If you want something from me, you will listen to me first. It may be not a bad way of doing it. Our system has evolved that way.
So do not confuse the business of supply days with the business of supply. They are two separate things.
Dealing with the business of supply, again, I do take exception to your point that we cannot have a motion to amend. Standing Order 81(3) states, ``For the purposes of this Order, the business of supply shall consist of motions to concur''. It does not allow amendment. They shall only consist of motions to ``concur'' -
The Chair: That's what I was suggesting, though, that we be specific about -
Mr. Williams: - and ``restore'' and ``reinstate''.
The Chair: But any motion allows amendments, John. You know that.
Mr. Williams: But after the vote on the amendment you move back to the main motion. What is the main motion? A motion to concur.
The Chair: It could be concurrence as amended. If there is an amendment, it would then be concurrence as amended. Right?
Mr. Williams: But the point the government has always said - and Dr. Pagtakhan has stated this quite specifically - is that confidence is invoked for the slightest opportunity. I think you said yourself that not only have opposition parties sometimes had political motives in the motions they have introduced, but as well, sometimes the government has overreacted and been overly political in introducing confidence. The fact that the government has usually more votes than the rest of us means that what they want, they can have.
What I'm trying to do is introduce an opportunity for real amendment and a real opportunity to amend. I can assure you, if we do not change Standing Order 81(3) the entire work of this committee has been for nought. I cannot support the idea of a new committee to deal with the estimates. I cannot support this grandiose plan to debate and talk about changes, because we'll run up against a stone wall. It's that simple.
Standing Order 81(3) can be amended quite easily. It can also ensure that frivolous political tricks by political parties can be prevented at the same time. As I said, you can have a real motion to amend and a motion to concur as amended at the end of the day as two separate motions rather than tying one to the other.
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That is what I'm trying to say: Standing Order 81(3) must change. It can be changed and it can ensure that the government continues to enjoy the confidence of the House, but it can allow a real opportunity for the opposition to make its points - and not only the opposition but committees, which have, as we all know, a majority of government members sitting on them. If these committees make a recommendation, that recommendation, which is endorsed by a committee that has a majority of government members sitting on it, would have a real chance of being debated and voted upon.
The Chair: John, maybe I have a blind spot here, but the government puts forwards its position, amendments get moved, sometimes by government members, sometimes by opposition members, and then we vote on the government motion as amended or not amended.
Mr. Williams: A motion to concur -
The Chair: I may have a blind spot on this, but I don't think so. I don't think that's the important thing. The important thing is that the hard work of committees actually gets before Parliament for debate. And I'm suggesting that we can do that, in fact, with an amendment to Standing Order 81(3).
Mr. Williams: We only to have to look, Madam Chair, at the fact that these changes were introduced in 1968. In the last 30 years, there have been two changes. When there was a minority Liberal government, the government knocked $1,000 off the salary of the president of the CBC and I think it knocked $19,000 off a subsidy to CN Rail. They were two immaterial, irrelevant changes, but they happened when there was a minority government. The minority government of the day needed the support of another party whose members said they wanted to see a little change. I think they were upset with the president of the CBC at that time. So the government said, okay, we will give you two minor pyrrhic victories.
But the point I'm trying to make, Madam Chair, is that every time, even when your party was in opposition, you were totally and absolutely incapable of making any change - not even one cent - because Standing Order 81(3) stopped you dead in your tracks. And that's why -
The Chair: The opposition is incapable of making any changes. Only Parliament - Parliament in total - is capable of making changes.
Mr. Williams: Parliament in itself made no changes whatsoever, except when there was a minority government, when the government said that it must listen to Parliament, that it had to listen to Parliament. And ever since 1968, they have taken the allotted business of supply days, granted these 21 days for debate on issues of grievance, and restricted the debate on supply to a very short period of time, because - and I agree - we can't have the House tied up for months on end on the business of supply -
The Chair: No.
Mr. Williams: - and it's far better to have it dealt with in committee.
The Chair: Maybe there is -
Mr. Williams: But the point I'm trying to make is that every effort and every opportunity for rational debate and change, no matter how competent or how sensible the changes are, is stopped cold by Standing Order 81(3). That's why I say it has to change.
The Chair: I guess I'm just disagreeing with your interpretation of it.
Brian.
Mr. O'Neal: Again, I just want to make a number of comments for information purposes.
First of all, in terms of debating reports coming out of committees on the estimates, I just want to point out that Standing Order 81(13) indicates that supply days, and I quote:
- may be used for the purpose of considering reports from standing committees relating to the
consideration of the estimates therein.
The second concerns Standing Order 81(3), which Mr. Williams has been citing. I don't have a copy in front of me but it seems to me that there's a reference made to ``motions to restore or reinstate''. Would that not mean - and this is a question for you all to consider - if a committee were to reduce or eliminate an estimate, it would require the government to either accept that reduction or table a motion to reinstate or restore that eliminated estimate? Would that not then trigger debate?
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On the other hand, maybe the subcommittee members will decide that this particular standing order is too vague and you need to specify that you would like to see motions to amend estimates included in the business of supply. But that's entirely up to you.
