INTRODUCTION TO THE INQUIRY'S ORIGINS, PROCESS, AND AIMS
Late in 1995, the Committee decided to make the advancement of Canada's northern foreign policy interests the object of its next study, in view of both the dramatically changed post-Cold War context for achieving significantly greater cooperation among the circumpolar nations,1 and the opportune, if sometimes overlooked, prospects for Canada to exercise important international leadership in this regard. Arctic cooperation stands out as an area of enormous, but still underdeveloped, potential for Canadian foreign policy. Despite recent initiatives, notably Canada's 1989 proposal, and eventually successful push, to create an international Arctic Council, and the Government's 1994 appointment of a "Circumpolar Ambassador," the subject opens a largely unfinished agenda for action.
Much attention has been given to Canada's need to position itself for the future as a Pacific Rim nation, and we do not doubt that need. But the diversification of Canada's international interests must not mean neglecting our own central, and likely increasing, geopolitical importance as a polar rim nation bridging North America and Eurasia (see cover map and Box 1 "The Circumpolar Region in Profile"). By focussing on this immense trans-Arctic region in transition - one-quarter of which flies the Canadian flag - we foresee unique possibilities for Canada to play a strategic role that would, in the words of a prominent international relations scholar, Oran Young, not only "fit many Canadians' image of their place in international society [but] also alleviate their fears of being sandwiched between the great powers in the Circumpolar North."2
Moreover, the Cold War's passing and the challenging promise of rapid political and economic transformations confront Canadian policymakers, as never before, with a greatly expanded horizon for joint action by the Arctic states that will encompass cooperative approaches to regional security and sustainable human development principles and prospects. Most notable of these are: environmental protection with global ramifications; new models of institution-building and participatory structures involving
Of the two polar regions of the globe, the Arctic differs from the Antarctic in posing a complex range of evolving boundary, jurisdictional and geopolitical questions. The land mass surrounding the South pole, a continent devoid of native human settlement, has been administered multinationally since 1959 under the terms of a formal treaty. Although Canada is not without interests in the Antarctic, the North polar region, the subject of this report, is where Canada exercises important national sovereignty (even though the extent of our maritime claims remains in some dispute) and in which active foreign policy processes should come into play. As well, the Arctic is increasingly the subject of study as a primary region of international relations in its own right.1
There are eight countries which are considered to be Arctic states. At the same time, there is no firm definitional boundary of what constitutes the Arctic region or the Circumpolar North. Moreover , the "North" is a somewhat broader notion than the "Arctic." In each country, there tends to be a mixture of geographical and political or administrative factors determining what is considered as Arctic or northern. For the purposes of this report, a useful, generally accepted international definition of the circumpolar region is Oran Young's description of it as comprising: "Alaska (except for the area known as the Southeast); the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, northern Quebec, and all of Labrador in Canada; all of Greenland; Iceland, the northern countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (known collectively as Fennoscandia); and all of what the Russians treat as the Arctic and the Russian North . . . [as well as] the marine systems of the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas, including the Bering, Chukchi, Beaufort, Greenland, Norwegian, Barents, Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian seas." 2 Nevertheless, we would note that in the case of Canada, only the three Maritime provinces do not have clear northern policy interests. Besides the far northern areas of Quebec and Labrador, Arctic conditions extend below the 605 parallel, and most of the provinces have large areas that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples identifies as "Mid-North."3
The international Circumpolar North region as defined above covers some 8% of the earth's surface (40 million square kilometres or 15% of the land area, 5% of the oceans), but accounts for barely 1% of world population. Of that small total, about one million, or 10%, are indigenous peoples, who constitute a majority in only a few areas (e.g. the Inuit in Canada's eastern Arctic, northern Quebec and Greenland). About three-quarters of the Arctic's human inhabitants live in Russia. The only sizeable cities outside of northern Russia are in Iceland and Alaska. Iceland has no aboriginal population, but is the only completely Arctic state. In the other seven countries, the Arctic has typically been treated as a "hinterland" dominated by policies and decisions made in southern metropoles. This is changing as a result of political devolution and participatory development by the region's residents. However, southern and indeed global interests in the circumpolar region may be expected to increase in the next century. Although the Arctic is no longer a pawn of Cold War strategies, it has great potential geopolitical significance in terms of issues of environmental change, indigenous rights, and sustainable human development, given also immense natural resource endowments and consequent pressures to develop them.4 Building adequate frameworks for circumpolar cooperation may therefore be essential to avoiding future international conflict scenarios.
