[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, February 4, 1997
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[English]
The Chair: Order. We are back to look at Bill C-55 and Ms Meredith's private member's bill, Bill C-254.
We have, live and in person, and also by videoconference from Vancouver, witnesses from the Canadian Bar Association.
Tamra Thomson, can you introduce your colleagues?
Ms Tamra Thomson (Director, Legislation and Law Reform, Canadian Bar Association): Yes, Madam Chair. I will introduce our presentation and then we will go to professors Jackson and Manson.
It is with pleasure that the National Criminal Justice Section appears before this committee today to present its views on Bill C-55. The Canadian Bar Association is a national association representing over 34,000 jurists across Canada. Amongst its primary objectives are improvement of the law and improvement of the administration of justice.
The submission we are presenting today was prepared by the Committee on Imprisonment and Release, part of the National Criminal Justice Section of the Canadian Bar Association. What we say today is presented on behalf of those two groups.
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With me to present the substance of our commentary, via videoconference, is Professor Michael Jackson, a professor at the University of British Columbia. As well, Professor Allan Manson, who's here with me, is a professor at Queen's University. Both are in the faculty of law.
These two gentlemen are members of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment and Release. I am informed by Professor Manson that between the two of them they have close to 50 years of experience, both as private lawyers and as academics, in matters relating to imprisonment and release.
I will ask Professor Jackson to begin the commentary on Bill C-55.
Professor Michael Jackson (Member, Committee on Imprisonment and Release, National Criminal Justice Section, Canadian Bar Association): Thank you, Madam Chairman.
That last comment regarding our accumulated 50 years of experience is rather a sobering thought.
Let me begin by making it very clear that the Canadian Bar Association supports the government's initiatives in seeking to have a differential response between those individuals who have committed less serious offences and those who have in fact committed the most serious offences, particularly those involving violence against women and children.
We understand that Bill C-55 is an attempt to address issues involving the most serious offenders within the criminal justice system. While we support that endeavour, we are of the view that the proposals contained in the bill in fact do not do justice to the issue and in fact raise considerable problems regarding efficacy and constitutionality.
As the committee members are aware, Bill C-55 has three primary components: changes to the dangerous offender legislation; introduction of a new long-term offender category; and changes to the provisions of section 810 in relation to recognizances. The conceptual theme that links all of these proposed amendments is that of preventive detention.
Preventive detention is an exceptional category of criminal intervention insofar as it focuses primarily upon the fear or risk of future crime rather than the commission of past offences. As such, it raises serious ethical and moral considerations.
I want to begin the first part of the submission by reviewing some of the historical experiences within Canada of preventive detention. We are of the view that understanding that history plays a critical part in your evaluation of the proposals currently before the committee.
In Canada we've had preventive detention since the late 1940s, first in the form of the habitual offender legislation and then the categories of criminal sexual psychopath and dangerous sexual offender. Both categories enabled a court to impose an indeterminate, indefinite life sentence. We've had experience of that for almost 30 years. Both those categories, like the current proposals, were designed to focus on a small group of dangerous predatory offenders who pose the most serious threat to public safety.
The actual experience from 1947 through to 1977, when the legislation was repealed in the form of the present dangerous offender legislation, was that despite the best intentions of the draftpersons of the legislation, the actual people who were caught within the net of preventive detention were largely people who, although grave social nuisances, were not in fact individuals who posed a serious threat of personal violence.
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In 1969 the Canadian Committee on Corrections reviewed the experience in the first 20 years and found that most of the individuals were not in fact serious dangerous offenders.
In fact, I did a study in the 1980s of some 18 men who remained in prison after the repeal of the legislation and I concluded that only one of them posed a serious threat to public safety, even though most of them had served longer sentences than those persons convicted of murder. So you have an example of preventive detention applied to people who are thought to be dangerous initially, but turned out not to be so, and yet who served amongst the longest sentences of anyone in the country.
As a result of that report, the government - the solicitor general and the justice minister - appointed a commission under Judge Stuart Leggatt, who reviewed the cases of some 87 men serving indeterminate sentences and recommended complete pardons in 73 of those cases, which gives you a sense of the overextension of preventive detention in the first 30 years of its application.
In 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the case of someone who was given an indeterminate sentence as a dangerous sexual offender in 1953 when he was 18, following his attempted rape of a young child. He served 37 years in prison and was denied parole by the parole board on the basis of evidence presented by their psychiatrist that he was a risk. That case went to the Supreme Court of Canada. Evidence had been presented on behalf of Mr. Steele by a defence psychiatrist and psychologist. Every judge who heard the case, including a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, found that in fact he was not a danger, that his imprisonment constituted cruel and unusual treatment, and ordered his release.
So our historical experience has been that where this legislation has existed, it has always posed the risk of overapplication to those persons who in fact are not dangerous. That's not been the only problem.
The Canadian Committee on Corrections, again reviewing the first 20 years of the experience, found that there was considerable regional disparity - so much so that almost half of the applications for preventive detention had been brought in British Columbia, and 80% or 90% of those in the city of Vancouver. The late Arthur Maloney, one of Canada's most distinguished criminal lawyers, looking at that experience, decried the almost irrational application of this legislation, which resulted in such an uneven and arbitrary application of the law. The Canadian Committee on Corrections said that legislation that was ``susceptible to such uneven application had no place in a rational system of corrections''.
It was the Canadian Committee on Corrections' recommendations that led to the present dangerous offender legislation, which has attempted to deal with some of those problems. But when we look at the last 20 years of experience - since 1977 - we find again that the present dangerous offender legislation has been applied unevenly across the country. What has changed is that now the preventive detention capital of Canada is Ontario, as opposed to British Columbia. But still, half of all applications are brought in Ontario; a full quarter are brought in British Columbia; and until last year none were brought in Quebec. That is very significant, because what it suggests is that in Quebec the criminal justice system has been able to address issues of dangerousness and dangerous offenders without invoking - let alone calling for the change - of the present provisions.
Moving from that historical experience to the impetus for Bill C-55, as we understand it the call for legislative change emerged primarily as a result of an inquest in 1992 in a horrific example of the system having gone wrong, when Mr. Fredericks, who was released before the expiry of his sentence on mandatory supervision, shortly thereafter murdered a young child in Toronto. The inquiry into that issue found that even though Mr. Fredericks in fact had committed offences that would have subjected him to an application for a dangerous - [Technical Difficulty - Editor] - and he would be subject to a dangerous offender application. But it has given rise to a call for change, when in reality, the response to the Fredericks experience, horrific as it was, is a better application of the existing provision.
