CONCLUSION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
CIRCUMPOLAR COOPERATION AS A CANADIAN
FOREIGN POLICY VOCATION
The experience of the Arctic regions is becoming more and more relevant to our international interests. . . . They have a very major bearing on our future, out of proportion to the number of people living there.
Few Canadians are in a better position to assess the global significance of Canada's interests in Arctic cooperation than Maurice Strong, who has had a distinguished career of domestic and international public service following early years spent in the Canadian Arctic. During a meeting with the Committee as we were completing this study in February 1997, the Co-Chair of the 1992 "Earth Summit," currently advisor on reform to both the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the World Bank, observed that the Arctic represents "one of the most important pieces of the ecological structure of our world community." Canada, he affirmed, is "an Arctic power, and the experience we have had in developing and protecting our Arctic regions is a very major part of the Canadian knowledge base" [65:10]. Reinforcing an underlying message in much of the testimony we received, the Committee's Report shares the conviction that Canada has an opportunity to manage its unique Arctic assets wisely in ways that connect our own benefit with that of the wider world.
International interest in the Canadian Arctic - notably including by this century's great powers, Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R./Russia - has evolved through many stages from the earliest fascination with polar exploration to today's forward-looking debates over circumpolar sustainable development. At times it seems that foreigners have appreciated what is special about our Arctic more than many southern Canadians. Despite Canada's image as a northern country, we have been slow to develop a consciousness of ourselves as a polar-rim nation belonging to an international circumpolar region. The growing political self-confidence of Canadians living in the Arctic, and especially of indigenous peoples' organizations, has accelerated that process. In recent years, as well, the demise of Cold War rivalries has opened up unprecedented avenues for collaborative pan-Arctic endeavours. Yet, as Laval University's Paul Painchaud reminded the Committee, Canada has still to develop a circumpolar foreign policy orientation that is commensurate with such expanding challenges and opportunities.
Redressing this situation is, above all, the task that our Report refers to the Government of Canada. Not only does the Government retain particular responsibilities for northern affairs, especially in the regions north of 605, but, more important, the Arctic is increasingly significant to the long-term interests of all Canadians - economic, political, social, and environmental. There is a leading role to be played by Canada in forging closer ties with other Arctic states with similar interests, and in working collaboratively to develop better international regimes for preserving the Arctic's unique ecosystems and securing rights to sustainable human development under pressures of rapid change. At the same time, it is clear that the ad hoc, scattered or isolated federal approaches that have too often characterized Ottawa's past involvement in circumpolar affairs cannot do the job. The Government must not only coordinate its own actions in the Arctic, giving them overall strategic rationale and coherence, it must learn to work collaboratively with a number of key domestic and international partners, without whose participation the goals just cited are not achievable. In addition to engaging the Canadian interest as a whole, the development of an effective circumpolar foreign policy must enlist the creative energies of Arctic residents and aboriginal peoples, nongovernmental organizations, other levels of government within Canada and governments in other countries with Arctic concerns.
Accordingly, the First Part of the Committee's Report has addressed the building of circumpolar policy and institutional frameworks, both in the domestic and international arenas, that will be capable of supporting such Canadian foreign policy development. Projecting a vigorous presence internationally will first require Canada to get its own act together. As part of putting in place a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework, our recommendations call for governmental concertation combined with a participatory public process in order to set out key priorities for an Arctic Region 2000 Strategy integrating foreign policy aims and objectives. To carry out such a strategy requires strengthening the instruments of coordination and implementation. In particular, we argue that the recently created Office of Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade should be supported by an associated Division for Circumpolar Affairs, thereby giving a better-equipped and consolidated thrust to Canada's international Arctic activities. Given the importance of ensuring regular northern input into circumpolar foreign policy development, the outreach functions of the Ambassador's office should also be emphasized, and several liaison offices established in locations across the Arctic to faciliate more ongoing interaction and feedback.