Arctic communities and indigenous peoples; circumpolar trade and investment strategies; technical assistance; and scientific, technological, educational, social and cultural exchanges.
Making a first appearance before the Committee on 21 November 1995, Canada's first Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, Mary Simon, welcomed parliamentary involvement in very practical terms, observing that:
. . . once the Arctic Council is created we are going to have to decide on what the key priorities are and what the main issues are that require attention at the multilateral level. . . . any assistance that we can get help on in terms of doing research or in terms of helping us shape the agenda for the Arctic Council would be extremely helpful. [81:5]3Following the recalling of Parliament, the reconstituted Committee reaffirmed in March 1996 that it would proceed with the circumpolar study, receiving the strong endorsement of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, in his first appearance before the Committee in April.
Preliminary briefings and distribution of background discussion materials took place in the wake of two important international conferences held in the preceding month in the Canadian Arctic - the third ministerial conference of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in Inuvik and the second conference of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) in Yellowknife. As well, during this period Ottawa was hosting delicate negotiations towards an agreement among the eight Arctic nations on establishment of the long-awaited "Arctic Council" to promote circumpolar cooperation with Canada to occupy the role of chair in its first two years.4 This initiative, finally realized in September 1996, became a focal point for deliberating on the range of foreign policy interests and goals that Canada ought to be pursuing as a key actor within an emerging international circumpolar community.
The first phase of the Committee's inquiry concentrated on obtaining Canadian views on the emerging international agenda for the Arctic. During the series of panels held in Ottawa (five in late April and early May, one in early June, and a final roundtable in October), the Committee heard from nearly 30 witnesses on major themes involved in developing a northern foreign policy for Canada and in advancing Canadian interests in strengthening circumpolar cooperation. Among those who testified were longtime Canadian leaders in the field such as Dr. Fred Roots, science advisor emeritus to the Department of the Environment; Professor Franklyn Griffiths, who joined Ambassador Simon on a panel focussed on the Arctic Council; and Rosemarie Kuptana, President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), who underlined a broad aboriginal perspective on Arctic cooperation.5 Professors David Cox and Donald McRae addressed the more traditional security and sovereignty dimensions. Spokespersons for the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and several other environmental NGOs concentrated on the growing challenges of Arctic sustainable development in preserving a fragile ecosystem while improving the livelihoods of resident communities. Others brought forward future economic and trade potential, aboriginal business development, and Arctic transportation and communications as being important issues in furthering circumpolar cooperation.
Notwithstanding the promise of such cooperation internationally, the last panel, with leading northern experts from Quebec universities and the Quebec Public Health Centre, left members with probing questions about continuing deficiencies within the Canadian policy framework. Professor Paul Painchaud of Laval University was particularly outspoken about the overdue need for a more substantive and strategic Canadian foreign policy presence in circumpolar affairs.
Moreover, while there was strong agreement that international factors are of major and increasing importance to Canada's Arctic interests - i.e. the need for a northern focus in foreign policy terms is real and growing - questions were raised about the adequacy of current policy structures, processes, and financial muscle for supporting these international objectives in ways that are coherent and integrated with overall governmental policies towards the North. How, in concrete terms, can foreign policy initiatives both meet the needs of northerners and serve long-term Canadian goals? The importance of assuring that tangible benefits accrue to the local communities scattered across Canada's vast Arctic territories was a dominating theme during the Committee's travel in late May, from Whitehorse in the Yukon, to Inuvik and Resolute north of the Arctic Circle, and to Kuujjuaq in northern Quebec.