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As a result of the Fredericks inquest, the Government of Canada appointed a task force to look at the whole issue of high-risk offenders, and it was out of the recommendations of that task force that you have Bill C-55.
The Canadian Bar Association supports many of the principles articulated by the task force - principles that talk about the need for proportionality between the degree of risk and the measures taken by the criminal justice systems; principles that talk about providing resources to identify those who are dangerous and providing the treatment resources to address their dangerousness, and the resources to address their supervision in the community.
The question is the balance between community protection and the requirements of procedural due process and the principles entrenched in the Charter of Rights.
Turning now to the particular proposals in Bill C-55 as they deal with the dangerous offender legislation, it is our view that the balance presently drawn by the existing provisions has in fact been reconfigured in a way that runs the risk of threatening the constitutionality.
The dangerous offender legislation was subject to constitutional challenge in the case of Lyons. The Supreme Court of Canada, in looking at the existing provisions, said they were carefully tailored and drew the appropriate balance between public protection against those who are truly dangerous and the need to protect against arbitrary application of the law, and also to ensure that those people were not detained for longer than their dangerousness required.
The Supreme Court of Canada looked at a variety of both substantive and procedural provisions in the legislation in concluding that it was constitutional. The problem with Bill C-55, from the Canadian Bar Association's perspective, is that it changes the balance. It changes some of those provisions that the Supreme Court of Canada found to be critically integral to the constitutionality of the present scheme.
Let me address some of those. The first part of Bill C-55 would take away the discretion that presently exists for a judge who has determined that someone is a dangerous offender - a discretion not to impose an indeterminate sentence but instead to impose a definite sentence. Bill C-55 would require a judge, having found someone to meet the criteria of dangerousness, to impose an indefinite life sentence.
That provision - that discretion - has been exercised in only a few cases, but that does not gainsay its significance in tailoring the legislation. The Supreme Court of Canada specifically talked about this discretion as being a mechanism by which a judge could tailor the legislation to the particular circumstances of the offender.
Let me give you an example of a case where it was applied, a case in British Columbia some ten years ago of a young man who essentially was locked up in various institutions from the time he was seven until into his twenties. After being paroled, he committed another offence involving the use of a weapon, although nobody was hurt, and the Crown brought a dangerous offender application against him.
He met the criteria. He had a past history of violence. His present offence was one of the triggering offences, and there was evidence that absent treatment, he might reoffend again in a serious way. The judge found him to be a dangerous offender.
The question then turned: was there a way of addressing his danger and risk without an indeterminate sentence? Extensive evidence was presented by psychiatrists and psychologists, saying that within seven years, if he resolved to deal with his problems and if treatment was provided, he in fact could turn his life around.
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The judge imposed a seven-year sentence, and this was a remarkable success story, one that you rarely hear about. This particular individual dealt with the treatment issues. He started to run marathons to raise money for disabled individuals. He enrolled in educational programs, got himself credits for a degree, was released on parole, and since that time has engaged in activities in which he helps street kids, people who come from backgrounds like himself. He has in fact done enormous work, and good work, in helping people leave the streets to try to find their way within the confines of a lawful society.
So there you have an example where a judge exercising the discretion that exists in the law was able to do justice, both to society - [Technical Difficulty - Editor] - having someone declared dangerous. What is the point if in fact you get a definite sentence instead of the indefinite sentence? It really is the argument that having done such hard work, the Crown should be rewarded for its efforts.
The issue, however, is one of proportionality. The present provision allows a judge to tailor the sentence to the offence and there are no compelling reasons for abolishing it. The Canadian Bar Association is of the view that abolishing it changes one of the significant incidences of that careful balance the Supreme Court of Canada looks to in finding the present legislation constitutional.
The second provision in Bill C-55 would change part of the procedure. At the present time at a dangerous offender hearing, evidence is called by the Crown and the defence. Each has the right to nominate a psychiatrist to give evidence regarding dangerousness. Bill C-55 would abolish that requirement. In its place, the bill introduces an overarching assessment that is viewed as being a neutral one in order to avoid the battle of the experts and to have before the court a neutral assessment, which will hopefully be state of the art, upon which the Crown and the court can place high value in determining the issues of dangerousness.
Again, there are a number of problems with this. In Lyons, the court specifically pointed to the fact that under the existing provisions, both the Crown and the defence have the ability to nominate an expert. In our view, that is a critical provision.
Bill C-55 makes a number of assumptions that we believe are questionable.
First of all, the ability to have a neutral assessment of dangerousness is questionable. The task force talked about the importance of having multi-disciplinary assessments, of using the best available evidence.
In fact, the evidence to date suggests that predictions of dangerousness are fraught with problems. Always in those predictions is the risk of error. The resources to provide multi-disciplinary assessments vary across the country. In many places they don't exist. Where they do exist they often exist in the form of institutional resources, which have a certain bias in favour of detention.
It is the Canadian Bar Association's view that given the issues involved in the dangerous offender application, given the highly contested issues of the reliability of scientific judgments about dangerousness, given the highly contested issues of the balance between the right of the public to protection and the right of an individual not to be detained without justification, the adversary process is in fact the appropriate process.
Requiring psychiatric evidence from both the Crown and the defence is in fact the best process. It's within the crucible of that adversarial process of cross-examination and questioning that a judge, and ultimately it is a judge, will determine whether in fact this individual is dangerous and whether this individual should be sentenced to the most draconian sentence in the system.
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So we support the existing recommendations, and we see no compelling reason for changing that, again, critical part of the existing balance.
The third part of the legislation would allow the Crown to bring an application for a dangerous offender within the six months after a person has already been sentenced in a normal criminal proceeding, so long as notice has been given prior to sentence that such an application was made.
That is intended to permit the Crown to compensate for any lack of prior investigation when the case first comes before the court. But again, we question whether that is necessary, given other measures that have been introduced already as a result of the task force report.
One of the things that came out of the task force report was the recognition that amongst existing law enforcement agencies and existing crown counsel, often people slip through the cracks. Someone who commits an offence in Vancouver may in fact have a record in Ontario and that record was slow in coming to British Columbia, with the result that the combined knowledge of law enforcement and correctional authorities didn't become known until too late in the day to bring the dangerous offender application.