At the international level, the immediate task is to secure an adequate institutional foundation for pursuing a broad agenda of circumpolar cooperation. With Cold War antagonisms no longer an obstacle, transnational initiatives and organizations have multiplied in the 1990s, some among indigenous peoples, some purely nongovernmental, others established on a subnational or subregional basis. But, apart from the limited arrangements introduced through the Nordic-led Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, lacking until 1996 was a high-level political cooperation organization linking the national governments of the eight Arctic countries and with a mandate to coordinate their collective action on common problems. That was formally redressed by the inauguration last September in Ottawa of the Arctic Council, largely the result of Canada's instigation in the late 1980s and renewed persistent effort since 1995. Canada, furthermore, assumed the position of Council Chair and host of its secretariat for the first two formative years. Also, the inclusion of three prominent indigenous peoples' organizations as founding "permanent participants" in the Council indicates unusual promise for innovative partnerships between governments and the Arctic's traditional inhabitants.
Notwithstanding such progress, a number of critical questions remain - including the scope for additional aboriginal and other forms of democratic representation - if the Council is to be able to operate successfully as the overarching organizational vehicle for promoting circumpolar cooperation. As yet, much of the content is simply carried over from the pre-existing and still separate AEPS process. In terms of a comprehensive sustainable development initiative, there are large expectations but little in the way of concrete commitments. The Report therefore confronts the full range of unfinished business raised by Canada's role in entrenching circumpolar internationalism through the Council - from the breadth of its mandate to the adequacy of its funding and political support. The Report's recommendations are designed to ensure that the Arctic Council does not become just another Arctic body going through the motions, but proceeds quickly to demonstrate real benefits in important areas of policy interest.
Having dealt with these basic framework considerations, the Second Part of the Report delves into the common agenda of circumpolar cooperation, suggesting ways for Canada to contribute to advancing mutual interests in priority areas. Fortunately, the historical transition from the sovereignty and military security preoccupations of the Arctic powers during past decades, to their emerging focus on environmental matters and human-centred sustainable development has paved the way for new thinking and policy options. This transformed context extends notably to the security field itself, now redefined to encompass the security of Arctic peoples rather than just state boundaries; seeking as well to reduce threats to the Arctic environment from military activities, which still need to be taken into account. While maintaining Canada's sovereign rights within its own area of Arctic jurisdiction, the Report stresses progress towards long-term cooperative security and demilitarization of the circumpolar region. Specific attention is directed to the integration of Russia into such a system. For the explicit purposes of environmental security, the Report recommends that Canada join with the Nordic countries and the United States to further environmental, especially nuclear, safety cooperation initiatives for addressing the serious situation in northern Russia.
The centrepiece of circumpolar cooperation is the larger complex issue of sustainable development, the subject of the Report's middle chapters. We begin with the crucial challenges of environmental sustainability, and the immediate task of fulfilling the commitments already undertaken by Arctic governments through the AEPS process. Beyond that there is much more to be accomplished in terms of: applying obligations under international agreements to the Arctic (including Agenda21 and the Law of the Sea); developing common standards for assessment of environmental impacts; taking collective action on such issues as climate change, biodiversity, contaminants and long-range pollutants, and other dangers to public health. With respect to utilizing the indigenous knowledge of northerners in support of these efforts, the report endorses the approach to northern environmental stewardship recommended by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
Protecting the Arctic environment is only the first step. The Report emphasizes the need for a people-centred view of future development in the region, with the aim of providing a sustainable economic base for Arctic communities that will foster social and cultural, as well as material, well-being. That means working towards common circumpolar approaches to economic development that will respect community sustainability principles, as well as seeking to avoid the historic patterns in which Arctic resources have too often been exploited carelessly for the primary benefit of outsiders while leaving the damages and costs behind. The Report accepts that large-scale development that meets appropriately stringent conditions can contribute to economic welfare. Circumpolar cooperation can assist through sharing learning about the best practices for managing and coping with such development processes. As well, Canada can benefit from taking a lead in the many practical aspects of economic cooperation: job training and small business development; access to micro-credit; promoting indigenous enterprises, ecotourism, cultural exports, commercial applications from research into cold-climate technologies; liberalizing trade in Arctic products; and improving transportation and communications networks. The Report sees the need for substantial upgrading of the policy coordination instruments within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade so that Canada can carry forward such a strategic approach to fostering circumpolar sustainable development.