I have one final thing to say. The subcommittee may decide that it might be prudent to call an expert witness on this particular issue and ask for his or her advice. I don't know how appropriate it would be to get someone from table research, but perhaps the Clerk of the House could be asked some of these more detailed questions which I don't remember having come up during the meetings we held.
The Chair: Rey.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Obviously we have to get an expert opinion on that. We have some varying interpretations. If the motion to reinstate remains a confidence motion, from my way of thinking, it does not answer the sentiment of John.
The Chair: It's not defined as a confidence motion in the Standing Orders. The government, in its head, defines whether it's a confidence motion. That's all. That section of the report says largely that a motion to concur is not a confidence motion unless the government says it's a confidence motion.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Must it have to say it at the beginning of debate?
The Chair: No, it doesn't. If it considers it to be a confidence motion, then it will treat it as a confidence motion.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Has there ever been any incident in the history of Parliament where a concurrence motion was deemed by a government of the day to not be a confidence motion, or has it been assured to be a confidence motion to the point that in the eyes of the public it remains a confidence motion whether written or not?
The Chair: A confidence motion is whatever the government decides is a confidence motion, as you found out on your motion to support medicare.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Yes, that's why I was thinking earlier about money matters and non-money matters.
The Chair: Whether you call it a concurrence motion or not, any money matter is still considered a confidence motion.
Mr. Pagtakhan: In that instance, the government did say it in debate as a basis to justify opposing the motion. My understanding at the time was - lack of knowledge of procedure - that it is hampered in its ability to say it is not a confidence motion because the perception or understanding, due to tradition, has made it such that during the business of supply any subject is always treated automatically as a vote of confidence.
If that is so, and it is the sentiment of this committee to clarify that, at the very least, in response to the sentiment raised by John, then we definitely have a duty to address that question. And the sentiment raised by -
The Chair: Perhaps if you read the section on confidence, you'll see that it is pretty well clarified. Concurrence is not a motion of confidence. It's only how the government treats it. It's not in the Standing Orders.
Mr. Williams: I didn't say that concurrence is confidence.
The Chair: I know you didn't.
Mr. Williams: I said one can reintroduce rather than build a concurrence or reinstatement. They are the only three motions allowed on that particular day. Rather than saying these are the only three motions that can be debated that day with amendments, if we're allowed, we can amend the Standing Orders to deal with motions and the final motion that day shall be a motion to concur as amended.
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The Chair: But they may not be amended.
Mr. Williams: Well, to concur or...I don't have the terminology in front of me, Madam Chair, but to concur in the estimates as they now exist - whatever the terminology may be - to allow for an amendment to be debated and voted on in its own right without its triggering the concurrence words.
The Chair: What is the amendment to?
Mr. Williams: Well, as I said, Madam Chairman -
The Chair: It's an amendment to what?
Mr. Pagtakhan: To allocate -
The Chair: If you're going to have an amendment, you have to have something before the House.
Mr. Williams: Madam Chair, as I said earlier, the Standing Orders can allow a blanket motion to amend without detail, just a blanket motion to amend. They allow a blanket motion to be introduced, and that blanket motion would therefore require a subamendment with detail. That way you can restrict the debate to a committee report or to one particular item. You can't run off and have umpteen different changes. When one issue is debated, one potential change is debated and voted on, we can perhaps introduce a second one within the same day.
At the end of the day, when these changes have been debated and voted on, the estimates can then be concurred in as amended, if they have been amended. Therefore, albeit it is in the same day, you remove this concurrence from every issue we're talking about.
I know I'm not that clear, Madam Chair. I'll maybe have to put down a written report to change Standing Order 81(3). But 81(3) as it is currently written will not allow a vote on an amendment without that vote also triggering concurrence, reinstatement, or reintroduction. That's the point I am trying to make.
The Chair: I'm going to hear from Mr. Laurin and then maybe suggest a way we can deal with this, if that's okay.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Madam Chair, I would suggest making a recommendation that would be worded more or less as follows: that carrying or defeating a motion on the business of supply will not automatically be interpreted as a vote of confidence or non-confidence in the government. For a matter of confidence to arise, there would have to be a specific request for a vote of confidence, but a vote on a supply motion should never be considered a vote of confidence or non-confidence in the government. One should not conclude that voting for or against a supply motion is calling confidence in government into question.
The difficulty arises because we say: If you vote against it, it is a vote of non-confidence. That is not necessarily the case. Associating the two things makes it more difficult to discuss the business of supply. If we dissociated the two, it could significantly improve work in committees. It would provide more of an opportunity for committee recommendations to be approved in the House without calling Parliament into question.
I would suggest adopting a recommendation along those lines and dissociating the issue of confidence from all supply motions, whether they are carried or defeated.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Pagtakhan.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Madam Chair, as I was hearing the submissions...we are halfway through here, and I think your suggestion is to have a specific motion for a vote of confidence, and all other motions - concurrence, or whatever they are - need not be a vote of confidence unless specifically there is a motion that this is a vote of confidence.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Could you repeat your comment? The interpreter missed it.
