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EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, December 3, 1996

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[English]

The Chair: Order.

In this session we're dealing with Bill C-55, an act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to issues of high-risk offenders, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the Criminal Records Act, Prisons and Reformatories Act, and the Department of Solicitor General Act. In addition, we will be dealing with Bill C-254, a private member's bill of Ms Meredith to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the Criminal Code.

Appearing this morning is the Hon. Allan Rock, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada. Welcome. I understand you have a brief to present. Then, if this morning is any measure of how things are going, I'm sure there will be lots of questions.

[Translation]

The Honourable Allan Rock (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada): Thank you, madam Chair. First of all, I would like to thank all of the members of the committee for giving me this opportunity today to discuss Bill C-55.

With this bill, the government has proposed new measures applicable to high risk offenders. These measures are designed to strengthen the correctional service and sentencing system for individuals where there's a high risk that they may become repeat violent offenders.

This bill is the result of at least three years of study by a task force on high risk violent offenders and continuous discussions between the provincial and federal ministers responsible for justice.

Bill C-55 is also the result of in-depth and comprehensive consultations with the individuals, associations and organizations concerned.

[English]

There are four essential elements to the existing bill which I put before the committee, Madam Chair. The first proposes improvements to the existing dangerous offender procedure. The second proposes the creation of a new long-term offender category. The third introduces a new basis on which judicial restraint can be imposed on those who may commit a serious violent offence. The fourth proposes changes to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to deal more sensibly with low-risk offenders.

Dealing first with the dangerous offender provisions, may I first point out that this mechanism is unique to Canada. It has been tested in the Supreme Court of Canada and has been found to be constitutionally valid. The changes we propose are intended to improve the dangerous offender provisions but not to change them in terms of their fundamental spirit. The changes are these.

First, to ensure that when a judge finds that someone is indeed a dangerous offender, the penalty will be indefinite incarceration, and the option that has existed up to now of imposing a definite term will not be available. It seems to us only sensible that if the Attorney General of the province agrees to such an application, the expense and time is taken in making it out, and the court is satisfied that a person falls within this exceptional category, then the consequence should be indefinite incarceration. If the court has in mind a definite term, there's an abundance of other options the court can pursue.

Second, we are removing or proposing to remove the requirement for two psychiatric opinions. We've replaced that with what we think is an improved assessment procedure, removing the artificial requirement that two psychiatrists testify, which is sometimes an impediment in smaller communities where only one forensic psychiatrist is available and in fact provides evidence for both parties.

Third, we propose to move the date of the first review of a person confined as a dangerous offender to seven years after sentencing rather than the current three, bringing it in line with the time of first review for other violent offenders imprisoned under our criminal code.

[Translation]

Fourthly, the bill proposes to create a window of opportunity whereby the application must be made by the attorney to the court. Under subsection 753(2) in the bill, the Attorney General will have up to six months following the finding of guilt to make the application.

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The application must be based on "relevant evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the imposition of sentence".

The Attorney General must also serve notice, at the time of conviction, of his possible intentions to make this application.

[English]

The reason for this window of opportunity arises from experience. It has happened that after news of a conviction has been in the media, other persons come forward with additional evidence. As long as the Crown gives notice of the time of the finding of guilt, the six months will be available for the purpose of bringing the application.

The second element in Bill C-55 has to do with the creation of the category of long-term offender. I observe, Madam Chair, that under the criminal law at present it's really an all-or-nothing situation. Either the Crown with the agreement of the Attorney General of the province persuades the court that someone is a dangerous offender so that they're incarcerated indefinitely or the person is incarcerated for a specified period, and at the expiry of the warrant the person is beyond the reach of the authorities.

Naturally and properly, the test for the dangerous offender category is high and exacting. The reality is that 90% of successful dangerous offender applications involve sex offenders. Repeat sex offenders are the most troublesome, high-risk category in the criminal law. The creation of the long-term offender category is intended to provide another mechanism for dealing with this risk. The creation of the category was a recommendation of the federal-provincial-territorial task force that spent almost three years reviewing this area of the law. In essence, the long-term offender mechanism would fill a gap by providing a sentencing option for those who do not fall within the dangerous offender category but are still at a high risk to reoffend, much higher than the general prison population.

As proposed, the offences that can give rise to a long-term offender designation are all sex crimes and involve patterns of offending. The difference in essence between the dangerous offender and the long-term offender may be the degree of brutality and the prospect in the case of a long-term offender that the person can be controlled and treated over an extended period of time.

The new risk assessment procedure that is in Bill C-55 will serve for both the dangerous offender and long-term offender applications and will help enormously in determining the kind and the level of risk posed by these criminals.

[Translation]

I will not go into the details concerning the conditions to be imposed on long-term offenders. I will simply say that I expect the supervision provided by Correctional Service Canada, in conjunction with the National Parole Board, to be more intensive, more frequent, and probably more costly than it is for the usual parole cases.

[English]

I have just two quick notes before I leave this element of the bill, Madam Chair. The first is that members will notice that Bill C-55 proposes that a breach of a long-term supervision order would constitute an indictable offence under proposed section 753.3, carrying a penalty of up to ten years of imprisonment. And second, the long-term supervision period would start only once the offender completes the entire sentence. So if, for example, a sex offender would be sentenced to eight years in penitentiary, that person would be required to serve all eight years, including parole, before the supervision period would begin.

Let me pass to the third element of this bill, which is judicial restraint, and let me first take a few moments to put this proposal in a context, because some concerns have been raised about this aspect of Bill C-55.

As you are well aware, Madam Chair, there has existed since time immemorial a common law jurisdiction drawing upon the inherent power of the court to require someone to keep the peace, to enter into a recognizance or a bond to do so and for the court to impose conditions the breach of which would themselves be offences.

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This jurisdiction or power in the court has never depended upon the commission of an offence by the person involved. Rather, it's based upon the obligation and the power of the court to make sure that we have a peaceful society and where the court is persuaded that a particular individual constitutes a threat to that peace to reach into that person's life, require them to promise to be peaceful and punish them if they fail to comply.