The task force recommended, and the Solicitor General last year introduced, reforms that didn't require legislation to address that issue. Now, under a crown files flagging system, on potential candidates for dangerous offender, information is shared between law enforcement, correctional, and crown agencies, and therefore the need for a six-month window, as it were, has been rendered unnecessary from the point of view of effective, efficient law enforcement and prosecution.
The other concern we have is that this provision has serious problems in terms of its constitutionality. It challenges the important concept of finality and also raises serious issues in terms of double jeopardy.
The fourth element of Bill C-55 is one that would shift the present system that allows for a review by the National Parole Board after three years, and then two years thereafter. Bill C-55 would push the threshold of the first parole review to seven years so that someone who is given the indeterminate sentence would have to serve seven years before being given a review.
In actual fact, this would not make much difference in practical terms, because to our knowledge no one has been paroled within that seven-year window. However, in looking at the existing provisions, the Supreme Court of Canada placed particular emphasis upon the parole review provisions and it said that absent those provisions it would have grave problems regarding the constitutionality of the dangerous offender legislation.
But it was the availability of regular reviews starting after three years and every two years thereafter that ensured that the parole board will be looking at all of these individuals and asking the questions: Have they responded to treatment? Are they still dangerous? Can their risk be managed in the community?
By moving the threshold to seven years, by taking away the discretion not to impose the indeterminate sentence, by opening up the threshold of opportunity, and then, in combination, viewing all those provisions, the Canadian Bar Association is of the view that if there was another challenge to the dangerous offender legislation with these amendments in place, the Supreme Court of Canada would take a very different view.
But over and above the issue of constitutionality, there is the issue of why it is necessary. Why is it necessary to change a system that has worked, a system that has now been improved through administrative measures? Why is it necessary to change legislation, which runs the risk of rendering the whole scheme unconstitutional and will not in fact demonstrate significant additional benefits in terms of public protection but runs the real risk in terms of the historical experience of in fact subjecting some individuals to imprisonment far beyond what their crimes deserve and their risk of dangerousness requires?
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Professor Manson will address the committee on the other provisions of Bill C-55 dealing with the long-term offender category and section 810.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Jackson.
Professor Manson.
Professor Allan Manson (Member, Committee on Imprisonment and Release of the National Criminal Justice Section, Canadian Bar Association): I notice we've run a bit beyond the allotted time, so I'm in your hands, Madam Chair.
The Chair: No, that's fine. Carry on.
Prof. Manson: I urge you all to read this submission. Michael gave you a summary of it, but a lot of time by a lot of people who are quite knowledgeable went into this material. In our view, it's quite well-researched and we very much urge you to read it.
In general, the Canadian Bar Association is opposed to expanding the net of preventive detention. We already have a dangerous offender regime; we have section 810.1 of the Criminal Code. Surely, that's enough.
The leading authority in the United States on the ability of scientists and clinicians to predict dangerousness is John Monahan. He recently received one of the huge MacArthur's Genius Awards and is doing his research on the prediction of dangerousness. In the early 1980s he said it couldn't be done and in two out of three cases where someone is declared to be dangerous those declarations are wrong.
Even though he's now more optimistic than he was 15 years ago, in the sense that he recognizes that some techniques, especially actuarial prediction in combination with other models - and I'm sure you'll be hearing from people who advocate these models - his view is that even if you get better you never move beyond the profound moral, ethical, and legal questions that preventive detention carries with it. That is the position of the Canadian Bar Association. We have certain measures now, and Canada ought not to be the world leader in preventive detention. That's nothing to be proud of.
Let's look at our current statistics with respect to violent crime. The murder rate has gone down again. It is the lowest it's been since 1974. The rate of violent crime has gone down since 1992, and we've had a dramatic decrease between 1994 and 1995 - 4.1% nationally.
That's interesting because in Quebec, where Michael just pointed out there has only been one occasion in which the dangerous offender legislation has been used, in 1995 the violent crime rate decreased 7.5%, which compares favourably with Ontario, where the decrease was 4.3%, and British Columbia, where it was only 3.3%.
Let's look at the groups this legislation is apparently intended to protect: children and women. Let's be very serious. Children are at risk of harm. The greatest sources of that risk are their immediate family, their extended family, and acquaintances. It is only in a very small proportion of cases where children are victimized by strangers. Let's look at women. Women are at risk of harm in the community, whether it be violence or sexual violence. The greatest sources of that risk are spouses, ex-spouses, dates, boyfriends, and acquaintances.
So while we all agree that it's important to protect people who are especially vulnerable in the community, this legislation doesn't do it.
I'll say a few brief things about long-term offenders in proposed section 810.2 and then move on to questions. The long-term offender regime will create a new category with a lower threshold than dangerous offenders, whereby people can be sentenced to penitentiary terms for a minimum of two years, but perhaps more, and then have periods of supervision attached that, while the legislation says ``not to exceed 10 years'', will always be 10 years. By definition it has to be. If a judge is of the view that there is a substantial risk to reoffend, surely that won't have any cap. If you say on January 1, 1997, this person represents a substantial risk to reoffend, you can't say for a month or for six months or for two years, so it's always going to be ten years of supervision.
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In our view this is unnecessary, it's potentially unconstitutional, and other alternatives are available whereby supervision for shorter periods can be provided, with regular renewal by judges. That's what is missing here. It's this huge period of control and confinement, the jump from the current regime of fixed sentences and lifetime indeterminate sentences to including this huge jump: penitentiary sentences plus ten years of potential confinement and control.
About proposed section 810.2, surely section 810.1 fills the bill if there is a need here. The current provision doesn't require a triggering offence. It doesn't require a previous conviction. The threshold is extremely low, the risk is unspecified. It not only results in a twelve-month recognizance but with very onerous conditions, including electronic monitoring, which is clearly a very intrusive measure. Clearly liberty interests are implicated. Again, section 810.1, the constitutionality of which is currently before the courts, must satisfy whatever need there is to expand the net. Proposed section 810.2 is unnecessary, and in our view likely unconstitutional.
To wrap up, I would like to read you the conclusion to our submission, because I think it makes the point very succinctly.