From that standpoint, the Committee's travel north of 605, beyond the familiar testimony from senior Government officials, NGO representatives and invited experts in Ottawa, was the most crucial element of this first phase. It provided members with a rare opportunity for listening and observing, thereby ensuring that the preoccupations of people making their home in the Canadian Arctic could be voiced directly during the process of developing policy directions for government. The Committee divided into two panels in order to be able to visit more communities across the Arctic. Members heard from aboriginal peoples' organizations, including major northern-based development corporations (from Inuvialuit Regional Corp. in the western Arctic, to Dennendeh Development Corp., to Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. in Iqaluit, to Makivik Corp. in northern Quebec) and resource co-management boards; local and territorial governments (including Nunavut implementation bodies); community leaders; business people; cultural enterprises; and educational and research institutions. There were also informal public encounters, such as participation in community "open-line" radio. Members were able to get an on-site appreciation of major developments affecting Arctic communities, and to inspect facilities such as the Polar Continental Shelf Project, based in Resolute. On the Committee's return from the Arctic, panels were also convened with northern studies experts at university research centres in Edmonton, Calgary and Montreal.6
The results of the first phase of the Committee's investigations confirmed broad, though certainly not uncritical, support for the Government's plan to establish the eight-country Arctic Council as a centrepiece for circumpolar cooperation. Realization of the Council's potential beyond its formal inauguration last September is the focus of Chapter Three of the report. We found most witnesses were quite hopeful that the Council would provide a permanent multilateral forum in which the Arctic states could pursue the cooperative endeavours that are becoming increasingly necessary on environmental and other grounds. Now that the Council exists, it will have to show what it can do. Expectations also focussed on the Council's promise to include a unique structure for indigenous peoples' participation, and on its prospective mandate to address a comprehensive range of "sustainable development" issues. Questions were also raised about the rest of its proposed mandate, representative structures and functional roles, priorities for action, financing, degree of political support outside Canada, and likely substantive powers and capacities to effect change. How, in particular, could such a body bring about significant concrete improvements in the living conditions of Arctic Canadians and the opportunities available to them?
On the issue of public benefit and accountability, there was support for promoting greater parliamentary involvement on behalf of all Canadians and citizens in other Arctic countries, but also some divergence of views. For example, during the Committee's third panel, on 2 May, held jointly with the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development, Canadian Government and parliamentary representatives and ICC President, Rosemarie Kuptana, were not in agreement as to the nature and form of any such parliamentary-Council linkage, and when that should be determined. (Among other Arctic states, the matter of parliamentary involvement had been left open to that point. For example, an Arctic cooperation agreement adopted by the Nordic Council of Ministers in February 1996 stated somewhat equivocally: "The governments will emphasise that cooperation with the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region is to be accorded a high priority. The final forms of parliamentary participation are to be determined following the establishment of the [Arctic] Council, and decisions on its structure.")7
The Committee has taken note of the strong position taken by our colleagues on the House Environment Committee in their June 1996 report on the Yellowknife and Inuvik conferences. In urging vigorous Canadian action to implement the resolutions of the parliamentary gathering, they had recommended that: "the Government of Canada make appropriate representations in support of the proposition that the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region have a substantive and permanent role on the Arctic Council."8 In that regard, we see as a promising sign the provision for Canadian M.P. Clifford Lincoln to make a formal statement on behalf of the parliamentary group during the 19 September inauguration ceremony in Ottawa. The important issue of active future parliamentary roles in the development of institutions of circumpolar cooperation is one to which we will return in Chapter Three, in the context of the Arctic Council's constitution and working procedures, and again in Chapter Seven, in relation to democratic approaches to circumpolar development.
In the second phase of the Committee's inquiry, the focus moved to a consideration of international views on the policy approaches and priorities that should guide future circumpolar cooperation activities. Shortly following the Arctic Council's inauguration, the Committee was privileged to benefit from an astute, and challenging, assessment by preeminent American scholar Oran Young, Director of the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth College.9 In December, several other prominent American witnesses added to that testimony. Appearing by video conference from Anchorage, Alaska, was Stephen Cowper, a former Governor of Alaska, who currently serves as executive director of the Northern Forum, an organization linking a number of subnational entities within ten countries in the high latitudes. More directly on U.S. Arctic interests and outlooks, George Newton and Garrett Brass, Chairman and Executive Director respectively of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, were among the last witnesses, on 12 December.
The major aspect of the second phase was the Committee's travel in early November to five of the six other Arctic Council member nations.10 Again, to maximize coverage and efficient use of resources, the Committee divided into two panels. One panel travelled to Oslo and Tromsø in Norway, Stockholm in Sweden, and Copenhagen in Denmark (this last city has the offices of the Greenland Home Rule Government and also hosts the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat of the Arctic Council). This group also met with leading researchers at the renowned Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University, England. The other panel visited Helsinki, Finland, and Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia. While it was unfortunate that this second group was prevented by poor weather from attending scheduled meetings in the key Arctic port of Murmansk, members nevertheless gathered valuable insights on the serious problems in the Kola peninsula that have attracted international concern (see the references in Chapters Four, Five and Nine).