In 1954 the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of MacKenzie v. Martin had occasion to canvass the history of this power. Mr. Justice Rand, who wrote in that judgment, described the history and went back to what he called the ``immemorial exercise of this special jurisdiction''. Mr. Justice Rand reviewed the first peace bond statute, which was enacted in the first year of the reign of Edward III in 1327. He also touched upon the better known Justices of the Peace Act that was enacted in 1361. My point is that this is an ancient power which courts in an organized and civil society have possessed, not depending upon somebody committing a crime but rather in order to achieve the important objective of maintaining a peaceful society.

That common-law jurisdiction was codified as long ago as the late 19th century in our Criminal Code and it now appears as section 810, which deals generally with peace bonds. It was on that power that the federal government built in the introduction of section 810.1, some several years ago. Section 810.1 went a step further, but still in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to require people to comply with conditions in order to keep the peace.

Section 810.1 provides that if a provincial court judge is satisfied on reasonable grounds that someone will commit a sexual offence against children, then the judge may order that person to enter into a recognizance and comply with conditions the judge will fix, including, for example, not to have contact with children under 14; stay away from parks, swimming pools, day care centres, school yards. And, Madam Chair, the proof that is upon the Crown to establish the reasonable basis for the fear is on a balance of probabilities. It is not the criminal level of beyond reasonable doubt but the civil level of balance of probabilities.

After section 810.1 was enacted, it was invoked in the case of a man named Wray Boudreo. The court had been persuaded there was a reasonable basis for the fear that he might commit a sexual offence against children. The court made an order under section 810.1 and then there was an application brought to set aside the order and strike down the section because it was contrary to the charter. The argument was that someone was being punished when they hadn't even committed a crime. Here we had a charter right of someone who was able to walk the streets like everybody else and the court was infringing that right. It was argued that this was an unnecessary and unjustified intrusion of the personal liberty of Wray Boudreo. Since no crime had been made out, this punitive order should not be permitted.

Judgment in that case was rendered in January of this year and we took into account that judgment in preparing the provisions of section 810.2 as they appear in Bill C-55. Let me quote from a paragraph in the judgment of Mr. Justice Then of the Ontario Court General Division. It appears on page 372 of the Ontario reports. The judge is dealing with that argument that such a restraining order is in breach of a charter right and is impermissible. The judge says this:

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That is a glimpse into the judgment, which is some 70 pages long, but in the course of which the judge comes to the conclusion that this ancient power is not punitive. We're not punishing someone. Rather it's an exercise of the court's preventive power to avoid a crime being committed.

As the judge says, if there's a reasonable basis for the fear, it's better even for the offender to have this minimal intrusion on liberty than what might happen to the person if they're convicted of the underlying offence.

Building on that jurisdiction, which has existed from time immemorial, and learning from the judgment of that court in relation to section 810.1, which elaborated upon it, we have presented proposed section 810.2 in Bill C-55. It's intended to deal with the worst kinds of personal injury offences, short of homicide. By definition, we're dealing here with a very serious threat to the public. It seems to me and it seems to the government that there's a need for a carefully structured preventive measure of this kind.

I invite the committee to consider this. If you're attracted to the sense of the long-term offender category, if you recognize that it fills a gap in the current law, that it can protect our families and our children, that it can achieve something worthwhile and that it's valid - and I suggest there's no question that it is - but if you also face the reality that we can't impose the long-term offender category on those already in the prison population, the question becomes how do we deal with people who are coming to the end of their prison sentences? They're approaching warrant expiry, and they might well have been good candidates for the long-term offender, but we can't reach back into the past and impose it validly.

We need a mechanism to deal with those persons who are at high risk and in respect of whom no other mechanism is available. I suggest proposed section 810.2 provides that.

I ask you to look at the essential elements of proposed section 810.2. Some complain that it's overly intrusive, that it's disrespectful of charter rights. But look at the way it's crafted. First of all, it's limited to the most serious of offences, only those listed in section 752 of the code. Those are the most serious violent offences, short of murder. Second, the onus is on the Crown to prove convincingly that the threat is real. Third, any such application can only be made with the consent of the Attorney General. And fourth, the finding is made only after a full judicial hearing, with the court to arrive at its own conclusion.

Electronic monitoring is mentioned, but as only one possible condition in the order that the court might make, and that condition is obviously discretionary. A judge is unlikely to impose the monitoring condition except in the most serious of cases.

So I believe this proposal is valid, is measured and is a sensible step toward community safety.

Let me also make clear that I've listened carefully to the criticisms of this proposal that have been expressed since Bill C-55 was tabled, and I've particularly noted that some of that criticism has come from people with whom we're ordinarily in accord on such matters.

I'm also very much aware that Mr. Justice Then in the Boudreo decision cautions against over-breadth and warns that any legislative measure intended to draw on this preventive power must be very carefully crafted.

So let me make the following suggestions to this committee, which I'd be grateful if you'd consider in relation to the essential elements of this judicial restraint proposal.

First, who can be subject of such an order? Who might be restrained in this fashion under proposed section 810.2?

I ask you to look at the possibility of limiting the application of proposed section 810.2 to those who have a past conviction for a violent criminal offence. At the same time, I worry about that approach. I just put this in the record for you to look at.

I worry that by limiting its application to those with a past conviction, we might be taken as saying those who've been convicted once are more likely to reoffend only for that reason. I worry about the argument against that approach that it constitutes double punishment, as prohibited by paragraph 11(h) of the charter. I worry that it makes proposed section 810.2 look more punitive than preventive, because it relates to the past conviction and seems to build on it. I ask you to consider that.

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I think a better approach is another suggestion I would put to you: to limit section 810.2 in its application to those who have a history of violent behaviour. And here we wouldn't be focusing on convictions necessarily, although they might be evidence of past violent behaviour. Rather, you'd be focusing on conduct. It might be less likely to be seen as creating a class of persons based only on those persons' criminal convictions. It might be less likely to be seen as punitive.

A conviction would be relevant, but would not be a condition precedent to invoking the section. The Crown would be at liberty to tender evidence of past violent behaviour in attempting to lead the judge to conclude that there's a reasonable basis for fear that the person will commit one of the offences in section 752.

A third alternative approach, which I invite the committee to consider, is applying the kind of pattern that's in section 518 of the code at the moment, and creating sort of a list of factors that the court could take into account in determining whether to impose an order under 810.2, listing past record, past violent behaviour and any other circumstance relevant to the application, so that we'd highlight these factors without making any of them conditions precedent. I invite the committee to look at the model of section 518 of Criminal Code and consider whether that might be a useful and constructive way of approaching it.