Rather than dedicating scarce resources to measures that attempt to predict violence and control among a handful of individuals, public protection would be better assured by using those resources to alleviate poverty, to improve health services and educational opportunities, and to remedy family dysfunction. These socio-economic measures, coupled with treatment and rehabilitation programs designed to reduce recidivism, would better prevent crime. By focusing inordinate attention on preventive detention, resources are misdirected.
That is the view of the Canadian Bar Association, and we come here to urge you to show some leadership on these issues. Whatever party you come from, show some leadership.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Crête.
[Translation]
Mr. Crête (Kamouraska - Rivière-du-Loup): Thank you for your excellent presentation. You have given us an interesting demonstration of the efficiency of our current system. However, since you are experts in this field, I would like to ask you what you feel is the best way of handling the problem facing MPs, namely what to do about specific cases of individuals falling through the cracks.
In this area, even though nine cases out of ten may be successes, it's obviously the tenth that makes the headlines and attracts attention. In that respect, we should be aiming for a system of zero tolerance.
I would like you to give us the benefit of your expertise, as regards your awareness of a variety of experiences, including those of other countries. Can you give us examples of countries that have taken the approach you are advocating, with good results? And, conversely, what kind of results have countries that take a more punitive approach had, compared to both overall results and specific results in the difficult cases that can arise?
[English]
Prof. Manson: Certainly there are specific tragedies to which our attention quickly moves. The Stephenson case is a good example. The prosecutors in the early 1980s were not as aggressive as they now would be, I have absolutely no doubt about that. The Correctional Service failed to use the detention provisions that are contained in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act because they misunderstood them at the time. I have no doubt that those steps would be taken now.
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So along with the process of sharing information and flagging what Professor Jackson talked about and what was recommended by the federal-provincial task force, there's every reason to expect that the really bad cases will become apparent to the authorities and to expect that the authorities will invest the appropriate resources.
Zero tolerance, I fear, can never be achieved, because you may well be talking about a situation like Bernardo's. He had no previous convictions for related matters. It would be impossible to create a system based on risk prediction that would find that kind of a person. I just don't know of any way that you could do that.
You asked about other countries. There are countries that invest a lot of resources in therapeutic regimes. There is this notion that pedophilia, for example, is incurable but can be controlled. There are various treatment modalities that have different degrees of success. Resources ought to be directed to those areas. There are countries that have moved towards a therapeutic regime.
With respect to preventive detention, the Australian experience is very different. Like England, Australia rejected long preventive detention akin to our dangerous offender regime. In New South Wales and in Victoria, where that terrible case arose, they passed a specific bit of legislation directed to that person, permitting the Attorney General to go to a court and satisfy the court that the person met a very high standard that would permit continued detention of that person to be renewed regularly by that court.
In this way both the political people - the Attorney General - and the courts are accountable for this enormous intrusion. By enormous intrusion we mean incarcerating someone because of risk rather than because of what they've done.
So I think the answer is that there are alternatives. We can't expect the world to become perfect, but there are alternatives, and there are other ways in which we could be spending our resources rather than trying to use the criminal justice system to respond to wrecked psyches.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Crête.
Ms Meredith.
Ms Meredith (Surrey - White Rock - South Langley): Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Jackson, I want to follow up on some of the comments you made. You said the Bar Association supports the endeavour of protecting women and children. You also mentioned that the purpose of or the intention of the dangerous offender legislation that is presently in place is directed towards predatory offenders, offenders who are not domestic offenders, an offender who is not the spouse or the father or the stepfather, but a predator who seeks satisfaction, if you will, by seeking out victims.
You also commented that you felt the existing legislation was adequate because it dealt with determinate as well as indeterminate sentences.
I want to pose this to you: Bill C-254, my private member's bill, does allow for determinate sentences or indeterminate sentences. It does allow for a prosecutor and a defence attorney to submit expert testimony or assessments by psychiatrists. The big difference, of course, is that Bill C-254 talks about being able to do it after the time of sentencing when an individual is incarcerated and further information comes up or his behaviour indicates that he is a genuine risk to society. It talks about him being allowed to go into a dangerous offender hearing, so he would still have the judicial process where you can have competing interests trying to bring the facts of the case to light.
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I take it you have a problem more with it being done after sentencing, as opposed to the process. Am I clear on that?
Prof. Jackson: I think the best way for me to approach that, Ms Meredith, is that the proposal in your bill, as I understand it, was something the Canadian Bar Association reviewed in its original incarnation several years ago when the then Solicitor General, Mr. Lewis, introduced a proposal that I believe has substantial similarities to your own private member's bill. At that point, we were of the view that it raised substantial problems in relation to constitutionality.
Again, it was well-intentioned. It was directed to a clear, pressing, and substantial concern of protecting the public from high-risk offenders. But we were concerned that doing that at the end of the sentence, after someone had served their full term, raised overwhelming problems of double jeopardy and also ran the risk that those individuals who might think they would be subject to such an application would in fact do their time without receiving treatment, without talking to anybody, so that you would not be able to gather information on them to determine their risk.
Those issues were ones that were actually experienced in the state of Washington.
Prof. Manson: He was about to say that the sexual predator legislation in the state of Washington has been declared unconstitutional - [Inaudible - Editor] -
As well, the federal-provincial task force looked very carefully at that proposal and described it as unworkable, ineffective, and extremely expensive.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): When Mr. Manson was speaking his microphone wasn't on. Can we clarify that it would have been picked up?
Prof. Manson: I apologize to Mike. I only jumped in because I see we've lost the technology.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): But you forgot to say the magic word. You say ``Jackson'' and he comes back.
Prof. Manson: Jackson.
Ms Meredith: Madam Chair, it does cause me some concern that we are seeing witnesses from British Columbia in this way. I feel it's very difficult for me to feel we're getting adequate representation when we continually lose communication with these people.
Following up, assuming that at some point Mr. Jackson will join us, and talking about the unconstitutionality of the private member's bill and of Bill C-55, then I ask you, how do you propose that we protect Canadians, Canadian women and Canadian children, from individuals who are presently in the system who, for whatever reasons, did not get picked up at the time of sentencing, who have shown by their refusal to take treatment while incarcerated and by their behaviour while incarcerated that they are a great threat to women and children, and even to male persons, if they are released into society? How do you assure Canadian women and children and others that their rights under the Constitution for freedom and security of person will be respected and upheld?