In the course of these intensive visits, the Committee met with Government ministers and senior officials, parliamentary counterparts, spokespersons for indigenous peoples, nongovernmental representatives, academics and experts in Arctic research, Canadian private sector contacts, and participants in significant joint projects involving Canadian partners. In Russia, some of these projects are supported through the technical cooperation program of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). A noteworthy example is the Gorbachev Foundation, which is involved in significant common undertakings with the University of Calgary, including funding of an innovative project led by its Arctic Institute in the Murmansk region. The Committee members were able to meet with Mr. Gorbachev himself. While discussions in each country were directed at bettering our understanding of Euro-Arctic perspectives on the many aspects of circumpolar cooperation, the broader context of enhancing bilateral ties with Canada, transatlantic and interregional relations also formed part of the agenda. The findings from this enriching cross-cultural experience are particularly reflected in Part III of the report.
The report proceeds from a consideration of overarching concerns - constructing a coherent framework for Canada's international policies on circumpolar cooperation - to the more programmatic elements of policy and process, and then to the specifics of strengthening relationships with other Arctic rim countries.
Part I looks at building the policy and institutional framework within which Canada can exercise leadership in an emerging circumpolar community. Chapter One explores the growing significance of the Arctic as a dynamic region in global affairs and the implications for setting out a strategic Canadian agenda. Chapter Two then turns to the domestic challenge of realizing at last the long-delayed vision of a "northern dimension" in Canada's foreign policy, and of doing so in ways that integrate international and domestic concerns while benefiting northern Canadians. Chapter Three looks at Canada's pivotal role in making the Arctic Council work as the key new multilateral instrument at our disposal. The Council stands out, not only because it owes much to Canadian inspiration and persistence, but because it uniquely associates all of the circumpolar nation-states in a partnership with aboriginal peoples. Now that we have it, we must ask where should it be going, both in the immediate and the longer term, in developing its mandate, expanding its representation, working out effective structures and processes, establishing clear priorities for action, and not least, firming up funding and political support.
Part II tackles the more specific elements of Canada's interests and goals in advancing some priority areas for circumpolar cooperation. Chapter Four makes the historical transition from an older Arctic foreign policy, premised on the constraints of interstate conflicts, to the new agenda of post-Cold war cooperation. This chapter addresses the legacy of traditional national preoccupations over Arctic "sovereignty and security," and suggests ways of moving beyond those to take advantage of the opportunities for peace-building to promote human security and regional stability. Chapter Five is at the heart of the report as it sets out the emerging sustainable development agenda that most consider to be the primary human and environmental "security" challenge facing the circumpolar region in the coming decades. This chapter focusses on the first-order environmental priorities, and considers how Canada can work towards putting in place a comprehensive international Arctic "regime" for preserving vulnerable ecosystems and safeguarding the health of populations.
Continuing the central theme of sustainable development, Chapter Six looks to the equally crucial issues of use of sustainable resources and development of economic opportunities for Arctic peoples in a rapidly evolving international context. How can such things as public- and private-sector investment, promotion of circumpolar trade and commerce, and transport and communications links be employed responsibly to build a sustainable economic base that can provide for viable communities in the Arctic region? Chapter Seven delves more deeply into the need to evolve participatory models of Arctic sustainable development that will not only affirm the rights of indigenous peoples but allow for wider forms of democratic participation and establish the overall Canadian public interest in the accountability of Arctic policies and institutions. Chapter Eight considers a range of issues that might be grouped under the umbrella of knowledge-based capacity building; that is, a circumpolar system to support the sharing of scientific and technological research, indigenous knowledge networks, and educational and cultural cooperation. In short, how can Canada contribute to developing the region's human "capital" for the benefit of current and future generations?