Those are three possible ways of more narrowly focusing section 810.2 as to the population to whom it's intended to apply.

The second broad area of concern, as I've learned from listening to those who have been critical of the bill since it was tabled, has to do with electronic monitoring itself. Those who were critical of reference to electronic monitoring in this section say that it might be seen as constituting a form of detention or house arrest and that there might be here a deprivation of liberty not linked to a charge or conviction and therefore not justified in accordance with principles of law.

I don't happen to agree with that, but I respect the concern, and I identify for the committee's consideration at least two proposed approaches that I think would deal with this concern without undermining the essential objective of the statute, which is to improve public safety.

I would ask the committee to consider providing in section 810.2 that electronic monitoring would only be available in the most serious of cases, so that where there's a particularly serious threat to public safety, in effect, a higher threshold of public risk as proven by the Crown at the hearing, this device would be available as a possible imposition by the judge. This would focus the court on the evidence in any specific case.

For example, the section might read that the court shall not impose electronic monitoring unless it determines, on the basis of compelling evidence presented at the hearing, that the defendant poses a serious threat to the safety of the public and that such controls are necessary to prevent the commission of a serious personal injury offence.

A second possibility in terms of electronic monitoring, which I ask you to consider, is to limit the monitoring to certain types of electronic intervention. At the moment, the technology provides that a bracelet is supplied so that when the person leaves a controlled area an alarm sounds and the authorities can intervene. But the technology involving electronic monitoring is rapidly evolving. New technology now allows individual schools or other public facilities to operate receivers that warn of the approach of persons who are wearing electronic bracelets. Such systems, when they become widely available, hold the potential for adding a measure of protection for vulnerable individuals and groups.

So I'm asking you to consider whether there's a certain passive form of monitoring so that the person is free to move about. Only if they come within the range of prohibited places or persons would the alarm sound. But there are practical problems with this approach. Money is one of them. The resources would have to be found to develop and make available these sorts of passive monitoring systems to schools and other institutions. There is the possibility of false alarms. There is the perhaps cumbersome nature of the equipment for the person who has to wear it. But I would be grateful if the committee would look at this idea and let me have the benefit of your views.

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Let me say at once that the suggestions I've made for the committee's consideration in relation to proposed section 810.2 are intended to respond to concerns I've heard about civil liberties, but without departing from the underlying purpose of this legislation, which is to prevent crime. I believe we can accommodate those two very important objectives and I ask the committee for its help in doing so.

Let me close with the fourth element of this bill, which has to do with the low-risk strategy, Madam Chair. The essential theme of Bill C-55 is to match society's response to the level of risk posed by an individual offender. There are now categories in the criminal law, and after this bill those categories will be elaborated upon. If you look at the far end of the spectrum, there is the dangerous offender who's incarcerated indefinitely. There is the long-term offender who is at high risk to reoffend and who we're controlling in the community at the end of the prison sentence. There is the simple penitentiary sentence with the possibilities of detention to warrant expiry or parole, depending on the individual. There is provincial incarceration. There are conditional sentences. There is probation. And finally, at the other end of the spectrum, for the non-violent, first-time offender, in appropriate circumstances there are alternative measures.

[Translation]

In this respect, Bill C-55 contains an important measure with respect to low-risk offenders in the federal penitentiary system. I would refer you to clause 21 of the bill which proposes a new day parole program for federal inmates, subject to meeting certain criteria. This amendment would mean early day parole for low-risk offenders who would, as a result, be under a longer and better structured period of supervision while in the community. This group of low-risk repeat offenders represents approximately 12% of the federal inmate population.

Since 1992, about 80% of the inmates in this category have been released under the current program, and up until now, everything indicates that these inmates have no problems in the community.

[English]

We propose to conserve scarce corrections resources for those cases in which we need incarceration while dealing with low-risk offenders under appropriate supervision in the community.

I apologize for taking somewhat longer than I ordinarily do. I wanted to develop the suggestions I put to the committee to respond to concerns in relation to some aspects of the bill.

The sweep of this legislation is broad, but I believe that in substance it provides a combination of strategies that in the long run will make our streets and our families safer.

[Translation]

Thank you. I would be very happy to answer your questions.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Langlois, you have ten minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): I will share my time with Mr. St-Laurent given that I have very few questions or comments to make at this point.

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your presentation and I will get back to it in a few minutes. I would also like to thank you for bringing a few of the people who worked with you. I see Mr. Roy in the back, which is a sign that we will receive complete information but that we will not be very successful in making amendments to the bill. We will therefore prepare ourselves accordingly.

Mr. Rock: Mr. Langlois, you have to talk to Mr. Bellehumeur.

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Mr. Langlois: Mr. Minister, I believe that Mr. Bellehumeur shares my point of view. I must say that we become aware of the importance of the debate when we are dealing with top notch people.

This being said, I'm very pleased with many aspects of Bill 55, particularly the new clause 753 which you want to include and which will enable the Crown to have up to six months to apply to the court for a dangerous offender designation.

Indeed, the Crown was bound by the fact that it had to make such an application at the time of sentencing, which made its work much more stressful and which could enable it or not enable it to have all relevant information.

I think that it is quite acceptable to give the Crown the authority to make inquiries about the status of an individual, particularly since you are dealing with people who clearly will be given sentences exceeding six months. Consequently, I do not think that this time limit is unreasonable, and I think that I am ready to follow you as far as clause 753 is concerned.

Now, you will not hold it against me if I talk about the provisions that I am not so happy about. First of all, I would like to conclude with the provisions on low risk offenders, namely clause 21 of the bill. You referred to day parole, but I think that this clause is indicative of the will to rid our prisons of people who are simply occupying the premises, when in fact there are other people who are much more dangerous who should be there. The purpose has merit.

Let us now turn to your argument with respect to clause 810.2. Obviously, the committee minutes and the debates of the House will reflect what you have said. We have to decode what you have said, Mr. Minister, but when you talked about clause 810.2, you admitted implicitly, prima facie, that this subsection violated the Charter. You said: "Yes, this violates the Charter, and now I will demonstrate this to the committee".

But when you get right down to it, you weren't talking to us. You were addressing the courts through us, because they will read that you demonstrated to the committee that this violation of the Charter is justified in a free and democratic society. This is very skilful and I don't hold this against you. This is probably why you were appointed Minister of Justice.