Prof. Manson: The law enforcement authorities have - assuming that these people exist where you can point those fingers, and if the classic case is Boudreau, let me tell you, I sat in with the permission of the chair of the National Parole Board on those parole board hearings, and the way in which that man has been painted as a monster by the media and by politicians is outrageous, given the kinds of offences he committed and given the evidence that was before the parole board.
So there is this whole form of mob hysteria that gets easily generated by the assumption that we can find these people and we know who they are and we have nothing to do. Number one, we don't have that ability.
Ms Meredith: That is your impression.
Prof. Manson: Yes.
Number two, we have law enforcement authorities that have surveillance abilities. We have section 810.1, which permits the law enforcement authorities to take someone in front of a court and get a recognizance with very careful conditions in it that will last for a year. We have other resources we ought to be using to permit people, to encourage people, to pursue treatment, to pursue relapse-prevention therapy. You don't do that by hounding someone underground.
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If you're really concerned about protecting women and children, with all due respect, I would suggest you go to the leader of your party and ask him to go to Minister Martin and talk to Minister Martin about transfer payments, so provinces and territories have the resources to deal with the problems within families, the problems young children have, the problems within our institutions. Many of these people with these wrecked psyches have grown up in our own institutions. We don't provide the resources, and then later someone yells lock them up, lock them up, lock them up, when it's too late. I would suggest that's what you do, with all due respect.
Ms Meredith: Without making this a political debate, you will find it is the Liberal government that has reduced the transfer payments to the provinces that would deal with this.
Prof. Manson: I appreciate that. That's why I suggested you speak to your leader and have him speak to Minister Martin.
Ms Meredith: Not only that, sir, I don't think it's appropriate to bring a political discussion into this at this time.
What I would ask you, though, is when you talk about the resources being spent for the police community to be monitoring these individuals whom they do suspect are going to reoffend, and when you talk to us on the committee about saving resources by different measures, how can you say in one area you're going to save money by not having supervision of these individuals after sentencing, yet you are saying supervision before they find another victim is the way to go?
Prof. Manson: I don't believe we've ever said that.
Ms Meredith: If you go back in the transcript, I think you will find somebody here said the cost of the supervision program is such that the resources would be better spent -
- Rather than dedicating scarce resources to== alleviate poverty, to improve health services and
educational opportunities, and to remedy family dysfunction.
I pass on that.
Prof. Manson: We can debate who is in penitentiaries, but I assure you they're very largely represented by the poor and by the mentally ill.
Ms Meredith: And the lawyers who commit fraud, embezzlement? I don't think so.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you. That would be ten minutes, as it turns out.
[Translation]
Mr. Telegdi, you have ten minutes.
Mr. Telegdi (Waterloo): Thank you, Madame Chair.
[English]
Mr. Manson, I wish you had not made those political statements. But so be it. I would just point out to you that nationally the debt is double the per capita debt of Ontario. Also, to the extent that we make transfers to the provinces, we have absolutely no control, as we don't have in the province of Ontario, against having that money used as tax cuts instead of being directed to any programs.
I much appreciate many of the things you said, particularly on this issue, because when I look at my home province I see many of the preventive programs that have been put in place over many years, such as the programs to assist the victims of crime, to assist spouses who are guilty of domestic violence, to assist women in shelters - and the latest one is that the bail programs have been cut by the Province of Ontario, which is going to be very, very expensive to the people of the province of Ontario. It's later that we are going to be seeing the bills and paying the bills.
I guess what I'm grappling with in many ways is our model of the judicial system. If you compare us with the Europeans, we're doing badly. If you compare us with the Americans, we're doing much better than they are. There's no question the Americans have capital punishment, are much more punitive, and have jails, but they're starting to find out they can't keep all those people in jails and pay for them. A lot of folks shouldn't be in jail, and they're coming to that realization.
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When you talk about making sure we apply precious resources in the right direction - and you brought up the Bernardo case - I can't help but think of the point in time when the police had the DNA samples in the lab and there were inadequate resources to do DNA testing. Had the DNA testing been done on time, we would have cut short Bernardo's crime streak and we would have probably stopped the murders that occurred. This all came down to resources, having it allocated at the right place. This was simply a matter of having some more people in the DNA lab doing the testing.
I am concerned with the pressure we seem to be putting on our judiciary more and more. We are restricting their freedom to give out appropriate sentences. As we tie the hands of the judiciary, I am afraid we're going to be misdirecting more funds. Instead of dealing with the problem to prevent crime, we're going to be misdirecting it and spending it on locking people up.
As for crime rates, the perception of crime is much higher than the reality of crime. When we talk about judicial sentences, if the perception of the appropriateness of the sentences is gleaned from the media, it would seem the judges are not doing their jobs, but if it's done on the basis of people reading the transcripts, the evidence seems to indicate that the public believes the judicial system is being a bit too harsh. In some ways we are involved in a perception exercise.
Depending on what kind of society we have, we cannot as a society guarantee there's no risk to anybody. But surely we should be looking at models where there are fewer violent offences, less violence, instead of looking south of the border, which probably represents the worst of all kinds of systems and has produced the worst results.
Would you address a couple of those points: one, the allocation of resources; two, tying the judiciary's hands; and three, what can we do to combat the fact that the perception of the crime rate is much higher than the reality?
Prof. Manson: Certainly. I will start with the resource question.
The only reason I mentioned Minister Martin is I wanted to keep the discussion in the federal sphere, because that's where we are, but it's obviously an issue for all governments. You're absolutely right about what's been happening in Ontario. I certainly agree with everything you said. If we were at Queen's Park rather than in Ottawa, I would have made different comments directed to different people.
The resource issue is a critical one all around the country. Many of the resources that plug into the criminal justice system must be provided provincially. The probation services and the various other health care and treatment resources are provided provincially and territorially. There's huge disparity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in each jurisdiction they're shrinking.
With respect to perception, you're right that the public believes we have more violent crime than we do. But let me tell you one truth that is very important to recognize. Since 1980 our jail populations have increased by 50%. Just since 1990-91 the increase provincially was 11.1% and federally over 23%. And in the most recent audit year, federally it appears admissions have remained stable.
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So if admissions are stable but the average numbers are increasing, what does that mean? It means people are getting longer sentences and there are fewer paroles. So there's no question that our criminal justice system, in its application, is becoming harsher, even though people believe it's not, whereas crime rates, especially violent crime rates, are being reduced.