Part III of the report examines more specific geopolitical considerations in meeting the challenges of Canada's international Arctic relations. Chapter Nine looks at bilateral cooperation initiatives with the other Arctic Council states. In the case of North American and Canada-Nordic Arctic cooperation, there is also a significant regional integration context (e.g. NAFTA, the European Union) to be taken into account. Looming large in Canadian foreign policy interests in Canada-Russia Arctic cooperation are the need for transatlantic understanding and assistance for democratic and market reforms. Chapter Ten goes on to consider further the possibilities for effective multilateral collaboration among the growing number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental regional and circumpolar entities (e.g. the Nordic and Barents councils, subnational initiatives like the Northern Forum, bodies on circumpolar health, Arctic science, etc.). We are concerned that important Arctic cooperation goals not suffer from having scarce resources and energies dispersed rather than being effectively concentrated and coordinated.
A concluding section brings us back to the need for Canada to have a systematic forward-looking approach to circumpolar cooperation, and to continue to upgrade our foreign policy instruments - in particular, the capacity of the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador - in order to carry out the multiple aims described above in the long-term Canadian interest. Canada's chairmanship of the newly formed Arctic Council until 1998 is now a principal strategic test of Canadian resolve, and more concretely, of our ability to deliver internationally on promising intentions. But the Committee views this as only the first step of many. In order to keep moving forward, more Canadians must recognize that it is time for Canada to begin to act on an emergent consciousness that the circumpolar world is crucial to fulfilling our own foreign policy vocation and destiny. Accordingly, this report signals that essential public recognition and aims, above all, to contribute to the political momentum needed to sustain circumpolar cooperation in the Canadian interest.
1
These are the eight states that claim a territorial stake in the Arctic: Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, and Iceland. This list includes, therefore, both of the Cold War "superpowers," and, among the Nordic countries, three that are now members of the European Union (Finland, Sweden, and Denmark).
2
Oran Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, University Press of New England,
Hanover and London, 1992, p. 188-89; cited in Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Canada and Circumpolar
Cooperation: Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenge, Issues Papers prepared for the Committee, March 1996, p. 1.
Dr. Young testified before the Committee on 1 October 1996 (Issue No. 40).
3
Evidence, Meeting No. 81, p. 5. (All subsequent references in the text to published Committee proceedings will use
this abbreviated notation.)
4
Background documentation included staff issues papers (see note 2) on elements of Arctic cooperation and
Canadian foreign policy and on specific themes - Arctic security, legal claims, sustainable development,
environmental contaminants, science and technology - as well as expert background papers prepared for the
Yellowknife parliamentarians' conference. A summary discussion paper identifying key policy questions was also
circulated. The Committee was briefed on the AEPS in light of the Inuvik conference by John Rayner, Assistant
Deputy Minister for Northern Affairs in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND).
Patricia Low-Bédard, senior policy advisor to Ambassador Simon, and Mary Vandenhoff, a former Canadian
ambassador to Finland and executive director of the Arctic Council interim secretariat, briefed members on the
state of negotiations and remaining sticking points (principally over the representation of aboriginal participants
and the Council's "sustainable development" mandate).
5
All three were members of the nongovernmental Arctic Council Panel, composed of independent Arctic experts,
which, with private funding from the Gordon Foundation, produced a seminal report in 1990 that formed the basis
for early Canadian Government efforts towards establishing such a council. Cf. Robert Huebert, "The Arctic
Council: Global and Domestic Governance," unpublished paper, Department of Political Studies, University of
Manitoba, October 1996, p. 2-3. Professor Huebert was also a witness before the Committee's panel.
6
Findings from the Committee's travel will be referred to throughout the report. In addition, detailed trip reports are
available upon request.
7
Programme on Cooperation in the Arctic Region. Adopted by the Nordic Council of Ministers (Cooperation
Ministers), the Nordic Council, Stockholm, February 1996, p. 9-10.
8
Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, First Report on the Second Conference of
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, NWT, March 13-14, 1996 and the Third Ministerial Meeting on the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Inuvik, NWT, March 19-21, 1996, Ottawa, June 1996, p. 5. Cf. also Charles
Caccia, "A Parliamentary Perspective on the Arctic Council," Canadian Parliamentary Review, Autumn 1996, p.7-9.
(An earlier article highlighting the issue in contention appeared in The Hill Times, " `Nobodies' in Ottawa,
Backbenchers Set Sights on Global Scene: MPs Want a Piece of Arctic Council Action,"20 May 1996, p. 13.)
9
Oran Young also made available to the Committee his just-published monograph, The Arctic Council: Marking a
New Era in International Relations (1996), which is the best and most thorough analysis to date.
10
Iceland could not be included because of lack of time and resources.