However, I do have a problem with this. Judges will certainly read what you have said today and they will say: the Minister cautioned the committee because these were limited cases, the most dangerous cases including murder, and that we must target the population to find out who presents a high risk. You have probably already influenced the judge dealing with an individual who, in his opinion, appears to be a high risk offender.

However, I feel that this debate will take place, or should take place, before the courts. Is clause 810.2 justifiable in a free and democratic society? You yourself referred earlier to the peace bond which was reviewed in the MacKenzie decision of 1954. You also mentioned the existence of preventive provisions which did not have the scope of section 810.2, but which you said had been around since the time King Edward III. I think that this went back to the time of Edward the Confessor, but let's compromise and say that it was Edward III.

It's true, the peace bond has always been in existence. Moreover, when I was in law school, we spent a great deal of time discussing, with ours professor from the legal institutions, the relevance of the peace bond and its roots which can be found in customary law, before consolidation here in 1892, and which we maintained.

I don't see the need for getting further away from the notion of the peace bond as it exists. Why could we not continue to use the peace bond? I think that it has proven itself.

Clause 810.2 presents a serious problem. The problem is that you may find yourself dealing with the same judge. You will tell me that he could step down, but if you tell me that, you have not answered my question.

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Supposing that a judge acquits an individual and that, the following week, he is presented with an application from the Attorney General under clause 810.2. Having heard the evidence during the first trial, he would have acquitted the accused based on reasonable doubt, but must now make a decision based on the preponderance of the evidence and say: Sir, I acquitted you because I did not have any evidence beyond reasonable doubt of your guilt, but now, considering the preponderance of the evidence, I am issuing an order under 810.2. You can see that two different criteria will be applied.

I have a great deal of trouble accepting that criteria, Minister. Unless a guilty verdict is rendered, there's no doubt that this provision will be challenged unless the notwithstanding clause is invoked - and I doubt that it is your government's intention to do that. I think that your invitation to us to circumscribe it and see if we can't limit it even more so has merit in itself, but I don't think a judicial debate can be avoided.

Personally, from a political standpoint and based on substance, it doesn't seem acceptable to me to provide for the imprisonment of individuals who may have just been acquitted.

Those are my main comments about your bill, Minister.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Rock.

[Translation]

Mr. Rock: Thank you, madam Chair. I'd like to thank Mr. Langlois for his congratulatory remarks concerning certain parts of this bill.

But with regards clause 810.2, I would like to say that I am convinced that the bill, as written, is valid and constitutional. I'm sure that it is necessary for me, as Attorney General and Minister of Justice, to sign a certificate for each bill tabled by the government before the House of Commons stating that I have examined the bill and concluded that it is valid according to the Constitution of Canada. As a matter of fact, I signed this kind of certificate for Bill C-55.

I would therefore refute Mr. Langlois's statement that some parts of this bill are not valid. In my opinion, that is not the case. I think it's constitutional.

But as I said, I've heard the criticisms, the concerns, the worry expressed by some, and I've suggested approaches the committee could use in response to these concerns.

With regard to the specific questions raised by Mr. Langlois, namely whether we really need clause 810.2, personally I think we do, because we generally have jurisdiction to have such an order.

[English]

The peace bond in general is available in any case.

[Translation]

The former government had developed clause 810.1 for those who may commit sexual offences against children.

[English]

There's a specific approach.

[Translation]

A framework was created by the government to deal with those in that category.

[English]

That's specific to children under 14, and specific kinds of orders can be made.

[Translation]

But we have yet another category, namely

[English]

those we're treating with the long-term offender designation who may not yet have committed another crime or a crime but who we know from assessment are likely to do so, and these are the most serious crimes. We are building upon a jurisdiction and providing specifically for these people who might harm us. I say that without this provision we are missing an element of the criminal law in its preventive power that we can and should have.

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[Translation]

In any event, I do not feel that the notwithstanding clause of the Constitution is necessary in this case. It is not. Together, we can draft a clause that is perfectly valid and constitutional.

[English]

With your help we can overcome the concerns that have been expressed.

The last point I want to touch upon has to do with Monsieur Langlois's concern about the two different standards. It's true to say that on the Monday a person might be acquitted of a charge falling within section 752 but might be on the Wednesday or Thursday the subject of an order under proposed section 810.2.

There are two different approaches. The first is whether they are convicted of a criminality and the state must prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. That was Monday's job. It didn't succeed, but it may be that in the course of that trial there was evidence established, perhaps by agreement, that constitutes a reasonable fear or reasonable basis for the fear that the person is going to commit one of these crimes. So on the Wednesday, using a different standard, an order could be made. The issue on Wednesday is not whether they are guilty of a crime. That has been determined Monday. The issue on Wednesday is whether there is a reasonable basis on which the court can reach into this person's life to impose some measure of control commensurate with the risk they pose for serious harm to another.

It's the civil balance of probabilities standards, because the consequences for the accused are not the same. They're not going to be saddled with a record and go to penitentiary. They are going to have their liberty constrained to some degree, but only to a degree that is commensurate with protecting somebody else. We have to worry about the victim, too, as Mr. Ramsay will tell you.

We have to bear all these factors in mind and balance them. So I don't see any contradiction between those two different standards, or two different occasions, or two different purposes. They are both valid. I think they can co-exist, and that would be my response to Monsieur Langlois.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

Ms Meredith (Surrey - White Rock - South Langley): Mr. Minister, I would like to go over the four elements, starting with the dangerous offender application, where, as you have stated, you have opened the window to six months.

How are you going to deal with situations where an individual has been sentenced? They've appealed the sentence and so have the 30 days in a remand centre awaiting the appeal, and they are in an assessment centre for two months, which I understand is the normal process, to determine which place of incarceration best meets their needs. That means three months have gone by before the individual is in a position of being truly assessed. So your six months becomes three months.

Do you honestly feel that a window of three months is an adequate window to protect society from people who have committed horrendous crimes, who have proven by their actions that they are a danger to society and should have a dangerous offender application made on their behalf?

Mr. Rock: I think it's important to keep two things separate - first, the assessment. The assessment, according to Bill C-55, would take place before the Crown decides whether to seek long-term offender or dangerous offender status. So the conviction occurs, the finding of guilt occurs and then the person goes for assessment, and only at the end of that assessment does the Crown decide whether it's long-term offender, dangerous offender, or whether such an application will be made.