It's very important that people in Ottawa who play leadership roles in the community be frank with the community about what is really happening. You're absolutely right that we cannot guarantee a risk-free community. Any time people live collectively, cooperatively, there will be risks.
You raised the Bernardo case. I should point out that Ontario, through the auspices of Mr. Justice Archie Campbell, conducted a very careful review of all the police and forensic processes, and they found the kinds of errors you're talking about. Some of those are attributable to resources and some of them may have other explanations, but the kinds of resources we're concerned about are not simply the law enforcement resources; they're the resources in the community.
Let me give you an example. Evidence is quite clear today that if you take children six to nine years old and look for the group that experiences three factors - behavioural difficulties in school, functional cognitive intellectual difficulties, and parenting problems at home - you're likely looking at young people who will experience antisocial behaviour later on, and you may well be looking at criminals.
At the same time, experts tell us if you're going to address those problems, you have to address all three of them or you solve nothing. In other words, we have enormous expertise in terms of what will produce better citizens in the future, and it requires resources in the schools, in the homes, in our hospitals, and in our public institutions. Those are disappearing.
We talk about this exercise being one of misdirection. Instead of having these debates, instead of sucking up resources with these debates and with these new processes, such as long-term offenders, etc., let's put those resources where they ought to be: in the schools, in the homes, and in our public institutions.
It's a simple message and I know it may even sound naive, but if we adopted some basic principles like that and pursued them for the next 30 years, I'd be prepared to wager we'd be looking at a different country when we came back - a much better country, a much safer country, a country that provides the kinds of protections Ms Meredith and everyone else around the committee wants to see.
I'm sorry if that isn't an accurate or complete answer to your question, but it's an effort.
Mr. Telegdi: Could you touch on judicial discretion?
Prof. Manson: The point Professor Jackson made?
Mr. Telegdi: Yes.
Prof. Manson: I see we're back to the technical.
Perhaps, Michael, you'd like to go back to the argument about why judicial discretion in the dangerous offender -
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): I guess we need to clarify if Mr. Jackson actually heard that point.
Mr. Jackson, did you hear that?
Prof. Jackson: What I heard was the question about judicial discretion. Was there a context to that beyond what I heard?
Mr. Telegdi: I expressed a concern that judicial discretion is getting narrower and narrower. That's in light of the fact that if you look at Anthony Doob's studies, the public is much more supportive of the judicial decision if they get their information from the transcripts versus the media.
When we deal with crime it's very easy to have it sensationalized. The media's reporting of it often leaves a lot to be desired, so there's a perception created in the community. Of course one of the ways we respond to that is by limiting judicial discretion. I think we do ourselves a disservice, because we're taking it away from an individual whose job is to determine appropriateness of sentence.
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Prof. Jackson: I agree entirely with you. One of the gravest concerns of the Canadian Bar Association, particularly the Committee on Imprisonment and Release, in reviewing government initiatives over the last decade is the extent to which the initiatives have responded to a public perception it gathers from media accounts that is at odds with the realities of the criminal justice system. Professor Doob's study and the Archambault report from the Canadian Sentencing Commission talked about that in spades.
In relation to the dangerous offender provisions, it's certainly our view - and I think it's the Supreme Court of Canada's view - that the ability of a judge, having heard the best evidence, to decide whether or not the ultimate sanction - and I use that term advisedly - The indeterminate sentence is in many ways the most draconian measure we can bring against a prisoner. It often means life in prison or terms in prison substantially beyond the terms people who've been convicted of murder serve. A judge should be able to evaluate all the evidence and determine whether this is one of those exceptional individuals who is so dangerous that we have to invoke that measure against him or her.
I think the public perception that judicial discretion is somehow being abused is not well-documented in terms of the dangerous offender legislation. Relatively few people have been given the benefit of that discretion, but those few have been determined by judges to be worthy of sentences commensurate with their offences and risk, but falling short of indeterminate life sentences.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you, Professor Jackson. That's well over the time that should have been allotted, but it was great to have you back in from Vancouver.
[Translation]
Mr. Crête, you have five minutes.
Mr. Crête: I must say, from the outset, that I pretty much agree with your approach. When I talked about zero tolerance earlier, it was in relation to the subjectiveness of the process in relation to people already identified as being likely to commit a criminal act. We will receive popular support for these measures only if we can show people there are successes, and that cases are not slipping through the cracks.
My question, which is quite specific, has to do with whether there are any additional measures that could be taken to reduce the number of unfortunate incidents. Here I am obviously referring to convicted criminals, not people with no criminal record. In their case, I really don't think we can expect the system to predict criminal behaviour. I am talking about cases involving repeat offenders and the things we can do to avoid seeing these failures used as fodder by the public.
[English]
Prof. Manson: There are two points I'd like to make. First, there's a lot to be learned from the Quebec approach, which, rather than looking to long-term preventive detention, has put its resources into treatment facilities using the existing sentencing process and treatment facilities.
Secondly, I'd like to point out that one of the arguments that always persuades me that expanding the net of preventive detention is wrong-headed is to ask the question, which group in the community presents the greatest risk of causing harm in the future? I think the answer to that is easy: alcoholics with driving licences. That's the group most likely to cause the most harm in the future, and we provide in the Criminal Code for a fourteen-day mandatory sentence for a subsequent conviction. If I suggested to you that we should be saying long-term confinement, either lifetime or minimum penitentiary term and ten years supervision, everyone would stop for a minute and say no, something is wrong with that.
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Why would you say that? You would say that because maybe you know somebody in that kind of situation. Maybe you've been there yourself. But when we talk about this very small group of sex offenders, it's too easy to paint people as monsters, as the other, and to point a finger and say therefore the answer is clear.
In truth the answer is not so clear. We don't have the ability to predict the risk. When we do in a small group of cases, we have the 120 dangerous offenders serving lifetime indeterminate sentences. That's probably about the extent of the cases where we can actually predict. Everything else is iffy.
You won't do it for impaired drivers because it bothers you. I think you have to look very carefully at that distinction and you will start to understand why we're so concerned about widening the net of preventive detention. It's not because we're not concerned about potential victimization. It's because it's just not right, ethically and morally, when you don't have the resources to say, as Ms Meredith was saying a minute ago, what about the person? I'm saying we can't identify that person.
[Translation]
The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Torsney): Mr. DeVillers, you have five minutes.
[English]
Mr. DeVillers (Simcoe North): Thank you, Madam Chair.