[English]
Mr. Pagtakhan: I just wanted to be sure. Did I hear you correctly that your proposition is that for any vote of confidence there has to be a clear motion on confidence?
Mr. Laurin: Yes.
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Mr. Pagtakhan: Now, if that were so, that is one step further from what John was saying.
My thinking at this point is that the budget is so major a policy of any government that automatically it ought to be a vote of confidence, and hence it does not have to be stated year in and year out when we vote on the budget. Automatically it ought to be a vote of confidence. That is my sentiment.
However, where I am trying to reconcile this issue is where an item within that budget is to be modified and the total will not be changed, but there is only a reduction or reallocation. That is where I would like to keep an open mind - to consider such an amendment for change, of reallocation and decrease but not an increase in the total, as a potential change or progress without triggering a vote of confidence. That I can see. But I would say that at the end of the day the budget as amended, or the budget as is, ought to be treated automatically as a vote of confidence, without stating any more.
Mr. Williams: It's interesting to note, Madam Chair, that our researcher, Brian, gave us the example where some number of years ago the government was actually defeated.
Was it on the estimates, Brian?
Mr. O'Neal: No, it was on an amendment to the Income Tax Act.
Mr. Williams: Okay. It had been deemed to be confidence. Since they lost that vote, all of a sudden that wasn't the confidence vote. They introduced a formal vote of confidence several days later. So they could say that the vote on the changes to the tax act were not the confidence vote; it was the formal one held later. It's the double standard that has crept in that has caused the problems we are dealing with.
I wouldn't go as far as my colleague Mr. Laurin, to insist that every vote of confidence be dictated as such. I understand the confidence convention. To recognize the confidence convention I would like these motions to amend or reduce to be debated and decided upon completely and there be, at the end of the day, a standard resolution or vote recognizing that Parliament has granted this amount of supply to the government.
That way you deal with one and then you deal with the other rather than wrapping it up into confidence and changes, where we end up in this muddy water of what we can or cannot do. The government applies confidence and nothing can change.
The Chair: I think we've been around the mulberry bush on this probably a little longer than I should have allowed it to go on. I know Dr. Pagtakhan has another meeting he has to get to.
I think there are a couple of issues here. Maybe we should give Brian some time to look at Standing Order 81 and other relevant sections of the legislation, but Standing Order 81 in the context.
It's my understanding that when that motion of concurrence in the global estimates is moved it's the first time the estimates have been moved in the House. When they're tabled they're immediately referred. There is no government motion, with respect. So you have to have a government motion putting the estimates before the House for approval or debate, amendment, or whatever happens. You have to have that motion, because that's the only time a government motion occurs on its own estimates.
I think we're all interested in making sure that any reasoned reports of committees proposing changes get put forward in the House and get debated in the House.
Mr. Williams: And voted upon.
The Chair: Yes, of course.
I'd like to suggest that we give Brian some time to look at this. If you have specific suggestions for recommendation, why don't you draft something up and share it with me, share it withMr. Laurin? We'll pass it around before we meet again on Thursday.
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What's becoming increasingly evident to me is that one of the problems here is the amount of time the House spends. If you have one day for notices from members and that's the only time and the only possibility for debating amendments to the estimates.... It seems to me that's where the problem is, or that's certainly one of the big sources of the problem.
Mr. Williams: The Standing Orders actually allow three, but we've historically just had one. Is that right, Brian?
Mr. O'Neal: That I would have to check, if you're talking about votable. It's true they are divided up by supply period.
Mr. Williams: Yes, five days are divided up by supply period -
Mr. O'Neal: That's right.
Mr. Williams: - but three days are allowed for the main estimates. But we use only one.
Mr. O'Neal: A special procedure is in place for the last allotted day, and it allows for notices of objection.
Mr. Williams: Yes, notices of objection, which trigger a motion to concur.
Mr. O'Neal: Right, in the item objected to.
Mr. Williams: That's right. A motion of objection triggers a motion of concurrence.
The Chair: Guys, I have to go to the House very shortly, probably, to defer a vote, so I wonder if we could adjourn and leave this with Brian.
John, if you could draft something, we'll make sure it gets to the other members of the committee.
Brian can do some consulting. If we decide it would be helpful to hear from the clerk on Thursday, we'll invite him to our meeting.
The Clerk of the Committee: That's pretty short notice.
The Chair: I know it's very short notice, but let's see where we are once we see what you want and once Brian has had a chance to look at it and consult.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: On another point, as was mentioned earlier, Brian, I would suggest including a chapter in the final version of the report with all of the recommendations in numerical order, right before the conclusion. For someone who does not want to read the entire document, it would be a good summary.
[English]
The Chair: Yes, I think that's a good idea.
Are we ready to move again on Thursday and to try to make some progress with this report?
Mr. Williams: I would like to meet Thursday, because I'm not sure if I'm going to be here next week.
The Chair: Okay. I really do want to wrap this up.
Mr. Williams: Moi aussi.
The Chair: If there are no objections, I now adjourn this meeting.