Ms Meredith: If the assessment is done before the Crown determines whether they're going to go for a dangerous offender application, then why don't they go for that application at the time of sentencing? Why the six months?

Mr. Rock: Let me give you a case. If someone is convicted of a crime and the court is satisfied this person might be a candidate for dangerous offender or long-term offender category, the court will order the assessment. Only when that assessment comes back will the Crown then indicate whether they are going to seek a designation as a dangerous or long-term offender.

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Suppose the Crown says that they're not going to do it now, but they're giving notice that within six months they might. Then the person is sentenced as a regular offender, as the case may be. Within six months new evidence comes forward that was not available at the time of the hearing. Suppose it gets into the newspaper that the person has been convicted and four other people come forward to say that a similar thing happened to them with the same offender. There's evidence the Crown can rely upon. In those circumstances, the six-month window is an advantage to the Crown because they can act on that new evidence.

So I think it's important to keep the assessment separate from the window to see how the two of them operate separately.

Ms Meredith: But basically you are saying that it's still the determination as to whether it's giving notice or actually making the designation that's happening at the time of sentencing. It's not taking into any account whether the offender, upon sentencing and incarceration, has, through a period of being supervised and having his behaviour monitored, shown himself to be a dangerous offender. He's still going to get missed in this application.

Basically you're telling me that at the time of sentencing, either the judge is giving notice that he wants to consider the application and an assessment will be made at that time, or the decision has already been made and the request for dangerous offender will be made at the time of sentencing. The actual dangerousness that is identified through a period of monitoring the behaviour of this individual through incarceration will not be considered.

Mr. Rock: Don't forget, though, that because of the flagging system, people who are candidates for these categories are now being identified on CPIC to crown attorneys and police officers. Because of the flagging system put in place by the Solicitor General in March 1995, there has been a real improvement in the way such information is being collated and distributed across the system. So it's not as though they don't have any information about these people.

People in these categories are typically repeat offenders. They've had a history of violent offending. These are exceptional categories, and I find it difficult to think that it's only a period of assessment after they are in custody that's going to give rise to the application. I think we know something about these people before that happens.

In response to your specific question, the window gives the Crown that option for six months, to see if additional information comes to hand that wasn't available at the time of sentencing. But I don't want you to think that the assessment period eats into that window. It runs anyway.

Ms Meredith: With the information that will allow a court to make that kind of decision, will the record of a young offender now be considered if that information would help to deem that this young offender shows a repetitive and habitual history of dangerous behaviour that is a threat to society?

Mr. Rock: If I understand your question, it's whether a person who is over 18 and before the court, and who has a record of offending as a young offender, whether the young offender's record will be before the court for these purposes?

Ms Meredith: Yes.

Mr. Rock: I believe that by virtue of some changes we made in Bill C-37, the record of violent offending, which is relevant to this kind of application, would indeed be available. But I would want to double-check that before being absolutely categorical, Ms Meredith.

Ms Meredith: Because of timing, I'm going to skip to the judicial restraint.

The Chair: You have about four minutes left in this round.

Ms Meredith: Thank you.

With regard to your judicial restraint, you said that only the most serious offenders would be considered, and you said under section 752 of the code.

I know that colleagues from the Bloc have a concern about the intrusion on the individual's freedoms. My concern, having seen for myself how electric monitoring works in British Columbia, is that all that will happen is that people will be aware that the individual is away from the facility being monitored. That's not going to stop that individual from repeating a serious offence of seriously abusing, raping, killing an individual. All you will know is that for sentencing purposes, at the time of the event the individual was not where he should have been.

I don't see where that in itself is any great protection to an individual who, through his behaviour, has shown he is a serious threat to society.

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I also don't see how your concept of monitoring a school would protect the Pamela Camerons of the world who are walking down a main street and pulled off the street and killed and sexually assaulted by a dangerous offender. It's not going to protect society from the individual. All it's going to do is alert them to the presence of probably a pedophile - or that he or she was not at the premise being monitored at the time of an occurrence of a crime. I don't see, sir, how that's going to protect individuals in society.

Mr. Rock: I don't pretend that electronic monitoring is going to prevent all crime. I don't pretend that any of Bill C-55 is going to make it impossible for people to be abducted and sexually assaulted or murdered. Tragically, we're going to face those cases virtually no matter what we do.

All I'm saying is that there are steps we can take to make it less likely that we're going to lose our children to crime, or that someone is going to be attacked. It seems to me if we're going to be sensible about it, we should use the criminal law to deal with the risks. Where are the risks?

What Bill C-55 tries to do is to establish a regime by which we can determine where the risk is, through proper assessment, and then use the force of the criminal law to deal with that risk, to minimize it - maybe not to obliterate it, but to minimize it.

Electronic monitoring has its limitations - it's not a panacea - but it also has its advantages. In the proper case, I believe it's a helpful order. It's a tool we want to make available to the court, case by case to decide when it should be imposed.

As I've already suggested, you may want to look at whether we should use passive monitoring instead of house arrest, so to speak, so the person can walk the streets, and only when they come within the prohibited area does the alarm sound. I think you'd have to examine the availability of that technology, and whether you find it more acceptable as a strategy.

You refer to Pamela Cameron being pulled off the street. I don't remember the specific facts of that case, but there are cases where people have slipped through the cracks. This bill is trying to plug some of those cracks. There are cases where people have not been identified. The flagging system and better communication between police and crown attorneys is intended to deal with that.

But there are also cases where people have no history or no known history of offending or deviancy. They're out there, and so are my kids. So, yes, I worry, but there's no way I can, with a piece of legislation, rule out the possibility that this person might do something to my child. We just don't know.

We have to do whatever we can - within reason, under the Constitution - to sensibly address risk, and I think that's what this bill does. It isn't perfect. It won't stop all crime. But I believe.... For example, the Canadian Police Association described this as the most important piece of public safety legislation in 20 years, and I think they're right. I think it addresses the place where we're most vulnerable, which are those who are at highest risk to hurt us or our children.

Ms Meredith: But when you deal with high-risk individuals and you're talking about electronic bracelets, to me that's not really dealing with it. In British Columbia you use electronic monitoring for shoplifters, for petty theft, for those kinds of low-risk individuals. I don't see how you can have this long-term supervision, this long-term offender application after sentencing -

Mr. Rock: Well, we're not -

Ms Meredith: - but not go the next step, which is to say there are individuals who have been sentenced, who are in our prison system who are dangerous offenders, who we know when we let them out are going to be a threat to our women and our children and to society. If you can do the long-term supervision, why can't you go that one step further?