Looking at the brief, I see the comments on constitutionality under the heading of ``Dangerous Offenders''. I'm wondering if those comments apply to the other provisions on long-term offenders or the amendments to section 810 on recognizance and electronic monitoring. If not, what is the Canadian Bar position on constitutionality in those two areas? Also, I notice in the brief there's no comment on the low-risk offenders. Does the Canadian Bar have a position on those provisions of the bill?
Prof. Manson: First, about constitutionality, I think Lyons, the 1987 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, is a general analysis by the Supreme Court of the whole question of preventive detention. So our critique of Lyons as it applies to dangerous offenders and our concern that these changes to the dangerous offender regime dramatically change the whole matrix, such that the Supreme Court may have a very different view - Most of those comments apply equally in the sense that we're looking at lower thresholds. By that I mean the Crown having to make a lower showing in terms of future risk, future dangerousness. Under proposed section 810.2 there isn't even the past offence. It's simply that the Attorney General has the reasonable fear.
In general, our concerns about clause 7 and over-breadth apply equally to both long-term offenders and proposed section 810.2. Our concerns about arbitrariness, the absence of the carefully designed, carefully tailored mechanism, apply equally. In our view these are two mechanisms that will be subjected to very careful constitutional scrutiny. The arguments made in Lyons are going to be very difficult to mount again, especially when there is absolutely no empirical evidence about the need to expand the preventive net. There is no evidence that there is any increase or rash in the kinds of crimes that seem to be contemplated.
Mr. DeVillers: The brief says that for these reasons the legislation is placed at risk of being declared unconstitutional. Could you give us a better assessment of that risk? How dangerously at risk is it?
Prof. Manson: If I could look at long-term offenders for a second, what was very important to Mr. Justice LaForest was the existence of the serious personal injury offence as the trigger. That doesn't apply to the long-term offenders. There's a stipulated list of offences, with much lower maximum penalties, obviously considered to be less grave offences. So that characteristic that supported constitutionality doesn't exist.
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The balance of competing psychiatric evidence won't happen in the long-term offender cases either, because again, it imports this overarching assessment - the multi-disciplinary assessment - rather than the competing experts' views.
Various procedural safeguards that apply to the existing dangerous offender provision won't be applicable to long-term offenders. So the kinds of arguments that the Crowns were able to make about focusing on a small group of people and doing the best they can to tailor the process to that small, arguably dangerous group, that general approach, can't be made in regard to the long-term offenders in various ways.
So when you compare that to the clause 7, clause 9 and clause 12 analysis in Lyons, there has to be very serious concern that it will fail. One can't predict, but if it violates one of those sections and it's up to the Crown to justify, what evidence can they possibly bring forward when there is no empirical data to show the need?
The argument in the task force report about the need for long-term offenders is this: what happens when the Crown tries to make the case for dangerous offender status and doesn't succeed? The report tries to argue that maybe they shouldn't go home without something, but that's not much of an argument upon which to mount a whole new regime, surely, because they go home with a fixed sentence. There is always a fixed sentence, and it should be the appropriate and just fixed sentence. If it's a long one that's warranted by the circumstances, so be it. It's a fixed one.
Mr. DeVillers: I think I heard you say ``very serious risk''. Is that -
Prof. Manson: That would be our view, but one can't predict.
Mr. DeVillers: Okay.
The other point on the low-risk offenders and the provisions of the bill that -
Prof. Manson: Can you tell me which specific ones?
Mr. DeVillers: Just on some of the measures, some of the balance that I think the bill contains by the measures that were in the legislation dealing with changes on the low-risk offenders - I noticed there was no comment in the brief. Does the Bar Association have a position on that?
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): It's one-sixth rather than one-third for non-violent, low-risk offenders.
Prof. Manson: That's the change in parole eligibility.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): That's right.
Prof. Manson: We already have the accelerated parole reviews under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. In fact, that provision makes it a longer period. It's one-sixth or six months, whichever is the greater, because there have been arguments about whether it should be one-sixth even if your sentence is 24 months. One-sixth of 24 months is four months. That provision will make it one-sixth or six months, whichever is the lesser. It will increase the threshold for accelerated paroles.
The Canadian Bar Association certainly supports the whole idea of accelerated paroles. We support the idea that large numbers of people don't need to be incarcerated and certainly don't need to be incarcerated for long periods of time.
Mr. DeVillers: Thank you.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you.
Madam Meredith.
Ms Meredith: Thank you, Madam Chair.
Would it be fair to say, after looking at your summary of recommendations, that you feel Bill C-55 should be discarded?
Prof. Manson: Yes.
Ms Meredith: Earlier, you spoke about crime prevention, particularly with children. I don't think there is anybody in this room who would disagree with more resources for and more emphasis on those areas.
But I do want to ask you about something else. You said that the number of people in our jails can't be justified and that many of the people in our jails shouldn't be there. Over this period of 30 years, during the time that it takes for greater programs to take effect, to change the way society presents itself and to change the behaviour of individuals, who do you propose should be incarcerated? Who do you propose should be removed from society? Do you think anybody should be?
Prof. Manson: Yes. People who cause harm, especially physical harm, and represent dangers ought to be subject to imprisonment as an ``incapacitative'' tool.
Ms Meredith: How long do you keep somebody who will cause harm or has caused harm?
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Prof. Manson: We're talking about someone who has caused harm.
Ms Meredith: Okay, has caused harm - somebody who, because of their behaviour, because of their personality, because of who they are, is likely to cause harm. How long should they be kept incarcerated?
Prof. Manson: Last September 3, 1996, this Parliament saw the proclamation into force of its own legislation, Bill C-41, and section 718.1 makes it a fundamental principle of our sentencing system that proportionality be brought to bear, proportionality meaning in terms of the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. I agree with the comments earlier about judicial discretion. We have experienced members of the bench who aren't shy to impose very long sentences when proportionality warrants it.
Another part of Bill C-41 was the principle of restraint, which is the flip side, that the penal sanction should be used with economy and only where necessary. That's what section 718 of the code says now. These are brand-new amendments, and I would hope that our judges take them both very seriously.
Ms Meredith: So do you feel that a judicial decision to incarcerate a rapist who raped two child prostitutes - He got two years less a day. These two child prostitutes thought they were going to be killed, but because they were prostitutes there was an element of consent involved. The individual got two years less a day. Some time later he murdered a young girl.