Equally important is that indigenous northern voices be fully heard in the formulation of the Canadian approach, and that circumpolar policies be open to the widest democratic participation and benefit from regular parliamentary involvement. The Report recommends measures to strengthen the role of aboriginal peoples in policy development, both within Canadian foreign policy circles and through international mechanisms like the Arctic Council's Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat. While interstate coordination is important with respect to certain common circumpolar objectives, it is essential not to overlook the many international activities that can usefully take place below that level. The Government should be facilitating such "subsidiary" linkages as much as possible through regional (including provincial and territorial), community-level, private sector and nongovernmental contacts. The Report calls for the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs to make an annual accounting to Parliament through the Minister of Foreign Affairs on progress achieved. It also urges a strong parliamentary presence in circumpolar deliberations, notably through the work of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region.
Another fundamental dimension of circumpolar cooperation consists of forward-looking investments in knowledge and in human capital. Referring back to the remarks of Maurice Strong cited earlier, Canada has precious assets that can be utilized to make a distinctive contribution to international well-being. The Report argues for a strong and adequately-funded Arctic science program, as well as recognition of the place of indigenous knowledge. It proposes a reevaluation of the Canadian Polar Commission and a rejuvinated initiative within the International Arctic Science Committee. The Committee also sees merit in increasing support for information-sharing technologies and educational and cultural exchanges across the circumpolar region. Again, Canada cannot only assist the wider aims of cooperation, but also profit directly by building on areas of comparative advantage and developing niche markets.
In addition to these policy themes and sectoral priorities, the rest of the Report looks at issues arising from Canada's relations with other Arctic countries. For example, given several important bilateral disputes with the United States (notably protection of the Porcupine Caribou herd, and trade restrictions under the Marine Mammal Protection Act), we propose a more regular official foreign policy mechanism for discussing North American approaches to Arctic issues. There is also scope to expand the bilateral cooperation already taking place with the Nordic countries, especially on issues such as the sustainable utilization of renewable resources (including wild fur and marine-based products). This can only benefit from a stronger, more strategic orientation of foreign policy.
Clearly, the greatest set of bilateral, and for that matter multilateral, challenges revolve around relations with the new Russia, and specifically the move to support peaceful democratic and market transitions across its immense northern regions. The Report calls for an increased Canadian diplomatic and commercial presence beyond Moscow commensurate with this task. It suggests renewing northern cooperation arrangements within a more coherent and effective circumpolar foreign policy at the federal level, while, at the same time, recognizing the important contributions to be made by provincial, territorial, aboriginal and private sector initiatives in Russia. In terms of technical assistance, mainly through the Canadian International Development Agency, circumpolar cooperation priorities (notably environmental clean-up and sustainable livelihoods for indigenous minority communities) should figure prominently in Canada's strategy. The Report reviews some exemplary technical cooperation projects that show the potential for mutual benefits and also looks at the experience of Cambridge University's Scott Polar Research Institute and the financing facilities for Russia developed through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It then suggests some explicit ways of increasing the chances for success.
The tenth and last Chapter returns to the big picture of situating Canada's role in international Arctic relations within the project of building a stronger multilateral system for advancing circumpolar cooperation. It is apparent that the mere fact of having an Arctic Council will accomplish little unless it is accompanied by a multi-dimensional effort by the Arctic states that addresses Arctic concerns globally, regionally and subregionally, and that complements rather than detracts from the activities of other Arctic bodies (for example, the Nordic and Barents Region councils and the Northern Forum) with more specialized or limited mandates. As well, circumpolar foreign policy development must come to terms with the long-term implications of ongoing European and North American regional integration processes, the Arctic impacts of which have barely begun to be recognized.
We think, in the final analysis, that Canada could be uniquely positioned to build bridges between the various polar perspectives - North American and Euro-Arctic (Nordic and Russian), aboriginal and non-native, state and nongovernmental, national and regional - which must be brought into a constructive dialogue if the challenges of the twenty-first century circumpolar world are to be met. None of this is automatic, however, even if post-Cold War geopolitics have opened up exciting opportunities for cooperative endeavours in the interests of all. Canada must first recognize the full range of its own interests in the Arctic as an emerging international region of global importance. From there, the Government, in order to serve those interests well, must have the will to develop a strategic vision backed up by genuinely circumpolar foreign policy capabilities. To sum up the Report's overriding message in a few words, only then will Canada's advantaged place as a circumpolar power begin to be appreciated as central to the realization of our distinctive foreign policy vocation.