Mr. Rock: Can I answer that question? I know we're probably a little over time.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Rock: First of all, the electronic monitoring is not proposed for long-term offenders. The reference to electronic monitoring comes up in section 810.2, which is for the person who may not have committed a crime, but where you can persuade a judge that there's a reasonable basis for a fear that they're going to.

For a long-term offender, it empowers the court to impose, for as long as ten years after they're released from prison, a whole range of controls and supervision - reporting regularly to the police your whereabouts, maintaining a course of treatment, staying away from certain persons or places - whatever works, and it can be there for ten years.

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You ask why we can't pick up the people who are now in prison, why we can't go into the ranges at Kingston Penitentiary, look at the files of the people there and say you and you and you are all likely to reoffend so we're going to impose something on you now that's going to limit your freedom when you get out, or perhaps keep you in longer than your sentence provided. Well, we can't do that.

I've re-read Bill C-240 in preparation for being here today, which I know you put before the House and is something in which I know you believe very strongly. But as much as I admire and respect the objectives you're trying to achieve, I have to say that's something I could not certify as constitutionally valid in putting before the House. Everybody we've spoken to is unanimous about this. It just won't work.

In May of 1995, Madam Chair, the Solicitor General and I convened a weekend seminar on how to deal with high-risk offenders. Present at the table were crown attorneys, defence lawyers, civil libertarians, people who strongly believe in the Bill C-240 approach, corrections officials, and we also invited someone who is from Washington State who works closely with their sexual predator law. We looked at Bill C-240 and its elements and the conclusion to which we came around the table is that it would not pass constitutional muster. There's no sense in enacting it because it would be struck down.

That drove us to look at alternatives. Frankly, proposed section 810.2 came out of that process as a way of dealing with the present prison population in a way that would be legitimate and valid. The term ``long-term offender'' is imposed at the time of sentencing. That's why we can do it. We cannot apply it retroactively to those serving sentences because that's double punishment under the charter and is not permissible.

I believe we can deal with the concerns expressed by Ms Meredith about our safety, concerns which to a large extent I share in the fashion proposed by Bill C-55. It's a way we can do it legitimately, lawfully, and improve the present situation.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms Meredith. Mr. DeVillers, ten minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. DeVillers (Simcoe North): Thank you, madam Chair.

Minister, in your comments, you cited the Budreo case. Which court handed that decision?

Mr. Rock: The Ontario Court general Divisional. It's now before the Ontario Court of Appeal. I spoke with the Ontario people a few weeks ago and I think the appeal hearing will take place in the coming weeks.

Mr. DeVillers: My question was precisely about the appeal, whether the decision will remain the same.

Mr. Rock: It's true. We received the report of Mr. Justice. Then's judgment. It's a 70-page document, carefully prepared by the judge over a period of eight months, which contains a history of these provisions of the Criminal Code with an analysis of this entire field of criminal law which is, I think, highly valid.

We took action because it was a government commitment. Of course, it is possible that the Ontario Court of Appeal or even the Supreme Court of Canada may have a different approach.

Mr. DeVillers: Thank you.

My second question

[English]

has to do with the onus, the balance of probability. Did the department consider the possibility of a shifting onus, similar to the careless driving case under the Highway Traffic Act, where the Crown would make a prima facie case and then the onus would shift to the accused person or the person who's being reviewed as a long-term offender? Was that approach considered?

Mr. Rock: Are you talking about the long-term offender now, or the proposed section 810.2?

Mr. DeVillers: Either one. That type, because I hear the concerns about having the mixed onuses of the civil and the criminal.

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Mr. Rock: No. Let me make it clear. Long-term offender is a form of penalty after someone's been convicted of an offence. The Crown has to establish the elements that are in Bill C-55, namely substantial risk and so on.

In proposed section 810.2, we're dealing not with the conviction of a crime, as I was mentioning earlier. This is a civil onus, because the person isn't facing incarceration and punishment. The liberty of the subject in that sense is not in jeopardy. You're instead talking about the exercise of a preventive power, part of the criminal law power, but not to condemn and to punish. It was thought that approach is more consistent with the purpose.

We did not look at shifting onus. I cannot remember it coming up, Mr. DeVillers, but I can tell you there's a real concern about shifting onus in view of the jurisprudence under the charter. There are only certain situations where the court will permit the onus to shift to an accused or a citizen.

In the careless driving situation, we're dealing of course with provincial offences, not with criminal law.

Mr. DeVillers: Quasi-criminal.

Mr. Rock: But the real difference is that the liberty of the subject is not in jeopardy and they're not facing a criminal record, although under provincial offences the liberty of the subject could be in jeopardy.

What we're dealing with here is a situation where we believe that without shifting the onus, we can accomplish the purpose, based on the Boudreo analysis.

Mr. DeVillers: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. DeVillers.

There are about six minutes left, Mr. Discepola.

Mr. Discepola (Vaudreuil): Thank you, Chair.

Minister, I concur with some of your comments and I think it's an excellent step forward, but in answer to Ms Meredith's question, I hope this committee gives more latitude to electronic monitoring. I think you've been purposely vague in titling it ``electronic monitoring'', because as the technologies advance, as you've pointed out, we're going to have different alternatives open. I can see that if one day, God forbid, you wanted to, you could equip every criminal with a transmitter and every victim with a receiver so they could be warned when they are a certain distance apart.

As you concur, Minister, I think we will be able to help if we can warn schools not to let their children play in the playground because there is a pedophile in the proximity. In many cases the victims know their attackers. One day we will be able to have the technology to give advance warning to somebody that there's a certain offender in the near vicinity. So let's leave the scope open, because we will be able to do some ingenious things with it.

In answer to her question, Minister, you said you can't go back in the legislation, and I understand why, but there is one area I'm interested in. You're saying in the long-term offender category we're going to be able to impose a 10-year additional supervision period. The supervision period is not the part I have a concern with; it's that when somebody's under supervision, they may commit another act.