Prof. Manson: I learned a lesson in 1975, shortly after I was called to the bar, and that is not to comment on sentencing problems unless I know all of the details, because there's enormous subtlety and very important factors.
Ms Meredith: The judge thought so too.
Prof. Manson: I'm not familiar with the case you're talking about.
Ms Meredith: The judge thought because they were prostitutes, even though they were 14 and 17 years old, that there was an element of consent, so that person didn't deserve a federal sentence.
I would suggest to you that in looking at these kinds of issues and these types of individuals and acknowledging that there are people who are a threat and a danger to society and should not be left to prey upon innocent people, this has to be addressed somehow.
Prof. Manson: I agree with you that people who cause harm and represent a danger ought to be subject to the penal sanction, where necessary, for incapacitative reasons.
Ms Meredith: Thank you.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Ms Meredith, you have about one minute, and I know you were -
Ms Meredith: No, that's fine.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): I thought you were concerned about hearing from Vancouver.
Ms Meredith: I had the chance and I lost it because of technical difficulties.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): But he's still there.
Prof. Manson: I'd be happy to have Professor Jackson's views.
Ms Meredith: Mr. Jackson, would you like to comment on that?
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): He's been there for about the last two minutes.
Mr. Jackson.
Prof. Jackson: I'm not sure when you lost me in my response to Ms Meredith's question. Is that the one you'd like me to respond to?
Ms Meredith: No. Do you want to respond, sir, to the comments about who should be incarcerated? If you don't deal with dangerous offenders and establish some vehicle for keeping them off the street, how do you protect innocent victims?
Prof. Jackson: My response to that is we do have a system that does allow for these extraordinary measures to be taken against those people who are dangerous.
In relation to the particular example you've given, I agree with Professor Manson that it's very difficult to comment on a particular case without knowing all the facts.
But certainly, having regard to your own concerns over the years, concerns of groups like CAVEAT and other victims organizations, the judiciary has become more alert to the enormous damage that is done by offenders who in the past were viewed as more benign because there was no physical damage in terms of no physical harm. We've now become aware of the enormous psychological damage that can be done by child molesters, by pedophiles, and the enormous damage that can be done to women who have experienced sexual assault, regardless of whether or not they were actually beaten up or they were subjected to other indignities.
I know in my own classes in law school that is part of legal education, for the would-be lawyers to appreciate the damage we don't see beyond the physical dimensions of crime. I think the judges are becoming alert to that, and that's one of the reasons why in fact those who commit sex offences have become an increasingly large percentage of our federal penitentiaries and why their sentences are increasing in length.
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You can point to the exceptional case, but the Crown can appeal against what it views to be an inappropriate sentence and the appeal court will review that. If there's an error in principle and the sentence is beyond the appropriate range, having regard to proportionality, the degree of responsibility of the individual, and the gravity of the offence, the appeal courts are in a position to find fault and correct those errors.
We have a system that is becoming less tolerant of those kinds of offences that are most abhorrent to most members of the public. So in relation to your colleague's earlier question about zero tolerance, it seems to me the criminal justice system is becoming more intolerant of things that in the past would have been viewed as not so bad.
We have dangerous offender legislation. Over the last two years, as a result of good research and good coordination, Crowns are now cooperating. They're finding out from the Correctional Service what it knows about an individual. They're finding out from provincial and federal law enforcement people what they know so they're in the best position to determine if a case should proceed as if it were another case or if it should be subject to the extraordinary measures of dangerous offender legislation.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Mr. Telegdi, you have a few minutes.
Mr. Telegdi: Thank you, Madam Chair.
If my colleague from the other side will get me the transcript of the case - I assume she probably has one - I would like to personally read it to see what she is referring to. If she doesn't have it, I would caution against relying on other reports.
There's no question we're all horrified that Clifford Olson can even apply for parole. Most Canadians are similarly horrified. And there's no question that Paul Bernardo and people like him should never walk again. That is not the issue.
But we go to a ridiculous extent with some of the people we put in prisons, and we end up wasting resources that are much better utilized elsewhere. The most interesting case that I found to be most offensive was in my community, where somebody living in a township, on a matter of principle, refused to pay $25 for a dog licence. When all was said and done, the individual spent four or seven days in jail on that point of principle.
People may say this individual refused to abide by the law and served his time, but when it was all over it cost the government God knows how many thousands of dollars. It would have been much more useful to have taken that person to civil court where you could have seized the $25 plus whatever it cost to collect that money.
I think the whole concept of reserving the expensive spaces in prisons for those people who are dangers to life and limb is most laudable. For those people who don't need to be there, as long as they abide by the community sanctions placed on them, such as probation orders and parole orders, if it can be done in the community everybody wins. I think we would have better utilization of resources.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Does anyone wish to comment?
Prof. Manson: The Canadian Bar Association has always been concerned about the large number of people in custody for default on payment of fines, for example. In our view fines can be recovered civilly. That ought to be the most appropriate way. As a result of recent amendments, one hopes that there will be substantially fewer people in jail for default of payment. If a fine is the appropriate response, that should be the way to go to recover it: civilly. Don't subject somebody to long terms of imprisonment for default of payment.
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We certainly agree with you that there are large numbers of community sanctions that can produce constructive responses for the offender, for victims, and for communities. Those ought to be pursued. That's the value of the principle of restraint in the current amendments. All alternatives to incarceration must be considered before a judge decides that incarceration is necessary. We sincerely hope that all judges follow that and try to use their imaginations with existing resources.
In many jurisdictions the problem is that resources are shrinking, and they often disappear overnight - the probation resources; the community-based alternatives; and the bail supervision program, which you mentioned earlier and which is very cost-effective at $4.50 per person per day. But resources are the key to a lot of imaginative sentencing by imaginative judges, who have the nerve to say that a person ought not to be in jail. We certainly agree with you.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you. That draws our meeting to a close.
Colleagues, I'll remind you that we're here in this room again tomorrow. The meeting is from 4:30 until 6 p.m., which is an unusual scheduling assignment.
To you, Professor Jackson, I'm glad we got you back. It was good to listen to your perspective.
Thank you very much for coming as well. I count on the Bar Association to do some more PR. It's certainly not enough for MPs to voice some of the positions you've suggested. We need to get out there to the public.
Prof. Manson: Thank you for having us.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): We're adjourned.