As I understand the application of the long-term offender supervision period, they're still going to go through the current sentencing. So if somebody gets nine years, for calculation's sake, they're still going to have their parole eligibility at the three-year mark and they're still going to have their stat release at the two-thirds mark. And then, after the full sentence of nine years, the supervision period will kick in, correct?

Mr. Rock: Yes.

Mr. Discepola: Then one of the weak areas I have discovered in talking to many caseworkers and many institutions across Canada is the question of the weaknesses of the statutory release period.

The caseworkers know their offenders very well, and in very many cases I've talked to caseworkers who can almost tell me, as sure as hell, this person's going to commit an offence as soon as he or she gets out. But because of the limitations of the law and the lack of flexibility, especially around stat release, they get out, even though they may not have followed the prescribed programming that was set out for them.

So why is it that we don't look at that area of stat release to make it a little bit tighter for offenders, especially high-risk offenders, to apply for it, and give that flexibility and discretion to the caseworker, who above all knows the offender very well?

As I said, they're going to get out and they're going to be under supervision for an additional x number of years, but in the long term, if the person is dedicated or determined to commit another crime, it really doesn't protect the public, whereas if we can change the stat release conditions, we may be able to prevent some people from getting out who shouldn't be getting out.

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Mr. Rock: I think it's a perfect assignment for someone like the parliamentary secretary to the Solicitor General, for example. I think that would be ideal, because, as you know, the Solicitor General is responsible for the corrections system and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

Mr. Discepola: If you're going to take a stab, I'm going to take a stab at you. I think the weakness is that very often - and this is a criticism I've heard also - the Department of Justice will go merrily on its way and think of the loss, but far too often it doesn't go to the caseworkers and the people in the front-line staff who have to administer those laws and ask them their opinion. That should be done.

Mr. Rock: I think that's a fair point. One thing I'm proud of in Bill C-55, Mr. Discepola, is the collaboration that existed between the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice in the preparation of the bill.

As you know, before we were able to get approval for the bill at cabinet we had to establish that we had set aside the money to fund the supervision. This was not just on the never-never plan. We actually costed the supervision for the population of offenders we thought would be long term. You set aside that money in the corrections budget. We expect it's going to more expensive than parole. We expect it's going to be spent commencing over the next five or six years and it's going to be very real.

I think the supervision we're talking about in the long-term offender category is going to be very effective. It's not going to be perfect - that's a human factor that always enters into it - but it's going to be effective.

I don't wish to make light of your point about statutory release, and if there are ways the bill can be improved I'd be delighted to speak with you about it.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Discepola.

Mr. St-Laurent did you have questions?

[Translation]

Mr. St-Laurent (Manicouagan): As a matter of fact, I may have a question.

According to what you're saying, there will be an assessment after a period of seven years instead of the current three years. Will this assessment be done by Correctional Service or by the Department of Justice? Let me explain. If it's done by Correctional Service, we will have to satisfy ourselves with what is done right now; namely a few professionals will see the individual for 45 minutes every two months for approximately six months before issuing the report, which is a very risky thing. Or else we will simply gather up all the resources currently available to truly analyze the situation of the individual and discover wether he is prepared to come out and capable or not of facing society.

By resources, I mean, among other things, his correctional file which contains not only the results on paper, but also behaviour assessments in society, behaviour when confronted with aggression and his personal problem.

In the assessment that will be conducted, will all these elements have to be taken into account or, as is done too often right now, only a few reports by professionals who only see the individual partially?

Mr. Rock: Madam Chair, I'm not completely sure of the answer. To my knowledge, the assessment will be conducted by Correctional Service and not by the Department of Justice. It's exactly the same assessment that is done right now, but it will done after seven years rather than three.

For more details about this assessment, I would suggest that you ask the officials, especially those from the Department of the Solicitor General.

Mr. St-Laurent: Thank you very much.

Mr. Rock: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Langlois, you have about three minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: Thank you. With your permission, I'd like to get back to clause 810.2. You said earlier in your answer, Minister, that you certify the constitutional validity of this clause.

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I would not call it into question, but I thought that you were arguing the case to demonstrate that the violation of the Charter by clause 810.2 could be justified in a free and democratic society like our own.

Even on that assumption, I see a problem with clause 810.2, and that's the fourth point which states that the judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term not exceeding 12 months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance. You know very well that if a person is found guilty under clause 810.2, sub-clause 4), the person will have a criminal record pursuant to the Criminal Records Act.

Therefore, by administering a rule based on the preponderance of evidence, we start from point A to arrive to point B, and the person who refuses will then have a criminal record. I therefore feel it would be wiser to consider the person as having been in contempt of court, as is the case, if memory serves me, when a warrant is issued.

I think that we will have an opportunity to take a second look at this, even if your mind seems made up, because this is never clear-cut. In constitutional matters, everything is debatable.

Minister, could you please ask your officials to send our clerk a copy of the Ontario Supreme Court's decision in the Budreo case? I'm very interested in this because there is a decision of some magnitude that raises issues of law that may be useful to us. Thank you.

I wanted to ask you why we should give a criminal record to someone who would not have one otherwise because he or she has been acquitted. I would also point out that someone could appear on Monday and be acquitted because he or she was judged on evidence that required proof beyond any reasonable doubt and be constrained by clause 810.2 on Wednesday because at that point we would apply the criterion of the preponderance of evidence.

If you want to be brief, it can all be done in the same day. The same judge could hear all the evidence and say: Now, based on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, sir or madam, I shall acquit you. That said, after representations made by the Crown, on the spot, based on the preponderance of evidence, under clause 810.2, he'd say: I feel justified and authorized to impose conditions to let you walk out of here. This can all be done the same day, in extremis.

Don't you see a problem there? I feel something is wrong. Maybe I didn't fully grasp the debate us its entirely, but something doesn't seem to work in there. It's a bit like in the case of the resolution on Newfoundland. I thought it was nice and easy, but the longer I examine the debate on clause 17 on the terms of the Union between Newfoundland and Canada, the more I become convinced that a category of people constitutionally protected are going to lose their constitutional protection without their consent. And the more I convince myself of that, the more I feel I am making progress. However, I am not yet fully convinced. I'm listening to the debate.

That's what I said yesterday in the House, Minister. I'm getting convinced that this will be the first time, in Canada, that we will be legislating in the area of our Constitution to take away rights of our minorities without their consent. We have always legislated to broaden the scope.

That said, I would like to add that's not yet carved in stone. I'm ready to hear the arguments, listen to the debate and go forward together with those who would help me along and you are one of those, Minister. I would like to hear you again on that subject.

Mr. Rock: I don't intend to discuss clause 17 concerning Newfoundland here today, but I will forward a copy of my speech in the House of Commons explaining that all minorities are protected with the amendment.

Concerning Bill C-55, let's set aside the matter of constitutionality for the moment. I have suggested different approaches to the committee this morning on how to deal with those parts of this bill that were attacked by those who consider they are not constitutional.

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To deal with your real question, Mr. Langlois, it is true that if someone does not behave as the court has ordered, then it's off to jail, under this clause.

But that is also true under our present clause 810, the peace bond, which is simply a commitment not to disturb the peace. If the person refuses to give a commitment to act according to what the judge has ordered, the judge can send that person to jail for a maximum period of 12 months. That has been the law in Canada for a long time. No one has ever questioned the simple promise not to disturb the peace and no one has ever suggested that this clause was contrary to the Charter or the Constitution of Canada.

The same thing goes for clause 810.1, the clause questioned in the Budreo case. In fact, in clause 810.1, Parliament has said that whoever violates a commitment made under 810 or 810.1 is guilty either of a criminal act punishable by a maximum sentence of two years in jail or of a summary offence.

For a long time now, in the laws of Canada, the rule was that is you refused to make the commitment ordered by the judge in such circumstances, then you were facing imprisonment.

We added the same thing in clause 810.2 to be sure that people will seriously consider what the judge has to say if the Attorney General thinks there's a valid reason for this.

[English]

So it's not anomalous; it's not incompatible with the rules of fundamental justice. If they don't comply with a court order, they can face imprisonment.

May I also say, Madam Chair, that we are dealing with two very different things here. We went into this a bit earlier. There is proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminal guilt and convict and bounds of probabilities. When you're not trying to convict and imprison, you're simply trying to get the person to agree to an order for the public safety. It's a separate matter if that person breaches a court order. It is an offence to breach a court order. Then that person faces the risk of imprisonment. But if he or she complies with the court order, he or she doesn't face that risk.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Gallaway.

Mr. Gallaway (Sarnia - Lambton): Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll be brief.

Minister, you've described this continuum of offences and a continuum of sentences that may be imposed. My concern is with the electronic surveillance. I'd like to suggest to you that there is and will continue to be a continuum of electronic sophistication. Unlike Ms Meredith, I'm not familiar with the way these things operate. I have this idea that it's like air traffic control meeting the Criminal Code - that in some way you're going to be able to track these people.

You have talked about the risk, public safety and protecting children. You've also talked about the Constitution, the charter, and that by inserting electronic surveillance into this particular section of the act, no one's Charter of Rights is being offended, in your opinion. I believe you, but I am also aware of the continuum of electronic sophistication. I am also aware that the Constitution is the bedrock that doesn't shift.

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I'm wondering, in this particular case and as a result of the study you've done, where or when electronic surveillance or whatever you want to call it starts to offend a person's charter rights.

I think we are all moving in the same direction. We want safer communities. At the same time, we want to be protected from these people who are in our society whether we like it or not. Let me give you an example. Somebody is released on probation. Part of that order is that this person must remain in his or her home between the hours of 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. It happens. I can foresee the day when we could just hook that person up and track him or her. Does that offend that person's charter rights in the case I've recited, or is it only in the case you've described here where it does not offend the charter rights? Where's the line? That's all I'm asking.

Mr. Rock: It's difficult to be categorical, but I think the first thing we should determine when we're examining this question is whether the person has been convicted of an offence and is serving a sentence or not. I met with the Attorney General of Newfoundland not long ago, who explained to me that its system of electronic monitoring of offenders had saved it a fortune in money. It was able to de-incarcerate, or send out of prison, a whole group of offenders who'd been convicted of criminal offences and sentenced to incarceration. The province was able to send them home with electronic monitoring and keep track of them - air traffic control. It didn't have to feed and house them and have wardens, prison guards and the physical plant of a prison for them. Yet these people were being punished. They were being kept in their homes, as the case may be.

I don't think that offends the charter rights of those prisoners. I think if anything it enhances their rights. They are allowed to be in their own homes and have the comfort of their homes. They're not in the deprivation of a prison and a harsh environment and so on.

So it depends who we're talking about. If we're talking about somebody who has not been convicted of an offence, as might be the case with section 810.2, who's before the court, the Attorney General has authorized the application and the judge is going to require that person to wear an electronic monitor, the tougher question is what about the charter rights of that person? Again, you have to look at all the circumstances.

[Translation]

I have not convinced Mr. Langlois, but I think that my arguments, taking into account all the safeguards we have included, do lead you to consider that our bill is valid.

[English]

And we have the Attorney General consenting to the application. We have only the most serious offences that are engaged here - section 752. We have the onus on the Crown. We have a judge making the decision in a courtroom - it's not a justice of the peace, it's a provincial court judge. In the face of all of that, where you make out the reasonable fear, I say it's not an infringement of the Charter of Rights to impose this limitation when you balance the interests that are involved.

However, I've also said, Madam Chair and Mr. Gallaway, if there are those who for some reason find that unacceptable because it offends their sense of the charter and personal freedoms, then I propose you consider some alternative approaches, perhaps by expressly spelling out that the electronic monitoring part of this order is available only in the most serious cases where the court's persuaded that without that kind of intervention a serious crime of personal violence is going to occur. I ask you to consider that.

Consider the kind of surveillance that doesn't confine people to their homes. I've heard it said and I've read that the present state of electronic monitoring as used in Newfoundland confines people to a defined space. They argue that's therefore detention - deprivation of liberty without being convicted. If that's your view of things, consider the state of the development of electronic monitoring of another nature where they are free to move except in certain prohibited areas, or except in the vicinity of a potential victim.

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So without answering the question of where the line is between respecting and breaching the charter, and what section 1 would do to save even a breach if you took into account public safety with these high-risk individuals, I've suggested that there are alternative strategies you may wish to consider that finesse the question. They do so by meeting concerns that are in the minds of those sensitive to civil liberties and at the same time preserving the nature of the act as fundamentally crime prevention.

The Chair: That's the time we have set aside for the minister's visit. I want to thank you for coming and enlightening us with respect to this bill.

Mr. Rock: Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

The Chair: We're adjourned.

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